


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ARTICLES

The Soviets and Algerian Socialism

J AAN PENNAR

In May 1965, *Pravda* published a "joint communiqué" issued by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the "party" of the National Liberation Front (FLN) of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic.¹ The statement noted that members of the FLN Central Committee visiting the USSR had met, during the month, with Central Committee members of the CPSU. The Algerian delegation was headed by M'Hamed Omar Benmahdjoub, member of the FLN Politbureau, and the Soviet side was represented by such Party luminaries as Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolai Podgorny, Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev.

The ostensible purpose of the meetings was to acquaint the Algerians with the "methods and practical work" of the CPSU, especially at the local level. This recalled Ben Bella's visit a year earlier when he and Premier Khrushchev had issued another "communiqué" encouraging "further strengthening and development of the bonds of brotherhood and solidarity" between the CPSU and FLN.² The wording of the latest "communiqué" also emphasized this mutual desire. The representatives of the CPSU, it declared, noted "with satisfaction" that Algeria had "irrevocably" opted for socialism, a fact concretely exemplified in the extension of nationalization, the removal of privileges and the "agrarian revolution." The Soviet representatives also "listened with interest" to an exposition of self-management operations among workers and peasants in Algeria which, they were told, had not only an economic purpose but political significance as well. Both parties then proceeded to uphold the fight of "oppressed peoples" for national independence and "economic liberation."

In foreign policy, the FLN delegation subscribed to current Soviet positions, in return for a solidarity statement on the Palestine issue and the CPSU's approval of Algerian policy of "positive neutrality" and non-alignment. In Soviet terms, however, this policy makes the countries applying it "natural allies of the socialist countries," i.e., of the Communist bloc:

Positive neutrality is the negative reaction of young countries to military blocs created at the initiative of imperialist states. The policy of non-alignment does not presuppose the same attitude toward friends and defenders of peace, on the one hand, and foes and aggressors, on the other. On the contrary, the young developing countries, carrying on a struggle against imperialism and interested in preserving universal peace, are the natural allies of socialist countries.³

¹ *Pravda*, May 22, 1965.

² *Ibid.*, May 7, 1964.

³ *Kommunist Estoni*, Tallinn, 1965, No. 3, p. 54.

Ten days before the above "communiqué" was issued, Houari Boumedienne, leader of an Algerian governmental delegation on a visit to the USSR, granted an interview to the Moscow *New Times* on the eve of his departure. He, too, suggested that "basically, Algerian foreign policy follows the same lines as that of the Soviet Union."⁴ He added, however, that "our people want to live in peace with all nations," and appealed for Soviet economic assistance and trade. On June 19,⁵ 1965, ten days after the publication of this interview, Colonel Boumedienne ousted Ben Bella from office. The deposed President was described by the new Algerian Revolutionary Council as a "diabolical dictator" who had abused his power: "Nobody can presume to represent alone Algeria, its revolution and socialism."⁶

The *coup* created complications for local Communists, on the one hand, and Soviet theoreticians, on the other. Both Marxist theory and practice were found wanting and in need of revision.

The Algerian Communist Party came into being in October 1936. At the outset of the Algerian guerrilla war in 1954, the Party had 15,000 members and controlled the local affiliated trade union movement, the Confédération Generale du Travail (CGT).⁶ This prompted the Algerian nationalists in February 1956 to establish their own trade unions, which were free from Communist control.⁷ The Algerian Communist Party played no major role during the guerrilla war, despite subsequent protestations. As the Chinese Communists put it:

The leaders of the Algerian Communist Party danced to the baton of Khrushchev and of the leadership of the French Communist Party, and completely accepted the revisionist line against armed struggle.... [The Party] forfeited the confidence of the Algerian people and its position in Algerian political life.⁸

One Algerian Communist leader, Hadj Bachir Ali, admitted as much himself when he reviewed a Party policy statement in 1954, which underestimated armed insurrection and called for conciliation between the Europeans and Muslims. The Party, in his words, counted too much on the possibility of a proletarian revolution in France, and this led to the belief that victory in Algeria would come through the victory of the proletariat in that country.⁹

In the middle of 1956, the Algerian Communist Party agreed to close ranks with the National Liberation Army by accepting control by the FLN over Communist-led army groups. The Party also agreed that individual Communists already in the ranks of the Liberation Army could sever their organizational and political links, "without, however, renouncing their ideals and political convictions."¹⁰ The FLN leaders were not too impressed with such assistance.

⁴ *New Times*, Moscow, June 9, 1965, p. 11.

⁵ *The New York Times*, June 20, 1965.

⁶ Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton (eds.), *Communism and Revolution—The Strategic Uses of Political Violence*, Princeton, N.J., 1964, p. 319.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

⁸ *Peking Review*, April 3, 1964, p. 18.

⁹ *World Marxist Review: Problems of Peace and Socialism*, North American Edition, Toronto, Ont., 1965, No. 1, p. 56.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

Communists who wanted to join in the fight for independence were welcomed, providing they agreed not to infiltrate the FLN or to distort its goals. When some did, they were sent on exceedingly dangerous missions from which few returned.¹¹ Neither was the FLN too impressed with Communists in metropolitan France. The party's organ, *El Moudjahid*, declared in 1957 that there was no link between the FLN and the French Left because the French worker was also participating in the exploitation of Algerians.¹² When the Algerian Provisional Government was formed in September 1958, the Communists were excluded from it. This led Larbi Bukhali, then first secretary of the Communist Party, to complain:

As soon as the Provisional Government was formed, our party welcomed it, expressed its readiness to support it and at the same time expressed the desire to share its responsibility in partisan forces and elsewhere. However, this desire was never realized. In this connection, it should be recalled that there are no Communists in the government and its organs. Moreover, there are some people in the government who make no secret of their anti-Communist feelings.¹³

Bukhali appealed for an end to the policy of isolating Algerian Communists and called for unity of action between the FLN and the Algerian Communist Party.¹⁴

Shortly after the country had gained its independence, in September 1962, the Algerian Communist Party appealed to all Communists to vote for FLN candidates in the parliamentary elections, even though Communist candidates were not listed on the FLN ticket.¹⁵ The Party, obviously, had no other choice: the FLN's political program had stolen most of its thunder, and organizationally it was weak. On November 29, 1962, Ben Bella outlawed the Algerian Communist Party. The Soviet Communists were shocked; an announcement issued by the Central Committee of the CPSU read:

This unjustified measure has called forth among all true friends of the Algerian people deep regret and concern. [It] can only weaken the unity of democratic forces...bring great damage to the further strengthening of independence .

...[It] is welcomed with satisfaction and rejoicing in the camp of imperialists and colonizers...¹⁶

This theme was subsequently echoed in Soviet publications. *Aziya i Afrika segodnya* considered the outlawing of the Algerian Communist Party an example of French "imperialistic efforts to keep Algeria forever in the position of a dependent country." The Algerian government was accused of being "anti-democratic."¹⁷ A year later, however, the Soviets had reversed their position.

¹¹ Richard M. Brace, *Morocco-Algeria-Tunisia*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964, pp. 112-13.

¹² Walter Z. Laqueur, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*, New York, 1959, p. 309.

¹³ *Kommunist*, 1960, No. 16, pp. 84-85.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1963, No. 16, p. 117.

¹⁶ *Pravda*, December 4, 1962.

¹⁷ *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, 1963, No. 6, p. 43.

In November 1963, *Kommunist* noted that Communists were not being arrested or persecuted in Algeria. It was further noted that the Communists now had an opportunity to propagate and defend their views in the press. At this stage of the Algerian revolution, *Kommunist* continued, the Communists were stressing the common aims and political orientation of the Communist Party program and the program of the FLN as developed in Tripoli.¹⁸ On December 3, 1963, *Pravda* made it official: "The Government of Algeria has proclaimed the building of socialism as its goal." How this could be done without acknowledged Communist leadership was a moot question. Hadj Bachir Ali, the unofficial but *de facto* leader of Algerian Communists, had the following explanation:

...Today the situation is different: the FLN is no longer an amalgamation; it is becoming more and more a party of socialist revolution founded on the Algiers Charter. The Communists have joined this party not as a tactical maneuver but as a matter of principle. Inside the FLN, the Communists will conduct themselves with loyalty and devotion. They do not intend to form factions or trends there. In the joint fight for socialism, all prejudices will be cast aside.¹⁹

Bachir Ali spoke too soon. After the *coup* of June 1965, he and other leaders of the Marxist faction in the FLN organized a clandestine Organization of Popular Resistance to the "dictatorial regime" of Col. Houari Boumedienne.²⁰ The organization draws its main support from the French Communist Party and is based in Paris. According to *Pravda*, its leaders, Hadj Bachir Ali and Hocine Zahouane, who was quite close to Ben Bella, have been arrested in Algiers. Such measures, wrote *Pravda*, "can only serve the interests of imperialists" and represent an attempt to kindle an anti-Communist campaign upsetting "the development of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of Algeria and the Soviet Union."²¹ This strong statement notwithstanding, Mikoyan welcomed the new Algerian Ambassador to Moscow a week later in a "friendly chat."²²

The 1960 Moscow Conference of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties is generally credited with putting forward the thesis of "non-capitalist development of the national democratic revolution." In the spring of 1964, 17 Soviet experts attended a conference on this subject which was sponsored by the editorial board of *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* (World Economy and International Relations) and subsequently summarized in that journal. This Soviet airing of views on Third World socialism provides important clues to current Soviet policies and actions. The conference was summarized by V. Tyagunenko, of the Institute of the Peoples of Asia and a member of the *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* editorial board. Tyagunenko noted, among other things, that Algeria, together with the United Arab Republic, Burma, Mali, Ghana and Guinea, have reached or are reaching the point of take-off into non-capitalist

¹⁸ *Kommunist*, 1963, No. 16, p. 118.

¹⁹ *World Marxist Review: Problems of Peace and Socialism*, 1965, No. 1, pp. 50-51.

²⁰ *The New York Times*, August 22 and September 5, 1965.

²¹ *Pravda*, September 27, 1965.

²² *Ibid.*, October 3, 1965.

development.²³ He also conceded that Marxist theoreticians have a hard time keeping up with reforms in these countries, since these are initiated by "revolutionary democrats whose ideology is usually eclectic."²⁴ Georgi Mirsky, a young Soviet Middle East specialist who also participated in the conference, defined the "non-capitalist path" as "a path of transition to socialism in economically backward countries under conditions of the division of the world into two opposing social systems and with the active support of the socialist countries . . ."²⁵ It is not, according to Mirsky, a "third path" and can only lead to socialism.

It should be pointed out that in its program, issued half a year before it was outlawed, the Algerian Communist Party also envisaged a "non-capitalist path for developing the key branches of . . . [the Algerian] economy."²⁶ This, the Algerian Communists claimed, was in accord with the fundamental tenets adopted by the FLN Tripoli program three months later.²⁷

The "non-capitalist path," according to Tyagunenko, was a stage in the national liberation of countries where there were no "objective or subjective" preconditions for a victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.²⁸ In Algeria, this second or social stage of the revolution was formed by the war, which not only strengthened national consciousness but also united "the working masses on a class basis" by providing "a school for breeding class hatred toward all exploiters." This, apparently, took place without the knowledge of the early leadership of the FLN.²⁹ The nationalization measures taken by the Algerian government in the spring of 1963 "marked the country's decisive setting forth upon the road of non-capitalist development."³⁰ Neither Marx, Engels nor Lenin, however, considered the peasant as the principal motive force of the revolution, according to Mirsky arguing with an unnamed Mao Tse-tung in the *New Times*: "The proletariat is the only true and consistent revolutionary class."³¹ Things must have, therefore, changed in Algeria, too. By 1965, indeed, the Soviet guidelines for political instruction read as follows:

The FLN, which originally was largely a peasant party, today fills its ranks mainly with workers from industrial plants and collective farms. Its party program states that members are drawn mainly "from self-administered enterprises, factories and farms."

Thus, the conditions of the struggle for social progress gradually change the character of revolutionary-democratic parties, their activities and class composition, bringing them closer to the Marxist-Leninist parties.³²

²³ *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1964, No. 6, p. 78. (The debate has been summarized in English in a special issue of *The Mizan Newsletter*, Central Asian Research Centre, London, Vol. VI, No. 10, November 1964, under the title "The USSR and the Developing Countries—A Discussion in Moscow.")

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

²⁵ *Pravda*, January 31, 1965.

²⁶ *Kommunist*, 1962, No. 10, p. 89.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1963, No. 16, p. 114.

²⁸ *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1964, No. 10, p. 23.

²⁹ *Kommunist*, 1963, No. 16, p. 111.

³⁰ *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, 1963, No. 12, p. 7.

³¹ "The Proletariat and National Liberation," *New Times*, 1964, No. 18, p. 8.

³² *Kommunist Estonii*, 1965, No. 3, p. 51.

The Algerian government, according to Y. Potemkin, a Soviet commentator on Algerian matters, is made up mainly of representatives of the revolutionary intelligentsia whose background is that of the lower middle class or peasantry.³³

The outlawing of the Algerian Communist Party, together with a subsequent invitation to have its members join hands with the FLN in the building of a socialist Algeria, suggested to the Soviets the old concept of the Stalinist united front. It was, however, given a new twist:

...Marxist theoretical thought has devised a new formula for uniting all the sound elements of a nation—a *national democratic state*...

Owing to its origins and basic character, the national democratic state acts as the organ of a united national front. Its purpose is to be a weapon for the solution of all-democratic problems, for the completion of the national-democratic revolution and the creation of necessary conditions for a gradual switch to the socialist path of development.³⁴

On the basis of a national democratic state, it is apparently possible to achieve the transfer of leadership of the united front into the hands of the proletariat. But this transfer will take place only if the working class continually strengthens its influence over the "broad masses of the population."³⁵ A warning is thus posted that such a united national front "must not result in the Communists' losing their independent proletarian line. Even with the creation of a united front, the class struggle does not cease but only changes in form."³⁶

Soviet researchers looked into their own backyard for examples of what they had in mind for Third World socialist developments. The "rich and interesting experience in non-capitalist development" of Red China and North Vietnam "has been studied too little—it requires special analysis."³⁷ The development of the Soviet Central Asian republics "is of special value,"³⁸ while Mongolia's experience in non-capitalist development too has "widespread international significance."³⁹ The example of Mongolia smacks of Communist atavism because of the involvement of Lenin, who, it seems, expatiated on the possibility and necessity of non-capitalist development in that country. A more recent exposition notes the following:

The historical experience of the Mongolian People's Republic shows that during the all-democratic stage of the revolution, under specific concrete historical conditions, it is possible to solve a double problem: the liquidation of pre-capitalist social relations and, at the same time, the introduction of socialist elements into the economy.⁴⁰

³³ *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, 1963, No. 12, p. 7.

³⁴ *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1964, No. 11, p. 24.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1964, No. 6, p. 74.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 1964, No. 10, p. 22.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

³⁹ *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, 1964, No. 4, p. 7.

⁴⁰ *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1964, No. 11, p. 19.

Best suited to the political and social structure of a national-democratic state is an economic system based on an evergrowing state and cooperative system.⁴¹ The FLN-introduced committees of self-management on farms and in industry are warmly praised by Potemkin, who refers to them as an

...active revolutionary creation of the masses...which not only distinguishes the situation in Algeria from that of numerous other liberated countries...but also has put Algeria among those countries where the revolutionary-democratic leadership adheres to the path of non-capitalist development.⁴²

He is careful to add, however, that "the main struggle for the reconstruction of the economic and social life of the country on a socialist basis is still ahead."⁴³ Mirsky quotes the theses of the 1964 FLN draft program and finds them "undoubtedly based on a Marxist analysis."⁴⁴

Where does the national democratic state leave private property? Mirsky suggests that in some countries nationalization of small enterprises can only be nefarious to the economy.⁴⁵ In this contention he is supported by a colleague of his, V. M. Kollontai, who refers back to Lenin for a definition of terms within which some capitalist exchange might be permitted under the strictest state control. For the underdeveloped countries, the question is not how to oust the private entrepreneur rapidly and effectively, but how to limit his economic and political influence. State control, in other words, should prevent private capital "from becoming, in the future, an economic and political force capable of seizing power."⁴⁶ Tyaguneneko concludes the debate by noting that at present it would hardly be expedient to suppress the development of private capital completely, even in the more socially advanced countries. The public sector still cannot manage to supply all necessary goods. The complete suppression of private capital can also do political damage. It would be a "sectarian" policy, which might lead to the defeat of the "progressive forces" and, in the long run, to the victory of "imperialism."⁴⁷ Looking at Algeria early in 1965, a Soviet observer had the following to say on the subject:

There are still a number of private enterprises in the country, some of them financed by foreign capital. This is easily explained if one takes into account the scarcity of capital at the state's disposal and lack of national technical cadres. Most important is the fact that the government keeps a close eye on, and controls, all the activities of private sector enterprises. Thus, for example, foreign concerns in Algeria are obliged to spend 50 percent of their profits inside the country. They can use these 50 percent to expand their concern, to create new enterprises, etc., but they cannot transfer them abroad.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 1964, No. 10, pp. 30-31.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁴⁴ *New Times*, April 29, 1964, p. 12.

⁴⁵ *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1964, No. 4, p. 124.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 1964, No. 6, p. 79.

Thus, the private sector exists and is responsible for the greater part of the country's total production, but the state sector also exists.⁴⁸

Turning to the influence of religion in Algeria, one is bound to state that even during a short visit to that country the strength of religious feelings is apparent. It is as if Algerian nationalism were rooted in Islam, which more than anything else distinguishes native Algerians from the European colonists they fought. Soviet commentators are careful not to offend these feelings, which, they believe, will be overcome. Referring to Ben Bella's assertion that socialism and Islam are quite compatible, one of them writes:

It is possible that at some point it is necessary for the masses of religious fanatics to taste the fruits of socialist development *in practice*. And when this development becomes an integral part of their life and their existence, then they will realize what is standing in their way, especially as socialist development is inconceivable without a simultaneous eradication of illiteracy and raising of the cultural level. Then they will ask themselves whether the building of socialism is compatible with religious prejudice, and they will come to the right answer, with the help, of course, of the political organizing force as represented by the workers' party.⁴⁹

As for the fact that the Algerian constitution declares Islam to be the state religion, this "cannot hinder the development of the country along non-capitalist lines," according to two other Soviet commentators. They add that "the struggle for a higher living standard and for enlightenment of the popular masses has great influence on the liquidation of religious prejudices."⁵⁰

Soviet theorists have become more circumspect concerning Algeria since the removal of Ben Bella. *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* continues to list Algeria among the few countries which are on the path of non-capitalist development, although it adds a word of caution: "The social, economic and political structure of these countries is not yet sufficiently strong to guarantee a complete victory of socialist ways."⁵¹

The Sino-Soviet conflict has also left its mark on Algerian developments. The Chinese had an initial advantage over the Soviets by recognizing the Algerian Provisional Government immediately after it was formed in exile in 1958. The Soviets, who had to weigh their recognition against the goal of luring the French away from NATO, tarried until the cease-fire in 1962.⁵² Apologists for the Soviets' behavior argue that China, unlike the USSR, had no diplomatic relations with France and that the difference between her *de jure* and the USSR's *de facto* recognition was merely one of diplomatic form which did not prevent the USSR from aiding the Algerian rebellion.⁵³ Be that as it may, the Chinese line on Algerian developments has been straightforward and unhampered by the theoretical innovations that have occupied the Soviets in recent years.

⁴⁸ *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, 1965, No. 3, p. 24.

⁴⁹ *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, 1962, No. 10, p. 72.

⁵⁰ *Kommunist*, 1963, No. 16, p. 119.

⁵¹ *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1965, No. 9, p. 75.

⁵² Cf. Donald Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961*, Princeton, N.J., 1962, pp. 270-73.

⁵³ Jack Woddis, "The Soviet Union and National Liberation," *Marxism Today*, London, 1964, No. 8, p. 237.

Chou En-lai, in a speech to FLN cadres toward the end of 1963, praised the Algerian revolutionaries for relying upon the peasants and for combining the arms struggle with other forms. Now that the Algerian people, he continued, had set up a nation-wide revolutionary regime, the revolution was irresistibly developing in depth and raising its banner high over the African continent:

Dear friends and brothers, the present international situation is excellent. It is favorable to the intensive development of the Algerian revolution and to the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of all countries.⁵⁴

At a plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU in February 1964, Suslov complained that the Chinese were coming out against "highly important tenets" of Communist theory with respect to developing countries:

Teng Hsiao-ping, the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, bluntly declared at the bilateral meeting in Moscow in July 1963 that the thesis of the non-capitalist path is "idle chatter," although every Communist knows that this thesis was advanced by V. I. Lenin and has been confirmed by the experience of a number of formerly colonial peoples.⁵⁵

At the same time, Suslov continued, the Chinese have "no positive ideas that could help the progressive forces in the former colonies to fight for socialism." They would rather set these peoples apart "on a nationalist and even racial basis." International conferences held in Algiers and attended by both the Soviets and the Chinese have so far provided a forum for Sino-Soviet polemics. Both of these sparring partners have given assistance in various forms in order to maintain themselves in the Algerians' good graces. Apart from military aid and training programs, Soviet long-term credits already exceed 227 million dollars, while the Chinese have provided 50 million dollars' worth of credits as well as a 13,000-ton freighter loaded with other "gifts."⁵⁶ At a meeting of Arab Communists held in Vienna in December 1964, Hadj Bachir Ali, secretary general of the outlawed Algerian Communist Party, strongly supported Khalid Bagdash, secretary general of the Syrian Communist Party, when the latter recommended neutrality in the Sino-Soviet controversy.⁵⁷ The final communiqué did not mention the controversy but gave the Soviet Union the role of "vanguard" in the world socialist system.⁵⁸

The removal of Ben Bella took place ten days before the scheduled start of the second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers. Although not represented at the first conference in Bandung, the USSR has been knocking at the door of the second despite Communist China's attempts to keep Moscow out. The prompt recognition

⁵⁴ Hsinhua, December 28, 1963, as quoted in "China, the Arab World and Africa," a special issue of *The Mizan Newsletter*, Vol. VI, No. 5, May, 1964, p. 50

⁵⁵ *Pravda*, April 3, 1964.

⁵⁶ Cf. *Pravda*, May 7, 1964, and *The New York Times*, May 7, 1964, November 1, 1964, and February 14, 1965

⁵⁷ John K. Cooley reporting in *The Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, Mass., December 26, 1964.

⁵⁸ *Pravda*, December 11, 1964

of the Boumedienne government by China was largely motivated by the desire to see the conference take place. After its postponement, sparring between the USSR and China over participation continued. The subject was broached during a visit by an Algerian governmental delegation to Peking, headed by Minister of State Rabah Bitat, who declared, among other things, that "the Algerian people will always advance together with the Chinese people on the road of revolution."⁵⁹

When the ousted President Ben Bella visited the USSR in the spring of 1964, the then ebullient Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, addressed his Algerian guest as follows: "Comrade President," he began. Then he added, with great deliberation: "It is precisely with this designation that I want to address you, *Comrade President*."⁶⁰ Ben Bella did not reciprocate the "comradely" greeting but addressed Khrushchev as "Mr. Chairman, dear friend." A few days later, however, he accepted the "comradely" protocol *à la Moscou*.⁶¹ In taking his departure from the USSR twelve days later, Ben Bella was seen off by Leonid Brezhnev, then President of the Soviet Union (Khrushchev was on his way to visit Egypt). Putting aside his prepared text, Ben Bella told the frantically applauding rally of 6,000 Soviet Party workers that Algeria had "definitely chosen the path of socialism."⁶² He added that the Soviet Union had done "more than anyone else" to help Algeria.

Back home in Algeria, Ben Bella was inclined to correct the impression that Algerian socialism was heading toward atheistic Communism:

We solemnly reply here that our Socialism stems from Islam. We repeat before world opinion that we are not Communist.⁶³

In a press interview in late 1964, Ben Bella elaborated further:

We have made a revolution to defend our traditional values. The fellah fought first of all for that and not so much for social reasons. That is why our aim is to draw inspiration from those Islamic principles that are not in conflict with socialism.

Algerian socialism is Marxist only to the extent that it accepts "the essential aspects, if not the sum total" of Marx's economic analysis without the accompanying philosophical materialism.⁶⁴

Essentially, Ben Bella was echoing the prevailing philosophy of the FLN. The Moscow *New Times* quoted Boumedienne as follows:

Let me emphasize the part worker-management plays in our economic and social life. It is one of the chief features of socialist construction in Algeria.... As written in our Party statutes, worker-management is a form of gradual transition of the people's national revolution into a socialist revolution, for through the committees the people are drawn into direct participation in economic administration.⁶⁵

⁵⁹ *Peking Review*, August 27, 1965, p. 5.

⁶⁰ *The New York Times*, April 26, 1964 (our italics).

⁶¹ After the initial meeting, Ben Bella began calling Khrushchev "my friend and brother" (*Pravda*, April 30, 1964), but eventually he became "dear Comrade Khrushchev" (*Pravda*, May 6, 1964).

⁶² *The New York Times*, May 7, 1964.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, July 6, 1964.

⁶⁴ Mario Rossi, "Ben Bella Sketches Goals," *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 5, 1964.

⁶⁵ *New Times*, June 9, 1965, pp. 10-11.

Western commentators have noted that the transition to the Soviet brand of socialism is difficult in a developing country where the local Communist Party is proscribed and when the national leader maintains that he is already a socialist. The eclectic socialist doctrines in developing countries do not call for Communist leadership and the best course that the Soviets have been able to devise is to cooperate with any revolutionary movement lest it slips away from them.⁶⁶ It has also been suggested that Arab socialism is post-Communistic, having been founded later than local Communist parties, over which it has a competitive advantage since its nationalist loyalty is beyond doubt.⁶⁷ Moreover, socialism provides Arab intellectuals with a persuasive rationale that they are the élite called upon to bring about social progress even if the masses are reluctant to pay the price.⁶⁸

To this, Soviet commentators reply that they "have no reason to preclude the evolution of these theories toward a *rapprochement* with Marxism-Leninism." In other words, as R. M. Avakov, a young Soviet specialist and colleague of Mirsky's, puts it:

While the spreading of national-type socialist doctrines creates certain illusions and contributes to the development of a false view of socialism, it is significant that hundreds of millions of people are reaching toward the idea of socialism.⁶⁹

Furthermore,

The experience of the Algerian revolution has great international significance. Particularly great is the revolutionizing effect of Algeria on African and Arab countries. It is difficult, for example, to fail to see a connection between the influence of the Algerian revolution and the liquidation of foreign land ownership in Tunisia in May 1964 or the wider participation of the working masses of the UAR in government, as well as in political and social life.⁷⁰

Arab Communist leaders, meeting in Vienna in December 1964, gave the experience of Algeria and the UAR "high appraisal." They welcomed the achievements in Algeria "under the leadership of its vanguard party," the FLN, which had entered upon "a socialist path on the basis of the FLN program." This had found "its most brilliant expression in self-management and the mobilization of the popular masses." The UAR was placed upon the "non-capitalist" rather than "socialist" path, provided fuller expression was given to "the interests and ideology of the laboring people."⁷¹ This appraisal preceded, of course, the removal of Ben Bella from power. The new Boumedienne government, during its first days

⁶⁶ Cf. Richard Lowenthal and Herbert S. Dinerstein in *New Nations in a Divided World: The International Relations of the Afro-Asian States*, ed. by Kurt London, New York, N.Y., 1963, pp. 73 and 89 respectively.

⁶⁷ Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Princeton, N.J., 1963, p. 247.

⁶⁸ Morroe Berger, *The Arab World Today*, New York, N.Y., 1962, pp. 375-76.

⁶⁹ *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1964, No. 6, p. 67.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 1964, No. 10, p. 37.

⁷¹ *Prawda*, December 11, 1964.

of rule, removed the local Communists from responsible posts and closed their newspaper, the *Alger républicain*.⁷² The Communists have since gone underground.

Even if no change had taken place, it would still have been doubtful whether the Communists should be considered as having gained the upper hand in Algeria. It was rather a situation wherein they were willing to bend backward for small favors. It must also have been a very dubious course for the Communists to support FLN theories representing an amalgam of Islamic faith and Arab nationalism, general Marxist economic theories, syndicalist self-management schemes, Sultan-Galiev's Colonial International, Trotskyite Permanent Revolution and, last but not least, petty-bourgeois entrepreneurship. Soviet theoreticians were in confusion trying to catch up with such eclecticism. Others had been purged for less under Stalin, and neither Trotsky nor Sultan-Galiev has been rehabilitated to date. To ensure that theoretical analysis would not go overboard, Soviet commentators were ready with an escape clause:

In countries where both the feudals and the bourgeoisie have been deprived of political and economic power, the counter revolution relies chiefly on the bourgeois degeneration of the government machine, on the emergence of a new privileged class. This could ultimately lead to counterrevolution.⁷³

The governmental machinery in Algeria today is less concerned with theory than with running a country that has been desolated in a costly war and stripped of its French superstructure. The conditions prevailing may, in a way, remind one of the early nineteen-twenties in Soviet Russia, when Lenin launched the New Economic Policy (NEP); but historians will assert that no two historical situations are alike, no matter how great the temptation for theoretical comparison. Marxist sloganizing notwithstanding, the facts are that the former colonial ruler, France, retains its economic, social and political influence and without its help the country would be in dire straits indeed. Algeria relies upon French aid to balance its budget, upon French teachers to expand its educational facilities and upon French firms to explore its natural resources. In the summer of 1965, a new agreement was signed between the two countries which provided for a continuation of French economic assistance to the tune of four hundred million dollars for the next five years and for joint exploitation of Saharan gas and oil.⁷⁴

It is difficult to foresee what the future holds for Algeria. At the time of writing, however, it would seem that the new Algerian leaders, if one is to judge

⁷² The *Alger républicain* was due to be merged with the new FLN newspaper *El Moudjahid* regardless of the coup (see *The New York Times*, June 6, 1965). What was to become of its Communist editors, Henri Elleg and Boualem Khalifa, was not determined, but they have since gone underground (*The New York Times*, August 5, 1965). It is worth mentioning that newspapers of metropolitan France have a relatively large circulation in Algeria: *Le Monde*, which devotes at least a column a day to Algerian affairs, averages daily 8,000 copies in newsstand sales alone. *France-Soir*'s daily newsstand sales top 10,000 copies (*The New York Times*, July 19, 1964).

⁷³ *New Times*, February 10, 1965, p. 4.

⁷⁴ *The New York Times* (International Edition), Paris, July 17-18, 1965.

from their declared objectives, have turned inward to face the problem of building a viable nation. This is a formidable task indeed. It is obvious that in the search for a solution Algeria has to rely upon its own resources and upon foreign assistance which has been tested and found useful in the past. It would thus appear that there is little the Communists can do, either in theory or in practice, to divert Algeria from its present course. To quote Boumedienne: "We have no need of advice from abroad on how to build Socialism."⁷⁵

⁷⁵ As quoted in Robert Shaplen's "Letter from Algeria," *The New Yorker*, October 30, 1965, p. 162

The Activities of a Soviet Leader

HERMAN AKHMINOV

This article by Mr. Akhminov may be described as analysing the technology of power in the totalitarian system of the USSR as it is today. These techniques were, of course, affected to some degree by the character and personality of Khrushchev, but his removal from power does not deprive the article of its significance with regard to the Soviet regime.

A careful study of the activities of political leaders is a normal part of the analysis of any country's political policies. If we know exactly what the leader of a country does, what he has to do, how he divides his limited time among his various tasks and what motivates his actions, we are then in a position to make responsible judgments on that country's politics. We can then also properly estimate the chances of success, the possible and the probable consequences, etc., of the decisions involved in the formulation and execution of political policies.

The present article represents an attempt to determine whether it is possible to analyse the range of duties of Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev on the basis of all the information furnished on his activities by Soviet news media. The fact that Khrushchev is no longer in power does not necessarily invalidate our conclusions, since we have taken him simply as an example, although of course it is important to bear in mind that Khrushchev combined the functions of head of the Party and head of the government, whereas now Brezhnev is virtually the man with supreme power by virtue of his powers derived from the Party Central Committee and Kosygin may be regarded as the Party's technical and administrative "assistant."

The period selected for this study was August 1964, primarily because a preliminary survey of materials indicated that more information was available for this month than for any preceding month and also because August 1964 was Khrushchev's last normal month in office: in September, he spent much of his time relaxing in the Crimea; October, too, was unacceptable for our purposes, since until October 13 he was still in the Crimea and after that date he no longer acted in the capacity of prime minister. In addition, it was hoped that by closely examining Khrushchev's activities during August some additional light might be thrown on the reasons behind his subsequent overthrow. A brief survey of his activities half a year earlier, in February 1964, was also made for purposes of comparison. Apart from such considerations, it was of course immaterial which month or other period of time was selected, since the primary aim of the experiment was to determine the feasibility of analysing a prime minister's range of duties exclusively on the basis of factual data.

On August 1, 1964, *Pravda* reported Khrushchev's meeting the day before with David Rockefeller, President of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and his daughter. On the same day, accompanied by G. I. Voronov, A. P. Kirilenko, N. V. Podgorny, D. S. Polyansky and L. N. Yefremov, he visited an exhibition of industrial projects held in the Kremlin. In the evening, he attended a performance by the Royal Cambodian Ballet Company; afterwards, he met the performers.

On August 2, a joint communique was published on British Foreign Secretary Richard Butler's official visit to the USSR. *Pravda* reported that during his stay in the Soviet Union from July 27 to August 1 "Butler held friendly and open talks with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N. S. Khrushchev, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. A. Gromyko."

Soviet domestic news media made no mention of Khrushchev's activities on August 3.

Pravda for August 4 contained a short reply by Khrushchev to two questions, submitted by the editors of *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, relating to the first anniversary of the signing of the partial nuclear test ban treaty in Moscow.

On August 5, the Soviet press printed the exchange of letters between Khrushchev and Sir Alex Douglas-Home on the partial test ban treaty. Much more space, however, was allotted to Khrushchev's sudden trip to the Saratov and Volgograd oblasts on August 4, where he began a fifteen-day agricultural inspection tour. Accompanying Khrushchev on the first half of this tour were L. N. Yefremov, Party Central Committee Presidium candidate member and First Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee's Bureau for the RSFSR, and Central Committee Secretary V. I. Polyakov. We note here that while Yefremov left the inspection party for Moscow on August 12, Polyakov stayed with Khrushchev throughout the tour.

The tour began at Yershov railroad station, in Saratov Oblast, early on the morning of August 4. From there, the party went directly into the fields, accompanied by the first secretaries of the oblast Party industrial and agricultural committees, the head of the oblast department for agricultural production and state purchases, the head of the Yershov Kolkhoz-Sovkhoz Production Board, important officials in the oblast government and agricultural specialists.

Later, the inspection party visited the farm buildings of the Decembrist State Farm, where a reception was held. Here Khrushchev delivered a long speech, in which he expressed his initial impressions:

I do not now intend to speak of the shortcomings in your work. Apparently you are well aware of them yourselves However, I should like to draw your attention to those questions which must be answered by your collective and, indeed, by many other collective farms.¹

Among the many topics touched upon by Khrushchev on this and other occasions during the trip were American silos, the removal of straw from the

¹ *Pravda*, August 5, 1964.

fields, the relative merits of clean and occupied fallow, mineral fertilizers and their manufacture, silo trenches as a means of cutting silage losses, the pay system for collective and state farms (including suggestions for improving incentives) and the need to make full use of others' experience in order to implement the Central Committee's plans for the intensification of agriculture.

Khrushchev's references to some of his own sources of information in the sphere of agriculture are interesting:

Another method of removing straw from the fields was suggested by a designer from the Taganrog Design Bureau, Comrade Izakson....I saw a motion picture describing his experience....I shall try to acquaint myself with the method of gathering straw suggested by Comrade Izakson under production conditions, after which I shall express my opinion.²

He made good use of experience gained when traveling abroad:

I also had occasion to meet farmers in the USA and to acquaint myself with the organization of agricultural production there. The big American farmer has his own storehouse.³

On the subject of the relative advantages of clean and occupied fallow for cultivating grain in the steppes, Khrushchev remarked:

My authority in this matter is not very decisive, since I myself am not directly engaged in production, but my position in the Party is very high, and therefore I must deal with the facts carefully in order not to suppress through my authority and position the new things that are being born.⁴

Khrushchev also stated:

Unfortunately, we still have people who...are little interested in the experience of their neighbors, which is often written about in our newspapers.

Comrades, you must not adopt such an attitude to advanced experience and to the printed word. Like you, I too am a busy man, but each day I find time to read interesting articles and books, to concern myself with films on scientific achievements and advanced experience.⁵

From the Decembrist State Farm, the party traveled to several other state and collective farms in Saratov Oblast. During the second half of August 4, Khrushchev went to the Volgograd Oblast, where he visited a collective and a state farm. *Pravda's* coverage of the first part of the day was so extensive that his activities during the remainder of the day had to be reported in a subsequent issue.

On the morning of August 5, the inspection team arrived at the Volga-Don State Farm. Later in the day, it visited the Russia Collective Farm in the Volgograd Oblast, where Khrushchev had a long talk with the farm chairman.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

On August 6, *Pravda* published the text of Khrushchev's congratulatory note to the Indian government upon the completion of a power station built in India with Soviet aid. This issue also completed the paper's coverage of Khrushchev's activities in the Volgograd Oblast, where his conversations with state and collective farm workers and officials were reported in detail. The tone and content were more or less the same as those of earlier talks, praise alternating with criticism. Khrushchev spent the whole of August 6 visiting farms in the Rostov Oblast, talking to farm workers and officials as before.

The next day, the inspection party arrived in Krasnodar Krai, where Khrushchev, continuing his inspection, had more long talks with collective farms officials, which were reproduced in the Soviet press.

From here, Khrushchev, Yefremov and Polyakov headed for Ordzhonikidze, where Khrushchev delivered a major address on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic. In this speech, he gave his account of the official reasons for the tour:

Right now, the bourgeois press is trying to guess why Khrushchev decided to make a tour of the country. Various suggestions have been offered, among others that the Soviet Union has had another dry year and a crop failure, and that Khrushchev has gone to see which areas have grain and whether the Soviet Union can avoid buying grain [abroad].

What can one say to such "prophets" as these? Yes, I really am traveling around the country to look at the grain, to see the initial results of carrying out the decisions of the February plenary session of the Central Committee, but mainly in order to talk things over with the people—with collective and state farm workers, specialists, scientists and Party workers—on how best to utilize your immense possibilities...

As you know, the Central Committee is to hold a plenary session in November of this year. I have been given the task of delivering a report to this session, and am preparing it by making this trip and meeting the top people in agricultural production.⁶

On August 10, *Pravda* published the text of Khrushchev's telegrams to the Prime Minister of Turkey, İsmet İnönü, to Archbishop Makarios on the question of Cyprus and to the United Nations Secretary General, U Thant, condemning a Turkish air attack against Greek Cypriots.

In the course of his discussions with North Ossetian agricultural officials, workers and specialists, Khrushchev again clarified his motives for undertaking the tour:

The [Central Committee] plenary session will take place in November, and I have come to you in August in order to receive your advice and to give mine to you. Then you will be able to think everything over and make [your] calculations.⁷

On the afternoon of August 9, the group arrived in Kazan. This was Khrushchev's first visit to the Tatar Autonomous Republic, and he spent the rest of the day traveling by automobile to places of historical interest.

⁶ *Ibid.*, August 9, 1964.

⁷ *Ibid.*, August 10, 1964.

The next day, the party flew to Bugulma, in the Tatar ASSR, where Khrushchev talked to officials from the local oil industry. Then he visited the Avant-garde Collective Farm, where he had another long conversation, subsequently published, with farm workers and officials. Later the same day, he arrived in Bashkiria, where he inspected some oil fields and the Tumazinsky State Farm. On August 10, he also talked to Tatar and Bashkir workers at Oktyabrsky.

Khrushchev, Yefremov and Polyakov arrived in the city of Ufa on August 11. After inspecting a synthetic alcohol plant, they met workers of the local chemical industry, Party and governmental officials of the republic and officials from the Central Volga Sovnarkhoz. At this juncture in the farm tour, Yefremov left the party; he is next mentioned in *Pravda* on August 19 as one of those greeting Khrushchev at Vnukovo Airport upon the latter's return to Moscow the previous day.

Next, Khrushchev visited the virgin lands, beginning with Komsomolets, in the Kustanai Oblast, on August 12. In the morning, he drove through the fields of the Karabalyk Experimental Station and the Peshkovskoye and other state farms; the second half of the day was spent at a meeting held at the Peshkovskoye State Farm.

On August 13, Khrushchev arrived in the Tselinograd Oblast. There he met the English publisher Roy Thomson, who had asked for and received permission to accompany Khrushchev on a part of his tour. After an excursion through the fields, they had a three-hour conversation in the presence of, among others, A. I. Adzhubei and P. A. Satyukov, editors of *Izvestia* and *Pravda* respectively. The party then proceeded to the city of Tselinograd, where Khrushchev delivered a long speech summarizing his impressions of the farm tour thus far.

Labor remuneration should be linked with the output of produce, with the gross yield... from the area of plowland which is at the state farm's disposal and on which it grows the harvest. Leaders and specialists should be paid according to the gross output of grain from each hectare of plowland. Then you will consider how much clean fallow yields and how much autumn plowland yields. If clean fallow produces more, use it. If the autumn plowland yields more grain, you will plant on autumn plowland.

Do you understand me correctly, comrades?

Voices: We understand.

...Don't be in a hurry, don't think that Khrushchev has spoken against clean fallow. I am speaking in favor of the system of farming that yields most produce from each hectare of the total area of plowland. But you yourselves will decide which system this will be.⁸

On August 14, Khrushchev, Polyakov and Party officials of Kazakhstan and the Virgin Lands Krai visited the grain research institute at Shortandy, after which Khrushchev made extensive comments about the institute's work.

Next day, the inspection party flew to the city of Frunze, capital of Kirghizia, to inspect sugar beet fields, corn plantations and a collective farm for sheep raising.

⁸ *Ibid.*, August 15, 1964.

The August 15 issue of *Pravda* included the text of Khrushchev's, Mikoyan's and Gromyko's telegrams to their counterparts in North Korea on the occasion of that country's nineteenth anniversary.

On his second day in Frunze, Khrushchev attended an exhibition of agricultural achievements in Kirghizia. In the evening, he delivered a major address at a formal meeting of the Kirghiz Party Central Committee and Supreme Soviet. "On instructions from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR," Khrushchev awarded the republic its second Order of Lenin, in honor of the centenary of Kirghizia's incorporation into Russia. Beside dealing with his current farm tour, Khrushchev's speech also touched upon some international problems. There was a thinly veiled attack against the Chinese Communists:

There was a time in our country when some comrades told the workers and peasants: When Communism arrives, you will work when you please, but you will eat according to your needs. He who has a greater appetite will eat more, whether he has earned it or not. Fortunately, we left this interpretation of Communism far behind long ago.

Our Party says to the people: To eat according to one's needs, one must produce enough to feed everyone abundantly and have reserves for tomorrow. And for this must raise labor productivity, promote science and develop the forces of production to such a level as to satisfy fully all the material and spiritual needs of society.

Those who criticize us wanted to build Communism before we did and accused the Communists of the Soviet Union of delaying the transition to Communist principles of distribution.

Where the "accelerated" transition to Communism led is well known—to the disorganization of production and to starvation.⁹

On August 17, Khrushchev flew to the town of Przhnevsk, where he saw a monument to N. M. Przhnevsky and visited a memorial museum. Then the inspection party drove to Lake Issyk-Kul, visiting a collective farm on the way and arriving back in Frunze the same day.

Pravda for August 17 printed Khrushchev's and Mikoyan's greetings to President Sukarno on the occasion of Indonesia's nineteenth anniversary.

Finally, after addressing a meeting of irrigation workers and Party officials of Kirghizia and Uzbekistan in Frunze on August 18, Khrushchev drew his two-week tour to a close and flew back to Moscow.¹⁰

Soviet domestic news media contained no account of Khrushchev's activities on August 19.

Khrushchev's letter to the All-Union Conference of Young Cotton Growers in Tashkent was published in *Pravda* on August 21. The same issue reported that Khrushchev, Yefremov and Polyakov were among those who saw Mikojan off on August 20 when the latter left to attend Rumania's liberation celebrations in Bucharest.

⁹ *Ibid.*, August 17, 1964.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, August 19, 1964.

The major news story on August 21, however, was the death of the leader of the Italian Communist Party, Palmiro Togliatti, in the Crimea. Khrushchev, Kosygin, Podgorny and Ponomarev arrived at his bedside in Artek only forty minutes after his death. Khrushchev delivered a eulogy and conveyed his personal condolences to the deceased's widow. The Party Central Committee published a letter to the ruling body of the Italian Communist Party praising Togliatti's contribution to the cause of Communism.

On August 22, *Pravda* published Khrushchev's letter to Komsomol machine operators on a state farm in Kustanai Oblast, congratulating them on their successes under the new system linking pay to work output per unit area of land.

On the same day, Khrushchev gave a speech at Simferopol airport eulogizing Togliatti, which was published in the Soviet press and broadcast by Radio Moscow. Brezhnev headed a Soviet delegation which accompanied Togliatti's casket from the Crimea to Rome; Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Kosygin were among the pallbearers carrying the casket to the plane at Simferopol.

Khrushchev's and Mikoyan's congratulatory message to Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Rumania's liberation appeared in the August 23 issue of *Pravda*. At Yalta, Khrushchev met First Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Y. Tsedenbal for talks which a *Pravda* report of August 24 termed "friendly."

On August 24, Khrushchev returned from the Crimea to Moscow and sent a telegram to President de Gaulle on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the liberation of Paris.¹¹

The next day, Khrushchev acted as host to a delegation from the Sudanese Union Party, which had arrived in Moscow for talks on closer cooperation between the Republic of Mali and the Soviet Union, and on the following day he received a delegation from the Guinean Democratic Party which was in Moscow on an invitation from the Soviet government to discuss the further development of economic relations and cooperation between the two countries.

After two weeks' publicity on his forthcoming trip to Czechoslovakia, Khrushchev left Moscow for Prague on August 27, "to attend the twentieth anniversary celebrations of the Slovak national uprising." While flying over Polish territory, he relayed greetings to the Polish Communist leaders and the Polish people.¹² In Prague, the Soviet delegation was received by Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and other officials. Later in the day, a mass meeting of "Soviet-Slovak friendship" was held, attended, according to press reports, by hundreds of thousands of cheering spectators. Khrushchev delivered a speech in which he stressed the unity of the Communist bloc, recounted the difficulties encountered by the Soviet Union in building socialism and contrasted them with the "fraternal aid" Czechoslovakia was receiving for the same task. He deplored the "great-power chauvinism" and

¹¹ *Ibid.*, August 25, 1964.

¹² *Ibid.*, August 28, 1964.

schismatic activities of the Chinese comrades in the world Communist movement, briefly attacked American "imperialism" in Latin America, Europe, Asia, Africa and elsewhere, reaffirmed that the USSR and Czechoslovakia would "reach Communism together faster," and asserted that the Party's concern about raising the level of production and thus helping to raise the standard of living was the substance of the Party's general line.¹³

On the same day, the Soviet delegation was shown a monument dedicated to Soviet and Czechoslovak soldiers who fell in World War II. It then proceeded to a memorial museum on Mount Vitkov and laid a wreath on the grave of the Unknown Soldier, later visiting the Olšany Cemetery in Prague, where Soviet soldiers who died "defending Czechoslovakia's freedom" are buried; here, too, several wreaths were laid. In the evening, Khrushchev attended a dinner held in honor of the Soviet delegation; during the meal, he and Novotny toasted one another several times.

As may be seen, Khrushchev's time on August 27 was fully occupied. This fast tempo of personal activity on Khrushchev's part, moreover, continued throughout his stay in Czechoslovakia, which extended until September 5.

During the first half of August 28, the Soviet delegation practically repeated the previous day's schedule, visiting monuments and public buildings, laying wreaths and in general touring the city of Prague in the company of Czechoslovak Party officials. In the afternoon, the delegation flew to Banská Bystrica, where in 1944 Soviet aid had been furnished in an airlift operation. Here, Khrushchev once again found time to lay wreaths at a number of memorials and visited a museum in a nearby village.

On August 29, Khrushchev delivered a major address commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Slovak uprising in 1944. Of particular interest in this speech was the declaration that modern Communists are still dedicated to the program laid down by Marx and Engels in 1848:

Soviet Communists have proved by deeds their loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism. As you know, we Communists of Russia have founded our activities on a militant program—the Manifesto of the Communist Party, drawn up by Marx and Engels. The Communists of our country have always stood for internationalism and made use of the best experience of their foreign class brothers in the revolutionary struggle.¹⁴

After the speech, Khrushchev was awarded a medal in honor of the uprising. Then the entire delegation attended an air show at Tri duba Airport, a musical performance at Banská Bystrica and in the evening a gala dinner given in their honor. Afterward, Khrushchev and the others returned by air to Prague.

On August 29, *Pravda* printed a brief report on the letters, dated August 6 and 26 respectively, exchanged between US President Johnson and Khrushchev on the recently obtained US lunar photographs.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, August 30, 1964.

On August 31, Khrushchev spent a relatively quiet day in a Prague suburb; Soviet news coverage of his activities on this day was slight.

*

We may now proceed to make a few general remarks, in the course of which some additional facts will come to light to complete our picture of what may actually be learnt about a prime minister's range of duties from an examination of factual data alone. As mentioned above, British publisher Roy Thomson spent a day with Khrushchev in the virgin lands on August 13. According to reports of their meeting and conversations which appeared in both the Soviet and British press,¹⁵ Thomson was particularly impressed by Khrushchev's seemingly inexhaustible reserves of energy, his willingness to discuss all issues and his youthful vitality. Although he was nearly seventy-one years old, he seemed to have the energy of a man half that age. Thomson reported that Khrushchev's working day lasted fully fifteen hours during the time they were together, and said that this was an apparently normal schedule for the Soviet prime minister on his farm tour.

This record, so far as it goes, of Khrushchev's activities in August 1964 is interesting from various points of view. First of all, it demonstrates that even when the Soviet press prints extensive reports about the activities of the Soviet prime minister, it is still impossible to determine everything of significance that he did.

Even if we assume that Khrushchev was in contact with Moscow all the while he was traveling and that he received timely reports on all important developments, we must still ask ourselves whether or not he was in a position to control the country adequately during the month under consideration. (As a matter of fact, he spent three-quarters of his time in August 1964 outside Moscow; five days were spent outside the country.) Although we have no definite answer to this question, we can say that August 1964 was a very quiet month as far as Soviet governmental activity was concerned. Apart from other events already mentioned, only the following may, in our opinion, have required the personal attention of the prime minister during the month in question:

1. Among others, the Sudanese Union Party delegation, the Guinean Democratic Party delegation, a military delegation from Cuba, a governmental delegation from the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the Deputy Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic, a Syrian economic delegation, the Swedish Minister of Agriculture and the chairman of India's Legislative Commission all arrived in the USSR during this month. Some of them would probably have been received personally by Khrushchev, had he been in Moscow at the time of their arrival and had his plans not been altered by the death of Togliatti. Nevertheless, there were none among them to whom Khrushchev's presence was absolutely essential.

¹⁵ *The Sunday Times*, London, August 16 and 30, 1964.

2. On August 5, an all-Union conference on organizing the labor of collective and state farm workers and increasing their material incentives was convened. A law raising the salaries of educational workers was passed (August 12) and a decree issued introducing changes into the Soviet educational system (August 13).

3. In the diplomatic sphere, the month's activities included a Foreign Ministry protest to the US Embassy in Moscow about flights by US aircraft over a Soviet ship in the Atlantic (August 3), a declaration by the Soviet government about the USSR's invitation to attend the Second Conference of Asian and African Countries (August 14), another regarding Archbishop Makarios's request for military aid (August 16), and the Soviet note of protest to the Turkish government concerning an "attack on the Soviet pavilion at the exhibition in Izmir" (August 30).

4. Finally, a number of Soviet artificial satellites (Nos. 37-44 in the Kosmos series) were put into orbit around the Earth.

Undoubtedly, all these activities took place with the approval and under the control of the "leader." They were either prepared in advance or of such a nature that Khrushchev could easily give his approval no matter where he happened to be, either in or outside Moscow. This leads us to the conclusion that he did, in fact, effectively control the activities of the Soviet government in August 1964, even though he was not always in Moscow. Notwithstanding the immense number of problems with which the head of the Soviet government had to deal in this month, it turns out that he was fully capable of personally supervising the most important decisions. Thus, the concentration of power in the hands of a single leader was, in principle, possible even here.

On the basis of the exceptionally thorough news coverage given to Khrushchev's movements in August 1964, we may also make some general observations on what the head of the Soviet government does. Three primary but unequally weighted fields of activity may be discerned:

1. *Dealing with Non-Communist Foreigners.* This part of Khrushchev's activities does not seem to have been intended to replace the functions of the Soviet foreign minister, but rather to pursue the aim of gathering news about the situation abroad and influencing foreign developments by means of political impact instead of through diplomatic channels.

Khrushchev repeatedly made use of his foreign travel experiences to promote Soviet domestic policies.

2. *Dealing with Problems of World Communism.* Khrushchev met a number of representatives of foreign Communist parties and spent five days in Czechoslovakia personally attending to the problems of that relatively small Communist country.

Dealing with the affairs of foreign Communist countries seems to be an integral part of the duties of every member of the Party Central Committee Presidium. At roughly the same time as Khrushchev was visiting Czechoslovakia, Mikoyan was performing a similar function in Rumania. It may be said that the task of influencing the affairs of foreign Communist parties is not confined to

"the" leader, but is the duty of all the most important leaders of the Soviet Communist Party: one has the impression that each man acts as an exchangeable member of a team rather than as an individual.

3. *Dealing with Domestic Politics.* This was the most important part of Khrushchev's activities in the month under consideration. Although his journey through agricultural regions of the USSR was officially termed an inspection tour, it might also be accurately described as a public relations tour. During this period, Khrushchev met relatively junior Party officials and talked a great deal with ordinary Soviet citizens.

To judge by the reports available, the following *motifs* kept recurring in Khrushchev's speeches during his tour: "Improve the management of specialized production"; "Labor remuneration should be linked with output"; "I have come in order to receive your advice"; "You yourselves will decide." Khrushchev's statements may be interpreted as propaganda, but only, in our view, in the broadest possible sense and even then only to a limited extent.

Some basic remarks about the nature of power may be in order here. The exercise of power consists primarily in the regulation of relations between people and between groups of people. Of course, any politician performs only those tasks that fall within his sphere of influence. He may have a variety of functions which require a variety of political approaches, but his function is always that of a manager, an organizer of people.

The exercise of political power, therefore, does not mean a mechanical handing out of orders; it is primarily an appreciation of what is wanted by others and an ability to discern accurately what practical measures may be taken at a given time. Khrushchev showed quite clearly that he knew what *he* wanted while he was "taking counsel with the people," i.e., he wanted to carry out the program for the transition to Communism; but he also wanted to know how best to implement that program under the conditions existing.

Khrushchev seems to have controlled all basic actions taken by the Soviet government during the period in question—at least, he had time to do so—, but he was scarcely in a position to guide every governmental decision. His function appears to have been to select one of various alternative decisions advanced by the Party "apparatus" which supported him. The "apparatus" supports the "leader" so long as he is in office, but only on the condition that he takes no decision contrary to the will of the apparatus.

The fact that, even under Communism, the "leader's" freedom of decision is limited by the will of his supporters is confirmed by the observation that the same people remained at the top of the power structure after Khrushchev's overthrow and that no significant change in Soviet policy has taken place since then. The only important decision adopted so far by the new leaders has been to abolish the "great Party reform" of 1962, which divided the lower Party organs into "industrial" and "agricultural" departments. There is, however, no evidence that this step would not have been taken if Khrushchev had remained in power. The

guiding idea behind this reform may have been to effect a purge of the Party apparatus at this level without causing major upheavals: as a result of the division of administrative bodies according to the "production principle," the Party leaders could purge an "industrial" branch of the apparatus without affecting their control over the "agricultural" branch in the same area, and *vice versa*. Once the personnel changes had been carried out, the division into "industrial" and "agricultural" bodies, which was contrary to traditional Communist practice, was no longer justified from the Party's standpoint.

The only other major decision taken by the new leaders was to abolish the restrictions on peasants' private farm plots, privately operated animal husbandry and private housebuilding, which had been imposed under Khrushchev after the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961. However, these were routine measures which a new leadership could be expected to take in order to demonstrate an initial good will.

Our next conclusion derived from an analysis of Khrushchev's activities during August 1964 is of theoretical value for the pursuit of Sovietology. For our analysis, we deliberately selected a month of intense activity for Khrushchev in the expectation that by so doing we should be able to dispense with the need for speculation or for making assumptions. This expectation received a sharp rebuff: even during August 1964, a month of extraordinary news coverage, we were able to disclose only a small portion of the Soviet prime minister's activities.

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We know even less about the month chosen for the sake of comparison. The plenary session of the Central Committee of February 10–15, 1964, "On the Intensification of Agricultural Production on the Basis of a Wide Use of Fertilizers, the Development of Irrigation, Integrated Mechanization and the Introduction of the Achievements of Science and Advanced Experience for [effecting] the Swiftest Increase in the Output of Farm Produce," received the most detailed coverage by Soviet news media. At the end of the session, Khrushchev delivered a long speech describing the tasks and goals which the new program for the intensification of agricultural production placed before the Party.¹⁶ This was followed by a nineteen-point resolution, adopted unanimously by the Central Committee on February 15, which virtually ratified Khrushchev's speech of the previous day.¹⁷

The question of implementing the Central Committee's decisions was the subject of a special conference of the Central Committee Presidium on February 28. Khrushchev delivered a long report on "concrete measures" for carrying them out.¹⁸ These measures were chiefly characterized by the single word "more": the Party must achieve more production, more Party guidance, more mechanization, more labor productivity, more cadres, etc. Apart from this, Khrushchev

¹⁶ *Pravda*, February 15, 1964.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, February 16, 1964.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, March 7, 1964.

made a digression in order to expound his views on the introduction of a labor passport in the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev's other activities in February 1964 which warrant attention for their value in estimating how typical this month was in comparison with August 1964 included his message to the West calling for a "realistic, comprehensive consideration of all the consequences that military intervention in Cyprus may bring in its wake" and for "respect for the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus";¹⁹ his note on the Somali-Ethiopian clash, in which he expressed "the conviction of the Soviet government that in our time there are not, neither can there be, any territorial disputes or unsettled border questions between states that have to be settled by force of arms";²⁰ and his reception in the Kremlin of various foreign state and party delegations.

Khrushchev spent the entire month of February 1964 in Moscow. In spite of extensive press coverage of his activities during this period, Khrushchev was often mentioned not as the principal in an article but was quoted in reference to some point he had spoken about previously,²¹ and on some days he was not hailed in print at all, so far as the Party's official organ, *Pravda*, was concerned.

The facts to be gleaned from a perusal of Soviet news media are frequently, as in this case, so meager that it is impossible to draw any reliable conclusions from published data alone. Does this mean that there is no effective method of studying Soviet affairs? By no means. The intelligent use of general principles can often fill the gap, always provided that theories are treated as hypotheses and their validity in every particular case is checked against the available facts.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, February 8, 1964.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, February 12, 1964.

²¹ Compare, for example, *Izvestia*, February 16, 1964, "Concerning a Reply," condemning the British response to Khrushchev's Cyprus message.

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

Party Affairs

Pre-Congress Reshuffle

The response to the decisions of the September plenary session of the Party Central Committee on the reorganization of incentives in Soviet industry¹ had scarcely died down when a further extraordinary session of the Committee was scheduled for December 6.² Besides giving preliminary approval to the budget and economic plan for 1966, which are subject to ratification by the Supreme Soviet, the meeting adopted a number of unexpected decisions which were of particular importance in the sphere of domestic politics. On the basis of a report by Brezhnev, it approved measures for a reform of the system of Party and state control, and elected V. V. Shcherbitsky member of the Central Committee Presidium and I. V. Kapitonov Central Committee Secretary, both of these offices being additional to those already existing.³ Three days later, on December 9, 1965, a report on the proceedings of a session of the Supreme Soviet, summoned on December 7 to ratify the budget and the economic plan for 1966, revealed a number of other important measures adopted by the Central Committee, this time relating exclusively to changes of personnel, *viz.*, the replacement of A. I. Mikoyan as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR—i.e., as nominal head of state—by N. V. Podgorny, hitherto Party Central Committee Second Secretary, and the removal of A. Shelepin from his position as head of the system of Party and state control in conjunction with the reorganization of this system.⁴

All this testifies to the existence of conflicting influences and mutually opposed individuals and groups within the collective leadership and to consequent changes in the balance of power. Long before this, it had been possible to divine a lack of unanimity among the country's leaders on a number of fundamental questions of domestic and foreign policy, although the evidence was only indirect. Such evidence consisted of veiled hints to be found in the speeches made by the most prominent members of the collective leadership—Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Mikoyan and Suslov—at the March and September meetings of the Central Committee as well as on other occasions. The December meeting of the Central Committee served to bring these differences more into the open.

If, as would seem to be the case, Mikoyan's illness, the result of a serious operation performed three years previously, was bound to make itself felt not only in December but also during the September meeting of the Central Committee, the question arises: Why did he not decide to retire then, without waiting

¹ *Pravda*, September 28, 1965.

² *Ibid.*, December 7, 1965.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, December 10, 1965, p. 1.

for the forthcoming Party congress? Moreover, why did the reorganization of the system of Party and state control become necessary before the Party congress, and, if it was necessary, why was it not carried out by the Central Committee in September? Again, what does the removal of Shelepin signify?—Is it the beginning of his eclipse, or is the reason given for his removal—that he is to “concentrate on Party work”—a hint that he is earmarked for the position of “heir” to Brezhnev, i.e., for the post of Central Committee Second Secretary, in succession to Podgorny? Finally, what was the purpose of appointing Podgorny to the position of head of state?

For the moment, it is only possible to suggest tentative answers to these questions. However, the causes and the general significance of the changes may be determined fairly reliably if we bear in mind that it was necessary to prepare for the forthcoming Party congress, before which the collective leadership must appear with a united front and armed not only with a practical but also with an ideological program. Another important factor was the effect on Party policies during recent weeks of certain considerations in the field of foreign affairs.

Kosygin's announcement to the Central Committee in September of his program for reorganizing incentives in Soviet industry was the first important act by way of preparing for the forthcoming congress. Although nothing was actually said about the significance of the September session in this connection, Kosygin's reform may be regarded as being designed to achieve an aim of especial importance in the sphere of domestic politics, namely, that of presenting today's collective leadership—the Central Committee Presidium—as a body pursuing a definite goal and armed with a definite program of action, in contrast to the immediately post-Khrushchev period, which had been something of an interregnum, a period of administration pure and simple, not of purposeful government. Having carried through Kosygin's plan of reform, the country's leaders evidently nourished hopes of appearing before the Twenty-Third Party Congress six months later as a stable leadership armed with a vigorous and enterprising domestic policy.

Moreover, innovations were not to be confined to the sphere of domestic affairs. The ever more frequent calls for unity of action among the Communist parties of the world against the forces of “imperialism,” the stress laid on the duty of Communists throughout the world to form a common front in fighting for peace and resisting the USA's dangerous policy in Vietnam, the solemn celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the Seventh Comintern Congress—all this amounted to the declaration of a new foreign policy in lieu of the national-Communist *impasse* of the Khrushchev period.

Even before the September session was over, however, it became clear that the domestic reforms planned were something of a compromise. Their very author, Kosygin, devoted a good deal of attention to the need for ensuring that they did not engender a certain economic independence at the lower levels. Following Kosygin onto the rostrum, Brezhnev also uttered a warning against the dangers inherent in the plan. Shelepin did not speak at the session at all, even though his position as head of the Party and state control system properly required that

he should do so. Neither was anything to be heard on the subject from the collective leadership's ideological governess Suslov. All this suggested that Kosygin's plan of reform had not only evoked a variety of response but had even met with definite misgiving among certain individuals and groups within the Central Committee. The fact that, contrary to tradition, the appropriate speech was delivered by Kosygin and not by the First Secretary, Brezhnev, indicated that the former's followers were then in the ascendant. The only thing which at that time all had in common was the realization that things could not go on as they had done so far. That this realization was not enough to maintain the leadership's unity and that some new balance of forces was required is demonstrated by the important changes of personnel made by the Central Committee in December.

The reasons for these changes become even clearer if, in addition, it is remembered that between the September and December sessions of the Central Committee there was a sharp reaction on the part of China to the Central Committee's decisions of September and to the Soviet Party's post-Khrushchev policies in general. On November 13, 1965, *Jen Min Jih Pao* and *Hongqi* published an article which the Soviet press described as the most anti-Soviet publication to have appeared since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute. *Pravda*, hesitating to print the article in its entirety, gave the gist of the Chinese' attacks, from which, together with *Pravda's* comments, it is evident that the Chinese Communists had made a number of serious charges against their Soviet counterparts which were calculated to exacerbate the ideological dispute, it being impossible for Marxists (and the Soviet Communists, notwithstanding their revisionism, nevertheless think in the same Marxist terms) to ignore such charges. The Chinese Communists accused their Soviet colleagues of conspiring with the Americans, citing as proof the partial nuclear test ban and the USSR's and USA's common interest in banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They described economic developments in the USSR as an example of "bourgeois degeneration" and the USSR's agricultural policy as a deliberate encouragement of rural capitalism. As for the main question, namely, the Soviet calls for moderation, it was stated categorically that between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties there is nothing that unites, only that which divides; between them there is nothing in common, there are only differences. The Chinese declared that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the Chinese Communist Party and its supporters on the one hand and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its revisionist henchmen on the other.⁵

It was not until two weeks later, on the very eve of the December meeting of the Soviet Party Central Committee, that *Pravda* replied to this attack in a leading article entitled "The International Duty of Communists in All Countries." The relative insipidity of this document is understandable: in any dispute between two demagogues, the advantage is always on the side of the more shameless of the two, and the Soviet demagogues, having long dominated the world arena, are today confronted by others who are more powerful than they themselves.

⁵ *Ibid*, November 16, 1965, p. 5.

The *Pravda* article stressed the Soviets' anti-imperialism; in academic style, it argued the need for unity with the aid of suitable quotations from Lenin, and in its turn accused the Chinese of hindering aid to Vietnam and of other schismatic misdeeds likely to benefit the capitalist enemy.⁶

The force and the Communist logic of the Chinese charges could not but provoke a variety of reactions among the Soviet collective leadership, particularly as regards the threat that these accusations mean for the position of strength which the USSR is now gradually assuming, as leader of a recentralized Communist bloc without the Chinese schismatics.

The review of the Soviet periodical press in this issue of the *Bulletin* draws attention to the ideas of international Communist solidarity and "popular front" tactics which the Soviet leaders are now employing as the ideological basis for a reunified Soviet bloc. In view of the fact that precisely Mikoyan and Shelepin were the only members of the entire collective leadership who took no active part in the dispute with the Chinese, it may be reasonably supposed that they were opposed to decisive measures against the Chinese Communists such as excluding them from the Communist bloc. Consequently, the replacement of Mikoyan by an active opponent of the Chinese "schismatics," Podgorny, and the decision to clip the wings of Shelepin are a logical indication of the Soviet leaders' intention to tighten their attitude toward the Chinese Communists.

Finally, there are grounds for the view that this tighter attitude will concern not only China but also the United States. Charges of having friendly relations and common interests with the American imperialists are altogether too dangerous for the Soviet Party leaders, particularly in view of their plans to bolster up the monolith which was the Communist bloc, under the banner of Communist solidarity. If coexistence is to give way to renewed tension, this is one more reason for removing the aged Mikoyan.

Since the policy of reviving tension in foreign relations is not without its dangers on account of the war in Vietnam, the unity of the collective leadership becomes even more necessary, and so further reshuffles in the search for whole-hearted supporters will continue until the Twenty-Third Party Congress takes place, in the effort to stabilize the regime.

Finally, it is important to realize that the latest developments in Soviet domestic and foreign policy—Kosygin's reforms and the call for international Communist solidarity—have been forced upon the Soviet leaders by the country's internal economic crisis and the ideological attacks of the Chinese Communists. An important result of this circumstance is that the present trends of Soviet domestic and foreign policy are mutually contradictory; the former being revisionist and the latter orthodox Communist. This cannot but create additional difficulties for the present collective leadership, difficulties that are complicated by the fact that the Soviet leaders, notwithstanding all their revisionist deviations, continue to be dominated in their thinking by the Communist world outlook.

N. Galay

⁶ *Ibid.*, November 28, 1965, p. 1.

The Problem of Party Growth and Recruitment

A critical problem confronting the Soviet Party leaders on the eve of the forthcoming Twenty-Third Party Congress is the demoralization which appears to be going on within the Party's own ranks. This problem became particularly acute when it grew apparent that the new members brought into the Party by Khrushchev to rejuvenate it and increase its "fighting efficiency" had fallen far short of the standards laid down in the Party Statute. These new members are quite numerous, as will be seen from the following table:

Party Membership, 1939-64

	Members	Candidate Members	Total
1939 (Eighteenth Congress)	1,590,000	890,000	2,480,000
1952 (Nineteenth Congress)	6,000,000	870,000	6,870,000
1956 (Twentieth Congress)	6,800,000	420,000	7,220,000
1959 (Twenty-First Congress)	7,620,000	620,000	8,240,000
1961 (Twenty-Second Congress)	8,870,000	840,000	9,710,000
1964	—	—	12,000,000

SOURCES: *Yearbook of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia* (Yearbook of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia) for 1957 (page 9), 1959 (page 8) and 1962 (page 17), Moscow, 1957, 1959 and 1962; *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 14, p. 88

Thus, since Khrushchev consolidated his position in 1956, Party membership has increased by almost five million to a total of twelve million. Under Stalin, from 1939 to 1952, the average annual rate of growth was about 340,000, but after Stalin's death until the Twentieth Party Congress it was only 83,000. This sharp drop was probably due to apprehensions over the stability of the post-Stalin regime, with the result that only obvious enthusiasts and those who could not manage to avoid recruitment joined the Party during these years. Under Khrushchev, in contrast, the figure was almost 600,000, a development which he and his supporters regarded as progressive.¹ The momentum thus generated continued to be reflected in the recruiting practices of local Party organizations after his displacement until at least August 1965.

It is interesting to note that during the last ten years 2,700,000 Komsomol members have joined the Party.² This means that of the 600,000 persons who on an average joined the Party each year under Khrushchev, only 270,000 proceeded directly from the Komsomol. This, in its turn, means that most new Party members were not drawn from the Komsomol, as envisaged by the Party Statute, but from those who either had had nothing to do with the Komsomol or who, having belonged to it, for some reason did not proceed to join the Party until some considerable time had elapsed. It may be supposed that Khrushchev's intention had been to rejuvenate the Party by encouraging Komsomol members

¹ *XXII s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Stenografichesky otechet* (The Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Stenographic Record), Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 422.

² *Molodoi kommunist*, 1965, No. 10, p. 20.

to join it—an intention which largely remained unfulfilled: evidently, among the twenty million members of the Komsomol there are not so very many who are prepared to devote themselves to the building of Communism, and local Party organizations, if they were to show their loyalty to Khrushchev, had to recruit persons who were older and less touched with revolutionary fervor.

The means employed to promote this constant expansion in Party ranks have now become the object of widespread criticism in the Party press. In a recent issue of the *Bulletin*, we quoted a passage from an article by a Lieutenant Colonel Korotayev entitled "The Leninist Principle of Individual Selection of Party Members Must Be Strictly Observed" and published in the Party organ of the Soviet armed forces. Here Korotayev said:

... it should not be decided artificially from above whether or not a soldier is ready to join the Party. And yet this is precisely what certain Party officials do at times. In some units, for example, they try at all costs to get every officer without exception to join the Party. As a result, entry standards are lowered and frantic campaigning is tolerated. Here and there, people are not above boasting about the number of Party and candidate members enrolled. At certain meetings and seminars, nothing is to be heard but appeals to expand the size of Party organizations.... Leaders of some Party organizations literally talk comrades into joining the Party.³

A fitter of the name of S. Danilov, an old Party member and "honored construction worker of the RSFSR," wrote to the paper *Sovetskaya Rossiya*:

In recent years, our Party organization has almost doubled in size. This is considered to be a good sign. But perhaps we ought not to be carried away with increasing... the rate of admissions. When necessary, a comrade should be told with Party-like straightforwardness that he has not yet realized the responsibilities of a Communist. However, I cannot cite any instance in which this has been done in our organization. Nor can I recall that anyone was asked: "Why are you joining the Party?"⁴

Both *Kommunist* and *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* discuss the fact that as a result of the large-scale recruitment of Party members encouraged by Khrushchev many undesirable elements, including not only careerists but those who were morally not beyond reproach, plunderers of government property, etc., found their way into the Party.⁵ According to official information, 22,000 candidate members of the Party were refused admission as full members in 1964 on account of unacceptable conduct.⁶

Although these figures are impressive enough, they do not by any means give the whole picture. During 1964, it appears that altogether more than half a million persons were excluded from the Party: as we have seen, the total membership of the Party in 1964 was twelve million, but by the beginning of 1965

³ *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, 1965, No. 16, p. 28.

⁴ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, October 23, 1965.

⁵ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 13; *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, 1956, No. 16.

⁶ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 14, p. 89.

it was only 11,416,000.⁷ All this naturally does harm to the Party's prestige as the "avant-garde" of Soviet society.

Another circumstance harmful to this prestige was Khrushchev's gamble on rejuvenating the senior strata in the Party by advancing comparatively recent Party members before testing their political reliability. This may be seen from the relative seniority of delegates (the overwhelming majority of whom have always been *apparatchiki*) to the three Party congresses that were held under Khrushchev:

**Relative Seniority of Delegates
to the Twentieth, Twenty-First and Twenty-Second Party Congresses**

Date of Joining the Party	Twentieth Congress	Twenty-First Congress	Twenty-Second Congress
Before 1917	22 Delegates	8 Delegates	42 Delegates
1917-20	60 Delegates	37 Delegates	1.3%
1921-30	24.9%	19.9%	7.7%
1931-40	30.0%	33.8%	22.0%
1941-45	21.6%	21.7%	26.6%
1946 and After	13.4%	21.1%	—
1946-55	—	—	23.1%
1956 and After	—	—	18.4%

SOURCES *XX s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuzn Stenografichesky otchet* (The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A Stenographic Record), Vol. I, Moscow, 1956, p. 238, *XXI chrezvychayny s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuzn Stenografichesky otchet* (The Twenty-First [Extraordinary] Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A Stenographic Record), Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 261, *XXII s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuzn Stenografichesky otchet* (The Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A Stenographic Record), Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 429

From these figures, it is evident that under Khrushchev the influence of Communists who joined the Party in 1921-30 was drastically reduced. The same thing happened to those who joined during the next decade—at first slowly, then more rapidly. In this way, as the "liquidation of the consequences of personality cult" proceeded, the political influence was reduced of those Party members who helped Stalin to get rid of his opponents and bore the burden of industrialization and collectivization. At the same time, the status of those who joined after the war was appreciably enhanced, and in the last few years of Khrushchev's rule the role of members who had joined no more than six years previously began to grow rapidly. The report of the Mandatory Commission of the Twenty-Second Congress pointed out with approval that Party organization had drawn the correct conclusions from the criticism leveled during the Twenty-First Congress at the failure to advance junior members to responsible positions as much as might have been possible. In fact, 41.5 percent of the delegates to the Twenty-Second Congress had joined the Party since the war.

The result of this trend was that responsible posts in primary organizations and even more in Party organs at the raion level came to be occupied by inexperienced people who brought with them new ideas and tended to disregard the established principles of Party routine. And these are the very levels at which

⁷ *Yezhebodnik Bol'shoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii 1965* (Yearbook of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia for 1965), Moscow, 1965, p. 18.

the most important work in training Communists according to the requirements of the Party Statute is usually done.

We have already drawn attention in these columns to the August resolution of the Party Central Committee, "On Serious Shortcomings in the Work of the Kharkov Oblast Party Organization in Respect of the Recruitment and Education of Young Communists," and to the fact that such criticism, ostensibly addressed to a particular oblast organization, is, by tradition, intended for the Party as a whole.⁸ Here it will be in place to recall some of the main points of this resolution, which represented the first decisive step taken by the Party's present leaders toward restoring Party discipline. Pointing out that "many of the Party's primary organizations and city and raion committees are chiefly concerned with numerically swelling the Party's ranks and are frequently accepting people without carefully verifying their political, professional and moral qualities," the Central Committee condemned as harmful the enthusiasm for increasing the numerical strength of the Party to the detriment of its quality. The Central Committee insisted on "putting an end once for all to the laxity and liberality being displayed toward Party members and candidate members whose actions are incompatible with their Party affiliation."⁹

Thus, the mass recruitment campaign initiated by Khrushchev and continued under its own momentum after his overthrow has been brought to a halt, and it may be assumed that for a time the admission of new members to the Party will be sharply reduced, if not halted altogether, in spite of the past practice of intensifying recruitment just before a Party congress. Moreover, the possibility ought not to be excluded that there will be a campaign to purge the Party of all members "whose actions are incompatible with their Party affiliation." Probably, the first victims of the purge will be those who have openly compromised themselves by their conduct. The criteria for expulsion are so vaguely defined, however, that almost any member may be threatened by such a purge. The Central Committee's resolution on the Kharkov Oblast Party Committee should, therefore, be regarded as a warning to every Communist that he may find himself without a Party membership card if his present actions fail to give evidence of loyalty to his Party organization and a readiness to abide by the Party Statute. It is doubtful whether a large-scale purge, if one is actually contemplated, will be carried out in the time remaining before the Twenty-Third Party Congress, now scheduled to be held in March; but this does not rule out the possibility—indeed, the probability—of a limited purge of the Party ranks in the course of deciding who the delegates to the forthcoming congress shall be.

Closely connected with these problems of recruitment is the recent policy of attempting to revive the institution of criticism and self-criticism, as another means of exercising control over the quality and behavior of "Party cadres." To this we have also drawn attention elsewhere.¹⁰

Petr Kruzhin

⁸ See *Bulletin*, 1965, No. 11, pp. 52–54.

⁹ *Partinaya zhizn*, 1965, No. 15, pp. 23–25.

¹⁰ See *Bulletin*, 1965, No. 11, p. 55.

The Communist Bloc

The Geopolitical Aspect of the Sino-Soviet Conflict

On October 1, 1949, before the civil war in China had come to an end, the Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed in Peking. At the beginning of the following year, Mao Tse-tung, the "Chairman," i. e., President of the new republic, went at the head of a governmental delegation to Moscow, where on February 14 the USSR and China concluded a number of agreements, including one of friendship, alliance and mutual aid. The latter agreement fully reflected both the political situation in Asia at that time as well as the joint plan of action worked out by Mao and Stalin. It is interesting to recall that the alliance provided for under the agreement was directed primarily against Japan and her allies. Paragraph 1 of the agreement stipulated that

Both Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing the resumption of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties' being attacked by Japan or any other state allied with her and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.¹

The agreement is particularly important because for a long time it was virtually the only formal document on which the Sino-Soviet military alliance was based. As we have seen, this alliance was directed specifically against Japan, and did not commit either side to come to the assistance of the other if attacked by any other state. The agreement was quite clearly prompted by a genuine fear of a possible resurgence of Japanese militarism and, to a certain extent, of the possibility that Japan and the US might conclude a military pact capable of being used to sweep away the Communist regime in China before it had a chance to become firmly established.

One thing is certain: the first paragraph of the agreement is entirely irrelevant to the present political situation in Asia, quite apart from the fact that the joint Sino-Soviet action program, if it ever existed, has never been put into practice. Present-day Japan is not threatening anybody, and for the time being at least is not regarded as a threat by either Peking or Moscow. The major developments on the Asian political scene are taking place in the south of the continent and not the east, and it is now Communist China which has become the threat to peace and stability in the area, a fact of which the USSR, formally allied with that country under an agreement which does not expire until 1980, is well aware. Indeed, the USSR has broken the agreement on a number of occasions, in particular the provisions of Paragraph 3, according to which

¹ *Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements (Signed in Moscow on February 14, 1950)*, Peking, 1951, p. 6.

Each Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance directed against the other Contracting Party and not to take part in any coalition or in any actions or measures directed against the other Contracting Party.²

This clause has not prevented the USSR from providing India with economic and military aid on a scale considerable by Asian standards either before, during or after the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. Complained the Peking daily *Jen Min Jih Pao* in a lengthy article reprinted in brochure form:

The leaders of the Soviet Union began to give India military assistance in 1960, i.e., after the Indian reactionaries had begun their armed provocation of China. After the beginning of the massive offensive of the Indian reactionaries against China in October 1962, the leaders of the Soviet Union stepped up their aid to India. C. Subramaniam, the Indian Minister of Steel and Heavy Industries, told journalists on December 19 of that year that since India had declared a "state of emergency" the Soviet Union had speeded up her assistance to India in the construction of various projects. After consultation between representatives of the Communist Parties of China and the Soviet Union in July 1963, the leaders of the Soviet Union promised the Indian reactionaries even greater military assistance.³

At the same time, Communist China, by laying claim to large slices of Soviet territory, has violated Paragraph 5 of the agreement, which reads:

Each Contracting Party undertakes, in a spirit of friendship and cooperation and in conformity with the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other Contracting Party, as well as non-interference in its internal affairs, to develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties...⁴

Thus it can be said that, by early 1965 at least, the 1950 agreement, having been ignored by both sides, was not worth the paper on which it was written. What happened during the nineteen-fifties to make the Sino-Soviet alliance illusory and turn the two former allies into bitter enemies?

Without going into the causes of the Sino-Soviet conflict or examining the role played in the conflict by ideological factors, we can say that the bonds of Communist ideology and especially practice which existed between the two sides lessened rather than enhanced the prospects for the success of their political and military alliance, for the simple reason that under a totalitarian Communist regime China became more powerful and hence became tempted to pursue an expansionist policy. As the Yugoslav renegade Communist Milovan Djilas has pointed out, Stalin viewed the prospect of a Communist power takeover in China with mixed feelings, primarily because he realized that it would be impossible to turn China into a Soviet satellite, and that an independent China bent on fulfilling what it considered to be its historic mission would be extremely difficult to live with.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³ *Die Wahrheit darüber, wie sich die Führer der KPdSU mit Indien gegen China verbündet haben*, Peking, 1963, pp. 28–29 (a translation of an editorial article in *Jen Min Jih Pao*, Peking, November 2, 1963).

⁴ *Sino-Soviet Treaty* . . . , p. 7.

In this Stalin turned out to be quite right. As long as the Chinese Communists were engaged in "reconstruction," i.e., in overcoming the aftereffects of the civil war and Kuomintang leadership, the USSR and China appeared on the surface to be enjoying harmonious relations and pursuing a joint foreign policy. Their tendency to act in union was strengthened by a common hostility toward the USA and a common desire to liquidate US influence in the Far East. However, as soon as the two countries began to quarrel over ideological matters their geopolitical differences made their presence felt, and the alliance gave way to open conflict. As a result, Paragraph 4 of the 1950 agreement also became a dead letter. This paragraph reads:

Both Contracting Parties, in the interest of consolidating peace and universal security, will consult with each other in regard to all important international problems affecting the common interests of China and the Soviet Union.⁵

Such consultations are now out of the question, if only because the foreign policy interests of the USSR and Communist China have long been diametrically opposed. China is confronted with the problem of breaking out of the political isolation in which she finds herself as a result of her geographical position and the policies of the USA and the USSR. A glance at the map is sufficient to show how unfavorable China's situation is. Bounded on the east by the Pacific Ocean, where US military power reigns supreme, and on the north and northwest by the Soviet Union, with whom she shares a frontier thousands of kilometers long, China can only expand southwards. In the past China was able to do so, because on the way she encountered only small, weak and politically, culturally and economically backward peoples, and because she herself was the center of a vast cultural world, beyond which civilization as the Chinese understood it was non-existent. At present, however, China is far from the world's political and economic centers and is engaged in a struggle against the attempts of the USA and the USSR to isolate her politically, as we have said.

Some Western observers predict that in the not-too-distant future China will begin to expand northwards at the expense of the Soviet Union (there are not a few Western statesmen—French President Charles de Gaulle, for example—whose long-term policies are based on such predictions).⁶ Otto von Habsburg, for example, writes in his book *Der Ferne Osten ist nicht verloren* that

...sooner or later Russia will be forced to choose between becoming a satellite of China, with the prospect of losing at least a part of her colonial empire, and making an attempt to come to an agreement with the Atlantic world as well as with Japan. Whatever solution Russia adopts, she will have to make certain sacrifices, although in the second case territories regarded as Russian would not be affected.⁷

Colonel Miksche, a prominent military specialist, even went so far as to hint in the West German magazine *Wehr und Wirtschaft* that a Russo-Chinese war might well take place within ten or fifteen years.⁸

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ See, for example, René Courtin, *L'Europe de l'Atlantique à l'Oural*, Lagny-sur-Marne, 1963.

⁷ Otto Habsburg, *Der Ferne Osten ist nicht verloren*, Vienna—Munich, 1963, pp. 139–40.

⁸ F. O. Miksche, "Der russisch-chinesische Krieg," *Wehr und Wirtschaft*, Munich, 1963, No. 10.

It is only natural to ask whether there are any real signs that such a reorientation of Chinese expansionism has taken place, and if it has, why. (To what extent China would solve her geopolitical problems, let alone her economic and military problems, by forcing the USSR out of her Far Eastern territories and even Siberia is another question.) Recent statements by Chinese leaders certainly give the impression that China is laying claim to Soviet territory. Mao Tse-tung, for example, said in a talk with Japanese socialists on July 10, 1964:

There are too many places occupied by the Soviet Union. On the basis of the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union brought Mongolia under its domination under the pretext of guaranteeing that country's independence....When Khrushchev and Bulganin came to China in 1954, we raised this question, but they refused to discuss it....Certain individuals maintained that the Sinkiang region and the territories to the north of the Amur should be incorporated in the Soviet Union....The USSR is concentrating troops along its borders....About one hundred years ago, the region to the east of Lake Baikal became Russian territory and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka and other points have been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented the bill for this list.⁹

Nevertheless, there are three important points to bear in mind about this statement. First of all, Mao was talking not only of Russian expansion in the past but also of Soviet expansion in the present, i.e., the attempts of the USSR to gain a foothold in Sinkiang. This means that, for the time being at least, it is Moscow and not Peking which has the initiative in the squabble for territory. Secondly, Mao did not mention any specific plans for returning the lost territories to the Chinese fold, neither did he mention Siberia. Thirdly, Mao had, in the same conversation, commented significantly that

...there are no fatalities in paper warfare. We have been waging a paper war for several years now, and no one has died as a result. We are quite prepared to carry on this war for another twenty-five years.¹⁰

In other words, Mao's statement on the disputed territories was just another shot in the propaganda war between Moscow and Peking.

The theory that Chinese expansionism is directed northwards is based essentially on two assumptions, the first being that China has a huge population which is increasing at a colossal rate and the second that in the foreseeable future China will become an industrially and militarily powerful state capable of satisfying its territorial ambitions. The first of these assumptions is dubious in the extreme. For a start, the population figures given by the Chinese Communists themselves cannot possibly be right. Ever since the early nineteen-fifties, the Chinese press has been saying that the country's population is increasing extremely rapidly, but at the same time it has always given the same population figure, namely 600-650 million. There is, moreover, every reason to believe that this figure itself is too high and that the population of China is no greater than that of India, or India and

⁹ See *Pravda*, September 2, 1964, p. 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Pakistan together. The American journalist and demographic expert Russell Warren Howe, for example, who about one year ago calculated the population of Africa as being 25 percent greater than previously assumed, and was subsequently confirmed in this by the US statistical authorities, concluded after a series of involved calculations that the present Chinese population is no more than 400–500 million.¹¹ Dr. Sun Yat-sen, “father of the Chinese revolution,” was even convinced that the Chinese population showed a tendency to decrease. In his book *San Min Chu I* he wrote:

Within the last hundred years, China has begun to suffer from the population problem: the Chinese people are not increasing, while other populations are growing.¹²

Sun Yat-sen even spoke of “the white peril.” The world’s white population, he maintained, was increasing, while the population of China was decreasing. The “white” world would soon become overpopulated, and then the white peoples would pour into China in search of a place in the sun. Then, continued Sun Yat-sen

...China will not only lose her sovereignty, but she will perish, the Chinese people will be assimilated, and the race will disappear. The Mongol and Manchu conquerors of China used a smaller number to overcome a larger and tried to make the larger number their slaves. If the Powers some day subjugate China, it will be large numbers overcoming a smaller number.¹³

One cannot help feeling that both Sun Yat-sen as well as the Western adherents of the northerly expansion theory are influenced in their views more by subconscious fears than concrete realities. Colonel Miksche’s contention that in a war with China Russia would for the first time in the last few centuries be up against a nation vastly superior in numbers (Miksche gives the respective populations as 225 and 700 million) is based on figures whose veracity is highly questionable.

As we have said, the second assumption on which the northerly theory is founded is that before very long China will have become a powerful industrial and military nation, i.e., will have virtually solved her economic and political problems. In such a case, however, it would be the height of folly for the Chinese to push forward into regions with such an inhospitable climate as Siberia, for example, particularly in view of the fact that this would not be possible without a full-scale—probably nuclear—war.

In view of these and also many other considerations which lack of space prevents us from mentioning in this article (one being that China’s economic problems can only be solved by a transition from extensive to intensive farming, for which the acquisition of new territory is not required), the possibility that China will push northwards and get herself involved in a border conflict with the Soviet Union must be regarded as extremely remote. Deterioration of the situation along the border between China and her southern neighbor, India, is a much more

¹¹ See *Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, 1965, No. 39, p. 116.

¹² Sun Yat-sen, *San Min Chu I*, Taipeh, 1963, p. 13.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

distinct possibility. Before China can step out on the world political arena and satisfy her "great-power" ambitions, she must, first and foremost, achieve domination over India, either by conquering her militarily or by turning her into a Chinese satellite.

It is the prime goal of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia to prevent such a take-over by the Chinese. This became particularly evident during the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. According to Leninist theory, any conflict between "bourgeois" states is to the advantage of the "socialist camp" and must therefore be exacerbated by all possible means; should such a conflict flare up into armed hostilities, Communism's tactical objective of weakening the "bourgeois front" has been achieved, and all that remains is to pour oil on the flames. In this respect, the behavior of the Chinese Communists during the Kashmir conflict was entirely orthodox—although motivated by considerations which had nothing to do with Leninism. All the more surprising was the attitude adopted by the Soviet Union. True, after the death of Stalin Soviet policy toward the so-called "backward" countries, and especially those "liberating themselves from the colonialist yoke," underwent a certain revision. Whereas Stalin had branded as "lackeys of Western imperialism" countries in either of the above categories who showed reluctance to go over to Communism immediately, his successors required of these countries only that they preserve neutrality in the East-West conflict and, as far as possible, support the USSR in the United Nations. Under these circumstances, India, a country which, far from becoming Communist, took repressive measures against its own Communists, was able to build up fairly close ties with the USSR and receive Soviet economic and military aid. Pakistan, on the other hand, is, formally at least, a member of two anti-Communist military alliances, namely SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (the latter being directed specifically against the Soviet Union), and one would have expected that in view of this the USSR would have been only too ready to support India in her conflict with Pakistan in the interests of weakening the latter country militarily. This was not the case. For almost the first time in her history, the USSR assumed a strictly neutral attitude toward an armed conflict between two "bourgeois" states, and even made considerable efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement. True, there were certain subtle differences between the wordings of the appeals made to both sides by Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin. Thus, in his appeal to Indian Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri, Kosygin wrote:

India has offered concrete proof of her adherence to a policy of peace and peaceful coexistence on more than one occasion. This gives us grounds for hoping that statesmanship and wisdom will also be shown over Kashmir.¹⁴

The corresponding passage in Kosygin's letter to President Ayub Khan of Pakistan ran:

The fact that the government of Pakistan has been trying, particularly recently, to direct its efforts toward maintaining world peace, gives us, Mr. President, grounds

¹⁴ *Pravda*, September 12, 1965, p. 5.

for hoping that the government of Pakistan will, in connection with recent events in Kashmir, do everything in its power to end hostilities in this region and settle the conflict by peaceful means.¹⁵

Kosygin's remark that Pakistan had been striving for peace "particularly recently" is not without significance. Although we do not know exactly when the USSR began making overtures to Pakistan, there are good grounds for supposing that she did so in reply to the Sino-Pakistani *rapprochement* after the Chinese attack against India in the autumn of 1962. This seems to be the implication of the following excerpt from the *Jen Min Jih Pao* article we mentioned earlier:

The Soviet leaders are supporting the Indian reactionaries not only in order to prevent a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border question but also because they object to the fact that China is establishing and developing friendly relations with other countries in Asia and Africa, and particularly to the fact that China is settling long-standing disputes with other Asian countries. The *Pravda* article of September 21 and the Soviet government's declaration of the same date repeatedly express dissatisfaction with China because she has settled the question of her border with Pakistan and developed neighborly relations with that country. China is being basely and slanderously accused of "flirting with clearly reactionary regimes in Asia and Africa."¹⁶

For Moscow, which is trying to prevent India from coming under Chinese domination, the friendly relations between Pakistan and China and the hostility between Pakistan and India are equally disquieting. Should India be attacked by China, the USSR could only supply her with large-scale military aid by land. The USSR began to secure her land approaches to India long ago, by cultivating friendly relations with Afghanistan and building roads up to the Afghan-Pakistani border, but, as a glance at the map shows, the rest of the way lies through Pakistani territory. It is in the light of this circumstance that the visit of President Ayub Khan to Moscow in April 1965 must be viewed. That this visit may have ushered in a new era in Soviet-Pakistani relations seems to be the import of the speech delivered by Ayub Khan at the reception given in his honor. Said the Pakistani President:

It must be frankly admitted that only a few years ago relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union could hardly be described as cordial. Nevertheless, I should like to say in all sincerity that the people of Pakistan have always entertained the most friendly feelings for the Soviet people. . . . The people of Pakistan appreciate the role played by the Soviet Union in supporting liberation movements in various parts of the world and in defending the right of dependent peoples to self-determination.¹⁷

The joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit contained the following passage:

Both sides expressed their satisfaction with the present development of relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan. They declared that there were real oppor-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Die Wahrheit darüber* . . . , p. 36.

¹⁷ *Pravda*, April 9, 1965.

tunities for further developing neighborly relations between the two states and for strengthening confidence and mutually advantageous business cooperation between them despite the difference between their social and economic systems.¹⁸

It is perfectly clear that ideological or idealistic considerations play no part whatsoever in these diplomatic maneuverings. China is aiming at bringing India within its sphere of influence and at destroying India's social and political order so as to achieve domination over the whole of Asia and hence become a great power in the normal sense of the expression. India is expecting the USSR to come to her assistance against China, while Pakistan is alarmed at the prospect that large-scale Soviet aid to India may be used against her, Pakistan, in the Kashmir conflict. It now seems that the Soviet Union has most of the trump cards in this diplomatic game, and this fact is evidently infuriating the Chinese Communists, who are staking their chances on the ideological card. Thus, the *Jen Min Jih Pao* article dismissed the USSR's attempts to explain away her military aid to India as follows:

Denials and sophistry are to no avail. First of all, the Soviet-made weapons used by the Indian troops have been captured by the Chinese border troops during their defensive counterattack. Secondly, we should like to ask the leaders of the Soviet Union: What sort of people are you then? Arms dealers perhaps? If so, everything you say is perfectly correct. You deliver for ready cash, and on this basis you can do business with everyone. If, however, you call yourselves Communists and leaders of a socialist state as well, such speeches are completely false and utterly preposterous. How is it possible, from the standpoint of a Communist, to mention socialist China and India, which is dominated by the upper bourgeoisie, in the same breath? How can aid for reactionaries be placed in the same category as aid for a class brother?¹⁹

These accusations, however, take no account of the fact that for a long time now both the USSR and Communist China have been behaving in Southern Asia less as Communist states than as great powers with definite geopolitical objectives. This is why China was able to settle her border disputes with Burma, Nepal and Pakistan by peaceful means but cannot, or rather will not, do the same in the case of India.

Some Western observers consider that the Chinese attack against India was largely motivated by Peking's alarm at India's economic achievements. Their reasoning is as follows. China is trying to industrialize by Communist methods and India by democratic methods. Should India prove to be the more successful of the two in this respect, China would suffer a major propaganda setback, since her claim to be the only nation capable of showing underdeveloped countries the road to economic progress would be discredited. This theory does not bear analysis. First of all, India is industrializing at an extremely slow rate, and the problems which she is encountering in the process are in many cases much more complex than those with which the Chinese have to cope. Startling economic feats can hardly be expected from India for the time being, and should they be forthcoming the Chinese

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, April 11, 1965.

¹⁹ *Die Wahrheit darüber* . . . , p. 30.

Communists could always argue that they were merely the result of aid from the "imperialist" states, who had reduced India to a mere economic dependency, and from the Soviet Union, who had betrayed the principles of Marxism-Leninism and formed an alliance with the "imperialists" and the "bourgeoisie." However, as we have said, the Chinese will probably not have to resort to such arguments for a long time yet.

The reasons for China's aggressive policy toward India are rather political and geopolitical. During the first few years of India's independence, Nehru and Krishna Menon, particularly the latter, were often criticized by the opposition for failing to make India the leader of a non-Communist Asian bloc. At that time, Nehru was instead seeking to come to an agreement with China and form a bloc out of the colored nations, irrespectively of their social and political systems. In return, Chou En-lai promised the Indians that his country would never make an issue out of the disputed territories along the Sino-Indian border. At that time, however, China was a satellite of Moscow in matters of foreign policy, and had no intention of pushing southwards.

Since then, of course, the situation has changed completely. During the last few years, the Chinese Communists have not only been making attempts to swallow up Southern Asia but also, so it would seem, preparing to make a decisive breakthrough into the Near East and Africa. On none of his trips to Africa has Chou En-lai failed to make the sinister comment that the continent was "ripe for revolution." On the face of it, the Chinese intrigues in Africa—the Congo in particular—are pointless. Even if the Chinese Communists were to succeed in subverting an African state they could hardly turn it into a Chinese satellite because of the communications problem. These intrigues, however, make a good deal of sense if viewed as part of a vast scheme to encircle India and turn her into a Communist protectorate, or at the very least a reliable ally, of Peking.

By the same criterion, victory in South Vietnam is, so far as the Chinese leaders are concerned, not an end in itself but a stage in the Chinese drive to the south. The present Soviet reaction to events in Vietnam is therefore only understandable. As in many other parts of the world, the Soviets are on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the USSR has to render some sort of effective aid to the Vietcong rebels in her capacity of a Communist state committed to come to the assistance of all those waging "revolutionary wars," while on the other hand she knows full well that victory by the Vietcong would weaken her already shaky position in Asia while strengthening that of the Chinese, who would then most certainly start applying pressure first to Thailand and then to Malaysia. Hence the irresoluteness of Soviet aid to the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, which is constantly being jeered at by the Chinese.

The present quarreling between the Soviets and the Chinese must be regarded as nothing less than a jockeying for positions by both sides in preparation for a major showdown. It might appear at first sight that China now enjoys the more advantageous position. Many of her neighbors are either Chinese satellites or else

only too willing to cooperate with China in order to avoid being enslaved by her. Burma has long been cooperating with China in the closest possible fashion, Cambodia is virtually a Chinese satellite while the Pathet Lao in Laos appear to be working much more closely with Peking than with Moscow. The Japanese Communists have now gone completely over to the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet conflict and are accusing their Soviet colleagues of collaborating with the "imperialists" and departing from the "Communist norms for relations between individual Communist parties." A letter addressed to the Soviet Communist Party by the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party in the summer of 1964 declared:

The cause for the worsened relations between the CPJ and the CPSU lies in that: (1) You have unilaterally started public polemics within the international Communist movement and wanted our Party to follow your line in these polemics; (2) You have become so impatient of our rejection of your unjustifiable demand and our upholding of independent views that you have repeatedly attacked our Party by name, interfered in our internal affairs and made trouble with us.²⁰

The Japanese Communists concluded their letter by stating flatly that until the Soviet Communist Party publicly recanted its "revisionist" views there could be no talk of a reconciliation between the two parties. Thus, the Japanese Communists are taking just as unrelenting a line toward the Soviet Communist Party as are their Chinese colleagues.

Peking has also succeeded in establishing extremely close relations with both the Indonesian Communist Party and the Sukarno government, largely because both countries are united by a desire to "crush" Malaysia. It is not yet clear what repercussions the abortive *putsch* of last September will have on Sino-Indonesian relations, but quite obviously everything will depend on the extent to which the Indonesian government will adhere to its present policies, particularly in respect of Malaysia.

In fact, however, the Chinese position is by no means as strong as it appears. The Chinese have quite clearly failed to set themselves up as leaders of a united Afro-Asian bloc. Such a bloc does not exist and is hardly likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. The Chinese positions in a number of small neighboring states are certainly very strong, but only to the extent to which these states must reckon with the possibility of Chinese military aggression. Defeat of the Vietcong, who are now running into increasing difficulties, would, after the collapse of the Chinese-inspired revolt in the Congo, certainly weaken these positions.

As regards Japan, the prospects for a Communist power takeover in that country are remote indeed. True, there are many Japanese who would like to see closer relations between their country and Communist China, but even they would doubtless concede that, for the next few decades at least, Communist China will not be in a position to replace the USA and Western Europe as Japan's most important trading partner (at present Japan does more trade with Formosa than with mainland China). At the same time, the Japanese are well aware of the

²⁰ *Akabaya*, Tokyo, September 2, 1964.

military threat posed by China, and for this reason alone the Liberal-Democratic Party, the party responsible for the conclusion of the defensive alliance with the USA, may be expected to continue receiving an absolute majority in the Japanese parliament.

Finally, Sino-Indonesian cooperation, even should it survive last September's *putsch*, remains a house built on sand. The very possibility of a Communist victory in South Vietnam should make the Indonesian government aware of the Chinese threat and seek protection against it by seeking an alliance with either the USA or the USSR. The crushing of Malaysia would automatically remove the basis for the community of interests between China and Indonesia. Another serious obstacle to the formation of a durable alliance between the two nations is Indonesian nationalism, which in part is artificially stimulated.

On the other hand, the Soviet *rapprochement* with India, and to a lesser degree with Pakistan, is growing in the face of the Chinese threat, and is thus based on solid ground. In this way Indian nationalism is, thanks to the Chinese, benefiting the Soviets, while elsewhere in Asia nationalism is helping Peking only in a very limited sense.

At the same time, China is frightening away many present and potential allies by her radicalism, which is growing as she becomes more and more isolated. Scarcely any Asian or African country is prepared to go along with Peking in repudiating the United Nations, starting civil wars and adopting an aggressive attitude toward all white nations. Particularly in Africa, responsible politicians have long been warning against Peking's scheming and calling for the liquidation of the Afro-Asian bloc, which to all intents and purposes is dancing to the Chinese tune. The Kenyan Finance Minister, for example, made the following remark before the country's Senate in June of last year:

The other day Mr. Chou En-lai, who has no shame, said that the whole of Africa is ready for revolution, but against whom, I must ask? While the government of Kenya was grateful to China for giving it one million pounds sterling, this should not mean that Kenya must subject itself to China or allow its prestige and integrity to be abused.²¹

The Chinese Communists have failed to make a single anti-white bloc out of the Afro-Asian countries, for the simple reason that there is no real community of interests between the latter. In addition, the Chinese policy toward the Afro-Asian countries is unrealistic in that it asks them to make considerable sacrifices without offering them anything definite in return. It asks them, for example, to turn down all Soviet and Western aid. This was particularly evident at the Second Asian Economic Seminar held in the North Korean capital Pyongyang in June 1964, at which the head of the Chinese delegation, Nan Han-chen, expounded the thesis that a country should aim at complete economic self-sufficiency and not rely on foreign aid when building up its economic potential. According to Nan Han-chen, this "self-reliance," as he describes it, means

²¹ *East African Standard*, Nairobi, June 12, 1965.

... to rely mainly on the enthusiasm, initiative and creativeness of the masses of the people of one's own country and to rely on the internal resources and the accumulation of capital in the country in order to expand national construction, improve the people's livelihood and develop the national economy. It also means for a country to manufacture as far as possible and where conditions permit all the products it needs, to master as quickly as possible the technique and experience required for the development of its economy and to train its own technical and management personnel. Self-reliance also means to base all economic construction mainly on the foundation of a country's own manpower, material and financial resources.²²

Nan Han-chen said that Western aid must be turned down because it was part of a neo-colonialist plan to enslave peoples who had only recently succeeded in freeing themselves from the colonialist yoke. He also declared that Soviet, or "revisionist" aid as he described it, did not do the recipients any good either:

The modern revisionists also talk about "economic cooperation and economic aid." But they have no sincere desire to help the Asian and African countries to develop their independent national economies. In dealing with the Asian and African countries, they sometimes provide the machinery while holding back the key units and parts; sometimes they provide equipment while withholding technical knowledge, trying all they can to make the Asian and African countries economically dependent on them. . . . They have even gone so far as to cancel aid, withdraw experts and tear up contracts as a means of applying pressure.²³

Although there is certainly a lot of truth in what the Chinese say about Soviet economic aid, it seems equally certain that hardly any Afro-Asian country would seriously consider rejecting either Soviet or Western aid simply to accommodate the Chinese. Communist China has nothing to offer her potential allies except her "theory of revolution," which is scarcely calculated to arouse the enthusiasm of the established governments in the countries concerned, and this too is a reason for her failure to emerge at the head of an Afro-Asian bloc.

If Communist China nevertheless persists in her efforts to expand southwards, this is only because she has no other way of substantiating her claim to be a great power. In doing so, however, she is mobilizing the resistance of forces which she cannot hope to overcome in the foreseeable future. In the southwest, for example, she is opposed not only by India but also by the Soviet Union and virtually the entire Western world, and against such a coalition, which is no less real for being founded on a very limited community of interests, Chinese military power and the Chinese "theory of revolutionary warfare" can do nothing. Communist China's sole achievement to date has been to destroy the Soviet Union's prestige as the leader of a monolithic Communist bloc. On the other hand, the Soviets continue to occupy the more solid positions in the territories bordering on China, in Southern Asia, which is now the scene of a decisive struggle, and indeed almost everywhere in the world. Of major importance, however, is the fact that the many-faceted Sino-Soviet conflict is now taking place to the south of China, and will probably continue to do so for a long time to come.

²² *Peking Review*, July 3, 1964.

²³ *Ibid.*

Thus the treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual aid concluded by the USSR and China in 1950 is, as we said at the beginning of this article, now a dead letter, because the political contingencies which it was designed to meet have long ceased to be valid. Despite the absence of an official treaty to this effect, the USSR's ally in Asia is now India, and not Communist China, which has now emerged as a real enemy. Although at present the Chinese in no way constitute a threat to the USSR's territorial integrity or her existence as a state, their aggressiveness is a factor with which the Soviets have to reckon, and against which they are being compelled to take definite countermeasures.

A. Kashin

REVIEWS

The Periodical Press

Some considerable time has passed since the Soviet Party leaders were obliged to bring out once more the old banner of internationalism from their ideological storehouse and remove the cobwebs from it. Among the more important considerations that prompted them to do this were the postwar developments on the three continents of Africa, Asia and South America, which, though due to different causes and different in character, were known under the common label of "the national liberation movement." It goes without saying that the Soviet Party leaders were anxious to take a part in this political game and that they did everything to bring the movement to a head, since every conflict in the non-Communist world is considered by them to be a contribution to the building of Communism. They were also anxious, of course, to assume the secret leadership of this movement, but this was possible only under the banner of internationalism, which helps to disguise the real reasons for interfering in other countries' domestic affairs.

Another important circumstance that spoke in favor of restoring the slogan of internationalism was the existence of the USSR's postwar satellites. While in some cases paternal supervision and influence could be explained by a kind of Pan-Slavism, in others—such as Hungary, Rumania, Korea or Albania—recourse had to be taken to the Communist International, which justified intervention and called for political unity.

Finally, the present international situation, in which a number of countries are standing aloof from the two blocs and explosions of a social nature are prone to occur in many parts of the world, has provided the Soviet Party leaders with a third stimulus for promoting the principles of internationalism.

Apart from these factors, there is the multinational character of the Soviet Union itself, composed as it is of peoples of different races and varying in their history and religion, and this also necessitates some theoretical justification for political unity: here, too, the principle of internationalism serves its purpose. A recent article in *Kommunist*, for example, takes the USSR as its point of departure. Entitled "The Friendship of Peoples Building Communism," it refers to this friendship in the following terms:

The friendship uniting the peoples of our country, which was formed in the course of many years' common struggle against foreign aggressors, against Tsarist autocracy and the might of the landowners and capitalists, has been filled with new content, has acquired a socialist character and based itself on the firm foundations of proletarian internationalism (*Kommunist*, 1965, No. 16, page 4).

The editors of *Kommunist* regard this consolidation of the multinational elements that make up the Soviet Union and the Soviet peoples' economic and cultural achievements as a triumph of Marxism-Leninism. A passage from Lenin is quoted to back up this view:

"We rule, not by dividing according to the harsh law of ancient Rome," said V. I. Lenin shortly after the victory of the socialist revolution, "but by uniting all workers with the indissoluble bonds of living interests and class consciousness. And our Union, our new state, is more durable than an authoritarian regime which unites [its subjects] in artificial state formations necessary to the imperialists, by means of lies and a rod of iron" (pages 4–5).

In the light of this brotherhood of workers in the Soviet Union, the editors attempt to clarify the problem of the unity of nations on a world-wide scale. In doing so, they greatly magnify the role of the Party as a body striving to help backward peoples. The role of the Party within the Soviet Union is presented as follows:

The Party considered its task in the field of nationality policy to be that of bringing the backward peoples up to the level of the more highly developed, progressive peoples, creating in all the national republics a socialist industry and a socialist agriculture, carrying through the cultural revolution everywhere, and recruiting the masses of the people for the building of socialism. Skillfully combining the interests of each nation with the interests of the Soviet people as a whole and determinedly fighting great-power chauvinism and local nationalism, the Party has achieved the successful solution of this task (page 6).

The article goes on to assert that not only the political but also the economic and cultural inequality inherited from the *ancien régime* has been done away with during the period of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. They quote statistical data on the industrial development of individual Soviet republics and the establishment of large scientific institutions in which hundreds of thousands of people are employed, either as students or as researchers. The Soviet Army, in which members of all Soviet nationalities are staunch defenders of their country, is presented as an important factor in maintaining unity. The authors' main conclusion:

The bringing together in every possible way of the socialist nations and the strengthening of their social homogeneity is a law of socialism and Communism. At the same time, favorable objective conditions for the development of international relations must be supplemented by a deliberate influencing of this process, by constant concern to ensure that nations and nationalities are brought together in all departments of the life of society. Naturally, in the sphere of national relations fresh problems, sometimes even difficulties, may always arise, but they are entirely capable of being solved and overcome (page 12).

This leading article is merely the prelude to a lengthy exposition of the importance of the International, being followed by a contribution by B. Ponomarev entitled "Historical Lessons of the Seventh Comintern Congress and the Present Situation." This article is based on the meeting of representatives of thirty-eight Communist parties held in Prague on October 21–23, 1965 on the initiative of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the editorial board of the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the said Comintern congress. At this meeting, an attempt was made to revive the spirit of

internationalism which had marked the period following the October revolution, when the greatest hopes were placed on the international revolutionary movement and all national trends were rigorously condemned. An editorial note to the article states:

All delegations emphasized the present need for consolidating the international Communist movement on a basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism [and] the importance of joint action against imperialism and for the fundamental interests of the workers, for peace, democracy, national independence and socialism (page 14).

The article surveys the history of the international Communist movement, and links the Seventh Comintern Congress with the Party's concentrated efforts to determine the most important questions of policy and tactics for the movement as a whole. In the author's opinion, the entire course of history shows that the line taken by this congress was correct and "scientifically justified." The reader is reminded that the "struggle for the realization of the congress's decisions" proceeded under particularly difficult circumstances, at a time when a number of countries were ruled by fascism and when war broke out against the Soviet Union, the fulcrum of international socialism. Now, however, that fascism has been liquidated, the conditions are more favorable for a successful struggle for socialism on a world-wide scale.

When marking the thirtieth anniversary of the Seventh Congress, we particularly stress that its decisions are militantly opposed to aggressive and predatory wars and imperialism, which generates them (page 17).

It is stressed that this congress firmly established the idea of uniting democratic anti-imperialist forces, those forces which are due to become a decisive factor in international relations. The writer then proceeds to recent events, namely, the national liberation movement, to which the Communists have always attached great importance. We are told:

Our Party, basing itself on Lenin's teachings and elaborating them further, in accordance with the conditions of our era devotes unceasing attention to the national liberation movement and renders it all possible assistance, the tremendous importance of which is emphasized by many prominent leaders of this movement (page 21).

According to the article, new ways must be found to improve the work of all Communist parties. What is needed are absolute fidelity to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, implacable opposition to imperialism and fascism, a proper blending of national and international tasks, resistance to revisionism, dogmatism and nationalism, closer relations with the working class and the trade unions, and an ability to produce at any moment effective slogans capable of inciting the broad masses to action.

A noteworthy feature of the article is the emphasis laid on the need for co-existence as between national and international elements:

The conditions which today govern the activities of the Communist parties have become much more highly differentiated, and the scale of the national tasks with which they are confronted has increased. However, national tasks have never

removed the necessity of ensuring the international unity of Communists. This is particularly obvious at the present time, when the danger of anti-internationalist tendencies is clearly growing (page 24).

Evidently, the need for such "coexistence" is due to the fact that nationalist manifestations cannot disappear automatically, even when the *avant-garde* of the workers has acquired power. These manifestations

... exist as a burdensome heritage from the past, and may sometimes seriously slow down the building of socialism and the strengthening of the socialist commonwealth (page 25).

The relentless struggle of the Communists against manifestations of nationalism is, we are told, a very important condition for consolidating the world anti-imperialist front. Originally, proletarian internationalism was expressed exclusively in the solidarity of the workers of various countries in their struggle on behalf of common class interests; later, however, as the revolutionary struggle spread the tasks of internationalism grew correspondingly wider and became the foundation on which the cardinal problems of humanity could be solved.

Speaking generally, the article may be taken as a call to consolidate the ranks of the international army of Communists on the eve of what the author describes as "large-scale social battles." The cause of socialism, he says, is progressing further and further as new fighting units of the working class emerge in the people's democracies.

The same issue of *Kommunist* contains a press review entitled "Under the Banner of Proletarian Internationalism." Here, the reader is acquainted with some of the contents of periodicals published in such countries as Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, the editors informing him in each case to what extent the journal concerned deals with questions of proletarian internationalism. It is pointed out in each individual case to what extent these leading Party press organs reflect the position of the Soviet Party Central Committee. Pride of place is given to the Communist press of Rumania, which, according to the editors of *Kommunist*, takes the most definite stand against the aggressive plans of imperialism. We read:

The journal [*Lupta de clasa*] emphasizes that the policy pursued by imperialist circles of interfering in the domestic affairs of other peoples constitutes a great threat to the cause of peace. The Rumanian people indignantly condemns the armed intervention of the USA in South Vietnam and the aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and insistently demands their cessation (page 116).

The subject of internationalism is also dealt with in an article in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* entitled "The Class Nature and the Humanism of Socialist Foreign Policy." Here, internationalism is regarded as one of the conditions required for ensuring peace:

The struggle for peace [and] the policy of peaceful coexistence are inseparable from the policy of proletarian socialist internationalism, which is the main foreign policy principle of socialism. There is no force more dangerous to the imperialists

than the solidarity of peoples, of all workers, in the fight against reaction and oppression, for social progress, national liberation, democracy and peace (*Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, 1965, No. 11, page 15).

The article asserts that the relations between the socialist countries and "international relations of a new type" are based on the principle of socialist internationalism. The manifold and increasing aid given by the Soviet Union to other countries of the Communist bloc for the purposes of "economic and cultural construction" is presented as a manifestation of Soviet internationalism, the nature of which is described as follows:

The relations of socialist internationalism are of particular importance for two reasons: first, they represent a prototype of those international relations which will prevail, utterly and completely, throughout the world when the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism has been completed on a worldwide scale; second, their all-out development is an important condition for resolving in favor of socialism the fundamental conflict in the present era—the conflict between capitalism and socialism. The entire historical experience of the socialist system points to the necessity of maintaining the closest alliance between the countries abandoning capitalism and of uniting their efforts for the building of socialism and Communism and waging the struggle against imperialism (page 16).

In its conclusion, the article observes that dozens of new states are following the path of independent development and describes this as a fruitful process which helps to bring about a rejuvenation or renewal of democracy along the lines of an international commonwealth.

In order to complete the picture of internationalist tendencies in current Soviet policy, we should also mention the article by A. Rumyantsev, "The Historical Significance of the Seventh Comintern Congress and the Contemporary Communist Movement," published in *Kommunist* (1965, No. 15) and dealt with briefly in our last review of the Soviet periodical press. Reviewing the various stages in the development of the international movement, Rumyantsev concludes that the principles adopted thirty years ago are just as valid today:

Today, considerably more favorable possibilities are opening up before the entire world revolutionary liberation movement than thirty years ago. Much of what the Seventh Comintern Congress was only groping for is today being broadly developed in the work of the Communist parties, which base their policies on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and in their actions take account of the concrete conditions in each country (*Kommunist*, 1965, No. 15, page 33).

In conclusion, there is one more reason for the renewed interest in "internationalism" apart from those enumerated at the beginning of this review. In reviving the principles of the Communist International, the Soviet Party leaders are demonstrating to the Communist parties of the world (and particularly those of Europe) that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is keeping its political powder dry and, regardless of Chinese Communist accusations, is standing guard over the purity of Marxism-Leninism and avoiding the pitfall of revisionism.

A. Gayev

Literatur und Politik in der Sowjetunion nach Stalins Tod

By ALEXANDER STEININGER

Published for the Osteuropa-Institut, Munich, by Otto Harrassowitz,
Wiesbaden, 1965, 236 pp.

Russian literature during the time of the Tsars was not only a faithful portrayer of life but the conscience of the entire Russian people. Its influence on the country's political and social development was tremendous, and it was therefore not surprising that as soon as they seized power the Communists impressed it into the service of the Party and forced it to depict life according to "socialist realism." The writer, while retaining his function of influencing the thoughts and emotions of his readers, was to be guided not by his own conscience but by Party directives. Herein lies the fundamental difference between Russian and Soviet literature, a difference of which Alexander Steininger is well aware. He writes:

The Revolution interrupted the natural complex development of Russian literature and thrust extra-literary tasks upon it. It forced Russian literature to take a course which ran counter to any kind of independent development. For this reason, Soviet literature cannot be regarded as an organic continuation of Russian literature even though, as is only to be expected, Soviet Russian literature contains many features of the latter as regards character, form and structure. The further organic development of Russian literature was brought to a halt by the strict political discipline imposed by the regime, which impressed its stamp upon it (pages 17-18).

Of course, this did not mean that Russian literature as such ceased to exist; it merely went underground and assumed a wait-and-see posture. True, during the last few years of Stalin's rule, when Soviet writers were dutifully "varnishing reality," it certainly seemed that Russian literature had finally capitulated in the face of massive Party pressure and become utterly divorced from reality. However, the very first year after Stalin's death showed how false this impression had been. As soon as Stalin's reign of terror came to an end, the restless searching which had been taking place under the seemingly unruffled surface of Stalinist literature became articulate, and the works of Soviet writers began to show some of the humanitarian traits of Russian literature.

Alexander Steininger's book is an attempt to portray the struggle which has been going on in the Soviet Union between writers and the authorities ever since Stalin's death. The author approaches this task with extreme caution, and remarks, for example, that not all of the criticism leveled by the writers against "Soviet reality" should be taken as opposition to the regime, which actually encourages such criticism, providing it remains within certain limits—limits which have been exceeded by the writers on not a few occasions in recent years.

Steininger considers that the most important development to have taken place in the USSR during the post-Stalin era has been the intellectual emancipation

of the Soviet people, particularly the young people, whom the regime had hoped to turn into "new Soviet men and women." As the author points out, it is the young writers who are leading the revivalist movement in Soviet literature, which is becoming more and more Russian in character as a result. Steininger describes in detail the bitter squabbles between various writers and the Party during the "thaw," and shows that the Party's efforts to force Soviet literature back into the narrow channel carved out for it by Lenin and Stalin are failing.

The author rates Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speeches as being highly important inasmuch as they opened the eyes of the entire Soviet people, the writers of course included, to the hypocrisy which had pervaded their lives during the Stalin era, and hence opened the door to attacks against the regime, particularly on the part of young writers. Particularly dangerous for the regime, according to Steininger, is the fact that during the "thaw" the necessity of giving a writer a "social assignment" was questioned, so that now young writers take a disapproving view of being told by the authorities to write about "socialist construction" and the like and select their own themes.

It was during this period that Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone* appeared, a work which, although of no particular literary merit, paved the way for a massive attack on Soviet reality by Soviet writers. As Steininger points out, the literary "thaw" is still in progress. Although the authorities have forced individual writers to capitulate, they have not been able to halt the general trend in Soviet literature which started after the Twentieth Party Congress. Soviet writers are resorting to a number of devices to stress their independent attitude, ranging from the "conspiracy of silence" of certain prominent literary figures to the publication of underground journals by young writers.

Steininger rates the role played by Yevtushenko as entirely positive, despite his erratic maneuvering and his attempts to come to an agreement with the authorities. Indeed, says the author, in the general atmosphere of conflict and change following the official condemnation of Stalin's crimes even writers faithful to the regime are not sure exactly what is required of them. Whereas before the demands of "socialist realism" were clear, there is now confusion; the Party asks now for works "varnishing reality" as in Stalin's time, now for critical works—providing that the latter do not go too far. All this, says Steininger, is a consequence of the fact that Soviet intellectual life is on the move, a process which the regime is apparently incapable of stopping. The developments on the Soviet literary scene, on the other hand, are merely a reflection of the intellectual emancipation which has swept through the whole of Soviet society, the intelligentsia, of course, in particular. Writes Steininger:

As a result of their increased self-confidence, people [in the Soviet Union] are tending to think more and more outside the limits tolerated by the Party. The duality of Soviet life . . . has to a certain extent given way to greater frankness, in the private sphere at least. People are more free and easy. This change in psychological attitudes, which, as much as anything else, is a reaction to the Party's lies and is closely connected with what is called de-Stalinization, is also responsible for a

number of manifestations, sentiments and trends which run counter to the objectives of the Party and constitute at least a potential danger for the latter. Many of these manifestations . . . are particularly prevalent among the young people (page 218).

Steininger shows, in fact, that the conviction, widespread in the West, that nearly five decades of Party propaganda have produced a kind of *homo sovieticus* who is completely uncritical of "Soviet reality" and Party policy is founded on an illusion. Such a person does not exist. Soviet youth as a whole—and not only the young writers—is rebelling against the tedium of "socialist realism," the more so because it reflects the tedium of "Soviet reality." Steininger must be commended not only because he draws attention to this fact, but also because he offers a detailed and systematic survey of the "heretical" Soviet literature of the post-Stalin period (here a word of praise must be added for the excellent translations of Soviet poems, many of which had not previously appeared in German) and of the Party's futile attempts to put a stop to this "heresy." Of course, as Steininger points out, all these undercurrents do not represent a direct threat to the regime at present, but they might in the long run if the Party does not nip them in the bud. Steininger does not think that the Party will be able to do this. He concludes:

Taken together, the factors described constitute a potential weakening of the regime. These processes can also be described as significant. The essential point is that they are probably largely irreversible. At the same time, it must be strongly emphasized that the developments portrayed do not constitute a danger for the regime, not at present at least. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that things have started moving in the Soviet Union, even although anything may happen. The Soviet Union has reached a turning point and is undergoing considerable socio-political changes (page 221).

One cannot but agree with the author on this point.

A. Kashin

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

November 1965

- 1 First Secretary of Party Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev discusses international problems and future Franco-Soviet relations with visiting French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville.

Death of Party Central Committee Candidate Member and Supreme Soviet Deputy D. A. Polikarpov.

- 2 Two-day-long Seventh Plenary Meeting of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions comes to an end in Moscow. Subjects discussed were tasks facing Soviet trade unions as a result of resolutions adopted at September plenary meeting of Party Central Committee (speech by Council's Chairman, V. V. Grishin) and results of Sixth World Trade Union Congress.

Launching of twelve-ton Soviet space laboratory "Proton-2."

Meeting of secretariat of Union of Journalists of USSR to discuss results of session of executive committee of International Organization of Journalists held in Chile. Reports delivered by Union secretaries D. Goryunov and V. Chernyshev.

Announcement that Volga-Uvod Canal, to supply Ivanovo with water, has been brought into operation.

- 3 Publication of joint communiqué on visit to USSR of French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville.

Conference of trade union officials held to discuss reports of trade union organizations, election of trade union officials, measures to instill a "socialist" work discipline into workers, fulfillment of 1965 state social security budget, the draft for the 1966 budget and measures to fulfill plan for the construction of rest homes and tourist facilities.

Chairman of Algerian Revolutionary Council Houari Boumedienne receives Soviet delegation led by Chairman of Council of Nationalities J. V. Peive and Soviet military delegation led by Chief of General Staff of Soviet Armed Forces, Marshal M. V. Zakharov,

who have arrived to take part in celebrations of eleventh anniversary of beginning of Algerian war of revolution.

Party Central Committee Member and First Secretary of Latvian Party Central Committee A. J. Pelše and Deputy Head of Party Central Committee's International Affairs Department A. S. Belyakov arrive in Copenhagen to attend Twenty-Second Congress of Danish Communist Party.

- 4 Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-95."

Singapore government delegation arrives in Moscow.

Announcement that third session of Soviet-Polish Permanent Subcommittee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation has come to an end in Moscow after having surveyed results of subcommittee's activities from April to October 1965 and approved program for remaining period of 1965 and 1966.

Announcement that Soviet committee with Tadzhik writer Mirzo Tursun-zade as its chairman has been formed to promote First Solidarity Conference of Asian, African and Latin American Countries to be held from January 3 to January 10, 1966.

- 5 Soviet Foreign Ministry issues statement of protest in connection with US Defense Department's announcement of October 5 that US and Western Germany had concluded agreement on establishment of military school in Fort Bliss (Texas) for training West German military personnel to operate US rockets.

Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees that seventh session of Supreme Soviet of sixth convocation shall be convened in Moscow on December 7.

Announcement that Soviet Ambassador to Senegal V. I. Yerofeyev, recently given additional post of Ambassador to Gambia, has presented his credentials in the Gambian capital, Bathurst.

Third section of Kiev subway system, connecting Oktyabrsky and Darnitsky districts, brought into operation.

- Delegation of Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, led by Rector of First Moscow Medical Institute and Member of Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences Professor V. V. Kovanov, arrives in Peking.
- Protocol allowing Aeroflot to carry out regular flights to Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania signed in Kampala.
- 6 Pakistani-Soviet Cultural Society founded in Karachi, Dr. M. Ali being elected as its chairman.
- Chairman of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions V. V. Grishin receives delegation from Central Committee of South Vietnamese National Liberation Front.
- Brezhnev, Party Central Committee Presidium Member A. P. Kirilenko and Party Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev receive Chilean parliamentary delegation.
- Brezhnev receives Cuban Vice Premier and Armed Forces Minister Major Raúl Castro Ruz.
- Meeting of Moscow City Council and Party Committee, attended by guests from 67 countries, held to celebrate 48th anniversary of October Revolution. Speech delivered by Party Central Committee Presidium Member and First Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers D. S. Polyansky. Similar meetings held in other Soviet cities.
- 7 Parade of Moscow garrison troops, followed by demonstration of Moscow workers, takes place on Red Square in celebration of 48th anniversary of October Revolution. Parade taken by Defense Minister Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky and commanded by Commander of Moscow City Garrison and Moscow Military District, General of the Army A. P. Beloborodov. Anti-rocket rockets and rockets capable of being fired from submarines shown.
- Publication of Marshal Malinovsky's order on occasion of 48th anniversary of October Revolution.
- 8 Announcement that first constituent meeting of UAR-USSR Friendship Society has been held in Cairo. Speech delivered by UAR High Dam Minister Zedki Soliman.
- 9 Chairman of Supreme Soviet Presidium A. I. Mikoyan receives Vice President of Central African Republic.
- Chairman of Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin receives Chilean parliamentary delegation.
- 10 Soviet Militia Day.
- Moscow City Planning Council adopts resolution to erect the Triumphal Arch which formerly stood near the Belorussian Station on the Kutuzovskiy Prospekt near the "Battle of Borodino" tableau.
- Delegation of Czech Communist Party workers led by head of schools and science department of Party's Central Committee arrives in Moscow to study Party administration of science and education in the USSR.
- Soviet trade union delegation led by V. V. Grishin leaves for Belgrade at invitation of Central Council of Yugoslav Federation of Trade Unions.
- Mali governmental delegation led by Education Minister arrives in Moscow.
- 11 Round-table meeting between over one hundred Soviet and foreign news correspondents and prominent Soviet lawyers who took part in Nuremberg trials held to mark twentieth anniversary of these trials. Speech delivered by chief Soviet prosecutor at the trials, Procurator General R. A. Rudenko.
- Delegation from Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and "USSR-Sweden" Society, led by RSFSR Health Minister V. V. Trofimov, leaves Moscow for Stockholm.
- Announcement that Indian Finance Minister T. T. Krishnamachari has been received by Chairman of State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations S. A. Skachkov and Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev.
- Announcement that All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions has adopted resolution on conclusion of collective agreements for 1965.
- Announcement that conference on standardization in electrical engineering and electronics, attended by representatives from the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, has been convened in Kiev by permanent Comecon commission for standardization.
- Moscow City Council delegation led by Chairman of Council's Executive Committee, V. F. Promyslov, arrives in Ankara at invitation of that city's Mayor.
- Bulgarian Communist Party delegation led by Party Central Committee Secretary Nacho Papazov arrives in Moscow to study Party administration of industry in the USSR.

Agreement between Aeroflot and East African Airways allowing former to carry out regular flights to Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania signed on basis of protocol signed in Kampala on November 5.

Finnish trade delegation arrives in Moscow for negotiations on Soviet-Finnish trade in 1966.

- 12 Announcement that protocol on Soviet-Icelandic trade during period 1966-68 has been signed in Moscow. Deputy Head of Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry's Department for Trade with Western Countries, M. N. Gribkov, signs for the USSR.

Announcement that delegation of Soviet scientists led by President of Academy of Sciences M. V. Keldysh has arrived back from France.

Soviet space capsule "Venera-2" launched in direction of Venus.

Soviet trade union delegation arrives in Belgrade.

- 13 Chairman of State Committee for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries S. K. Romanovsky and Mali Education Minister sign cultural exchange agreement covering period 1966-67.

Bicentennial of foundation of I. M. Sechenov First Moscow Medical Institute.

Soviet governmental delegation led by Party Central Committee Presidium Member and First Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers K. T. Mazurov and including Deputy Chairman of State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations I. A. Kuleyev leaves for Kabul to attend official opening of Kushka-Herat-Kandahar motor road, built with Soviet assistance.

- 14 Minister of Higher and Special Secondary Education V. P. Yelyutin opens Institute of Russian Studies in Delhi, set up on initiative of Indian government.

Announcement that hydroelectric power station has been under construction in the Pulisanginskoye Ravine at Nurek (Tadzhikistan) since 1964.

- 15 Announcement that Council of Ministers and Party Central Committee Presidium have approved drafts of 1966 budget and national economic development plan.

Announcement that Guinean trade delegation has arrived in Moscow to negotiate 1966 trade agreement.

RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees that sixth session of RSFSR Supreme Soviet of sixth convocation shall be convened in Moscow on December 16.

Soviet delegation led by Transport Construction Minister Y. F. Kozhevnikov leaves Moscow for Rome under scientific and technical cooperation agreement.

One-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of launching of first Russian steamship, the "Yelizaveta," into the Neva at St. Petersburg.

Exhibition of works of Mikhail Sholokhov opened in V. I. Lenin Library in Moscow to mark award of Nobel Prize to this author. Speech delivered by Chairman of State Press Committee N. Mikhailov.

Opening in Moscow of conference on cooperation in space research and peaceful use of space, attended by representatives from USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Mongolia and Cuba. Possibility of joint construction and launching of artificial satellites discussed.

- 16 Publication of Soviet government's statement condemning unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith.

Finnish Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ahti Karjalainen arrives in Moscow at head of Finnish trade delegation.

Soviet space capsule "Venera-3" launched toward Venus.

Session of Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences devoted to development of agriculture in non-black-earth zone opens in Moscow.

- 17 Soviet trade union delegation led by Secretary of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions P. T. Pimenov leaves Moscow for Hanoi at invitation of North Vietnamese General Confederation of Trade Unions.

International seminar on digital methods of short-range weather forecasting organized in Moscow by newly established World Meteorological Center within framework of expanded UN technical assistance program.

First Transcaucasian Gerontological and Geriatric Conference opens in Tbilisi.

- 18 Agreement on scientific cooperation between Soviet and Chinese Academies of Sciences in 1965 and 1966 signed in Moscow.

Staff of newly established Embassy of Republic of Chad arrive in Moscow.

- Soviet-Polish trade and payments agreement: envisaging trade to the value of over eight thousand million rubles between the two countries during the period 1966-70 signed in Moscow.
- Kosygin receives head of Guinean trade delegation.
- Soviet-Guinean trade agreement for 1966 signed in Moscow.
- 19 Announcement that all-Union symposium on the genetics and selection of microorganisms has begun in Yerevan.
- Rocket Troops and Artillery Day.
- Delegation from Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, including Academician Y. K. Fedorov and writer Ilya Ehrenburg, leaves for Sofia to attend session of presidium of World Peace Council.
- Kosygin receives US Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Senators Aiken, Boggs, Inouye and Muskie at their request. Member of College of Soviet Foreign Ministry M. N. Smimovsky present.
- Soviet-Mongolian trade agreement for 1966 signed in Moscow.
- 20 Delegation from Presidium of Rumanian Academy of Sciences, led by Academy's President and Vice President of Rumanian State Council Ilie Murgulescu, arrives in Moscow.
- Brezhnev, Party Central Committee Secretary and Presidium Member M. A. Suslov and Party Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev receive First Secretary of Central Committee of Greek Communist Party.
- Announcement that exhibition of Finnish electronic equipment and Swedish office machines has opened in Moscow.
- Announcement that group of Soviet poets, including Aleksei Surkov, Leonid Martynov, Semen Kirsanov, Aleksandr Tvardovsky, Boris Slutsky, Robert Rozhdestvensky, Andrei Voznesensky, Viktor Sosnora and Bella Akhmadulina are in Paris as guests of French government and a French publishing house.
- Construction of Belorussian Tire Plant, to produce heavy-duty tires, starts in Bobruisk.
- Soviet-Finnish trade agreement signed. USSR to supply Finland with machinery, automobiles, tractors, solid and liquid fuels and ferrous and non-ferrous metals in exchange for paper-making machinery, ships, etc.
- 21 Announcement that construction of second stage of Tashkent State District Power Station has begun.
- Announcement that seminar for state prosecution officials at republican, krai and oblast levels has been held in Moscow. Subjects discussed were the consolidation of "socialist" legality, tighter supervision by the State Prosecutor's Office in criminal investigation matters and improvements in the selection and training of state prosecution officials. Speeches delivered by Procurator General R. A. Rudenko and Chairman of Supreme Court A. F. Gorkin.
- Announcement that talks have taken place in Moscow between Israeli Communist Party delegations and Suslov, Ponomarev and Deputy Head of Party Central Committee's International Affairs Department V. G. Korionov.
- 22 Brezhnev receives Cuban Vice Premier and Armed Forces Minister Major Raúl Castro Ruz. Party Central Committee Secretary Y. V. Andropov present.
- Three-day conference on economics and economic propaganda opens in Moscow.
- 23 Soviet-Cuban agreement on expansion of economic and technical cooperation signed in Moscow. Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers V. N. Novikov signs for the USSR. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Mikoyan, Mazurov, Polyansky, Podgorny, Suslov, Kirilenko and others present.
- Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-96."
- Delegation from State Committee for Labor and Wages, led by the Committee's Chairman, A. P. Volkov, leaves for London at invitation of British Labor Minister.
- Announcement that deposits of turquoise have been discovered in Kyzyl Kum Desert, of amethyst in the northern part of the Fergana Valley, of nephrite in the Issyk-Kul region and of jasper in the vicinity of the River Naryn.
- Ninth Congress of Coal Industry Workers' Trade Union opens in Moscow. Report delivered by the chairman of the trade union's central committee, V. G. Arkhipov.
- Fifth Congress of Oil and Chemical Industry Workers' Trade Union opens in Moscow. Report delivered by the chairman of the trade union's central committee, V. S. Krivich.

- First Constituent Congress of Union of Cinematographic Workers of the USSR opened in Moscow by Honored Art Worker of the RSFSR Professor L. V. Kuleshov. Speech on "Communist Construction and the Tasks Facing Soviet Cinematography" delivered by L. A. Kulidzhanov, who is elected First Secretary of the Union's Board.
- 24 Brazilian trade delegation arrives in Moscow. Conference of deputy defense ministers and top army leaders of Warsaw Pact countries opens in Moscow. Speech delivered by Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces, Marshal A. A. Grechko.
- Chairman of Supreme Soviet Presidium A. I. Mikoyan awarded Order of Lenin on occasion of his seventieth birthday.
- 25 All-Union seminar on use of radio-isotope techniques in industry opens in Moscow. Kosygin receives Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto. Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko and Head of Soviet Foreign Ministry's Southern Asia Department V. I. Likhachev present.
- Seventh Congress of Agricultural and State Purchasing Workers' and Employee's Trade Union opens in Moscow. Report delivered by secretary of the trade union's central committee I. I. Melnikov.
- Announcement that Soviet delegation led by First Deputy Foreign Trade Minister M. R. Kuzmin has arrived in Copenhagen to attend opening of Soviet industrial exhibition.
- Publication of TASS warning to shipping and aircraft of test launchings of Soviet space rockets into an area of the Central Pacific having a radius of 40 sea miles and a center with coordinates 00°05'S and 163°45'W during the period November 25—December 25.
- 26 Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-97."
- Announcement that Soviet cosmonauts Belyayev and Leonov have visited Danish satellite tracking station.
- 27 Announcement that first issue of *Turist*, a new illustrated monthly of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, will come out in January.
- Launching of Soviet artificial satellite "Kosmos-98."
- Protocol on proceedings of Ninth Session of Comecon's Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy signed in Tbilisi.
- 28 Poetry Day celebrated in Moscow.
- 29 British Foreign Minister Michael¹ Stewart arrives in Moscow on official visit.
- All-Union scientific discussion on the provision of economic incentives for technical and industrial development opened in Moscow by Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A. M. Rumyantsev.
- Opening of jubilee scientific conference devoted to centenary of the founding of the K. A. Timiryazev Agricultural Academy. Report on the Academy's work delivered by its Rector, Professor I. S. Shatilov.
- Sixth Congress of Cultural Workers' Trade Union opened. Report delivered by the Chairman of the Trade Union's Central Committee, T. G. Kalinnikov.
- Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev arrives in East Berlin to sign Soviet-East German trade agreement covering period 1966—70.
- First experimental color television transmitted from Moscow to Paris via Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Molniya-1."
- 30 Announcement that in 1966 the Central Archives Department of the Council of Ministers will begin publishing a new journal called *Sovetskiye arkhivy* in collaboration with the Party Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
- Brezhnev, Kosygin, Mikoyan and other Party and government leaders visit automobile exhibition on site of Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy in Moscow.
- Soviet-Rumanian cultural and scientific cooperation agreement for 1966—70 signed in Bucharest, Deputy Chairman of State Committee for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries being the signatory for the USSR.
- Talks between Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko and his British counterpart Michael Stewart begin in Soviet Foreign Ministry. First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov also present.
- Twentieth Session of Comecon's Executive Committee opens in Moscow.
- Announcement that Brezhnev has visited First Secretary of East German Socialist Unity Party and Chairman of East German State Council Walter Ulbricht at latter's request from November 27 to November 29.

Changes and Appointments

- 12 A. M. Shkolnikov relieved of duties of First Secretary of Volgograd Oblast Party Committee in connection with his appointment as First Deputy Chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers and replaced by L. S. Kulichenko.
- 13 M. T. Yefremov appointed Deputy Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers.
- 15 N. A. Mikhailov first mentioned as Chairman of State Press Committee.
- 24 Announcement that General of the Army P. I. Batov has been relieved of duties of Chief of Staff of Warsaw Pact Forces at his own request, owing to poor health, and replaced by General of the Army M. I. Kazakov.
- 26 I. T. Marchenko relieved of duties of First Secretary of Tomsk Oblast Party Committee in connection with his appointment as Minister of Local Industry of the RSFSR and replaced by Y. K. Ligachev.

Addenda and Corrigenda

In the Chronicle for September 1965 (*Bulletin*, 1965, No. 11), the entry for September 17 under the heading "Changes and Appointments" should read: "Ambassador to Senegal V. I. Yerofeyev given additional post of Ambassador to **Gambia**."

On page 17 of the *Bulletin*, 1965, No. 12, line 21 should read: "talent of a **pace-setter** of Soviet literature, Mikhail Aleksandrovich Sholokhov."

*

The following information should be added to the Chronicle for October 1965 (*Bulletin*, 1965, No. 12):

On October 9, by virtue of a decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium abolishing the appointment of Minister of the USSR, the following were released from their duties as Ministers of the USSR: A. A. Etmekdzhiyan, A. A. Goreglyad, N. P. Gusev, V. A. Kalamkarov, G. A. Karavayev, A. V. Korobov, V. D. Lebedev, N. V. Martynov, M. V. Posokhin, A. V. Romanov, P. K. Romanov, A. Y. Ryabenko, V. M. Ryabikov, V. K. Sitnin, S. A. Stepanov and S. M. Tikhomirov.

On October 9, in connection with a proposal of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Supreme Soviet Presidium laid down that the chairmen of the State Committees for Sound and Television Broadcasting, for Cinematography and for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries and the State Press Committee are no longer members of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

On October 19, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR abolished the Virgin Lands (Tselinny) Krai and made its constituent oblasts (those of Kokchetav, Kustanai, North Kazakhstan, Pavlodar and Tselinograd) immediately subordinate to the government of the Kazakh SSR.

Notes on Contributors

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AKHMINOV, HERMAN. Born 1921 at Arkhangelsk. Studied at Leningrad University, 1939–40; taken prisoner of war, 1942; later studied at Oxford (B.Litt., 1959); member of the Research Section of the Institute for the Study of the USSR since 1957. Writer and lecturer on Soviet problems; author of *Die Macht im Hintergrund* (1950), *Die Totengräber des Kommunismus* (1964), *Breschnew und Kossygin: Die neuen Männer im Krewl?* (1964) and numerous articles.

GALAY, NIKOLAI. Born 1902 at Staritsa, Tver Province. Studied and later taught on General Golovin's advanced courses on military science in Paris, 1927–39. Served with the White Army during the Civil War and, as a battalion commander, with the Vlasov Army in World War II. Senior associate of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, specializing in military affairs and Soviet foreign policy. Editor of the *Bulletin*.

KRUZHIN, PETR. Born 1921 in what is now Kalinin Oblast. Left school in 1939 and entered an officers' training school, from which he graduated in 1941. While at school and in the army, was an active member of the Komsomol. Taken prisoner by the Germans in 1942 and joined the Vlasov movement in 1943. Since then has written on political subjects and Soviet youth (including "A Young Communist" in *Thirteen Who Fled*, New York, 1949).

KASHIN, A. Born 1927 in Shanghai, son of a Russian émigré family. Grew up in China. In 1946, took Soviet citizenship and until 1948 worked as a TASS correspondent. In that year, wrote an open letter to the Shanghai press renouncing his Soviet citizenship on ethical grounds. After the Communists' seizure of Shanghai, was several times arrested and in 1952 expelled from China. Since then, has been living in Western Germany and working as a free-lance journalist.

GAYEV, ARKADY. Journalist. Worked for *Pravda* and *Izvestia* and also for the Soviet regional press from 1921 until World War II, since when he has been living in Munich. A regular contributor of articles on Soviet literature and the Soviet press to the publications of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

BULLETIN

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Nikolai Galay



INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

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ARTICLES

Consumer Goods in Soviet Industry

ALEKSANDER KÜTT

Although Mr. Kutt's article was written before the appearance of the official Soviet statistical yearbook on the national economy in 1964, his estimates for that year do not differ materially from the official data. We are therefore publishing his article without alteration.

Since the obviously permanent eclipse of Khrushchev, the West has been examining with especial care all statements and actions made by the new Soviet collective leadership. Naturally enough, one of the questions of greatest interest to the West has been what course the new leaders might set in the economic sphere. In fact, so long as power continues to play a dominant role in international politics, the new leaders' economic plans and their implementation will reveal more of their ultimate intentions than any political statements. For the West, the question of paramount importance was whether the new leaders would continue the overwhelmingly preferential treatment of heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods output.

Five days after the fall of Khrushchev, when the Central Committee's new First Secretary Brezhnev and the new premier Kosygin both spoke at the festive meeting in honor of the latest Soviet 'spacemen, the prospects of a change for the better were not promising. In the precarious situation in which the new leaders found themselves, one might have expected them to state clearly that in future the consumer would be given at least equal, if not preferential, treatment, if they had had the slightest intention to adopt such a course. Instead, Brezhnev repeated the old formula of the "development of the productive forces of our society and, on this basis, the steady improvement of the well-being of the Soviet people." Kosygin assured his hearers in general terms that the Party had "no higher, nobler or more vital task than that of ensuring that the living standard and well-being of the Soviet people shall show a steady growth." Further statements on economic policy which followed in November 1964 gave no grounds for any greater optimism.

The surprise and pleasure were consequently all the greater when, in a speech before the Supreme Soviet on December 9, 1964, Kosygin declared that in 1965 the output of producer goods was to increase by 8.2 percent and that of consumer goods by 7.7 percent. The difference between these two growth rates was only 6 percent.

Another surprise in Kosygin's speech was the statement that the production of consumer goods during 1964 would show an increase of 6.5 percent. Since

the light and food industries, which account for about 90 percent of the output of consumer goods,¹ had shown an increase of only 2 percent in the first half of that year, the figure given by Kosygin seemed to imply an extraordinary effort by the new leaders in the last months of 1964 to make more consumer goods available. To find something comparable to this implied achievement, one has to go back to the year 1957, when, after the Hungarian uprising, a number of Communist regimes displayed equal dexterity in switching over to a temporary preferential treatment of consumer goods.

Of apparently only formal significance was the parenthetical remark "in the planned group" (*po planiruyemomu krugu*) in the heading under which the growth figures were presented—a formula which had never been employed before when reporting rates of growth in Soviet industrial production. (It may be noted here that the same formula has been employed since that occasion: when presenting the plan for 1966 on December 7 last, Chairman of Gosplan N. K. Baibakov used it in connection with increases in industrial output.)²

Whatever optimism Kosygin's figures may have created was shortlived. It was suppressed by fresh surprises in the report of the Central Statistical Authority, published on January 30, 1965, on the fulfillment of the plan for 1964. Not only was the increase in the national income for 1964 here given as "over 7 percent" instead of Kosygin's 5 percent—a contradiction which earned a special editorial in the *New York Times*—,³ but the report also appeared to challenge Kosygin's figure for the increase in overall industrial output: instead of the latter's 7.8 percent, the report indicated an increase of 7.1 percent—and, incidentally, described it as an increase in "the production of all industry" instead of "gross industrial production," which is the usual formula; since, however, no decision could yet have been made to report the net instead of the gross output of industry (although there have been proposals to that effect), the Central Statistical Authority's figure most probably still referred to gross output as Kosygin's had done. Another remarkable feature was the omission of data on the growth of producer and consumer goods production—both of them regular features of the Authority's yearly reports in the past.

Of greatest importance, however, for the interpretation of economic policy was the fact that, according to the Authority's report, there was only a very slight improvement in the combined output of the food, light and "cultural goods" industries during the second half of 1964. In 1964 as a whole, only the light industry showed an improvement in its rate of growth, from 2 percent in the middle of the year to 3 percent, while the rates of growth in the manufacture of food and "cultural goods" remained at 2 and 9 percent respectively. This also

¹ The two main categories of Soviet industrial output, groups A and B, are in this article referred to as "producer" and "consumer goods" respectively. Subdivisions of the latter are the output of the light industry (primarily textiles and other fabrics and related products), the food industry, and the manufacture of what may be described as "cultural, household and personal articles" (*tovary kulturno-bytovogo naznacheniya*), which are here referred to simply as "cultural goods."

² *Pravda*, December 8, 1965.

³ *The New York Times*, February 3, 1965.

was in direct contradiction to Kosygin's figure of 6.5 percent for the rise in the output of consumer goods during 1964.

Further doubt on this figure of Kosygin's is cast by a comparison of data concerning the growth of consumer goods output during the full years 1963 and 1964. In 1963, the increase in the output of "cultural goods" was (as in 1964) 9 percent, and in that of the food and light industries respectively 5 and 2 percent (as against 2 and 3 percent respectively in 1964), while the growth in the output of consumer goods as a whole in 1963 was reported by the Central Statistical Authority to have been 5 percent. Bearing in mind the increases already mentioned for 1964 and also the fact that the food and light industries account for over one-half and for one-third respectively of all retail sales, one comes to the conclusion that the overall increase in the output of consumer goods in 1964 cannot have been better than in 1963.

*

What, then, is the explanation of the contradiction between Kosygin's and the Central Statistical Authority's data for the increase in the manufacture of consumer goods and in total industrial output in 1964? As will be seen below, Kosygin's figure for the 1964 increase in consumer goods output does not represent a continuation, pure and simple, of statistical data for previous years. His parenthetical formula "in the planned group" was not, after all, of purely formal significance, but indicated a basis for computation that was entirely different from that used in previous years, thus concealing the real percentage increase in consumer goods output, which in reality was much lower.

The following considerations are helpful in solving the problem.⁴ As a rule, consumer goods manufactured by plants basically producing producer goods are classed for statistical purposes as belonging to the production of the food, light or "cultural goods" industries;⁴ similarly, products manufactured by consumer goods plants but used in the producer goods industry are classified as producer goods. This would permit a computation of the increase in consumer goods output on the basis of the Central Statistical Authority's data for increases in the output of food, light and "cultural" goods if we knew the value ratio between the aggregate productions of these branches of industry. Unfortunately, however, such information is not available. The second best basis consists of the value ratio between the retail sales of goods produced by these three branches. Here certain adjustments have to be made. For one, the rates of growth in consumer goods production, as given in Soviet statistics, are computed from the value of these goods at factory prices excluding turnover tax on raw materials, and the fact that average tax rates on products of the food, light and "cultural goods" industries differ from one another will probably change somewhat their relative value at retail prices with turnover tax included. Second, domestic retail sales fail to reflect production insofar as they include the sale of imported goods

⁴ See, for example, *Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1962 godu: Statisticheskiy yezhbegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1962: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1963, pp. 126, 202 and 666-67.

and exclude goods which are exported. Third, the average retail sales margins for different groups of goods are probably different. Fourth, the value ratio between retail sales of products of the food, light and "cultural goods" industries differs from that between the output of these goods as a result of fluctuations in stocks. Fifth, retail sales also include non-industrial goods. One might think of some other minor deviations which can, however, have only a negligible effect.

Most of the causes of deviation mentioned under points four and five may be rectified on the basis of published details of Soviet retail sales and stocks. As to the rest, the following table shows the extent to which the aggregate growth in output of the food, light and "cultural goods" industries, computed from the Central Statistical Authority's data on the growth rates of these industries and retail sales values, has deviated in recent years from the official growth rate of the consumer goods industry as a whole.

Reported and Computed Annual Increases in Output of Soviet Consumer Goods Industry, 1957-64
(Percentages)

		A	B	Excess of A over B	C	Excess of A over C	D	Excess of A over D
1957	over	8.0	8.19	1	8.16	1	8.12	2
1958		7.0	6.84	2	6.92	1	6.91	1
1959		10.3	10.09	2	10.05	2	10.06	2
1960	over	7.0	5.82	22	5.90	20	5.94	19
1961		6.6	6.09	8	6.05	9	6.02	10
1962		7.0	6.76	4	6.66	5	6.62	6
1963		5.0	4.43	13	4.50	11	4.49	11
Average 1957-63				7		7		7
1964		6.5	3.14	107	—	—	—	—

— No data yet available

SOURCES For retail sales in 1956-62, the statistical yearbooks *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR* for 1958-62 (Moscow, 1959-63), for annual increases in consumer goods output (except 1957 and 1960), respective annual plan fulfillment reports of Central Statistical Authority, increases in consumer goods output in 1957 and 1960 calculated from statistical yearbooks (any issue after 1959). As a basis for the 1964 figure in Column B, the shares of food and non-food retail sales in the total retail sales of the preceding year (1963) were calculated from *SSSR v 1963 godu. Kratkiy statisticheskiy sbornik* (The USSR in Figures in 1963: A Brief Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1964, pp. 184-85, while the share of "cultural goods" in the total of non-food sales for 1963 was estimated to be the average of the preceding five years, which ranged between 27.2 percent and 28.3 percent, viz., 28 percent.

In this table, Column A contains the official figures for the percentage increase in consumer goods output as indicated in the Central Statistical Authority's annual plan fulfillment reports (the figure for 1964 is that given by Kosygin); Column B contains approximate estimates of the increase in consumer goods output based on the proportion of retail sales of products of the food, light and "cultural goods" industries to all retail sales in the preceding year and data of the Central Statistical Authority on the growth rates of these industries in the year under consideration; Column C gives the increase in output as under B but with the non-industrial goods in food sales eliminated; Column D gives the increase as under C after account has been taken of fluctuations during the year of stocks of food, textiles and "cultural goods" in factories, wholesale and retail stores. The remaining columns indicate the extent to which the increase

in Column A exceeds that in Columns B, C and D, expressed as a percentage of the latter.

The Central Statistical Authority has been publishing the annual increases in output of the food, light and "cultural goods" industries in the present form since 1957. As will be seen from the table, during the seven years 1957-63, the "cleansing" of retail sales, with a view to bringing the sales of these three groups of goods closer to their output (in monetary terms), has had little effect upon the proportions of these individual groups to the total of retail sales: this is, of course, the only factor that causes divergences in Columns C and D from the figures in Column B.

Two other useful observations may be made. First, those factors which cause discrepancies between the data in Column A and those in the other columns (except those factors which necessitate the corrections under C and D) seem to be such as tend to reduce the increase rates under B, C and D in relation to those under A. What is more important, when everything, including the rounding of data for the output increases in individual industries in Central Statistical Authority reports, is considered, the computed increases (i.e., those under B, C and D) keep remarkably close to the official data on increases in the output of consumer goods (i.e., those under A). As indicated in the table, the data under A exceed those under B, C and D on the average by only 7 percent during the years 1957-63, the excess varying from practically nothing in 1957 to 19-22 percent in 1960. (If the increases in the output of the food and other branches of the consumer industry in 1960 are rounded downward by close to one-half of one percent, the discrepancy in 1960 becomes no more than 10-12 percent.)

The situation is entirely different with regard to the year 1964: for that year, the estimated average increase based on total retail sales (Column B—no data are yet available for columns C and D) is 3.14 percent, while the rate reported by Kosygin is 6.5 percent. This results in an excess of 107 percent, or over fifteen times as much as the average excess of 7 percent for the preceding seven years. It is this huge discrepancy that suggests that Kosygin's phrase "in the planned group" must have referred to a limited group of consumer goods with a much higher average rate of increase in output than that of all consumer goods. The conclusion one arrives at is that, for the purposes of Kosygin's speech, both the reduced output in 1964 and full output in 1963 of certain lines of production which were in the process of being discontinued in 1964 or which had been relegated to lower planning levels not taken into account by the central planning authorities were excluded from the computation of the increase in consumer goods output in 1964. Presumably, it was considered inadvisable, at least for the time being, that the Central Statistical Authority should follow this example in its report on the plan fulfillment for 1964: if it had done so, the Authority would have been compelled either to print different data in its next yearbook or to discontinue in these yearbooks a very important item of reporting. This also appears to have been the reason why the Authority in its report gave the figure of 7.1 percent instead of Kosygin's 7.8 percent for the overall increase in industrial output in 1964.

What, then, were the 1964 increases in the output of producer and consumer goods, expressed in terms comparable with the statistics for previous years? If we assume that the actual increase in consumer goods output exceeded the estimated increase by 10 percent, which is the average excess of Column A over Column B during the preceding five years, the actual increase in consumer goods output in 1964 must have been about 3.5 percent instead of Kosygin's 6.5 percent. Further, on the basis of this assumed actual increase, the Central Statistical Authority's figure of 7.1 percent for the overall increase in industrial output in 1964 and the ratio of producer to consumer goods output in 1963 (74.5 : 25.5),⁵ the increase in producer goods output in 1964 must have been about 8.3 percent, i.e., close to the 8.2 percent reported by Kosygin.

*

The actual increase in industrial production in 1964 and the planned increase in 1965 were both given by Kosygin under the same heading and qualified by the same remark "in the planned group." As we have seen, this formula served to conceal the fact that the actual increase in consumer goods output in 1964 was apparently little more than half the figure given. Nonetheless, it would be erroneous to assume that the increase in the overall output of consumer goods in 1965 will similarly prove to be little more than half the figure of 7.8 percent given as the planned increase for that year. As far as the plan for 1965 is concerned, there is no way of knowing what is concealed behind this formula until other comprehensive information is published which helps us to find the correct answer. For the time being, the most reliable assumption would appear to be that, since the harvest in 1964 was much better than in 1963, the overall increase in consumer goods output in 1965 will prove to have been considerably higher than it was in 1964.

*

Kosygin's reason for hiding the low increase in the overall output of consumer goods in 1964 seems to have been that promises concerning the ratio of producer to consumer goods output had not been kept, year after year, since 1960. The following table presents the (average) annual increases, planned and actual, in the output of producer and consumer goods (Columns A and B respectively) over a number of years and the extent to which the increase in producer goods output exceeded that in consumer goods output, expressed as a percentage of the latter:

(Average) Annual Increases in Producer and Consumer Goods Output Over Selected Periods,
Planned (1959-80) and Actual (1929-64)

(Percentages)			
	PLANNED		
	A	B	Excess of A over B
1959-65 (Seven-Year Plan)	9.3	c7.3	27.4
1961-70 (First Decade of Twenty-Year Program)	10.6	9.2	14.5
1971-80 (Second Decade of Twenty-Year Program)	9.8	7.7	26.6

⁵ *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1963 godu: Kratkiy statisticheskiy sbornik* (The USSR in Figures in 1963: A Brief Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1964, p. 76.

	ACTUAL	A	B	Excess of A over B
1929—40		21.5	12.7	69.9
1945—53		12.1	14.2	-15.1
1954—58		12.4	9.3	33.0
1959—63 (First Five Years of Seven-Year Plan)		10.8	7.2	49.4
1961—63 (First Three Years of Twenty-Year Program)		10.3	6.4	61.2
1963		9.8	5.3	85.3
1964*		8.3	3.5	142.0

* Author's estimate.

As will be seen, during the twelve years preceding the USSR's entry into World War II, the average annual rate of increase in the output of producer goods exceeded that of consumer goods by the very high average of 69.9 percent. In contrast, during the years 1945—53 it was actually 15.1 percent lower, this being the period when the prices of consumer goods were subjected to a heavy reduction (according to reports, 57 percent from 1948 to April 1954). From 1954 to the beginning of the Seven-Year Plan, the growth rate of producer goods production exceeded that of consumer goods once more, *viz.*, by 33 percent. The Seven-Year Plan promised to reduce this still quite high difference to an annual average of 27.4 percent. During the first year of this plan, 1959, the difference, aided by the record harvest of 1958, even dropped to 24.4 percent, but in the following years started to grow again; in 1963 it reached 85.3 percent, making an average for the first five years of the Seven-Year Plan of 49.4 percent. In the meantime, the twenty-year program promised to reduce the difference still more than the Seven-Year Plan had done: this was in fact the most important feature of the program, as Khrushchev himself observed in his report on the subject. For the first decade of the program, the figure foreseen was only 14.5 percent; during the first three years, however, it turned out to be 61.2 percent—well over four times more.

In the fourth year of the twenty-year program, the difference between the growth of producer and consumer goods amounted, according to our estimates, to 142 percent, or nearly ten times as much as that scheduled for the first decade of this program. During the first four years, the average difference reached about 74 percent, which is well above the average difference of 70 percent during the last twelve prewar years condemned in Khrushchev's twenty-year program report. In order to attain the average difference of 14.5 percent planned for the ten-year period 1961—70, the relationship between the growth rates of the producer and consumer goods industries would have to be reversed during the remaining six years 1965—70, i.e., the average increase in output of consumer goods would have to be higher than that of producer goods. This, however, will hardly be the case.

Finally, it may be pointed out that Kosygin's figures for the increases in output of producer and consumer goods in 1964 "in the planned group" indicated an excess of only 26 percent of the former over the latter, instead of an actual excess of more than 140 percent.

The following table shows the shares accounted for by the producer and consumer goods industries in the total industrial output of the USSR in selected years from 1928 (the first year of the First Five-Year Plan) up to 1964:

**Proportions of Producer and Consumer Goods in Total Industrial Output
of the USSR, Selected Years, 1928—64**
(Percentages)

	Producer Goods	Consumer Goods
1928	39.5	60.5
1940	61.2	38.8
1950	68.8	31.2
1960	72.5	27.5
1961	73.1	26.9
1962	73.7	26.3
1963	74.5	25.5
1964*	75.4	24.6

* Author's estimate

SOURCES For 1928—62, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1962 godu* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1962: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1963, p. 123; for 1963, *SSSR v 1963 godu* (The USSR in 1963: A Brief Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1964, p. 76.

These ratios are based on gross output expressed in comparable terms of enterprises' wholesale prices less the turnover tax on raw materials. Among other things, however, these prices include the value of raw and basic materials, which constitute a considerably greater proportion of the cost price of consumer than of producer goods. This factor exaggerates the share of consumer goods in the total industrial output in relation to their share in the "added value" (*pribovochnaya stoimost*), i.e., the gross value less the cost of raw materials, supplies, electric energy and contract work.

No direct information is supplied by Soviet sources either about the added value of Soviet industrial output or about the share in it of consumer goods, which would show more exactly the proportion of effort devoted to the development of the consumer goods industry. However, desultory information in these sources provides a basis for computing these quantities with reasonable accuracy.

Discussing price formation in *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, A. Komin, chief specialist at the Price Bureau of the State Planning Commission, wrote in 1963:

In 1960, the gross output of industry in group A amounted, in wholesale prices of enterprises, to 105,000 million rubles and in group B to 50,000 million rubles. The profit amounted to 14,000 million rubles, or 10 percent. The turnover tax in 1960 amounted to 31,300 million rubles. If the turnover tax were to be distributed among all branches proportionately to wages, industry in group A would account for about 27,000 million rubles, which constitutes 26 percent of the value of the output of these branches at wholesale prices.⁶

Since 27,000 million rubles constitutes 86.3 percent of 31,300 million rubles, the consumer goods industry must in 1960 have accounted for 13.7 percent of

⁶ *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, 1963, No. 4, p. 28.

the payroll (normally the major component of the added value)⁷ of the whole of Soviet industry.

Two less important components of the added value are profits (including taxes) and allowances for depreciation. In official Soviet data, the share of consumer goods in national income and expenditure is much inflated, by an extraordinarily heavy burden of profits, taxes, customs tariffs, etc. (which in the last analysis are all taxes). For our purposes, therefore, a fairly high level of profits and taxes, distributed proportionately to the capital invested in the consumer and producer goods industries, has to be assumed; this yearly return on investments, net of depreciation but including taxes in the usual sense of the term, may reasonably be taken as amounting to 20 percent. As for data on the distribution of invested capital by branches of industry and other information enabling us to establish payrolls, depreciation and returns on investments both for industry as a whole and for the consumer goods industry, these are provided by Soviet statistical yearbooks. The following table presents the results of these computations.

**Share of Consumer Goods in the Added Value of Soviet Industrial Production,
1960 and 1963**
(Millions of Rubles)

	1960		1963	
	All Industry	Consumer Goods Industry	All Industry	Consumer Goods Industry
Payroll	27,307	3,741 (13.7%)	32,780	4,120 (12.6%)
Allowances for Depreciation ..	4,952	486* (9.8%)	8,419	674* (8.0%)
Profits on Investments (20%) ..	18,013	2,558* (14.2%)	24,778	3,321* (13.4%)
Total (Added Value)	50,272	6,785 (13.5%)	65,977	8,115 (12.3%)

* Light and food industries.

(Calculating depreciation in the light and food industries involves the question of the ratio of the average wage in the one industry to that in the other. The latest data available, which relate to the year 1955 and are confined in their application to the Estonian SSR, indicate that these two wages are, or were, almost equal, that in the food industry being 2 percent higher. For our purposes, it was assumed that they were equal in both 1960 and 1963. Although this assumption may be somewhat erroneous, a difference of 10 percent [which is conceivable but improbably high] would cause an error in the share of consumer goods in the added value of gross industrial output of only ± 0.02 percent for the year 1960 and ± 0.03 percent for 1963. With regard to returns on investments, it may be said that, statistically speaking, capital investments in the Soviet consumer goods industry are confined to the light and food industries, so that all the data under the heading "Consumer Goods Industry" in the table above may be said to be valid for the consumer goods industry as a whole.)

⁷ According to the 1962-64 issues of the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (US Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.), wages constituted an average of 54 percent of the added value of manufactured goods during the years 1958-62.

The proportion of the added value of consumer goods to that of gross industrial production, based on the factors employed in the table above, was, as may be seen, in 1960 already very low. The consideration of working capital (*oborotnye sredstva*) in addition to capital investments would probably lead to a still lower figure; for example, while stocks in the wholesale and retail trades are fairly large and, in some cases at least, show a vigorous increase, those of finished goods in the light and food industries seem to be very small.

During the three years 1961-63, not only did the number of workers in the light and food industries drop from 27.5 percent to 26.3 percent of the total industrial labor force; labor productivity also rose much more slowly in the consumer goods sector than in industry in general—by 3 percent and 14 percent in the light and food industries respectively, as against an increase of 16 percent in all industry.⁸ According to these data, the output of the light industry must have grown during these three years by only 9 percent and that of the food industry by 26 percent, whereas the total industrial output is indicated as having increased by 29 percent. Since about 80 percent of all industrial workers are on piece work in one form or another, the share accounted for by the consumer goods sector in the industrial payroll must have suffered a considerable setback. These developments and the officially reported drop from 27.5 percent in 1960 to 25.5 percent in 1963 in the share accounted for by the consumer goods industry in the total output of industry (see table on page 10) both indicate a decrease from 13.7 percent in 1960 to approximately 12.6 percent in 1963 in the share of the consumer goods sector in the total industrial payroll. This decline, combined with the diminution in the consumer goods industry's share of invested capital from 14.2 percent at the end of 1960 to 13.4 percent by the end of 1963 (at the end of 1960, the total value of capital invested in all industry and in the consumer goods sector was respectively 90,100 million and 12,800 million rubles, while the corresponding figures for the end of 1963 were 123,900 million and 16,600 million rubles) and the drop in the share of allowances for depreciation (see table on page 11), brought down the consumer goods sector's share in the total added value to only 12.3 percent in 1963.

It might be argued that the Soviet government's budgetary obligations with regard to defense, education, medical care, future investments, etc., require more income than can be provided by a 20-percent return on invested capital and other existing taxation, and that for reasons of its own the government does not wish to raise personal income tax above its present low level. However, even if the need for more income were fully met by a considerable increase in profits, the small share of the consumer goods sector in the added value of Soviet industrial production would change very little if these higher profits were still charged to the consumer and producer goods sectors proportionately to the capital invested.

⁸ Calculated on the basis of the number of workers and productivity indices in *Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1963 godu: Statisticheskyy yezhегоdnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1963: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1965, pp. 122, 124 and 126.

As may be seen from the statistical yearbook for 1963, the profits yielded by Soviet industry in that year amounted to 19,600 million rubles, and the total turnover tax amounted to 34,500 million rubles.⁹ A little calculation shows that the substitution of the sum of these amounts, i.e., 54,100 million rubles, or 44 percent of the invested capital of 123,900 million rubles, for the figure of 24,778 million rubles in the table on page 11 would raise the share of the consumer goods sector in the 1963 added value, at the higher price level, from 12.3 percent to no more than 12.6 percent. A profit rate of 44 percent, extended to all "productive" capital investments (254,000 million rubles), would have yielded, in 1963, 111,000 million rubles; but the total revenue in the Soviet budget for that year was only 89,500 million rubles.

According to available information, the process of reducing the share of the consumer goods industry continued during 1964: instead of maintaining the average yearly increase of over 7 percent of the three preceding years, the output of the food industry in 1964 rose by only 2 percent, while the light and "cultural goods" industries barely kept up the pace of the years 1961-63. The proportion accounted for by the consumer goods industry in the country's total industrial output dropped by a difference of nearly 0.9 percent, whereas the difference over the three preceding years, 1961-63, had amounted to 1.4 percent (see table on page 10). All this indicates that wages in the consumer goods sector must have decreased in 1964 to no more than 12.1 percent of the payroll for industry as a whole.

With regard to invested capital, the situation of the consumer goods industry cannot have been much better. The diminution in its share of invested capital during the years 1961-63 was caused mainly, if not entirely, by the decrease from 22 percent in 1960 to 19 percent in 1963 in the share of producer goods for manufacturing consumer goods (in Soviet economic nomenclature, Subdivision II in Group A goods) in the total output of producer goods.¹⁰ There is very little likelihood that this trend, which can be observed over many years, was discontinued in 1964; indeed, there is reason to believe that this decline may even have been accelerated, in view of the extraordinarily small increase in consumer goods output for that year.

With the drop in the share of the consumer goods sector in the total industrial payroll (including social insurance) to 12.1 percent and the continuing downward trend in the share of invested capital, the share of consumer goods in the added value of Soviet industry must have declined in 1964 to slightly below 12 percent. As for 1965, although Kosygin promised "more machines, raw materials and supplies for the expansion of the output of consumer goods," he did not promise any equality of treatment of the producer and consumer goods sectors in this regard, not to speak of a preferential treatment of the latter sector, which alone would raise the above figure.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 637.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

An exact comparison of this proportion with corresponding figures for any of the Western economies is at present impossible, because of the lack of data on the precise composition of goods constituting Group B in Soviet statistics. However, a tentative breakdown of the added value in United States industry and mining (Soviet industrial statistics include mining) into the added value of producer and consumer goods suggests that nearly one-half of this value may be attributed to consumer goods. No information is available on the distribution of the added value in United States industry and mining during the period of World War II; but it is questionable whether even at that time of supreme effort to create the industrial plant required for armaments the consumer goods sector was left with a share of only 12 percent.

In April 1965, Kosygin, revealing some features of the five-year plan for 1966–70, declared that “wages must be placed in direct relationship to increases in labor productivity and growth of production.”¹¹ Even if this means—which it may not—that the producer and consumer goods industries will be developed at an equal rate and even if this principle is implemented, there is still little reason for optimism. An equal rate of growth of the producer and consumer goods industries during this period will merely freeze for the next five years the share of the added value in the consumer goods sector at less than 12 percent and leave the rest, i.e., more than 88 percent, to that sector of Soviet industry which feeds the growth of power. Such is the conclusion to which we are led by Soviet data as measured by a Western method and adapted to some Western practices.

¹¹ *The New York Times*, April 20, 1965; *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, 1965, No. 4, p. 8.

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

The Communist Bloc

The Impact of Recent Reverses in Chinese Foreign Policy Upon the Sino-Soviet Dispute

In this article, Mr. Cottingham reviews the efforts made by the post-Khrushchev leaders of the USSR to restore the unity of the Communist bloc after its destruction by the Chinese Communists. In doing so, he points out the successes scored by the Soviet side and a number of equally considerable setbacks suffered by the Chinese in the sphere of foreign policy.

At the same time, the author's assessment of the USSR's successes may appear over-optimistic. As he rightly says, events in Vietnam have shown that the Chinese' description of the Soviet Union as a "paper tiger" is coming back on them like a boomerang. These events have, however, a dual significance: as far as Vietnam is concerned, the label "paper tiger" is, indeed, no less applicable to the USSR than to Communist China.

The first official indication that Chinese foreign policy was undergoing serious reconsideration was contained in the oft-cited article of September 2 by Defense Minister Marshal Lin Piao.¹ This was the beginning of a steady crescendo in official commentaries suggesting that Peking is attempting to compensate publicly for a series of diplomatic reverses. The pace was accelerated in an unprecedented press conference on September 29, when Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi invited the "imperialists," the Indians and the Soviets to attack China, adding the assertion that "all would be thoroughly wiped out." Pressing a step further, he encouraged the other Afro-Asian states to follow China's lead and develop their own nuclear weapons.² Such bellicosity has seldom been heard in public statements by leading members of a government since World War II. As the new Soviet leaders proceed to consolidate their position within the Communist movement, the weight of China's present difficulties may have a precipitous effect on the Sino-Soviet rivalry.

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A brief review of recent Chinese diplomatic activities will indicate the gravity of these difficulties. First, the Vietnam conflict is the first to have broken out between the Communists and the imperialists in eleven years and the validity of Mao Tse-tung's strategy for world domination is at stake.³ The Viet Cong summer monsoon offensive bogged down at an early date, and the effectiveness

¹ Hsinhua, September 2, 1965.

² *Ibid.*, September 29 and 30 and October 1, 1965.

³ For a definition of Chinese foreign policy objectives and political strategy, see Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, 4 vols., London, 1956; Robert D. Crane, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute on War and the Cuban Missile Debate," *Orbis*, Philadelphia, Pa., Vol. VIII, No. 3, pp. 537-49; Donald S. Carlisle, "The Sino-Soviet Schism," *ibid.*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, pp. 790-815; and Richard Lowenthal, *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith*, New York, 1964.

of the US involvement has produced recurring tactical defeats, with steadily mounting Viet Cong casualties. The Soviets have provided North Vietnam with both offensive and defensive weapons in quantities that China can ill afford to match.⁴ Faced with these unexpected developments, Peking may have to reassess the price it is willing to pay to prove the veracity of its doctrine or accept the stigma that it is the Chinese and not the imperialists who are "paper tigers." As a Yugoslav commentator has observed,

The war in Vietnam has proved that China is not at all willing to do what she advises others to do and what she demands from others as proof of their ideological orthodoxy. . . . China has proclaimed a "holy war" to the last Vietnamese, or rather to the last African, Asian and anti-imperialist.⁵

Secondly, there is substantial evidence that the former Chinese satellites, North Korea and North Vietnam, have succeeded in established their neutrality between the two Communist rivals. The degree of authority that the Vietnamese delegations have been able to exercise during their frequent visits to Europe indicate that Hanoi is now able to speak for itself on virtually any issue. This degree of autonomy was recently demonstrated when Nguyen Van Dong, the officially accredited representative in Moscow of the Viet Cong's political body, the NFLSV, gave a press conference in Helsinki at which he stated, "relations between the Viet Cong and People's China now are considerably strained," and explained the reasons.⁶ After extensive preparatory work, the North Korean Party made a fateful move on April 14 when it rejected the Chinese "dogmatist" position and openly espoused the policy of "separate roads to Communism." Party Chairman Kim Il-song stated that North Korea had adopted a policy of "holding fast to the principle of solving all problems concerning the revolution and [socialist] construction independently in conformity with actual conditions at home and relying mainly on one's own efforts."⁷ Since then, North Korea has carefully picked a middle course between the two poles, which has placed the Chinese in a position not unlike that of the Soviets when Peking was trying to woo Rumania from the Kremlin's folds two years ago.

The extent of China's involvement in the unsuccessful Indonesian *coup* on September 30 remains obscure. However, judging from its attitude since the attempt, it sides with the insurgents and consequently has suffered a severe loss of influence in a country where it was considered firmly established. The Soviet position, on the other hand, was made clear soon after the event. Throughout October, the Soviet press carried official statements and editorials denouncing the rebels and their supporters. A definitive statement of the Soviet position

⁴ Brezhnev told the Soviet Party Central Committee that Soviet aid to Hanoi had been given without compensation (*Pravda*, September 29, 1965).

⁵ *Rad*, Belgrade, October 29, 1965, p. 7.

⁶ Radio Prague, October 21, 1965.

⁷ For the moves made by North Korea to establish and gain recognition of its autonomy within the Communist movement, see, *inter alia*, E. Kux and J. C. Kun, *Die Satelliten Peking*, Stuttgart, 1964. K. Pavlov identifies this quest for neutrality as early as mid-1963 (see his "The Sino-Soviet Conflict. Origins and Present Prospects," *Bulletin*, 1963, No. 11).

	ACTUAL	A	B	Excess of A over B
1929-40		21.5	12.7	69.9
1945-53		12.1	14.2	-15.1
1954-58		12.4	9.3	33.0
1959-63 (First Five Years of Seven-Year Plan)		10.8	7.2	49.4
1961-63 (First Three Years of Twenty-Year Program)		10.3	6.4	61.2
1963		9.8	5.3	85.3
1964*		8.3	3.5	142.0

* Author's estimate.

As will be seen, during the twelve years preceding the USSR's entry into World War II, the average annual rate of increase in the output of producer goods exceeded that of consumer goods by the very high average of 69.9 percent. In contrast, during the years 1945-53 it was actually 15.1 percent lower, this being the period when the prices of consumer goods were subjected to a heavy reduction (according to reports, 57 percent from 1948 to April 1954). From 1954 to the beginning of the Seven-Year Plan, the growth rate of producer goods production exceeded that of consumer goods once more, *viz.*, by 33 percent. The Seven-Year Plan promised to reduce this still quite high difference to an annual average of 27.4 percent. During the first year of this plan, 1959, the difference, aided by the record harvest of 1958, even dropped to 24.4 percent, but in the following years started to grow again; in 1963 it reached 85.3 percent, making an average for the first five years of the Seven-Year Plan of 49.4 percent. In the meantime, the twenty-year program promised to reduce the difference still more than the Seven-Year Plan had done: this was in fact the most important feature of the program, as Khrushchev himself observed in his report on the subject. For the first decade of the program, the figure foreseen was only 14.5 percent; during the first three years, however, it turned out to be 61.2 percent—well over four times more.

In the fourth year of the twenty-year program, the difference between the growth of producer and consumer goods amounted, according to our estimates, to 142 percent, or nearly ten times as much as that scheduled for the first decade of this program. During the first four years, the average difference reached about 74 percent, which is well above the average difference of 70 percent during the last twelve prewar years condemned in Khrushchev's twenty-year program report. In order to attain the average difference of 14.5 percent planned for the ten-year period 1961-70, the relationship between the growth rates of the producer and consumer goods industries would have to be reversed during the remaining six years 1965-70, i.e., the average increase in output of consumer goods would have to be higher than that of producer goods. This, however, will hardly be the case.

Finally, it may be pointed out that Kosygin's figures for the increases in output of producer and consumer goods in 1964 "in the planned group" indicated an excess of only 26 percent of the former over the latter, instead of an actual excess of more than 140 percent.

The following table shows the shares accounted for by the producer and consumer goods industries in the total industrial output of the USSR in selected years from 1928 (the first year of the First Five-Year Plan) up to 1964:

**Proportions of Producer and Consumer Goods in Total Industrial Output
of the USSR, Selected Years, 1928—64**
(Percentages)

	Producer Goods	Consumer Goods
1928	39.5	60.5
1940	61.2	38.8
1950	68.8	31.2
1960	72.5	27.5
1961	73.1	26.9
1962	73.7	26.3
1963	74.5	25.5
1964*	75.4	24.6

* Author's estimate

SOURCES. For 1928—62, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1962 godu. Statistichesky yezhegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1962. A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1963, p. 120; for 1963, *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1963 godu. Kratkiy statistichesky sbornik* (The USSR in Figures in 1963. A Brief Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1964, p. 76

These ratios are based on gross output expressed in comparable terms of enterprises' wholesale prices less the turnover tax on raw materials. Among other things, however, these prices include the value of raw and basic materials, which constitute a considerably greater proportion of the cost price of consumer than of producer goods. This factor exaggerates the share of consumer goods in the total industrial output in relation to their share in the "added value" (*pribavochnaya stoimost*), i.e., the gross value less the cost of raw materials, supplies, electric energy and contract work.

No direct information is supplied by Soviet sources either about the added value of Soviet industrial output or about the share in it of consumer goods, which would show more exactly the proportion of effort devoted to the development of the consumer goods industry. However, desultory information in these sources provides a basis for computing these quantities with reasonable accuracy.

Discussing price formation in *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, A. Komin, chief specialist at the Price Bureau of the State Planning Commission, wrote in 1963:

In 1960, the gross output of industry in group A amounted, in wholesale prices of enterprises, to 105,000 million rubles and in group B to 50,000 million rubles. The profit amounted to 14,000 million rubles, or 10 percent. The turnover tax in 1960 amounted to 31,300 million rubles. If the turnover tax were to be distributed among all branches proportionately to wages, industry in group A would account for about 27,000 million rubles, which constitutes 26 percent of the value of the output of these branches at wholesale prices.⁶

Since 27,000 million rubles constitutes 86.3 percent of 31,300 million rubles, the consumer goods industry must in 1960 have accounted for 13.7 percent of

⁶ *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, 1963, No. 4, p. 28.

the payroll (normally the major component of the added value)⁷ of the whole of Soviet industry.

Two less important components of the added value are profits (including taxes) and allowances for depreciation. In official Soviet data, the share of consumer goods in national income and expenditure is much inflated by an extraordinarily heavy burden of profits, taxes, customs tariffs, etc. (which in the last analysis are all taxes). For our purposes, therefore, a fairly high level of profits and taxes, distributed proportionately to the capital invested in the consumer and producer goods industries, has to be assumed; this yearly return on investments, net of depreciation but including taxes in the usual sense of the term, may reasonably be taken as amounting to 20 percent. As for data on the distribution of invested capital by branches of industry and other information enabling us to establish payrolls, depreciation and returns on investments both for industry as a whole and for the consumer goods industry, these are provided by Soviet statistical yearbooks. The following table presents the results of these computations.

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A brief review of recent Chinese diplomatic activities will indicate the gravity of these difficulties. First, the Vietnam conflict is the first to have broken out between the Communists and the imperialists in eleven years and the validity of Mao Tse-tung's strategy for world domination is at stake.³ The Viet Cong summer monsoon offensive bogged down at an early date, and the effectiveness

¹ Hsinhua, September 2, 1965.

² *Ibid.*, September 29 and 30 and October 1, 1965.

³ For a definition of Chinese foreign policy objectives and political strategy, see Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, 4 vols., London, 1956; Robert D. Crane, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute on War and the Cuban Missile Debate," *Orbis*, Philadelphia, Pa., Vol. VIII, No. 3, pp. 537-49; Donald S. Carlisle, "The Sino-Soviet Schism," *ibid.*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, pp. 790-815; and Richard Lowenthal, *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith*, New York, 1964.

of the US involvement has produced recurring tactical defeats, with steadily mounting Viet Cong casualties. The Soviets have provided North Vietnam with both offensive and defensive weapons in quantities that China can ill afford to match.⁴ Faced with these unexpected developments, Peking may have to reassess the price it is willing to pay to prove the veracity of its doctrine or accept the stigma that it is the Chinese and not the imperialists who are "paper tigers." As a Yugoslav commentator has observed,

The war in Vietnam has proved that China is not at all willing to do what she advises others to do and what she demands from others as proof of their ideological orthodoxy. . . . China has proclaimed a "holy war" to the last Vietnamese, or rather to the last African, Asian and anti-imperialist.⁵

Secondly, there is substantial evidence that the former Chinese satellites, North Korea and North Vietnam, have succeeded in establishing their neutrality between the two Communist rivals. The degree of authority that the Vietnamese delegations have been able to exercise during their frequent visits to Europe indicate that Hanoi is now able to speak for itself on virtually any issue. This degree of autonomy was recently demonstrated when Nguyen Van Dong, the officially accredited representative in Moscow of the Viet Cong's political body, the NFLSV, gave a press conference in Helsinki at which he stated, "relations between the Viet Cong and People's China now are considerably strained," and explained the reasons.⁶ After extensive preparatory work, the North Korean Party made a fateful move on April 14 when it rejected the Chinese "dogmatist" position and openly espoused the policy of "separate roads to Communism." Party Chairman Kim Il-song stated that North Korea had adopted a policy of "holding fast to the principle of solving all problems concerning the revolution and [socialist] construction independently in conformity with actual conditions at home and relying mainly on one's own efforts."⁷ Since then, North Korea has carefully picked a middle course between the two poles, which has placed the Chinese in a position not unlike that of the Soviets when Peking was trying to woo Rumania from the Kremlin's folds two years ago.

The extent of China's involvement in the unsuccessful Indonesian *coup* on September 30 remains obscure. However, judging from its attitude since the attempt, it sides with the insurgents and consequently has suffered a severe loss of influence in a country where it was considered firmly established. The Soviet position, on the other hand, was made clear soon after the event. Throughout October, the Soviet press carried official statements and editorials denouncing the rebels and their supporters. A definitive statement of the Soviet position

⁴ Brezhnev told the Soviet Party Central Committee that Soviet aid to Hanoi had been given without compensation (*Pravda*, September 29, 1965).

⁵ *Rad*, Belgrade, October 29, 1965, p. 7.

⁶ Radio Prague, October 21, 1965.

⁷ For the moves made by North Korea to establish and gain recognition of its autonomy within the Communist movement, see, *inter alia*, E. Kux and J. C. Kun, *Die Satelliten Peking*, Stuttgart, 1964. K. Pavlov identifies this quest for neutrality as early as mid-1963 (see his "The Sino-Soviet Conflict. Origins and Present Prospects," *Bulletin*, 1963, No. 11).

7. Finally, it does not appear probable that the Soviets will be able to overcome this opposition in time to convene an all-Party conference before the Twenty-Third Soviet Party Congress in March 1966. Indeed, the conference may be merely a gambit sacrificed to achieve the real goal, which is a new front. They may, therefore, select the Party congress to formulate a definitive policy on inter-Party relations or to establish a new Communist organization. The Twenty-Third Party Congress will be an all-Soviet show, even though other parties recognized by the Kremlin will be invited. Resolutions adopted by the congress are formally binding only on those parties which officially subscribe to them. Participation in this gathering, therefore, would presumably be more acceptable to the Communist parties in opposition, since they would have considerably greater latitude than at an all-Party congress, where they would feel compelled to defend actively their vested interests.

This intensification of Soviet diplomatic activity over the past few months seems to be characterized by positive measures to constrict Peking's influence rather than simply to counteract Chinese initiative as in the latter years of the Khrushchev era. The object of this diplomacy has not been to purify international Communism by purging the dissenters or to allow passively circumstances and Chinese blunders to embarrass Peking, but to demonstrate the unrealistic nature of the present Chinese regime's interpretations of Communist dogma and restore unity to the movement by seizing the initiative and pressing Peking on every issue that affords a tactical advantage. Events have shown China's inability to rally effectively the "progressive" forces throughout the world around a single banner. Coupled with their failure, Soviet diplomatic moves have succeeded in isolating China to an unprecedented degree within the Communist movement and in international politics.

As for future trends in Sino-Soviet relations, it should be emphasized that predictions relating to this desperate rivalry are treacherous, especially when they seek to include the question of increasing Chinese isolation. It is extremely difficult to decide how far Peking is determined to pursue its present policy. Its pronouncements, for instance, suggest that China is prepared to accept complete dissociation from Soviet policy on the Vietnam conflict.³⁰ It is not expected, however, that China will soon precipitate a formal break, for this would deny Peking the protection afforded by the Sino-Soviet military alliance of 1950 and expose Chinese interests more directly to the threats of US escalation in Southeast Asia. On the whole, the Soviets are apparently now in a position to exploit future Chinese difficulties in order to secure greater maneuverability for promoting their own plans for rallying the "progressive" elements and restoring unity to international Communism.

Chester T. Cottingham

³⁰ Hsinhua, November 11, 1965. An 18,000-word statement denounced the USSR for seeking a negotiated settlement of the conflict, and concluded: "Because of this, China cannot take united action with the Soviet Union."

Religion

The Philosophical and Psychological Foundations of Soviet Atheism

Several months ago, the journal *Nauka i religiya* carried a contribution from one of its special correspondents, B. Maryanov, under the heading "Doubts in the Land of Lvov." Maryanov describes how at a meeting of atheists discussing the progress made in their work one of those present exclaimed: "My God! The efficiency of our work is pretty low—about as low as the efficiency of a steam engine." "What do you mean," replied another. "Steam engine? The wheel hasn't been invented yet."¹

This remark reveals something of the philosophical, scientific and (one is tempted to think) also the technical standard of the Soviet state's atheistic propaganda. This standard is responsible for the fact, now evident not only to Soviet propagandists but to the world at large, that this propaganda is a failure. The question may well be asked: Is this failure due solely to the rational foundations of Soviet atheist propaganda, or has it other, deeper, causes?

In the view of the present writer, the main reasons for the failure of Soviet atheist propaganda are to be found in its hidden philosophical and psychological foundations. What we have in mind here is not the official materialist basis of atheism, which is set forth in a number of Soviet publications, but certain other principles which, though nowhere explicitly stated, intuitively repel millions of people, including even those who may not be aware of them.

Modern Soviet atheism, in its most highly developed form, may be described as a philosophy of emptiness and solitariness. It goes without saying that an empty and lonely life is completely unsatisfactory for the individual, but what we have in mind is something else: atheism bases its philosophy on cosmic emptiness and the cosmic loneliness of the individual and of humanity as a whole. In this life, it says, man remains absolutely and constantly alone; confronted by a mysteriously silent and empty universe, he emerges from the realm of non-existence and lives his portion of the common senseless life, only to relapse once more into non-existence. This cosmic loneliness, this infinite void of non-existence, is the only reality that atheism is prepared to acknowledge, the only reality which it can offer humanity. The attempt to grasp such "realities" inevitably has the effect of putting the individual on his guard, and often repels him from atheism, for the individual finds it impossible to lead a life that is devoid of meaning, and the intuition responsible for this fact is also a reality which he has to take into account.

Soviet atheists are secretly well aware of the repellent emptiness of their principles, which they consequently attempt to disguise. How far they succeed in this attempt to mask their own philosophy we shall see later. With the aim of giving some meaning to what they themselves conceive as meaningless, of filling

¹ *Nauka i religiya*, 1965, No. 7, p. 2.

this void and so solving the problem of cosmic loneliness, the editors of the journal *Nauka i religiya* in 1964 instituted a discussion with their readers under the heading, "A Conversation on the Meaning of Life." This discussion proved to be rather protracted, being taken up in one number of the journal after another, until, after having been dropped in occasional issues, it was concluded in that for July 1965. Here, the editors wrote:

It is impossible to reflect upon the meaning of human life while ignoring its philosophical problems. It is not for nothing that these problems are called "eternal." They have been disturbing man from time out of mind, ever since he first began to consider his nature and his purpose.²

The journal's editors know, of course, what they are doing; they put the word "eternal" in quotation marks partly because they wish to represent these problems as being no longer eternal, as having been solved—albeit by the offer of something that in fact is of only temporary, not eternal, validity, something that is relative, not absolute. The editors go on:

We reject the existence of God and the afterlife. The life of the individual and of all humanity has no meaning which is given beforehand and which does not depend on men. The meaning of our life is to be found in life itself—more than that, it is we who create it. Such are the essential principles of our understanding of life.³

Thus, in lieu of the religious outlook, which links man with the Creator and so with the whole of the cosmos, today's exponents of atheism can offer nothing but the view that the portion of life lived by the individual is meaningless, being bounded on both sides by utter nothingness; man is completely alone in a completely empty universe; the process of life is self-contained, and the possibilities of lending it meaning limited.

At the beginning of the discussion, some readers expressed themselves in favor of adopting a religious solution to the problems raised, and as the discussion proceeded their numbers diminished. Apparently, the editors considered it expedient to print replies more consonant with the philosophy of atheism. If we take a look at the replies received and consider the values which in the atheists' view are capable of giving human life a satisfactory meaning, we find that these values may be divided into two groups. Those in the first group are of an empirical nature and characterize people who are not aware of the full complexity of the task of giving life a philosophical meaning. Such people swim, as it were, on the surface; their horizon does not extend beyond the natural limits of life, and they are unaware of any link between life and the universe. In their view, the purpose of life is to be found in the following values: labor, health, glory, honor, fame, money, the fulfillment of desires and ambitions, children, a happy family life, a successful career and personal life, work on behalf of the community, the improvement of living conditions, the struggle for peace, constant struggle and progress, the building of a new society.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*

These are fifteen of the most typical values listed by those belonging to the first group. It is not difficult to see that they are primitive; can one seriously believe, for example, that the purpose of life is to enjoy good health and reputation and have one's pockets stuffed full of money? Even such values as the fight for peace, the building of a better society and "constant struggle and progress" are relative: one may ask, what will be the purpose of life when the new society has been built and peace established? Progress toward what goal? And if the struggle is to be constant, is it a value in itself? Naïve, blind empiricism is the basis on which the values in this first group are founded.

The second group of replies is somewhat less simple, implying as it does a more profound approach to the problems of life. First on the list here is creativity and creative work. Then come: self-improvement, the good, spiritual wealth, self-sacrifice, "Man with a capital M," knowledge, beauty, love, development of one's abilities, the proper organization of one's life, and physical deathlessness.

It is clear that we are here concerned with questions of a spiritual rather than of a (more or less) physical or material order. For example, creativity is undoubtedly a spiritual element in almost any form: it unites man with that Creation which is the Universe; by virtue of his own modest creative efforts, man enters the stream of that Creative element which lies at the basis of the eternally developing universe. It may, of course, be objected that there is also a kind of destructive creativity: in pre-Christian times, in the era of Zoroaster, the struggle between the two elements of light and darkness was the content of man's religious and spiritual life. The important point, however, is that all the values in this second group are positive values of a spiritual order. Even the last one, "physical deathlessness," contains an element of protest against the limited atheist outlook and corresponds to certain *motifs* clearly expressed by Pasternak in his *Doctor Zhivago*.

These values meet with no objection from the believers in cosmic loneliness and material existence limited in time, who apparently fail to realize that the values in the second group tend to lead us beyond the bounds of material existence. Let us take beauty, for example. One may ask, what kind of beauty—physical, intellectual or spiritual?—Beauty in man, Nature or spiritual things? Our perception of beauty develops gradually, from beauty in Nature to that in art, further to moral beauty, which finds its ultimate realization in the Deity. Such things as the good, love and self-sacrifice also bring us face to face with spiritual values and lead us to a recognition of the spiritual source of the universe.

Bearing in mind life in the Soviet Union, we inevitably raise the question: How is it that people born and brought up in a purely materialist atmosphere, people who have been taught to believe that spiritual things are merely a function of highly-organized matter, take an interest in things that officially are only of secondary importance and invest them with primary significance? The answer is that for all the plausibility of the materialist theory which they have had to learn by heart, these people are intuitively aware of what makes them "Men with a capital M," and that this proves to be what they have been told to consider

merely secondary. They are intuitively aware that these "secondary" things unite them with the cosmos and relieve them of their loneliness. Hence, for many people the lamp glimmering before an icon tells more about the purpose of life and unites them more closely with the universe than the most intelligent and "progressive" arguments of the atheists.

There is no doubt that present-day Soviet atheistic propaganda is capable at least to some extent of rationally convincing, by the simplicity and primitive logic of its empiricism, people who are inexperienced in religious matters: but in doing so it begins to undermine their spiritual outlook; they find themselves in a kind of spiritual vacuum—a position that cannot for long be tolerated by the individual who is aware of himself as an individual.

It is characteristic that, while expressing approval of those spiritual values which had been suggested by some of their readers, the editors of *Nauka i religiya* made no attempt to explain the reasons for their approval. Instead, they attempted to demean these ideals, to limit their significance to the bounds of the visible physical world:

The meaning of life and man's happiness are not determined beforehand, but are discovered in life itself, in struggle and work, in tireless searchings. When we speak about searchings, we have in mind not idle contemplation, an attempt to find oneself in oneself, but in life, labor and cognition.⁴

While it is true that man finds the meaning of life during the process of living, by exploring all its many facets, by "searching," the simultaneous rejection of the thinking man's desire to penetrate by means of contemplation into other worlds is a trick characteristic of the atheists, who would deny the individual the right to remain alone with his thoughts.

Thus, while not denying some of the spiritual ideals advanced by their readers, the editors of *Nauka i religiya* attempt to minimize their significance and confine them to the material world, to that limited and self-contained space of time which each individual spends in it. These are all, so they say, purely earthly ideals, attributes of this earthly life, and have no wider significance whatever. They write:

Life is given to us in order to use it in the best possible way for ourselves and for others, in order to find our fullest expression in something, to find our unique, irrepeatable embodiment, our proper place among our fellow-men, to achieve the greatest possible perfection of those abilities that have been given to us.⁵

One may ask, why is life given to us in order to use it not only for us but also for others, why must we perfect our abilities, and so on? To these questions the editors do not, and indeed cannot, offer a reply, for the simple reason that they have no substantial motives to appeal to apart from the building of a Communist society, which is an ideal that by no means appeals to everybody.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁵ *Ibid.*

There is also another aspect of the matter. The preachings of atheism produce a certain state of mind, an outlook, which, carried to its logical conclusion, exerts a destructive influence upon the foundations of Soviet society. A young man of twenty-two, who signed himself Leonid, wrote a letter to the editors of *Komsomolskaya pravda*, who published it on May 20, 1965, and then, a few months later, gave the gist of it as follows:

All around me, people say one thing and do another: they condemn dissolute conduct, but themselves want only to wallow in it. But I say, and do, one thing only: the love of which the poets write does not exist, there is only love for money, position and a merry carefree life. And I revel in this life, full of wine and cheap caresses. I've led this life so far and will lead it in future. I want nothing else. As far as your educational work is concerned, I am a washout.⁶

Republishing the letter in this form, the editors commented that it had aroused the indignation of many readers, who had written to the paper to express their indignation. A selection of extracts from these letters then follows.

This is all very credible: the readers condemned Leonid, since most people have an inborn sense of what is right, a striving for the good. But such strivings cannot be explained or justified by atheistic doctrine. The editors commented:

These readers pity Leonid and warn him that the life he has been leading and intends to continue leading will inevitably bring him to a sorry end. Well, they say, you intend to lead a carefree life, to drink and deceive the girls. Let's say you spend five, ten years like that—what then? How will you live then? And what will you leave behind you?—Families broken with your "assistance," the ruined lives of young men who believed in your "philosophy"?⁷

But there are those of a like mind with Leonid, "the bearers," as the paper puts it, "of cynicism and nihilism." Another young man, named Shitov, wrote to the paper:

You only have one life, and you have to live it in such a way that you don't afterwards bitterly regret the years that have been spent profitlessly. These words of Ostrovsky's I interpret in my own way. Let people call me a cynic and an egoist, but I live only for myself. Everyone has his own ideas about happiness. As far as I am concerned, it doesn't exist: happiness is a bluff, a myth.⁸

A certain Aleksandr wrote to the editors to say that the main thing in life is to occupy a solid position in society. The holding of definite views is, in his opinion, the lot of primitive people, although it is easier to live if you have them, even if they are only assumed. The best thing is to adapt your views to the times: for the sake of your opinions, he says, you may well have to suffer and even lose your position...

Vasily N. follows the principle of "Live and let live." He sees the purpose of life in making a career. In general, one has to live for one's own good. As for Viktor A., some things seem to have lost all permanent value:

⁶ *Komsomolskaya pravda*, October 20, 1965.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

Family?—That's just a prejudice, it's dying out nowadays. Friendship?—Just so long as a man is necessary. Comradeship?—Only if it is needed for one's work.⁹

The editors wonder where these young people can have taken their views from. They do not, of course, say that these young people and many others like them show in the final analysis the results of the moral disintegration due to atheism. The nature of this disintegration may be seen in the implications of Shitov's words quoted above, namely, that people without a religious faith who live for others and do nothing for themselves hate life, although they fear death. This would seem to sum up fairly accurately the conclusions which proceed logically from the theory of atheism. All the spiritual values which the atheists borrow from religion seem absurdly out of place against the background of this rather startling conclusion. As for the indignation expressed by the Soviet press at the views which we have quoted, this seems misplaced: one is reminded of the truth, "As ye sow, so shall ye reap." The only cause for surprise lies in the fact that the harvest is no greater.

Finally, reference may be made to an article by M. G. Mikhailov entitled "An Appeal to Experience," published in the journal *Nauka i religiya*, which suggests that Soviet atheists have begun to realize where the roots of this disintegration lie. Mikhailov describes a conversation with a religious-minded girl named Vera Shcherbak, with whom he discusses a question which is indeed very important but which sounds strange when coming from the lips of an atheist. He discusses the salvation of man's soul, by which he means cleansing a man of mean feelings. He asks the girl whether a non-believer can be free of all such feelings, and if so, whether it is not possible to save one's soul without God. He concludes:

Consequently, belief in God is not the only possible means of freeing one's soul from all that is mean in one's feelings, thoughts and actions—consequently, one may dispense with a belief in God?... Is it not worth taking a more detailed interest in other means, if they lead to the same results?¹⁰

Thus, Soviet atheism apparently finds itself obliged to adopt a remarkable series of borrowings—e.g., a number of ethical laws borrowed from religion and declared to be part of the Communist ethic, the idea of saving one's soul (though this time without God)—in order to lend some meaning to that meaningless void with which it would confront man. The very remarkability of these borrowings is an indication of the lengths to which Soviet atheism is forced to go in its struggle with religion in the USSR.

Rev. Dimitry Konstantinow

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Nauka i religiya*, 1965, No. 8, pp. 3—4.

The Economy

The Uneven Development of the Soviet Oil and Gas Industry

From 1963 to 1964, oil production in the USSR increased from 206,000,000 to 224,000,000 tons and gas production from 91,500 to 108,500 million cubic meters. During the Seven-Year Plan, the Ural-Volga region, the Northern Caucasus and Azerbaidzhan have been the major oil-producing regions. Fifty percent of the gas was obtained in the Northern Caucasus, 38.3 percent in the Ukraine, 6.3 percent in Azerbaidzhan and 4.4 percent in Uzbekistan.¹

In 1964, 63 deposits of oil, 38 of gas and 2 of oil and gas were found. The largest of the oil deposits were the South Balyk, the Vata, the Severo-Pokurskoye and the Poikinskoye deposits in the Tyumen Oblast, the Rechitsa deposit in the Belorussian SSR and the Zapadnoye Barsa-Kelmes deposit in the Turkmen SSR. Large gas deposits were discovered in the Tyumen and Novosibirsk Oblasts, Kalmykia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenia.² Fourteen oil and four gas deposits were found in Western Siberia, one of the most promising oil- and gas-bearing regions in the entire country. In the Irkutsk Oblast, the oil deposits in the Osa and Markovo horizons were found to be inconsiderable, but in the south of the oblast prospects for striking oil at the new Birkinskoye gas deposit are considered to be good.³ Six deposits of gas and two of oil were discovered in Central Asia, where 25 percent of the USSR's known gas reserves are located. In the Ural-Volga region, the major oil-producing region of the USSR, 51 new deposits were discovered, as well as considerable new oil and gas reserves in existing deposits. These new reserves, however, consist largely of high-sulfur oils, which are hardly being extracted at the present because they are costly to process.⁴ In the 1965 navigation period, it was planned to supply the Omsk refinery with at least one million tons of oil from the Shaim, Surgut and Megion deposits. By June 1965, oil from eight wells in the Uzen oilfield, in the south of the Mangyshlak Peninsula, was already being supplied to the Gurev refinery *via* the Uzen-Shevchenko pipeline.⁵

However, although oil and gas production is growing rapidly, the situation as regards test and development drilling is far from satisfactory, despite the fact that up to 40 percent of capital investment in the oil industry is accounted for by drilling. According to tentative Soviet calculations, by 1970 capital investment in drilling for oil and gas is to reach 2,000–2,300 million rubles, or approximately three times the 1963 level.⁶ In order to arrive at a fair evaluation of Soviet

¹ *Geologiya nefi i gaza*, 1965, No. 4, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 1–2.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4.

⁵ *Pravda*, June 5, 1965, p. 1.

⁶ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, June 27, 1964, p. 3.

drilling as a whole, however, a number of facts must be considered. First of all, the last fifteen years have seen a marked increase in the amount of test and development drilling carried out in such difficult regions as the boggy taiga of Western Siberia and the desert wastes of the Mangyshlak Peninsula, i.e., regions where roads are virtually non-existent and the climate is hostile. In addition to this, the new and highly-productive oil and gas deposits discovered in Azerbaidzhan, the Krasnodar and Stavropol Krai, the Chechen-Ingush region, Turkmenia and Daghestan are located at considerable depths, ranging from 3,500 to 5,000 meters. Indeed, 35 percent of the hypothetical reserves of oil now being extracted and 55 percent of those of gas are located at depths of over 3,500 meters. From 1953 to 1963, the average depth of test wells increased from 1,531 to 2,150 meters and that of producing wells from 1,305 to 1,623 meters. The difficulties encountered by Soviet drillers in deep drilling are illustrated by the fact that in the Zyrya oilfield in Azerbaidzhan it took an average of two to three months to drill down to a depth of 3,500 meters as compared with three to four months for the next thousand meters and as much as six to ten months for the final 500 meters; during this last stage, the entire five-kilometer-long drilling string had to be raised and lowered over one hundred times.⁷

The problem of cutting down drilling costs was discussed in some detail at the All-Union Drillers' Conference held in 1964 in Krasnodar. It was noted that during the Seven-Year Plan drilling figures had compared most unfavorably with the control figures and had tended to become worse as time went on. Thus, from 1958 to 1963 the average depths of producing and test wells had increased from 1,535 to 1,623 meters and 1,857 to 2,150 meters respectively, progress per drilling rig had decreased from 1,084 to 991 (417 to 368) meters per month and progress per bit from 30 to 25.9 (18.8 to 16.6) meters, as a result of which the cost of a drilled meter had increased from 46.5 to 53.3 (108.3 to 141.6) rubles.⁸ According to Soviet geologist M. Mikhailov, if drilling costs had remained stable during the period 1959-63 an extra 2,300 wells, each of them 1,800 meters deep, could have been drilled for the same money.⁹

Nikolai Baibakov, then Chairman of the State Committee for the Oil Extracting Industry, later admitted that in part these disappointing figures had been due to the use of inadequate drilling equipment and techniques, particularly in deep drilling. There had also been supply difficulties. The government's massive 1961 program for producing high-capacity equipment for drilling enterprises was not being carried out satisfactorily. In 1963, for example, plans for the production of drilling rigs, bits and tool joints had been fulfilled to the extent of only 92, 90 and 87 percent respectively. A similar situation had existed in respect to certain other items. All this, concluded Baibakov, had set back the reequipment of drilling enterprises by some two to three years.¹⁰

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, February 17, 1965, p. 16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, June 27, 1964, p. 3.

In February 1964, Khrushchev said that the Soviet machine-building industry should not hesitate to borrow from abroad whenever desirable, and Soviet oil equipment designers were accordingly instructed to concentrate on solving new problems and to study and exploit Western developments instead of wasting time producing designs which were already in existence.¹¹

The situation in regard to drilling bits is extremely bad. The seven plants engaged in their manufacture are, by the admission of Soviet experts themselves, backward in respect of both equipment and technology. The quality of the bits is miserable, their range is limited and not nearly enough are being produced. As a result, Soviet drillers often find themselves obliged to use bits which are unsuited to the given geological conditions. Little use is being made of modern jet, insert, one-cone and diamond bits, despite the fact that according to the State Committee for the Oil Extracting Industry a single diamond bit lasts up to 60 times as long as a three-cone bit. Although about 7,000,000 carats of industrial diamonds are being mined yearly in Yakutia and the Urals and a new diamond tool plant has been built at Nalchik, in the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR, Soviet drillers are being supplied with a mere 250 diamond bits yearly instead of the 3,500 which they require.¹²

The Soviet machine-building industry is apparently still unable to produce good-quality diesel motors and high-power mud pumps for drilling rigs, while the tube mills continue to turn out thick-walled casing and drill pipes of extremely low strength. These pipes, which have a maximum yield point of a mere 55 kilograms per square millimeter and are available in only three steel grades, compare most unfavorably with those being produced in the USA, Great Britain and Western Germany, which are available in six steel grades and have yield points of 126 kilograms per square millimeter and more. In addition to this, light-alloy pipes are still not being used for deep drilling, despite their unquestionable advantages, because the Soviet metallurgical industry has so far failed to master the technique of making them.¹³

It is thus scarcely surprising that over 5,000,000 rig hours were lost in 1961 and 1962 alone as a result of breakdowns and stoppages. The number of breakdowns per thousand meters drilled has actually been increasing, about 60 percent being due to fractures of the casing, drill pipes, tools and tool locks and the remaining 40 percent to failures to observe technical regulations.¹⁴

At the same time, the organization of drilling operations is in many regions badly in need of an overhaul. This applies particularly to test drilling, which is organized according to numerous completely different systems, many of them hopelessly obsolete. A notable exception to this confusion is the Tatar ASSR, where in 1957 test drilling was put exclusively in the hands of the drilling organizations themselves (under the old set-up various geological departments,

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

trusts and prospecting groups also had a finger in the pie), which had at their disposal all the necessary technical, transport and storage facilities, living accommodation and cultural amenities for the workers, etc. However, although the initiative of the Tatar drilling organizations was appreciated by leading officials of the State Committee for the Oil Extracting Industry, it was found impossible to extend the new and simplified organizational structure to other oil and gas deposits because the latter came under the jurisdiction of no fewer than 47 sovnarkhozes.¹⁵

As a result, test drilling figures compare most unfavorably with those for industrial drilling, and geological prospecting is proceeding extremely slowly in the promising new oil- and gas-bearing regions. Only 4 percent of all deep test drilling in the USSR is carried out in Western Siberia and only one percent in Eastern Siberia, with its rich Markovo deposit, and the Mangyshlak Peninsula. From 1958 to 1962, ten times more deep test wells were bored in depleted Bashkiria than in promising Eastern Siberia. Large sums of money are frequently wasted on prospecting in unpromising areas. Of 90 geological structures explored in the Saratov Oblast, no fewer than 55 proved to be barren and another 27 nearly so. This meant that 930,000 meters of deep wells were bored at a cost of 90,000,000 rubles to virtually no effect. Over 100,000,000 rubles were wasted in a similar fashion in the Volgograd Oblast.¹⁶ In the Bashkir and Tatar ASSR's, where many large fields have already been discovered, considerable sums are wasted on small deposits. No less than 2,200,000 meters were bored in the process of exploring the latter, 1,800,000 meters of which failed to reveal either oil or gas. At the same time, the USSR's known oil and gas reserves failed to increase as planned during the period 1958-64 because of the repeated underfulfillment of deep test drilling plans throughout most of the country, the total deficit for the USSR as a whole being 10,700,000 meters, that for the RSFSR 5,700,000 meters, that for the Ukraine 960,000 meters and that for Uzbekistan 1,300,000 meters. Moreover, the drilling of test wells with a depth of 3,200-3,500 meters is running into difficulties due to poor technology and equipment.¹⁷

The testing of completed wells is also badly organized. Testing plans are not being fulfilled, particularly where deep wells are involved. For no apparent reason, the average testing time has been showing a steady increase and in 1963 reached 126 days. Only 35-40 percent of the total testing time is being spent productively.¹⁸

During the last ten years or so, the average size of newly discovered deposits has been diminishing considerably. Particularly alarming from the Soviet oil industry's point of view is the fact that deposits discovered during the period 1960-64 are on the average less than half the size of those discovered in former years. This is a clear sign that the country's natural resources are becoming exhausted.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, June 8, 1963, p. 11.

¹⁷ *Geologiya nefi i gaza*, 1965, No. 4, pp. 7-9.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

All this, of course, will inevitably slow down the rate of increase of Soviet oil production, whose rapid postwar development has been largely the result of an extensive exploitation of surface layers. Now that the latter are becoming exhausted, Soviet oilmen are being forced to concentrate more and more on the deeper-lying deposits, which are obviously much more difficult to exploit.

G. A. Vvedensky

New Information on Soviet Foreign Trade

As far as foreign trade is concerned, 1964 was an ominously bleak year for the USSR: for the first time in peace, the USSR became a net importer of grain and grain products. Whereas in 1962 the USSR's trade in grain had shown a net surplus of over eight million tons, the net deficit incurred in 1964 totaled over four-and-a-half million tons. In money terms, this meant that a credit of 490 million rubles in 1962 gave way to a debit of 227 million rubles in 1964. One of the consequences of the inability of Soviet agriculture to provide adequate grain for the rising expectations and needs of Soviet and East European consumers was the sale of over 1,000 million dollars' worth of Soviet gold in 1963 and 1964. Another related and equally serious consequence of the grain deficit in 1964—and the probable deficits of 1965 and 1966—is the revision of plans for imports, exports and industrial development necessitated during the forthcoming Five-Year Plan.

Some of these facts may be derived from the recently-published Soviet year-book on foreign trade in 1964.¹ The new handbook contains such a wealth of information that justice cannot be done to it in a short study; we have therefore attempted here merely to highlight three important features of Soviet foreign trade during the past four years—the trends of overall balances, the changing structure of trade with Eastern Europe and the deteriorating grain trade. All data have been taken or derived from the new handbook and from its predecessors for the years 1959–63.

Overall Trade Balances of the USSR, 1961–64
(Millions of Rubles, Current Prices)

	1961	1962	1963	1964
Total Exports	5,398	6,328	6,545	6,913
Total Imports	5,245	5,810	6,353	6,963
Balance	+153	+518	+192	—50
<i>Trade with Socialist Countries:</i>				
Exports	3,889	4,415	4,590	4,866
Imports	3,732	4,109	4,488	4,812
Balance	+157	+306	+102	+54
<i>with Members of Comecon:</i>				
Exports	3,161	3,688	3,850	4,175
Imports	2,812	3,286	3,779	4,057
Balance	+349	+402	+71	+118

¹ *Vnesnnyaya trgovlya Soyuz SSSR za 1964 god: Statistichesky obzor* (The Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1964: A Statistical Survey), Moscow, 1965, 269 pp.

<i>Trade with Capitalist Countries :</i>				
	1961	1962	1963	1964
Exports	1,509	1,913	1,956	2,048
Imports	1,513	1,701	1,865	2,151
Balance	—4	+212	+91	—103
<i>with Developed Countries :</i>				
Exports	984	1,023	1,135	1,181
Imports	1,006	1,175	1,281	1,587
Balance	—22	—152	—146	—406
<i>with Underdeveloped Countries :</i>				
Exports	525	890	821	867
Imports	507	526	584	564
Balance	+18	+364	+237	+303

The most disturbing feature for Soviet planners is the 1964 deficit of 406 million rubles recorded in trade with the capitalist developed countries. Until 1960, the USSR had achieved a favorable balance each year with the industrialized West, but from that year on deficits appeared which have had to be covered by credits or by the sale of gold. It should be noted that the Soviets need a sizeable surplus of hard currency to finance much of their diplomatic, propaganda and subversive activities throughout the world.

The deficit with the capitalist developed countries is by no means compensated for by the surplus accruing from Soviet trade with the "capitalist" underdeveloped countries. These surpluses correspond fairly closely with the amount of Soviet credits actually drawn in any one year. Thus, in 1964 the trade surplus was 303 million rubles, while total Soviet credits drawn by (not extended to) these countries amounted to 344.6 million dollars, or 310.1 million rubles.

Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe (Excluding Albania), 1961—64
(Millions of Rubles, Current Prices)

BULGARIA				
	1961	1962	1963	1964
Exports	321	403	446	510
Imports	294	351	400	480
Soviet Balance	+27	+52	+46	+30
HUNGARY				
Exports	323	370	399	443
Imports	294	350	381	433
Soviet Balance	+29	+20	+18	+10
EASTERN GERMANY				
Exports	1,088	1,235	1,183	1,247
Imports	788	966	1,173	1,195
Soviet Balance	+300	+269	+10	+52
POLAND				
Exports	478	535	596	594
Imports	429	508	553	646
Soviet Balance	+49	+27	+43	—52

RUMANIA

	1961	1962	1963	1964
Exports	263	337	359	444
Imports	307	314	369	379
Soviet Balance	-44	+23	-10	+65

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

	1961	1962	1963	1964
Exports	587	694	764	811
Imports	628	742	856	872
Soviet Balance	—41	—48	—92	—61
Total Soviet Balance	+320	+343	+15	+44

Although the USSR has consistently recorded a favorable overall trade balance with the six European satellite members of Comecon, the balance declined to 15 million rubles in 1963 and to 44 million rubles in 1964. Within the overall deficit of these countries, Czechoslovakia has registered a surplus in her trade with the USSR in eight out of the last ten years. In 1964, for the first time, Poland enjoyed a surplus in her trade with the Soviet Union, most of which was attributable to the drastic reduction in her imports of Soviet grain. Although the figures shed some light upon Poland's recent obstreperous behavior within Comecon and Czechoslovakia's continuing dissatisfaction over the structure of her trade with the USSR, it would first be necessary to examine the six nations' total foreign trade before a meaningful appraisal could be made of their economic relations with the USSR.

Soviet Trade in Grain (Excluding Groats) and Flour, 1961-64
(Thousands of Metric Tons)

	1961	1962	1963	1964
Total Exports of Grain	7,481	7,814	6,260	3,514
<i>To</i> Eastern Germany	1,787	2,186	1,577	1,191
Czechoslovakia	1,176	1,451	1,501	900
Poland ..	604	862	820	110
Hungary ..	416	294	141	15
Bulgaria ..	5	108	150	120
Rumania	—	—	—	400
Cuba	251	412	462	516
Total Imports of Grain	679	46	3,103	7,287
<i>From</i> Canada	486	—	2,323	3,885
Australia	—	—	273	1,402
USA ..	—	—	—	1,785
Argentina ..	—	—	6	106
Rumania	162	5	395*	5
Net Exports (+) or Imports (—) of Grain	+6,802	+7,768	+3,157	—3,773
Net Exports (+) or Imports (—) of Flour**	+285	+286	—1	—814
Physical Balance	+7,087	+8,054	+3,156	—4,587

* In 1963, Rumania "lent" the USSR 403,000 tons of grain
** Converted to grain equivalent at ratio 4:5

Monetary Value of Soviet Trade in Grain (Excluding Groats) and Flour, 1961-64
(Millions of Rubles, Current Prices)

	1961	1962	1963	1964
Grain and Flour Exports	444	495	400	242
Grain and Flour Imports	43	5	216	519
Monetary Balance	+401	+490	+184	-277

It is difficult to make a completely accurate assessment of Soviet grain purchases from the West in any given period, since the reports come from a multitude of sources and duplication sometimes occurs. The best record is provided by the annual foreign trade handbook, *Vneshnyaya torgovlya Soyuza SSR*, but details of 1965's transactions will not be available from this source until September 1966. However, with the massive purchase of Canadian wheat and flour announced on August 11 and the 1.1 million tons bought from the Argentine on August 12, it seems fairly certain that the USSR contracted to buy about 10 million tons of wheat and flour from the West in 1965. Most of the wheat and flour was scheduled to be delivered by the beginning of this year. The following table gives the details of the purchases for 1965 recorded so far:

Date of Purchase	Exporting Country	Amount Purchased (Metric Tons)
January 7, 1965	France	250,000
February 1, 1965	Canada	120,000
February 5, 1965	Australia	750,000
April 9, 1965	Australia	600,000
April 14, 1965	France	150,000
April 24, 1965	Argentine	750,000
July 20, 1965	France	300,000
August 5, 1965	Canada	720,000
August 11, 1965	Canada	5,000,000
August 12, 1965	Argentine	1,100,000
August 21, 1965	France	300,000
Total		10,040,000

SOURCES *The Guardian*, London, January 15 and September 2, 1965; *The New York Times*, February 2, April 10 and August 12, 1965, UPI, February 5, 1965, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, April 26, 1965, *The Economist*, London, July 24, 1965, Reuter August 11, 1965

It appears that in 1965 and 1966 the USSR will again appear on the world grain market as a net importer. Aggravating this situation is the fact that Soviet grain imports from the West must be paid for in hard currency, whereas her grain exports are paid for in rubles. Since the total foreign trade turnover of the USSR in 1964 was less than 14,000 million rubles, of which less than 3,000 million rubles represented trade with the industrial countries of the West, the significance of the grain purchases can hardly be overestimated; they must also bring home very forcefully to the planners the lamentable weakness of their agricultural base.

The disclosure of the figure of 900,000 tons of grain sold to Czechoslovakia in 1964 sheds some light upon the recent bland statement by Novotny, that "despite the unfavorable harvest in the Soviet Union, the USSR will supply to Czechoslovakia the grain that she has pledged to send us under the trade agreement."² It

² CTK, Prague, October 28, 1965.

seems that the annual Soviet-Czech trade protocols in recent years have stipulated deliveries of less than one million tons of Soviet grain. This is well below Czech requirements, and the balance has usually been made up through supplementary purchases. From 1964 on, the Soviet Union has apparently resolved to deliver only the minimum amounts of grain as laid down in the protocols; for her additional requirements, Czechoslovakia will have to go on the world market for anything up to one million tons—and pay anything up to 80 million dollars in hard currency. Since Czechoslovakia is a major supplier of high-grade industrial products to the USSR (in 1964, for example, she supplied the Soviets with two-thirds of all imported large-diameter pipe—a product subject to a somewhat ineffective NATO embargo), it is hardly surprising that the USSR's inability or unwillingness to deliver a further one million tons of grain is prompting the Czechs to make an "agonizing reappraisal" of their trade relations with Comecon in general and the Soviet Union in particular.

Keith Bush

study of Russian ecclesiastical chanting belongs simultaneously to two disciplines—musicology and Orthodox liturgics.

Professor Uspensky is not only a musicologist, but an expert in liturgics and archeology.¹ The combination of these specialties in one and the same person is of particular importance and also, unfortunately, extraordinarily rare. For this reason, the book under review merits especial study. Its author devotes most of his attention to the musical aspect, touching on the liturgical only insofar as this was, by the nature of the subject, unavoidable. This is probably due to the fact that the book is published, not by the Moscow Patriarchate, but by a state publishing house concerned with musical and not religious questions. The result is that while the reader obtains a clear idea of the genesis and musical nature of these old Russian church melodies, their logical force and the question of their execution, which can only be considered within the framework of the service concerned, tends to be lost sight of.

The author divides his historical account into three periods: (1) Kievan Rus (up to the middle of the twelfth century); (2) the period of "feudal disunity" (from the middle of the twelfth to the end of the fifteenth century); and (3) Muscovy (from the end of the fifteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century). Such a division, associated as it is with political developments, seems to us artificial. More natural would have been to link the most important events with changes in the liturgical system such as the universal adoption of the monastic ritual instead of that of the Cathedral of St. Sophia, which had been in use in all cathedrals and other important town churches until the beginning of the fifteenth century. Of course, political circumstances inevitably exert a certain influence upon the development of ecclesiastical art, but this influence is indirect, delaying or accelerating the evolution of liturgical forms which are of importance for our present subject within the framework of general ecclesiastical culture.

In the book under review, Professor Uspensky does not follow the traditional view that the oldest Russian ecclesiastical chanting represented the Byzantine musical system transplanted bodily and adapted to Church Slavic texts.² By analysing the oldest Russian manuscripts and comparing them with Byzantine manuscripts of the same period, he demonstrates the extent to which authentically Russian elements helped to mold the ecclesiastical chant and its melodic treasures. He comes to the conclusion that Russian singers and chanters even in the earliest period showed a high degree of independent musical thought on the practical as

¹ See, for example, his article on the Orthodox Vespers in *Bogoslovskie trudy*, published by the Moscow Patriarchate, No. 1, 1959, pp. 7–52.

² E.g., D. V. Razumovsky, *Tserkovnoye peniye v Rossii* (Ecclesiastical Chanting in Russia), Parts I–III, Moscow, 1867–69; V. M. Metallov, *Ocherk istorii pravoslavnago tserkovnago peniya v Rossii* (Outline History of Ecclesiastical Chanting in Russia), 3rd ed., Moscow, 1900, 4th ed., Moscow, 1915; A. V. Preobrazhensky, *Kul'tovaya muzyka v Rossii* (Religious Music in Russia), Leningrad, 1924; I. I. Voznesensky, *Bolshei i maly znamenny raspev* (The Great and Little Znamenny Chant), Riga, 1890; Y. K. Arnold, *Teoriya pravoslavnago tserkovnago peniya voobshche, po ucheniyu yellinskikh i vizantiyskikh pisatelei* (The Theory of Orthodox Church Chanting in General, According to the Teachings of Hellenic and Byzantine Writers), Moscow, 1880; Miloš M. Velimirović, *Byzantine Elements in Early Slavic Chant*, Copenhagen, 1960

well as the theoretical plane. In this connection, the section (pages 36–50) on the hitherto mysterious Kondakar chant is of particular interest. Here we find a number of observations that are both new and important, some of them of a philological and liturgical character.³ In the author's view, the Kondakar chant was of purely Byzantine origin and was performed in the Byzantine manner; that this manner was alien to the Russians explains, according to him, the complete disappearance of this type of chant after the thirteenth century.

The author devotes much attention to a modal analysis of the melodies of the Znamenny chant, the oldest form of chanting in the Russian Church. This section is completely new, and removes the contradictions which had riddled the analyses offered a hundred years before by the "father of the history of Russian ecclesiastical chanting," D. V. Razumovsky, and his successors I. I. Voznesensky and Y. K. Arnold. Professor Uspensky stresses the prevalence in the structure of these melodies, not of the system of fifths and fourths which characterized the Byzantine and Gregorian styles, but of a system of thirds and fourths, without the observance of any correspondence between the authentic and plagal modes or *glasy*. He cites numerous analogous passages in the melodies of *byliny* and certain folksongs, although he is far from subscribing to the theory of the provenance of the Znamenny chant from folksong; he confines himself to pointing out certain common features of intonation and articulation, the origin of which he sees in the modal basis common to Russian musical thought as a whole.

Another entirely new and extremely interesting contribution is to be found in the author's remarks on the performance of the psalms.⁴ Leaving aside the liturgical aspect, which itself is of great importance in this matter, he gives a musical analysis of the melodies, which he very plausibly attributes to the well-known Novgorod chanter Igumen Markell Bezborody, who lived in the second half of the sixteenth century.

The reader is offered a fairly detailed study of problems relating to the *demestvenny* and *putevoi* chants, the oldest records of non-unison ecclesiastical chanting, and the theory and semiography of ecclesiastical chanting as worked out by Russian masters. Some of Professor Uspensky's conclusions concerning polyphonic chanting differ from those of another Soviet musicologist, V. M. Belyayev, contained in the latter's substantial article on "Early Russian Polyphony"⁵ and in his book *Old Russian Musical Literature*.⁶

³ Compare the present writer's contributions on the question of the disappearance of the Kondakar chant and on the portrayal of St. Romanos Melodos as a chanter of liturgical texts in *Pravoslavnaya zhizn*, Jordanville, N.Y., 1962, No. 5, pp. 7–17, and 1964, No. 10, respectively.

⁴ Cf. Jean de Gardner, "Le psautier chanté en slavon au XVII^e siècle," *Actes du troisième Congrès International de musique sacrée*, Paris, 1957, pp. 346–52.

⁵ *Studia memoriae Belae Bartók sacra*, Academia, Budapest, 1956, pp. 327–36 (English translation *ibid.*, pp. 307–26). Cf. V. V. Stasov's article (written in 1865) on the *demestvenny* and three-staff chant in *Izbrannye sochineniya* (Selected Works), Vol. I, Moscow, 1952, pp. 123–40, also Razumovsky, *op. cit.*, and Metallov, *op. cit.*

⁶ V. M. Belyayev, *Drevne-russkaya muzykal'naya pismennost' (Old Russian Musical Literature)*, Moscow, 1962, 134 pp. with several facsimile reproductions of MS. pages and numerous examples in music type.

In the section dealing with semiography (pages 96–117), the author refers almost in passing to the musical significance of non-staff symbols—*kryuki* and other neums. However, the semiography and paleography of Russian ecclesiastical chanting is a discipline on its own which falls outside the range of the book under review.

At the end of the book, there is a bibliography of Russian and foreign literature, which is less exhaustive than that given by V. M. Metallov in his *Outline History of Ecclesiastical Chanting in Russia* but serves as a valuable supplement to it so far as literature published after 1917 is concerned. Unfortunately, Uspensky's bibliography is very incomplete in its coverage of foreign literature, extending only up to 1949, despite the fact that since that time not a few publications have appeared outside the USSR which deal with various aspects of the subject. One particularly important feature is the author's list of the original manuscripts of old Russian chants which he used, together with indications of their present whereabouts and library catalogue numbers: when Orthodox Church property was secularized in the USSR, the contents of various libraries attached to monasteries and churches, the collection at the Moscow Synodal Printing House, etc., were dispersed among various state libraries, where they received new catalogue numbers, so that Metallov's information here is no longer of any use.

Professor Uspensky's book cannot be regarded as being itself a piece of research but rather as a résumé of the results of the author's research into various aspects of his subject. Only in the section on the origin and modal structure of the melodies does he give the reader some insight into his analytical technique. The entire book is a valuable contribution to the study of Russian liturgical singing; it cannot entirely replace Metallov's history, which goes as far as the end of the nineteenth century, but it serves as a much-needed supplement to Metallov's work and in many instances also as a corrective. It is written in a good academic style, is supplied with a critical appraisal of sources, and merits close study by all who are interested, not only in ecclesiastical chanting, but in Russian music in general.⁷

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The publication of this book inevitably raises a number of questions. One may well ask whether its publication by a Soviet publishing house that has nothing to do with the Church does not indicate some shift, however slight, in the secular authorities' tactics *vis-à-vis* the Church. It is difficult, of course, to say, but to the present writer this seems improbable—just as improbable as that the same interpretation may be placed on the publication of books on Russian iconography or Russian ecclesiastical architecture. The true reason, it would seem, is rather that it is just as impossible to ignore Russian ecclesiastical chanting when studying the history of Russian music as it would be to exclude ecclesiastical architecture from the history of early Russian architecture or iconography from the history

⁷ Attention may be drawn to Prof. Uspensky's article on the Byzantine chant in Kievan Rus (*Actes des XI Internationales Byzantinistes-Kongresses 1958*, Munich, 1960, pp. 643–54, five facsimile reproductions), which differs somewhat from the chapter on chanting in Kievan Rus in the book here reviewed.

of old Russian painting—or, for that matter, the Ostromir Gospels and other old Russian religious documents from a study of Russian literature. The desire, now observable in the USSR, to discover original elements in Russian culture, elements testifying to an independence of foreign influences, leads to the necessity of studying monuments of the various branches of old Russian art, and most of these monuments were created under the direct and powerful influence of religious feeling. In the field of music, the only such monument that has survived in written form (and also, incidentally, to some extent orally, hence the fact that it is still alive) consists of the liturgical chants which we have been discussing: to ignore them would mean to erase the entire musical culture of the Eastern Slavs up to the middle of the seventeenth century, when secular music along Western European lines began to penetrate into Russia, with the result that from this time on Russian music began to acquire a character typical of European music in general. The subsequent period no longer bears an exclusively Russian—or rather East Slav Orthodox—character, and for this reason Professor Uspensky ends his extremely interesting and valuable account with the middle of the seventeenth century.

In any case, the publication of this book shows that despite the frequently unfavorable conditions attendant upon this branch of study scholars specializing in this field in the USSR have not lost their interest and that research into the subject, so far from ceasing, continues to evoke a response. The fact, already referred to, that scholars in the Soviet Union have an incomparably greater amount of primary material at their disposal than their Western colleagues lends additional authority to their work.—It only remains to express the wish that further publications of this quality will make their appearance.

Johann von Gardner

Kratkaya istoriya SSSR.—II

(A Concise History of the USSR: Part II)

Published for the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR
by the "Nauka" Publishing House, Moscow—Leningrad, 1964, 632 pp.

The first part of this work appeared in 1963. Like the 1959 *History of the CPSU*, the *Concise History* was supposed to come out in several languages, but so far it has not. This, perhaps, is just as well in view of the extremely low academic level of the work, which constitutes further evidence that there is no place for objective historical research in a one-Party state. A good example of the distortions characteristic of the publications of the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences is to be found in chapter three, where the events leading up to the formation of the USSR are described. The compilers of the *Concise History* maintain that while the idea of forming "a union of republics enjoying equal rights" (page 144) came from Lenin, it was the Communist Party which actually organized the creation of the new state. They write: -

In the middle of 1922, the Communist parties of the national republics raised the question of establishing closer ties with the RSFSR (page 146).

In fact, the situation was as follows. In principle, Lenin was always in favor of a large centralized state. Even before the Revolution, he wrote:

Marxists, of course, are opposed to federation and decentralization—for the simple reason that capitalism requires for its development states which are as large and as centralized as possible. . . . The large centralized state represents a tremendous step forward from medieval particularism [*razdroblennosti*] toward the future socialist unity of the entire world, and except *via* such a state (which is indissolubly linked with capitalism) there can be no road to socialism.¹

Lenin accordingly built up his Bolshevik Party, which before the Revolution was called the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, on a strictly centralistic basis, and although in 1918 the Communist parties in the various non-Russian republics formed from the old Tsarist provinces received national designations, i.e., the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, etc., they acted on instructions from the Kremlin, as is the case today. In this connection, scant credence can be given to the allegation of the compilers of the *Concise History* that after the Communist parties of the national republics had decided to seek "closer ties with the RSFSR" a "broad popular unification movement" arose during the course of which it was proposed "to abandon contractual relations between the republics in favor of the establishment of a single unified state" (page 146). In actual fact, this "unification movement" was initiated by the Communist parties of the national republics, which were, as we have said, mere branch agencies of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

It is further maintained that Stalin, in his capacity of chairman of the commission set up under the Russian Communist Party's Central Committee to work out a draft project for uniting all the Soviet republics within a single state, made the "profoundly erroneous" proposal to incorporate the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Armenian, Azerbaidzhani and Georgian republics into the RSFSR as autonomous republics and extend the authority of the RSFSR government to the entire Union. This, according to the *Concise History*, would have "diminished the rights of the independent Soviet republics" and only benefited the "great-power chauvinists in the state apparatus of the RSFSR" (page 146). Lenin, it is alleged, resolutely opposed Stalin on this point, being rather in favor of a "voluntary union of equal and independent Soviet republics," and pressed the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party into adopting, on October 6, 1922, a resolution that

The conclusion of a treaty between the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Federation of Transcaucasian Republics and the RSFSR uniting the latter in a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each party retaining the right of free secession from the Union, is acknowledged to be imperative (as quoted on page 147 of Part II of the *Concise History*).

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), 3rd ed., Vol. XVII, Moscow, p. 154.

The compilers of the *Concise History* ignore the fact that at that time Stalin supported Lenin's conception of a future Soviet state, and do not bother to explain why such a convinced centralist as Lenin should have put forward a plan for a confederation of republics, saying merely that the implementation of Stalin's proposal would have involved the danger of increased "great-power chauvinism" on the part of the Russians. Lenin did, in fact, have the same objective in mind as Stalin, namely, the creation of a highly centralized Soviet empire, but he realized that in the matter of relations between Moscow and the non-Russian provinces it was necessary to be *suaviter in modo, fortiter in re*. He was well aware that within the national republics—even within the Communist parties themselves—there were powerful centrifugal tendencies (condemned in Communist propaganda as "bourgeois nationalism," "local chauvinism" and "political banditry," the latter term being reserved for armed revolts against the Soviet administrations in the national republics).

It will be remembered that upon its foundation in 1922 the USSR consisted of only four political entities, namely Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Transcaucasian Federation (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia). At that time, the Red Army was engaged in a bitter struggle against the local armed forces of Turkestan in an effort to establish a Soviet regime there. Only in 1924 was Turkestan occupied by the Red Army. The *Concise History* glosses over this bloody conflict by saying that conditions were only by the end of 1924 ripe for the partition of Central Asia (page 151).

In partitioning Turkestan into a number of national territories despite the fact that with the exception of the Tadzhiks, who are of Persian stock, all the peoples living in the region were Turkic in origin and shared a common language, culture and history, the Kremlin leaders were merely pursuing a policy of "divide and rule." Nevertheless, the *Concise History* describes the act of partition as "a great success for the nationalities policy of the Soviet authorities" which was only possible "under conditions of national equality and friendship" (*ibid.*).

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people would meet any attempt to "control the country from outside" with "an upsurge of nationalism."³ The brochure also contained a demand that the Ukrainian Communist Party cease to be a part of the Russian Communist Party and be admitted to the Comintern as an independent section. At the Eleventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party held in March and April 1922, the Ukrainian representative Nikolai Skrypnik expressed mistrust of the Party's intentions in respect of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, pointing out that the erosion of the rights of these peoples by Moscow was in contradiction to the Party's talk of liberating the "colonial countries" and the "working masses all over the world."⁴ In general, Ukrainian oppositionists were sent to work in Russia and subjected to reprisals.

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... preserve the union of soviet socialist republics only in the military and diplomatic spheres, and in all other respects restore full independence to the individual people's commissariats.⁷

³ See *Revolyutsiya v nebespetsi!* (The Revolution in Danger!), published by the "Nova Doba" Library, Vienna, 1920, pp. 75-76.

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Lenin's principal motive for departing from his beloved centralism was that he was afraid that suppression of the non-Russians by the Soviet government—in his eyes a part of the Tsarist legacy which had only been lightly “tarred with the Soviet brush,” as he put it⁸—would undermine that government's authority in the East, where Lenin hoped for a popular uprising against the West European colonial powers.⁹ Lenin's warnings as to the possible consequences of over-hasty centralization were brought to the attention of the Twelfth Party Congress of April 1923, which was trying to hammer out a constitution for the USSR, but were brushed aside by the majority of delegates under Stalin—as were similar warnings by a number of prominent Communist leaders attending the Congress, including Khrisian Rakovsky, head of the Soviet government of the Ukraine, Party theoretician Nikolai Bukharin, Nikolai Skrypnik and the Georgian Communist Makharadze. None of these undercurrents is mentioned in the *Concise History*, which confines itself to the utterly false allegation that in working out a Soviet constitution “based on equal rights and duties for the Union republics” the Congress had acted “in accordance with Lenin's instructions” (page 149).

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So much for the “sovereignty” of the Union republics, which according to the *Concise History* is “protected” by the Soviet Constitution.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 362.

¹⁰ *Sovetskiye konstitutsii* (Soviet Constitutions), Moscow, 1963, pp. 186–87.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

study of Russian ecclesiastical chanting belongs simultaneously to two disciplines—musicology and Orthodox liturgics.

Professor Uspensky is not only a musicologist, but an expert in liturgics and archeology.¹ The combination of these specialties in one and the same person is of particular importance and also, unfortunately, extraordinarily rare. For this reason, the book under review merits especial study. Its author devotes most of his attention to the musical aspect, touching on the liturgical only insofar as this was, by the nature of the subject, unavoidable. This is probably due to the fact that the book is published, not by the Moscow Patriarchate, but by a state publishing house concerned with musical and not religious questions. The result is that while the reader obtains a clear idea of the genesis and musical nature of these old Russian church melodies, their logical force and the question of their execution, which can only be considered within the framework of the service concerned, tends to be lost sight of.

The author divides his historical account into three periods: (1) Kievan Rus (up to the middle of the twelfth century); (2) the period of "feudal disunity" (from the middle of the twelfth to the end of the fifteenth century); and (3) Muscovy (from the end of the fifteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century). Such a division, associated as it is with political developments, seems to us artificial. More natural would have been to link the most important events with changes in the liturgical system such as the universal adoption of the monastic ritual instead of that of the Cathedral of St. Sophia, which had been in use in all cathedrals and other important town churches until the beginning of the fifteenth century. Of course, political circumstances inevitably exert a certain influence upon the development of ecclesiastical art, but this influence is indirect, delaying or accelerating the evolution of liturgical forms which are of importance for our present subject within the framework of general ecclesiastical culture.

In the book under review, Professor Uspensky does not follow the traditional view that the oldest Russian ecclesiastical chanting represented the Byzantine musical system transplanted bodily and adapted to Church Slavic texts.² By analysing the oldest Russian manuscripts and comparing them with Byzantine manuscripts of the same period, he demonstrates the extent to which authentically Russian elements helped to mold the ecclesiastical chant and its melodic treasures. He comes to the conclusion that Russian singers and chanters even in the earliest period showed a high degree of independent musical thought on the practical as

¹ See, for example, his article on the Orthodox Vespers in *Bogoslovskie trudy*, published by the Moscow Patriarchate, No. 1, 1959, pp. 7–52.

² E.g., D. V. Razumovsky, *Tserkovnoye peniye v Rossii* (Ecclesiastical Chanting in Russia), Parts I–III, Moscow, 1867–69; V. M. Metallov, *Očerki istorii pravoslavnago tserkovnago peniya v Rossii* (Outline History of Ecclesiastical Chanting in Russia), 3rd ed., Moscow, 1900, 4th ed., Moscow, 1915; A. V. Preobrazhensky, *Kul'tovaya muzyka v Rossii* (Religious Music in Russia), Leningrad, 1924; I. I. Voznesensky, *Bolshei i maloi znamenny raspev* (The Great and Little Znamenny Chant), Riga, 1890; Y. K. Arnold, *Teoriya pravoslavnago tserkovnago peniya voobshche, po ucheniyu yellinskikh i vizantiiskikh pisatelei* (The Theory of Orthodox Church Chanting in General, According to the Teachings of Hellenic and Byzantine Writers), Moscow, 1880; Miloš M. Velimirović, *Byzantine Elements in Early Slavic Chant*, Copenhagen, 1960.

well as the theoretical plane. In this connection, the section (pages 36–50) on the hitherto mysterious Kondakar chant is of particular interest. Here we find a number of observations that are both new and important, some of them of a philological and liturgical character.³ In the author's view, the Kondakar chant was of purely Byzantine origin and was performed in the Byzantine manner; that this manner was alien to the Russians explains, according to him, the complete disappearance of this type of chant after the thirteenth century.

The author devotes much attention to a modal analysis of the melodies of the Znamenny chant, the oldest form of chanting in the Russian Church. This section is completely new, and removes the contradictions which had riddled the analyses offered a hundred years before by the "father of the history of Russian ecclesiastical chanting," D. V. Razumovsky, and his successors I. I. Voznesensky and Y. K. Arnold. Professor Uspensky stresses the prevalence in the structure of these melodies, not of the system of fifths and fourths which characterized the Byzantine and Gregorian styles, but of a system of thirds and fourths, without the observance of any correspondence between the authentic and plagal modes or *glasy*. He cites numerous analogous passages in the melodies of *byliny* and certain folksongs, although he is far from subscribing to the theory of the provenance of the Znamenny chant from folksong; he confines himself to pointing out certain common features of intonation and articulation, the origin of which he sees in the modal basis common to Russian musical thought as a whole.

Another entirely new and extremely interesting contribution is to be found in the author's remarks on the performance of the psalms.⁴ Leaving aside the liturgical aspect, which itself is of great importance in this matter, he gives a musical analysis of the melodies, which he very plausibly attributes to the well-known Novgorod chanter Igumen Markell Bezborody, who lived in the second half of the sixteenth century.

The reader is offered a fairly detailed study of problems relating to the *demestvenny* and *putevoi* chants, the oldest records of non-unison ecclesiastical chanting, and the theory and semiography of ecclesiastical chanting as worked out by Russian masters. Some of Professor Uspensky's conclusions concerning polyphonic chanting differ from those of another Soviet musicologist, V. M. Belyayev, contained in the latter's substantial article on "Early Russian Polyphony"⁵ and in his book *Old Russian Musical Literature*.⁶

³ Compare the present writer's contributions on the question of the disappearance of the Kondakar chant and on the portrayal of St. Romanos Melodos as a chanter of liturgical texts in *Pravoslavnyaya zhizn*, Jordanville, N Y, 1962, No. 5, pp. 7–17, and 1964, No. 10, respectively.

⁴ Cf. Jean de Gardner, "Le psautier chanté en slave au XVII^e siècle," *Actes du troisième Congrès International de musique sacrée*, Paris, 1957, pp. 346–52.

⁵ *Studia memoriae Belae Bartók sacra*, Academia, Budapest, 1956, pp. 327–36 (English translation *ibid.*, pp. 307–26). Cf. V. V. Stasov's article (written in 1865) on the *demestvenny* and three-staff chant in *Izbrannye sochineniya* (Selected Works), Vol. I, Moscow, 1952, pp. 123–40, also Razumovsky, *op. cit.*, and Metallov, *op. cit.*

⁶ V. M. Belyayev, *Drevne-russkaya muzykal'naya pismennost* (Old Russian Musical Literature), Moscow, 1962, 134 pp. with several facsimile reproductions of MS. pages and numerous examples in music type.

In the section dealing with semiography (pages 96–117), the author refers almost in passing to the musical significance of non-staff symbols—*kryuki* and other neums. However, the semiography and paleography of Russian ecclesiastical chanting is a discipline on its own which falls outside the range of the book under review.

At the end of the book, there is a bibliography of Russian and foreign literature, which is less exhaustive than that given by V. M. Metallov in his *Outline History of Ecclesiastical Chanting in Russia* but serves as a valuable supplement to it so far as literature published after 1917 is concerned. Unfortunately, Uspensky's bibliography is very incomplete in its coverage of foreign literature, extending only up to 1949, despite the fact that since that time not a few publications have appeared outside the USSR which deal with various aspects of the subject. One particularly important feature is the author's list of the original manuscripts of old Russian chants which he used, together with indications of their present whereabouts and library catalogue numbers: when Orthodox Church property was secularized in the USSR, the contents of various libraries attached to monasteries and churches, the collection at the Moscow Synodal Printing House, etc., were dispersed among various state libraries, where they received new catalogue numbers, so that Metallov's information here is no longer of any use.

Professor Uspensky's book cannot be regarded as being itself a piece of research but rather as a résumé of the results of the author's research into various aspects of his subject. Only in the section on the origin and modal structure of the melodies does he give the reader some insight into his analytical technique. The entire book is a valuable contribution to the study of Russian liturgical singing; it cannot entirely replace Metallov's history, which goes as far as the end of the nineteenth century, but it serves as a much-needed supplement to Metallov's work and in many instances also as a corrective. It is written in a good academic style, is supplied with a critical appraisal of sources, and merits close study by all who are interested, not only in ecclesiastical chanting, but in Russian music in general.⁷

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The publication of this book inevitably raises a number of questions. One may well ask whether its publication by a Soviet publishing house that has nothing to do with the Church does not indicate some shift, however slight, in the secular authorities' tactics *vis-à-vis* the Church. It is difficult, of course, to say, but to the present writer this seems improbable—just as improbable as that the same interpretation may be placed on the publication of books on Russian iconography or Russian ecclesiastical architecture. The true reason, it would seem, is rather that it is just as impossible to ignore Russian ecclesiastical chanting when studying the history of Russian music as it would be to exclude ecclesiastical architecture from the history of early Russian architecture or iconography from the history

⁷ Attention may be drawn to Prof. Uspensky's article on the Byzantine chant in Kievan Rus (*Akten des XI. Internationalen Byzantinisten-Kongresses 1958*, Munich, 1960, pp. 643–54, five facsimile reproductions), which differs somewhat from the chapter on chanting in Kievan Rus in the book here reviewed.

of old Russian painting—or, for that matter, the Ostromir Gospels and other old Russian religious documents from a study of Russian literature. The desire, now observable in the USSR, to discover original elements in Russian culture, elements testifying to an independence of foreign influences, leads to the necessity of studying monuments of the various branches of old Russian art, and most of these monuments were created under the direct and powerful influence of religious feeling. In the field of music, the only such monument that has survived in written form (and also, incidentally, to some extent orally, hence the fact that it is still alive) consists of the liturgical chants which we have been discussing: to ignore them would mean to erase the entire musical culture of the Eastern Slavs up to the middle of the seventeenth century, when secular music along Western European lines began to penetrate into Russia, with the result that from this time on Russian music began to acquire a character typical of European music in general. The subsequent period no longer bears an exclusively Russian—or rather East Slav Orthodox—character, and for this reason Professor Uspensky ends his extremely interesting and valuable account with the middle of the seventeenth century.

In any case, the publication of this book shows that despite the frequently unfavorable conditions attendant upon this branch of study scholars specializing in this field in the USSR have not lost their interest and that research into the subject, so far from ceasing, continues to evoke a response. The fact, already referred to, that scholars in the Soviet Union have an incomparably greater amount of primary material at their disposal than their Western colleagues lends additional authority to their work.—It only remains to express the wish that further publications of this quality will make their appearance.

Johann von Gardner

Kratkaya istoriya SSSR.—II

(A Concise History of the USSR: Part II)

Published for the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR
by the "Nauka" Publishing House, Moscow—Leningrad, 1964, 632 pp.

The first part of this work appeared in 1963. Like the 1959 *History of the CPSU*, the *Concise History* was supposed to come out in several languages, but so far it has not. This, perhaps, is just as well in view of the extremely low academic level of the work, which constitutes further evidence that there is no place for objective historical research in a one-Party state. A good example of the distortions characteristic of the publications of the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences is to be found in chapter three, where the events leading up to the formation of the USSR are described. The compilers of the *Concise History* maintain that while the idea of forming "a union of republics enjoying equal rights" (page 144) came from Lenin, it was the Communist Party which actually organized the creation of the new state. They write:

In the middle of 1922, the Communist parties of the national republics raised the question of establishing closer ties with the RSFSR (page 146).

In fact, the situation was as follows. In principle, Lenin was always in favor of a large centralized state. Even before the Revolution, he wrote:

Marxists, of course, are opposed to federation and decentralization—for the simple reason that capitalism requires for its development states which are as large and as centralized as possible. . . . The large centralized state represents a tremendous step forward from medieval particularism [*razdroblennosti*] toward the future socialist unity of the entire world, and except *via* such a state (which is indissolubly linked with capitalism) there can be no road to socialism.¹

Lenin accordingly built up his Bolshevik Party, which before the Revolution was called the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, on a strictly centralistic basis, and although in 1918 the Communist parties in the various non-Russian republics formed from the old Tsarist provinces received national designations, i.e., the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, etc., they acted on instructions from the Kremlin, as is the case today. In this connection, scant credence can be given to the allegation of the compilers of the *Concise History* that after the Communist parties of the national republics had decided to seek "closer ties with the RSFSR" a "broad popular unification movement" arose during the course of which it was proposed "to abandon contractual relations between the republics in favor of the establishment of a single unified state" (page 146). In actual fact, this "unification movement" was initiated by the Communist parties of the national republics, which were, as we have said, mere branch agencies of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

It is further maintained that Stalin, in his capacity of chairman of the commission set up under the Russian Communist Party's Central Committee to work out a draft project for uniting all the Soviet republics within a single state, made the "profoundly erroneous" proposal to incorporate the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Armenian, Azerbaidzhani and Georgian republics into the RSFSR as autonomous republics and extend the authority of the RSFSR government to the entire Union. This, according to the *Concise History*, would have "diminished the rights of the independent Soviet republics" and only benefited the "great-power chauvinists in the state apparatus of the RSFSR" (page 146). Lenin, it is alleged, resolutely opposed Stalin on this point, being rather in favor of a "voluntary union of equal and independent Soviet republics," and pressed the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party into adopting, on October 6, 1922, a resolution that

The conclusion of a treaty between the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Federation of Transcaucasian Republics and the RSFSR uniting the latter in a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each party retaining the right of free secession from the Union, is acknowledged to be imperative (as quoted on page 147 of Part II of the *Concise History*).

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Sobremenniya* (Works), 3rd ed., Vol. XVII, Moscow, p. 154.

The compilers of the *Concise History* ignore the fact that at that time Stalin supported Lenin's conception of a future Soviet state, and do not bother to explain why such a convinced centralist as Lenin should have put forward a plan for a confederation of republics, saying merely that the implementation of Stalin's proposal would have involved the danger of increased "great-power chauvinism" on the part of the Russians. Lenin did, in fact, have the same objective in mind as Stalin, namely, the creation of a highly centralized Soviet empire, but he realized that in the matter of relations between Moscow and the non-Russian provinces it was necessary to be *suaviter in modo, fortiter in re*. He was well aware that within the national republics—even within the Communist parties themselves—there were powerful centrifugal tendencies (condemned in Communist propaganda as "bourgeois nationalism," "local chauvinism" and "political banditry," the latter term being reserved for armed revolts against the Soviet administrations in the national republics).

It will be remembered that upon its foundation in 1922 the USSR consisted of only four political entities, namely Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Transcaucasian Federation (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia). At that time, the Red Army was engaged in a bitter struggle against the local armed forces of Turkestan in an effort to establish a Soviet regime there. Only in 1924 was Turkestan occupied by the Red Army. The *Concise History* glosses over this bloody conflict by saying that conditions were only by the end of 1924 ripe for the partition of Central Asia (page 151).

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⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 362.

¹⁰ *Sovetskoye konstitutsii* (Soviet Constitutions), Moscow, 1963, pp. 186–87.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

At the time of the formation of the USSR, centralism was looked upon as an all-conquering force. Thus, in the "Declarations on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" adopted by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR in 1922 it was proudly proclaimed that the new state would be a "decisive step toward uniting the workers of all countries in a World Socialist Soviet Republic."¹² The *Concise History* does not mention this at all, and is equally silent on the decisive role played by Stalin in the drafting of the Soviet Constitution (as we have said, Stalin was chairman of a commission set up for this purpose by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party [Bolsheviks], of which he was then Secretary General).

As a result of these numerous *lacunae*, the *Concise History* ends up by giving a completely distorted picture of the events which accompanied the formation of the USSR.

P. Fedenko

The Balkans

By CHARLES JELAVICH and BARBARA JELAVICH

Published by Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1965, 150 pp.

Located at the meeting point of three continents and readily approachable by land and sea, the Balkans have throughout their history been less a subject of action than an object of the power politics of the great nations. After World War II, they became a testing ground for Soviet expansionism, and consequently an important factor in the history of the Soviet Union. The Soviet take-over and subsequent complete or partial loss of control on the part of the individual countries is particularly well told.

This small book provides not only a clear guide through the tangles of current Balkan international affairs but makes sense of the present by relating it to the past. The subject is treated chronologically, beginning with the Ottoman conquest and carrying down to the events of 1964. Each period is sketched with regard to the area as a whole and also separately to each of the countries treated—Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia. The authors find three recurring themes—nationalism, "great-power" interference, and relative economic backwardness. For the future as in the past, they believe that the strategic significance of the area and the unresolved conflicts of the great world powers hold little hope: "The Balkans will remain a crossroads where competing systems meet, an area of danger and conflict."

There are seven maps, an annotated list of suggested readings, and an index.

O. J. F.

¹² *Obrazovaniye SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov* (The Formation of the USSR: A Compilation of Documents), Moscow, 1949, p. 333.

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

December 1965

- 1 Soviet military delegation led by First Deputy Defense Minister Marshal A.A. Grechko arrives in UAR on official visit.

Fifth Congress of Union of State Trade and Consumers' Cooperative Society Workers opens in Moscow. Report delivered by chairman of Union's central committee, A. G. Shalaurova.

Seventh Congress of Maritime and River Fleet Workers' Union opens in Moscow. Report delivered by chairman of Union's central committee, G. A. Sayenko.

Announcement that construction of second stage of Almalyk substation is being completed.

Announcement that delegation from Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, led by the deputy chairman of the Union's presidium, Y. V. Ivanov, has arrived in Delhi in response to an invitation by the Indo-Soviet Society for the Development of Cultural Relations to participate in an Indo-Soviet friendship month.

- 2 Announcement that six-month seminar on economic and personnel problems has been started for officials of Ministry of Machine Building for the Light, Food and Household Equipment Industries. Speech on tasks facing the Ministry given by the Minister, V. N. Doyenin.

Plenary meeting of Perm Oblast Party Committee discusses intensification of political and ideological education work among young people.

Chairman of Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin discusses international situation and Soviet-British relations with British Foreign Minister Michael Stewart. Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain A. A. Soldatov and Head of Soviet Foreign Ministry's Second European Department A. A. Rozhchin present.

Gromyko and Stewart sign consular convention between USSR and Great Britain, to come into force when ratification instruments are exchanged in London.

Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers M. A. Lesechko receives member of Yugoslav Federal Executive Council Aleksandar Grlićkov, in Moscow for Twentieth Session of Comecon's Executive Committee, for a discussion on future economic relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.

Soviet-Ghanaian trade talks begin in Moscow.

- 3 Announcement that delegation from "Finland-Soviet Union" Society has arrived in USSR.

Launching of Soviet soft-landing moon probe "Luna-8."

Soviet-East German trade agreement for 1966-70, providing for trade to a value of 13,000 million rubles during this period, signed in East Berlin.

- 4 Publication of joint communiqué on visit to USSR of British Foreign Minister Michael Stewart.

Party Central Committee First Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, Party Central Committee Secretary and Presidium Member M. A. Suslov and Party Central Committee Secretary Y. V. Andropov receive Secretary and Politburo Member of Polish United Workers' Party Zenon Kliszko.

Joint session of Draft Bill Commissions of Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities of USSR Supreme Soviet held to discuss health legislation draft for USSR as a whole and for Union republics. Participants include Chairman of Council of Nationalities J. V. Peive, Health Minister B. V. Petrovsky and Finance Minister V. F. Garbuzov.

- 5 Soviet Constitution Day.

Three-day conference of members of Kazakh, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Tadzhik and Turkmenian Academies of Sciences on coordination of social science research comes to an end in Alma-Ata.

- 5 Session of Councils of Elders of Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities of USSR Supreme Soviet held.

Soviet draft for joint message by co-chairmen of 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina to governments of countries who participated in this conference and countries represented on International Control Commission for Vietnam handed over to British Embassy Minister Brimelow to be forwarded to British government.

Fourth conference of representatives of Academies of Sciences of "socialist" countries comes to an end in Moscow. Results of scientific collaboration since third conference (held in Sofia in April 1964) discussed.

Plenary session of Party Central Committee takes place in Moscow. Reports on "The National Economic Plan of the USSR for 1966," by Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers and Chairman of State Planning Committee (Gosplan) N. K. Baibakov, and "The Budget of the USSR for 1966," by Finance Minister V. F. Garbuzov, heard and discussed. Conversion of Party and state control agencies into "people's control" agencies also discussed, a speech on this subject being delivered by Brezhnev.

Kosygin receives *New York Times* political commentator James Reston at latter's request. Head of Soviet Foreign Ministry's Press Department, L. M. Zamyatin, present.

- 7 Announcement that "Luna-8" moon probe has crashed on the moon.

Seventh session of Supreme Soviet opens in Moscow, hearing reports on "The State Plan for Developing the Economy of the USSR in 1966," by Gosplan Chairman N. K. Baibakov, and "The State Budget of the USSR for 1966 and the Execution of the State Budget of the USSR for 1964," by Finance Minister V. F. Garbuzov, and co-reports by member of Budget Commission of Council of the Union I. V. Kapitonov, Chairman of Budget Commission of Council of Nationalities M. A. Yasnov and Chairman of Economic Commission of Council of Nationalities G. P. Butenko.

Seventh Congress of Textile and Light Industry Workers' Union opens in Moscow. Report delivered by chairman of the Union's central committee, M. A. Kolbetskaya.

Fourth session of standing Soviet-Czech subcommission on scientific and technical cooperation held in Prague. Plans for future cooperation approved.

Soviet Nobel Prize winner Mikhail Sholokhov appears at press conference in Stockholm.

- 8 Kosygin receives Ghanaian trade and economic delegation led by Ghanaian Finance Minister Amoako-Atta

Amoako-Atta meets Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev and Chairman of State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations S. A. Skachkov to discuss Soviet-Ghanaian trade and economic relations.

Announcement that North Vietnamese economic delegation led by Vice-Premier and Politburo Member of Central Committee of Vietnamese Workers' Party Le Than Nghi has arrived in Moscow.

- 9 Announcement that Indian Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan have agreed to Soviet proposal to meet in Tashkent on January 4, 1966, to discuss the Kashmir conflict. Kosygin to act as mediator.

Supreme Soviet adopts resolution to convert "Party and State Control" organs into "People's Control" organs.

Kosygin receives Le Than Nghi.

Supreme Soviet ratifies decree transferring part of Komsomolets Raion (Kustanai Oblast, Kazakh SSR) to Troitsk Raion (Chelyabinsk Oblast, RSFSR).

Council of Ministers reconstituted to include: Chairman, First Deputy Chairmen and Deputy Chairmen of Council of Ministers; Ministers of the USSR; Chairman of State Planning Committee (Gosplan); Chairman of State Committee for Building Affairs (Gostroi); Chairman of State Committee for Material and Technical Supply; Chairman of Committee for People's Control; Chairman of State Committee for Labor and Wages; Chairman of State Committee for Science and Technology; Chairman of State Committee for Professional Technical Education; Chairman of State Purchasing Committee; Chairman of State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations; Chairman of Committee for State Security; Chairman of All-Union Association for the Sale of Agricultural Machinery to State and Collective Farms ("Soyuzselkhoztekhnika"); Chairman of Board of State Bank; Head of Central Statistical Authority; Chairmen of Councils of Ministers of Union Republics (*ex officio*).

Announcement that Suslov and Party Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev have met Secretary General of Syrian Communist Party and a member of the Party's Politburo.

- Supreme Soviet approves state budget for 1966, with a revenue of 105,535,158,000 rubles and an expenditure of 105,393,761,000 rubles (defense estimates alone being 13,430,000,000 rubles), the report on the execution of the state budget for 1964, and the state plan for the development of the national economy in 1966.
- Regular meeting of Committee of USSR Parliamentary Group held in Moscow. Report delivered by J. V. Peive, member of Executive Committee of Interparliamentary Union, on activities of 137th Session of Executive Committee and 3rd Session of Guiding Council of International Center for Parliamentary Documentation, both of which took place in Geneva in November. Preparations for sessions of Interparliamentary Union to take place in Canberra April 11—18, 1966, also discussed. Appeal on occasion of twentieth anniversary of Nuremberg Trials adopted.
- 10 Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees that "Medical Worker's Day" shall be celebrated on third Sunday of June and "Chemist's Day" on last Sunday of May of each year.
- Bicentenary of I. M. Sechenov First Moscow Medical Institute.
- Supreme Soviet delegation led by member of Party Central Committee Presidium and Draft Bill Commission of Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet, P. Y. Shelest, arrives in Budapest on a friendly visit at the invitation of the Hungarian National Assembly.
- Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation signed in Moscow between State Committee for Science and Technology, represented by its Chairman, V. A. Kirillin, and "Montecatini" of Italy, represented by its President.
- Nobel Prize for Literature handed over to Soviet writer Mikhail Sholokhov in Stockholm.
- Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-99."
- 11 Signing in Havana of contract under which USSR is to send 228 technicians to Cuba for three-year period to assist in the planning and installation of sugar mill equipment and in organizing research work in the sugar industry.
- Chairman of Council of Nationalities of USSR Supreme Soviet J. V. Peive receives group of trade-union activists from Asia, Africa and Latin America and acquaints them with Soviet electoral system and activities of Supreme Soviet.
- Gromyko arrives in Prague on official visit.
- 12 Announcement that Ninth Congress of Medical Workers' Union has come to an end in Moscow, having adopted a resolution to carry out a public inspection of labor protection and safety engineering measures in all Union republics in 1966.
- Elections of people's judges take place in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Azerbaidzhan, Moldavia, Latvia, Kirghizia and Turkmenia. Elections in remaining republics to take place on December 19.
- Mali delegation led by Mali Finance and Trade Minister arrives in Moscow for negotiations on trade in 1966.
- 13 Fourth plenary session of executive committee of Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies opens in Moscow.
- Third session of standing Soviet-Bulgarian subcommission on scientific and technical cooperation held in Sofia. USSR to supply Bulgaria with information on developments in machine- and instrument-building, the metallurgical, mining, light and food industries, building and transport in exchange for information on Bulgarian achievements in chemistry, metallurgy, the electrical engineering and food industries, building and agriculture.
- Chairman of Algerian Revolutionary Council and Council of Ministers, Colonel Houari Boumedienne, accompanied by Algerian Foreign Minister and others, arrives in USSR on official visit.
- General meeting of USSR Academy of Sciences on problems of economic development and technical progress opens in Moscow.
- 14 Soviet leaders discuss Soviet-Algerian relations and world problems with Houari Boumedienne.
- Seventh session of Comecon's Standing Commission on Statistics opens in Moscow. Session attended by delegations from Comecon member-countries USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Mongolia, observers from North Vietnam, North Korea and Yugoslavia and Executive Secretary of UN Economic Commission for Europe, Vladimir Velebit.
- Cuban Minister and member of Secretariat of Central Committee of Cuban Communist Party Carlos Rafael Rodriguez arrives in Moscow in response to an invitation by the Party Central Committee.

Announcement that Executive Secretary of UN Economic Commission for Europe, Vladimir Velebit, has been received in Moscow by Deputy Foreign Minister N. P. Firyubin.

Announcement that new electrified railroad line from Abakan to Taishet is in continuous operation.

- 15 Publication of TASS announcement that during period from December 16, 1965, to June 1, 1966, the USSR will be carrying out tests of a landing system for space vehicles, and that various elements of the carrier rockets will be landing in the Pacific Ocean.

Twenty-fifth anniversary of foundation of Moscow University of Marxism-Leninism. Speech delivered at commemorative meeting by the University's Rector, F. V. Suslov, who reports that almost 20,000 Muscovites are now studying at the University.

- 16 Announcement that broadened meeting of presidium of Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, attended by representatives of Soviet public organizations, has been held. Resolutions adopted by World Peace Council in Sofia discussed.

Publication of TASS announcement that Soviet rocket launchings into an area of the Pacific Ocean centered on coordinates 0°5'S and 163°45'W have been completed ahead of schedule.

Sixth session of RSFSR Supreme Soviet of sixth convocation opened by Chairman of RSFSR Supreme Soviet V. I. Krestyaninov. Agenda includes state plan for developing the national economy of the RSFSR in 1966; state budget of the RSFSR for 1966; execution of state budget of the RSFSR for 1964.

- 17 Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-100."

Soviet Communist Party delegation led by Central Committee member, Supreme Soviet deputy and First Secretary of Central Committee of Kirghiz Communist Party T. Usubaliyev arrives in Lagos to attend First Congress of Nigerian Socialist Workers' and Peasants' Party.

Soviet-Polish cultural and scientific cooperation agreement for 1966-67 signed in Warsaw.

Publication of communiqué on Gromyko's visit to Czechoslovakia.

Seventh Congress of Machine Building Workers' Union comes to an end after having adopted a resolution to create a new trade union for workers in the shipbuilding industry.

Speeches delivered by G. P. Sofonov, chairman of the central committee of the Machine Building Workers' Union, and V. V. Grishin, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

- 18 Announcement that Brezhnev has received Boumedienne.

Five-day conference of TASS and republican telegraph agency workers on further improvements in the speed and accuracy of reporting comes to an end.

Protocol on scientific and technical cooperation between State Committee for Science and Technology and Italian firm "Olivetti" signed in Moscow. Cooperation is to embrace the development and application of automation means.

Brezhnev receives Deputy Chairman of Mongolian Council of Ministers and Member of Politburo of Central Committee of Mongolian Communist Party Maudar.

- 19 South Vietnamese youth delegation arrives in Moscow following an invitation by the Komsomol Central Committee and the Committee for Youth Organizations.

Finnish President Urho Kekkonen arrives in USSR on unofficial visit following an invitation by the Soviet government.

Announcement that Soviet-Ghanaian trade protocol for 1966 has been signed and a contract concluded between Soviet and Ghanaian foreign trade organizations under which Ghana is to supply USSR with 150,000 tons of cocoa beans during 1966-67.

- 20 Publication of joint communiqué on visit of Algerian leader Houari Boumedienne to USSR from December 13 to December 18.

Soviet Foreign Ministry sends British government Soviet draft for joint message by co-chairmen of Geneva conference on Laos to chairman of International Control Commission for Laos.

Soviet-Japanese cultural agreement for 1966 signed in Moscow. Agreement to be implemented by Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and Japanese Socialist Party.

- 21 Announcement that "Statistika" publishing house has issued statistical yearbook *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1964).

Sessions of Ukrainian, Belorussian, Kazakh and Azerbaidzhan Supreme Soviets open to

discuss and approve the state national economic development plans and the state budgets for their republics for 1966.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-101."

Moscow City Party Committee discusses municipal budget and development plan for 1966 and measures to be taken by the city's Party organization to step up work with administrative cadres. Speeches delivered by Chairman of Executive Committee of Moscow City Council V. F. Promyslov and First Secretary of Moscow City Party Committee N. G. Yegorychev. Resolution adopted to convene Eighteenth Moscow City Party Conference on March 3, 1966.

Agreements on Soviet-North Vietnamese trade and Soviet economic and technical aid to North Vietnam in 1966 signed in Moscow.

Soviet Foreign Ministry protests to Canadian Ambassador Forde about agreement allowing West German troops to train with modern military equipment, including rockets and tanks, on Canadian territory.

Third session of Soviet-Polish governmental agreement on economic, scientific and technical cooperation opens in Moscow. Soviet delegation led by Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers M. A. Lesechko.

- 22 Announcement that Sixth Plenary Meeting of Board of USSR Journalists' Union has come to an end.

Brezhnev receives North Vietnamese Vice-Premier Le Than Nghi.

- 23 Announcement that British Prime Minister Harold Wilson will visit USSR from February 21 to February 24.

Publication of joint communiqué on visit of Finnish President Kekkonen to USSR from December 20 to December 22. Kosygin and Chairman of Supreme Soviet Presidium N. V. Podgorny accept Kekkonen's invitation to visit Finland.

Eighth plenary meeting of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions opened in Moscow by the Council's Chairman, V. V. Grishin. Council Secretary T. N. Nikolayeva delivers report "On the Tasks of the Trade Unions in Respect of Intensifying Educational Work Among the Workers and Strengthening Socialist Work Discipline." Results of visit of Soviet trade union delegation to North Vietnam discussed.

Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh arrives in Moscow.

Signing of Soviet-Cuban agreement on broader cooperation in fields of science, culture, radio broadcasting, health and sport.

Gromyko receives Zambian Finance Minister Wina and Agriculture Minister Mudenda, who have arrived in Moscow on a goodwill mission.

- 24 Publication of report on visit of delegation of East German Party officials and agricultural specialists to USSR from December 18 to December 23. The delegation, led by Politburo Candidate Member and Central Committee Secretary of East German Socialist Unity Party Gerhard Gruneberg, acquainted itself with the organization of agricultural production in the USSR.

Announcement that Minister of National Economy and Rural Action of Central African Republic, Bernard Ayandho, has arrived in Moscow to negotiate with representatives of Soviet Civil Aviation Ministry on the establishment of direct air communications between Moscow and the Central African Republic.

Announcement that conference of Soviet-Rumanian Friendship Society has taken place in Moscow, RSFSR Education Minister Y. I. Afanasenko being reelected Board Chairman of the Society.

Kosygin receives Zambian Ministers Wina and Mudenda. Soviet-Zambian relations and current international problems discussed.

Soviet-Rumanian trade agreement for 1966-70 signed in Moscow.

- 25 Announcement that Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers have adopted resolution, to come into effect on January 1, 1966, allowing state and collective farms to purchase motor vehicles, tractors and agricultural machinery, as well as spare parts for the latter, at wholesale prices. Wholesale prices for tires and electrical and other equipment to be cut by 20 percent, and those for tractor spare parts by 10 percent.

Soviet Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichiev leaves for Cairo following an invitation by the UAR government.

- 26 Publication of joint communiqué on goodwill visit of Zambian Ministers Wina and Mudenda to USSR from December 22 to December 25. Announcement that agreement on direct air link between USSR and Central African

Republic has been signed in Moscow, First Deputy Civil Aviation Minister G. S. Schetchikov being the signatory for the USSR.

- 27 Eighth plenary meeting of Komsomol Central Committee, devoted to the education of youth, opened by the Central Committee's First Secretary, S. P. Pavlov. Resolution adopted to convene Fifteenth Komsomol Congress on May 17, 1966.

Announcement that delegation from USSR Academy of Sciences, led by the Academy's President, M. V. Keldysh, has returned to Moscow from a tour of East German scientific institutions.

- 28 Presidium of Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee hears report on preparations in USSR for First Solidarity Conference of Asian, African and Latin American Countries scheduled to open in Havana on January 3, 1966.

Iranian governmental delegation led by Economics Minister Alinaghi Alikhani arrives in Moscow to conclude negotiations on economic and technical cooperation, started in Teheran in September 1965.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellites "Kosmos-102" and "Kosmos-103."

- 29 Soviet delegation led by Candidate Member of Party Central Committee Presidium, Supreme Soviet Deputy and First Secretary of Uzbek Party Central Committee Sh. R. Rashidov leaves for Havana to participate in First Solidarity Conference of Asian, African and Latin American Countries.

Group of Soviet scientists led by Vice President of USSR Academy of Sciences M. D. Millionshchikov arrives in Addis Ababa to participate in Fifteenth Pugwash Conference.

- 30 Chad Republic Ambassador arrives to take up residence in Moscow.

Expanded Soviet-Italian cultural exchange program signed in Moscow by President of "USSR-Italy" Society G. Aleksandrov and President of "Italy-USSR" Society.

Announcement that with effect from January 1, 1966, the retail prices for sugar, confectionery, cotton fabrics, knitwear and certain other goods in rural areas will be reduced to the levels applying in urban areas.

Soviet-UAR trade agreement, calling for a 50-percent increase in the volume of trade during 1966-70, signed in Cairo.

- 31 First stage of Teya iron mine (Khakass Autonomous Oblast) goes into operation.

Changes and Appointments

- 6 V. V. Shcherbitsky elected candidate member of the Party Central Committee Presidium.

I. V. Kapitonov elected Party Central Committee Secretary.

- 9 A. I. Mikoyan relieved of duties of Chairman of Supreme Soviet Presidium at his own request and elected member of the Presidium.

N. V. Podgorny elected Chairman of Supreme Soviet Presidium.

P. V. Kovanov elected Chairman of Committee for People's Control.

A. N. Shelepin relieved of duties of Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers.

G. V. Kaznin elected member of USSR Supreme Court in place of F. V. Kalakin, who has died.

- 13 I. P. Skulkov elected First Secretary of Kostroma Oblast Party Committee, replacing L. Y. Florentev, who is transferred to other work.

- 15 A. V. Basov appointed Ambassador to Rumania, replacing I. K. Zhegalin, who is transferred to other work.

- 21 N. A. Kuznetsov relieved of duties of Second Secretary and Bureau Member of Moscow City Party Committee in connection with his appointment to the position of RSFSR Culture Minister.

V. Y. Pavlov elected Second Secretary and L. A. Borisov Secretary of Moscow City Party Committee.

G. A. Kiselev appointed Ambassador to Switzerland, replacing A. I. Loshchakov, who is transferred to other work.

- 27 M. T. Yefremov relieved of duties of First Secretary and Bureau Member of Gorky Oblast Party Committee in connection with his appointment to the position of Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers.

K. F. Katushev elected First Secretary of Gorky Oblast Party Committee.

- 28 L. N. Musatov appointed Ambassador to Mali, replacing I. A. Melnik, who is transferred to other work.

Notes on Contributors

KÜTT, ALEKSANDER. Estonian economist; graduate of the State University of Tartu, Estonia. Until the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries, was active mainly in the cooperative movement. Moved to the USA in 1954. Since 1956, Chairman of the Committee for a Free Estonia; Estonian delegate to the Assembly of Captive European Nations, New York. Author of numerous articles on the Soviet economy.

COTTINGHAM, CHESTER T. A student of Soviet foreign policy. Has visited the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on numerous occasions since 1958.

KONSTANTINOW, REV. D. In the USSR, specialized in the study of printing and publishing; author of numerous articles and books on the subject. Since World War II, in emigration. Now a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church in the United States. Author of a number of articles published by the Institute on religious subjects.

VVEDENSKY, G. A. Engineer, received technical education in Moscow. Before World War II, worked in Soviet industry. On the staff of the Institute since 1954, specializing in questions of Soviet industry.

BUSH, KEITH. Born in 1929 in London. Trained at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University (M.A.). Analyst of current economic developments in the Soviet Union.


KRUZHIN, PETR. Born 1921 in what is now Kalinin Oblast. Left school in 1939 and entered an officers' training school, from which he graduated in 1941. While at school and in the army, was an active member of the Komsomol. Taken prisoner by the Germans in 1942 and joined the Vlasov movement in 1943. Since then has written on political subjects and Soviet youth (including "A Young Communist" in *Thirteen Who Fleed*, New York, 1949).

GARDNER, JOHANN VON. Born in Russia in 1898. Graduated in 1928 from the Orthodox Theological Faculty of Belgrade University. Has specialized in a study of the historical, archeological, stylistic and liturgical aspects of Orthodox church singing. At one time, professor at the Orthodox Theological Seminary at Cetinje, Montenegro. For a period, commissioned by the Yugoslav government to study the Uniate movement in the Carpathians. Spent four years in Jerusalem as editor of the journal *Svyataya Zemlya*. Since 1954, has been lecturing on the liturgical singing of the Russian Orthodox Church at Munich University.

FEDENKO, P. Historian. Born 1893. In 1917, graduated from the Institute of History and Philology in St. Petersburg. In 1926-34, Professor of Ukrainian History at the Ukrainian Pedagogical Institute in Prague and, after 1932, at the Ukrainian Free University there. Since 1956, holds title of Professor of East European History at the Ukrainian Technical Institute in New York. Member of the Institute for the Study of the USSR and its Learned Council. Author of *Novaya "Istoriya KPSS"* (A New History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) (Munich, 1960) and of various books on the Ukrainian movement.

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ARTICLES

The Dismantling of Party and State Control as an Independent Pillar of Soviet Power

CHRISTIAN DUEVEL

Few events in the post-Khrushchevian evolution of the Soviet regime have given rise to so many controversial interpretations as the transformation, decreed by the Party Central Committee in December 1965, of the organs of Party and state control into organs of "people's control." Yet this important decision in Soviet domestic politics can consistently and on the basis of much circumstantial evidence be shown to have been the direct result of a clash of basic interests between two powerful hierarchies, those of the Committee of Party and State Control and the Party apparatus. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that it took the form of a power struggle involving in the first place the respective leaders of these two hierarchies, *viz.*, the Chairman of the Committee of Party and State Control, Presidium member and Secretary of the Party Central Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Aleksandr Shelepin, and First Secretary and Presidium member of the Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev.

The conflict may be traced back to at least as far as the early summer of 1965, when Brezhnev's position appeared to have weakened as a result of attempts on his part to procrastinate the adoption or limit the impact of far-reaching economic reforms to which the majority of the policy-making Presidium of the Central Committee was committed. It may have been this temporary weakness of Brezhnev's position which the Committee of Party and State Control under Shelepin attempted to exploit in order to extend its own functions of inspection and control, which were still hemmed in by the Party's own activities in this field, on the one hand, and the countless specialized (mostly technological or financial) inspection agencies operating within the framework of the central and regional government, on the other. This medley of control agencies, no doubt, was and continues to be a major problem, especially in the sphere of economic management, for such parallelism and duplication of control is not only wasteful but even hampers the normal functioning of the economy. This state of affairs was vividly described, for instance, in a *Pravda* report from Omsk in early July of last year, which was particularly noteworthy for its praise of the Party and state control organs and criticism of the Party's own control activities. Reporting on a controversy which arose over the inspection of an important local factory, *Pravda's* correspondent described the facts of the matter, from the words of the plant's Party official, as follows:

Recently, our *kollektiv* was inspected by a commission of the oblast Party and state control committee, we are told by the Party committee secretary of the Siberian Automobile Factory, F. Y. Yermakov. They were interested how we go about raising the quality of production. Ten people were at work. They helped us discover shortcomings and made many suggestions. Altogether, they did some good work, we mapped out what definite measures we should take, but...instead of going to work, we had to receive another commission. This time from the [Omsk City] Tsentralny Raion Party Committee. Also about quality. It turns out that it is intended to hear our account at a plenary session of the raion committee.¹

Party raion committee secretary A. I. Kuznetsov's counter-argument was that the Party committee had "planned beforehand, back in April, to hear the ...factory about the quality of production, 'but then the commission of Party and state control suddenly interfered'." While *Pravda's* reservations about the merits of the Party official's argument were indicated by the use of quotation marks, its own judgment was passed in the following words:

Since the committee of Party and state control had already examined the question of the quality of production at the Siberian Automobile Factory, the raion committee, it seems, could have set aside the planned check-up. No, they check again and make hearings.

Commenting on the incident, *Pravda* complained that "one may still frequently hear: 'we shall check up and bring the matter before the bureau.' Much more seldom: 'we'll go into it and help correct shortcomings on the spot'." Reading *Pravda's* account of the incident, there could be no possible doubt: the former, obnoxious method of control was that of the Party committee, the latter, commendable one that of the Party and state control committee. The question left unanswered but which every thoughtful reader was bound to ask himself after perusing the *Pravda* report was: Why should the Party at all go into the business of inspection when there was a much more efficient Party and state control committee to do the job?

Although *Pravda's* judgment in this case seemed biased against the Party committee (in point of fact, it would have appeared more logical to reprimand the committee of Party and state control for interfering since the Party committee had already been preparing for its own check-up beforehand), the incident might have been shrugged off as of no real significance if it had not been characteristic of a general trend in stressing the efficiency of Shelepin's Party and state control organs at the time. A day before, *Pravda* had censured Party organizations for failing to give due support to the "rural assistance groups of Party and state control," thus causing their activity to slacken. It even reported on a decree by the Crimean Party Oblast Committee which had taken primary Party organizations to task for having unilaterally given up (*samoustranilis*) leadership of these assistance groups and for failing to give them practical help.²

¹ *Pravda*, July 7, 1965.

² *Ibid*, July 6, 1965 (editorial).

At the end of July, *Pravda* again openly sided with the Party and state control committee in a quarrel between Shelepin's local "activists" and the Party First Secretary of the city of Novotroitsk, A. Y. Grishmanovsky. There is no need here to relate the somewhat complicated story of the dispute at Novotroitsk, but *Pravda's* admonishment to Grishmanovsky, which sounded like a warning to all Party officials to respect the Party and state control organs, appears worth quoting:

To whom, if not to the first secretary of the Party city committee, must it be clear that one cannot behave like that toward the committee of Party and state control and its activists...?³

The climax of this campaign was reached in early August, when the question of coordinating the various control agencies under the leadership of the Party and State Control Committee was at last officially tabled by one of its leading officials. V. Turovtsev, Chairman of the Party and State Control Committee of Moscow, reported in *Izvestia* about many shortcomings discovered in the work of the specialized control organs in the course of an inquiry conducted by his committee. In an article entitled "Commission after Commission," Turovtsev noted the "ever more frequent" publication of newspaper articles complaining about the "lack of coordination" of control agencies, and reported on "first steps" taken by the Party and State Control Committee of Moscow to coordinate these agencies under its direction:

The question of coordinating all forms of control is now becoming very acute. The first steps have been taken by our committee to bring order into the organization of control in Moscow. A department of free-lance collaborators was set up in 1964, which is making analyses of the activity of control organs.⁴

Reporting on various other practical measures taken by the Committee of Party and State Control to coordinate the activity of the various agencies, Turovtsev concluded that all this was "just the beginning."

As it turned out, it was the "beginning of the end" of the Committee of Party and State Control's far-flung plans to "control all controllers." In the course of the same month, Shelepin's committee suffered its first reverses. This occurred in connection with the "redelegations"—i.e., the delegation of new members—to the local assistance groups of the Party and State Control Committee, which it was decided to coordinate with the general meetings of primary Party organizations at which reports were due to be heard and new officials elected. Originally elected for two-year terms, the assistance groups had come into existence mostly in 1962–63, in the wake of the formation of the Party and State Control Committee at the plenary session of the Party Central Committee in November 1962. The renewal of some of the assistance groups consequently had been overdue for several months, while others had not even completed their two-year term. Nevertheless, a renewal of the membership of assistance groups had been

³ *Ibid.*, July 31, 1965, p. 2.

⁴ *Izvestia*, August 3, 1965, p. 4.

taking place all the time, as "inactive" or otherwise undesirable members were eliminated and new ones drawn in. Consequently, there was hardly any real need for carrying out the reappointment of assistance groups in a mass campaign at that time.

However this may have been, we know for sure that in some places the annual Party primaries had already been held when it was decided at the end of July that the "redelegations" to the assistance groups should be timed to coincide with local Party elections.⁶ The first notification of the impending "redelegations" was published, on behalf of the Party and State Control Committee, in *Pravda* on July 30. It served notice that city and raion committees of Party and state control were required to carry out the necessary measures "after coordination with the city [and] raion Party committees and primary Party organizations." The Party and state control organs were thus assigned the leading role in organizing the "redelegations," in the course of which, it was stressed, "special attention" should be given to the nomination of the assistance groups' chairmen.

This issue became the major bone of contention and, perhaps, logically so, because it depended to a considerable extent on the chairman of the assistance groups how and against whom the weapon of Party and state control might be used locally. There seems to have ensued in many places a tug of war between the Party and state control committees and the local Party organs on the question who had the right to nominate the candidates for election to the chairmanship of an assistance group. The Party leaders' reaction was to organize a press campaign emphasizing that the Party's responsibility for "cadre work," i.e., for nominations, appointments and "elections," also applied to the Party and state control organs. It was summed up in the thesis that "Party and state control is an inalienable part of [all] Party organizational work," which was first proclaimed as the Party's battle slogan in the campaign by the newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* on August 4. The thesis made it unmistakably clear that Party and state control organs must be regarded as subject to the control of Party committees' departments of Party organizational work in all matters affecting personnel policy.

Primarily an organ of the RSFSR Bureau of the Party Central Committee, this leading daily of the Russian Federation has most consistently been pushing both Brezhnev's own views and his role in the present collective leadership. This is hardly surprising, of course, in view of Brezhnev's position as Chairman of the RSFSR Bureau, whose First Deputy Chairman, moreover, is Brezhnev's former close associate from Dnepropetrovsk—Kirilenko. The editorial concerned, although entitled "Our Friend—the People's Controller," in fact adopted a rather unusually critical attitude toward the Party and State Control Committee, implying the need for strict Party supervision of the "delegations" to assistance groups. "Communists," it said, "must make a fundamental appraisal of how the Party bureaus have been directing the groups and posts, of how the controllers have been fulfilling the tasks entrusted to them."

⁶ *Partinaya zhizn*, 1965, No 16, p. 46

Sovetskaya Rossiya at the same time hinted strongly that Party organs must take the elections of the chairmen of assistance groups under their own control when it wrote:

Party organs must render effective assistance to the city and raion committees of Party and state control. For the militancy of the organs of control will depend on who will become the leaders.

This editorial, which appeared only a few days after the campaign of "re-delegations" had been announced, leads one to conclude that the quarrel began as a deliberate bid by the Party leaders to bring the Party and state control organs once more under their own control.

The second newspaper to champion the view that "Party and state control is an inalienable component part of Party organizational work" was *Sovetskaya Belorussiya* in an editorial of August 13. The Belorussian newspaper, moreover, almost literally repeated the corollary to this thesis propounded earlier by *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, which enjoined Party organizations to exercise strict supervision over the "re-delegations." The Belorussian newspaper's stand was also quite consistent with the allegiance displayed in the past by Belorussia's Party Central Committee First Secretary P. M. Masharov toward Brezhnev.⁶

It was not until August 20, during Shelepin's absence on a "trouble-shooting" mission in North Korea (August 11–21), that Brezhnev succeeded in getting *Pravda* to throw its editorial support behind the anti-Party-and-state-control thesis that Party and state control is an "inalienable part of [all] Party organizational work."—What arrangements may have been necessary behind the scenes to forge a broad alliance against the Party and State Control Committee is a matter of conjecture: it seems likely, however, that Brezhnev's need for allies in this struggle paved the way for the subsequent smooth adoption of Kosygin's economic reform, essential aspects of which Brezhnev had at first opposed.

However this may have been, *Pravda*'s editorial support carried the day: with only a very few exceptions, one leading paper after the other now came out in support of the thesis designed to curb the Party and state control organs and bring them back under Party control.⁷ At least one instance is known where it

⁶ Notably in *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 11, pp. 12–24.

⁷ The *Pravda* editorial of August 20, 1965, was reprinted by *Kazakhstanskaya pravda* (Alma-Ata), *Kommunist* (Yerevan), *Sovetskaya Latviya* (Riga), all on August 21, 1965. *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* (Frunze), which has a record for automatically reprinting important *Pravda* editorials, reprinted both of those of August 20 and September 4, 1965, that were relevant, although in its own editorial of August 19, 1965, it had adopted a very favorable attitude toward the Party and state control organs. The view of Party and state control as an "inalienable part of Party organizational work" was featured also in editorials of *Turkmenstanskaya iskra* (Ashkhabad), August 24, 1965 (cf. its editorial of September 8, 1965); *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), August 31, 1965; *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent), August 24, 1965; again in a *Pravda* editorial of September 4, 1965, as well as in articles published in *Pravda Ukrainy*, September 2, 1965, and *Selskaya zhizn*, September 16, 1965. As early as August 4, 1965, *Kazakhstanskaya pravda* printed a editorial strongly backing Party control over the appointments to the assistance groups of Party and state control, but did not specifically mention the thesis, which it endorsed, however, by reprinting the *Pravda* editorial of August 20. Noteworthy exceptions among the Union-republic press which failed to support the thesis in this early period, although they published editorials on the report-and-election meetings and the "re-delegations" to the assistance groups at this time, were *Zarya Vostoka* (Tbilisi), *Bakunsky rabochy* (Baku) and *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* (Dushanbe).

was "emphasized" at a seminar of local Party secretaries specifically called to discuss the question of "Party leadership of the assistance groups and posts."⁸

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From the beginning of September, the thesis that Party and state control was an inalienable part of Party organizational work was supplemented by the demand that the deputy secretary of the local Party organization be elected in a quasi-automatic way to the chairmanship of the assistance group of Party and state control. In *Pravda Ukrainy*, the deputy Party secretary's right to this position was even presented as an unquestionable fact:

...Party and state control is an inalienable component part of all Party organizational work. And for good reason the deputy secretary of the Party organization heads the group.⁹

This was an obvious overstatement, for two days later a *Pravda* editorial was forced to admit that so far this had been the case only in a "majority" of instances:

In the majority of enterprises, in kolkhozes, sovkhozes and institutions where Party report-and-election meetings have been held and boards elected, the chairmen of the assistance groups of Party and state control are the deputy secretaries of the Party bureaus [or] of the Party control commissions.¹⁰

Pravda strongly deprecated the "minority" practice of electing other people to chair the assistance groups, when it went on as follows:

It goes without saying that an assistance group headed by the deputy secretary of the Party organization will fulfill more successfully both its direct duties and its role as the organizing center around which all public control is coordinated.

This was practically a writ to elect the deputy Party secretaries automatically to the chairmanship of the groups. It was an open challenge to the Party and State Control Committee, which, if accepted demurely, would have turned Shelepin's organization into a mere appendage of the Party apparatus, for the assistance groups would then have been almost totally dependent on the local Party organs, which have the power to nominate or dismiss the deputy Party secretary. Moreover, it would have set a precedent for the higher Party and state control organs, whose membership was also due for renewal.

The Party's demand was ill-founded from the legal point of view. Under the provisions of the "Statutes on the Committee of Party and State Control of the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Corresponding Local Organs,"

⁸ *Selskaya zhizn*, September 16, 1965.

⁹ *Pravda Ukrainy*, September 2, 1965.

¹⁰ *Pravda*, September 4, 1965.

The chairmen of assistance groups and their deputies are elected at a general meeting of members of the group and are confirmed by the Party committee or the bureau of the primary Party organization and by the immediately superior organ of Party and state control.¹¹

The Statutes do not assign any special role to deputy Party secretaries within the assistance groups. In point of fact, the election of the chairmen of assistance groups had at first been discussed in the press in terms clearly suggesting that they were not in any way to be rigged in favor of the deputy Party secretary. For what may have been meant by the instruction of the Party and State Control Committee to pay "special attention" to the nomination of the chairmen of assistance groups if the "election" of deputy Party secretaries to this post was a foregone conclusion? *Partiinaya zhizn* likewise discussed the election as a matter involving the choice of various possible candidates:

It is another question whether it is practically expedient to nominate as chairman of the assistance group, let us say, the chief veterinarian [*zootehnik*], for he heads a most important sector of sovkhoz or kolkhoz production, and he will have to carry out control of his own work. In the sovkhoz or kolkhoz Party organization, it is always possible to find some other Communist with initiative and principles for the post of chairman of the assistance group.¹²

Thus, the only recommendation made by *Partiinaya zhizn* at that time was to elect a Party member to the post (rather than a trade union, Komsomol or other "public" delegate not holding a Party card).

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The attitude adopted in the matter by the fortnightly "Party and state control sheets" published by *Pravda* and *Izvestia* must be considered separately, because they failed to subscribe to the Party's view that "Party and state control is an inalienable part of Party organizational work" even after it had become the editorial line of the Party press: indeed, they not only refused to propagate but actually obstructed the Party's demand that deputy Party secretaries be elected to head the assistance groups. It appears quite obvious in retrospect that these Party and state control sheets, as well as the Party and state control pages published by *Sovetskaya Rossiya*,¹³ remained under the editorial control of representatives of the Party and State Control Committee when the Party press line had already veered against Shelepin's committee.

¹¹ *Spravochnik partinogo rabotnika* (The Party Worker's Handbook), 5th ed., Moscow, 1964, p. 306. (The reference to the need for confirmation by the higher organ of Party and state control is missing from the version of the Statutes published in *Pravda*, January 18, 1963, and in *Spravochnik partinogo rabotnika*, 4th ed., Moscow, 1963, p. 518.)

¹² *Partiinaya zhizn*, 1965, No. 16, p. 47.

¹³ *Sovetskaya Rossiya* published Party and state control pages during this period only on four occasions: July 6, August 26, October 30 and December 2, 1965. The Party's thesis and views on the election of chairmen of assistance groups were ignored. However, the view that deputy Party secretaries must also be chairmen of assistance groups was propagated in reports from Leningrad and Vladimir frontpaged (i.e., not included in the Party and state control pages) by *Sovetskaya Rossiya* on September 22, 1965.

Pravda's Party and state control sheet Number 59 first came to grips with the problem in F. Kozhukhov's report from Kharkov, which gave favorable publicity to a local case where not the deputy Party secretary had been elected to head the assistance group, but the other way round: the chairman of the assistance group, who had in the past recommended himself as an efficient activist in Shelepin's committee, was in addition elected deputy Party secretary.¹⁴ This may have been the best solution to the problem from the viewpoint of the leaders of the Party and State Control Committee.

In this same control sheet, the editors replied to a reader's letter asking whether the chief agronomist or the chief veterinarian might be elected to head the assistance group. In so doing, they construed the hypothetical example of a chief agronomist or veterinarian's being elected both a deputy Party secretary and chairman of the assistance group, only to reject such a combination, arguing that on every farm it should always be possible to find "some worthy people" for the chairmanship of the assistance group "apart from the chief specialists."

Subsequently, the Party and state control sheets of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* published biographical profiles and similar materials about newly-elected chairmen of assistance groups, from none of which did it appear that they were also deputy secretaries of the local Party organization.¹⁵ *Izvestia's* control sheet Number 63 editorially criticized the "frivolous attitude toward the nomination of group leaders, which has led in a number of places to their frequent exchange." In the context of this editorial, which expressed approval of the work of Party and state control organs, this somewhat enigmatic statement may be understood as criticism of the fact that, as a result of the Party's "frivolous attitude" to their nomination, chairmen of assistance groups originally drafted by the Party and state control organs from among non-approved Party or even non-Party members were in many places subsequently replaced, with or without pressure "from above," by the deputy secretaries of local Party organizations. This impression of a complaint by Party and state control leaders now heavily on the defensive was reinforced by the editorial's demand that "all attempts to persecute activists of people's control and reprisals against them be resolutely stopped," as well as by the statement that "the [Party and state control] committees themselves, every assistance group, must determine what to take under control, on what to concentrate attention."¹⁶ This seems a far cry from the days when the Party and state control organs were telling the other control agencies what they should control. While the editorial did not specify who was trying to interfere in this way with the work of the Party and state control organs, there can be little doubt that the complaints were aimed at the Party apparatus.

¹⁴ *Pravda*, August 18, 1965.

¹⁵ Party and state control sheet No. 62, *ibid*, September 24, 1965 (biographical profile of Kheli Tammyarv); Party and state control sheet No. 61, *Izvestia*, October 8, 1965 (item entitled "Mandate of the Workers"); Party and state control sheet No. 63, *Pravda*, October 12, 1965 (biographical profile of I. M. Orel).

¹⁶ *Izvestia*, October 29, 1965.

This was the last Party and state control sheet to reflect continued editorial control by the Party and State Control Committee. Those published during November provided clear evidence of the complete victory of the Party apparatus. *Pravda's* control sheet Number 65 for the first time acknowledged the view that the "activity of the organs of Party and state control, of the assistance groups and posts is an inseparable part of Party organizational work."¹⁷ The statement was made in answer to the provocative question of a Party member from Kazakhstan whether the chairman of the assistance group was "an independent unit and must work independently of the Party organization." The editorial reply stated that the people's controllers "cannot operate by themselves [*naosobitsu*]" ; on the contrary, the assistance group works "under the leadership of the workshop's Party bureau." Simultaneously, the Party and state control sheet acknowledged for the first time that "as a rule, the chairman of the assistance group, who is elected at a meeting of the group's members, is simultaneously the deputy secretary of the Party organization." The same issue included an article by Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Party and State Control Committee A. Malenkin, who stressed no less than four times the role of Party and state control organs as "helpers" or in "helping" the Party organizations.

The subsequent issue of *Pravda's* Party and state control sheet (Number 66) reported that the Presidium of the Azerbaidzhan Party Central Committee had examined the results of "redelegations" to the assistance groups of committees of Party and state control and "measures to strengthen leadership of them."¹⁸ The same issue once more found it necessary to explain to readers why it was "very important" for the chairman of the assistance group to "be simultaneously also the deputy secretary of the Party organization." This was in reply to a reader's letter asking whether the deputy secretary of a Party organization "automatically becomes chairman of the assistance group of Party and state control, although he was not delegated to it." The answer was: "No, . . . it goes without saying that he must be delegated to membership in the group"—a "condition" which obviously can be easily fulfilled by any Party organization which wants its deputy secretary to head the local people's controllers.

Thus, by perusing merely the Party and state control sheets of *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, it is possible to trace step by step first the heyday of the Party and State Control Committee, when even an oblast first secretary of the Party was prepared to give fulsome praise to the Party and state control organs and support the "broad independent activity" of the assistance groups,¹⁹ then the Party and State Control Committee's retreat, and finally its defeat, when the subordination of the Party and state control organs to the Party was stressed in every way.

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To put the record straight, it must be said that the assistance groups actually have a dual subordination in accordance with the Statutes of the Party and State

¹⁷ *Pravda*, November 16, 1965.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, November 30, 1965.

¹⁹ Party and state control sheet No. 57, *Izvestia*, August 3, 1965.

Control Committee, which provide that "the assistance groups work under the leadership of the Party organizations and the corresponding local organs of Party and state control..."²⁰ It is this system of dual subordination, without any detailed regulation of the rights and functions of each of the apparatuses involved, which eventually and, perhaps, inevitably resulted in an outright struggle for power when Khrushchev's one-man rule was succeeded by a new collective leadership.

In the course of the campaign against Shelepin's committee, the latter's earlier pretensions to coordinate all control activities were explicitly rejected by both the Party and the specialized control organs. On behalf of the Party apparatus, this was done by *Partnaya zhizn*, where the role of coordinator of all public control activities was claimed by the Party:

The Party organizations direct the activity of the assistance groups... of Party and state control... Of course, in industrial enterprises, on construction sites, in transport, trade and communal catering organizations, other forms of public control of production by the masses also exist. These are the trade union commissions for labor protection and safety engineering, the "Komsomol searchlight," the raiding brigades, and so forth. They operate in close contact with the [Party and state control] groups... The activity of all forms of control in every *kollektiv* is coordinated and directed by the Party organization.²¹

The rapid evolution of official views on the matter becomes evident when we recall that only four weeks earlier the assistance group of Party and state control had still been called in a *Pravda* editorial (as well as elsewhere) the "organizing center around which all public control is coordinated."

The Party and State Control Committee's plan to coordinate under its aegis all the specialized control agencies was rejected by an article published in the authoritative legal journal *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* under the title "Control Activity: Practical Experience and Scientific Recommendations." While the need for coordinating the control activities of these numerous departmental control agencies with the Party and state control system was acknowledged by the journal in principle, it was emphasized at the same time:

The proposed coordination does not mean that the organs of Party and state control are called upon to assume the leadership of all the activities of public and departmental control, to subordinate to themselves the organs of departmental control. Clearly, it must in the main be limited to the mutual exchange and coordination of plans of work and concrete check-ups in order to determine the most important sectors of activity specifically to every kind of control.²²

The article, written by N. G. Salishcheva and Y. V. Shorina, two senior staff members of the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, particularly stressed the need for a "more clear-cut delimitation of functions" between the organs of Party and state control and other state and public organi-

²⁰ *Pravda*, January 18, 1963.

²¹ *Parti naya zhizn*, 1965, No. 19, pp. 28-29.

²² *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1965, No. 11, p. 22.

zations with control functions. From their specific proposals and critical remarks, it appeared that they really understood by this a unilateral limitation of functions of the Party and State Control Committee. In particular, they argued that the Statutes of the Party and State Control Committee adopted in 1962 specified some functions such as "control of the measure of labor and the measure of consumption," application of the principle "he who does not work shall not eat," etc., which really were the task of "many organs of the Soviet state, including those of economic administration."²³ (This point has already received editorial indorsement from *Pravda*, which stated recently that one of the chief tasks of control during the "lengthy period of socialist and Communist construction" is to "guarantee the strictest control by society and by the state over the measure of labor and the measure of consumption.")²⁴

The article in *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* likewise supplied not a few examples of how the Party and state control organs, supplanting the organs of operative administration, had taken upon themselves the decision of economic questions, how they had conducted checks of communal enterprises without regard to the relevant standing commissions of the local soviets, as well as examples of the arbitrary victimization of workers, allegedly made possible by unclear formulation in the Statutes of the Party and State Control Committee, etc.

Such criticism of the 1962 Statutes suggests that the new statutes of the organs of people's control, which are to be issued by the Council of Ministers of the USSR in accordance with the Party Central Committee's decree of December 6,²⁵ will much more closely circumscribe the functions and competence of the new State Committee of People's Control of the USSR and its local organs. The downgrading of the former Party and State Control Committee, in fact, is so obvious that the efforts made in official documents to camouflage this fundamental feature of the reorganization cannot but cause surprise. The official explanation, contained in the Central Committee decree, that the reorganization was made for the purpose of a "broad enlistment of toilers in the matter of checking and control and for increasing their importance in the work of the control organs" is difficult to reconcile with numerous Soviet press reports indicating a further expansion of the army of people's controllers in connection with the "redellegations" held during the summer and fall of 1965. On the basis of these reports, it must be assumed that the membership of the assistance groups considerably exceeded the five-million mark at the end of 1965. As recently as October, a journal of the Central Committee referred to the people enlisted by the Party and State Control Committee as a "huge army of toilers."²⁶ References such as these, which could be multiplied at will, did not suggest any official dissatisfaction with the level of popular recruitment to the assistance groups.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²⁴ *Pravda*, December 13, 1965 (editorial).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, December 7, 1965.

²⁶ *Partinaya zhizn*, 1965, No. 19, p. 28.

- Neither the curt Central Committee decree nor Brezhnev's explanatory remarks on the same subject provided any enlightenment on the question why "redelegations" to the main organizations of the Party and State Control Committee had been organized during August–November, when the Party and State Control Committee itself was to be completely reorganized at the beginning of December. Would it not have been much more logical either to postpone these "redelegations," so as to hold them in conjunction with the proposed reorganization of the Party and state control organs, or to advance the date of the reorganization?

Brezhnev's speech, nevertheless, provided some hints about the real reasons for the reorganization. He noted, for instance, that the designation "organs of Party and state control" was not "quite precise" since it inadequately reflected the fact that there was such a thing as people's control in the Soviet Union. This was hardly convincing insofar as "people's control" and "people's controllers" had long been used as synonyms for Party and state control and its local activists. But the previous name, no doubt, was a misnomer from the newly accepted point of view that these organs were not entitled to control the Party. This would seem to account also for the fact that the new statutes of the organs of people's control, unlike their 1962 edition for the Party and state control organs issued jointly by the Party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers,²⁷ will be adopted on the sole authority of the Council of Ministers.

Brezhnev, moreover, emphasized that

...the organs of people's control do not control the work of Party organs. This work is controlled by a system of inner-Party control based on the Party Statute. It is necessary, therefore, for the Party commissions—which are obliged in accordance with the Party Statute to check the observance of Party discipline by Party members and candidate members, to call to account Communists guilty of violating the Party Program and Statutes, Party and state discipline, as well as those who infringe Party morals—to activate their work.²⁸

The Party First Secretary's remarks signify a return to the previous separation of control functions as between Party and state organs, abolished by Khrushchev during the plenary session of the Central Committee in November 1962. In his report to the Central Committee, Khrushchev had recalled that the principle of joint Party and state control was originally propounded by Lenin and subsequently implemented by amalgamating the Central Control Commission with the Peasant and Workers' Inspection (TsKK-RKI). Noting that this Leninist principle was "grossly violated by Stalin," Khrushchev had reminded his audience:

At the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, on Stalin's proposal, which was in contradiction with Lenin's instructions about the unification of Party and state control, in place of the joint organ of Party and state control, the TsKK-RKI, two

²⁷ *Pravda*, January 18, 1963

²⁸ *Ibid.*, December 7, 1965

control centers were created, the Party Control Commission under the Party Central Committee and the governmental Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.²⁹

Since this version of Lenin's views on Party and state control subsequently became the official line in Party historiography, another revision of Soviet textbooks on Party history appears inevitable.

Khrushchev's action in setting up the Party and State Control Committee in late 1962, although based on a "principle of Lenin's," had been a clear violation of Article 40 of the Party Statute adopted almost exactly a year before at the Twenty-Second Party Congress, which provided for a Party Control Committee under the Central Committee. The Party Commission set up in its stead at the time, with the reduced functions of a sort of "Party court of appeal" (and now, as then, headed by Shvernik), actually has no statutory basis in the present Party Statute.

Finally, the much lower status of the newly-constituted organs of people's control is evident from the fact that with the appointment of Pavel V. Kovanov as Chairman of the USSR Committee of People's Control³⁰ a second-rank official (with merely candidate membership in the Central Committee) has been entrusted with the leadership of this organization, without having been given even Shelepin's former status as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Similar demotions of leading officials in the former system of Party and state control are now taking place at all levels of the hierarchy, although the final organizational shape of the new Committee of People's Control is still somewhat conjectural. Only publication of the announced new statutes of the organs of people's control is likely to provide some indication of how the crucial juncture between the government-controlled administrative organs of people's control and the Party-controlled mass of "people's controllers" will be fitted together. This should be a rather novel experience in Soviet extra-constitutional history. It would consequently seem too hazardous at the present moment to forecast that the new control set-up will prove any more viable under the collective leadership than its predecessor.

As regards the system of "inner-Party control" to which Brezhnev referred, there is at present no indication that it will be any more effective than the pre-1962 Party control system, about which Khrushchev said that organizationally it was "not satisfactory" and in controlling the execution of Party decisions "inadequate." He even went on record with the statement that "in essence we have no special organs of Party control."³¹

In the light of all these facts, it appears impossible to find a rational justification for the reorganization of the Party and State Control Committee on grounds of administrative expediency or efficiency. Soviet press coverage of developments affecting the Party and State Control Committee since the early summer of 1965,

²⁹ *Ibid.*, November 20, 1962.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, December 10, 1965.

³¹ *Ibid.*, November 20, 1962.

on the other hand, provides ample evidence, as we have seen, of conflicting views about the role of the Party and state control organs *vis-à-vis* the departmental control agencies and, most conspicuously, *vis-à-vis* the Party apparatus.

There is reason to believe that the internal decision to dismantle Shelepin's Party and State Control Committee was based on charges of "non-observance of state discipline and socialist legality." The Central Committee decree stated that the organs of people's control must be an effective means at the disposal of the Party and government "for strengthening state discipline and socialist legality." Brezhnev reworded this to say that the main thing in the new agencies' activity would be to assist the Party and government, *inter alia*, "in the observance of state discipline and socialist legality." In a *Pravda* article entitled "Organization (*organizovannost*) and Discipline," D. Kunayev, the Party First Secretary of Kazakhstan, wrote that the reorganization of the organs of Party and state control would "permit . . . to guarantee the systematic checking of the execution of Party and government directives . . . [and] to strengthen state discipline and socialist legality."³² In other words, this had not been "guaranteed" so far by the Party and State Control Committee under Shelepin's direction.

The likelihood of such unpublished charges against the former Party and State Control Committee is also suggested by the findings published in *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* by Salishcheva and Shorina, which included criticism of the Party and state control organs to this effect. Thus, discussing the shortcomings of the Party and state control organs, the authors of this article noted the importance of "guaranteeing socialist legality" and of "observing the rights and legal interests of the organs and official persons subject to control." More specifically, they stressed that

Clarification of some points of the Statutes of December 20, 1962, would contribute to raising the guarantees of legality in the activity of the organs of Party and state control. . . .³³

The recommendations of these two authors are based on their findings in Kazakhstan, which suggests that they investigated the shortcomings of Party and state control organs in this republic as part of some special project for which there is likely to have been a high-level order. The seven-page article in *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* may consequently be no more than an abstract of a much more detailed (and critical) report subsequently used by the Party leaders to justify the reorganization of the Party and State Control Committee. The choice of Kazakhstan for the inquiry may not have been altogether fortuitous in view of the fact that its Party First Secretary, Kunayev, is one of Brezhnev's erstwhile protégés from the early period of the virgin lands campaign, when Brezhnev himself was Party First Secretary of Kazakhstan.

Discussing the relevant subject of state discipline, Kunayev observed in his above-mentioned article that

³² *Ibid.*, December 14, 1965.

³³ *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1965, No. 11, p. 22.

...we have such a category of workers who do not think of executing some state tasks or other without pressure, without continual pushing from outside. Is it necessary to say that finally life itself, the interest of the cause, force us to rid organizations and institutions of such comrades?³⁴

Kunayev's subject of "organization and discipline" had first been discussed in a somewhat similar context by Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Party and State Control Committee Malenkin (previously mentioned for his extraordinary emphasis on the Party and state control organs' role as "helpers" of the Party), who argued, in *Pravda's* control sheet Number 65, that while "every violator of state discipline must answer for his deeds . . . measures for bringing influence to bear should not be reduced to mere punishment." Measures of a "moral order" were frequently much more effective. As such, he mentioned a kind of public self-criticism. In a rather lenient mood for a high-ranking Party and state control official, Malenkin wanted to see severer measures applied only in the case of "crimes" (involving "thieves," "speculators," etc).

However, the most noteworthy article appeared on the control page of *Sovetskaya Rossiya* just before the announcement of the reorganization of Shelepin's committee. Entitled "Why Did They Not Defend Him?",³⁵ it reported the pathetic story of an upright man of principle named Timofei Zhorov, chairman of an assistance group of Party and state control since it first came into being, who struggled for his principles even with the kolkhoz chairman, but was left in the lurch by the Party secretary and other local dignitaries when people who disliked his principles devastated his garden and threw bricks into his window. Timofei had "defended many," but when he himself "needed defense" nobody came to his support. He resigned the chairmanship of the people's controllers "however much they asked him to stay" and became an ordinary member of the group. The moral: people like Timofei "must be valued and protected."

This is the essence of a story published only a few days before the Central Committee meeting which dismantled the Party and State Control Committee and made Shelepin resign the chairmanship ostensibly in order to enable him to "concentrate on work in the Central Committee."³⁶ Was the story meant to have any allegorical meaning? Long experience with the press of totalitarian regimes shows that a very great variety of devices may be adopted to overcome the barriers imposed by such a regime on the free expression of opinion. Whether this is a case in point cannot be decided with certainty. But it would indeed be surprising if the appearance of this story had been a mere coincidence, if the editors had failed to realize that the publication of Timofei Zhorov's story at this particular moment would be taken by many baffled Soviet readers as a cue to what had happened to the first and only chairman of the Party and State Control Committee, Aleksandr N. Shelepin.

³⁴ *Pravda*, December 14, 1965.

³⁵ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, December 2, 1965.

³⁶ *Pravda*, December 10, 1965.

Whatever the future may hold for Shelepin's career (and this may well depend in no small measure on Brezhnev's own ability or failure to command, in the months or years to come, a stable majority in the policy-making Party Presidium), it is already clear that, for better or worse, a decisive blow has been struck not only at the Party and State Control Committee but at the very concept of an independent control agency empowered, without respect to persons, to check the activities of both government and Party. Once again, the Soviet Party apparatus has demonstrated its determination to nip in the bud any challenge to its ultimate authority, even though that challenge may be more potential than real.

Moscow Fortifies its Positions in Asia

NIKOLAI GALAY

General de Gaulle's state visit to the Soviet Union, officially announced for this June, fits perfectly—although nothing of this is said officially—into the French President's "grand plan" for a "Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals." A few years ago, the French professor of political economy, René Courtin, analysed all of de Gaulle's utterances on this subject and set forth the main ideas behind this "grand plan,"¹ which have been summarized elsewhere in an Institute publication.² According to Courtin, its essence is to be found in the idea that the Soviet Union will inevitably, in the not-too-distant future, cease to be a Euroasian and become a purely European power. In de Gaulle's view, Siberia and Central Asia are doomed to the same fate as Algeria. Sooner or later, the "Russians" will be driven out of Asia "by the Mongols or the Chinese." Communism he regards as nothing more than an historical episode that has in no way substantially changed "eternal Russia." The more the USSR, or Russia, is threatened from the Chinese quarter, the sooner it will turn again to the West. It will then recall its cultural ties with Europe and seek a stable alliance with its neighbors in the West. This, in de Gaulle's mind, will be the moment for the realization of his "grand plan"—the formation of a new and mighty power center stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals and including the European USSR as part of a united Europe headed by France.

However, recent events in Asia will almost certainly compel the General to modify his ideas considerably, leaving no more than survived from his idea of "French Algeria." Soviet political activity in Tashkent and Ulan Bator has clearly demonstrated the strength of the USSR's position as an Asiatic state, which shows up the idea of driving the USSR out of Asia at any time in the foreseeable future as little more than an illusion.

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January 1966 marks an important stage in the history not only of Soviet foreign policy but of international relations in Asia as a whole. For this there are three reasons: (a) the enhanced activity of Soviet policy in Asia; (b) the Soviet Union's assertion of its position and its rights as a state in Asia; and (c) the improved position of the whole of Eastern Siberia, both in a political sense and with regard to military strategy. All these successes were the result of a number of Soviet diplomatic measures that had been prepared well in advance and which were undertaken entirely on the USSR's initiative. Some of them were carried

¹ René Courtin, *L'Europe de l'Atlantique à l'Oural*, Lagny-sur-Marne, 1963, pp. 28—34 and 123—24.

² *Studies on the Soviet Union*, New Series, Vol. V, No. 1, Munich, 1965, pp. 4—5.

out long before Brezhnev's visit to Mongolia in January of this year, while others were the result of exploiting favorable circumstances, as the Soviet intervention in developments on the Indian subcontinent. Events in Tashkent and Ulan Bator resulted in a strengthening of the Soviet position on the periphery of Asia.

The fact that the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, i.e., the leaders of the two largest and most densely populated states in Asia after China, accepted the mediation of the USSR in the Indo-Pakistani conflict and, under Soviet pressure, signed an agreement to seek a peaceful solution to their political, territorial and religious differences which had become focused in the Kashmir problem, was a signal success for Soviet policy. The very fact of their acceptance of Soviet mediation completely disarms the persistent Chinese attempts to deny both the USSR and its Union republics in Asia the right to be considered Asian powers—attempts which were intended to exclude the USSR and its representatives from all meetings of Asian, African and Latin American countries designed to influence the policies of the newly emancipated colonies. Furthermore, the Tashkent meeting and Pakistan's consent to take part in it will undoubtedly have an effect upon the somewhat abnormal and capricious stand taken by Pakistan, which on the one hand is a member of the anti-Communist defensive alliance CENTO and, on the other, has been working for a *rapprochement* with Communist China.

This *rapprochement* was predetermined in the early sixties by China's support for Pakistan's ambitions with regard to Kashmir, while the Soviet Union took India's side at a time when the latter country was pressing similar claims to this province. Intervention in the Indo-Pakistani conflict provided the two Communist neighbors with an opportunity to demonstrate to one another their influence on the Indian subcontinent. At the same time, the *rapprochement* with Pakistan meant that China was beginning to drive a wedge between India and the USSR and hinder overland communications between these two countries: by exerting pressure on Pakistan, she could at any moment cut off the route running *via* Kabul and Herat, built with Soviet aid, and her attack on the Indian frontier in 1962 demonstrated the vulnerability of this sector of India's borders. This period probably marked the nadir of Soviet influence in southern Asia.

The Sino-Soviet struggle for routes of penetration into the Indian subcontinent, having begun in the early sixties, was settled at Tashkent in the USSR's favor. Now that the joint Indo-Pakistani declaration on Kashmir³ has somewhat modified the circumstances prompting Pakistan to seek a *rapprochement* with China the danger of Pakistan's becoming a sphere of Chinese penetration and a barrier between the USSR and India has been considerably reduced. Pakistan's acceptance of Kosygin's services as mediator has also modified her position in CENTO: whether she leaves this organization or continues to be a formal member of it, Pakistan may already be regarded as one of the non-aligned countries.

³ *Pravda*, January 11, 1966, p. 1.

It is at present impossible to say by what means—promises, obligations and the like—the Soviet leaders succeeded in bringing India and Pakistan together under their own auspices and so strengthening their own position in southern Asia, but three important factors contributing to this success may be indicated. The first of these is the fact that Kosygin intervened on behalf of the USSR not as the Communist “hypostasis” but as a powerful neighboring state, in the name of the common interests of three states—the USSR, India and Pakistan—which meet in the region of the Pamirs. All the steps taken by the Soviets in Tashkent stressed the governmental nature of the Soviet mission. The list of its members indicated only their governmental functions, completely ignoring the fact that they were all senior Party officials. Members of the delegation were accordingly listed as follows: A. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR; Y. S. Nasreddinova, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR; R. Kurbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Uzbek SSR; A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky, Minister of Defense of the USSR; Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky; the Soviet Ambassadors to India and Pakistan; departmental heads in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.

The second factor was the USSR’s geographical position as a Euroasian power three-quarters of whose total area lies in Asia and five of whose “Union republics” are in Central Asia. The part played in the meeting by the Soviet republic of Uzbekistan was stressed by Kosygin in his introductory speech:

President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri will be conducting their negotiations on the territory of Soviet Uzbekistan.... The peoples of our country and particularly of the Central Asian republics have long maintained close commercial and cultural links with the peoples of Pakistan and India.⁴

Voluntarily or not, both Ayub Khan and Shastri accepted this argument for the Asian affiliation of the USSR, and in their replies expressed their deep satisfaction that the meeting should take place in an “historic Asian city” (Shastri), in the capital of the “republic of Uzbekistan,” with whose people there were “many common traditions in the sphere of culture and many memories of a wonderful past” (Ayub Khan).⁵

The third factor lay in the USSR’s economic, technical and military strength which has given it fresh power in Central Asia since World War II.⁶ This power is confronted on the Chinese side of the Sinkiang border by nothing more than the thinly populated, roadless and (from Peking’s point of view) politically unreliable areas of Chinese Turkestan and Tibet.

These are the three factors which, quite apart from ideological considerations, contributed to a Soviet success whose significance can hardly be overestimated.

⁴ *Ibid.*, January 5, 1966, p. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Studies on the Soviet Union*, New Series, Vol V, No. 1, pp. 12–16.

Almost concurrently with the meeting in Tashkent, there took place in Ulan Bator the ceremony of signing a new treaty of friendship between the USSR and its oldest satellite, the Mongolian People's Republic. This document was signed by a Soviet delegation headed by Brezhnev and officially described as a Party and governmental delegation. This dual nature, in which the Party aspect predominated, was stressed as pointedly as the Party aspect of the delegation in Tashkent was ignored. Thus, the members were listed in all reports as follows: L. I. Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Party Central Committee and member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; K. T. Mazurov, member of the Party Central Committee Presidium and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR; Y. V. Andropov, Party Central Committee Secretary; A. A. Gromyko, member of the Party Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs; R. Y. Malinovsky, member of the Party Central Committee and Minister of Defense, etc. As will be seen, even in the case of Gromyko and Malinovsky the Party function, contrary to custom, was placed before the governmental.⁷

In itself, the signing of a twenty-year Soviet-Mongolian treaty of "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" is of little practical significance in the matter of protecting Mongolia from Chinese pretensions to regard Outer Mongolia as a Chinese province enjoying a merely temporary independence. The renewal of the treaty, which in fact secures Mongolia not only as a Soviet zone of defense against China protecting the extremely important Irkutsk-Angara industrial center in Eastern Siberia but also as a bridgehead for offensive operations against China, had been preceded long before by certain economic and military measures such as the setting up of an industrial base in Mongolia with a number of plants, including a thermal power station at Darkhan, on the Trans-Mongolian Railroad south of Kyakhta, the construction of a railroad branch from Darkhan to the new town of Sharyn-Gol, of high-voltage powerlines, an elevator, etc.⁸ These operations, which were inspected by the Soviet delegation, should be regarded as part of the preparations for the economic base which will be required to constitute the immediate rear in the event of offensive military operations against China. They have been supplemented by the expulsion from the country of all Chinese workers employed on construction sites and their replacement by Soviet military construction units⁹ as well as by Soviet, Polish and Czech civilian specialists. Thus, the Mongolian strategic bridgehead is becoming a serious threat to Chinese Turkestan, flanking as it does the only railroad line connecting this peripheral area with the center. A similar threat from a westerly direction is arising *vis-à-vis* Manchuria.

Even so, these measures were evidently considered by the Soviet leaders to be inadequate in view of their political maneuvers against China, and so it was decided to lay particular stress upon the Party aspect of the matter. While glossing

⁷ *Pravda*, January 10, 1966, p. 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, January 15, 1966, p. 1.

⁹ *Novosti Mongolii*, Ulan Bator, April 10, 1965.

over the operations mentioned above, the Soviet press referred to Mongolia as an example of an underdeveloped country that had, with Soviet aid, jumped the stage of capitalist development and proceeded straight to the building of socialism.¹⁰ The Party aspect was also stressed in the Soviet-Mongolian communiqué in which Brezhnev and his Party counterpart Tsedenbal (who is also Prime Minister) expressed their unanimity over the main problems of international affairs not only in Asia but also in Europe; including censure of United States imperialism, of the United States' "piratic" war in Vietnam, of the persecution of the Communist Party of Indonesia, of the Taiwan regime, of the presence of American troops in Korea and Vietnam, of colonialism, neocolonialism and racism (in Rhodesia), of West German "revanchism" and, finally, (without specifically mentioning China) of those who "pay more attention to that which disunites than to that which unites the Communist movement."¹¹

Despite its censorious nature, this *tour d'horizon* was relatively moderate in tone, maintaining a kind of balance between the perpetual incantations of the priests of the Communist temple and an enumeration of the principles of modern, (so to speak) "enlightened" Communism. The purpose of the incantations was to disguise, for the benefit of Chinese and other Communists in Asia, those measures in Mongolia to which we have briefly referred and which may be described as measures to incorporate that country in the Soviet empire. It may be safely assumed that for all its revolutionary content this Soviet-Mongolian *credo* will provoke from the Chinese no more positive a response than similar declarations had done in the past. Nevertheless, the Chinese are not at present in a position to take any definite measures against the Soviet occupation of military or economic positions of strength in Mongolia. Thus, geopolitical realities were responsible for the success of the Soviet mission to Ulan Bator as well of that to Tashkent.

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The beginning of January witnessed yet a third political enterprise on the part of the USSR, namely, the mission led by Shelepin to North Vietnam. This was described neither as a governmental nor as a Party and governmental delegation, but quite simply as a mission. For some reason, there were widespread hopes in the West that Shelepin would assume the role of peacemaker, rather as the USA was probing the possibilities of peace in Vietnam at about the same time. Such hopes, however, were automatically excluded by the composition of the delegation: Party Central Committee Secretaries A. Shelepin and D. Ustinov, first deputy head of a Central Committee department K. Rusakov, Colonel General F. Tolubko, and representatives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry A. Chistyakov and I. Shcherbatov. It was, in fact, a military and Party delegation composed of persons competent to analyse the position with regard to the war in Vietnam. The names of Ustinov, a prominent organizer and specialist in the war industry, and General Tolubko, deputy commander in chief of strategic

¹⁰ *Pravda*, January 15, 1966, pp. 1-2, and January 16, 1966, p. 2.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, January 18, 1966, p. 1.

missile forces, speak for themselves. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Shelepin's mission had a purely military purpose, namely, that of stepping up military aid to Vietnam by means of rocket weapons. It was, admittedly, not the first time that the country had been visited by Soviet military specialists for this purpose: among Kosygin's delegation of February 1965 were no less authoritative specialists in conventional weapons (which are the very weapons that Vietnam needs): Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Forces Marshal K. Vershinin, Minister of Civil Aviation and head of Aeroflot Colonel General Y. Loginov, and Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations Colonel General G. Sidorovich. This had not, however, resulted in the opening of the Soviet air "umbrella" over Vietnam or in the building of an air "bridge" between the USSR and North Vietnam with the aid of Aeroflot. On this occasion, the limits of the Soviet military potential on non-Soviet territory as defined in these columns in May 1965 proved to be more or less correct.¹² It is not our present purpose to attempt to forecast the results for Vietnam of the recent appearance there of Tolubko and Ustinov; but there are some grounds for supposing that even though it has been agreed to increase Soviet military aid to Vietnam, this aid will produce no more substantial results than in the past. Shelepin's speeches in North Vietnam, although considerably more demagogic and anti-American in tone than those of Brezhnev in Mongolia, were distinctly reserved when it came to promises of increasing military aid. Shelepin devoted much more attention to the dangers inherent in the arming and instigation of Western Germany to aggression by American "imperialism." After describing in some detail the armaments at Western Germany's disposal, including its 450,000-strong Bundeswehr, the latter's ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, etc., Shelepin remarked:

Add to this the fact that the USA is maintaining over 250,000 officers and men in Western Germany and it becomes clear how acute the situation in Western Europe is and why the Soviet Union has to be constantly on the alert in this extremely dangerous and restive part of the world.¹³

These sallies of Shelepin's are in fact little more than excuses for the inadequacy of Soviet aid to North Vietnam. Chinese accusations go so far as to allege that the USSR is sabotaging aid to North Vietnam and has allied itself with the USA. Ignoring this Chinese demagoguery, we cannot, however, overlook the fact that it is in the USSR's interest to prolong the war in Vietnam, which is holding down American forces of almost the same strength as are stationed in Europe and the Mediterranean area. Such suspicions will inevitably be in the minds of the Chinese and North Vietnamese and, indeed, many others throughout the Communist movement.

In view of the foregoing, it may be assumed that Shelepin's mission failed in its main task (which was particularly important in view of the forthcoming Twenty-Third Party Congress) of persuading North Vietnam to abandon its neutral

¹² N. Galay, "The Limits of the Soviet Potential," *Bulletin*, 1965, No. 5.

¹³ *Pravda*, January 10, 1966, p. 3.

attitude with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute and side with the USSR. Quite naturally, the North Vietnamese leaders could hardly allow themselves to succumb to the Soviets' blandishments in view of the primitive but, for their purposes, effective aid received from China and the inadequacy of the Soviet commitments in Vietnam.

The failure of this mission provides one more illustration of the unconvincingness of Soviet revolutionary phraseology, as applied to the revolutionary struggle in Asia, when compared with the fervor and persistence of the Chinese. Moreover, the application of state pressure, as at Tashkent and Ulan Bator, has its technical limitations outside the borders of the USSR. Communists in Asia must be well aware that it was the influence of Communist China that instigated the Indonesian Communists to attempt a seizure of power in Indonesia; but when this attempt failed and the Communists in Indonesia were subjected to persecution, the USSR assumed a completely passive attitude, confining itself to purely formal protests.

Meanwhile, the present Soviet leaders are insisting upon the need for international socialist and Communist solidarity and opposing those tendencies toward national Communism which appeared throughout the Communist movement after the death of Stalin¹⁴ and which led to the present split in the Communist camp. When we compare the effect of Soviet intervention in Tashkent and Hanoi, however, it becomes evident that the strength of Soviet policy lies, not in its revolutionary demagoguery, nor in its ability to conduct revolutionary wars, but in its ability to exploit the potential of the USSR as a *state*. In this anomalous relation between its aspirations and its potentialities is to be found one of the main problems now confronting the USSR as leader of the world Communist movement.

¹⁴ See, for example, *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 15, p. 20, and *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, 1965, No. 10, p. 8.

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

Foreign Affairs

The Free World and the War in Vietnam

The fighting in Vietnam is growing increasingly severe. The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, true to the Chinese policy based on what they call the "paper tiger" doctrine, are maintaining their tenacious offensive in the belief that the United States and South Vietnam government forces are "paper tigers" because, whatever superiority they may have in manpower and weapons, they are sooner or later doomed to defeat by a revolutionary people armed with "rifles, grenades, arrows and swords."

Mao Tse-tung first used the phrase "US imperialism and all other reactionaries are paper tigers" in an interview with an American journalist in August 1946. Peking's renewed emphasis of this doctrine after a long interval must be watched closely, for it underlies China's revolutionary ideology as well as her tactics for Communizing the world. China revolutionary ideology as well as her tactics for Communizing the world. China now appears determined to put this doctrine into practice and is launching a "political war" to outrival American military strength, based on ultramodern weapons, by means of a guerrilla war in Vietnam on the one hand and by a worldwide rebellion of revolutionary peoples against the USA on the other.

Such being the background to the tension in Vietnam, the most carefully-considered countermeasures cannot be effective unless an effort is made to examine the "paper tiger" doctrine and offer grounds for refuting it. The following article is based on the premise that South Vietnam must not be abandoned to Communism, since it is strategically important for controlling the entire area of Southeast Asia, as World War II showed. The article is partly based on a contribution to the Japanese-language publication *The Current* (Tokyo, 1965, No. 40)

Peking's Theories of the "Paper Tiger" and a "People's War"

The Balkans were once called the most dangerous powder magazine in Europe. Today, Southeast Asia may be described as a second Balkan Peninsular which is menacing world peace. Coupled with unstable elements within target countries, the armed intrusions of Communist guerrillas have been disturbing peace and order in Southeast Asia and so indeed threatening world peace.

It was early in 1959 that Communist China made up her mind to export her revolution to the rest of Southeast Asia. Her first move in this direction was the conquest of Tibet in March of that year, the whole area of Tibet being placed under her military control the following August. The build-up of her armaments along the Tibeto-Indian border frightened the small Himalayan states and caused boundary troubles with India.

About that time, the Communist Pathet Lao started its rebellion in Laos and the Workers' Party of North Vietnam began smuggling men of the "South Liberation Army" into South Vietnam, where they are the main strength of the present Viet Cong forces. There is no doubt that behind these developments there was the Chinese Communists' guidance and support based on their "people's war" theory.

Since then, the Viet Cong's activities have become more and more aggressive. The "People's Liberation Front of South Vietnam" was organized under the guise of a Southerners' national movement in December 1960, and then the "People's Revolutionary Party," an offshoot of the Workers' Party of North Vietnam and the core of the Front, made its debut in January 1962. This meant that the Communist guerrillas were now completely prepared for action in South Vietnam.

In February 1962, the United States, in response to a request of the South Vietnam government for military assistance, established her military aid headquarters in Saigon to support the government troops in their fight against the Viet Cong forces. The situation in South Vietnam, however, steadily worsened as a result of continual changes in the government as well as Viet Cong reinforcements of men, munitions and equipment from the North. Driven by the need to cut off North Vietnamese supplies of personnel and weapons to the Viet Cong, the United States began bombing the North in February 1965, and, as the situation further deteriorated, sent powerful combat units in August.

Early predictions that the bombing of North Vietnam would result in a bridging over of Sino-Soviet disagreements and unify their action against the "imperialists" or lead to military intervention along the lines of the Korean War did not materialize. On the contrary, Peking's immutably stiff attitude toward Moscow and its self-righteous claim to be the originator of the revolutionary struggle made the confrontation more acute. North Vietnam has suffered severe damage, transport and communications being seriously disrupted and military installations destroyed. The Viet Cong is compelled to depend, to a great extent, on regular troops sent from the North as the result of its serious losses in men.

Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong show no indication of giving up their resistance, and the Chinese Communists behind them are declaring even more loudly the ultimate victory of their "people's war." It should be pointed out that the well-known phrase, "American imperialism is a paper tiger," does not mean Chinese contempt for the United States. It is a reflection of the belief in the inexhaustibility of the power of the people, of the view that "imperialists against the people are doomed, while revolutionary forces allied with the people are assured of ultimate victory." Apart from whether or not the Chinese Communists are friends of the people and whether or not their "paper tiger" idea is true and universally applicable, the fact remains that this idea is the basis of their philosophy: from it sprang the Chinese Communists' basic idea of revolution, Mao Tse-tung's strategy and tactics of war and revolution and the "people's war" theory.

Not only is Peking busily engaged in lending guidance and encouragement based on its "paper tiger" doctrine to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong in order to make them fight to the end, it is also starting a global political war by propagating this doctrine in order to incite the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to rise up against American imperialism. For this purpose, Peking repeated its "paper tiger" doctrine more emphatically than ever in April and May

1965, when the Second Afro-Asian Conference was in the offing. An article by Luo Jui-ching, chief of the General Staff of the Chinese Army, published in the theoretical organ *Hongqi*, and a speech by Peng Chen, a secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, delivered on May 25 at the Institute of Socialism in Djakarta were noteworthy as illustrating how the "paper tiger" doctrine was to be put into practice. The Luo Jui-ching article, entitled "Let Us Push Forward the Anti-US Imperialist Struggle to the Last in Remembrance of the Victory over the German Fascists," called for "extreme revolutionary vigilance" on the political and ideological fronts as well as in the military sphere in readiness for an imperialist attack. In the event of a war with imperialism, a broad united front must be formed in order to deal a concentrated blow. This was feasible now that US imperialism was being counter-attacked by more than 90 percent of the world's population, the article declared. "Positive defense" was the only correct strategic policy: it was this that had secured the Soviet Union's victory in World War II, by rousing the righteous indignation of the Soviet population and armed services and winning the sympathy and support of the world. Although weapons were important, the decisive factor was the men wielding these weapons. The imperialists, being isolated from the people, had no alternative but to rely upon their superiority of weapons, which they stressed in the hope of intimidating their opponents. No matter how numerous and well-armed the aggressor's troops might be, popular resistance in the form of guerrilla attacks and sabotage were bound to lead to their defeat. US imperialism, the article declared, had overextended its lines of communication. As it encountered unyielding resistance from the people's liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, it was suffering a series of setbacks. The article went on:

US imperialism has atomic bombs. Certainly, they are terribly destructive weapons. It is not they, however, that decide a war. The atomic bomb is only a "paper tiger" that bluffs people. Moreover, the United States' nuclear monopoly has long been broken up.

US imperialism, which possesses nuclear weapons, is clamoring for nuclear retaliation. Recent developments in South Vietnam, however, have fully proved that it was at a loss how to act when confronted with the rifles, grenades, arrows and swords wielded by a revolutionary people.¹

The reference to the collapse of the United States' monopoly of nuclear weapons acquires particular significance in view of the explosion of China's second atomic bomb, which took place five days after the article was published. The main point, however, is that, in Peking's view, nuclear armaments are a "paper tiger" in the hands of imperialists, but a formidable weapon in the hands of a revolutionary people.

Although the Algiers conference was put off until November 5, mainly owing to the Algerian *coup d'état* of June 19, Communist China continued her

¹ *Hongqi*, Peking, 1965, No. 5. An editorial in *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking, May 9, 1965), entitled "The Historical Experience of the Anti-Fascist War," took a similar line, in particular stressing the need, exemplified by World War II, to rely, when launching a blow against an aggressor, on the united revolutionary forces of the people.

efforts to turn the conference into a forum for impeaching US imperialism. Around that time, however, her political failures in Asia and Africa were becoming evident. Her radical and revolutionary approach to the problems of the Afro-Asian countries, her emphasis upon the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist struggle and her failure to recognize the fact that the leaders of the developing countries, having seized power and attained national independence, had transferred their attention from revolutionary struggle to building up a solid infrastructure, placed them on the alert. In any case, many Asian and African leaders looked to the USSR rather than to China.

China revealed herself as a fisher in troubled waters when the war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir broke out and the United Nations tried to bring about a truce between the two countries. She marred the "Peking-Djakarta axis" herself in the wake of the Indonesian abortive *coup* by supporting Indonesian Communists who failed in their assaults on anti-Communist Army leaders.

Faced with these unfavorable developments, the Chinese Communist leaders rapidly lost interest in the holding of a second Afro-Asian conference on November 5 and set about breaking off the meeting. In the end, the Algiers conference was indefinitely postponed.

All this reminds us that Peking's ambition of a global anti-American political war based on the "paper tiger" doctrine has suffered a series of reverses, with the result that many people are saying it is none other than Red China that is the "paper tiger." This is the language of men who do not understand what the "paper tiger" doctrine really is.

The Chinese Communists, self-complacent in our eyes, have been concentrating on the accomplishment of their mission over a long period of time, refusing to be daunted by temporary failures. They are striving to regain their prestige among the Asian and African nations by working for "solidarity" among these nations or by advocating and instigating a "people's war." Particularly noteworthy in this connection were a major theoretical article by Lin Piao, Minister of Defense, on "the people's war" published on September 3 and a joint anti-Soviet editorial published in *Jen Min Jib Pao* and *Hongqi* on November 11.

Lin Piao's article appeared, therefore, at a time when China's setback in Asia and Africa was evident. It regarded the seizure of power by the people as the supreme form of revolution, defined Asia and Africa as the main battlefronts in the "people's war" and revealed China's determination to set the "people's war" in motion everywhere where it was possible in the two continents. Recent developments amply illustrate Lin Piao's words: the Chinese Communists have been giving their active support to armed rebellions in the Congo (Leopoldville) and other African states; they were behind the Indonesian Communists in their recent attempted *coup* in Djakarta; they also tried to instill the idea of a "people's war" into hundreds of young Japanese invited to attend a "Chinese-Japanese Youth Friendship Festival" in the fall of 1965.

The joint editorial also tells the reader of the Chinese' intention to carry their "people's war" theory into practice. It termed Moscow's call for a "broad

anti-imperialist united movement" a "betrayal of the peoples," and advocated that the Chinese establish a "worldwide anti-American people's united front" of their own. (Incidentally, one should note Peking's recent neglect of "the second intermediary zone" thesis, once widely propagated when France recognized Communist China, according to which Asia and Africa constituted the first and anti-American capitalist nations in other areas the second "intermediary zone": its aim was to draw all nations in the intermediary zone into the international anti-American united movement advocated by China.)

All things considered, not only are the Chinese Communists crying for the continuation of war in Vietnam at the expense of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong while the rest of the world is anxious for peace and stability in South-east Asia, but, armed with the "paper tiger" doctrine, they want to fight out a political war against the United States on a worldwide scale in which the Vietnam conflict is playing a major role.

Japan is no exception as far as being exposed to torrential anti-American propaganda from Peking and its followers is concerned. Our preoccupation with the war situation in Vietnam and neglect of the world situation as a whole may mean that we cannot see the wood for the trees, and mislead us into allowing Peking to attain its goal. Now is the time for the nations of the free world, armed with a clear understanding of Peking's "paper tiger" doctrine and the realization that this doctrine is the basis of all its policies, both explicit and implicit, to take the initiative and nip the Chinese Communists' ascendancy in the bud.

How Should We Deal with the Situation ?

When considering how the non-Communist world can cope with the situation in Vietnam, the first point to be made is that, since the war in Vietnam is part of a worldwide political conflict, concentration on victory in Vietnam alone will not lead the West to ultimate victory. Military measures alone, therefore, are not enough: the West must show insight and determination in dealing with the "paper tiger" doctrine by producing more far-reaching plans and adopting much more effective political maneuvers than it has done so far. In particular, it must aim at securing international public opinion in its favor. To this end, the following steps are necessary. First, efforts should be redoubled to prove that the conflict in Vietnam originated in armed penetration by the North Vietnamese with the support of the Communist bloc, in particular Communist China, though camouflaged as a war of national liberation. Second, efforts should be made to convince world public opinion that Communist China is the only country opposing a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese problem, by showing that her "paper tiger" doctrine, so far from being aimed at negotiating a peaceful settlement of this problem, is designed to involve all the new emerging nations in a struggle with the United States. Third, a definite promise should be made on the withdrawal of American troops as soon as peace in Vietnam is secured, and the Southeast Asia development program expounded by President Johnson in his

Baltimore speech should be publicized in detail in order to give the inhabitants of this area a brighter prospect for the future.

Although minor tactical shifts are always possible, the main feature of Peking's immediate policy is undoubtedly to incite peoples throughout the world to rise in revolt against the "imperialists," and every available opportunity is being taken to organize the population of the newly-emerging states of Asia, Africa and elsewhere into an international united front against the United States. Here the following steps would appear expedient. First, when seeking the support of world public opinion, efforts should be made to warn nationalist leaders in the new emerging nations of Peking's "paper tiger" doctrine and to disclose the details of Chinese Communist activities in a number of these countries where radical elements were incited to armed insurrection. Second, the advanced nations should show greater understanding for the problems dividing the South and North by encouraging and aiding economic and social development projects launched by the leaders of the new emerging countries. Every effort should be made to help such leaders to consolidate their position in the moderate non-aligned nations on the one hand and to isolate them in the pro-Peking nations on the other. Here, a subtle exploitation of the antagonism between Moscow and Peking would also be worth consideration.

With regard to the war in Vietnam, priority must, of course, be given to the mopping up of Viet Cong forces in the South while disrupting the supply of personnel, arms and equipment from the North. There are, however, various points which have to be borne in mind. First, the outcome of the war depends on the competition for popularity: although they must have considerable experience in this field, the US military authorities in South Vietnam, if little progress here is achieved, will have to consider whether some measures of fundamental importance have not been overlooked. These include the question of transferring, with compensation, the ownership of farms from landlord to tenant, the cancellation of peasants' debts still outstanding to the landlord, the raising of prices for farm produce and the establishment of reliable networks for collecting farm produce as well as distributing necessary commodities. The most essential thing, however, is, of course, to convince the Vietnamese people of the United States' true object in Vietnam and to give a firm pledge that the US has no intention of acting like a colonial ruler, as France did in the old days.

Second, as far as military strategy is concerned, priority must be given to recovering the initiative in the battle area. As Luo Jui-ching pointed out in his article in *Hongqi*, the most important thing in guerrilla warfare is to retain the initiative so that the enemy is everywhere put on the defensive and so generally weakened. Such "positive defense," he wrote, was not concerned with the struggle for a position but aimed at delivering a concentrated assault with superior forces at a place and time of one's own choosing; enemy troops were consequently pinned down all along a vast battlefield, thus losing their freedom of movement and being exposed to severe losses.² If full use is made of the excellent airborne

² *Hongqi*, 1965, No. 5.

mobility which the US and South Vietnam government troops have already displayed, a recovery of the initiative is possible, and it is encouraging to note that the efforts made to this end have not been without success. Indeed, it may be said that, thanks to their overwhelming air power, American troops fighting the Viet Cong have now apparently succeeded in taking over the initiative.

Once the emptiness of the "paper tiger" doctrine has been proved by political and military measures and the fact that the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong and the South Vietnam People's Liberation Front are the victims of this doctrine been recognized, the time will come for political maneuvers to play a decisive role. Until then, there is no alternative but to continue the fight in Vietnam in expectation of a protracted war.

Etsuo Kobtani

The Communist Bloc

The Mongolian People's Republic

These notes by Professor Rupen outline the present position of the Mongolian People's Republic, politically and culturally, between two Communist empires. They provide a background to the article in this issue "Moscow Fortifies its Positions in Asia."

Among the plentiful evidence confirming Mongolia's unswerving alignment with the USSR against Communist China, specific mention may be made of the agreement signed by the USSR and Mongolia on April 19, 1965, providing for economic and technical assistance during the period 1966-70, and the twenty-year treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance signed in Ulan Bator on January 15, 1966.¹ On this latter occasion, the Soviet delegation, headed by Brezhnev, included Malinovsky, Gromyko and First Secretary of the Kalmyk Party Central Committee B. Gorodovikov—apparently the first instance for decades of Kalmyk representation in a Soviet delegation to the country. Of the thirteen Mongolian negotiators, one was an army man (Lkhagvasuren, Minister of Defense and Commander of the Mongolian Army), six foreign affairs officials (including Dugersuren, Minister of Foreign Affairs), and six economists (including Ragcha, the present head of the Mongolian state planning authority, and two of his predecessors in this post). At least seven of them had received their education in the USSR or had had long experience of that country in various capacities, including the present Mongolian Ambassador in Moscow and his predecessor. Two (S. Luvsan and D. Gombodzhav) have spent some years in Peking.

¹ The text of the new treaty and of the Soviet-Mongolian communiqué appears in *Pravda*, January 18, 1966. The first formal Soviet-Mongolian treaty, a ten-year protocol of mutual assistance, was signed on March 12, 1936; just before expiry, converted into the twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance of February 27, 1946.

The Mongolian representative at the tricontinental conference held in Havana in January of this year was Lodoidamba, Chairman of the Mongolian Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Lodoidamba submitted a dissertation in 1959 to the Academy of Social Sciences of the Soviet Party Central Committee in Moscow.

The agreement of April 19, 1965, provided for a credit of 495 million rubles and for an extension on accumulated debts of 170 million rubles. The new credit is equivalent to over one-third of the total capital expenditure envisaged by Mongolia's plan for 1966–70. Thus, the Soviet Union remains Mongolia's principal foreign trade and aid partner, and continues to subsidize her inability to meet her debts in full.²

Soviet trade with Mongolia amounted to 178,500,000 rubles in 1964; in the same year, the USSR's trade with North Vietnam amounted to 73,800,000 and with North Korea to 147,100,000 rubles.³ Soviet exports of coal to Mongolia increased from 31,000 tons in 1963 to 256,000 tons in 1964; of petroleum products, from 140,100 tons to 160,000 tons; and of clothing and textiles, from about 7,500,000 rubles to 12,500,000 rubles. During the same period, Mongolia's exports of sheep and goats to the Soviet Union decreased slightly from 1,246,000 head to 1,133,800 head, while its wool exports to the USSR increased from 8,000 tons to 10,600 tons.

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Comecon and other East European activities continue to buttress direct Soviet efforts in Mongolia and emphasize the latter's separation from China, at the same time providing the Mongols with non-Soviet European contacts. Kadar led a delegation which visited Ulan Bator September 27–October 2, 1965; this resulted in an announcement of Hungarian assistance in the establishment near Ulan Bator of "the largest veterinary drug and foodstuff producing unit in Asia." In September 1965, two hundred Bulgarian construction specialists were working in Mongolia. Tsendenbal and a number of other Mongolian leaders visited Czechoslovakia June 21–25, 1965. Czechoslovakia provides assistance for the Ulan Bator Leather and Shoe Factory, and a Czech architect is directing the construction of a seven-story hospital in modern glass style, with a heliport on the roof.⁴ Aid from Czechoslovakia amounted to 14,100,000 rubles in 1965. Bilateral scientific and cultural cooperation committees met in Warsaw in July and in Sofia and Belgrade in September last year. A Comecon geological seminar met in Ulan Bator August 21–28, 1965. Furthermore, a British resident chargé d'affaires is now permanently assigned to Mongolia, and the United Nations held a regional seminar on "Women's Participation in Public Life" in Ulan Bator

² *Nowosti Mongolii*, Ulan Bator, June 9, 1965.

³ *Vnesbnyaya torgovlya Soyuza SSR za 1964 god: Statistichesky obzor* (The Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1964: A Statistical Survey), Moscow, 1965.

⁴ *Nowosti Mongolii*, July 7, 1965.

on August 3–17, 1965.⁵ All these connections—with the USSR, Eastern and Western Europe and even America—further increase the ideological and political distance from Peking.

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Communist China does not expect to shift Mongolia from her present orientation toward the USSR, and has virtually withdrawn from active competition with the Soviet Union in that country. This conclusion is derived from a radio report of a meeting of Soviet, Chinese and Mongolian representatives which took place in Peking September 2–9, 1965, to discuss the effects of the change from the Russian wide gauge to the Chinese standard gauge on the 337-kilometer section of the Trans-Mongolian Railroad situated on Chinese territory. As a result of this change, which confirms the implications of the Sino-Mongolian border treaty of December 16, 1962, the section of the railroad on Chinese territory now becomes devoted entirely to domestic Chinese interests and to China's border defense, instead of serving as a link to Ulan Bator. Dzamyn Ude, the last station on the Mongolian side, thus becomes a virtual terminus; and the Chinese city of Chining, envisaged by the Chinese in 1956 as a major railhead and transshipment point for trade with the Soviet Union and Mongolia,⁶ becomes an intermediate station on a railroad line to the Sino-Mongolian border.

A second indicator of China's relations with Mongolia was provided by Chen Yi's press conference of September 29, 1965, at which a Hong Kong correspondent asked:

The relationship between Outer Mongolia and China proper is closer than that between Tibet and China proper, whether viewed historically or from the standpoint of race, color and culture. Tibet is part of China's territory, and all the more so is Outer Mongolia. Such being the case, why is it that the delimitation of the Sino-Mongolian boundary should have taken place?

To this, Chen Yi replied:

Tibet and the Mongolian People's Republic are two different matters which should not be mentioned in the same breath. The Mongolian People's Republic proclaimed independence in 1924 following a revolution, whereas Tibet has always been part of China's territory. In 1945, Chiang Kai-shek's government concluded a treaty with the government of the Soviet Union recognizing the Mongolian People's Republic. After its founding, China succeeded to the commitment and recognized Mongolia as a socialist country. It is only natural and nothing strange for China and Mongolia to delimit the boundary between them in a friendly way. There are Han chauvinists in China who have always refused to recognize the Mongolian

⁵ For Western tourism in Mongolia, see *The New York Times*, December 12, 1965.

⁶ *Survey of the China Mainland Press*, Hong Kong, No. 1201 (January 5, 1956). The first stage in the building of this railroad was the spur of the Trans-Siberian, constructed from Ulan Ude to the Mongolian border near Kyakhta in 1937. On November 7, 1949, the first train from the USSR arrived in Ulan Bator. On September 15, 1952, the USSR, the Mongolian People's Republic and China agreed to extend the railroad from Ulan Bator to Chining; this section was opened to traffic on January 1, 1956 (joint Soviet-Mongolian-Chinese communiqué of January 4, 1956).

People's Republic. We are opposed to such Han chauvinism. Since its founding, New China has provided the Mongolian People's Republic with large amounts of aid. In recent years, the leading group of Mongolia has been following the Khrushchev revisionists in opposing China. But we do not cancel our aid to it on this account, because our New China is guided by Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought, and we are not Khrushchev revisionists. It is for the Mongolian people themselves to decide whether cooperation with China is more in their interests. We do not impose our will on them.⁷

According to reports, 4,500 Chinese workers were still left in Mongolia in the summer of 1965, finishing projects begun earlier.⁸ For example, a report of September 28, 1965, referred to completion by the Chinese of a 23-kilometer concrete highway from Ulan Bator to Nalaikha. The original agreement for this project had been signed in May 1960.⁹

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After the announcement of the holding of a Soviet Party congress in March of this year, the Mongols called for a new congress of their People's Revolutionary Party, to meet on June 7. (The last congress of this party, the fourteenth, met July 3-7, 1961.) In June 1965, the khural structure of local government, based on the Soviet model, encompassed 13,460 deputies in 309 somons (districts). In addition, the 18 aimak (regional) khurals embraced 1,369 and the city khurals a further 198 deputies. Of all these local deputies, 57 percent in June 1965 were Party members, and 24.5 percent were women.¹⁰

The new five-year plan calls for 25 million head of livestock in 1970, a figure which implies continuing difficulties in this fundamental sector of the Mongolian economy. Grain production is to attain the annual figure of 700,000 tons by 1970; that for 1965 was estimated in August at 384,000 tons,¹¹ of which 290,000 were accounted for by state farms and the rest by cooperatives.

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Of the country's one million inhabitants, about 150,000 are now going to school. There are 289 elementary schools offering a course of four years, 65 "incomplete secondary" schools (seven or eight years), 43 "complete secondary" schools (ten or eleven years), 17 "tekhnikums" (technical schools requiring graduation from an "incomplete secondary" school for entry) and seven higher educational institutions, which require graduation from a "complete secondary" school.

⁷ Radio Peking, September 30, 1965. Compare the Chinese statement of March 1960 cited in Robert A. Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century*, Bloomington, Ind., 1964, pp. 304-5.

⁸ *The New York Times*, August 9, 1965, and Western eyewitness reports.

⁹ Radio Peking, September 28, 1965.

¹⁰ *Novosti Mongolii*, June 16, 1965.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, August 28, 1965.

. Of the 8,550 pupils who graduated from "incomplete secondary" schools in 1965, 2,736 were to proceed to a course of further education, while the rest were to go straight on to work. Of the 4,328 who finished "complete secondary" school, 350 were to proceed to a course of higher education in Mongolia and 120 for similar education in the USSR; the rest, numbering 3,758, were to receive no immediate further education. Nevertheless, 1,030 pupils were admitted to higher educational institutions in 1965 after some kind of interruption in their education (undoubtedly work or military service).

Of the approximate total of 2,000 students who graduated from higher educational institutions in 1965, 300 graduated from the State University, 360 from the Agricultural Institute, 200 from the Medical Institute and 256 from the Institute of Economics (all located in the capital city); 430 graduated from places of higher education in the USSR. Of the 3,000 Mongols pursuing regular courses of study abroad, 2,500 were in the USSR, 1,000 of them in Moscow. In addition, 2,000 Mongols were in the USSR for special training in construction work.

In addition to the two hundred doctors who graduated in 1965, three hundred medical assistants (*feldshers*) completed their training: altogether, some 2,500 are studying at secondary and higher medical schools. In 1965, there were 2,089 pupils registered at 22 evening schools (one offering a "complete secondary" and the rest "incomplete secondary" courses of instruction); pupils completing courses at evening institutes and *tekhnikums* numbered 160. Nurseries and kindergartens now serve about one-fifth of the children of pre-school age (3-7 years).¹²

Thus, it would appear that in 1965 one out of five children aged 3-7 years was placed in a pre-school institution; practically all between the ages of 7 and 10 or 11 were attending primary school; many finish the course of "incomplete secondary" school education, and three out of ten go on to some kind of further training. Of the number graduating from "complete secondary" schools (which is half that finishing "incomplete secondary" school), something over one in ten proceed immediately to a place of higher education, while another two in ten do so after a period of interruption. For every Mongolian student graduating from a Soviet higher educational institution, four graduate from similar institutions in Mongolia.

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The Mongols aim at having one doctor for every *somon* and a medical assistant in every work brigade. In August of last year, it was announced that 35 percent of the *somons* and 30 percent of the work brigades were so staffed. It was also claimed that the average expectation of life had been raised to 64 years.¹³ According to a Mongolian report, pneumonia and intestinal diseases are "most hazardous to Mongolian children of younger ages."¹⁴

¹² *Ibid.*, June-December 1965, *passim*

¹³ *Ibid.*, August 4, 1965.

¹⁴ *Mongolia Today*, No. 50, New Delhi, March 1965, p. 12.

Among acknowledged domestic problems, the "most critical" is the lack of an adequate labor force. The important coal mines at Nalaikha, which have long been in operation, "systematically" fail to fulfill their production quotas. In 1964, an average of 30 percent of all vehicles were out of use because of breakdowns and a lack of spare parts.¹⁵

The lack of a steel industry apparently continues to irritate nationalistic Mongols. Speaking on June 4, 1965, Tsedenbal observed, "The question is sometimes asked: Why do we not found our own metallurgical industry?" and answered the question by stating that the country possessed insufficient resources of metals.¹⁶

The city which serves as capital of the Eastern Aimak is still called Choibalsan, and the Sukhe-Bator-Choibalsan Mausoleum in Ulan Bator still bears that name. Numerous positive references to Choibalsan's role in World War II have appeared recently.¹⁷ In July publication was announced of a revised edition of the official *History of the Mongolian People's Republic*, in which "certain erroneous positions concerning the personality cult have been removed."¹⁸ A leading Mongolian intellectual, Professor Rinchen, who has experienced periodic difficulties with the regime, was reported to have taken an active part in a conference held by the Institute of Language and Literature of the Academy of Sciences in Ulan Bator on November 26, 1965.¹⁹

Scattered references indicate that some attention is being paid to Mongolia's Kazakh minority of about 37,000, living mainly in the Bayan-Ülegei Aimak, on the borders of Soviet Central Asia. In the chief town of Ülegei, there is a Kazakh and Mongolian-language ten-year ("complete secondary") school and a new radio station broadcasting in Kazakh. Two recently named officials in one somon, the Party secretary and the local government chairman, bear Kazakh names, whereas officials in this aimak have almost invariably in the past been Mongols.²⁰ It may be added that the delegation led by Brezhnev which visited Ulan Bator in January included the Minister of Culture of the Kazakh SSR.

Finally, it may be pointed out that a Soviet writer, M. I. Golman, examines "bourgeois" writing about Mongolia in an article entitled "The Recent History of Mongolia in Bourgeois Historiography and Journalism."²¹ He discusses the work of William Ballis, Charles Bawden, Gerard Frieters, George Ginsburgs, Franklyn

¹⁵ *Novosti Mongolii*, June 9, 1965.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* (Cf. Rupen, *op. cit.*, p. 326.)

¹⁷ Particularly in *Novosti Mongolii*, September 1, 1965.

¹⁸ See discussion of this history in *Kratkiye soobshcheniya Instituta vostokovedeniya Akademii Nauk SSSR*, 1955, No. 17, pp. 92-94, and the present writer's review of it in *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. I, No. 4, Wiesbaden, 1955, pp. 297-308. The book is *Istoriya MNR* (History of the Mongolian People's Republic), Moscow-Leningrad, 1954, 422 pages.

¹⁹ *Novosti Mongolii*, December 1, 1965. For an account of some of Prof. Rinchen's earlier difficulties, see Rupen, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-87.

²⁰ *Novosti Mongolii*, August 18 and 20 and November 24, 1965.

²¹ *Kratkiye soobshcheniya Instituta narodov Azii*, No. 85, 1964, pp. 169-86. For a recent bibliography on Mongolia, see *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1965, No. 3, pp. 179-87.

Holzman, Owen Lattimore, George Murphy, Jack Raymond, Robert Rupen, Harrison Salisbury, Peter Tang, Eric Thiel and many others. The assessment is, of course, generally negative, but it does supply specific references to much of recent Western writing on the subject.

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Everything thus continues to orient the Mongolian People's Republic toward the USSR: politics, economics, military affairs, cultural relations. China appears to have taken a back seat. Close relations between Mongolia and the USSR, now of 45 years' standing, continue, while the Chinese challenge of a few years ago has nearly evaporated. Of course, a potential Chinese influence there always exists, and considerable effort is needed for the Soviets to counterbalance even Chinese quiescence. Geography and demography are on China's side, and the USSR maintains its position artificially by political activity and economic subsidy. "Ruble imperialism" operates. Meanwhile, Mongolians gain position, prestige and relative wealth by acquiring a Soviet education and a command of the Russian language. The Russians now find many leading Mongolian officials who know them, their language and their country; the Mongolian élite owes its favored position to a large extent to the USSR. What can China offer them? True independence is probably impossible in any case, and the Russians are fewer and farther away than the Chinese.

The most significant point in recent developments, however, is that Peking appears to have resigned itself to the situation, at least temporarily. A divided Mongolia is recognized, and China does not challenge the *status quo*. She has succeeded to the deal made decades ago between Russia and Japan.

Mongolia's domestic economic situation is improving slowly, if at all, and the Soviets appear to have accepted the inevitability of a costly "permanent" commitment. They have made considerable effort to make the country economically self-sufficient, but appear only to have raised Mongolian expectations which they cannot risk disappointing. Chinese laborers have been forced out, but Russians and East Europeans have to move in. The Mongolians continue to be expert at watching Chinese and Russians work: if the Mongolians work harder, the product of their labors will go to pay off old debts to the Soviet Union, so they make haste very slowly—and there is always the threat of China to motivate Russian *largesse*.

Robert A. Rupen

Party Affairs

Party Protection and Privileged Status in Soviet Society

From the following article, taken in conjunction with that by Mr. Duevel on the reform of the system of Party and state control, it becomes evident that the apparatus headed by Shelepin attempted to reform the *nomenklatura* of the Party Central Committee itself and that this was the cause of its defeat.

A good example of the exclusiveness of the Soviet ruling élite is provided by what is known in the USSR as the *nomenklatura* system. This term is defined in the *Encyclopedic Dictionary* as "a list of posts whose incumbents are approved by a higher Party, governmental or professional organization."¹ Such posts include all senior positions in all branches of activity, whether political, "public" (*obshchestvenny*) or economic, whether it be, for example, membership of a Party central committee, a directorship in industry, chairmanship of a city soviet or the post of store manager. The compilation of such lists of posts whose incumbents have to be approved by higher authority and the inclusion of new ones is, practically speaking, the prerogative of the Party, insofar as the personnel departments of other bodies such as ministries or trade unions work in close cooperation with the personnel departments of the corresponding Party agencies. The same, of course, applies to the nomination of candidates to fill these posts.

A *nomenklatura* official is one listed in the files as suitable for appointment to *nomenklatura* posts. As a rule, he is a Party member, and only in rare cases—in the spheres of science and engineering, finance and culture—may he have no Party affiliation. All such posts and officials—commonly termed "responsible" or "leading" officials—are divided into levels corresponding to the organizational divisions of the Party: (1) the all-Union Party Central Committee; (2) the Union-republic central committees; (3) oblast and krai Party committees and the central committees of autonomous republics; (4) major city Party committees; and (5) raion Party committees. The more important the post, the higher its *nomenklatura* level. Thus, the director of an industrial undertaking may figure in the *nomenklatura* list at the oblast, Union-republic or even all-Union level, and two such directors in the same oblast may figure in lists at different levels, depending on the size and importance of the undertakings in their charge.

Owing to the criteria used in selecting *nomenklatura* officials and assessing their work, the appointment of such officials is largely subjective. The primary criterion is *ideinost*, or ideological integrity, but since this quality is not only difficult to assess but has long since degenerated into maintenance at all costs of the Soviet system and the power of the Communist Party, its place has been taken by loyalty to the Soviet system and the Party and a feeling of identity with them.

¹ *Entsiklopedichesky slovar v dvukh tomakh* (Encyclopedic Dictionary in Two Volumes), Vol. II, Moscow, 1964, p. 107.

In practice, this is measured by the readiness of a *nomenklatura* official to employ any means in order to execute the commands of higher authority. Such an assessment, however, can only be made over a long period of collaboration both with other officials on the same level and with those at different levels of the *nomenklatura* hierarchy.

It is this feature that accounts for the particularly important point that the composition of the *nomenklatura* lists is unusually stable, despite repeated reminders from Party leaders that the system should be rejuvenated. As early as 1956, V. Ovechkin wrote in his short story "A Difficult Spring":

At the present time, the average age of raion [Party] committee secretaries in our oblast is probably somewhere between forty and fifty, nearer, I think, to fifty. . . . Two five-year plans hence, will the average age of raion committee secretaries be on the verge of sixty? And later about seventy? . . . No, there is something wrong at the moment with our education of the young and our attitude toward them.²

Complaining from the rostrum of the Twenty-Second Party Congress of the stability of this caste despite its inclusion of quite incompetent officials, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR Polyansky stated:

Unfortunately, there is among them an extremely tenacious category of people who constantly make a mess of things and still for years on end continue for some reason to be considered "responsible officials." It is as though, having once got into a certain *nomenklatura* [rating], they have acquired a warrant for their official immortality.³

This remarkable "stability" is one of the best illustrations of how tradition, once entrenched, proves stronger than the wishes and even the direct orders of the Party leaders: At a conference summoned by the Central Committee in 1964, Khrushchev complained of this in the following terms:

I fear that, once back home, some of you will start reasoning as follows: Ivan Ivanovich has been in responsible positions for twenty years. Of course, he's made a mess of twenty collective farms, but all the same let's send him to the twenty-first, perhaps something will come of him.⁴

Even the unofficial purges after Stalin's death did not, with few exceptions, result in any real changes of personnel within this category apart from mere reshuffles.

We have seen that loyalty to something relatively abstract—the Party and the cause of Communism—has assumed more concrete form in a readiness to execute at all costs the wishes of higher authority. Indeed, it has become materialized in a personal loyalty of subordinates to superiors and a personal confidence of superiors in their subordinates. This has always been the basis of the "selection of leading cadres," even in the economic field, where the appreciation of a man's efficiency is hardly less subjective, under Soviet conditions, than in other fields

² *Novyi mir*, 1956, No. 9, p. 127.

³ *Pravda*, October 24, 1961

⁴ *Ibid*, March 7, 1964.

of activity. It was stated, for example, some time ago during a meeting of the Georgian Party Central Committee:

Cases have still not been completely eliminated in which people are promoted to executive posts on the grounds of kinship, friendship or personal loyalty. Officials who have proved failures or who have compromised themselves are allowed to switch from one place to another.⁵

Adzhubei and Volovchenko provide examples of a meteoric career based on ties of kinship and friendship respectively.

The practical selection of "leading cadres" is the business of the personnel departments of Party organs, which, from the oblast committee level upwards, have what may be described as their own labor exchanges. Although for the most important posts a fairly careful—albeit not entirely objective—selection is made, for ordinary appointments the department keeps on hand a list of vacancies from which a "leading official" temporarily out of work is allowed to choose the one he prefers. (Throughout the period of his unemployment, such an official continues to receive his former salary.) The choice thus made is not binding on the personnel department, which may reject the appointment without disclosing the grounds for the decision; but approval is ensured if the candidate is on good terms with the head of the personnel department, the personnel secretary and, of course, the first secretary of the Party oblast committee.

This personal element in the selection of "leading cadres" is responsible for the emergence of a particular type of outlook and conduct that has become almost standard for officials in this class. "Personality cults" flourish on a greater or smaller scale, resulting in blind sycophancy on the one hand and lordly disdain on the other. In Soviet literature, one finds examples of how, as in the days of serfdom, highly placed officials address subordinates, irrespective of age or education, in the familiar and condescending second person singular, while the latter address their superiors in the respectful second person plural.

As a result of the conditions in which they work, many of these officials ...are either unable or unwilling to think and calculate for themselves; such officials are quite satisfied to let higher organizations do the thinking and make decisions for them.⁶

A typical example is provided by the case of N. M. Arkhipov, a collective farm chairman of long experience who, on enquiring whether he should begin sowing wheat and sugar beet, received from the raion Party committee the reply that he should decide such questions for himself. To this, his embarrassed answer was: "Yes, but how can I without the instructions of the raion Party committee?"⁷ As a result of this inbred lack of initiative, most "leading officials" always seek to obtain "instructions" at least from that level of the Party hierarchy in whose *nomenklatura* they are listed.

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 29, 1964.

⁶ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1963, No. 11, p. 122.

⁷ *Pravda*, June 9, 1965.

Criminal proceedings cannot be instituted against a "leading official" without the consent of the Party organ to whose *nomenklatura* he belongs. This principle, established long ago, remains in force today despite all the legal reforms which have been introduced since Stalin's death. *Pravda* cited an instance where the public prosecutor of the Chishmy Raion, having completed the investigation of a case involving two senior officials who were both Party members, wrote to the local raion Party committee, stating that the accused, "by abusing their official position, . . . [had] permitted the squandering and misappropriation of state property." The two men were liable to criminal prosecution for their actions, but the raion committee "settled everything behind closed doors. Bronnikov [one of the two] was reprimanded and the fact entered in his registration file, and that was the end of that."⁸ *Pravda* had earlier publicized the case of two brothers, again both Party members, who, working in a store, had "made themselves a large fortune" by sharp practice: the public prosecutor's request for permission to initiate criminal proceedings was ignored by the local raion Party committee and granted only when the matter reached the Party Central Committee of Tadzhikistan. The two men were imprisoned. However, the report continued:

Some time later, secretary of the raion Party committee Comrade Shermatov sent the public prosecutor a letter in which he suggested that the arrested swindlers be set free, "since they are Communists."⁹

Thus, it is the Party and not the judicature that decides whether a *nomenklatura* official and indeed any Party member shall be brought to trial. Should the Party decide against him—and this depends least of all on objective considerations—he is first expelled from the Party and only then brought to trial. Tradition in such matters is strictly observed, and it is only by assuming a violation of the practice on the part of the Party Central Committee of Tadzhikistan that an explanation can be found for the raion committee secretary's request that the two men, who had not been deprived of their Party membership, be released.

Of course, it should not be thought that this principle was established in order to attract swindlers and rogues into the Party or to protect them within its ranks; it was introduced primarily to maintain the monopolistic position of the Party in Soviet society. Concentrating in its own hands all forms of power, the Party could not logically permit anyone in the country to control any aspect of its activities. The situation becomes still more critical when it is a question of the *nomenklatura* caste, which is the very body that controls the whole of the country. Another, purely practical, reason for the principle is that, in order to carry out routine directives, responsible officials are often obliged to violate both the letter and the spirit of Soviet laws. It may be asserted without fear of exaggeration that if the law were to be strictly observed a large proportion of such officials would be permanently in prison. This does not, however, prevent this particular privilege

⁸ *Ibid.*, October 24, 1963

⁹ *Ibid.*, November 30, 1962.

from serving as an attraction for unscrupulous persons anxious to gain entry into the Party and then into the *nomenklatura* caste so as to exploit the privilege as a shield against the law. That is why the lower ranks of the *nomenklatura*, particularly in the economic field, are full of people whom official Soviet terminology commonly describes as "inveterate money-grubbers."

The higher the level of the *nomenklatura*, the more difficult it is for petty swindlers to penetrate into it, although even here there are exceptions. In any case, the privilege enjoyed by responsible officials *vis-à-vis* the law seems to engender in them particular attitudes and standards of conduct which can fairly be described as asocial. The most striking feature is the widespread and marked irresponsibility which results in situations such as the following:

The Supreme Court and Public Prosecutor's Office of the Georgian SSR issued an official statement. It contained two figures: 1,135 and 799. The first is the total number of complaints of unjust dismissal from work investigated last year by the legal organs of the republic. The second is the number of claims satisfied. Thus, in almost seventy cases out of a hundred the heads of institutions and state departments had proved to be in the wrong, to have acted in violation of the law.¹⁰

From this example, as from others already cited, it is clear that petty tyranny and arbitrary behavior are widespread in the middle and upper strata of the *nomenklatura* system. Equally widespread in the upper strata is a conceit which is largely due to a carefully concealed inferiority complex.

In the light of everything that has been said, one or two further examples culled from the Soviet press should appear significant:

During the past two years, nineteen leading officials in the city [Mogilev, Belorussian SSR] have permitted abuses, embezzlement and other misdemeanors, and have been dismissed for inefficient management of their enterprises. But in fact many of them have not been released, but have been transferred to other responsible posts.¹¹

On the grounds of grave technical mismanagement, "suppressing criticism and indulging in intrigues," the Party committee of Mine No. 37 in Karaganda issued a severe reprimand and warning to the chief engineer of the mine, Makeyev, and expelled him from the Party bureau of the mine. The Karaganda City Party Committee, however, did not ratify the decision. Addressing a "qualified rebuke" to the Party committee of the mine, the leaders of the city Party committee stated: "Makeyev is listed in our *nomenklatura*; we are recommending him for responsible Party work."¹² Finally,

The State Committee for Viticulture and Winemaking of the [Azerbaijan] Republic promoted M. Gasanov to a new post and gave him a favorable reference. . . . During his previous ten years' work in the winemaking industry, M. Gasanov had on four occasions been dismissed from the posts he held for mismanagement and

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, March 16, 1965, p. 2.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, September 3, 1965.

¹² *Ibid.*, November 29, 1965.

various violations of regulations. Why, then, was he promoted?—Primarily because this man had “been a director” and consequently, in the view of his patrons, should continue to hold his place in a certain *nomenklatura*.¹³

All the features of this system to which we have drawn attention clearly tend to consolidate its representatives as a new class and to aggravate still further the social anomalies which characterize Soviet society. The Soviet press has long since ceased attempting to disguise the existence of these anomalies, merely presenting them in the best possible light.

K. A. Krylov

Soviet Society

Komsomol Problems on the Eve of the Twenty-Third Party Congress

Soon after the Twenty-Third Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, in the middle of May, the Fifteenth Congress of the Komsomol is due to take place. The Komsomol now has a membership of over 22,000,000, and despite the growing emancipation of Soviet youth it still plays a key role in implementing the Party leadership's economic and political plans.

The formal functions of the Komsomol congress will be to review the organization's activities during the past four years and undertake to fulfill the tasks set by the Party Congress. It will, however, be overshadowed by a number of serious problems.

Among these problems is that of consolidating and expanding the system whereby young people are mobilized in large numbers for work in lagging or vital sectors of the economy. The scope of this mobilization is well illustrated by the fact that during the period 1956–62 the Komsomol sent no fewer than 700,000 young people to help reclaim the virgin lands, roughly 2,000,000 to livestock-breeding farms and another 1,300,000 to work on construction projects in Siberia, the Far East and Kazakhstan.¹ In addition to this, since about 1958 Komsomol organizations have been exercising their “patronage,” to use the Soviet phrase, over major projects such as the construction of hydroelectric power stations, factories and railroads, declaring the latter to be “Komsomol shock projects.” Special Komsomol “staff headquarters” and “inspection posts” attempt to ensure that the work is not held up by shortages of equipment, materials or manpower, if necessary mobilizing Komsomol shock brigades for this purpose. As late as 1965, the Komsomol kept an eagle eye on the construction of 125 major enterprises in the chemical, oil, gas, paper, metallurgical, chemical machine-building, railroad and building material industries, thereby making a valuable contribution to the fulfillment of the country's economic plans.

¹³ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 17; p. 29

¹ *Molodoi kommunist*, 1962, No. 4, p. 2

In carrying out such mass mobilizations, the Komsomol leaders have speculated shamelessly on their charges' lack of experience, on their love of independence and adventure, as well as on their patriotism, stimulating the latter emotions by mass propaganda. This is now freely admitted in Soviet youth organs. We read, for example, in *Komsomolskaya pravda*:

How many movies, stories, poems, sketches and plays there were in which the hero's departure for a Siberian construction project was presented as the surest solution to all problems! How many hackneyed plots and contrived situations some authors spawned in their zeal to exploit the gold-bearing Siberian vein!²

It was only natural that the young Komsomol volunteers, who had been given a completely false idea of their future working conditions and prospects, should rapidly become disillusioned. At the same time, many were often reluctant to return home, some because they were too proud to admit defeat, others because they came from provincial areas where life was intolerably dull. This has evidently led to a colossal rate of manpower fluctuation among the young workers at major construction projects, reaching 90 percent in some cases, and also to the emergence of an entire new social group composed of temporary workers without any permanent residence. This group includes many "floating" workers who have founded a family and would be only too glad to settle down in one of the new settlements, but who are prevented from doing so because the Komsomol and building authorities are so preoccupied in fulfilling the plan that they have no time to consider providing amenities for the workers.

The general dissatisfaction of this social group with living conditions, symptomatic of a general restlessness among the Soviet population as a whole, is, paradoxically enough, aggravated rather than improved by the fat pay checks taken home by workers in developing areas, since these merely make the lack of even the most elementary consumer goods more apparent. In particular, the wives of these workers pine for the comforts of a remote civilization.

The disillusionment of the new settlers is only too apparent in the results of a poll carried out in the town of Zapolyarny (Murmansk Oblast) at the beginning of 1965 by the Komsomol Central Committee's organ *Molodoi kommunist*. The interviewers found that only 56.3 percent of those questioned were happy living in the town, 35 percent were dissatisfied with all aspects or at least one aspect of life in the town, while the "don't-knows" accounted for the remaining 8.7 percent. Of those in the "dissatisfied" category, 28.4 percent had arrived in Zapolyarny before 1961, 32.8 percent during 1961 and 1962 and 40.3 percent during 1963 and 1964, which suggests that the later arrivals were more demanding, and also, of course, that many dissatisfied persons left after a short time.³

The principle cause for complaint was poor living conditions, including inadequate cultural and sports facilities, in second place were those who were dissatisfied with "everything." Cause number three was poor conditions for

² *Komsomolskaya pravda*, January 12, 1966.

³ *Molodoi kommunist*, 1965, No. 5, p. 88.

study, followed by inadequate housing. The poll also showed that dissatisfaction grew with increasing maturity and was in inverse proportion to the interviewee's educational level.

All the negative factors listed above are slowly wrecking the Komsomol's "patronage" and "mobilization" system, which in its present form may well have to be abandoned in the next five years. (Another factor, of course, is that a system based on the idealism of volunteers is unlikely to fit in with the more rational methods of economic management being introduced by the Soviet leaders.)

A much serious problem for the Komsomol leaders is the steadily widening gap between functionaries and rank-and-file members, which is drastically diminishing the Komsomol's influence on Soviet youth. Symptomatic of the organization's low prestige among Soviet youth is the fact that the Komsomol badge cannot compete in appeal with the badges of the local football team or voluntary fire brigade, for example.⁴ Neither do members think much of the Komsomol meeting, which is supposed to be the highlight of Komsomol activities. Here is a typical opinion:

Quite frankly, we would not go to our meetings were it not for Komsomol discipline. Because we know the routine off by heart. The same old people will be elected to the presidium. A feeble report. Followed by an awkward silence. Then the same old question: "Who would like to speak?" We always know who is going to speak, because they are always up on the platform. They talk about everything without saying anything. It is impossible to take down a single word of these speeches. Nothing is taken down anyway: the draft resolution has long been prepared.⁵

In order to compel unwilling members to attend these meetings, it is a favorite practice at many factories to set up pickets to bar the exits after shifts, or simply to confiscate the passes of those leaving so that they have to come to the meeting in order to get them back.⁶

Protests against the hypocrisy of Komsomol "democracy" are growing. We read, for example, in *Molodoi kommunist*:

When preparing for elections, the old committee or bureau usually selects its own successors. Voices are frequently raised against all preparation of candidates. "Why do they serve us up with ready-made candidates merely so that we can pretend to elect them?" people ask.⁷

The journal also quotes a case when a candidate put forward by higher authorities for the post of secretary of a Komsomol district organization in Moscow was declared to have been elected "unanimously"—much to the surprise of those who had voted against him.⁸ However, the lack of democracy in the

⁴ See, for example, *Komsomolskaya pravda*, August 20, 1965.

⁵ *Molodoi kommunist*, 1965, No. 2, p. 43.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1965, No. 3, p. 35.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

Komsomol is also due in a measure to the apathy of the members themselves. A young technologist, member of the Komsomol committee at a factory in Moscow, admitted:

In my opinion, there is no democracy in the Komsomol. Although there is talk of it in our Charter, it is not, in fact, being practised. . . . [This despite the fact that] there are no formal barriers to prevent a rank-and-file member from putting any worthwhile idea into practice. The committee is only too glad if he comes to them with such an idea. Come on, says the Charter, exercise your rights as boss of your own organization. But . . . the member does not come. Apparently he does not need this democracy. When I reported for the secretary last year, I enumerated dozens of good measures. And yet all of them originated either in the district committee or in our committee. I cannot remember a single instance of a rank-and-file member's being the initiator of any important project in our organization. Like a soldier, he "carries out orders"—and nothing else. I do not know the reason for this passivity, and thus cannot wait to be reelected. What a job it is to have to appeal to the initiative of the rank-and-file member the whole year round and yet not know how to force him to display this initiative!⁹

Komsomol members are even going ahead and setting up unofficial organizations of their own. Some of these organizations are serious, others less so, but all doubtless provide their members with something in which the Komsomol itself is lacking. They include a "collective of young enthusiasts," set up at the beginning of 1962 in a certain Soviet city, whose "Charter" reads:

We hereby found, on a truly scientific basis and on the basis of the highest principles of human morality—friendship, love, mutual assistance, uncomplacency, kindness and respect—a collective of young enthusiasts firmly committed to eradicating all that is old and outmoded from people's lives and people's minds and to clearing the way for what is new and progressive.¹⁰

In the same way, about three years ago groups of Komsomol members calling themselves "Young Communards" began to make their appearance in various localities.¹¹ These "Young Communards," 14–18-year-olds who considered that the Komsomol did not sufficiently cater for the interests of their age group, even succeeded in forcing the Komsomol authorities to recognize their independence within the "parent" organization, a circumstance which is still a source of tension between the "rebels" and the Komsomol functionaries.¹²

If the gulf between the Komsomol and Soviet youth has been steadily widening, this is not because the Komsomol's youth work has been deteriorating (it has, in fact, scarcely been modified), but rather because the young people themselves are beginning to chafe under the restrictions inherent in the totalitarian nature of this organization. In other words, it is the young people who have changed, and not the Komsomol. Over one half of the latter's members are aged between 14 and 18, i.e., were born after the war and grew up during the

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹⁰ *Komsomolskaya pravda*, June 6, 1964.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, May 14, 1964.

¹² *Ibid.*, October 8, 1965.

post-Stalin period. They have only second-hand knowledge of Stalin's reign of terror and World War II, not to mention the early Five-Year Plans and the Revolution. Their general outlook has instead been molded by the anti-war atmosphere prevalent in the Soviet Union, by the, albeit partial, revelation of the injustice, lies and deceit which flourished during the period of the "cult of personality," and, last but not least, by the realization that the inhabitants of non-Communist countries lead a freer and fuller life.

The emergence of this restless younger generation has dealt a severe blow to the propaganda myth about the creation of a "new Soviet man." Despite their having been subjected to a constant stream of Party propaganda all their lives and having parents who themselves, in the majority of cases at least, grew up under the Soviet regime, young people in the Soviet Union are straying further and further from the course marked out for them by the ideological authorities. In a desperate attempt to counter Soviet youth's increasing predilection for the philosophies of pacifism, "abstract" humanism and peaceful coexistence, the Komsomol's Central Committee appealed to the country's young people at a plenary session held last year to be constantly prepared to defend the motherland against the foes which encircled her. The session, which was attended by the Head of the Army and Navy's Main Political Department, General A. A. Yepishyev, and the Chairman of the Committee for State Security, V. Y. Semichastny, lasted several days, and dealt with such matters as the protection of Soviet youth from Western influences, the fight against internal ideological enemies, the intensification of "patriotic" military education and pre-conscription military training for Komsomol members.

This loss of contact between the Komsomol and Soviet youth is, however, as we have seen, not the sort of problem that can be cured by such crude Stalinist methods, and there is no doubt that, along with the fortunes of the Komsomol's "colonization" and "patronage" drive, it will be one of the principal topics of discussion at the Party's Twenty-Third Congress, and to an understandably greater degree at the following Fifteenth Congress of the Komsomol.

S. Voronitsyn

REVIEWS

The Periodical Press

The Twenty-Third Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, scheduled to take place in March, is likely to prove the most interesting gathering of its kind, with the possible exception of the Twentieth and Twenty-Second Congresses, which were dominated by de-Stalinization. While the forthcoming Party congress does not promise to be sensational, it is significant inasmuch as it is the first to be held under the new leaders and comes only a short time after far-reaching economic reforms. The Party press, of course, is busily engaged in preparing the masses for acceptance of the domestic and foreign policies to be proclaimed at the congress.

The first issue of the Party's theoretical journal *Kommunist* for 1966 opens with a series of articles under the common heading, "The Party Proceeds to its Twenty-Third Congress." The first of these articles, an editorial entitled "The Force of Example," begins with the declaration that the present stage of the development of Soviet society calls for increased responsibility for Communist construction on the part of each Communist and each worker, and goes on to say, somewhat more specifically:

The interests of the development of the USSR demand above all that Communists enhance their leading role in economic reconstruction, which occupies a key position in the fight to achieve the transition to Communism, consolidate the might of the Soviet state and increase the well-being of the Soviet people. Drawing on the historical experience of socialist construction in our country and on the experience of the world socialist community, the Communist Party is penetrating ever more deeply into the essence of economic relations in our society in order to make correct use of the latter's economic laws and immense creative possibilities (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 1, page 5).

It is highly significant that the "correct use" of economic laws is now considered the most important requisite for the successful construction of Communism, and not the various forms of "socialist" labor as was the case only quite recently. The editors continue:

To set an example today means:

to increase the effectiveness of social production, increase output per ruble of basic production funds and more fully exploit the possibilities for increasing labor productivity;

to boost technological development in every possible way, create new prototypes of machinery and equipment on the basis of the latest achievements of science and industrial practice and put them into commission more speedily;

to consolidate and develop economic self-sufficiency [*khozyaistvenny raschet*], increase the profitability of production, improve the quality and reduce the prime cost of products . . . (*Ibid.*, pages 5-6.)

Praising the valuable contribution made by economic experts toward strengthening the country's economy, the editorial continues:

Preparations for the economic reform have shown that all the conditions necessary for a further development of social and scientific thought are now present. It is now up to the scientific workers to set an example of Party integrity [*printsipialnost*] and the creative development of theory (*ibid.*, page 7).

The editors do not explain in what way "Party integrity" could be conducive to creative economic thinking, but cite as justification for the present reform movement the introduction of the "New Economic Policy" (NEP) by Lenin in 1921:

Let us take the new economic policy, for example. V. I. Lenin saw the prime requisite for the success of NEP to consist in convincing all Communists, and through them all workers, that it was objectively necessary, that it was necessary to switch from old, obsolete methods of work to new methods which met the new requirements (*ibid.*).

Leaving aside the fact that the switch would be more accurately described as being from the new-fangled Communist methods back to well-tried capitalist methods, the important point here is the emphasis on the need to convince all concerned of the necessity of abandoning the once sacrosanct principles of socialist management in favor of a more liberal economic system. This change-over, which Soviet propaganda is attempting to portray as a transition to something almost sensationallly new, is also being extended to agriculture:

Socialist agriculture is developing along the same lines as industry. Here too . . . centralized management is being combined with broad local initiative and independence to an ever increasing degree, here too the foundations of complete economic self-sufficiency are being strengthened and the role of economic stimuli and material incentive increased (*ibid.*, page 9).

Also significant is that the editors speak of the need to develop the collective farms in accordance with their "cooperative," rather than their "socialist," nature.

Subsequent contributions place equal emphasis on industry and agriculture, although in his article "On the Economic Foundations of the Union of the Working Class and the Kolkhoz Peasantry" I. Glotov draws especial attention to the need for dealing with agricultural backwardness:

It is particularly important to put a stop to the neglect of the country's largest [agricultural] region, which comprises the non-black-earth zone of the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, Belorussia and the Ukrainian Polesie. This region contains areas which have long been settled, as well as tens of millions of hectares of good agricultural land accounting for almost one-fifth of the country's sown area (*ibid.*, page 17).

The author ascribes the poor state of agriculture in these areas (all of which, with the notable exception of the Baltic States, are traditional laggards in this respect) primarily to the decades-old Soviet practice of constantly changing state

purchase quotas (*ibid.*, page 19). Reluctantly conceding that personal plots have proved to be vastly more efficient than the state and collective farms, Glotov goes on to make the following highly dubious prognosis:

Individual farming, of course, is a transient historical category. People will give up personal farming on their own accord when they become convinced of its disadvantageousness and when communal [*obshchestvennoye*] production is able to replace it entirely (*ibid.*, page 20).

The author does not say when this transition is to take place, neither does he venture to explain why individual farming should become "disadvantageous."

Needless to say, the ideological aspects of the problems confronting the forthcoming Party congress are not neglected. Thus, in an article entitled "Beneath the Banner of Great Responsibility," V. Berezov, Head of the Department of Organizational and Party Work of the Leningrad City Party Committee, comments:

As before, production tasks are in the center of the Party organizations' attention. However, whereas previously these tasks were frequently considered only from a narrow technical viewpoint, the Party organizations are now adopting a broader and more profound approach to them and are striving to act upon production *via* people with the aid of various methods of organizational work and various forms of ideological influence (*ibid.*, page 24).

In his article "Economics and National Economic Management," A. Rumyantsev, the former chief editor of *Kommunist*, warns that the complex economic problems of the modern world cannot be solved without a good deal of solid theoretical homework. He also advances the dubious argument that profitability can only be increased by regularizing the commodity-money relationship.

The pre-Congress line of *Kommunist* is, of course, echoed in the Union-republic Party press. *Kommunist Ukrainy*, for example, starts off the New Year by editorializing that "the further development of agriculture is a matter of particular concern to the Party, government and the entire Soviet people" (*Kommunist Ukrainy*, Kiev, 1966, No. 1, page 7). The journal stresses the need to strengthen the material and technical basis of Soviet farms and makes the point that the latter have never had a material and financial basis of their own. Again following the Party line, A. Kochubei, Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers and Chairman of the republic's State Planning Committee, writes in his article "Perfecting Planning Under the New Conditions of Industrial Management" that "one of the chief ways of perfecting planned national economic management is to raise the scientific level of planning" (*ibid.*, page 15).

Partiinaya zhizn has also been devoting considerable space to the Congress, and a leading article which appeared in one of its recent issues under the heading "The Great Tasks Confronting Rural Communists" calls upon Party administrators to play a key role in improving the agricultural situation:

In 1966, the country's agricultural workers will have to increase the production of wheat, rye, buckwheat, millet, industrial crops, vegetables, meat, milk, eggs and

wool. Party organs at oblast, krai and republican level should keep these matters in the center of their attention (*Partiinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 2, page 6).

A leading article entitled "Beneath the Banner of the Leninist Norms of Party Life" in the previous issue of the journal had recommended a pre-Congress revamp of the Party's economic management methods:

Before management of the economy by the Party organizations and their elected organs can be radically reorganized it is absolutely imperative that their entire organizational and ideological activity be improved (*ibid.*, 1966, No. 1, page 4).

The same issue contained an article entitled "The Intensification of Agriculture and the Tasks of Science" by P. Lobanov, President of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, which, as its title suggests, was devoted to the role of the specialist in dealing with agricultural backwardness. Writes Lobanov:

Under present conditions, when the task of systematically intensifying agriculture is being tackled, scientific research institutes must concentrate their material and technical resources and the efforts of their scientists on solving the main problems—which involves ruthlessly eliminating duplication and over-diversification in their work—and must also radically improve their general performance and get more results out of their research (*ibid.*, page 17).

Of course, the success of Soviet agriculture depends not on the specialist alone but also on the farm workers and officials themselves, whose indifference is still as great as ever, as the following excerpt from the sketch "The Kolkhoz Chairman" suggests:

The grain was being harvested. Everyone who could be bothered was helping himself from the threshing floors. They were loading up with grain quite openly, from the heap on the threshing floor. At the time I tried to talk to chairman Zhuravlev about it, but all he could do was to wave me aside, and once or twice he even said "I know, I know . . ." (*Ibid.*, page 61.)

One thing is clear: the transition to "economic self-sufficiency" represents a movement away from Communism in the sphere of economics. The Soviet leaders, of course, firmly reject, as did Mikhail Suslov at the recent Italian Communist Party Congress, the suggestion that the Soviet economy is going "capitalist." They maintain that it is rather proceeding along strictly "socialist" lines, but when explaining this process in greater detail they are forced to speak in suspiciously "capitalist" terms. Of course, the proposed economic measures still call for tight restrictions on private property and income—restrictions inherent in the Communist system—and will therefore not be conducive to maximum economic development.

A. Gayev

The Russian Revolution

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLAIN

Volume I (514 pages):

**1917–1918: From the Overthrow of the Czar to the Assumption of Power
by the Bolsheviks**

Volume II (558 pages):

1918–1921: From the Civil War to the Consolidation of Power

Published by Grosset and Dunlap, New York, 1965

The approach of the fiftieth anniversary of the Communist Revolution of 1917 has brought with it a widespread revival of interest in the events of the first crucial years of Bolshevik power. As a starting point, there is no better source of information on the moods of the time, the hopes and fears of the opposing forces, the balance of power, the personalities involved, the historical backdrop against which the drama was played out and the incidents of the Revolution and its aftermath than William Henry Chamberlain's two-volume study of over a thousand pages. First published in 1934, this book was the product of ten years' on-the-spot meticulous collection of source material, both written and oral, and thoughtful writing by a highly conscientious and intelligent journalist. While interpretations may have changed and emphases shifted with the passage of time, very little new light has been shed on the details reported. As the author notes, his comparatively easy access to the principal persons concerned and to many of the documents cannot be repeated and the results of his work can in fact only very slightly be added to. Not only are many of the sources open to him no longer in existence but those that are extant, at least in the Soviet Union, have long been closed to Western researchers.

If there is a central theme, it is that the Old Regime had become so incapable of providing the reforms necessary to usher the polyglot Russian Empire into the modern age that it collapsed under the stress of World War I. Tsarism had paved the way by denying the young Russian middle class the opportunity to accumulate administrative experience and responsibility. In ordinary times, the ferment of bitterness could have been repressed; "but when the whole system crumbled under the shock of the war this ferment was bound to carry the upheaval much farther than liberals or even moderate Socialists desired." With no other substantial group either inside or outside the government capable of taking over, the small but highly-disciplined Bolshevik Party headed by Lenin seized power almost, as it were, by default.

The holding of power, says the author, was a far greater achievement than the taking of it. If all the hatreds which the activities of the Soviet government generated in various classes of the people had ever found concentrated expression at one time under a single leadership, the Bolshevik regime, he asserts, would have been swept out of existence. There was thus, he concludes, no miracle about the Bolshevik success. Neither, one might add, was there any inevitability about it—certainly not in the dogmatic Marxist sense that the time

had arrived when capitalism in Russia was destined to give way to Communism, and most certainly not in the sense that economic conditions in Russia predetermined precisely this kind of revolution. With only slight changes in the course of the World War, in the personalities of the Bolshevik leaders and their opponents, in any of a thousand other circumstances, the outcome might have been very different.

The book has real pertinence not only to the events of the time but to the world fifty years later. Seen as a revolution that succeeded only because the circumstances peculiar to the Russia of 1917 made it possible, the stubborn efforts of the Soviet leaders throughout the past half-century to generalize their own revolutionary process into a recipe for success elsewhere seem out of place, to say the least. Little less ill-advised, in the light of the last event reported in the book, the agrarian collapse, have been the stubborn efforts of the past half-century to build a new Russia without appealing to the self-interest of the peasants.

The book is provided with an appendix of documents of the Revolution, a comprehensive but now out-of-date bibliography, a chronicle of events and an index.

O. J. F.

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

January 1966

1 Party Central Committee expresses approval of promise made by Moscow and Leningrad industrial workers to economize on materials and recommends that their example be followed on a nation-wide scale.

2 Chairman of Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin, Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, Defense Minister Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky, Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, Deputy Foreign Minister N. P. Firyubin, Ambassador to India I. A. Benediktov, Ambassador to Pakistan M. V. Degtyar and others leave Moscow for Tashkent in order to participate in Indo-Pakistani peace talks.

3 Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri arrive in Tashkent for peace talks.

Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev leaves Moscow for Delhi to conclude negotiations on Soviet-Indian trade agreement for 1966—70.

4 Indo-Pakistani peace talks begin in Tashkent. First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov receives newly-appointed Chad Ambassador, who is to present his credentials to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

5 Council of Ministers adopts resolutions allowing collective farms to take out bank credits to meet current expenses and reducing electricity charges for agricultural enterprises.

Announcement that negotiations on Soviet-Afghan cultural and scientific cooperation program for 1966 have begun in Moscow.

6 Announcement that regular plenary session of USSR Supreme Court has been held under chairmanship of A. F. Gorkin. Participants included Procurator General R. A. Rudenko.

Publication of Vietnam appeal by Patriarch Aleksii of Moscow and All Russia.

Announcement that Soviet Merchant Marine Ministry has organized group of icebreakers to open Arctic shipping lane from Europe to Canada under agreement with Canadian business circles.

Kenyan governmental delegation led by Economic Planning and Development Minister Tom Mboya and including Ministers of Agriculture and Commerce, Industry and Cooperatives arrives in Moscow to discuss economic cooperation between Kenya and the USSR.

Soviet delegation led by Party Central Committee Secretary and Presidium Member A. N. Shelepin leaves for Hanoi following an invitation by the North Vietnamese government and the Vietnamese Workers' Party.

Shaim-Tyumen oil pipeline goes into operation.

Soviet Foreign Ministry hands over to British Ambassador Sir Geoffrey Harrison a Soviet draft for a joint message from the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina and the 1962 conference on Laos to the countries which participated in these conferences condemning "American aggression" in Indochina.

7 Soviet-Indian trade agreement for 1966—70 signed in Delhi. Under this agreement, which calls for a trade increase of almost 100 percent above the 1964 level, the USSR is to supply India with power-generating, electrical engineering, metallurgical, mining, roadbuilding, metalworking and agricultural equipment.

Soviet Party and governmental delegation led by Party Central Committee First Secretary L. I. Brezhnev and including Party Central Committee Presidium Member and First Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers K. T. Mazurov, Party Central Committee Secretary Y. V. Andropov, Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko and Defense Minister R. Y. Malinovsky leaves Moscow for Ulan-Bator on official visit to Mongolia.

Announcement that symposium on the relations between man and society, attended by Soviet philosophers and visiting Japanese sociologists, has been held in Moscow.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-104."

8 Announcement that Soviet delegation under A. N. Shelepin has made a brief stop in Peking en route for Hanoi.

- Gas gusher with a daily yield of 3,000,000 cubic meters struck at a depth of over 3,000 meters near Kanibadam (Tadzhik SSR).
- 9 Soviet trade union delegation led by Chairman of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions V. V. Grishin leaves for Helsinki to take part in activities of Finno-Soviet trade union commission.
- Announcement that Seventh All-Union Congress of Anatomists, Histologists and Embryologists is to be held in June 1966 in Tbilisi.
- 10 Talks between Vietnamese Communist Party representatives and visiting Soviet delegation begin in Hanoi
- Indo-Pakistani talks in Tashkent come to an end with the signing of a declaration restoring peace and normal diplomatic relations between the two nations.
- Four underground and two surface stations of Tbilisi subway system opened to traffic.
- Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev receives head of visiting Iranian governmental delegation, Economics Minister Alinaghi Alikhani.
- Regular session of Soviet commission on UNESCO affairs approves program for Soviet participation in UNESCO projects in 1966.
- 11 Announcement that People's Control Committee has adopted resolution on tasks facing the Committee's organs as a result of economy drive by Moscow and Leningrad industrial workers
- Regular meeting of Comecon's permanent commission on foreign trade held in Moscow. Work program for 1966 approved.
- Indian Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri dies in Tashkent.
- Kosygin arrives in Delhi for Shastri's funeral.
- 12 Soviet-Afghan cultural and scientific co-operation program for 1966 signed in Moscow.
- French President Charles de Gaulle receives Soviet Ambassador V. A. Zorin and accepts invitation to pay official visit to USSR in 1966.
- 13 Soviet-Mongolian talks on mutual relations and international situation begin in Ulan-Bator.
- Iranian Economics Minister Alikhani signs agreement with Chairman of State Committee for Foreign Relations S. A. Skachkov under which USSR is to give Iran technical assistance in the construction of a metallurgical plant, a machine-building plant and a gas pipeline for supplying gas to the USSR, and an agreement with Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev under which Iran is to supply USSR with natural gas during period 1970—85 in exchange for machinery, as a result of which Soviet-Iranian trade is to be quadrupled by 1971.
- 14 Kosygin flies on to Kabul, after having attended Indian Premier Shastri's funeral in Delhi, following an invitation by the Afghan government.
- Death of S. P. Korolev, member of Presidium of USSR Academy of Sciences and leading rocket designer and space expert (he designed Gagarin's space capsule)
- 15 Publication of communiqué on visit of Soviet delegation to North Vietnam.
- Announcement that USSR and Great Britain have begun series of joint experiments in which Jodrell Bank observatory picks up radio signal bounced off Venus by Soviet scientists.
- UAR President Nasser receives Soviet Power and Electrification Minister P. S. Neporozhny, who is in Cairo to celebrate sixth anniversary of start of construction of Aswan Dam
- Twenty-year friendship and mutual assistance treaty between USSR and Mongolia signed in Ulan-Bator.
- 16 Group of Soviet Communist Party workers arrives in East Berlin following an invitation by East German Socialist Unity Party.
- Soviet Party delegation led by Party Central Committee's Light and Food Industry Department P. K. Sizov leaves for Poland to study operation of Polish Party organizations and light and food industry enterprises and measures being taken to improve quality and range of Polish consumer goods
- Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina arrives in Moscow on official visit
- 17 Soviet-Japanese trade and payments agreement for 1966—70 initialed in Tokyo
- Czech Party delegation led by Party Central Committee Secretary and Presidium Member Drahomir Kolder arrives in Moscow to study Soviet Communist Party's experience in national economic management
- 18 Announcement that large gold deposit has been discovered in Zod region (Armenia).
- Announcement that all-Union conference of directors of evening universities of Marxism-

- Leninism has been held in Leningrad by Party Central Committee's propaganda and agitation department to discuss question of improving the level of instruction in these universities.
- Publication of joint communiqué on visit of Soviet Party and governmental delegation to Mongolia.
- 19 Publication of report on visit of Norwegian Communist Party workers to Moscow from January 9 to January 18 in order to study Soviet Communist Party's national economic management work.
- Party Central Committee Secretary and Presidium Member M. A. Suslov and Party Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev receive delegation from Cypriot Progressive Party.
- Czech President and Party Central Committee First Secretary Antonin Novotny and Party Central Committee Secretary and Presidium Member Jiří Hendrych arrive in Moscow on friendly visit.
- 20 Permanent Representative of the USSR at the United Nations, N. T. Fedorenko, complains to UN Secretary General U Thant of insufficient representation of USSR in UN Secretariat.
- Meeting of Soviet War Veterans' Committee opened in Moscow by the Committee's Deputy Chairman, General of the Army I. V. Tyulenev. Report on Committee's work during 1965 and tasks facing it in 1966 delivered by Committee's Chairman, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko.
- 21 Contract signed in Havana under which USSR will send seismological recording ship into Cuban waters to carry out investigations into Cuba's geological structure and oil possibilities during 1966 and 1967.
- 22 Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-105."
- 23 Publication of communiqué on visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Shima to USSR
- Announcement that chief editor of Austrian Communist Party organ *Volksstimme*, Franz West, has been in Moscow for a week-long study visit as the guest of *Pravda*.
- 24 Soviet Party delegation led by M. A. Suslov and including Party Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev leaves for Rome in order to attend Eleventh Congress of Italian Communist Party.
- Quarriable corundum deposit discovered on Salair Ridge (Kemerovo Oblast)
- Finn-Soviet consular convention signed in Moscow.
- 25 Brezhnev, Kosygin, Mazurov and other Soviet Party and government leaders visit exhibition of new trucks and tractors in Moscow.
- Chairman of State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations S. A. Skachkov arrives in Cairo for economic negotiations following an invitation by UAR Vice-Premier Mustafa Khalil
- Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-106."
- 26 Announcement that Party Central Committee has set up 149-man commission to draft new model statute for an agricultural artel. The commission has Brezhnev as its chairman and includes all Party Central Committee Secretaries and Presidium Members and Candidate Members.
- Second All-Union Conference of Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society opens in Moscow. Report delivered by the Society's Board Chairman, Deputy Chairman of State Committee for Labor and Wages I. V. Goroshkin.
- Announcement that First Deputy Foreign Trade Minister M. R. Kuzmin has arrived in Helsinki following an invitation by Finnish Foreign Minister.
- 27 Announcement that contacts between Soviet and Hungarian scientists are to be increased during 1966-70 under an agreement between the Academies of Sciences of the two countries.
- 28 Soviet Party delegation led by Candidate Member of Party Central Committee Presidium V. V. Grishin leaves for Helsinki to attend Fourteenth Congress of Finnish Communist Party.
- Soviet-East German cultural and scientific cooperation agreement for 1966 and 1967 signed in East Berlin.
- 29 Announcement that Moscow City Council delegation led by Chairman of Council's Executive Committee, V. F. Promyslov, has flown to Tokyo.
- Board Secretary of USSR Union of Journalists V. I. Chernyshev and First Secretary of German Union of Journalists Horst Vogt sign agreement in East Berlin on cooperation between their two Unions in 1966.

- 30 Announcement that large group of delegates from First Solidarity Conference of African, Asian and Latin American Countries held in Havana is visiting the USSR following an invitation by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The delegates are acquainting themselves with Soviet life and the work of the Committee.
- 31 Launching of Soviet moon probe "Luna-9"
Second session of Franco-Soviet color television commission held in Paris.
Delegation from "France-USSR" Society arrives in Moscow.

Changes and Appointments

- 4 Y. F. Karpova appointed Deputy Chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers.
- 9 Announcement that V. A. Kuroyedov has been appointed Chairman of Council for Religious Affairs under the USSR Council of Ministers.
- 11 S. S. Apriyarkin elected First Secretary of Chechen-Ingush Oblast Party Committee, in place of F. Y. Titov, who is transferred to other work.
- 12 G. S. Zolotukhin elected First Secretary of Krasnodar Krai Party Committee, replacing G. I. Vorobev, who has been appointed Deputy Minister for Agriculture of the USSR.
- 13 G. P. Arkadev appointed Permanent Representative of the USSR at International Atomic Energy Agency.
- 16 A. A. Soldatov appointed Deputy Foreign Minister.
- 19 F. Y. Titov appointed Ambassador to Hungary, replacing G. A. Denusov, who is transferred to other work.
- 23 G. A. Kozlov relieved of duties of Secretary of Kazakh Party Central Committee in connection with his appointment as Chairman of Kazakh People's Control Committee.
F. S. Kolomiyets relieved of duties of Kazakh Party Central Committee Secretary and Presidium Member in connection with his transfer to other work.
A. S. Koleyev elected Member of Kazakh Party Central Committee Presidium.
- 27 M. N. Smirnovsky elected Ambassador to Great Britain, replacing A. A. Soldatov, who has been appointed Deputy Foreign Minister.
- 30 A. T. Lavrenteva appointed Deputy Minister of the Light Industry.
A. I. Maksimov appointed Deputy Minister of Power and Electrification.
I. A. Salashchenko appointed Deputy Minister of the Aviation Industry.
P. G. Yakimuk appointed Deputy Minister of Melioration and Water Economy.

INSTITUTE ACTIVITIES

The Soviet Take-Over Generation

On September 6-8, 1965, an international symposium, the fourth in a series held on the premises of the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, met to discuss the subject of the "Soviet Take-Over Generation." Attended by 32 full participants from Western Europe, the United States, Japan and Brazil as well as by about 15 observers from the press, broadcasting institutions, diplomatic missions and governmental organizations, the symposium, under the joint chairmanship of Mr. Edward L. Crowley, deputy director of the Institute, and Mr. A. Lebed, deputy head of its Research and Publications Department and head of the Biographical Section, discussed the backgrounds, experience and world outlook of those members of the Soviet élite who are at present in second echelon positions but who within the next five to ten years will assume leadership in the different fields of politics, economy, science and culture in the Soviet Union.

Central themes of the papers read and of the ensuing discussions were as follows: Does the *nomenklatura* system still work as under Stalin or has it been considerably modified under the pressure of the growing complexity of Soviet economic and political life? Are the marked differences in outlook which are easily to be observed in the different age-groups (generations) likely to have an immediate effect on the procedures and policies to be adopted by them, once they have assumed leadership, or is the existing system of selection and assignment of cadres, as a socio-political mechanism of self-perpetuation of an existing pattern of rule, capable of shaping the new generation after old models? Then—a more technical question, the answer to which may offer a partial answer to the second one—do the war losses in the Soviet Party and state élite necessarily constrain the present leaders to admit on an unduly large scale young people to leading positions or not? And if so, is it perhaps true that the youngest are not always the most liberal?

The first session of the symposium opened with Mr. Lebed's paper on the "Training and Assignment of Soviet Leaders," which dealt mainly with the functioning of the *nomenklatura* system past and present, monopolization of assignment, selection methods, Party school training and loyalty control. This paper demonstrated some of the difficulties involved in obtaining the relevant personal data: in an inquiry embracing 300 full and candidate members of the presidiums of the Party central committees of the USSR and the Union republics as well as the directors of the largest Soviet state trusts, it was impossible to find out the social origin of 62 percent of the total, the educational background of 30 percent, and the date of birth of 19 percent. Some of the data seem to be treated as official secrets. According to the findings of this paper, the old *nomenklatura* system still exists and essentially has preserved all its vigor. This point of view was challenged during the discussion, mainly on the grounds that the present leaders have to

give in to the need for technical knowledge and organizing ability in senior officials not only of the Party apparatus and therefore often have to relax their *nomenklatura* policies where professional qualification is more important than political loyalty. The author of the paper observed that since there was no sure criterion of political loyalty this quality was mainly controlled by "a system of measures that prevent direct or indirect betrayal," i.e., by material privileges and the threat of terror, impersonal loyalty to the cause being replaced by personal loyalty to individual leaders. Professor Frederick J. Fleron, of Kentucky University, reminded the audience that the use of personal influence, including even nepotism, was by no means confined to Communist countries and did not necessarily signify the advanced degeneration of a regime. In view of the importance of personal influence and family ties, the rest of the discussion concentrated on these seemingly not so Communist features.

Mr. Victor Frank, of London, presented a comparative analysis of the age structure of the Soviet Party Central Committee (170 full and 132 candidate members) and Central Auditing Commission (62 members) on the one hand, and the British Parliament on the other, which showed that the present élite is not so eager to admit on a broad scale younger people into its ranks and that promotion is rather slow and cautious. Of those Central Committee members whose age is precisely known (76 percent of the total), 95 percent were born before the Revolution of 1917 (60.8 percent in the House of Commons), while 75 percent of the population of the USSR was born after 1917. The proportion of those in their twenties to forties is 7.2 percent in the Central Committee and 42.9 percent in the House of Commons; of those in their fifties, it is 57.4 percent in the Central Committee and 33.0 percent in the House of Commons, and for those in their sixties the percentages are respectively 31.8 and 20.3. The average age in the House of Commons is 6.5 years lower than in the Central Committee.

A paper by Professor Utechin, from Oxford University, was devoted to some historical aspects of the generation problem in ideology. The roots of reformist Communist thinking he traced in the works of Bogdanov and Bukharin.

The sessions of the second day were devoted to the take-over generation in industry, the economy and economic science. In his paper on "Tomorrow's Industrialists," Mr. Jack Miller, of Glasgow University, expressed the view that the coming man will "carry into the take-over the mixed inheritance both of a particular system and of the necessity for its replacement." He has been formed in a period "which has . . . demonstrated that something more than tinkering [with the problem of modernization] is unavoidable." In a dynamic-structural model of Soviet society, he pointed out that the Soviet New Class is composed of two sections—the Party *apparatus*, whose membership in that class depends on "power," a kind of "divine right" to push people around, and what he termed the *praktikat*, whose membership is based on "authority," i.e., on specialized knowledge and qualified judgment in technical, scientific, managerial and cultural matters. He said: "Class privilege is as important in the USSR as anywhere else, but the present privileged class is on the point of disruption and reconstruction, insofar

as its *praktikat* section, with the industrialists at the core, is gaining self-confidence, to produce or use a new kind of politician, while the *apparat* section is losing both its confidence in itself and the protection of ideology." Referring to the "stable class of relatively settled and more or less skilled workers," he remarked that "at this stage of Soviet evolution their interests march with those of the industrial *praktikat*, who do not need to continue a high rate of investment but are concerned by their nature with efficiency. . . and a big rise in real wages." These two groups also had in common an "opposition to the big and little *apparatchiki* (the workers' demand for fair treatment and the managers' for the right to manage)." As a third element in his model, Mr. Miller pointed to "the absence of law . . . of security of contract so long as an *apparat* exists which is above the law." Observing that "the orderliness of real law is as necessary for industrial efficiency as it is for any other aspect of social activity," he stressed that "on this point the interests not only of the industrialists but of all sections of Soviet society other than the *apparat* find common ground against the *apparat*. This is where the demand for fair treatment and for efficiency meet." Other elements of his model were ideology, as a function of what he termed the "religion of production," and the "incompetence of the present *apparat* to keep ideology moving in line with the growth of sophistication of the country as a whole . . . a task which may be impossible in the nature of things."

In a comprehensive paper on the "Revival of Soviet Economics and the New Generation of Soviet Economists," which provided an historical outline of the problem, Prof. Vladimir Trembl, of Franklin and Marshall College, USA, described the evolution of Soviet economic theory from "liquidationism" to mathematical economics, a trend which it "would be more accurate to define not as revisionism of Marxism but as a sustained and gradually succeeding effort to return Soviet theory to the mainstream of economics." Giving a broad picture of the Soviet school of mathematical economics, which must have worked for years *sub rosa*, he pointed out that the members of this school are either very old, like its founders Kantorovich, Novozhilov and Nemchinov, or very young. A middle age-group of some scientific standing practically does not exist. The fact that the founders have been awarded the Lenin prize does not yet signify, he said, "a complete approbation of new theories by the political leadership, but it does lend respectability to what was considered heretical a year or so ago." On the other hand, "the early optimism [of the young mathematical economists] born out of the relatively easy victory over the 'mathematical phobia' [of the ideologists and Party controllers] seems now to have been somewhat premature as the proponents of the new method come face to face with the monumental inertia of the system." Notwithstanding this political frustration of the economic reformists, "the change is in the air . . . all conjectures point to the irreversibility of the current trend toward secularization of economic science, liberalization and decentralization of the system and mitigation of the Party's control of the economy."

A special paper by Mr. I. V. Majstrenko was devoted to "The New Generation of Agricultural Workers" in the USSR. The author emphasized that for young

people from the countryside the chances of promotion beyond the raion level, so far as they exist at all, depend on how individuals succeed in crossing the socio-political borderline which divides country and town. As a rule, the higher agricultural leadership is composed of people of urban origin, a fact which engenders a feeling of social inferiority among people of rural origin.

The morning session of the last day was devoted to the take-over generation in the Soviet armed forces and the afternoon session to problems of the younger generation in Soviet literature. Mr. Nikolai Galay, of the Institute, gave a detailed picture of the take-over generations at various levels of age and rank in the Soviet Army. The analysis embraced the historical formation of outlook and the present socio-psychological situation of the rising age groups, both within the armed forces and in relation to the rest of society, the different kinds of knowledge and achievement from which they derive their authority and prestige, the impact of the new technology and weapon systems on educational and training standards and discipline, the isolation of the middle age-group and the questing and sometimes protesting state of mind of the youngest soldiers, which causes some trouble to the military leadership. He drew the conclusion that the coming top leadership may be expected to prove still less politically ambitious than its predecessor, that the middle echelon of technically-minded officers seems to be much more than its predecessor in the hands of the *politapparat*, whereas the gulf between the upper and middle echelons on one hand and the youngest generation on the other must possibly be balanced by political measures, perhaps even by transforming the Soviet armed forces into a relatively small professional army with an unusually high proportion of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. As a social body with the highest possible degree of organization, the army seems to be best suited for inquiries into generation problems. But, as the author indicated himself, the findings of this analysis cannot be regarded as conclusive for the country's population as a whole.

Prof. Marc Slonim, of Geneva, opened the last session with a paper on "The New Generation in Soviet Literature," in which he emphasized the desire "of the majority of young writers for creative freedom, experimentation in literature, increasing ties with the West, rejection of dogmatic and false patterns in language [and] style...and a resumption of the true humanistic tradition..." But, he said, "the promoters of reform and renovation do not seem to imply any changes in the basic principles of the regime." Prof. Slonim holds that this "rebellion of the hearts" or "conspiracy of feelings," as it has been called, is no political conspiracy. His paper ended with an interesting comparison of the new Soviet generation with "those who after the French Revolution lost their illusions but swelled the ranks of the romantics in France."

In lieu of the paper that had been planned on the take-over generation in Soviet education, Prof. Allan Kassof, from Princeton University, and Dr. Jaan Pennar led a discussion on the problems facing Soviet youth and the Soviet authorities concerned with youth affairs. Prof. Kassof drew attention to certain elements of "juvenilization" in Soviet society which seem to be inherent in the

evolution of a modern industrial society. Many of the familiar youth problems facing Western developed societies were, he said, present in the Soviet Union too. Institute researcher Mr. S. S. Voronitsyn presented a paper on "Youth and Its Organization as a Reserve of the Take-Over Generation," in which he examined the functional ties linking the apparatus of the Party with that of the Komsomol, some characteristic features of the post-Komsomol careers of some Komsomol leaders, and Komsomol work as a testing-ground for political loyalty. In addition, he considered the school system as a selection mechanism and pointed out that notwithstanding the attempt of Khrushchev to reshape the social aspect of children of the New Intelligentsia by his school reform of 1958, social pressure and the needs of a developing industrial society had resulted in the fact that the bulk of the "take-over reserve" was made up of children of the New Class, so that there was a kind of hereditary intelligentsia in the making, whose members had a strong class consciousness and nothing but a robot-type mentality.

In general, the symposium helped to clarify the concept of a take-over generation and to draw attention to some peculiarities of this generation in different sections of Soviet society. From what was said during the proceedings, the following conclusions may be drawn: The "new generation" should not be identified with the "liberal" element, for this would mean reducing this generation to one of its component parts. The antiliberals are perhaps as strongly represented in the new generation as elsewhere, although they have not attracted as much attention in the West as the liberals have. (Some of the most outstanding "liberalizers" are in their sixties or even older.) The justification for speaking quite generally of a "new generation" or a "take-over generation" lies in the undeniable need for renovating or modernizing the entire system; one should, however, distinguish between those who, by genuine conviction or from self-interest, are themselves demanding far-reaching economic reforms, greater intellectual freedom, the right to experiment, etc., and those who feel constrained to be reformist in order to preserve the essentials of the present system. The latter group includes the powerful Party apparatus and all others who are interested in the preservation of the existing order and anxious that any adaptation to new conditions shall not be too dangerous. While the existence of new ideas and of pressure from below is undeniable, the actual outcome of the take-over, therefore, depends on those who are now in effective control of the situation. An unstable continuity is consequently to be expected rather than rupture and sudden change.

W. A.

Notes on Contributors

DUEVEL, CHRISTIAN. Born 1926 at Stettin. Studied economics and Oriental languages and literature at the Free University of Berlin and Munich University. Senior researcher on Soviet and East bloc affairs in the Central Research Department of Radio Liberty, Munich.

GALAY, NIKOLAI. Born 1902 at Staritsa, Tver Province. Studied and later taught on General Golovin's advanced courses on military science in Paris, 1927—39. Served with the White Army during the Civil War and, as a battalion commander, with the Vlasov Army in World War II. Senior associate of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, specializing in military affairs and Soviet foreign policy. Editor of the *Bulletin*.

KOHTANI, ETSUO. Born 1903 in Yamaguchi Prefecture, Japan. Graduated in 1924 from military officers' school and in 1931 from General Staff College. From 1935 to 1937, Japanese assistant military attaché in Moscow; from 1940 to 1942, general staff officer of Kwantung Army in Manchuria; from 1943 to 1945, Japanese assistant military attaché in Berlin; since May 1963, Director of the KDK Kojimachi Institute.

RUPEN, ROBERT A. Born 1922 in Chicago. Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina, since 1958; currently International Relations Consultant, Naval War College, R. I. Has traveled extensively in Soviet Union and Mongolia. Author of numerous books and articles on Mongolia.

KRYLOV, K. A. Born 1914 in St. Petersburg. Graduated 1940 as a civil engineer from a Kiev institute. Taken prisoner by the Germans in 1942; later active in the Vlasov movement. Since 1949, has been teaching and writing on questions of Soviet economics.

VORONITSYN, S. Born in 1926 in Yugoslavia. Graduated in 1960 from Frankfurt University in sociology. Has published work in various journals. Now on the staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich.

GATEV, ARKADY. Journalist. Worked for *Pravda* and *Izvestia* and also for the Soviet regional press from 1921 until World War II, since when he has been living in Munich. A regular contributor of articles on Soviet literature and the Soviet press to the publications of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

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ARTICLES

The Soviet Concept of the Revolutionary Democratic State and its Political Significance

GEORG A. VON STACKELBERG

At the end of 1964, the Soviet press began to apply the term "revolutionary democratic state" to the type of political regime existing in certain Asian and African states. Within a short time, this new concept had completely ousted that of the "national democratic state," first advanced at the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties in 1960. (The declaration issued at the end of this conference had stated that "in the present historical situation, many countries are internationally and domestically well placed to form independent national democratic states.")¹

The developments which led to the birth of the term "national democracy" were as follows. By the late fifties, it was clear that in many ex-colonies the "bourgeois democratic revolution" was not developing into a "socialist" revolution as Communist theoreticians had expected, and that there was no reason to suppose that the proletariat in these countries would come to power and establish a dictatorship. At the same time, the Soviet Union could hardly insist on the inevitability of such a development if it was to maintain the friendly relations which it had started to enjoy with many of the countries concerned. It was for this reason that the USSR, having "rehabilitated" such national leaders as Nehru and U Nu at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956,² was compelled to make the existence of these "national bourgeois" governments fit in somehow with Marxist theory. The recommendation at the Moscow conference of the "national democratic state" as a vehicle for the development of young Asian and African states was an attempt to solve this difficulty.

The principal features of a "national democracy" as enumerated in the Moscow declaration and in an article by B. Ponomarev entitled "On the National Democratic State," published in the Soviet Communist Party's theoretical mouthpiece *Kommunist* in the following year,³ were: "the renunciation of dictatorial and despotic methods of government," the creation of a state sector in industry, the participation of Communists in the people's fight for its rights,

¹ See *Pravda*, December 6, 1960.

² See Georg A. von Stackelberg, "'Peaceful Coexistence' Between the Communists and the National Bourgeoisie," *Bulletin*, Munich, 1960, No. 7.

³ *Kommunist*, 1961, No. 8.

resolute preservation of political and economic independence, and social progress. In his article, Ponomarev named Ghana, Mali, Indonesia and the Congo as being among those countries in which conditions were ripe for the establishment of a national democracy as a result of the "revolutionary transformations" which had taken place in them. Ponomarev went on to say:

In such a state, it is the representatives of the nation's progressive forces... who are in power. In those liberated countries whose peoples are still deprived of democratic freedoms, the fight for the establishment of a national democratic state provides the country's progressive forces with an opportunity to sweep away the remains of colonial administration, seize power from those traitors to their country in the service of imperialism and take the fate of the nation into their own hands.⁴

Ponomarev explained that these "progressive forces" comprised the workers, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and that part of the "national bourgeoisie" capable of being "influenced" by the alliance of workers and peasants. In other words, the forces involved in the establishment of national democracies were to be virtually the same as those forming the Communist-organized popular fronts in Western European countries, the difference being that the latter comprised "democratic political parties and trade-union, women's, youth, cooperative and other mass organizations"⁵ united under the direction of the working class whereas the former were to be made up primarily of the workers, the peasantry and a section of the "national bourgeoisie." After World War II, the popular fronts played a major role in setting up "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe and China; the Soviets hoped that the national democracies would prove equally successful.

The national democracy was conceived by Communist theoreticians merely as a stage in the transition from a "bourgeois-democratic state" to a dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of a people's democracy, represented in Asia by the Chinese People's Republic, North Korea and North Vietnam. Wrote Soviet ideologist Kim:

The class nature of the independent national-democratic state fully reflects Lenin's idea of utilizing the anti-imperialist strivings of all strata represented in the national front, which should, however, be based on a union between the working class and the peasantry directed by its vanguard, namely the Communist and worker's parties.⁶

Khrushchev made a frank reference to the dual role of Communists in national movements and national fronts in a speech at a general meeting of the Party organizations of the Higher Party School of the Academy of Social Sciences and the Party Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism in January 1961. He said that while "supporting the generally democratic measures of the national governments," Communists should "explain to the masses that such

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁵ See *Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Small Soviet Encyclopedia), 3rd ed., Vol. VI, Moscow, 1959, p. 434.

⁶ *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, 1961, No. 4, p. 3.

measures are by no means socialistic,"⁷ thus implying that a dictatorship of the proletariat would be required before this epithet could be applied. That the national democracy was only a means to an end was also noted in pronouncements by other Communist parties. The South African Communist Party's Program, for example, contains the assertion that "the creation of a national democratic state as a transitional stage on the way to socialism will fully conform to the interests of most of the peoples of Africa."⁸

The Chinese, although somewhat hampered in their criticism of the idea of a national democracy by the fact that they had been among those who had signed the Moscow declaration, nevertheless insisted, without attacking the new concept directly, that the revolutionary struggle should be aimed at setting up "people's democracies" at once. This led the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to complain in a letter to its Chinese counterpart that in signing the declaration the Chinese Communist leaders had been merely "maneuvering."⁹ In an article in *Kommunist*, Soviet ideologist Y. Zhukov accused the Chinese of jeopardizing Communist unity and the "national liberation struggle" by their independent stand. He also maintained that for many countries where capitalism was still in an embryonic stage, the Chinese demand was tantamount to a demand for an immediate bypassing of essential phases in their development. Zhukov declared that "the non-capitalist road [i.e., the road to Communism bypassing the stage of capitalism], which the Chinese theoreticians are trying to ignore, is a reality," and gave as an example the final decision in favor of socialism which Mali's ruling Sudanese Union Party had made at its Sixth Congress in September 1962.¹⁰ The Chinese rejoined in a letter of June 14, 1963, that "the contradiction between the suppressed nations and imperialism" could only be solved by revolution, and that "history" had entrusted the workers' parties of Asia, Africa and Latin America with "the noble mission of bearing aloft the banner of the struggle against the old and the new colonialism for national independence and a people's democracy."¹¹

In 1961, Ponomarev wrote in *Kommunist*:

The strength of the Communists lies in the fact that they find new methods and forms of struggle which lead in the most positive manner to the realization of their vital interests. The idea of the national democratic state, advanced by the Communist and workers' parties, is not the fruit of armchair cogitations, but has been engendered by life itself.¹²

Political developments in the emerging nations belied this assertion. In many countries where, according to Soviet theoreticians, conditions were ripe for the establishment of national democracies, such as Guinea, Ghana, Mali,

⁷ See *Kommunist*, 1961, No. 1, p. 3.

⁸ See, for example, *Kommunist*, 1963, No. 4, p. 85.

⁹ See *Pravda*, July 14, 1963.

¹⁰ *Kommunist*, 1963, No. 12, pp. 30-31.

¹¹ See *Pravda*, July 14, 1963.

¹² *Kommunist*, 1961, No. 8, p. 43.

the UAR, Algeria and Burma, one-party systems of government under leaders enjoying dictatorial powers made their appearance. The Communists, far from being included in these governments, were pushed right into the background, a circumstance which nevertheless did not prevent the implementation of far-reaching social reforms in the countries concerned. As a result the Soviets, vying with the Chinese for influence in Africa and anxious to win the friendship of the reformist leaders, were compelled to give up the concept of the national democracy. This switch, which took place at the end of 1964, was preceded by increasing tolerance in the Soviet press toward reform-loving Asian and African countries, whether they were suppressing the Communists or not (this was particularly apparent in the case of the UAR and Algeria). Only in the previous year, 1963, Y. Zhukov had said in *Kommunist* that while "the creation and consolidation of an extensive state industrial sector in the UAR, Burma and other countries is laying a solid foundation for the economic independence of these countries," "the nationalization of private enterprises is in itself not a socialist measure."¹³ Prior to 1964, the persecution of Communists in the UAR and the prohibition of the Communist Party in Algeria was regarded with extreme displeasure by the Soviet leaders. Thus, commenting on the banning of the Communist Party in Algeria, the UAR, Tunisia and Morocco, a declaration of the Party Central Committee issued in 1962 had warned the leaders of such countries that they would not build socialism by persecuting the Communists.¹⁴ However, in the second half of 1964, the Soviets changed their tune and began to say that socialism could still be built in the emerging countries even if the Communist parties in those countries were banned. Articles recognizing that socialist construction was taking place in the UAR, Algeria, Burma, Mali and Guinea made their appearance in the Soviet press. I. Belyayev noted in *Kommunist* that "the experience of the UAR has shown the success which a young state can achieve when its leaders base their policies on the objective necessity for developing their countries along socialist lines,"¹⁵ and that "the provisional constitution of the UAR promulgated in the spring of 1964 proclaimed the building of socialism in the country as a general goal."¹⁶ In another *Kommunist* article, N. Prozogin welcomed the "construction of a socialist society" in Algeria,¹⁷ while the joint communiqué issued after Algerian President Ben Bella's visit to the USSR in the same year also contained a congratulatory reference to Algeria's progress in the building of socialism.¹⁸ In the journal *Narody Azii i Afriki*, N. P. Anikayev and R. A. Ulyanovsky praised the socio-economic reforms being carried out in Burma—again without Communist participation—, as well as the declaration of that country's Revolutionary Council, which bore the title "The Burmese Road to Socialism."¹⁹ (It is interesting to note that the British Com-

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1963, No. 12, p. 29.

¹⁴ See *Pravda*, December 4, 1962.

¹⁵ *Kommunist*, 1964, No. 9, p. 96.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1964, No. 10, p. 106.

¹⁸ See, for example, *Pravda*, May 7, 1964.

¹⁹ *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1964, No. 4, pp. 3–11.

munist Party did not follow the Soviet example; in an article entitled "Socialist Ideas in Africa," which appeared in the Party's theoretical organ, *Marxism Today*, Idris Cox asserted that "the advance to socialism is possible only if the working class advances to leadership in the national united front...[but the fact is that] the working class is not yet in the leadership of the independent African states," concluding that there could thus be no talk of the building of socialism in these states.)²⁰

Thus, since they could no longer describe the emerging nations as "national democracies," the Soviets began to call them "revolutionary democracies." This term first appeared in an article by K. Brutents in *Kommunist* at the end of 1964. Brutents wrote:

...in many former colonies and semicolonies, socialist development is both possible and necessary before class stratification has become sufficiently pronounced. Under such conditions, when...the proletariat has not yet developed into a leading force in social development, the intermediate strata, namely the peasantry, the lower urban classes and the democratic intelligentsia, acquire political independence and thus assume a particularly active role. The revolutionary democracy becomes their spokesman.²¹

Brutents defined "revolutionary democrats" as politicians who were "under the influence of the tremendous achievements of the world socialist system" and their program as "going beyond the bounds of capitalism" and "including many of the important programmatic demands of the Communist parties of the liberated countries."²² This was tantamount to saying that the "revolutionary democracies" could do without the Communists because the "revolutionary democrats," in carrying out social reforms insisted on by the Communists, had become in a sense substitutes for the latter. This idea came out even more clearly in a subsequent issue of *Pravda*, which maintained:

With the present distribution of forces on the world arena, transition to the non-capitalist road can be achieved under the leadership of the revolutionary democrats, and not only under that of the working class. The former have come to power in a number of young states in which, although the bourgeoisie has become bankrupt, capitalism has become discredited and the people are leaning toward socialism, a powerful working class has not yet emerged—a consequence of twisted colonial development and the low level of productive forces—so that conditions for the realization of proletarian leadership are absent.²³

Among the countries acknowledged in the Soviet press to be revolutionary democracies were the UAR, Algeria, Burma, Ghana, Guinea, the Congo (Brazzaville), Zanzibar and Mali.²⁴ The new line was also reflected in the 1965 October greeting to foreign countries²⁵ (the wording of these greetings is a useful

²⁰ *Marxism Today*, London, 1964, No. 2, pp. 44–45.

²¹ *Kommunist*, 1964, No. 17, p. 30.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Pravda*, January 31, 1965.

²⁴ See, for example, *Pravda*, January 31, February 23 and September 3, 1965.

²⁵ See, for example, *Pravda*, October 23, 1965.

barometer of relations between the USSR and the countries concerned). There were, at the same time, certain nuances. Whereas the inhabitants of the UAR were described as "fighting for the socialist development of their country," the peoples of Algeria, Burma, Ghana, Guinea, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Mali were acknowledged to be merely "fighting for the social progress" of their countries. The UAR, Burma, Ghana, Guinea, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Mali were termed "independent national democratic states," Algeria simply as a "national state." In the May greetings the Algerian people had been described as both "building an independent national democratic state" and "fighting for the socialist development of their country."²⁶ This rewording was doubtless due to Soviet uncertainty as to Algerian political intentions after the overthrow of Ben Bella.

It is interesting to compare the October greetings to the revolutionary democracies with those to other countries. The revolutionary democracies, as we have seen, are referred to as "fighting for socialist development" or "fighting for social progress," whereas the people's democracies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere are said to be already "building socialism." Emerging countries not falling under the category of revolutionary democracies are generally described as "fighting to consolidate their national independence" or "fighting against imperialism and colonialism for freedom and independence." India and Indonesia are special cases. While both peoples are termed "great," there is no reference to the nature of the political regime in either country. In fact, India is still rated a "bourgeois national state" by the Soviet government. At the beginning of last year, A. Kuznetsov wrote in *Pravda* that "the policy of Indian ruling circles, who are striving to satisfy the class interests of the national bourgeoisie, has engendered not a few contradictions, difficulties and even dangers."²⁷ The Indians took this as an insult, and their Deputy Foreign Minister announced before parliament that the Indian government had protested to the Soviet government about the publication of the offending article.²⁸ This protest, however, did not prevent Soviet ideologists from continuing their attacks against the Indian government. *Kommunist*, for example, followed up by maintaining:

In a number of recently liberated countries, there are alarming signs of an intensification of openly reactionary and anti-popular tendencies in the policy of the ruling national bourgeoisie... in India, for example, this is manifesting itself in a strengthening of the monopolistic groups of the big bourgeoisie and a consolidation of the bloc of the most reactionary groups with the landlords. The right-wing parties defending their interests are openly opposing a neutralist course in foreign policy and striving to establish a terroristic dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the landlords.²⁹

Indonesia too has never been considered by the Soviet leaders to be either a "democratic" state or a state developing toward socialism—Soviet economic

²⁶ See, for example, *Pravda*, April 22, 1965.

²⁷ *Pravda*, January 7, 1965.

²⁸ See *Hindustan Times*, Delhi, February 23, 1965.

²⁹ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 13, pp. 16–17.

and military aid to Indonesia notwithstanding. The Indonesian Communist Party, which is under Chinese influence, considers the sole road to socialism to consist in fighting for the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of a people's democracy. Moreover, no radical social reforms have so far been carried out in Indonesia. The Soviet appraisal of Indonesia's political regime has also been greatly influenced by that country's close alignment with Peking.

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When Soviet ideologists describe the revolutionary democracies as "fighting for socialist development," it is only natural to ask what they mean by "socialist." Even in 1961, Communist theoreticians frowned on the idea of a "national" brand of socialism. Thus, in an article entitled "On the Non-Capitalist Road of Development" in the journal *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, V. Li dismissed suggestions that a "socialist-style" society could be built under the guidance of non-Communist forces as attempts by "bourgeois nationalist" ideologists to distract the people from the "active revolutionary struggle for non-capitalist development,"³⁰ while Uruguayan Communist Party leader Arismendi described them as "reflecting the thinking and social philosophy of the non-proletarian classes" and "assuming the guise of socialism." In this connection, Arismendi attacked UAR President Nasser for talking of "coöperative socialism" and Indian Premier Nehru for expressing "the ideological concepts and thinking of the nationalistic bourgeoisie."³¹ In the same year, the Algerian Communist Party also declared, in its letter of greeting to the Twenty-Second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, that genuine socialism could not be built without "the guidance of the working class, which is led by the mighty Communist Party"³² (Soviet indignation at the subsequent banning of the Algerian Communist Party in November 1962 was thus only too understandable).

Soviet ideologists also reject the idea that there can be such a thing as "Asian," "African" or "Arab" socialism. V. Petrov argued thus in respect to African socialism in a program for East African listeners put out in Swahili by Moscow Radio on April 2, 1965. On this occasion, he made the point that the most important feature of true, "scientific," socialism was that all means of production were in the hands of the people and not of the monopolists. Similarly, Fedor Burlatsky wrote in *Pravda* that "socialism is basically a unified system. There is not and cannot be a Russian, German, Chinese or African socialism." (In the same article, incidentally, Burlatsky accused socialist governments in Western Europe of opportunism and of failing to effect far-reaching economic and political transformations capable of undermining the power of capital.)³³

At the same time, it is noted with satisfaction in the Soviet press that "scientific," or, as it is sometimes called, "proletarian" socialism has been officially

³⁰ *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, 1961, No. 11, p. 12.

³¹ *World Marxist Review: Problems of Peace and Socialism*, Prague-London, 1961, No. 11, p. 22.

³² See *Pravda*, October 24, 1961.

³³ *Pravda*, August 15, 1965.

acknowledged by certain African leaders and national democratic parties to be the basis for all social development. A typical example quoted was the declaration made by Mali's Sudanese Union Party at its Sixth Congress that "Mali is transforming its life on the basis of the principles of scientific socialism, and is not arming itself with the theories of so-called 'African socialism.'"³⁴ State control over private enterprises, a state monopoly over the establishment of new industrial enterprises and the abolition of private ownership of the land were listed as significant features of Mali's progress toward socialism.³⁵ It was also said that in Mali the state controlled 80 percent of the economy.³⁶ In *Kommunist*, I. Potekhin gave as an example of the evolution of certain African political leaders' ideas on socialism the fact that Ghana's Convention People's Party had called first for "African socialism," then simply for "socialism," and finally for "scientific socialism,"³⁷ while *Pravda* commentator Burlatsky quoted Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah as saying:

We in Ghana have made a firm decision in favor of the socialist road, and we are going to build a socialist society. What kind of socialism do we mean? Only scientific socialism, of course, since no other kind exists.³⁸

At the same time, the Soviets have become very much more conciliatory and flexible in their attitude toward non-Communist and "non-scientific" forms of socialism in the Afro-Asian countries, a circumstance which has greatly enhanced their prestige in many of these countries despite Chinese rivalry. Potekhin, for example, wrote in his *Kommunist* article that several existing brands of African socialism were merely delusions on the part of Africans striving for genuine socialism. He asserted that the African people as a whole considered the term "African socialism" as implying a "categorical rejection of the capitalist path of development" as well as the "liquidation not only of imperialist exploitation but also of the exploitation of man by man," which, said Potekhin, amounted to "genuine scientific socialism."³⁹ In *Pravda*, Iskanderov rejected the allegation made by Fenner Brockway in his book *African Socialism* that Marxist-Leninists regarded scientific socialism as applicable under any conditions and its theory and methods as universal. Iskanderov said that, on the contrary, "there is no insurmountable wall between the socialist trends and views which have gained wide currency in the developing countries and proletarian socialism."⁴⁰ In *Kommunist*, it was conceded that in many cases "revolutionary democrats" were carrying out the same top-priority socio-economic reforms which Communists had been propagandizing for decades and which they had written into their programs.⁴¹ Burlatsky wrote:

³⁴ *Ibid.*, August 27, 1965.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, January 31, 1965.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, August 15, 1965.

³⁷ *Kommunist*, 1964, No. 1, pp. 111-12.

³⁸ *Pravda*, August 15, 1965.

³⁹ *Kommunist*, 1964, No. 1, p. 112.

⁴⁰ *Pravda*, June 4, 1965.

⁴¹ *Kommunist*, 1964, No. 17, p. 30.

There exist vital interests which are bringing Communists, the countries of the socialist community, closer to the adherents of other, non-Communist, conceptions of socialism. I am speaking of the common desire to put an end to the capitalist system... This circumstance provides a basis for the closest cooperation and unity between all forces standing for socialism. An understanding of the full complexity and contradictoriness of the fight for socialism in the developing countries of Africa and Asia is absolutely in line with such cooperation.⁴²

As already implied, by no means all the "revolutionary democracies" take the view that their "non-capitalist" path of development will inevitably lead to a "scientific" or "proletarian" socialism as Soviet theoreticians maintain. President Nasser, for example, avoids using either epithet in connection with socialism, while Arab newspapers described the UAR's decision to declare Port Said a free trade zone as a rejection of Marxist socialism.⁴³ This attitude is particularly prevalent in one-party states such as the UAR, Algeria, Ghana, Mali and Guinea, and has already elicited a Soviet warning to the Communists in the emerging countries not to lose their identity. Burlatsky, for example, wrote:

Communists welcome any social forces sincerely striving for socialism. But instead of being absorbed by [these forces], they [the Communists] occupy a place of their own, expressing as they do the interests of the most progressive and revolutionary class of our time, namely the working class... preserving a high-principled and at the same time flexible approach, Communists say to the representatives of non-Communist trends in socialism: "You are for socialism—this is very good and really pleases us. But we make no secret of the fact that we shall try to introduce the truly scientific theory and practice of socialism into any revolutionary movement."⁴⁴

Burlatsky observes that the carrying out of social reforms in the African countries leads to the emergence of a "firm, decisive dictatorial power." The very fact, however, that in such countries power becomes virtually concentrated in the hands of a single person may result in the abandonment of a policy of "scientific" or "African" socialism if that person is removed from power by a *coup*; in such an eventuality, the country's development may follow quite different lines. A good example of this is provided by the recent *coup* in Ghana.

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The establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat is an indispensable prerequisite for the creation of a socialist system as conceived in Marxist-Leninist theory. Since such a dictatorship does not exist in the revolutionary democracies, it is reasonable to ask how the Soviets can talk of the building of socialism in these countries. Their explanation is that the "socialist" system itself plays the role of an "international" dictatorship of the proletariat and that the working classes of the "socialist" countries constitute "a mighty proletarian vanguard in respect to the peasants and semi-proletarian masses of the former colonies and

⁴² *Pravda*, August 15, 1965.

⁴³ See, for example, *Al Jarida*, Beirut, November 11, 1965.

⁴⁴ *Pravda*, August 15, 1965.

semi-colonies.”⁴⁵ In other words, the existence of a world-wide socialist system makes it possible for the “revolutionary democrats” to lead their countries to socialism along the non-capitalist road without setting up a dictatorship of the proletariat at home. The Chinese, of course, disagree. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, for example, asserted in a letter to its Soviet counterpart that

...it is not the world socialist system and the working class of the imperialist countries which are influencing the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America; on the contrary...in a sense the cause of the international revolutionary proletariat as a whole depends in the last analysis on the revolutionary struggle of the peoples living in these regions, who account for the overwhelming majority of the world's population.⁴⁶

The declaration of the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties in 1960 had said merely that the world Communist system was a “reliable shield for the independent national development of the liberated countries” and that “the forces of world socialism” had “decisively contributed to the fight of peoples in colonies and dependent countries for liberation from imperialist oppression.” The thesis that the world socialist system could act as a kind of substitute for a dictatorship of the proletariat in the emerging countries was only published in 1963, in a *Pravda* article dedicated to the third anniversary of the signing of the Moscow declaration.⁴⁷ It provided Soviet ideologists with the basis for replacing the concept of the “national democracy” by that of the “revolutionary democracy.”

The Chinese, as we have seen, reject the idea of a “revolutionary democracy.” (Their attacks, by the way, are directed exclusively at the idea as such, rather than at the individual “revolutionary democracies,” whom they are wooing intensively.) Defense Minister Lin Piao snorted in a speech delivered on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the defeat of Japan in World War II that “the Khrushchev revisionists are now actively preaching that socialism can be built without the proletariat and without a genuinely revolutionary party armed with the advanced proletarian ideology.” He contended that a “national democratic” revolution was only a necessary precursor of a “socialist” revolution led by the proletariat.⁴⁸ The Soviet standpoint also came under heavy Chinese fire in an article entitled “Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on ‘United Action,’” published in the daily *Jen Min Jih Pao* and the Chinese Communist Party's theoretical organ *Hung Chi* on November 10, 1965. Here is an excerpt:

The new leaders of the CPSU have further developed Khrushchev revisionism by openly spreading the fallacy that socialism can be achieved without the leadership of the proletariat...In propagating this ultrareactionary theory, which is a thorough betrayal of Marxism-Leninism, the new leaders of the CPSU are not only

⁴⁵ *Kommunist*, 1964, No. 17, pp. 31–32.

⁴⁶ See *Pravda*, July 14, 1963.

⁴⁷ *Pravda*, December 6, 1963.

⁴⁸ *Hsinhua*, September 2, 1965.

giving an ideological weapon to the reactionaries, who are hostile to Communism and the people, but are trying to confuse those nations and peoples who are in the stage of national-democratic revolution.

Again, in a speech at an October Revolution rally in Peking last year, Liu Ning-yi, a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, said that it was necessary to establish a "firm worker-peasant alliance" under the leadership of a "Marxist-Leninist proletarian party" and use "revolutionary violence" in order to "overthrow the rule of reaction, seize state power, smash the old state machine and set up a dictatorship of the proletariat."⁴⁹ This militant philosophy is hardly calculated to win the enthusiasm of the leaders of the "revolutionary democracies," not to mention other non-Communist Afro-Asian states. The Soviet concept of the "revolutionary democracy," on the other hand, is regarded favorably in the states so designated, for the following reasons. First of all, it allows the leaders of these states to continue holding the reigns of power inasmuch as it does not call for the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat in their countries. Secondly, it places the countries concerned in a certain privileged category which can count on large-scale Soviet economic aid in the future. Indeed, the recent successes which the USSR has scored over China in Africa and Asia are due in a large measure to the fact that the non-Communist countries of both continents find the Soviet concept of a "revolutionary democracy" infinitely more attractive than the Chinese doctrine that the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat is an indispensable step toward the building of socialism.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, November 6, 1965.

Anna Akhmatova: An Example of Literary Integrity

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The essential feature of Akhmatova's lyrical writing is the fusion of profoundly personal experience with universal values, which with the passage of time become heightened to the point of prophetic pronouncements and on occasion develop an almost majestic power of conjuration. She began with love lyrics, and with time developed a view of the world that resembled a religious vision.

Werner Horst, "Zum Tode von Akhmatova,"
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, March 7, 1966, p. 12

The career of Anna Andreyevna Akhmatova was both a creative and a tragic one: until it came to an end on the night of March 5, it had been a life of selfless service to art harried by political persecution.

Akhmatova's early life was fairly cloudless. In the preface to one of her last verse collections, she wrote:

I was born on June 11 (23), 1889, near Odessa (Bolshoi Fontan). At that time, my father was a retired naval mechanical engineer. As a child, I was taken north, first to Pavlovsk, then to Tsarskoye Selo. There I lived until I was sixteen.

My first recollections are of Tsarskoye Selo: the green damp magnificence of the parks, the meadows where my nurse used to take me for a walk, the hippodrome where little dappled horses galloped, the old railroad station.¹

She wrote her first poem when she was only eleven years old, under the influence, not even of Pushkin and Lermontov, but of their predecessor, the poet of the Catherine age Derzhavin, whose odes she knew by heart. After finishing secondary school in 1907 in Kiev, where the family had moved after the disturbances of 1905, she proceeded to the law faculty of the city's Higher Women's Courses; soon after, however, she removed to St. Petersburg and continued her studies as a student at the Higher Historical and Literary Courses. The first part of her life was thus associated with both the south of Russia and with the northern capital, the brilliant city of St. Petersburg. This undoubtedly was partly responsible for the poetess's wide range of style and subject.

Before World War I, Akhmatova was able to undertake some extensive journeys abroad. For two years running (1910-11), she spent the spring in Paris, where she witnessed the first triumphs of the Russian ballet. The next year, she visited northern Italy—Genoa, Pisa, Florence, Bologna, Padua and Venice. Of this journey, she said later: "The impression made on me by Italian painting and architecture was tremendous: it was like a dream that you remember the whole of your life." It was then that her first book of verse appeared—*Evening* (1912),

¹ Anna Akhmatova, *Stikhotvoreniya (1909-1960)* (Poems, 1909-60), Moscow, 1961.

which despite the extremely modest number of copies printed—300—produced an impression on the reading public and met with a favorable reception from the critics.

Two years later, in March 1914, there appeared a second volume, *The Rosary*, in which the author's mature poetic voice could be detected. Much of the war was spent in the province of Tver, near the town of Bezhitsk, amid the fields, forests and rolling hills. Here she wrote her third volume of verse, *The White Flock*, which was published in September 1917.

The Communist revolution was not long in making itself felt: Akhmatova had to work in the library of an agronomic institute and combine literature with pen-pushing. Even so, in 1920–21 she managed to produce two further verse collections, *The Plantain* and *Anno Domini*.

From this period dates the beginning of the trials which were to last for some decades. In 1921, the poet Nikolai Gumilev, her former husband² and the father of her son, was shot. His participation in an anti-Soviet conspiracy had its effect upon the poetess's destiny, even though she was already divorced from him. The publication of *Anno Domini* was followed by a long period of silence. For eighteen years, not a single line of hers appeared in Soviet journals. Although as an artist she was thus, so to speak, buried alive, she did not desert her poetical vocation, nor did she abandon the principles for which she stood as a writer. Only after another period of war had begun—with Japan, Poland, Finland and finally with Germany—did the name of Anna Akhmatova reappear on the pages of Soviet publications. Prominent men of letters intervened on her behalf: even such a Stalinist as Aleksandr Fadeyev, who was head of the Union of Soviet Writers, in 1938 submitted to Stalin a personal request to review the case of her son, who had been banished to a concentration camp.

During World War II, Anna Akhmatova, now in Tashkent, devoted herself with her former youthful energy to writing and produced a quantity of verse, in which two themes were prominent—her childhood spent at Tsarskoye Selo, and a patriotism which had grown as the war had taken a more tragic course. In the distant and somewhat provincial town of Tashkent, she became the center of literary life: such at any rate is the assertion made in his reminiscences *People, Years, Life* by Ilya Ehrenburg, who visited her there. These difficult years saw the publication of a slim volume of her work, *Selected Verse*.³ It was beginning to look as though the poetess had been amnestied, but the ban was not lifted for long. Little more than one year after the war was ended, a resolution of the Party Central Committee of August 14, 1946, condemned her work as "harmful" and described her as expressing moods that were "alien to the Soviet people." The resolution had been adopted after a speech by the ideological boss Zhdanov, in which he had described Akhmatova as an "infuriated gentlewoman" who kowtowed to the "bourgeois culture of the West." The resolution was followed by Akhmatova's exclusion from the Union of Writers. Once more, all editorial

² Akhmatova was the poetess's *nom de plume*. Her maiden name was Gorenko.

³ Anna Akhmatova, *Izbrannoye* (Selected Verse), Tashkent, 1943, 116 pages.

doors were slammed in her face. What she had said of herself in 1915 had again come true:

So it has come about: prison
Has become my second motherland—
The first I dare not even
Mention in my prayers.

The condemnation was sufficiently strong to prevent the inclusion of Akhmatova's name in the first volume (1953) of the three-volume *Encyclopedic Dictionary*.⁴

Only two years after Stalin's death did Akhmatova once more receive the right to publish her verse. In 1958, a volume of 132 pages came out with a selection of verses written during the years 1909–57. Its editor, the orthodox Stalinist Aleksei Surkov, made every effort to ensure that no “dissonant” line should find its way into the book. An indication of the severity of the supervision to which it was subjected is the fact that the book was handed to the printers on June 25, 1957, and permission to print not given until July 18, 1958. In order to avoid the necessity of touching upon a number of ticklish questions, the book came out without any commentary in the form of an author's or editorial preface. On the other hand, the verses were so arranged as to give the impression that their author had continued writing over the years without interruption: gaps there are, but they are inconspicuous.

During all these various stages of prolonged silence, brief amnesty, renewed condemnation and finally rehabilitation, Akhmatova remained true to herself and refused to adapt herself, as an artist, to circumstances. Together with Mandelshtam and others, she belonged to the movement known as *akmeizm*, of which her husband Gumilev was a leader.⁵ *Akmeizm* was condemned by official Party criticism, which regarded it as a reactionary movement

... characterized by a hostile attitude to progressive literary trends, to realism, fear of revolution, extreme individualism, militant formalism, championing of “pure art” and a retreat into mysticism.⁶

Poems which displayed the traits of this school particularly prominently were, of course, not included in the collection; in general, it contains nothing in which there is a suggestion of the tragic and passionate notes and the intimate sincerity that mark her work. The reader is not surprised when he fails to find lines such as the following:

⁴ Her name reappears in the *Entsiklopedichesky slovar v dvukh tomakh* (Encyclopedic Dictionary in Two Volumes), Vol. I, Moscow, 1963, p. 83, where her membership of the *akmeist* group is mentioned and the comment is made: “Her verse is emotional; elements of loneliness and mysticism reflect the contradictions in her work...”

⁵ The *akmeisty* were a group of Russian poets that emerged in the first quarter of this century. In contrast to the mysticism of the Symbolist school, they aimed at complete clarity of expression—without abandoning the use of metaphor and symbolism—and stood for the belief that every object in life has its artistic significance.

⁶ *Entsiklopedichesky slovar* (Encyclopedic Dictionary), Vol. I, Moscow, 1953, p. 42.

They wound Thy sacred body,
Cast lots for Thy robes.

—Or:

I have learnt to live simply, wisely,
To look toward Heaven and pray to God...

—Or:

Then I was a guest on earth.
At my baptism I received the name of Anna...

—Or:

So I pray during Thy communion
After so many weary days,
That the storm-cloud over mourning Russia
May become bright in a halo of light.

There are also a few selected translations of poems in foreign languages, only one of which is from the French, the rest being translated from the Chinese, Korean, Rumanian and Bengali.

The chief significance of this volume, however, is that it served as a kind of passport for the authoress's return to the field of Soviet literature: as time went on, her name appeared more and more frequently in various Soviet papers and journals—naturally enough, for the most part in those following a more liberal trend. Most of her work published at this time appeared, for example, in *Novy mir* and nothing at all in *Oktyabr*. Her contributions to the journal *Moskva* were also fairly frequent: during the years 1959–60, she published here part of her poem "Triptych,"⁷ a translation of passages from a poem by the Polish writer Juliusz Słowacki,⁸ and a long poem of hers, "A March Elegy."⁹

At the end of the nineteen-fifties, despite increasing Party pressure on the more liberal writers, the name of Anna Akhmatova began to acquire the aureole of a first-class writer of independent views, an aureole which grew as each fresh contribution from her pen appeared month after month. *Novy mir* published a noteworthy group of her poems at the beginning of 1960;¹⁰ one month later, it printed her translations of some verse by the Soviet Jewish poet Samuil Gal-kin.¹¹ Further, she was allowed to travel abroad, revisiting those places in Italy with which her memories of almost fifty years before were associated. Not only was she given a friendly reception by many Italian friends of poetry, but she was awarded the Etna-Taormina literary prize. This event found a considerable echo in the Soviet press: *Novy mir* published a cycle of her lyrics with an editorial preface in which the award was given much prominence.¹²

Publishers outside the Soviet Union have also shown an interest in Akhmatova's poetry. In 1963, the émigré Association of Writers Abroad issued in Munich a small collection of her verse under the title *Requiem*, comprising for the most

⁷ *Moskva*, 1959, No. 7.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1959, No. 9.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1960, No. 7.

¹⁰ *Novy mir*, 1960, No. 1, pp. 151–53.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1960, No. 2.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1965, No. 1.

part poems that had been ignored in the Soviet Union. A publisher's note states that the poems "have been received by us from Russia and are being printed without the author's knowledge or permission." The bond between the sufferings of the people and those of the individual is expressed in the following four lines, with which the volume opens:

No, not under alien skies
And not under the protection of others' wings—
I remained with my people
There where my people, to its misfortune, was.¹³

In all the writings by foreign authors devoted to postrevolutionary Russian literature, Anna Akhmatova occupies a prominent place, being described as providing a rare example of a crystal-clear artistic conscience and an unblemished career. In lieu of a preface, the *Requiem* collection quotes a passage from Akhmatova's diary for April 1, 1957:

During the dreadful years of the Yezhov Terror, I spent seventeen months waiting in line outside prisons in Leningrad [for news of her son]. On one occasion, someone "identified" me. A blue-lipped woman standing behind me—who, of course, had never heard of me—then, roused from the torpor that weighed on us all, asked me in a whisper (there everyone spoke in a whisper):

"Can you describe this too?"

To which I said:

"I can."

Something approaching a smile then passed over what had once been her face.¹⁴

The year 1965 saw the appearance of other verse collections of Akhmatova's, which considerably exceeded in size the volume edited by Surkov. A 470-page volume entitled *The Flight of Time* contains verse already published many years before in the collections *Evening*, *The Rosary*, *The White Flock*, *The Plantain*, *Anno Domini* and *The Reed*, but offers no appreciation of the poems or their author. An attempt at a literary portrait of the poetess, with an assessment of her importance for Russian literature, was, however, undertaken in a lengthy article by the critic Evgeny Osetrov published in *Literaturnaya gazeta* after her return from Italy.¹⁵

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Anna Akhmatova's work is closely linked with the people. Her strength was derived from an awareness of the unity of thought and experience that united her with a multitude of people who had preserved their integrity during the most difficult days of the Soviet regime—and, indeed, with many other figures known in history.

¹³ Anna Akhmatova, *Requiem* (Requiem), Munich, 1963, p. 7.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁵ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, February 6, 1965.

Despite the fact that almost the whole of her career since the Revolution had been one of persecution interrupted by only a few years of amnesty, no political accusations were ever leveled against her. She had belonged to the *akmeist* group, but this was not her chief fault; the main reason for the authorities' discontent was that all her work was derived from spiritual sources, that she was on the wrong side of the materialist barriers. Whatever her theme, the reader divines that humanism which has always marked the best representatives of Russian literature.

One can only marvel at the courage with which she faced her political persecutors. She stoically bore all that they inflicted upon her—the execution of her former husband, the ban on her publications, the banishment of her only son, her exclusion from the writers' organization, and innumerable attacks by the critics. To this list may be added material difficulties, a feeling of isolation, unfriendly sidelong glances. It was a road of tribulation, a “road to Calvary” that lasted not a few hours but years, decades. Many other Soviet writers had to make the same journey; many of them lost their lives, but it would be difficult to find an example of comparable stoicism and honesty.

At least it may be said that Anna Akhmatova lived to receive the recognition that had so long been due to her. The genuineness of this recognition is indicated by evidence which makes it clear that the nature of the Soviet regime has not changed: for example, one week before the poetess's death *Pravda* and *Izvestia* both lavished praise upon Zhdanov, the man who twenty years before had branded her as an object of disgrace.¹⁶ The recognition of Akhmatova came in fact from the Soviet younger generation and from Western literary circles interested in her work. It was these factors that forced the Soviet authorities to modify their attitude.

¹⁶ *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, February 26, 1966.

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

Party Affairs

The Party Congress: Where does the Power Really Lie?

As the Twenty-Third Party Congress approached, a gigantic propaganda campaign was being waged in the Soviet Union which sometimes prompted the thought that the congress itself would prove to be little more than a propaganda spectacle.

Undoubtedly, the Soviet system is a dictatorship based on complete control by the Party—in effect, by the Party leaders—of all spheres of communal life, a dictatorship which offers no effective guarantees of the right to freedom of expression, the right to hold meetings, to form political organizations, etc. When one takes a closer look at the way in which the Soviet system works, however, it becomes clear that one cannot say simply that the Party leaders do exactly as they wish. One is forced to this conclusion, not because democratic institutions of a kind exist in the Soviet Union, but because the will of the Party is a very complex phenomenon. A Communist dictatorship is based on a dual system of government: on the one hand there are the governmental councils or “soviets,” the structure of which corresponds fairly closely to that of governmental organs in democratic states; on the other hand, there is the Party hierarchy—parallel with every raion and city soviet, for example, there is a raion or city Party committee, in which the real power is concentrated.

Formally at any rate, the system of soviets at all levels corresponds fairly closely to the classical model of a parliamentary democracy. All of them, from the village soviet to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, are elected by a majority of votes in a universal, direct and secret ballot. All of them, whatever the level, represent parliaments of a kind which elect from among their members the executive organs—the executive committees of the village, city, raion and oblast soviets, the governments of the Union republics and the government of the USSR. The only impediments in the way of true democracy are that in each constituency only one candidate is presented, that this candidate is selected by the Party agencies and that the organs of state government themselves have no power. According to Paragraph 123 of the Soviet Constitution, the Communist Party “represents the leading kernel of all state, non-state [*obschestvennykh*] and trade union organizations,” i.e., it is entitled to tell the official government how the country shall be governed.

Thus, the principle of elections without a choice of candidates and the control of governmental by Party agencies deprive the governmental agencies of all real power. If we attempt to answer the question, what possibilities the broad masses of the population have of influencing the policies of the country's leaders, we get the following picture.

The population of the Soviet Union at present amounts to about 225 million persons, of whom some 145 million are eighteen years of age or more and so are entitled to vote. As electors, all these people are without influence upon the course of political events, since they vote, in a universal, direct and secret ballot, for or against candidates who, when elected, are in no position to exert any influence upon the policies of the Party. The only practical significance of these elections lies in the fact that the number of voting slips on which the candidate's name has been crossed out enables the country's leaders to keep a check on the numbers of people actively opposed to the existing regime.

Among these 145 million persons entitled to the vote, however, there are some twelve million who belong to the Party. As Soviet citizens, they are as powerless as the rest: like the rest, they can do no more than cross out the name of a candidate for election to a governmental body without power. Nevertheless, as Party members, they do have some opportunity of influencing the Party leaders and hence also the government.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is organized on the principle of "democratic centralism," which means no more than that the Party's agencies are elected by voters at lower levels and that the decisions of higher agencies are binding on those at lower levels. The procedure for elections within the Party is already fairly familiar. The primary Party organizations, which usually exist within single enterprises, elect by a direct and secret ballot the members of their leading organs and also their delegates to the local raion Party conference; this elects the raion Party committee and also its delegates to the oblast Party conference, which in turn elects the oblast Party committee and its delegates to the Union-republic or all-Union Party congress.

Thus, the leading organs of the Soviet Communist Party are elected by a system of indirect voting embracing a number of stages at all of which—except, of course, the lowest—the votes are cast by persons to whom this function has been delegated by those at the next lowest level. Altogether, the number of levels is five or even six: (1) the totality of Party members; (2) the delegates to raion Party conferences; (3) the delegates to oblast Party conferences; (4) the delegates to Party congresses; (5) the members of the Party Central Committee, who are elected at the Party congress and who in their turn elect what in effect is the true government of the Soviet Union—the Presidium of the all-Union Party Central Committee.

The true nature of democracy as it exists in the Soviet Union is best demonstrated by comparing the methods of voting in the governmental and Party systems: those organs that have no power—the soviets at all levels—are elected by direct, universal and secret ballot, while those that do have the power are elected by Party members who themselves have been delegated for the purpose, by a method which ensures the best possible opportunity for the leadership of controlling the results of these elections. Within the Party, the rank and file can express its will—insofar as this differs from that of the Party leaders—only if it succeeds in sending to the raion conference such electors as will in their turn send

other electors who are prepared to champion the rank and file's point of view at the oblast conference and so send delegates of a like mind to the Party congress; but each electoral meeting at whatever level, particularly if Party officials are to be elected, is attended by a representative of a higher Party agency who tries by the application of more or less severe pressure to secure those results which the agency represented by him desires.

There is plenty of evidence in the columns of the Party press to show that these representatives of higher Party authority on occasion quite simply produce a list of candidates already drawn up and propose that the business of proposing candidates be considered settled. The latest case of this nature to come to our notice may be found in the December issue of *Kommunist*. In connection with the preparations for the forthcoming Party congress, it was reported that a representative of the local raion Party committee appeared at a meeting of a primary Party organization with lists already drawn up, not only of the future officers of the primary organization but also of those approved for election to the raion Party conference.¹

However this may be, it seems reasonable to suppose, even without factual evidence, that even such a complex system of indirect voting is not a mere formality and that at all levels of the Party hierarchy conflicts arise which can only be settled by a majority of votes. Such a conclusion might well be made *a priori*: wherever decisions have to be made disagreements are inevitable, and their resolution is conceivable only if it be assumed that the numbers of those for and against the course of action proposed are taken into account. Whether a formal vote is taken or it is considered sufficient to sound the consensus of opinion is, of course, a secondary matter. In fact, however, direct evidence is available to show that serious conflicts take place at all levels of the Party hierarchy and that the course of action is determined by the majority, on occasion after a formal vote. A classical example of the solution of such disagreements by a majority vote is provided by the attempt of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and other members of the Central Committee Presidium, subsequently labeled the "anti-Party group," to remove Khrushchev from his position as First Secretary. It is now known that, as Khrushchev himself said, an "arithmetical majority" in the Presidium adopted a decision to remove him which was then rejected by a majority in the Central Committee.²

Similar cases are now to be observed at the lower levels. In connection with the recent "pre-election campaign," a number of cases were reported in which primary Party organizations did not elect the candidates proposed by the raion Party committees. In an article in *Kommunist*, for example, the reader was told how 23 out of 127 members of a primary Party organization voted against the deputy director of a state farm whom the raion Party committee

¹ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 18, p. 37.

² *XXII sessiia Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Stenografichesky otchet* (The Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Stenographic Record), Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 106.

wanted to see as secretary of the primary organization; the raion committee managed to secure a second vote on the issue, but failed to persuade the members of the primary organization to change their opinion.³ In the same issue of the journal, another writer described how only 25 of 54 votes were cast in favor of a workshop foreman who was a candidate for election to the committee of his Party organization.⁴

It is worth noting that the Party leaders are by no means concerned that Party functionaries of the middle stratum should be in complete control of the organizations subordinate to them, for this would mean that such officials, enjoying the complete support of their subordinates, would be correspondingly less amenable to the highest Party organs. Consequently, none other than the highest Party organs called upon Party members not to follow the instructions of senior organs blindly so far as recommendations of candidates for official positions within the Party were concerned:

[Certain Party officials] attempt to extend the absolute bindingness of decisions by higher upon lower organs to the process of electing Party organs, even though the recommendation of a raion or city committee on some one's candidature is not a decision which must on all accounts be executed, but merely [the expression of] a point of view which Party members must, of course, take into account but with which they may also disagree. Things are in a bad way if such disagreement is regarded as an "undermining" of the authority of the higher organ.⁵

In general, "intra-Party democracy" is quite an important, if not the only, factor in the selection of "leading officials," whose destinies are undoubtedly influenced by the will of ordinary Party members, the delegates to Party conferences and (probably) congresses and especially the members of Party committees at the various levels. For this reason alone, the present congress and more particularly the preparations for it should not be regarded as a mere show of propaganda. Measures preceding the congress included the holding of elections to all Party committees, bureaus and auditing commissions. The members of all raion, city, national district, oblast and krai committees, the central committees of the Union-republic parties and the corresponding auditing commissions, totaling some 328,000 persons, were obliged to hear the critical opinions of both subordinates and superiors.⁶ Again, the very scale of these measures excluded the possibility that they and the congress with which they were associated are mere propaganda.

The conflicts to which we have been referring so far are those concerning the choice of personnel. It may be asked whether such issues are really very important, whether it makes much difference, from the standpoint of high-level politics, whether Comrade Ivanov or Comrade Petrov is made the leader of such-and-such a Party organization, whether such elections do not decide who is

³ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 18, p. 37.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁵ *Partiinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 1, p. 30.

⁶ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 18, p. 39.

to carry out the leaders' policies rather than what these policies are to be. Naturally, such questions are to some extent justified, but local bosses, even though they receive their instructions from higher authority, still play an important part. Even at the lowest level, the leader of a Party organization—in Moscow, for example—is responsible for an organization numbering on the average some fifty persons and controlling the work of an institution numbering some five hundred or more workers. These figures are only very rough, for there are also primary Party organizations embracing three or four thousand or even more members; the latter is the case, for example, at the Ordzhonikidze Boiler Works at Podolsk, in the Moscow Oblast, where Party members constitute one-seventh of the works personnel.⁷ Even the leaders of comparatively small Party organizations, however, may well be compared in this respect with the directors of medium-sized enterprises in the West. Leading officials of Party raion and oblast committees are persons of very considerable importance: the secretary of any oblast Party committee in the USSR bears responsibility for the destinies of about the same number of people as Enver Hoxha. The leaders of the Union-republic Communist parties, who are still relatively small bosses when considered from the all-Union level, are comparable as regards sphere of influence with the heads of most of the world's sovereign states. Thus, the mere replacement of one official by another is a matter of some political importance.

The recent pre-election campaign in the USSR conveyed the impression that it was accompanied by a struggle between two important sections of the Soviet aristocracy, the Party *apparatus* and the specialists, and that this struggle was not only of a class but also political nature, concerning primarily the solution of those political problems which had arisen as a result of the reform of industrial management undertaken by the last plenary session of the Party Central Committee in September 1965. As a leading article in *Kommunist* put it, "as the independence of enterprises is extended, so the role of production collectives in planning and in the material stimulation of workers...increases."⁸ It is a fact that when senior officials of enterprises were given the right to dispose more freely of their wages funds and to regulate incentives for the workers their power and influence over their personnel were considerably enhanced, so that it is not surprising that members of the *apparatus* should demand "a further enhancement of the role of Party organizations in production."⁹ A logical but somewhat unexpected development of this attitude was the demand to reduce the numbers of specialists and other non-members of the *apparatus* in Party agencies. This is explicitly set forth in a particularly interesting article by F. Petrenko in *Kommunist*, where we read:

...sometimes it happens that certain officials are elected to a Party agency solely on the basis of their function or position. If it be the director of a factory, the chairman of a collective farm or the leader of an institution, his virtually automatic election to the bureau or committee of the Party organization, the raion or city

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1966, No. 1, p. 10.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1965, No. 18, p. 43.

Party committee is not infrequently taken for granted. There is no gainsaying that, the leaders of state and economic organs must be elected to Party organs, but should we tolerate here any automatic procedures? The electoral element exists in the system of Party democracy for the very purpose of providing an opportunity in each individual case of deciding as rationally as possible the question who should belong to the leading Party organ.¹⁰

The same view may be found in *Partiinaya zhizn*, the journal for Party *apparatchiki*:

In practice, the following problem not infrequently crops up: should we aim at having the director of an enterprise, the leader of an institution, the chairman of the local committee, etc., necessarily as members of the bureau [or] the committee of a [Party] primary organization? The problem is no fortuitous one. The presence in a Party agency of representatives of the administration [or] public organizations undoubtedly has its advantages. Whoever would like to forbid the election of economic officials to Party agencies—such views are sometimes to be heard—is obviously on the wrong track. But must we always elect only senior officials?¹¹

When the elections to Party agencies were getting under way in February, *Pravda* stepped in with an editorial under the title of "The Party Worker," which began with the words, "Communists [and] the entire Soviet people are preparing for the Twenty-Third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." A few lines farther on, the *apparatchiki* were praised in the following terms:

The Party worker of today is a successor to the professional revolutionaries, the first fighters of Lenin's party, the continuator of the best traditions of the commissars in the Civil War, the political organizers of the period of collectivization and the first five-year plans, and the organizers of victory in the Great Fatherland War.¹²

In addition to this and other flattering observations, however, Party officials were told that they must "learn how to manage the economy" and reoccupy key positions in order to dictate their will in the Party's agencies.

At present, there are many qualified specialists in Party committees; but it is possible to be an educated engineer and a poor Party worker. A political leader must know how to work with people, how to unite and direct the energies, will and talents of the masses so as to achieve the lofty goal [of Communism], and this is a complex art that is not handed out together with a diploma.¹³

The meaning of this was clear: the Party *apparat* was demanding the right to "decide in the most rational manner the question of the composition of Party agencies." It was also clear that the demand was part of an organized campaign: the same idea is rarely advanced in three publications without instructions from higher authority.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹¹ *Partiinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 1, p. 30.

¹² *Pravda*, February 7, 1965.

¹³ *Ibid.*

The practical conclusion is that during the many Party election meetings a kind of class struggle was being waged—a struggle in which the Party *apparatus*, “in alliance with the masses,” was opposed to the election of men with responsible positions in industry as members of Party committees, bureaus, etc. The latter naturally strive to retain their position in the Party agencies, since on this depends their influence on Party economic policy.

It is still too early to say to what extent the ideas of “all power to the *apparatchiki*!” and “fewer specialists to be elected to Party organs” will be realized. At all the innumerable meetings of primary Party organizations, raion and oblast conferences and congresses of the Union-republic Communist parties—or rather, in lobby conversations and intrigues, the question where to draw the line in liberalizing the regime and allowing the specialists to acquire political power was until recently being discussed. At least, however, one can say that the recent elections to Party agencies appear on closer inspection to be an event of greater importance than might seem at first sight.

H. Akhminov

Krai and Oblast Party Committee First Secretaries

In February, as a prelude to the forthcoming Twenty-Third Party Congress, Party conferences were held in the 139 krais, oblasts and autonomous republics at which new committees were elected. The following list shows how these elections affected the krai and oblast committee first secretaries, and also gives an overall picture of the changes made during the post-Khrushchev period.

In the second column, oblast and krai Party committee first secretaries in office immediately prior to Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964 are listed. At this time, of course, the majority of oblasts and krais had two first secretaries, one for industry and one for agriculture; the list gives only those first secretaries who, by reason of the economic structure of the oblast or krai concerned, held the more important position (in most cases, they had held the post of first secretary prior to the division of the committees into industrial and agricultural components). The third column lists the first secretaries in office between Khrushchev's overthrow and the February conferences, and the fourth column those elected at the latter conferences.

Oblast (Krai) Committee ¹	Prior to October 1964	October 1964 to February 1966	Present Incumbent
Abkhazian (ASSR) . . .	BGAZHBA, M. T.	KOBAKHIYA, V. O.	No change
Adygei	BERZEGOV, N. A.	No change	do.
Adzharian (ASSR) . . .	TKHILAISHVILI, A. D.	do.	do.
Aktyubinsk	ZHURIN, N. I.	do.	do.
Alma-Ata	DYKHNOV, N. V.	NIYAZBEKOV, S. B. ²	ASKAROV, A. A. ³
Altai (Krai)	GEORGIYEV, A. V.	No change	No change
Amur	MOROZOV, P. I.	ABRAMENKO, S. S.	do.
Andizhan	KHAIDAROV, A. Kh.	No change	do.

¹ The Party committees of the autonomous republics are also known as oblast committees

² Assumed office in November–December 1964 as a result of the reunification of the oblast or krai committee

³ Assumed office prior to the February conference

Oblast (Krai) Committee ¹	Prior to October 1964	October 1964 to February 1966	Present Incumbent
Arkhangelsk	NOVIKOV, K. A.	No change	No change
Astrakhan	ANTONOV, V. I.	do.	do.
Bashkir (ASSR)	NURIYEV, Z. N.	do.	do.
Belgorod	VASILEV, N. F.	do.	do.
Brest-Litovsk	MIKULICH, V. A.	do.	do.
Bryansk	KRAKHMALOV, M. K.	do.	do.
Bukhara	MATCHANOV, N. M.	MURTAZAYEV, K.	do.
Buryat (ASSR)	MODOGOYEV, A. U.	No change	do.
Chechen-Ingush (ASSR)	TITOV, F. Y.	APRYATKIN, S. S. ⁴	do.
Chelyabinsk	KUZYUKOV, F. F.	RODIONOV, N. N. ⁴	do.
Cherkassy	NAIDK, L. I.	VATCHENKO, A. F. ³	ANDREYEV, A. N. ³
Chernigov	BORISENKO, N. M.	No change	No change
Chernovtsy	GRIGORENKO, A. S.	do.	do.
Chumkent	LIVENTSOV, V. A.	do.	do.
Chita	SMIRNOV, A. I.	do.	do.
Chuvash (ASSR)	ISLYUKOV, S. M.	do.	do.
Crimean	LUTAK, I. K.	do.	do.
Daghestan (ASSR)	DANIYALOV, A. D.	do.	do.
Dnepropetrovsk	SHCHERBITSKY, V. V.	VATCHENKO, A. F. ⁴	do.
Donetsk	DEGTYAREV, V. I.	No change	do.
Dzhambul	ASKAROV, A. A.	SADVAKASOV, B. S.	do.
East Kazakhstan	KOLEBAYEV, A. S.	NEKLYUDOV, A. I.	do.
Fergana	GABRIYELYANTS, G. I.	SHAMSUDINOV, F. Sh.	do.
Gomel	POLYAKOV, I. Y.	YAZYKOVICH, V. F. ³	do.
Gorky	YEFREMOV, M. T.	KATUSHEV, K. F. ⁴	do.
Gorno-Altai	LAZEBNY, N. S.	No change	do.
Gorno-Badakhshan	NAZARSHOYEV, M.	do.	do.
Grodno	MITKEVICH, V. F.	do.	do.
Gurev	ISENOV, M. A.	do.	do.
Irkutsk	SHCHETININ, S. N.	do.	do.
Ivano-Frankovsk	KASHCHEYEV, I. A.	POGREBNIYAK, Y. P. ⁴	do.
Ivanovo	KAPITONOV, I. V.	SMIRNOV, A. N.	do.
Jewish	PODGAYEV, G. Y.	No change	do.
Kabardino-Balkar (ASSR)	MALBAKHOV, T. K.	do.	do.
Kalinin	KORYTKOV, N. G.	do.	do.
Kaliningrad	KONOVALOV, N. S.	do.	do.
Kalmuck (ASSR)	GORODOVIKOV, B. B.	do.	do.
Kaluga	KANDRENKOV, A. A.	do.	do.
Kamchatka	ORLOV, M. A.	do.	do.
Karachai-Cherkess	LYZHIN, N. M.	do.	do.
Karaganda	BANNIKOV, N. V.	do.	do.
Karakalpak (ASSR)	KAMALOV, K.	do.	do.
Karelian (ASSR)	SENKIN, I. I.	do.	do.
Kashkadarya	ASAMOV, S.	do.	do.
Kemerovo	LUBENNIKOV, L. I.	YESHTOKIN, A. F. ⁴	do.
Khabarovsk (Krai)	SHITIKOV, A. P.	No change	do.
Khakass	DANKOVTSSEV, A. G.	do.	do.
Kharkov	VASHCHENKO, G. I.	do.	do.
Kherson	KOCHUBEI, A. S.	do.	do.
Khmelnitsky	BUBNOVSKY, N. D.	do.	do.

¹ The Party committees of the autonomous republics are also known as oblast committees—

² Assumed office in November—December 1964 as a result of the reunification of the oblast or krai committee

³ Assumed office prior to the February conference but after the Central Committee meeting of September 1965.

⁴ Assumed office after the Central Committee meeting of September 1965.

Oblast (Krai) Committee ¹	Prior to October 1964	October 1964 to February 1966	Present Incumbent
Khorezm	RAKHIMOV, B. R.	No change	No change
Kiev	DROZDENKO, V. I.	do.	do.
Kirov	PETUKHOV, B. F.	do.	do.
Kirovograd	KIRICHENKO, N. K.	DOROSHENKO, P. Y. ²	KIRICHENKO, N. K. ³
Kokchetav	BRYZHIN, A. A.	No change	No change
Komi (ASSR)	DMITRIN, A. G.	MOROZOV, I. P. ⁴	do.
Kostroma	FLORENTEV, L. Y.	SKULKOV, I. P. ⁴	do.
Krasnodar (Krai)	VOROBEOV, G. I.	ZOLOTUKHIN, G. S. ⁴	do.
Krasnoyarsk (Krai) ...	KOKAREV, A. A.	No change	do.
Kuibyshev	TOKAREV, A. M.	do.	do.
Kurgan	SIZOV, G. F.	do.	do.
Kursk	MONASHEV, L. G.	do.	do.
Kustanai	BORODIN, A. M.	do.	do.
Kzyl-Orda	IKSANOV, M. B.	do.	do.
Leningrad	TOLSTIKOV, V. S.	do.	do.
Lipetsk	PAVLOV, G. P.	do.	do.
Lugansk	SHEVCHENKO, V. V.	do.	do.
Lvov	KUTSEVOL, V. S.	do.	do.
Magadan	AFANASEV, P. Y.	do.	do.
Maritime (Krai)	CHERNYSHEV, V. Y.	do.	do.
Mary (ASSR)	URAYEV, P. V.	do.	do.
Minsk	NOSILOVSKY, A. B.	POLYAKOV, I. Y. ²	do.
Mogilev	MATYUSHEVSKY, K. V.	KRIULIN, G. A. ²	do.
Mordvinian (ASSR) ..	OSIPOV, G. I.	No change	do.
Moscow	KONOTOP, V. I.	do.	do.
Murmansk	DENISOV, G. Y.	do.	do.
Nagorno-Karabakh ...	MELKUMYAN, G. A.	do.	do.
Nakhichevan (ASSR) ..	IBRAGIMOV, G. A.	do.	do.
Nikolayev	IVASHCHENKO, A. V.	POPLEVKIN, T. T. ²	do.
North Kazakhstan	PODGORBUNSKY, K. Z.	DEMIDENKO, V. P. ⁴	do.
North Ossetian (ASSR)	KABALOYEV, B. Y.	No change	do.
Novgorod	BAZOVSKY, V. N.	do.	do.
Novosibirsk	GORYACHEV, F. S.	do.	do.
Odessa	SINITSA, M. S.	do.	do.
Omsk	MANYAKIN, S. I.	do.	do.
Orel	IGNATOV, N. F.	SOKOLOV, T. I. ⁴	do.
Orenburg	KOVALENKO, A. V.	No change	do.
Osh	SUYUMBAYEV, A. S.	do.	do.
Pavlodar	SLAZHNEV, I. G.	BUROV, I. M. ⁴	do.
Penza	YERMIN, L. B.	No change	do.
Perm	GALANSHIN, K. I.	do.	do.
Poltava	MUZHITSKY, A. M.	do.	do.
Pskov	GUSTOV, I. S.	do.	do.
Rostov	SKRYABIN, V. V.	SOLOMENTSEV, M. S. ²	do.
Rovno	DENISENKO, A. I.	MOZGOVOI, I. A. ⁴	do.
Ryazan	GRISHIN, K. N.	No change	do.
Sakhalin	LEONOV, P. A.	do.	do.
Samarkand	USMANOV, S. N.	do.	do.
Saratov	SHIBAYEV, A. I.	do.	do.
Semipalatinsk	KARPENKO, M. P.	do.	do.

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⁴ Assumed office after the Central Committee meeting of September 1965.

Oblast (Krai) Committee ¹	Prior to October 1964	October 1964 to February 1966	Present Incumbent
Smolensk	KALMYK, N. I.	No change	No change
South Ossetian	CHIAYEV, I. S.	DZHUSSOYEV, G. N.	do.
Stavropol (Krai)	KULAKOV, F. D.	YEFREMOV, L. N. ²	do.
Sumy	NAUMENKO, A. M.	VOLTOVSKY, B. I. ²	do.
Surkhandarya	SHAMSUDINOV, F. Sh.	MURADOV, N. M.	do.
Sverdlovsk	NIKOLAYEV, K. K.	No change	do.
Syr-Darya	MAKHMUDOV, N. M.	do.	do.
Tambov	ZOLOTUKHIN, G. S.	CHERNY, V. I.	do.
Tashkent	ABDURAZAKOV, M.	No change	do.
Tatar (ASSR)	TABEYEV, F. A.	do.	do.
Ternopol	SHEVCHUK, G. I.	do.	do.
Tomsk	MARCHENKO, I. T.	LIGACHEV, Y. K. ³	do.
Transcarpathian	ILNITSKY, Y. V.	No change	do.
Tselinograd	DEMIDENKO, V. P.	KRUCHINA, N. Y. ³	do.
Tula	YUNAK, I. Kh.	No change	do.
Tuva (ASSR)	TOKA, S. K.	do.	do.
Tyumen	SHCHERBINA, B. Y.	do.	do.
Udmurt (ASSR)	SKULKOV, I. P.	MARISOV, V. K. ³	do.
Ulyanovsk	SKOCHILOV, A. A.	No change	do.
Uralsk	KOSPANOV, Sh. K.	do.	do.
Vinnitsa	KOZYR, P. P.	do.	do.
Vitebsk	PILOTOVICH, S. A.	AKSENOV, A. N. ³	do.
Vladimir	PONOMAREV, M. A.	No change	do.
Volgograd	SHKOLNIKOV, A. M.	KULICHENKO, L. S. ³	do.
Volhynian	KALITA, F. I.	No change	do.
Vologda	DRYGIN, A. S.	do.	do.
Voronezh	KHITROV, S. D.	do.	do.
Yakut (ASSR)	BORISOV, S. Z.	CHIRYAYEV, G. I. ³	do.
Yaroslavl	LOSHCHENKOV, F. I.	No change	do.
Zaporozhe	TITARENKO, A. A.	do.	do. ⁴
Zhitomir	LAZURENKO, M. K.	do.	do.

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² Assumed office in November–December 1964 as a result of the reunification of the oblast or krai committee

³ Assumed office after the Central Committee meeting of September 1965

⁴ On March 26, 1966, *Pravda* reported that Titarenko had been replaced by M. N. Vsevolzhsky as First Secretary of the Zaporozhe Oblast Party Committee.

The list shows that oblast and krai Party committee first secretaries have been replaced on no fewer than 42 occasions during the comparatively short period since Khrushchev's overthrow. These changes were distributed among 39 committees, or 28 percent of the total.

The bulk of the changes took place in the RSFSR (17), the Ukraine (9) and Kazakhstan (7), the number of oblasts, krajs and autonomous republics affected being 17 out of 76 in the RSFSR, 7 out of 25 in the Ukraine and 6 out of 15 in Kazakhstan. In two Ukrainian committees (those of the Kirovograd and Cherkassy Oblasts) and in one Kazakh committee (that of the Alma-Ata Oblast), the first secretary was replaced on two occasions.

The changes fall roughly into three periods. Eleven, or slightly over one quarter, took place in November and December 1964, i.e., shortly after Khrushchev's ouster, as a result of the reunification of the oblast and krai committees; 20, or very nearly half, after the Party Central Committee's plenary meeting of last September; and the remainder at various times in 1965 prior to the plenary meeting.

An important point to note is that at the February conferences all the first secretaries were reelected, which indicates that the prerogative of electing new secretaries still remains in the hands of the Party's central organs.

The fates of the first secretaries affected by the changes were as follows. P. Y. Doroshenko (Kirovograd Oblast Committee) was appointed Minister of Agriculture of the Ukraine in March 1965, and M. T. Yefremov (Gorky) Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in November of that year. I. V. Kapitonov (Ivanovo) was transferred to the Party Central Committee apparatus in December 1964, and became a Party Central Committee Secretary in December of the following year. A. S. Koleybayev (East Kazakhstan) was elected secretary of the Kazakh Party Central Committee in April 1965. F. D. Kulakov (Stavropol) became a departmental head in the Party Central Committee in December 1964 and a secretary in September 1965. N. M. Matchanov (Bukhara) became a secretary of the Uzbek Party Central Committee in March 1965, I. T. Marchenko (Tomsk) Minister of Local Industry of the RSFSR in November 1965, P. I. Morozov (Amur) Deputy Minister of Agriculture in December 1964, and S. A. Pilotovich (Vitebsk) a secretary of the Belorussian Party Central Committee in January 1966. I. G. Slazhnev (Pavlodar) was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers in October 1965, and First Deputy Chairman in December of that year. L. Y. Florentev (Kostroma) was appointed Minister of Agriculture of the RSFSR in the same month. V. V. Shcherbitsky (Dnepropetrovsk) became Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers in October 1965, and in the following December was made a Candidate Member of the Party Central Committee Presidium.

All these changes may be regarded as promotions, although Shcherbitsky merely regained the position which he had lost in 1963. The transfers of A. A. Askarov from the Dzhambul to the Alma-Ata committee (April 1965), A. F. Vatchenko (Cherkassy to Dnepropetrovsk, October 1965), G. S. Zolotukhin (Tambov to Krasnodar, January 1965), I. Y. Polyakov (Gomel to Minsk, December 1964) and F. Sh. Shamsudinov (Surkhandarya to Ferghana, May 1965) are also promotions inasmuch as they are transfers to a politically more important committee.

In December 1964, N. K. Kirichenko, First Secretary of the Kirovograd Oblast Committee for Industry, was transferred to the less important post of Chairman of the Oblast Executive Committee as a result of the merging of the industrial and agricultural committees. However, in October 1965 he was elected First Secretary of the reunified Oblast Party Committee, so that his position too may be said to have improved somewhat.

There were some clear cases of demotion. In December 1964, N. V. Dykhnov (Alma-Ata) became First Secretary of the Alma-Ata City Committee, A. V. Ivashchenko (Nikolayev) and A. B. Nosilovsky (Minsk) Second Secretaries of their respective committees, K. V. Matyushevsky (Mogilev) Acting Chairman of the Brest-Litovsk Oblast Executive Committee and A. M. Naumenko (Sumy) Chairman of the Sumy Oblast Executive Committee, while L. I. Naidek (Cherkassy) was transferred to the Ukrainian Party and State Control apparatus. In January 1966, F. Y. Titov (Checheno-Ingushetia) was appointed Ambassador to Hungary. Since December 1964, there has been no news of L. I. Lubennikov (Kemerovo) and V. V. Skryabin (Rostov), an indication that they too have been demoted. The same may be concluded of M. T. Bgzhba (Abkhazia), released in September 1965, S. Z. Borisov (Yakutia, October 1965), A. I. Denisenko (Rovno, January 1966), N. F. Ignatov (Orel, October 1965), I. A. Kashcheyev (Ivano-Frankovsk, January 1966) and K. Z. Podgorbunsky (North Kazakhstan, November

1965), all of whom were said to have been "transferred to other work," a phrase often used to signify demotion in the USSR.

The positions of I. P. Skullov, transferred from the Udmurt to the Kostroma committee in December 1965, and V. P. Demidenko, transferred from the Tselinograd to the North Kazakhstan committee in the previous month, can, on the other hand, be said to have remained exactly the same.

Other first secretaries were, in effect, "kicked upstairs." G. I. Vorobev (Krasnodar) became Deputy Minister of Agriculture (January 1966), G. L. Gabrielyants (Ferghana) Deputy Chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers (May 1965), A. G. Dmitrin (Komi ASSR) Deputy Minister of the Timber Industry (October 1965), F. F. Kuzyukov (Chelyabinsk) Deputy Minister of the Coal Industry (October 1965), S. B. Niyazbekov (Alma-Ata) Chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet Presidium (April 1965), I. S. Chiayev (South Ossetia) Georgian Minister of the Building Materials Industry (February 1965) and A. M. Shkolnikov (Volgograd) Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR (November 1965).

Thus, 18 first secretaries may be said to have been promoted, 15 demoted, 7 transferred to politically less important work and 2 to positions of equal importance.

In general, there appears to be a tendency to renew gradually the body of krai and oblast Party committee first secretaries, and it is notable that one of the ways in which this is being done is to transfer first secretaries to governmental work. Most of the new incumbents have either been lower-ranking Party secretaries in city and oblast committees or have held governmental posts. Exceptions are L. N. Yefremov, who in December 1964 became First Secretary of the Stavropol Krai Committee while retaining his position in the Party Central Committee Presidium, and T. I. Sokolov and N. N. Rodionov, who in October 1965 became First Secretaries of the Orel and Chelyabinsk Oblast Committees respectively; Sokolov was released from the position of First Secretary of the Virgin Lands Krai Committee in February 1963, and Rodionov from that of Second Secretary of this committee in December 1962, after which nothing was heard of either. Their reappearance as first secretaries is clear evidence of their political rehabilitation. A special case is M. S. Solomentsev, prior to December 1964 Second Secretary of the Kazakh Party Central Committee, whose transfer to the position of First Secretary of the Rostov Oblast Committee was something of a demotion.

Petr Kruzhin

The Economy

The Budget and Plan for 1966

Each December, the state budget and economic plan for the following year are submitted to the Supreme Soviet for discussion and approval. In December 1964, the new leaders had been in office for only a few weeks and had had little opportunity of radically revising the 1965 budget and plan, which therefore reflected the policies current under Khrushchev. The budget and plan for 1966¹ are therefore of particular interest inasmuch as they give the clearest indications yet of the economic priorities and intentions of the new administration. More conclusive evidence will be forthcoming in the shape of the new five-year plan.

Fine words and noble sentiments cost nothing and commit their speaker to little. Stalin often expressed concern that the urban standard of living be raised and that the peasants be offered adequate material incentives, yet when the forced industrialization and collectivization began, both urban living standards and peasants' real incomes declined sharply and were not to regain their 1928 levels throughout Stalin's reign. In the first five years after Stalin's death, Khrushchev did much to improve the peasants' lot, principally by raising state purchase prices from nominal levels to something approaching the average costs of production. Nevertheless, despite the multitude of his public utterances to the effect that increased material incentives were a prerequisite of increased agricultural output, he actually allowed the real incomes of collective farmers to decline during 1959 and 1960, and thereafter to make such meager progress that by the end of 1964 they had risen by less than 10 percent above the 1958 level.

Although the budget and plan proposals are formal expressions of intention, it should be recalled that planned targets are frequently not met through a combination of objective and subjective factors. For example, the sums allocated for the development of the chemical industry have not once been fully spent during the Seven-Year Plan period, principally because the timetable was unrealistic and because the volume of unfinished construction rocketed, owing to bad planning and lack of coordination. Similarly, sums allocated to agriculture are rarely fully invested. Nevertheless, the planned investments are the best available guides to current priorities, since definitive figures on expenditure are made available only after considerable delay.

With these considerations in mind, let us look at the salient features of the budget and plan for 1966. Although the speeches by the Minister of Finance, V. F. Garbuzov, and the new head of Gosplan, N. K. Baibakov, were clearer and more informative than in previous years, it is to be regretted that many details of budgetary expenditure are still withheld from the Soviet public. These two speeches contain virtually all the details of the budget and plan that observers

¹ *Pravda*, December 8, 1965.

will learn until the statistical yearbook on the national economy for 1966 is published in two years' time. The subsequent debate on the proposals shed no further light on the matter, and it is unlikely that much more will be revealed by articles in the specialized journals. Some of the lacunae, of course, stem from considerations of security, e.g., no detailed breakdowns are offered on the votes for defense and science, while some reflect delicate policy decisions, e.g., no mention was made of investments in the chemical industry for 1966.

Selected Items of Soviet Economic Development

Annual or Average Annual Increases, Actual and Planned, 1959-66
(Percentages)

	Seven-Year Plan		1964	1965	1966 (Plan)
	Planned*	Actual*			
National Income	c 7.3	6.5	7.5	6.0	6.4
Total Investment	— **	7.5	9.0	6.0 *	6.4
Centralized Investment	— **	9.3	9.4	8.0 *	6.3
Investment in Industry	— **	8.9	11.9	8.0 *	5.2
Investment in Agriculture (Productive and Non-Productive)	— **	c 9.4	18.3	15.0 *	c 4.0
Gross Industrial Production	8.8	9.1	7.3	8.6	6.7
Producer Goods	c 9.4	10.1	8.9	8.7	6.9
Consumer Goods	c 7.3	6.8	3.5	8.5	6.0
Production of Chemicals	c 18.0	c 14.0	14.9	14.0	12.0
Production of Iron and Steel	c 7.3	c 7.3	6.0	9.0	6.4
Gross Agricultural Production	7.9	2.0	14.0	1.0	8-10
Profits in Industry	—	c 13.0	16.3	11.5 *	14.2
Industrial Labor Productivity	6.0	5.3	4.0	5.0	4.7
Average Wage of Workers and Employees	3.4	2.8	3.9	5.5	—
Real Incomes of Workers and Employees	4.9	3.1	c 4.0	7.0	6.5

— No data available.

* Author's estimates

** The following sums were scheduled for investment during the Seven-Year Plan: Total investments approximately 300,000 million rubles; centralized investments, 194,000-197,000 million rubles, investments in industry approximately 100,000 million rubles, and investments in agriculture: approximately 50,000 million rubles.

SOURCES: N. S. Khrushchev, *O kontrol'nykh tsifrakh razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR na 1959-1965 gody* (Control Figures for the Development of the National Economy in 1959-65), Moscow, 1959; G. I. Sambovsky, *Kratkiy spravochnik o Semiletim planu SSSR* (A Concise Handbook on the Seven-Year Plan of the USSR), Moscow, 1960; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu: Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1964: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1965; *Pravda*, December 10, 1964, December 8, 1965, and February 3, 1966.

A target increase of 6.7 percent has been set for gross industrial production in 1966. This is lower than any annual increase reported as having been actually achieved since the beginning of NEP, with the exclusion of the war years 1940-46. There are several reasons for this more modest goal. In the first place, the planners have taken into account the shortfall of 1965's grain harvest and its after-effects upon livestock products. (After the last bad grain harvest in 1963, the projected low increase in industrial production was concealed by grouping together the targets for 1964 and 1965.) Other factors which will combine to stunt industrial development are the sharp cutback in the growth of industrial investment (1966 will see a rise of just over half of that achieved in 1965), the vagaries of the calendar, which will allow three working days less during the year, the diminishing enthusiasm for quantity instead of quality of production, and, quite possibly, a realization that the plan should not be too taut: when every sector is stretched

to maximum capacity, a shortfall in one branch may have serious repercussions throughout the economy.

Within the planned overall increase of 6.7 percent, producer goods are scheduled to show an increase of 6.9 percent and consumer goods 6.0 percent. Thus, the gap between the two will be greater than that achieved in 1965, although the consumer goods level is surprisingly high in view of the present shortage of feed and poor prospects for foodstuffs production.

Chemicals are to be cut back to a growth of 12 percent, which is far below that planned for the Seven-Year Plan but not far short of the growth rate reported as actually achieved. This reduced emphasis is in line with Kosygin's avowed policy of a balanced growth for all sectors of the economy and in contrast with Khrushchev's preferential treatment of the chemical panacea. Iron and steel production is to grow at a healthy rate of 6.4 percent, although this is considered by many to be too low to meet future requirements.

The rate of growth of total investments in industry, i.e., from both centralized funds and enterprises' own resources, is down to 5.2 percent (in constant prices), or less than two-thirds of the average recorded during the Seven-Year Plan. State centralized investments in agriculture are to rise by over 15 percent, although total investments in this branch will show a much smaller increase.

The labor productivity target is set at a relatively modest 4.7 percent, which is lower than that achieved in 1965 and reflects the three fewer working days (about one percent of the working year). No figure was given for the projected increase in average wages, but this is likely to be in line with 1965's considerable rise of 5.5 percent. Real incomes are scheduled to rise by 6.5 percent, a rate slightly less than that in 1965.

Very astutely, the new leaders have refrained from predicting production targets for individual crops and animal products, doubtless recalling that Khrushchev's dreamlike prognostications look somewhat "unscientific" to diligent researchers in back numbers of *Pravda*. Instead, the more realistic state procurement targets laid down at the Central Committee meeting of March 1965 have been adhered to, although Baibakov made it clear that the government was counting upon considerable above-plan purchases. Nevertheless, an 8-10 percent increase in the gross agricultural product over 1965 has been projected. This is uncharacteristically optimistic for the new regime. On the one hand, the increased purchase prices and other liberal measures introduced in March 1965 will undoubtedly have a positive effect upon agricultural output. On the other hand, 1965 was a good year for virtually all produce except grain, and it will prove difficult to do 8-10 percent better in 1966, particularly when the present shortage of feed, the emergency slaughterings, the reported wheat winterkill and the after-effects of the widespread hoof-and-mouth epidemic are taken into account. Characteristically, neither speaker chose to admit that about ten million tons of Western wheat had been purchased during 1965, whereas Khrushchev had shown an endearing frankness in this respect in 1963.

Soviet Budgetary Income

Actual, Estimated or Planned, 1963–66

	(Millions of Current Rubles)			
	1963	1964	1965*	1966 (Plan)
Total Income.....	89,500	94,400	103,500	105,400
from Turnover Tax	34,500	36,700	39,100	39,400
Deductions from Profits	25,700	28,700	31,600	35,200
Income Tax	6,300	6,800	7,300	8,100
Taxes on Collective Farms	—	—	1,100	700
Social Security Payments	4,700	5,000	—	—

— No data available

* Author's estimates

SOURCES: *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1964: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1965, *Pravda*, December 10, 1964, and December 8, 1965.

As is evident from the figures for the last few years, "deductions from profits" are gradually overtaking the turnover tax as the prime source of budgetary income, and this trend is to continue. The deductions from enterprises' profits will, under the provisions of the September 1965 reforms, be assessed in proportion to the fixed and working capital employed and not, as hitherto, in relation to the absolute level of profit. These interest charges (or "payments for funds," to use the Soviet euphemism) will soon provide the bulk of budgetary income.

The Central Committee's decisions of March 1965 are making conspicuous inroads into the budgetary income from turnover tax. For example, the lifting of the "rural surcharge" (*selskaya nadbavka*) from certain goods was estimated to cost about 520 million rubles in 1965,² and will cost another 400 million rubles this year when the surcharge is lifted from all rural retail prices.³ With effect from January 1, 1966, vehicles and machinery purchased by collective and state farms are to be sold at wholesale instead of retail prices. Thus, a GAZ-69 general-purpose vehicle will cost a collective farm 1,280 rubles instead of 3,000 rubles, and a "Volga" automobile may now be purchased for 1,900 rubles instead of 5,500 rubles.⁴ These price reductions alone will reduce the budgetary income by 450 million rubles in 1966.

Income taxes on the population are expected to yield 11 percent more than in 1965. This reflects the large number of lower-paid service workers whose salaries were boosted in 1965 to above the tax-free minimum of 60 rubles a month.

The level of direct taxation in the USSR is not very different from that prevailing in Western Europe: a married man with three dependants, earning the average industrial wage of 102 rubles a month, pays some 8 rubles a month in income tax. It might be relevant to recall that income tax was scheduled to be abolished altogether over a five-year period from 1960 to 1965. After the first two stages were completed, *Izvestia* announced a "temporary postponement" of the abolition;⁵ since then, nothing more has been heard about this delicate matter.

² *Ibid.*, April 25, 1965.

³ *Ibid.*, December 31, 1965.

⁴ *Ibid.*, December 26, 1965.

⁵ *Izvestia*, September 25, 1962.

Before March 1965, a standard 12.5 percent rate of tax was paid by collective farms on all cash and value of produce less a certain amount of the money and produce used up for productive purposes. During the period 1959–63, this tax amounted to 8.6 percent of the gross income of all collective farms in the RSFSR.⁶ At the Central Committee plenary session of March 1965, it was announced that a standard 12 percent tax was to be levied on that portion of a collective farm's net income which exceeded a profitability rate of 15 percent. It is not known precisely how much budgetary income has accrued from collective farms in the past, since in the annual statistical handbooks this has been grouped together with the tax from cooperatives and from enterprises of public organizations,⁷ but the total from this source is expected to dwindle to 700 million rubles in 1966, which is 500 million rubles less than would have been paid under the previous system.

Soviet Budgetary Expenditure

Actual, Estimated or Planned, 1963–66

(Millions of Current Rubles)

	1963	1964	1965*	1966 (Plan)
Total Expenditure	87,000	92,200	102,700	105,300
on The National Economy	38,800	40,600	42,300	43,800
Industry	—	—	20,600	22,400
Agriculture	—	—	7,000	6,500
Social-Cultural Measures	31,000	33,300	37,500	40,400
Education	13,700	15,100	15,400	18,700
Science**	4,900	5,200	5,900	6,500
Public Health and Physical Culture	5,300	5,600	5,700	7,000
Social Security and Social Insurance	11,900	12,500	13,400	14,600
State Pensions	8,900	9,500	—	10,200
State Contribution to Kolkhoz Pension Fund	nil	nil	400	400
Defense	13,900	13,300	12,800	13,400
Administration	1,100	1,100	1,100	1,300

— No data available.

* Author's estimates.

** From all sources.

SOURCES: *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu: Statistichesky yezhbegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1964: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1965, *Pravda*, December 10, 1964, and December 8, 1965.

Much attention was devoted by external observers to the 600 million ruble boost to overt defense expenditure, yet not everyone noticed that the "science" vote received a similar increase. Just how much of the annual expenditure on science is used for items of military significance is not known.

Another item which is classified as part of the defense budget in many other countries is the expenditure on military pensions. About one-fifth of all Soviet state pensioners are war veterans or their survivors,⁸ and it is probable that well over a fifth of the 10,200 million rubles earmarked for state pensions in 1966 will be paid to this class of pensioners.

In evaluating the 40,600 million rubles bill for "social-cultural measures," it is interesting albeit misleading to compare this with the annual bill for the US

⁶ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 1, p. 60.

⁷ See, for example, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu: Statistichesky yezhbegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1964: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1965, p. 747.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 603.

welfare state, now estimated at 35,000 million dollars, or 31,500 million rubles.⁹ Of course, the Soviet heading embraces far more than the US "welfare" concept; US appraisals of the latter vary from "long overdue compassion" to "pork-barrel patronage," depending on the side of the political fence from which it is viewed.

At first sight, it may appear curious that the budgetary allocation to agriculture has been reduced from 700 million rubles in 1965 to 6,500 million rubles in 1966. The reason for this is that budgetary allocations cover not only investment capital but also subsidies to current operation, the cost of price adjustments for foreign trade, and so on. With the sole exception of 1956, state farms have made an overall loss each year since their inception; in recent years, annual state subsidies averaging about 2,000 million rubles have been needed to cover their deficits. However, under the provisions of the March 1965 reforms, the delivery prices paid to state farms were raised considerably; for example, all-Union weighted average prices were raised by 25 percent for wheat, 32 percent for rye and 36 percent for cattle.¹⁰ As a result, state farms were due to receive an additional 1,300 million rubles for their planned deliveries in 1965¹¹ and more in 1966, corresponding to the increase in planned deliveries of livestock and livestock products. Thus, although the centralized investment in agriculture is planned to rise by more than 15 percent in 1966, it is hoped that state farms will need little or no subsidizing. This explains the cut in budgetary allocations.

Finally, for many years the costs of running the massive state *apparat* have reputedly been kept down to 1,100 million rubles; for 1966, these have been allowed to rise to 1,300 million rubles.

All-Union Investments

Actual, Estimated or Planned, 1963-66

(Millions of Rubles)

	1963	1964	1965 ¹	1966 (Plan)
Total Investments	42,200	46,000	48,000	52,900
Centralized Investments	31,800	34,800	37,200	40,400
Investments in Industry	15,100	16,900	18,500	19,500
Iron and Steel	1,500	1,400	1,600	1,700
Machinebuilding	2,400	2,600	—	— ²
Chemicals	1,500	2,000	2,300 ³	—
Light Industry	500	600	600	700
Food Industry	1,200	1,400	1,300 ³	1,600
Investments in Agriculture	8,200	9,700	11,000+	11,500
State Investments	4,800	5,800	5,300	6,100
Collective Farms	3,400	3,900	5,700+	5,400
Investments in Housing Construction ⁴	5,900	5,700	6,200	6,600

— No data available.

¹ Author's estimates.

² An increase of 13 percent is envisaged for 1966.

³ Plan figures

⁴ Excluding collective farm and individual housing construction

NOTE: Data for 1963-64 are given in constant prices of 1955, those for 1965-66 in current prices

SOURCES: *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu. Statisticheskiy yearbook* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1964. A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1965, *Pravda*, December 10, 1964, December 8, 1965, and February 3, 1966.

⁹ *The Times*, London, December 8, 1965.

¹⁰ *Ekonomika selskogo khozyaystva*, 1965, No. 6, pp. 23 and 25.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

. Great care should be taken when evaluating Soviet statements concerning investments, since they contain many pitfalls even for the wary. We have already noted the distinction to be drawn between planned and actual investments. It is also necessary to distinguish between the budgetary allocations for investment in a given branch and the total investment made available from all sources. The investment totals in statistical handbooks are normally given in constant prices, i.e., in terms of the prices obtaining in a particular year (at present, 1955 prices are used, although in two or three years' time these will presumably be replaced by 1966 prices), while the totals announced to the Supreme Soviet would appear to be in current prices. Centralized investments, i.e., those covered by the central investment plan and including planned *nizhelimitnye* investments, should not be confused with decentralized investments drawn from the enterprise funds, profits of local industries and the like. Particularly where agricultural investments are concerned, a distinction must be made between productive and non-productive investment.

The most significant feature of the investment plan for 1966 is the low increase (5.3 percent) set for total investments in industry. International comparisons are fraught with hazards, but when the annual increases for Soviet investments in machinery and equipment for the period 1963–66 are compared with the 13–14 percent average anticipated for the US during that period,¹² it will be seen that Soviet prospects in the Great Economic Race are not as good as they once were.

Of particular interest is the silence over investments in the chemical industry in the face of frankness over the allocations to the iron and steel industry, since many observers, rightly or wrongly, attach great political significance to the relative fortunes of these two branches. It will be recalled that during the course of the Seven-Year Plan chemical investments were to catch up with, and even surpass, those in the iron and steel industry, the former receiving 10,000–10,500 million rubles and the latter "about 10,000 million rubles." It now seems quite possible that chemical investments again failed to meet their targets in 1965¹³ and that total investments in this branch during the seven-year period will have fallen short of the allocations to iron and steel. The production of chemicals in 1966 is scheduled to rise by 12 percent, but this does not necessarily mean that investments in the branch are planned to increase at the same pace, for much of the production increase is, one may assume, to be accounted for by clearing some of the awe-inspiring backlog of unfinished construction. Thus it may even be possible that metallurgical investments are set to enjoy a higher rate of growth than chemical investments, provoking the inevitable speculation over the resurgence of folkloric metal-eaters. Of course, one very simple explanation lies in the acute shortage of foreign exchange presently experienced by the USSR; much of the equipment for Khrushchev's grandiose program of "chemicalization" was to have been purchased abroad, while investments in the iron and steel industry involve little or no imports.

¹² *The New York Times*, December 11, 1965.

¹³ This is implied by an article in *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1965, No. 46, p. 22.

Agriculture

So much propaganda mileage has been derived from the impressive investment target of 71,000 million rubles set for the period 1966–70 that it comes as something of an anticlimax to learn that state investments in this lagging sector during the first year of the Five-Year Plan are set at only a few percent over those for 1964 (6,100 million rubles in current prices as compared with 5,800 million rubles in 1955 prices). Total investments in agriculture, on the other hand, will be boosted by a 38 percent increase in collective farm investments over this period. Of even greater significance to the national economy is the redistribution of budgetary income and expenditure necessitated by the recent agricultural reforms.

The definitive figures for agricultural investment in 1964 show an 18 percent increase in total investments, which included a 21 percent rise in state investments and a 15 percent increase from collective farm sources. The report of the Central Statistical Authority for 1965 claims that "over eleven thousand million rubles" were invested in agriculture by the state and by collective farms.¹⁴ Since the state's share for this year has already been inferred at 5,300 million rubles, it would appear that 1965 saw a leap in collective farm investments from 3,900 million rubles (in constant prices of 1955) to over 5,700 million rubles (in current prices). Curiously, the target for collective farm investments in 1966 is set at a lesser amount, namely, 5,400 million rubles. Whatever the final figures, it is clear that collective farm investments have been boosted by the increased state purchase prices and by the more than 7,000 million rubles in state credits that were scheduled to be extended during 1965.¹⁵

When speaking of state investments in agriculture, it would appear that Soviet spokesmen often refer to centralized investments of a productive nature only. For example, Korobov wrote at the beginning of 1965:

In 1964, the volume [of state investments in agriculture] was set at 4,800 million rubles; the plan for 1965 envisages directing about 5,700 million rubles to these ends. In addition, the state is extending 1,500 million rubles to state farms for capital construction.¹⁶

Thus, the state investment figure for 1965 and the total and state investment figures for 1966 given in the table above may exclude investments from state farm funds and state investments of a non-productive nature. In this respect, it should be borne in mind that non-productive investments may absorb an increasing share of total investments in agriculture. In addition to the billions of rubles planned for farm machinery, grain elevators, irrigation and drainage, large sums will have to be found for housing, roads, cinemas and all the basic amenities which are so conspicuously absent from the rural scene but which are needed if young "cadres" are to be "kept down on the farm." This is particularly true of the

¹⁴ *Pravda*, February 3, 1966.

¹⁵ *Trud*, April 9, 1965.

¹⁶ *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, 1965, No. 1.

bleak and primitive new lands settlements, and the formidable cost of providing even a modest level of services there may well be a crucial factor in any future decision partly to abandon the virgin lands.

In order to reach a rough estimate of the magnitude of budgetary redistribution occasioned by the March 1965 agricultural reforms, it is easiest first to assess the bill for 1965:

1. *Increased State Purchase Prices.* The additional cost of the planned purchases and deliveries in 1965 was estimated at 3,200 million rubles; anticipated above-plan purchases were to increase the bill to 3,500 million rubles.¹⁷ Although there has been a short-fall in planned and above-plan purchases of grain, these have probably been more than compensated by the above-plan purchases of meat and animal products. Of the 3,500 million rubles, some 1,300 million went to state farms and should have done much to reduce their need for operating subsidies. Since state retail prices for foodstuffs were to remain unchanged, the remaining 2,200 million rubles, which went to collective farms, represent an additional subsidy to be met from budgetary funds.

2. *Kolkhoz Income Tax.* Under the revised tax structure, collective farms were expected to pay 500 million rubles less in income tax during 1965.¹⁸

3. *Writing-Off of Kolkhoz Debts.* As a result of the decree canceling or deferring the repayments of debts, collective farms were to pay about 300 million rubles less in 1965 on the repayment and servicing of loans than was hitherto envisaged.¹⁹

4. *Lifting of Rural Surcharge.* The cost, in decreased budgetary income, of lifting the *selskaya nadbavka* in 1965 was put at 520 million rubles.

5. *Land Improvement.* The cost of land improvement in the non-black-earth zone was assumed by the state. In 1965, this was estimated to save collective farms some 85 million rubles.²⁰

As a result of the above measures, the state incurred additional expenditures or shortfalls in budgetary income totaling some 3,300 million rubles. This is in line with the "over 3,000 million rubles" predicted by Garbuzov in the Central Committee last March.²¹ In addition, as we have already mentioned, state credits extended to collective farms were due to rise sharply to over 7,000 million rubles. The costs in 1966 will be appreciably greater, with more price support for increased state purchases and 850 million rubles derived from the lifting of the remaining rural surcharge and the reduction in turnover tax on agricultural vehicles and machinery. Indeed, Garbuzov estimated the additional expenditure during the Five-Year Plan at more than 22,000 million rubles.²²

¹⁷ *Ekonomika selskogo khozyaistva*, 1965, No. 6, p. 14.

¹⁸ *Selskaya xbizn*, April 24, 1965.

¹⁹ *Ekonomika selskogo khozyaistva*, 1965, No. 6, p. 14.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 24—26 marta 1965 g.: Stenografichesky otechet* (The Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 24—26, 1965: Stenographic Report), Moscow, 1965, p. 132.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 133.

Where will the money come from? Presumably, Garbuzov is counting upon a continuing sizeable budgetary surplus (the years 1961–64 produced actual surpluses of 1,700 million, 2,100 million, 2,500 million and 2,200 million rubles respectively),²³ although he has *planned* for a surplus of only 141 million rubles in 1966. The 3,000 million ruble bill for 1965 was met by appropriating virtually the whole of the 1964 budgetary surplus and by taking the remaining 1,000 million rubles from the reserve funds of the Councils of Ministers of the USSR and the Union republics.²⁴ There cannot be very much left in these particular kitties, and so Garbuzov may have to look elsewhere in the future.

Production Totals

The principal production targets announced are compared with known totals for 1964 and 1965 in the Appendix to this article, and need little further comment.

The chemical industry is still suffering from severe “investment indigestion,” and particularly from the inadequate emphasis devoted to chemical engineering equipment early in the Seven-Year Plan. The 1966 targets for plastics and for chemical fibers are well below those originally planned for 1965. Mineral fertilizer production again fell short of its goal in 1965.

Gas and coal targets for 1966 are also below the Seven-Year Plan goals for 1965. A long overdue 50 percent boost in the production of automatic and semi-automatic lines is scheduled for 1966.

The discrepancy between the output and delivery to agriculture of mineral fertilizer is partly due to the delivery time lag, but also stems from the continuing need to export several million tons of fertilizer each year. Similarly, not all Soviet-made tractors are destined for Soviet farms; many go to industry while others are exported.

From the impressive increases in their production, it is evident that television sets and refrigerators will soon cease to be status symbols and become commonplace in Soviet homes. No mention was made of passenger automobile production for 1966; it will take a considerable time before new capacity is commissioned and before any agreement to build baby Fiats under licence can bear full fruit.

Conclusions

The budget and plan for 1966 provide for an extension of the period of reform, shoring-up and consolidation of the Soviet economy which has been under way since the departure of Khrushchev. The first year of the Five-Year Plan promises to be one of unspectacular expansion while the March and September 1965 reforms are being implemented, yet should provide a more stable platform for a renewed and more rapid rate of growth. Definite measures have been adopted to rectify two cardinal imbalances which have prevailed since Soviet industrialization began—the neglect of the agricultural sector and of the consumer.

²³ *Pravda*, December 11, 1962, December 17, 1963, December 10, 1964, and December 10, 1965.

²⁴ *Plenum Tsentralnogo Komiteta*..., pp. 133–34.

Khrushchev made many promises to divert the necessary resources into agriculture and substantially to raise his subjects' standard of living. After a good start, when impressive gains were made on the abjectly low levels prevailing under Stalin, Khrushchev failed to carry through his reforms, and in both fields his modest Seven-Year Plan goals were unfulfilled. In his last twelve months in office, he went far in providing for future massive inputs of capital into agriculture, a new deal for the peasantry and the raising of incomes, but it was too little and too late.

In contrast, under the provisions of the first annual budget and plan to be drawn up under the new Soviet leaders, not only are state investments in agriculture planned to show the greatest rise on all sectors, but also some 4,000 million rubles of budgetary resources are being diverted into the farm sector to provide the basis for increased investments and material incentives.

Substantially more than lip-service has been paid the Soviet consumer. For the second year running, the gap between producer goods and consumer goods is expected to be less than one percent, the average wage will rise more than productivity and real incomes will increase at a faster rate than the national income.

A formidable array of economic problems remains, but with their first budget and plan, the new Soviet leaders are at least showing a more realistic and rational approach to the solution of these problems.

Keith Bush

Appendix

Selected Items of Soviet Industrial Production, 1964-65 (Actual) and 1966 (Planned)

GENERAL			
	1964	1965	1966
Electric Power (Thousand Million Kilowatt-Hours)	459	507	561
Oil (Million Tons)	224	243	264
Gas (Thousand Million Cubic Meters)	110	129	148
Coal (Million Tons).....	554	578	598
Pig Iron (Million Tons)	62	66	70
Steel (Million Tons)	85	91	97
Rolled Metals (Million Tons)	67	71	76
Steel Pipe (Million Tons)	8	9	10
Automatic and Semiautomatic Lines (Sets)	222	218	350
Plastics and Synthetic Resins (Thousand Tons)	721	821	c1,000
Cement (Million Tons)	65	72	78
Slate (Million Tiles).....	4,000	4,200	4,400
Window Glass (Million Square Meters)	186	198	205
Composition Roofing (Million Square Meters)	995	1,080	1,000+
Cellulose (Thousand Tons)	2,933	3,250	4,000
Timber Hauling (Million Cubic Meters)*	260	258	262

AGRICULTURAL GOODS

	<i>Produced</i>	1964	1965	1966
Mineral Fertilizer (Million Tons)		26	31	39
Tractors (Thousands)		329	355	384
Trucks and Buses (Thousands)		418	415	—
Grain Combines (Thousands)		84	86	92
<i>Supplied to Agriculture</i>				
Mineral Fertilizer (Million Tons)		22	29	30
Tractors (Thousands)		222	240	263
Trucks (Thousands)		63	77	130
Grain Combines (Thousands)		78	77	86

CONSUMER GOODS

Cloth (Million Square Meters)	7,200	7,313	7,900
Knitted Underwear (Million Pieces)	640	750	1,000+
Knitted Outerwear (Million Pieces)	153	172	
Leather Footwear (Million Pairs)	474	486	510
Chemical Fiber (Thousand Tons)	361	407	475
Television Sets (Thousands)	2,900	3,700	4,500
Refrigerators (Thousands)	1,100	1,675	2,500
Housing (Million Square Meters)*	75	78	90
State and Cooperative Retail Trade Turnover (Thousand Million Rubles, Current Prices)	95	104	111

* Excluding Collective Farms.

SOURCES. *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu* *Statisticheskyy yearbook* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1964: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1965, *passim*; *Pravda*, December 8, 1965, and February 3, 1966

Soviet Society

An Insoluble Conflict

Among recent developments on the Soviet sociopolitical scene has been the exacerbation of the long-standing ideological conflict between the two major components of the Soviet leadership—the “technicians” and the “intellectuals.”

This conflict goes back to the period of accelerated industrialization, which led to the emergence of a new class, the technical intelligentsia, but it has only really become acute during the last few years, as a result of the enhanced importance and influence of the latter class due to the extraordinary increase in the pace of scientific and technological development. Its course has been influenced by certain consequences of the circumstances attending the formation of an industrial society in the USSR, by the difference between the goals set each group, and by a certain arrogance displayed by the “humanists” toward the “technicians,” but probably most of all by the vast difference in the degree of intellectual freedom allowed each group. Whereas the mathematical and to some extent the

• natural sciences have gained almost complete freedom (although they are still being closely watched by the Party), a factor which has greatly stimulated their development, the humanities—and this also applies to the social sciences—remain trammelled by Party dogma, and as a result have had nothing to offer save intellectually barren commentaries on the obsolete works of Marx and Lenin and a few live artistic shoots which have contrived to force their way through the stubborn crust of socialist realism. The situation is such that the journal *Novy mir* was led to make the comment that, unlike the humanities, the natural sciences offered young people plenty of scope for clear, imaginative thinking, gave them a sense of purpose and provided a working atmosphere characterized by a friendly spirit of competition.¹

Under such circumstances, it was perhaps inevitable that the natural scientists should begin to show a tendency to “absolutize” science and technology and turn their work into a kind of philosophy of life. Curiously enough, however, it has not been the appearance of this new philosophy as such—itsself a natural consequence of a materialistic education and the Party’s drive to create a “new Soviet man”—which has caused the split among the country’s intellectuals so much as certain of its consequences, which are now developing into a real threat to the humanities, Soviet ideology and even the Soviet system itself. Representatives of the creative intelligentsia have become alarmed at the spread of a kind of cultural and intellectual nihilism among all levels of Soviet youth. Since this attitude is finding adherents not only among the lower-ranking natural scientists but also among persons in a measure responsible for the formation of Soviet society, it constitutes a very real problem and has already become a topic of discussion in the Soviet press, which previously tried to pretend that such a problem was foreign to the very nature of the Soviet system. We read, for example, in the Communist youth newspaper *Komsomolskaya pravda* that

... today, when the influence of science on the life of society is growing all the time, when science is beginning to play a most active part in the practical transformation of the world and claiming a dominant role in defining the directions of this transformation, it is far from a matter of indifference to us how the personalities of men of science are being molded and how science itself is influencing the mentality, breadth of vision and character of modern man.

The latest discoveries in physics, cybernetics and cosmogony and the wondrous things promised by these discoveries place upon science an additional heavy burden of responsibility. The almost limitless power which man will gain—is bound to gain!—over Nature is a double-edged weapon.²

Even more remarkable within the context of the Soviet system is the fact that the possibility of the creation of an “automated cybernetic” paradise on earth is being openly discussed. The film “Alphaville,” shown at the Fourth Moscow Film Festival, and the novel *Return From the Stars* by the Polish writer Stanislaw Lem (reprinted in *Molodaya gvardiya*) have been used by Soviet publicists to

¹ *Novy mir*, 1965, No. 8, p. 228.

² *Komsomolskaya pravda*, August 11, 1965.

illustrate the dangers of scientific totalitarianism. One article quotes the example of a young would-be bionic physicist who after hearing of an alleged US project to turn newborn babies into robots by electronically controlling their cerebral functions exclaims excitedly, "I say, this is damned interesting!", only to add reflectively "But why not, after all?"³

Leading Soviet ideologists are also disquieted by the fact that the technical intelligentsia are rejecting the humanities as out-of-date and that their pragmatism is blunting their ideological class approach and thus tending to bring them closer to their Western colleagues.

The first major ideological clash between the "technicians" and the "intellectuals" occurred in the autumn of 1959 and took the form of a protracted discussion in the columns of *Komsomolskaya pravda*, which ended up by splitting Soviet intellectual youth into the "physicists" and the "lyricists." Ilya Ehrenburg started the ball rolling in an open letter in which he sharply criticized a Leningrad girl student's boy friend—a young "atomic age" engineer—for taking the view that it was not worth while for either him or his colleagues to be interested in anything except physics, and that art was going to the dogs anyway.⁴ The letter provoked a lively response—this was presumably Ehrenburg's intention—and among those taking the side of the engineer was a Moscow colleague by the name of Poletayev, who wrote in with what may be described as a manifesto of modern Soviet scientists and technicians. According to Poletayev,

...science and technology are fashioning the present era and exerting an ever greater influence on man's tastes, character and behavior. The tempo of life has changed since the times when many masterpieces were created... We are living by the creativeness of our minds, and not our hearts, by the poetry of ideas, theories, experiments and construction. This is our era. It demands absolutely everything of a man...⁵

Elaborating, Poletayev went on to assert that the "atomic age" people criticized by Ehrenburg were infinitely more essential to society than the artists and their admirers. He too expressed the view that art had had its day and was not worth the attention of the scientist.

The discussion really heated up after this, and *Komsomolskaya pravda* began to receive up to a thousand letters a day in response to the demagogic and yet obviously sincere outpourings of Poletayev. Among his supporters was a certain Vlasyuk, an agronomist by profession, whose letter is an excellent example of the crude materialism of the middle-grade specialist in the Soviet Union. In Vlasyuk's opinion

...it is incalculably more useful to be a good specialist, to be a daily producer of material wealth and an active builder of Communism than to ooh and aah over

³ *Ibid.*, August 10 and 11, 1965.

⁴ *Ibid.*, September 2, 1959.

⁵ *Ibid.*, October 11, 1959.

Otello. Frankly speaking, one can live without art, but not without food, clothing and shelter. Art is a superstructure, so to speak. The basis, however, is created by the labor of simple people and specialists.⁶

Although Vlasuk was merely regurgitating a piece of Party propaganda, his views were attacked in a handbook on Communist education put out by the Party Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences as reflecting a narrow practicality "foreign to the spirit of our times" and reminiscent of "the 'ideal' businessman in a bourgeois society."⁷ This is an interesting point, since it offers further evidence that the Communists are revamping some of their materialistic postulates.

The discussion started by Ehrenburg raged in the columns of *Komsomolskaya pravda* for over six months, and was then carried on in youth clubs, hostels and lecture halls, where it is still continuing along basically the same lines. Ehrenburg and Poletayev long remained the chief spokesmen for the two opposing factions, and there were several intellectual battles between the two men. An interesting account of one of these battles, which took place in late 1961 with the participation of many famous scientists, is given by the French journalist Jean Marabini.⁸ During the course of this discussion, Poletayev, after mentioning that he devoted his entire spare time to building an "intelligent" problem-solving robot which would one day surpass its creator, asserted that the person who had expressed the "nonsensical" view that life without art was nothing but a sequence of biological processes could not have had the faintest idea about science. Ehrenburg completely demolished this argument by calmly retorting that the person who had uttered this "nonsense" was none other than Joliot-Curie. However, Ehrenburg too received a jolt to his popularity with the audience when Professor Lyapunov, a prominent Soviet mathematician, quoted Ehrenburg's bloodthirsty World War II slogans as evidence that inhumanity and devotion to the cause of culture and art were not mutually incompatible.

The relationship between morals and scientific knowledge was for long the focal point of the conflict between the "technicians" and the "intellectuals." First raised in a large-scale debate at the Novosibirsk scientific center in 1962,⁹ this question was subsequently discussed at considerable length in *Komsomolskaya pravda*, but in neither case was any unanimous conclusion arrived at.

Thus, what had begun as a seemingly straightforward newspaper polemic about the role of art in Soviet society developed over the years into an extensive public debate on philosophical and ideological questions which brought already existing tensions between the "technicians" and the "intellectuals" to the surface. However, since the discussion was confined to the fields of culture and technology,

⁶ *Ibid.*, October 25, 1959.

⁷ *Voprosy teorii i praktiki kommunisticheskogo vospitaniya* (Questions of the Theory and Practice of Communist Education), Moscow, 1962, p. 288.

⁸ Jean Marabini, *Jugend zwieser Welten* (tr. by E. de Burbure and F. Melichar), Wiesbaden [1962], pp. 107 et seq.

⁹ See *Komsomolskaya pravda*, September 1, 1963.

for the most part at least, many people who differed widely on other matters found themselves on the same side of the fence in this particular instance. Both "liberals" and "dogmatists" in the Soviet art world found themselves united, for example, in their demands for preservation of the nation's historical and cultural heritage and in their support for the talented young artist Ilya Glazunov, whose work, although revealing an undoubted patriotism, was quite out of line with socialist realism.¹⁰

It is more than likely that the "intellectuals" will become further unified as a result of their recently begun campaign against the powerful influence of the "technicians" in the planning of a radical new education reform. The "intellectuals" are particularly alarmed by a movement to draw up new curricula placing more emphasis on the natural sciences and correspondingly less on the humanities. That their fears are not without foundation may be seen from the following statement by Vice President of the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogic Sciences A. I. Markushevich:

...since the role of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and technology in our society has increased considerably of late, while the duration of study has remained the same, humanistic education is losing out somewhat...

...even so, it is imperative to allot more time in school schedules to a more thorough and intensive study of the natural and technological sciences at the expense of the humanities.¹¹

Prominent personalities in the Soviet art world, including film producers Bondarchuk and Romm and writer L. Kasil, sprang to the defense of the humanities in an open letter to *Izvestia*.¹² Their chief argument against the planned reduction in the amount of time devoted to instruction in the humanities was that these subjects played an important part in molding a person's moral outlook:

It is on man's spiritual world that the question will depend whether the atom he has split will be used for good or for evil. But this spiritual world does not develop by itself. It is instilled into a person, primarily during his youth, during his school years, and primarily through the medium of literature, painting, music, history and philosophy.

The authors of the letter drew the following interesting comparison:

In the nineteen-thirties, there was a proposal to tear down the Church of the Blessed Vasily in order to facilitate the flow of motor traffic. The very same demolition tactics are now being proposed in order to clear the way for the technical sciences!

Comparatively recently, Soviet "humanists" succeeded in frustrating the implementation of Khrushchev's school reform, which would have jeopardized the country's cultural progress, but this success was only achieved in close cooperation with the scientists and technologists, who were no less interested

¹⁰ See, for example, *Izvestia*, March 22, 1964.

¹¹ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, April 24, 1965.

¹² *Izvestia*, July 3, 1965.

in the reform's downfall. Now the "humanists" are alone in their fight against the antihumanistic trend in Soviet education, and it seems that the only help they can expect will be from the ideological authorities, who are no doubt anxious to preserve the primacy of instruction in Marxist-Leninist theory.

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Although the present ideological conflict among the Soviet intelligentsia is still in its initial stage, its repercussions throughout all spheres of Soviet life and its probable influence on future developments can hardly be overestimated. Even now, its effects are manifesting themselves in internal Party disunity over the choice of the road to Communism, in the pragmatism of domestic political reforms, and even in the work of young poets. The emergence of a new scientific and technological philosophy which in part is replacing the old Party ideology and in part goes beyond it will very likely sting the Party's ideologists to greater activity. The latter, however, may find themselves hindered in their opposition by the relatively pragmatic policy of the present Soviet leaders, who are completely dependent on the active support and cooperation of the nation's scientists and technicians for the achievement of their goals. On the other hand, further absolutization of science and technology may lead to a temporary decline in cultural and artistic standards. However, to end on an optimistic note, there are good grounds for supposing that the influx of questing young people into the natural sciences may provide, under the influence of the latest scientific achievements, the stimuli for a new spiritual renaissance.

S. Voronitsyn

REVIEWS

The Periodical Press

In its second issue for this year, *Kommunist* publishes a number of articles under the general title, "The Party Goes to its Twenty-Third Congress." One of them, an editorial entitled "The Ideological Conviction of the Builders of Communism," is written in the optimistic tone characteristic of current Soviet propaganda, and begins as follows:

Joyful, profoundly meaningful news is now streaming in from all parts of the country. Soviet citizens, anxious to welcome the forthcoming Twenty-Third Party Congress in a fitting manner, are determinedly seeking and finding ways of raising the effectiveness of production, increasing industrial output and improving its quality while lowering costs. The unity of Party and people, the strength of the socialist regime are clearly demonstrated in all this (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 2, page 3).

Stressing that every victory on the road to Communism is primarily a result of the devotion of Soviet citizens to the ideas of Communism, the journal observes:

As a result of the Party's tireless and consistent efforts in organization and education, the minds, views, the entire spiritual physiognomy of the Soviet man has undergone a fundamental change in the process of socialist construction. A new man, in fact, has been born—the man of the socialist era. How right was F. Engels, when he wrote that the new society will need new people and that it will create them! Ideological conviction, a conscious belief in the triumph of Communist ideals, is the most vivid demonstration of the essence of the Soviet man, the fundamental feature of his character (page 5).

To judge by these passages, it would seem that the Party was approaching its twenty-third congress firmly persuaded of the preparedness of the Soviet people to carry out all its decisions unhesitatingly and the devotion of every Soviet citizen to the ideas of Communism and the Party's leadership. On closer inspection, however, something rather different is revealed. One might even say that on the eve of the Twenty-Third Congress, the Party had come face to face with a complex problem in the field of relations between government and people, the problem of disloyalty to the Communist regime.

The most acute manifestation of this problem in post-Stalin times occurred at the end of 1962, with the case of Colonel Oleg V. Penkovsky, a Soviet intelligence officer who, distrustful of his own government, entered into collaboration with the British and American intelligence services. Another, this time quite recent, case was that of Soviet writers Andrei D. Sinyavsky (Abram Terts), Yuly M. Daniel (Nikolai Arzhak) and Valery Y. Tarsis, who had been secretly despatching their writings to the West in order to have them published there. Some of these writings bore a clearly anti-Soviet character. In February, Sinyavsky and Daniel were sentenced to imprisonment, and about the same time Tarsis,

who had been allowed to travel to Britain to read some lectures there, was deprived of his Soviet citizenship for some public anti-Soviet statements he had made.

No mention of these persons is, of course, made in the *Kommunist* article we are discussing, nor is there any direct reference to the fact that there are any problems in the field of political relations between the Soviet authorities and the Soviet population. To speak or write openly of such problems is no part of the traditions of Soviet propaganda, which as a rule presents that which is aimed at as though it were already reality, and prefers to pass over negative phenomena in silence. Despite all this, there are certain passages in the article which suggest that the ghost of Oleg Penkovsky is haunting the present Party leaders, who are all too prone to divine his presence in the person of every individual Soviet citizen.

The assertion in the article that a new man, the man of the socialist era, has been born in the USSR, is followed by the following lines:

This is a remarkable victory for socialist society. Yet even now that Marxism-Leninism has become the heritage of the broadest strata of the workers, the Communist Party considers it essential to continue showing an indefatigable concern for the education of Soviet people. As emphasized in the Party Program, the Party considers the most important thing in ideological work at the present stage to be the further education of all Soviet people in a spirit of high ideological integrity and devotion to Communism (page 5).

Among the reasons given in the article for the Party leaders' adoption of this standpoint is the following:

The task of further developing ideological conviction among the workers also arises from the acute ideological struggle between the socialist and capitalist systems. . . . We cannot ignore the fact that international reaction, in the struggle against socialism, is making use of a tremendous propaganda machine in an attempt to exert a pernicious influence on Soviet people, sow doubts and shake their faith in the righteousness of our cause, and in the final analysis put a brake upon Communist construction. The ideologists of imperialism are striving to galvanize prejudices and survivals of the past, to inflame individualism and nationalism and sow enmity among the peoples (page 6).

If this passage is correctly interpreted, there is no mistaking its implication of political mistrust on the part of the Party leaders toward the very "man of the socialist era" to whom they were ascribing the highest Communist virtues only a few lines before. As the article proceeds, however, the mistrust turns into obvious suspicion embracing every Soviet citizen, including members of the Party:

The need for stepping up the development of ideological conviction among Soviet people is dictated finally by tasks involved in the struggle with negative phenomena occurring in this country, with the survivals of bourgeois views and morals. We still have plenty of people characterized by hypocrisy, people whose convictions, as V. I. Lenin pointedly observed, are only skin-deep (*ibid*).

The word "hypocrisy" used here comes very close to the term "double dealing" (*dvurushnichestvo*) widely applied at the end of the thirties to the victims of the Stalin regime. This does not, of course, mean that new purges of the Stalin type are on the way, but it does indicate that the country's leaders are considering some measures to prevent the appearance of further Penkovsky's and Sinyavsky's. To judge from the article under discussion, one of these measures is the intensification of efforts to develop by education a Communist spirit in the Soviet population: this is to proceed "on a broad front" with the application not only of traditional but also of new methods. We read:

An ideological education, the formation of a scientific world outlook, is unthinkable without a study of Marxist-Leninist theory on the part of both Communists and non-Party men. . . . Experience shows that the higher the theoretical and ideological level of Party, governmental and economic workers, the more fruitful their practical activity and the more highly skilled their leadership of the masses. Consequently, we must not countenance any irresponsibility with regard to theory: without it, all progress is impossible (page 7).

Great importance is attached to educating a proper attitude toward labor:

The ideological hardening of the builders of Communism cannot be achieved solely by means of enlightenment, by the acquisition of bookish knowledge. The formation of ideological conviction must be closely linked with labor. . . . Through the production collective, a person participates in the life of socialist society not only as a producer of material goods and as a consumer of them, but also as a public worker, as a master of production interested in the settlement of all matters concerning common interests (pages 7-8).

The author draws attention to another factor which is supposed to play an equally active part in educating the masses in a Communist spirit:

Practical experience in the management of social affairs has a beneficial effect upon the development of ideological convictions. Work in commissions, councils, the organs of cooperation with people's control and other public institutions promotes the formation of personal interests and extends the individual's horizon. People begin to think along the lines of the state, they learn to decide important questions and carry an enterprise through to its conclusion (page 8).

The Party leaders are aware that Penkovsky, Sinyavsky and others, being Communists, did their share of studying Marxist-Leninist theory. They were no idlers, but were obliged to take part in "public work"; and yet they betrayed the cause of Communism. For the first time during the last few decades and—one must suppose—not without chagrin, the article observes:

In the development of ideological convictions, the activity of the individual himself, his personal desire to master a scientific world outlook thoroughly and develop in himself Communist convictions cannot be left out of the reckoning. It is impossible to maintain that a person may play the role of a merely passive object of the educational process on which influences are brought to bear purely [as it were] from outside, . . . [that] his mind is formed regardless of his will and his own efforts. . . . Only ideas that have been worked out independently form part of his flesh and blood and become his own . . . (Page 9.)

- The article goes on:

The complex process of transforming ideas into convictions, in which the individual's intellectual, emotional and volitional powers and abilities play their part, takes place more successfully when a milieu that is healthy in all respects has been created, when injustice is not tolerated, when people do not fear to tell others the truth, however bitter it may be (*ibid.*).

It is worth while quoting the passage in which the author lists those qualities that distinguish the "man of the socialist era," qualities which the Party leaders would like to see in all members of Soviet society:

In today's conditions, to be an ideologically convinced fighter for Communism means:

to carry the Party's decisions consistently and unflinching into effect, to promote actively the strengthening and extension of the Party's links with the people, to take an active part in the country's political life, in the administration of state affairs, in economic and cultural construction;

to be aware of the great responsibility one bears to the collective in which one works and to the entire country for the affairs of the collective, to be a carrier of Party and state discipline and an impassioned fighter for the establishment of the principles of socialism and Communism;

to follow a high code of principles, to be ready at any moment to enter the fight against routine and injustice, to go against the current if need be, but to secure the unmasking of unhealthy phenomena, however they may be disguised. In practice, high-principledness means severe criticism of those responsible for faults, an implacable attitude toward everything that hinders our progress to Communism;

to be the embodiment of genuine nobility, features of which are a feeling of profound respect for the man of labor [and] a readiness to perform heroic feats in the name of the Fatherland, to undergo any trial for the sake of the workers' happiness. Karl Marx wrote that only he who makes the largest possible number of people happy can himself be a happy man. Concern for people's happiness, for the establishment of genuinely human relations, is an indispensable condition for everyone who shares the Communist ideology;

to strive for the full development of one's own personality and [that] of all members of our society, not only to understand and treasure beauty in life and in art oneself but also to struggle for the establishment of the aesthetic ideal of Communism in our reality, for the ideological and aesthetic education of all workers (pages 9-10).

Particular stress is laid on the following point:

In turning the workers into convinced supporters of Communism, a large part is played by Soviet art and literature, which by their specific media influence people's minds and feelings, develop Communist awareness and help to sublimate ideas into personal convictions. Herein lies the essence of the high purpose of art and literature.... Writers, artists, theater and cinema workers are called upon by their works to arouse in people high civic feeling, to entrench Communist ideals in reality (page 8).

Pointing out that in consequence it is also important for "workers in art and literature" themselves to be firm believers in the principles of Communism, the authors refer to the need for "thoughtful work with" members of the artistic professions. Here there is no doubt that they have in mind an intensification of the Party's control over the fields of literature and art. They write:

Thoughtful work with writers, actors, composers, cinema workers and artists will undoubtedly help them in their creative work. In this work, one must be guided by the main line in the development of Soviet literature and art, the essence of which is the consolidation of its bond with the life of the people, a truthful and highly artistic portrayal of the wealth and variety of socialist reality, an inspired and vivid reproduction of what is new and genuinely Communist and the unmasking of all that is opposed to the progress of society (page 9).

The last two passages quoted justify the assumption that measures being prepared for the prevention of further betrayals of the Communist cause will primarily be applied to those active in literature and the arts. This seems all the more probable in view of the fact that Sinyavsky, Daniel and Tarsis belonged to this social group. It may be supposed that the proceedings of the Party congress will show to what extent this assumption was justified.

The question of educating people in a Communist spirit inevitably concerns the younger generation. We read in the article under review:

Particular concern is displayed by the Party for our youth, the education of new generations of convinced fighters, the formation of the man of the Communist future who harmoniously combines spiritual wealth, moral purity and physical perfection. The Party considers it essential constantly to improve methods of educating young people, finding more effective approaches to their reason and emotions, forming in young people who are entering upon a responsible working life Communist convictions, a high degree of culture, and persistence in the solution of tasks in economic and cultural construction. All this is much more complicated than a simple transfer of knowledge (pages 5-6).

Observing that success here depends on the combined efforts of Party, Komsomol and trade union organizations as well as "production collectives," educational institutions and associations of writers and artists, the authors continue:

Work with [the younger generation] must be flexible and many-sided, earnest and true to principle. In this work, one must make skillful use of all means, particularly the experience of older generations, the wonderful revolutionary and labor traditions of our people. Soviet young people must master Communism thoroughly as something for which they themselves must fight selflessly (page 6).

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Another means, in the eyes of the Party leaders, of preventing the betrayal of Communism lies in encouraging criticism, including self-criticism, in all spheres of Soviet life. This becomes clear from an article on "Criticism and Self-Criticism in Party Life" in *Partiinaya zhizn*, where the reader is told:

Our Party regards criticism and self-criticism as an effective means of improving the Party's leadership and education of key personnel. Many thousands of leaders who have been educated by the Party, who are talented and devoted to the cause of Communism are working selflessly, devoting their strength, knowledge and experience to the welfare of the people. The Party and the people have entrusted much to them, but they also demand much of them and control them, guided by Lenin's principle of keeping people under supervision... (*Partinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 2, page 26).

Elsewhere in the article, criticism and self-criticism are more clearly presented as means of keeping a check upon the activities and the state of mind of all strata of the population:

The Party Program points out the necessity of developing in every way criticism and self-criticism, the determined unmasking and correction of mistakes and shortcomings. The norms which have developed in the Party and which are laid down in the [Party] Rules and Program ensure the broad participation of all Communists in the fight with shortcomings. On the basis of these norms, Communists unmask all kinds of hitches and failures in their own work and that of their leaders, they fight ostentation and conceit, complacency and bureaucracy, and attack philistinism and all who succumb to the influence of alien ideas (page 23).

The journal issues a warning to the enemies of criticism:

In the interests of the correct education of key personnel, Party organizations cannot tolerate any kind of obstacle to the development of criticism. When they forget this, the enemies of criticism let themselves go and resort to all kinds of devices in order to rid themselves of troublesome people (page 27).

The case is cited of a nurse named L. Turchakova, who wrote to the editors of the paper *Dneprovskaya pravda* about the state of affairs at the Nizhnedneprovsk Railroad Hospital, in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. Her allegations were confirmed, after which the hospital authorities, "taking umbrage at the criticism,"

...began to try and remove Comrade Turchakova from the hospital, to this end going so far as to employ blackmail and slander. Strange as it may seem, secretary of the Party organization M. Trusova [and] officials of the Amur-Nizhnednepetrovsk Raion Party Committee, observing this protracted persecution, did not call the enemies of criticism to order (*ibid.*).

This case gives us a glimpse of the difficulties that face the Party leaders as soon as they try to deal with the problem of disloyalty to Communism: between administrative and Party authorities, a bond of loyalty, of *esprit de corps*, grows up which then proves stronger than the requirements of the Party Rules and Program.

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We have seen from the passages quoted that the Party leaders want to see work on the Communist education of youth "flexible and many-sided." It is worth trying to establish how this intention is being realized. The January issue of the youth journal *Yunist* contains an article, "The Foreseeable Tomorrow," by the former chief editor of *Pravda*, A. M. Rumyantsev. The article deals with

the decisions of the September 1965 meeting of the Party Central Committee relating to the new system of industrial management, and would appear to provide the model for a "frank conversation" which will now be followed in propaganda designed for young readers. Its main feature is its inclusion of a few bold admissions designed to win the reader's confidence and so prepare him to accept whatever idea the writer wishes to put over; this idea is then presented with the appropriate force and persuasiveness. Here is the first of such admissions in the article under review:

It is no secret that many people seem to have grown tired of reforms and that their confidence in innovations has to some extent been undermined. And they are tired not so much of the reforms as of the ostentatious drumbeating which has always accompanied them (*Yunist*, 1966, No. 1, page 67).

It must be admitted that at a time when the leading articles in all organs of the Soviet press devoted to the forthcoming congress were somewhat reminiscent of "ostentatious drumbeating" an admission of this kind coming from Rumyantsev could hardly fail to impress the more critical of his young readers. But the article goes a good deal farther. For the first time since he was removed from power, Khrushchev's economic policies are given the name which they deserve, namely *samodurstvo*, which may be rendered as "petty tyranny," "stupid, willful conduct humiliating to others." Rumyantsev observes:

...all of the principal consequences connected with the personality cult have been removed within a relatively short time; but we are now dealing even more rapidly and effectively with the shortcomings which resulted from subjectivist leadership, or, to put it in plain Russian, from a certain *samodurstvo* in the country's economic life (*ibid.*).

Rumyantsev thus does not deny allegations that the life of Soviet society has its faults; but he attempts to minimize their importance:

People often say, this isn't right, that isn't right, and often they are correct. But does this mean that the admitted faults and mistakes testify to the inability, inertia and unimaginativeness of our people, our affairs, our society?—You yourselves will say, No (*ibid.*).

He proceeds to belittle the political significance of the personality cult and Khrushchev's "*samodurstvo*," reducing them in essence to the "wastage" inevitable in the building of Communism:

We are so deeply and justifiably persuaded of the correctness of the theoretical principles of socialism that we quite rightly describe mistakes and errors as the inevitable dross, the waste products which we throw away and at the same time take into account, since from them we ourselves learn and with them we teach others (*ibid.*).

In view of the fact that Stalin's "mistakes" cost the Soviet population millions of victims and Khrushchev's "errors" the Soviet economy billions of rubles, this remark of Rumyantsev's smacks, particularly in its application to Stalin, of

such stark cynicism that it can only be regarded as a relapse into Stalinism. Moreover, it would seem to imply that such "mistakes" and "errors" are chronic and that a repetition of them in the future must be taken for granted. The implication seems to be borne out by the following words:

We are following a discoverer's road; who ever guaranteed a new historical route to be free from the extraordinary occurrences which lie in wait for the one who blazes the trail? (*Ibid.*)

Rumyantsev, however, appears not to notice this implication, and concludes his intimate chat with his young readers on the "mistakes" and "errors" of the past with the optimistic assertion:

We are now standing on the threshold of a [period of] genuinely scientific management of the socialist economy and all-out development of democratic centralism, which tomorrow will destroy the consequences of the voluntarism of certain persons in the economic construction of socialism (*ibid.*).

Another innovation in propaganda work with youth is the modern hero, who is to set an example for others. What is new here is, strictly speaking, not so much the idea of an up-to-date hero as the particular character he assumes. Not so long ago, he was the young builder, geologist, cultivator of the virgin lands; today he is the Chekist. Under the healding "Ideological Integrity Bears Us Aloft," *Molodoi kommunist* prints a selection of material devoted to Colonel Rudolf I. Abel, who was arrested in the United States in 1957 as a Soviet spy and later was returned to the Soviet Union in exchange for the American pilot Powers. The editors of the journal supply the following commentary:

He was exceptionally courageous and firm during his trial in the USA. . . . On November 15, 1957, he was sentenced to thirty years' hard labor. All the FBI's efforts to secure from him the necessary information ended in complete failure. Rudolf Ivanovich devoted more than thirty years to work in Soviet intelligence. His fatherland valued highly the Chekist's courage, valor and unlimited devotion. Comrade Abel has been awarded the Order of Lenin, two military Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, the Order of the Red Star and a number of medals (*Molodoi kommunist*, 1966, No. 2, page 58).

The material that follows includes Abel's story of his life, drawings which he made while in prison in the United States, Western press comments on his staunchness displayed during the investigation and trial of his case, and an appeal from him to Soviet youth. The latter contains the following passage:

First of all, in connection with the forthcoming Twenty-Third Party Congress I should like to express the wish that our young people will perform new deeds of daring that are even bolder and more beneficial to our cause and that they will show courage and determination in their work. I wish them love and friendship, happiness and joy. The congress will issue directives for the new five-year plan, and we shall all, particularly the young people, have to work hard and fruitfully on their fulfillment (page 61).

The message concludes:

I should very much like to see our younger generation cultivating a high feeling of its own dignity, patriotism and unbounded faith in the righteousness of the cause for which their fathers fought (*ibid.*).

Thus, the model offered to Soviet youth displays unbounded loyalty to the Communist system. Yes, the Party propagandists seem to be saying, we had Penkovsky and Sinyavsky, but we also have Abel. Here, of course, they are right; but this is no solution to the problem, for it remains to be seen whether Abel will find many imitators.

Petr Kruzhin

Communism and Revolution:

The Strategic Uses of Political Violence

Edited by CYRIL E. BLACK and THOMAS P. THORNTON

Published by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1965, 570 pp.

The point of departure of this study is that the most important movement in the world today is something that for want of a better name may be called modernization. Revolutions arising from crises of modernization will occur with increasing frequency. The national revolutions of the past two centuries, while violent and far-reaching, were actually less important than international war, but in the foreseeable future, with international war practically outlawed by the utter destructiveness of nuclear armaments, violent change will most probably take the form of domestic revolutions. The Communist dream of world revolution will accordingly be channeled into a series of domestic revolutions. It is thus of crucial importance, when analysing the course of Communist strategy in the coming years, to attempt to understand the Communist theory and practice of such revolutions.

For this purpose, as the introductory chapter points out, there is plenty of material on hand. The Communists have produced a wealth of theory on domestic revolutions, and have made it available in their many writings on the subject. As to practice, there is hardly a country in the world where an effort has not been made to seize power, with or without help from outside, or where preparations for such a seizure have not been made.

The chapters on general strategy throw light on a number of facts of basic interest. One is that the great Communist revolutions, those of Russia and China, came about only after the governments of these countries had been fatally weakened by war as well as by inept management. The East European countries, with the exception of Yugoslavia, were Communized, not by domestic revolution but under Soviet armed occupation. A second general observation is that in the underdeveloped countries, which are the critical world areas today, the Communist centers of Moscow and Peking have in general had little success in their attempts

to exploit the dissatisfaction with modernism which has taken the form of national movements for independence. Apart from temporary victories, they have failed regardless of whether they have sided with the middle class movement or against it.

While these general considerations are of great interest, the heart of the book is the series of descriptions of Communist efforts at domestic revolution in the various world areas and, in many cases, in individual countries. These descriptions not only provide a picture of the grand sweep of the Communist revolution but also show fascinating similarities and differences in strategy. The thesis of the crucial importance of Communist domestic revolutions and accordingly of the crucial importance of the study itself is somewhat weakened by the record of nearly universal failure of such revolutions apart from those under the exceptional conditions of Russia and China.

Despite the absence of a unified approach on the part of the contributors (three authors' conferences notwithstanding), this study is a valuable contribution to the literature of Communist world revolution. Its usefulness is enhanced by a bibliographical essay; there is an index of names, but no general index.

O. J. F.

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

February 1966

- 1 Administrations of Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and "USSR-France" and "France-USSR" Societies gather in Moscow to discuss and sign 1966-67 cooperation program.

Polish Shipping Minister Janusz Bura-kiewicz received by Merchant Marine Minister V. G. Bakayev.

Afghan Premier Mohammed Hashim Mai-wandwal, accompanied by Foreign and Planning Ministers and other officials, arrives in USSR on official visit.

Announcement that Ministry of Higher and Special Secondary Education has adopted new procedures facilitating entry of out-standing pupils into colleges in 1966.

- 2 Announcement that oblast and krai Party conferences have begun.

Announcement that Fourth All-Union Voice Training Conference has come to an end in Moscow.

Announcement that All-Union Trade Pa-vilion plans to hold an international ex-hibition of agricultural machinery in Moscow in May, as well as international exhibitions to run concurrently with the International Congress of the Crystallographers' Union and the International Microbiological Congress to take place in Moscow in summer, and with the Thirteenth World Poultry Farmers' Congress scheduled to open in Kiev on August 15. An exhibition of mathematical machines and literature is to run concurrently with the International Mathematicians' Congress to be held in Moscow in August, and an inter-national exhibition of "means for mechanizing engineering, technical and administrative operations" ("Interorgtekhnik-66") is to be held in September.

- 3 Publication of Central Statistical Authority's report on fulfillment of state economic development plan for 1965.

"Aeroflot" opens weekly air freight service between Moscow and Paris with "AN-12" aircraft.

Soviet moon probe "Luna-9" makes soft landing on Moon.

Announcement that scientists from O. Y. Shmidt Institute of Earth Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the French Ionospheric Research and Telecommunications Group are carrying out joint observations of electromagnetic processes taking place in magnetosphere from village of Sogra (on river Pinega, Arkhangelsk Oblast) and island of Kerguelen in Indian Ocean.

- 4 Announcement that Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev has flown to Havana to sign protocol on Soviet-Cuban trade in 1966.

- 5 Soviet Sociological Association holds report and election meeting. Report delivered by Deputy Board Chairman Professor A. A. Zvorykin. Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor G. V. Osipov elected Board Chair-man. Resolution to issue quarterly journal *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya v SSSR* (Socio-logical Research in the USSR) adopted.

- 6 Announcement that Soviet-Czech standing sub-commission on scientific and technical cooperation has approved plans for co-operation in machine-building, chemistry and the exchange of information in 1966 and 1967 at its fifth extraordinary session.

Death of Member of Latvian Party Central Committee and Deputy to Latvian Supreme Soviet V. T. Latsis.

- 7 Annual general meeting of USSR Academy of Sciences opened in Moscow by Academy's President, M. V. Keldysh. Academician B. P. Konstantinov elected Vice-President.

Agreement on volume of export and import shipments during period 1966-70 reached by Soviet and Bulgarian representatives in Moscow. Protocol on negotiations signed by Railroad Communications Minister B. P. Beshchev and Merchant Marine Minister V. G. Bakayev for USSR.

- 8 Twenty-first session of Comecon's Executive Committee opens in Moscow.

8. Announcement that ninth annual meeting of Soviet International Law Association has ended in Moscow. Professor G. I. Tunkin reelected chairman.
Soviet-Italian cultural exchange program for 1966-67 signed in Moscow.
9. Announcement that conference of Agricultural Ministers of autonomous republics and heads of agricultural departments of oblasts and krais of RSFSR has been held in Moscow. Principal topic: the mobilization of production reserves in state and collective farms.
Deputy Chairman of Central Board of Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society, Army General P. I. Batov, and Secretary of Central Board of Vietnamese-Soviet Friendship Society, Nguyen Thi Luu, sign agreement on cooperation between their societies in 1966.
Joint session of Foreign Affairs Commissions of Council of Union and Council of Nationalities of Supreme Soviet adopts resolution to recommend Supreme Soviet Presidium to ratify Soviet-Mongolian friendship, co-operation and mutual aid treaty and Soviet-Pakistani cultural and scientific cooperation agreement. Commissions chaired by Supreme Soviet Deputies M. A. Suslov and B. N. Ponomarev.
10. Conference of criminal investigation workers held in Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order of the RSFSR. Speech on measures to improve efficiency of the Ministry's criminal investigation departments delivered by the Minister, V. S. Tikunov.
Announcement that All-Union Society of Geneticists and Selectioners is being organized, with Minister of Higher and Special Secondary Education of the RSFSR V. N. Stoletov as Chairman.
Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-107."
Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers adopt resolution under which advanced training departments for state and collective farm administrators and agricultural specialists are to be set up in 78 agricultural colleges in place of the existing schools and courses.
Press conference on soft landing of Soviet lunar probe "Luna-9" held in Moscow before Soviet and foreign journalists. Television pictures taken by probe's cameras demonstrated. President of USSR Academy of Sciences M. V. Keldysh speaks.
11. Announcement that Soviet-Polish Friendship Society and Polish-Soviet Friendship Society have signed agreement on cooperation in 1966.
Chilean economic delegation arrives in Moscow.
Presidium of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions adopts resolution defining tasks facing trade union organizations as a result of resolution adopted by Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers on measures to expand training of young people finishing "general education" schools in 1966 and find them employment in the national economy.
Publication of joint communiqué on visit of Afghan Premier to USSR.
12. Publication of TASS statement on talks between US and South Vietnamese leaders in Honolulu.
Protocol on Soviet-Cuban trade in 1966 signed in Havana. USSR to supply Cuba with petroleum, petroleum products, metals and sawn timber in exchange for sugar, tobacco, etc.
13. Announcement that Commander in Chief of UAR Navy Admiral Ezzat has arrived in USSR on a visit.
Announcement that Council of Ministers has adopted resolution "On Additional Material and Technical Aid to Agriculture for the Carrying Out of Field Work in 1966."
Swedish Justice Minister Kling arrives in Moscow as guest of USSR Supreme Court. He will be given an insight into Soviet legal system and operations of authorities responsible for preserving public order.
14. Writers A. D. Sinyavsky and Y. M. Daniel sentenced to 7 and 5 years' hard labor respectively after five-day trial in RSFSR Supreme Court.
Sixteenth anniversary of Soviet-Chinese treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance.
15. Announcement that Chairman of Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin has accepted invitation to pay official visit to Sweden at the beginning of July.
16. Second All-Union Conference of Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship Society ends in Moscow. Report delivered by Board Chairman Academician K. V. Ostrovityanov. *Pravda* Chief Editor M. V. Zimyanin elected new board chairman.

Conference of leaders of Union of Writers of Socialist Countries of Europe opens in Jablonna (near Warsaw). Soviet delegation led by Board Secretary of USSR Writers' Union A. A. Surkov.

Announcement that tagged atoms laboratory has been set up at All-Union Research Institute of Grain Farming. The tagged atoms will help make phosphorus deposits in North Kazakhstan assimilable by plants.

Announcement that All-Union "Izotop" Society has put out first issue of new publication entitled *Izotopy v SSSR* (Isotopes in the USSR).

Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko delivers note of protest to US Ambassador Foy Kohler in connection with crash of nuclear-armed "B-52" bomber in Spain.

Soviet governmental delegation led by Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev flies on to Mexico City after having concluded trade agreement in Havana.

All-Union symposium designed to promote concrete sociological research in the USSR begins in Leningrad. Importance of sociological research stressed in opening speech by Vice-President of USSR Academy of Sciences P. N. Fedoseyev.

- 17 Moscow Oblast Party Conference opens in Moscow. Report on work of Moscow Oblast Committee delivered by Committee's First Secretary, V. I. Konotop. Participants in conference include Party Central Committee Presidium Members L. I. Brezhnev, G. I. Voronov, A. P. Kirilenko, A. N. Kosygin, K. T. Mazurov, A. I. Mikoyan, N. V. Podgorny, D. S. Polyansky and M. A. Suslov.

Publication of appeal by Catholicos-Patriarch Yefrem II of All Georgia regarding war in Vietnam.

First constituent conference of Moscow branch of All-Russian Voluntary Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments opens in Moscow.

First Deputy Minister V. V. Kuznetsov hands over note to Japanese Ambassador protesting against use of Japanese territory by US as base for military operations in Vietnam.

Soviet "TU-114" passenger aircraft *en route* to Congo (Brazzaville) crashes upon take-off from Moscow. Dead include A. A. Petrov, Deputy Chairman of State Committee for

Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and of USSR Commission for UNESCO Affairs.

- 18 Eighteenth anniversary of signing of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance treaty between USSR and Hungary.

First Deputy Chief of General Staff of Soviet Armed Forces, Army General P. Batitsky, tells Soviet and foreign journalists at a press conference in Moscow dedicated to 48th anniversary of Soviet Armed Forces that USSR has thermonuclear weapons whose explosive force is equivalent to dozens of megatons of TNT.

Party Central Committee Secretary and Presidium Member M. A. Suslov and Secretary B. N. Ponomarev talk with First Secretary of West Berlin branch of East German Socialist Unity Party Danelius and Second Secretary Ziegler.

Eighth Party Conference of Group of Soviet Forces in Germany comes to an end in East Berlin. Participants include Soviet Defense Minister Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky and Head of Central Political Department of Soviet Army and Navy, Army General A. A. Yepishev. Delegates to Twenty-Third Party Congress elected.

Minister of Culture Y. A. Furtseva receives Nepalese culture delegation.

- 19 Announcement that State Forestry Committee has been set up under Council of Ministers.

Plenary session of Party Central Committee held. Draft of directives on 1966-70 national economic development plan to be issued by Twenty-Third Party Congress approved (speech by Kosygin). Speech delivered by First Secretary of Party Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-109."

- 20 Publication of draft of directives on 1966-70 national economic development plan to be issued by Twenty-Third Party Congress. Draft calls for increased defense expenditure.

Announcement that Cameroon President Ahidjo has accepted invitation to pay official visit to USSR in 1966.

- 21 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson arrives in USSR on official visit.

Announcement that Academy of Social Sciences of Party Central Committee has held session on methodological problems of economic science.

- Announcement that Supreme Soviet Presidium has deprived writer Valery Tarsis of his Soviet citizenship.
- Kosygin receives Commander in Chief of UAR Navy Admiral Ezzat, Commander in Chief of Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Fleet S. G. Gorshkov, present.
- 22 Announcement that Defense Ministry has decided to award prizes of 2,000, 1,500 and 1,000 rubles for the best literary works on Soviet Army and Navy to be published by Military Publishing House.
- Announcement that Institute for the Advanced Training of Investigation Workers of State Prosecution and Public Order Organs is being created and number of students admitted to legal institutes increased under resolution of Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers aimed at improving work of investigation workers concerned.
- Announcement that Chinese civil aviation delegation has arrived in Moscow for talks on establishment of air communications between China and USSR.
- Conference on specialization and cooperation in industry, particularly in machine-building, opened in Moscow by Comecon secretary N. Faddeyev in accordance with resolution of sixteenth session of Comecon's Executive Committee. Specialists from USSR, Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Mongolia present.
- Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-110," with two dogs, Veterok and Mgolek, on board.
- 23 Kosygin receives Swedish Justice Minister Kling.
- Publication of Marshal Malinovsky's order to mark 48th anniversary of Soviet Army and Navy.
- 24 Mongolian Foreign Minister Dugersurun arrives in Moscow for exchange of ratification instruments of Soviet-Mongolian friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance treaty.
- Announcement that Union-republic Party congresses have begun.
- Protocol on Soviet-UAR economic and technical cooperation agreement of September 22, 1964, signed in Cairo. At Egypt's request, special emphasis is to be placed on creation of Helwan metallurgical complex and petroleum and nephelite prospecting.
- 25 Publication of Soviet-British communiqué on visit of Prime Minister Wilson to USSR. Kosygin accepts Wilson's invitation to pay official visit to Britain at a time to be specified.
- Twentieth anniversary of Soviet-Mongolian friendship and mutual assistance treaty and economic and cultural cooperation agreement.
- Announcement that large brown coal deposit up to 50 meters thick has been discovered near Mukhinskaya Station on Transbaikalian Railroad Line.
- Protocol on fifth session of Soviet-Czech economic, scientific and technical cooperation commission signed in Prague.
- Meeting held to celebrate 45th anniversary of signing of Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty. Speech made by Board Chairman of Soviet Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Afghanistan and Minister of the Meat and Milk Industry of the USSR, S. F. Antonov.
- Group of Algerian National Liberation Front officials arrives in Moscow.
- 26 Forty-fifth anniversary of signing of Soviet-Iranian friendship treaty.
- First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov arrives in Cairo on five-day visit.
- 27 Announcement that Council of Ministers has established 68-man Main Committee for the Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy of the USSR (Glavyvstavkom), with V. A. Kirillin as Chairman, B. P. Beshchev, V. P. Yelyutin, V. F. Zhigalin, V. V. Matskevich, I. P. Fedyanin and K. P. Chernyayev as Deputy Chairmen, and N. I. Kovalenko as Responsible Secretary.
- Announcement that Council of Ministers has adopted resolution subordinating interbranch scientific and technical information organizations in RSFSR to State Committee for Science and Technology.
- 28 Delegation from Bulgarian-Soviet Friendship Committee arrives in Moscow for signing of program of cooperation with Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and with Soviet-Bulgarian Friendship Society.
- Twenty-third session of Academy of Arts of the USSR opened. Report delivered by Academy's President, V. A. Serov.

Changes and Appointments

- 5 A. Y. Kochinyan elected First Secretary of Armenian Party Central Committee in place of Y. N. Zarobyan, who is also relieved of duties of Member of Armenian Party Central Committee Presidium.
- 8 L. G. Melnikov appointed Chairman of State Committee for the Supervision of Work Safety in Industry and Mining.
V. Y. Kan appointed Deputy Minister of the Timber, Cellulose, Paper and Wood-Processing Industries.
- 13 V. A. Dvoryakovsky appointed Deputy Minister of Health.
V. G. Furov and P. V. Makartsev appointed Deputy Chairmen of Council for Religious Affairs.
- 17 N. V. Smolin appointed Ambassador to Togo in place of A. M. Kuchkarov, who is transferred to other work.
- 18 I. I. Ilichev appointed Ambassador to Denmark in place of K. D. Levychkin, who is transferred to other work.
- 27 K. N. Belyak appointed First Deputy and I. K. Zhegalin Deputy Minister of Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Construction.
Y. N. Zarobyan appointed Deputy Minister of Electrical Engineering Industry.
- 28 A. A. Rodionov appointed Ambassador to Burma in place of A. M. Ledovsky, who is transferred to other work.

Notes on Contributors

STACKELBERG, GEORG A. VON. Orientalist and specialist in Central and South Asian problems. Author of numerous articles on this area and regular contributor to Institute publications.

GAYEV, ARKADY. Journalist. Worked for *Pravda* and *Izvestia* and also for the Soviet regional press from 1921 until World War II, since when he has been living in Munich. A regular contributor of articles on Soviet literature and the Soviet press to the publications of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

AKHMINOV, HERMAN. Born 1921 at Arkhangelsk. Studied at Leningrad University, 1939-40; taken prisoner of war, 1942; later studied at Oxford (B.Litt., 1959); member of the Research Section of the Institute for the Study of the USSR since 1957. Writer and lecturer on Soviet problems; author of *Die Macht im Hintergrund* (1950), *Die Totengräber des Kommunismus* (1964), *Breschnev und Kossygin: Die neuen Männer im Krenl?* (1964) and numerous articles.

KRUZHIN, PETR. Born 1921 in what is now Kalinin Oblast. Left school in 1939 and entered an officers' training school, from which he graduated in 1941. While at school and in the army, was an active member of the Komsomol. Taken prisoner by the Germans in 1942 and joined the Vlasov movement in 1943. Since then has written on political subjects and Soviet youth (including "A Young Communist" in *Thirteen Who Fled*, New York, 1949). Assistant Editor of the *Bulletin*.

BUSH, KEITH. Born in 1929 in London. Trained at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University (M.A.). Analyst of current economic developments in the Soviet Union.

VORONITSYN, S. Born in 1926 in Yugoslavia. Graduated in 1960 from Frankfurt University in sociology. Has published work in various journals. Now on the staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich.

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
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ARTICLES

The Legal Position of the State-Owned Industrial Enterprise in the USSR

T. DAVLETSHIN

Procedures for the formation, operation and liquidation of state-owned industrial, construction, agricultural, transport and communications enterprises in the USSR are laid down in the "Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise" promulgated in October 1965.¹ (Cooperative enterprises, e.g., collective farms, and so-called "public" [*obshchestvennye*] enterprises are not covered by this statute.)

In this article, we shall be concerned merely with the legal status of the state-owned industrial enterprises. These had previously fallen under a 1927 act under which the trust alone, as distinct from its daughter enterprises, enjoyed the rights of a legal person and took part in the economic cycle as an independent legal subject.² Practical requirements, however, gradually turned the act into something of a dead letter; the trusts, although formally enterprises in their own right, became in effect the economic administration departments of their daughter enterprises, while in several industries they were abolished altogether. Individual enterprises, whether in a trust or not, became independent legal entities in their turn.

This irregular situation has now been recognized in the new statute, Article 2 of which reads:

The socialist state production enterprise, using the state property assigned for its operational administration or use, engages in productive and economic activity (manufacturing goods, executing work projects, rendering services) through the efforts of its collective, under the guidance of its superior authority and in accordance with the national economic plan and the principle of economic self-sufficiency [*khozraschet*], performs the duties and enjoys the rights involved in such activity, balances its own accounts and constitutes a legal person.

The statute distinguishes between independent and non-independent enterprises. Unlike the non-independent enterprises, the independent enterprises work on an economic self-sufficiency basis, have their own fixed and floating assets, and constitute independent legal entities. The non-independent enterprises are in-

¹ See, for example, *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1965, No. 42, pp. 25-29.

² *Sobranie zakonov i rasporyazhenii Raboche-krestyanskogo Pravitelstva Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik*, 1927, No. 39, Article 392.

incorporated in an independent enterprise, which assigns them the necessary fixed and floating assets from its own resources and is generally responsible for their performance.

Enterprises incorporating other production units come under the headings of combines, trusts or firms (*firmy*). There are two types of combine in the USSR, each having a different function. The first includes production units belonging to different but closely related industries and constitutes an independent enterprise, examples being the Magnitogorsk and Nizhny Tagil metallurgical combines. Combines of the second type, on the other hand, are merely agencies for the economic administration of a number of independent enterprises. Coal and timber combines fall under this category.

There are three kinds of trust, namely those whose functions are confined to the economic management of a group of independent enterprises, those incorporating non-independent production units and themselves constituting enterprises in their own right, and finally the mixed trusts, which include both kinds of enterprise.

Whereas trusts and combines have long existed in the USSR, the "firms," amalgamations of factories and plants, appeared only in 1961.³ The first firms comprised small light industrial enterprises, such as "Progress," with five shoe factories, and "Rassvet," with four leather factories. Each firm is run by a mother enterprise, which is usually the largest of the factories concerned; the others become branches of the mother enterprise and cease to enjoy the rights of a legal person. The basic features of a firm are highly centralized technical, industrial and economic planning and administration and a common balance sheet and bank account. Most firms have common accounting, labor and wages, power supply, engineering and design departments. Capital construction and material and technical supply are also centralized as a rule. The firm is headed by a general manager, who is also the manager of the mother enterprise. Firms are also to be found in the machine-building, chemical and electrical engineering industries, while some even comprise large heavy industry enterprises. Current policy is to promote the formation of "firms."

*

As its name suggests, the state enterprise is the property of the state. Its fixed and floating assets, as well as the products it manufactures, are also state property, the assets being described in Article 2 of the statute as being purely for the "operational" use of the enterprise. Attempts to describe state enterprises as joint owners, with the state, of the property assigned to them have been rejected both under Stalin (when such attempts were regarded as seditious) and subsequently.⁴ Under Article 8 of the statute, an enterprise enjoys the rights of possession, usufruct and disposal in respect to the property under its "operational"

³ See G. A. Vvedensky, "Soviet Industrial Firms," *Bulletin*, 1963, No. 8.

⁴ See, for example, *Voprosy filosofii*, 1953, No. 1, p. 104, and V. V. Laptev, *Pravovoye polozheniye gosudarstvennykh promyshlennyykh predpriyatiy SSSR* (The Legal Status of State Industrial Enterprises in the USSR), Moscow, 1963, p. 76

control and the right of usufruct in respect to its land, but it is obliged to exercise these rights in a manner compatible with its functions and with the requirements of the plan.

The property of an enterprise falls mainly under the following categories: fixed assets, floating assets, finished products, the works fund and profits. The legal rights enjoyed by the enterprise in respect to the various categories differ. In respect to its fixed assets, which include all forms of capital, it has, to all intents and purposes, only the right of usufruct. With few exceptions, these assets may not be sold purely at the enterprise's discretion, neither may they be mortgaged or confiscated to pay off a creditor. They may be transferred gratis to another state enterprise (or organization) or sold to a cooperative or public enterprise provided official approval is obtained. An enterprise is also allowed to hire out temporarily unused buildings, equipment and transport facilities at local rates (transport organizations, however, require official approval for hiring out transport). It may sell off surplus machinery, transport, etc., to another enterprise if the superior authority concerned refuses to redistribute such assets or fails to give notice of its intention to do so within one month of having been informed of their existence. An enterprise may sell off locally purchased materials, tools and other assets at its own discretion. Fixed assets may only be alienated to private persons if this is expressly permitted under all-Union or Union-republic law.⁵ At the Party Central Committee's plenary meeting of last September, a resolution was adopted to make enterprises pay in future for their fixed assets, and this, of course, will necessitate modifications of the laws relating to these assets.

The floating assets of an enterprise are subdivided into assets officially assigned to it on a long-term basis and assets which it receives in the form of a short-term bank credit. State enterprises were first assigned floating assets in 1931. The amount assigned is in accordance with the enterprise's plan targets and the norms regulating its expenses and its stocks of goods and materials. The assigned assets may not be withdrawn by the authorities, although surpluses may be redistributed among other enterprises as required.

Enterprises take out short-term credits with the State Bank in order to cover such current expenses as payment for goods in transit, seasonal work, the laying-in of stocks of fuel, materials, etc., and seasonal accumulations of stocks of finished products. According to Soviet economists, bank credits now account for roughly 45 percent of all floating assets held by enterprises.⁶

A state enterprise is required to keep its monetary resources in the State Bank, where it has a clearing account. Each enterprise is allowed only one clearing account. Non-independent enterprises have only "sub-accounts" or current accounts. Since the floating assets of an enterprise are intended to cover its working expenses, only the latter may be deducted from its clearing account,

⁵ P. I. Bardin (ed.), *Nauchno-praktichesky kommentariy k Osnovam grazhdanskogo sudoproizvodstva Soyuzn SSR i Soyuznykh respublik* (Scientific and Practical Commentary to the Principles of Civil Procedure in the USSR and the Union Republics), Moscow, 1962, pp. 116—17.

⁶ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1965, No. 46, p. 7.

and not, for example, capital construction expenses. Both the economic as well as the State Bank authorities are responsible for ensuring that an enterprise uses its floating assets in accordance with the established norms.

Although, economically speaking, finished products also come under the heading of floating assets, their legal status is different for the simple reason that they are intended for sale and not for use within the enterprise. Finished products are distributed to the consumer by the economic authorities. According to Article 29 of the statute,

...the enterprise produces and delivers products in accordance with approved plans and concluded agreements... , giving first priority to the delivery of products satisfying all-Union needs. Non-fulfillment of plans and delivery targets by an enterprise constitutes a gross violation of state discipline and renders the guilty officials liable in accordance with the established procedure.

Plans and orders, i.e., assignments, play a dominant role in the life of the Soviet enterprise. The enterprise has absolutely no say in drawing up the terms of the delivery "contracts" which it concludes on the basis of vouchers issued by the supply and marketing authorities. The terms of these contracts are drawn up by the authorities; the enterprise cannot even decide with whom the contract is to be concluded.—Enterprises producing consumer goods enjoy a certain latitude in this respect: according to Article 30 of the statute, they are allowed to organize their production "on the basis of orders from the trading organizations and concluded with the latter."

A state enterprise is allowed to keep only a certain percentage of the profit which it makes from the sale of its products, the rest going to the state. Such profits are also state property. Under the new economic reform, profit is to be one of the main criteria of efficiency, and the share left at the enterprise's disposal is to be increased, while enterprises are to be permitted to retain all profits accruing from the sale of consumer and industrial goods made from waste material.

A part of the enterprise's share of its profit goes into the works fund (*fond predpriyatiya*), which is used for expansion and modernization and the provision of social and cultural facilities, living accommodation and material incentives for the workers. The amount which goes into the works fund is established in accordance with the increase in sales, profits and economic efficiency, the latter being defined as the relation between total profits and the size of the works fund. Article 14 of the statute prohibits the withdrawal and redistribution of a works fund by a higher authority.

The state industrial enterprise is an independent legal subject, since it both possesses and exercises legal rights (in the USSR a distinction is made between these two concepts). However, the legal relations entered into by a Soviet state enterprise are basically different from those normally existing in jurisprudence. The term "legal relations" is usually used to signify a special relationship between persons or organizations, or between a person and an organization, in which

the rights of one subject correspond to the obligations of another. In the USSR, on the other hand, the distinction between rights and obligations is frequently unclear, and if an enterprise is *entitled* it is simultaneously *obliged* to take one or other course of action. For example, when an enterprise institutes court proceedings for the recovery of a debt as a competent party in a delivery contract it is not only exercising a right but fulfilling an obligation, since it is compelled to take such action under Soviet law. Debts of this kind may only be written off in cases where this is specifically permitted in law. The individual will, an essential element in the concept of right or entitlement, simply does not exist in relations between Soviet state enterprises, the argument being that it is superfluous as a constituent of legal relations in the USSR.

The legal situation of the Soviet state enterprise derives from the circumstance that the country's economy is bureaucratically managed from Moscow instead of being regulated on the basis of economic laws and legal norms. It is a situation which evoked the following frank criticism in last September's issue of the legal journal *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*:

...economic management is still organized in such a way that in their economic relations the highest planning authorities have only rights and the enterprises only obligations.... The old system of planned economic management, which is largely based on directives, has had its day. It is deepening more and more the contradiction between the changed technical and economic level of production and the outmoded methods used for managing the latter.... It is imperative to make a determined switch from administrative methods of management to economic methods, which presuppose the extensive use of value categories and economic and legal levers. But this also means making radical changes in economic and legal relations between the state, as the managerial party, and its individual production units, and also in relations between enterprises.⁷

In planning its production, the enterprise is bound by control figures and is informed of its plan targets by the authorities alone (Article 44). Under Article 48, an enterprise has the right to accept orders from other enterprises or organizations for the manufacture of products from its own waste materials or from material supplied by the customer provided that the fulfillment of the state plan is not thereby jeopardized. Further provisions of the statute lay down procedures for the procurement of equipment and materials and for the sale of finished products. The writing-off of material assets is permitted only in certain specified instances. An enterprise is allowed to write off not more than 100 rubles' worth of such assets in excess of the norms for loss and deterioration, but must report such action to the authorities.

The provisions relating to labor and wages are particularly detailed. In this sphere, the enterprise's freedom of action is restricted by all manner of "indicators," "model statutes," remuneration tariffs, etc., and also by the size of the wage fund. These provisions are perhaps typical of the statute as a whole inasmuch as they

⁷ *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1965, No. 9, pp. 81—82.

stipulate what the enterprise may, rather than what it may not, do and reflect a general attitude of suspicion that the enterprise might take it into its head to work against the interests of the state.

Under the statute, the director of an enterprise is appointed and dismissed by the authorities and is the only person entitled to manage the enterprise and represent it legally or in any other respect (the same was true under Stalin). The director's deputies, as well as such senior staff members as the chief accountant and the head of the technical control department, are also appointed by the superior authority, but they must first be recommended by the director, who also lays down their terms of reference. The concept of the "state of all the people," proclaimed at the Twenty-Second Party Congress, is nowhere reflected in the statute. There is not the slightest indication of a possible transfer of managerial functions to the workers and the public organizations (the trade unions, for example), whose role is vaguely defined in Article 4 of the statute as "extensive participation in the discussion and implementation of measures aimed at fulfilling the state plan, promoting and perfecting the productive and economic activity of the enterprise and improving the working and living conditions of its workers." Although the trade union organization is given a say in drawing up internal regulations, approving estimates for allocations from the works fund and distributing living accommodation, the director has the final word in such matters. The trade union must be consulted before a worker is dismissed by the management, but so far this has usually proved to be an empty formality.⁸ Generally speaking, the trade union organization is little more than a kind of adjutant to the director. Neither the trade union nor the workers collectively are empowered to supervise the management of their enterprise, this duty being performed by "the superior authority and the Party and state control authorities" (the latter have now been renamed "people's control authorities," but their functions will presumably continue to be those of a state inspectorate).

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The projected economic reform should lead to important changes in the legal status of the state enterprise. Basically, the reform calls for greater operational freedom for the individual enterprise in the form of permission to conclude contracts with a consumer directly and a reduction in the number of binding plan indicators. Those now valid were laid down in a decree of the Council of Ministers promulgated on August 2, 1954, and include: output in money and in kind; basic technical and economic indicators relating to the use of materials and equipment; staff strength and wage fund; labor productivity target; estimated production costs; prime costs of produced items; prime cost reduction target; prime cost of major mass- and series-produced items; balance between income and expenditure.⁹ Under the proposed reform, a state enterprise would only be

⁸ See F. Hajenko, "The Right to Work in the USSR," *Bulletin*, 1965, No. 11.

⁹ *Direktyvy KPSS i Sovetskogo pravitelstva po khozyaistvennym voprosam* (The Directives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government on Economic Questions), Vol. IV, Moscow, 1958, p. 250.

bound by the following, more realistic, plan indicators: total sales; broad production range; deliveries of equipment and materials to the enterprise under a centralized supply plan; wage fund; profits target; modernization target; efficiency expressed as the relationship between total profits and the size of the production funds.

It is generally considered in the USSR that implementation of the reform will be a protracted and complicated process. Price formation, the accumulation of reserve stocks of materials and legal relations between enterprises dealing with one another directly are only some of the problems which remain to be solved. There are, however, even greater difficulties. First of all, the planning authorities are quite obviously jealous of the enterprises' newly-won freedoms and often seek to curtail them. *Izvestia*, for example, tells of a case where a Moscow clothing factory dutifully carried out an order for schoolchildrens' uniforms for the "Detsky mir" trading firm only to have the "Rostorgodezhda" state wholesale trading office step in and divert part of the order to other cities, thus causing a breach of contract between the two trading partners.¹⁰ A further typical cause of conflict is that, as *Izvestia* points out,

...when profit is considered one of the main plan indicators of an enterprise, economic managers try to stop the production of unprofitable items and increase the production of the more profitable items...For example, factories are reluctant to produce infants' clothes, cheap cotton items, blouses, etc.¹¹

Last but not least, there is a dearth of experienced business executives capable of running Soviet factories on the quasi-"free enterprise" basis called for under the reform, and although the appropriate training facilities are now being provided all over the country, the situation can obviously not be remedied overnight.

One thing seems certain: whatever course the reform may take, it will necessitate a considerable revision of the statute on the state production enterprise.

¹⁰ *Izvestia*, December 3, 1965.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

Party Affairs

The Twenty-Third Party Congress

I—The General Significance

Even their severest critics could hardly accuse the present Soviet leaders of having been careless or superficial in their preparations for the recent Party congress. Various measures on the domestic front, top-level reshuffles and the switch in relations with countries of the socialist camp are evidence of the care with these preparations were made.

Two important stages were the plenary sessions of the Central Committee of March and September 1965, which respectively marked out new courses for lifting the country's agriculture out of its permanent crisis and industry out of its stagnation and state of dangerous disproportion. The Soviet leaders were able to come to the Congress armed with the economic decisions adopted at these two sessions.

Then, in November, the Central Committee introduced some adjustments into the distribution of leading Party officials—Mikoyan, Podgorny, Shelepin and a number of other less prominent persons—in order to restore an appearance of unity among the collective leadership before the Congress began. In this way, the post-Khrushchev leadership appeared at the Congress, outwardly at least, in the form of a monolithic collective whose most prominent members—Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, Shelepin and Polyansky—shared the functions of power between them, a collective that was prepared to effect a transition from the ideological makeshift of the immediate post-Khrushchev period to a new well-defined stage in the development not only of Soviet society but of world Communism.

The essence of this new stage may be seen in the sharp contrast between the new economic policy, which may be described as an attempt to introduce a kind of NEP at the lowest level—that of individual enterprises and collective farms—and the abrupt orthodox-Communist reaction in the spheres of domestic policy and ideology. In domestic policy, the new stage is marked by a change in the system of power and the methods of government. Abandoning Khrushchev's tactic of playing the role of a "people's tribune" determined at the first opportunity to replace the upper stratum of the Party by younger and more active men and transform the Party as a whole into a kind of popular Communist movement, the present leaders are now returning to an earlier stage when the Party bore the character of an élite, almost of an order of chivalry; they are aiming to stabilize the control of the upper stratum, the "inner Party," over the twelve-million mass of rank-and-file Party members and to find ways of investing the collective leadership

with the necessary stability and efficiency without returning to a one-man rule. In the ideological field, the "Khrushchevites" of yesterday are now dissociating themselves from national-Communist tendencies and laying stress on the principle of "international socialist solidarity" in an attempt to revive the old Marxist slogan, "Proletarians of the world, unite!"

It is important to note that all the decisions and plans adopted at the Congress bear a deterministic character. The Communist leaders, although they have always claimed to understand the laws governing the development of human society and consequently have always been sure of their ability to mold the mode of thought and life both of the individual and of society in accordance with Communist theory, are now, after the Soviet Union has been transformed into an industrial and technologically advanced state, finding themselves confronted not by theoretical, invented laws but by real laws of economics, politics, psychology and logic and by man's indestructible need to think for himself. In the face of these laws, the Communist leaders find themselves not on the offensive but rather on the defensive, in a position in which they have to adapt themselves to their environment.

It is only in this light that the contradictory nature of the Congress's decisions can be understood. The failure of Communist methods of economic management necessitated a certain "liberalization," i.e., the introduction of capitalist elements in a primitive form—the granting of a limited degree of independence and initiative to leaders of enterprises, the encouragement of incentives for workers and collective farmers, the official acknowledgment of the principle of profit, all of which amount to a relaxation of the suffocating pressure of centralized planning. With the aid of such capitalist vitamins, Khrushchev's successors are hoping to revive the anemic constitution of the socialist economy, and in these experiments they are pushing revisionism even farther than their predecessor did. On the other hand, the danger that the process may go too far is obliging them not only to retain the centralized management of the economy at the highest level—witness the virtual abolition of the sovnarkhoz system and its replacement by management according to economic branches—but also to intensify the Party's dogmatic influence and its control over the country's entire intellectual and spiritual life. The church-state of Communism, which claims the right to rule not only in temporal but also in spiritual things, is increasing its totalitarian dogmatic pressure in its ambition to create a quasi-theocratic oligarchy of Communism. All the changes introduced by Brezhnev and his colleagues into the power structure become clear in the light of this quasi-medieval "counterreformation."

The revival of the title of Secretary General and of the Stalinist term Politburo for the Central Committee Presidium is at the moment of psychological rather than real significance: one does not become a dictator merely by assuming the title of one. Even so, the trend is a noteworthy one: the dream, evidently nurtured by certain individuals at the top of the power structure, of becoming Secretary General of the Party is not only a reflection of personal ambition but also implies recognition of the impossibility of solving the problems facing Communism

without a one-man rule. One indubitable fact, however, is that the importance of the Presidium has increased while that of the Central Committee, which displayed its will on two critical occasions—the removal of the “anti-Party group” in 1957 and to an even greater degree the removal of Khrushchev in 1964—has been correspondingly reduced. The reduced frequency of plenary sessions and the introduction of “Party conferences”—plenary sessions attended not only by Central Committee members but also by other Party men of secondary importance, to be summoned as and when the Politburo determines—increase the importance of the latter body and reduce the Central Committee to the status it had under Stalin. All these measures are designed to strengthen the power of the collective leadership. Another even more important step in the same direction is the abandonment of the practice, introduced by Khrushchev at the Twenty-Second Party Congress, of systematically replacing (at the rate of not less than 30 percent every three or four years) leading “cadres” in the Party apparatus in order to give ambitious juniors a chance to become a raion or oblast first secretary. Now, Brezhnev is assuring the “inner Party” a permanently privileged position as the basis and instrument of power of the oligarchy. Khrushchev’s rotation of cadres has proved sufficiently dangerous to the Party’s leaders and the stability of power for his successors to prefer older and steadier men in responsible positions, in the spirit of the proverb “More haste, less speed”; but less haste and slower rotation are not the best means of promoting a movement which is supposed to be revolutionary, especially when there is competition from the more dynamic Chinese.

Finally, a word must be said about the important ideological switch from national-Communist trends to socialist solidarity within the socialist camp. These trends arose after World War II when the *locale* for building socialism was extended from a single country to a whole group of countries, and led to the disintegration not only of the socialist camp but of the Communist movement in general. Now that polycentrism, a burdensome heritage from the post-Stalin period, has become an almost permanent feature of the Communist bloc, the Soviet leaders are attempting to prevent the further disintegration of this bloc by playing the trump card of socialist solidarity.

Such is the logic behind the contradictory decisions adopted at the Twenty-Third Congress; but to discover the reasons for anomalous decisions is not necessarily, of course, to discover the means of removing the anomalies. Not only Western observers but members of the Politburo itself must be wondering what will result from this concoction of economic liberalism and ideological orthodoxy. Only the future can show whether an authoritarian system without a one-man dictatorship can be effective, although it should not be forgotten that an even more powerful Directoire, that formed in 1953 after the death of Stalin, found itself confronted within three months by the Beriya affair and subsequently by a certain emancipation of society and the armed forces from the Party’s influence, an emancipation which led to the inevitable Party reaction in the one-man rule of Khrushchev. Finally, it may be asked whether the call for socialist

solidarity will really prove to be a trump card in view of the Chinese Communists' even stronger ambitions to consolidate the socialist camp around themselves.

Such are the problems which faced the Soviet Party leaders before the Congress and which continue to face them now.

N. Galay

II—The Economic Reform

The economic reform set forth at the plenary sessions of the Party Central Committee in March and September of last year, whose basic features are market relations and a reduction of the disproportion between light and heavy industry, was not the result of good will on the part of the Soviet leaders. It was rather dictated by practical requirements: the Soviet economy was in an *impasse* from which purely administrative measures had failed to extricate it.

Within the Party Central Committee, the reform had its supporters and its opponents. Both factions realized that its implementation would lead to a far-reaching liberalization of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. However, whereas the former took this as a calculated risk, the latter were alarmed at such a prospect.

The intra-Party conflict stirred up by the reform left its imprint on the resolutions adopted during the March and September plenary meetings, which were vague and contradictory, particularly on the subject of industrial management. As a result, the dogmatists, such as Academician N. Fedorenko, continued their attacks against the reform, while the latter's most active initiators, for example Professor Liberman, welcome the reform as a departure from the remnants of dogmatism in the economic sphere and a step toward great social transformations and continued to press for its thorough implementation.

Verbal clashes between the two opposing schools of thought continued until shortly before the opening of the Twenty-Third Party Congress. On March 1, for example, Y. Tavrov asserted in a *Pravda* article that

... it would be profoundly erroneous to suppose that the immutable precept of priority for the development of heavy industry is being subjected to reappraisal. We adhered to it in the past, and we adhere to it now.

On March 22, this argument was countered by Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Venzher in an article printed in *Komsomolskaya pravda* under the heading "It Benefits Everyone." Venzher is noted for the fact that under Stalin he proposed dissolving the Machine and Tractor Stations and handing over all agricultural machinery to the collective farms. In his work *The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, published in 1952, Stalin attacked this proposal as a departure from Communism on the grounds that its implementation would result in a spread of market relations. For a long time after this criticism, Venzher's views were not published. In his *Komsomolskaya pravda* article, Venzher now expressed the view that so long as agriculture was neglected in favor of industry it would not be able to satisfy domestic needs. He wrote:

For many years, the balance of income and expenditure between town and country on a national scale was to the advantage of industry. If we take into account

everything realized by state and collective farms in the form of net income (profit) and everything received by rural areas in the form of various services (education, health services, pre-school children's institutions, social insurance, etc.), adding to this the share of state expenditure on administration and defense borne by the rural population, it becomes, in our view, apparent that agriculture is continuing to receive from the national economy less than is required for a more complete observance of the principle of equivalency in the distribution of income and expenditure between industry and agriculture.

As a second lever for solving the agricultural problem, Venzher proposes "rational specialization in state and collective farm production." He adds, however, that such specialization is impossible without establishing direct market relations between individual socialist enterprises and between enterprise and consumer, and in this connection criticizes the purchasing system adopted by the Party Central Committee in March 1965. In his view, the purchasing organizations rather than the farms should be set firm quotas by the state, since then the farms would no longer be compelled to fulfill unrealistic quotas, and the purchasing organizations could choose their own suppliers. Venzher also criticized the resolutions adopted at the Party's September meeting, in particular the restoration of industrial management by branches, which, he said, was causing "narrow specialization to the detriment of combine formation."

The Twenty-Third Party Congress was to put a stop to these polemics and mark out a clear path of economic reform. In this it may be said to have failed; it satisfied neither the dogmatists nor the reformers, attempting instead to combine two incompatible viewpoints. This is only too clear from Brezhnev's and Kosygin's speeches, from the ensuing discussions and from the final resolutions. Brezhnev, for example, merely reiterated the first economic policy statements made by the new Soviet leaders after Khrushchev's overthrow, together with general declarations of intent to push ahead with the task of creating the material and technical basis of Communism. On the economic reform itself he had only this to say:

At the Party Central Committee's plenary meetings in March and September, a new approach to economic management was worked out and the principles of the Party's economic policy at the present stage of our development defined. These principles consist in enhancing the role of economic methods and stimuli in the management of the national economy, radically improving state planning, broadening the economic self-sufficiency and initiative of enterprises and state and collective farms, increasing the responsibility of production collectives and their interest in the results of their work . . .

Much has still to be done before the new system of planning and economic incentives can be fully implemented. This is one of the important tasks facing us in the next few years.¹

It is evident from this that, unlike the wholehearted supporters of the reform, the Party Central Committee, which had already approved Brezhnev's report, merely proposed a partial broadening of market relations to the Congress, and

¹ *Pravda*, March 30, 1966.

this the Congress accepted. Brezhnev did, however, make a certain concession to the reformists in his statement that

The Party Central Committee considers that working people's incomes should be raised primarily by increasing the monetary wages of wage and salary earners and by increasing the remuneration of work performed on the public sector of collective farms.²

This contradicted the line laid down in the Party Program adopted at the previous Congress, according to which

... as the country advances toward Communism, personal needs will be increasingly met out of public consumption funds, whose rate of growth will exceed the rate of growth of payments for labor.³

The so-called "public consumption funds" (i.e., free or reduced-rate public services) satisfy consumer demands outside market relations, which they thus tend to restrict, whereas monetary remuneration has the opposite effect. In other words, the 20-year Communist construction program proclaimed by Khrushchev in 1961 has now been postponed, so that for the reformists all is not yet lost. We said before that the new emphasis on monetary remuneration was a concession to the reformists; it would perhaps be truer to say that it was a concession to reality. The day-to-day construction of Communism had shown that the ousting of monetary remuneration by "public consumption funds" was slowing down the growth of labor productivity. The latter system of payment was unpopular among the workers. This is only understandable in view of the fact that the "public consumption funds" were used for health resorts, rest homes, boarding houses, pensions, private cars and other sundry privileges for the Party élite.

The Congress did not enter into a discussion of the inefficiency resulting from economic management by branches, although only two months previously *Pravda* had printed a letter in which machine-building plants complained that the Ferrous Metallurgy Ministry was deciding, without reference to the profitability principle, which metallurgical enterprise should supply metal to which machine-building plant.⁴ This, in fact, is what Venzher meant by "narrow specialization to the detriment of combine formation." True, N. G. Yegorychev, First Secretary of the Party's Moscow City Committee, remarked in his Congress speech that "there is by no means always the required mutual understanding between all enterprises economically linked in a production process," and that quality was suffering as a result, but this was as far as he went.⁵

In general, it may be said that the Party is continuing its centralist economic policy, and is trying to avoid the consequences of economic reality by partial concessions and half-measures.

I. W. Majstrenko

² *Ibid.*

³ *Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1961, p. 84.

⁴ *Pravda*, January 30, 1966.

⁵ *Ibid.*, March 31, 1966.

III—Personnel Changes

On April 7, the members and candidate members of the Party Central Committee and the members of the Central Auditing Commission were elected. On April 8, the final day of the Congress, a plenary session of the new Central Committee was held.

At the latter, eleven members and eight candidate members were elected to the Central Committee's Politburo (formerly Presidium). The members were L. I. Brezhnev, A. P. Kirilenko, A. N. Kosygin, K. T. Mazurov, A. J. Pelše, N. V. Podgorny, D. S. Polyansky, A. N. Shelepin, P. Y. Shelest, M. A. Suslov and G. I. Voronov, and the candidate members P. N. Demichev, V. V. Grishin, D. A. Kunayev, P. M. Masharov, V. P. Mzhavanadze, Sh. R. Rashidov, V. V. Shcherbitsky and D. F. Ustinov. L. I. Brezhnev was elected Secretary General (formerly First Secretary) and Y. V. Andropov, P. N. Demichev, I. V. Kapitonov, A. P. Kirilenko, F. D. Kulakov, B. N. Ponomarev, A. P. Rudakov, A. N. Shelepin, M. A. Suslov and D. F. Ustinov secretaries of the Party Central Committee. A. J. Pelše was elected Chairman of the Party Control Committee, and G. F. Sizov Chairman of the Central Auditing Commission (the latter at a separate session of this Commission).

The numerical composition of the Politburo is exactly the same as that of the old Presidium if it is considered that, although the latter formally had twelve full members and only seven candidate members, N. M. Shvernik had long ceased to take any part in the Presidium's activities, and was thus, to all intents and purposes, merely a candidate member. Only A. I. Mikoyan and Shvernik of the Presidium members and L. N. Yefremov of the candidate members were not reelected to the Politburo. In the case of Mikoyan, this was no surprise in view of his request last December to be relieved of the duties of Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman on account of advanced age and poor health (whether these were the real reasons for his resignation is, of course, another matter). Age and failing health were certainly responsible for the non-reelection of the 78-year-old Shvernik, whose poor mobility and hearing have long been apparent. As for Yefremov, since November 1964 he has been First Secretary of the Stavropol Krai Committee, and it is strange that he should have retained the title of Presidium Candidate Member for so long.

The only new full member in the Politburo is Pelše, formerly First Secretary of the Latvian Party Central Committee. His promotion was presumably occasioned by the need to find a man with a long Party record and a revolutionary past to replace the old Bolshevik Shvernik as Chairman of the Party Control Committee, a position which traditionally carries with it membership of the top Party organ. Pelše was one of the few eligible candidates; he has been a Party member since 1915, in 1917 was a member of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies and a delegate at the Party's Sixth Congress, and two years later took part in the attempt to bring Latvia under Soviet control.

The two new Politburo candidate members are Kunayev and Masharov, First Secretaries of the Kazakh and Belorussian Party Central Committees

respectively. Although their election seems only natural in view of the long-apparent practice of giving the most important republics representation in the top Party organs, Masherov, who has been head of the Belorussian Communist Party for only one year, probably owes his advancement more to a past intimate working relationship with certain of the established Politburo members. During the war, for example, Masherov, as commissar of a partisan youth brigade in Belorussia, had close contact with Mazurov, then in charge of the republic's underground youth, and immediately after the war worked under Mazurov as a secretary of the Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee. In 1947, Masherov replaced Mazurov as First Secretary of the latter Committee, and thus became a colleague of Shelepin, then Second Secretary (he later became First Secretary) of the Committee.

Thus, the numerical and personnel composition of the Politburo remains virtually the same as that of its predecessor, the Party Central Committee Presidium, so that the renaming of the latter appears to have no deeper political significance. The personnel changes have, on the other hand, resulted in a certain rejuvenation of the top Party organ.

The number of Party Central Committee secretaries was increased to eleven by the election of A. P. Kirilenko. Kirilenko had been virtually running the Central Committee's RSFSR Bureau as one of the latter's First Deputy Chairmen; the Chairman himself, Brezhnev, was otherwise occupied, while the other First Deputy Chairman, Yefremov, was tied down by his Party work in Stavropol. Although the Bureau was dissolved at the Congress, control still has to be exercised over the republic's oblast and krai committees, a function which evidently remains in the hands of Kirilenko as one of the Party Central Committee's secretaries.

We have already spoken of Shvernik's replacement by Pelše as Chairman of the Party Control Committee. Here it should be added that press reports on the plenary session of April 8 contained no reference to the election of a First Deputy Chairman for this Committee, whereas prior to the Congress it had been stressed that Z. T. Serdyuk held this position. This reticence was evidently motivated by a desire not to belittle the merits of Pelše, who, unlike Shvernik, is still able and energetic. As for Serdyuk, who had been the effective head of the Committee, he was not elected to a single Party organ at the Congress, and has presumably paid the price for the Committee's failure to prevent the Party's ranks from becoming badly sullied in recent years.

As regards the Party Central Committee itself, 195 members and 165 candidate members were elected, as compared with 175 and 155 at the Twenty-Second Congress.

Of the 174 previous members, 147, or 84 percent, were reelected in this capacity, while 25 were not elected to any of the Party's top-level organs. The latter were: G. G. Abramov, G. A. Denisov, F. I. Golikov, N. F. Ignatov, L. F. Ilchev, O. I. Ivashchenko, N. S. Khrushchev, A. G. Krylov, P. S. Kuchumov,

L. I. Lubennikov, N. F. Manukovsky, N. A. Mukhitdinov, V. I. Polyakov, P. A. Satyukov, I. S. Senin, Z. T. Serdyuk, V. A. Shurygin, V. V. Skryabin, S. A. Stepanov, N. P. Tolubeyev, G. I. Vorobev, G. V. Yelyutin, V. V. Yermilov, Y. N. Zarobyan and I. K. Zhegalin. In addition, P. A. Rozenko was downgraded to candidate member, while G. F. Sizov was elected to the Central Auditing Commission (although the Commission elected him Chairman in place of N. A. Muraveva, Sizov too must be regarded as having been downgraded).

There were 48 new members. Of these, 25 had never before served in a top-level Party organ, namely A. P. Aleksandrov, S. A. Antonov, A. Askarov, N. K. Baibakov, A. P. Beloborodov, A. M. Borodin, P. D. Borodin, V. I. Degtyarev, P. D. Grushin, K. F. Katushev, V. V. Kholyavko, Sh. K. Kospanov, L. S. Kulichenko, S. G. Lapin, V. G. Lomonosov, V. V. Matskevich, V. Y. Pavlov, G. V. Romanov, A. M. Tokarev, S. P. Trapeznikov, G. I. Vashchenko, N. F. Vasilev, K. Y. Voroshilov, A. F. Yeshtokin and S. A. Zverev. A further twenty had been candidate members: P. F. Batitsky, M. Beisebayev, B. Y. Butoma, L. Y. Florentev, S. D. Khitrov, V. A. Kirillin, A. Y. Kochinyan, P. V. Kovanov, V. I. Kozlov, K. K. Nikolayev, B. Y. Paton, J. V. Peive, I. Y. Polyakov, N. N. Rodionov, A. I. Shokin, A. A. Skochilov, A. I. Struyev, N. A. Tikhonov, A. F. Vatchenko and G. S. Zolotukhin. The remaining three, V. F. Promyslov, V. I. Stepakov and M. V. Zimyanin, had been members of the Central Auditing Commission.

Of the previous 138 candidate members, 70 were reelected in this capacity and 20 elected full members, as we have seen. A further 47 were not elected to a top-level Party organ: Y. I. Afanasenko, A. A. Annaliyev, Sh. M. Arushanyan, A. F. Borisov, S. Z. Borisov, A. S. Bukharov, A. T. Chabanenko, Y. A. Dolinyuk, V. R. Filippov, N. P. Firyubin, M. A. Gavrilov, M. A. Iskenderov, A. V. Ivashchenko, I. A. Kairov, S. V. Kalchenko, N. D. Khudaiberdyev, F. S. Kolomiyets, N. F. Kozinets, V. V. Krotov, P. N. Kумыkin, A. S. Kuzmich, N. Y. Mamai, I. T. Marchenko, N. A. Melnikov, M. A. Menshikov, M. M. Musakhanov, M. A. Olshansky, G. I. Orlov, M. A. Pimenov, I. A. Pliyev, M. A. Polekhin, M. M. Privalov, S. I. Rudenko, Y. Y. Savitsky, V. A. Sayushev, I. M. Semenov, N. N. Semenov, V. A. Semenov, N. I. Smirnov, V. P. Sotnikov, V. P. Stepanov, N. I. Strokina, V. A. Sudets, A. A. Surkov, A. T. Tvardovsky, V. S. Yemelyanov and I. Y. Yusupov. The remaining candidate member, A. A. Müürisepp, was elected member of the Central Auditing Commission, which amounted to a demotion.

There were 95 new candidate members. Of these, 82 had not served in a top-level Party organ: S. S. Abramenko, Y. Y. Alekseyevsky, E. N. Alikhanov, N. N. Amelko, D. D. Angelev, N. V. Bannikov, R. A. Belskikh, B. F. Bratchenko, K. U. Chernenko, G. I. Chiryayev, A. P. Chubarov, V. A. Demchenko, V. F. Dobrik, A. F. Dobrynin, V. N. Doyenin, M. Gapurov, M. P. Georgadze, F. P. Golovchenko, K. S. Grushevoi, V. Y. Isayev, N. T. Kalchenko, Y. F. Karpova, M. I. Klepikov, F. K. Knyazev, V. I. Kochemasov, N. G. Kochetkov, L. A. Kostandov, N. T. Kozlov, A. S. Kremen, G. A. Kriulin, V. S. Kutsevol, N. A.

Kuznetsov, I. A. Lavrenov, Y. K. Ligachev, S. M. Lobov, Y. F. Loginov, N. G. Lyashchenko, P. R. Malofeyev, V. K. Marisov, S. S. Maryakhin, N. N. Mesyatsev, D. I. Mikhailov, A. U. Modogoyev, B. A. Muradyan, M. M. Musukhanov, A. M. Muzhitsky, P. S. Neporozhny, S. B. Niyazbekov, N. V. Ogarkov, B. N. Pastukhov, G. P. Pavlov, B. V. Petrovsky, P. T. Pimenov, M. T. Poberei, M. G. Popova, P. A. Rodionov, N. N. Romanov, V. P. Ruben, V. N. Rykov, V. F. Shauro, N. A. Shchelokov, A. S. Sheremetov, A. F. Shevchenko, A. V. Sidorenko, I. F. Sinitsyn, P. K. Sizov, I. G. Slazhnev, A. N. Smirnov, S. L. Sokolov, N. N. Tarasov, V. S. Tikunov, A. A. Titarenko, L. N. Tolkunov, P. V. Urayev, A. P. Vader, S. I. Vorotnikov, M. N. Vsevolzhsky, F. B. Yakubovsky, M. K. Yangel, A. A. Yezhevsky, K. I. Zarodov and N. I. Zhurin. The following twelve had been members of the Central Auditing Commission: R. F. Dementeva, V. I. Drozdenko, B. V. Gorodovikov, D. P. Goryunov, B. Y. Kabaloyev, G. I. Kozlov, V. I. Podzerko, V. S. Semenov, I. I. Senkin, I. M. Vladychenko, A. G. Yegorov and P. M. Yeslistratov. As we have noted, the remaining new candidate member, P. A. Rozenko, had previously been a full member.

Petr Kruzhin

The Communist Bloc

Who Will Bury Whom?

During a characteristic tirade, Khrushchev made the macabre forecast that the Communists would one day "bury" their capitalist foes. He was firmly convinced that the funeral would take place in a not-too-distant future and as the result of "peaceful competition" between the two world systems. According to the current Party program, approved under Khrushchev, the USSR is to catch up with the USA in the field of industrial production by 1970 at the latest and establish a commanding lead by 1980. This would mean that the USSR would take over the mantle of world leadership from the USA by about 1970.

For the late German publicist Fritz Sternberg, however, the situation was not so clear-cut. In his book *Wer beherrscht die zweite Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts?*, which came out at almost the same time as Khrushchev made his now-famous remark, Sternberg expressed the view that no single super-power would dominate the second half of the twentieth century, and tentatively forecast that both China and India would become world powers and that many emerging nations would come to play a decisive role in global affairs.

The Soviet leaders have since come to take a considerably more sober view of their chances of overtaking the USA economically. It now seems that Sternberg's prognosis was very much more realistic than Khrushchev's. Sternberg used the following analogy to depict the rates of development of the USSR, the USA and Communist China:

America has been compared to a racing driver who is way out in front but finds, when he looks behind, that the man in second place, Russia, is moving the faster of the two. This may soon be true of the relationship between the Soviet Union and China.¹

It is unfortunately impossible to verify properly whether this prediction of Sternberg's is coming true, since the Chinese have published no comprehensive economic statistics for years. Since, however, the Chinese now admit having suffered several bad years it hardly seems likely that they will have succeeded in gaining ground on the USSR either economically or militarily. Moreover, Communist sources indicate that the USSR has also not succeeded in gaining ground on the USA. Indeed, the gap between the two countries may even have widened. The Soviet Union is having to cope with the teething troubles involved in the long-overdue modernization of its industrial management methods, as well as with its ever-present agricultural crisis. In a major speech before the Party Central Committee on September 27 of last year, Kosygin was forced to concede that the national income, industrial production per ruble of invested capital and the growth rate of industrial labor productivity were all on the decline.² Kosygin's revelation merely confirmed what many Communist experts had been saying for some time. In March 1965, for example, A. Alekseyev and I. Ivanova had pointed out in the journal *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* that Comecon's economic growth rate was tending to drop, as a result of which the lead which Comecon had built up over the "capitalist" countries in respect of growth rate of industrial production had diminished during the past four years.³ Alekseyev and Ivanova set forth this development in the following table:

Yearly or Average Yearly Growth of Industrial Production
in the Socialist and Capitalist Countries, 1951-63
(Percentages)

Socialist Countries.	1951-55	1956-60	1961	1962	1963
Excluding Comecon Countries	13.7	13.6	4.0	4.0	7.0
Including Comecon Countries	13.3	10.4	9.0	9.0	8.0
Capital Countries.*					
Excluding EEC Countries	6.0	4.0	3.0	6.0	4.0
Including EEC Countries	9.0	7.0	6.0	6.0	5.0

* Includes developing countries.

SOURCE: *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, 1965, No. 3, p. 27.

In addition to offering a comparison between the "socialist" and "capitalist" growth rates, the above table shows that during the period 1951-60 China—the major Communist industrial nation outside Comecon—outpaced the Comecon countries, only to fall behind in the next three years. The Comecon countries, for their part, dropped well behind the non-Communist countries during the latter period. This circumstance is particularly remarkable in view of the fact

¹ Fritz Sternberg, *Wer beherrscht die zweite Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts?*, 2nd ed., Munich, 1963, p. 168.

² *Pravda*, September 28, 1965.

³ *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, 1965, No. 3, p. 26.

that the category "capitalist countries" includes the developing countries. In 1964, however, most of the Communist countries were able to increase their industrial growth rates, as we see from the following table:

Growth of Industrial Production in the Communist Countries, 1963-64
(Percentages)

	1963	1964
Albania	6.7	7.4
Bulgaria	10.0	11.1
China	—	15.0
Cuba	6.0	7.0
Czechoslovakia	0.6	4.1
Eastern Germany	4.3	6.7
Hungary	6.6	8.9
Mongolia	5.5	4.0
North Korea	8.0	17.0
North Vietnam	7.5	10.7
Poland	5.5	9.3
Rumania	12.5	14.1
USSR	8.1	7.1
Yugoslavia	15.5	16.0

SOURCE: *Pravda*, March 22, 1965

This table shows that in 1964 Communist China again drew a little closer to the USSR as regards industrial growth. It also shows that the Soviet growth rate dropped once more, which further diminished the USSR's prospects of achieving its declared aim of overtaking the USA. Although in 1965 the USSR apparently boosted its industrial growth rate to 8.5 percent, the increase planned for this year is an unprecedentedly low 6.7 percent,⁴ a figure which is tantamount to a withdrawal of the Soviet challenge to the USA. This conclusion is strengthened when we examine the growth rates of the major "capitalist" countries:

**Growth of Industrial Production in
Major Non-Communist Countries, 1961-65**
(Percentages)

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	
					First Quarter	Second Quarter
All Non-Communist Countries	3.0	6.8	5.5	7.8	6.6	—
USA	1.0	7.9	4.6	6.1	8.5	7.4
Great Britain	1.0	0.9	3.9	7.5	4.4	2.6
Western Germany	6.0	4.7	3.6	8.7	7.3	6.5
France	6.0	5.7	4.5	7.7	-1.6	-0.8
Italy	11.0	9.9	8.2	0.8	-2.2	—
Japan	19.0	8.4	10.1	16.9	8.2	4.3

SOURCE: Supplement to *Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus*, East Berlin, 1965, No. 11, p. 1.

The last two tables show clearly that the tendency is for the USA to continue increasing her lead over the USSR. Moreover, the USA is increasing her share of the industrial production of the "capitalist" world, as we see from the following table:

⁴ *Pravda*, December 8, 1965.

**Share of Individual Countries and Groups of Countries
in Non-Communist Industrial Production, 1961-65**
(Percentages)

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Developing Countries	9.0	9.0	9.1	9.1	8.6
Developed Countries	91.0	91.0	90.9	90.9	91.4
USA	44.8	45.2	45.2	44.7	46.1
Japan	5.3	5.4	5.7	6.2	4.7
Western Europe	35.7	34.9	34.6	34.2	35.3
Great Britain	9.2	8.7	8.5	8.5	9.4
Western Germany	9.8	9.7	9.4	9.6	9.6
France	4.8	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7
Italy	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.6	3.4

SOURCE: Supplement to *Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus*, East Berlin, 1965, No. 11, p. 2.

The USA, in fact, is well on the way to acquiring a fifty-percent share of the industrial production of the entire "capitalist" world. She produces almost five times as much as her nearest rival, Western Germany. Only a united Europe enjoying a fresh economic boom could seriously endanger the US hegemony. At the same time, the table contains no indication that the developing countries are forming new centers of power, as Sternberg suggested they would; the share of all these countries in the industrial production of the free world is less than that of Western Germany alone, and, more significantly, it has remained virtually static since 1961.

In general, the relative economic stability of the developed free-world nations can no longer be dismissed as a transient phenomenon, a fact which is being increasingly recognized in the Communist press. The *World Marxist Review* (the English-language edition of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*), contains a number of fairly objective analyses of this development in its November 1965 issue. In one of them, Czech economist Ludek Urban writes:

Twenty years have passed since the Second World War—a span equal to the interval between the two world wars. This naturally prompts one to essay some comparisons between the economic development of capitalism in the postwar period and in the interval between the wars. Even a cursory comparison with the twenties, and especially with the ten years of economic stagnation that preceded the outbreak of the Second World War, shows that the postwar period has been marked by greater stability.

Some of the basic differences are apparent at once.

First, postwar rates of economic growth have been higher. In the developed industrial countries, *per capita* production growth in the fifties was double the prewar rate, notwithstanding the breaking away of the colonial hinterland of imperialism. The economic advance was largely stimulated by the development of external economic relations, especially between the developed countries.⁵

This is tantamount to an admission that the Western industrial nations have achieved twenty years of prosperity for the most part independently of either the

⁵ *World Marxist Review: Problems of Peace and Socialism*, London, 1965, No. 11, p. 31.

"socialist" or the developing countries. Urban goes on to concede that "capitalist political economy has unquestionably made some progress in apprehending how the mechanism of the capitalist economy operates in present-day conditions," and that in the leading "capitalist" countries the state has not only become a major investor but has stimulated technological progress by shouldering a substantial proportion of the cost of basic and applied research. He also admits that "with the transition of capitalism to monopoly it can no longer be regarded as a realm of unbridled anarchy" and that the "spontaneity" of capitalism's economic development is giving way to planning. Urban concludes from this that conditions in the capitalist countries are ripe for the transition to "socialism," but that this transition must be brought about by the "revolutionary" forces in these countries.⁶ He does not seem to realize that in most Western industrial countries such forces are virtually non-existent.

To return to our main question: Who will bury whom? Who will dominate the second half of the twentieth century?

If this question were purely a matter of economic development, it would be quite simple to answer. In such a case, the distribution of power in the world would scarcely change in the course of the next few decades. The West now seems relatively immune to recessions, while the USSR's industrial growth rate is beginning to come down to the level usual in the West. The USSR would only stand a chance of overtaking the USA if the latter country were to experience a prolonged period of stagnation, an eventuality which even Soviet-bloc experts discount. Given a continuation of peaceful economic competition, the USA would remain the world's leading power, followed by the USSR. China can hardly hope to do better than slightly reduce the gap separating her from the USSR, while India is likely to need foreign aid for some time to come. As for the developing countries as a whole, prospects are not particularly bright: economic aid has so far failed materially to increase their share of the world's industrial production, and there are no signs that this aid will be either stepped up or used to greater effect in the future.

Whether and to what extent the highly-developed capitalist world can consolidate its economic lead depends in no small measure on the success of the integration movement in Western Europe, an area which if unified has much better prospects of emerging as a third world power than Communist China. It now seems reasonably certain that the unification of Western Europe will, in fact, be achieved, despite the current existence of two separate trade blocs, the EEC and EFTA, and despite the crisis now bedeviling the former and the structural weaknesses of the latter; the economic and other advantages offered by such an arrangement are only too obvious, and the presidential elections in France have shown that there too the "Europeans" are on the advance. Even the Communists appear convinced that the United States of Europe will one day become a reality. Fernand Nicolon, a French Communist economist,

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-35.

voiced the opinion that the problems now preoccupying the Common Market would eventually be overcome, conceding that while "aggravating the numerous contradictions of capitalism" the Community had "strengthened the solidarity of the bourgeoisie of the different countries" and "impelled coordination of their national policies."⁷ Nicolon believes that economic integration in Western Europe will not be confined to the Common Market, concluding that

—economic integration of Western Europe is an urgent necessity dictated by the development of science, technology and the productive forces, and by the growing socialization of production;

—owing to geographical, economic and political factors, the six countries now associated in the EEC seem to be predestined to be the focal point of the integration, despite the deep-seated contradictions between them on many issues. . .

—the power of attraction exerted by this integration zone on neighboring countries is likely to grow, and the EFTA countries will most likely find themselves drawn closer to the EEC economically, politically and perhaps even organizationally.⁸

At the same time, Nicolon contends that an integrated Europe, as a "zone of capitalist development," can only become economically, financially and politically consolidated if it "increasingly challenges US imperialist leadership."⁹ This view, which reflects Communist wishful thinking as to the gravity of tensions in the capitalist world, receives scant support among the EEC and EFTA countries, with the possible exception of France, the general desire being for a united Europe working with, not against, the USA.

However, the general world trend which we have outlined is conditional upon the continuation of peaceful economic development, and here it would be perhaps appropriate to list what are probably the three major threats to world peace.

Firstly, Soviet Communism may be faced with a grave ideological crisis some time after 1970, and by 1980 at the latest, if it does not gain its proclaimed economic victory over the USA and thereby prove that Communism is the sole possible economic system for mankind and the only solution to the "inner contradictions" of capitalism. The Soviets may well be tempted to make the "imperialists" the scapegoat for this failure (hints to this effect may be found in their Party Program) and—especially if the policy of peaceful coexistence fails to promote Soviet expansionism—lead to a radicalization of Soviet policy.

Secondly, Communist China, although relatively weak economically, is quite determined to play the role of a great power and is trying to alter the *status quo* by fomenting "wars of national revolution" in countries such as Laos, Vietnam and Indonesia. Rich in revolutionary experience, China is on the way to taking over the theoretical and practical leadership of the world revolution from Moscow.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹ *Ibid.*

Thirdly, roughly two-thirds of the world's inhabitants are living in developing countries whose economic situation is frequently desperate, despite injections of foreign aid. These countries are ripe for civil war, whether instigated by the Chinese or not.

Of these three potential sources of danger to world peace, the first is probably the least serious. Soviet Communism, like all other ideologies in their time, has changed, and it will continue to do so. It is most unlikely that, if confronted with an ideological crisis of the kind indicated, the Soviets would launch a nuclear war out of desperation. They would have little to gain and very much to lose in such a war. They could, of course, make an attempt at territorial expansion by force of arms, but since such attempts have brought them little in the past (the East European satellite regimes were set up beneath the shadow of Soviet bayonets, and did not owe their existence to civil uprisings), they are unlikely to risk much in this respect. Much more probable is that Moscow would resort to further revisionism as a way out of its ideological *impasse*. Another important factor to be considered is that even if the Soviet Communists were more or less to renounce their goal of world revolution, they would still have a great historical task to fulfill, namely the building of Communism in the USSR itself.

As regards Communist China, the situation is different. The Chinese Communists are every bit as nationalistic as their forebears. They have not forgotten that the Middle Kingdom once stretched out to the boundaries of the Roman Empire, and that it was the stronger of the two. Neither have they forgotten that their ancestors once exercised control over large areas to the south of China. The Chinese are strengthened in these sentiments by an awareness of their Communist role of "liberators" and a firm belief that in the "revolutionary war" they possess a very much cheaper and more effective weapon than the atomic bomb. Vietnam is a classic example of China's thousands-of-years-old tactics of "fighting to the last foreign soldier."

Even in Asia, the threat of Communist Chinese expansionism was not at first recognized. Nehru, for example, long believed in China's peaceful intentions, particularly in view of the fact that China had promised at the Bandung conference not to use force in disputes with participating countries. The bloody suppression of Tibet by the Chinese Army shocked Nehru, but his eyes were only really opened by the Chinese attack against India in the autumn of 1962. In 1964, shortly before his death, a disillusioned Nehru warned in an interview with an Austrian journalist:

Peking quite simply wants to be the boss in Asia. In order to achieve this she must put her most serious rival, India, out of the running. However, Peking wants even more. Once assured of a dominating influence in Asia, she will then, operating from this colossal base, file her claims to be a world power with all the expansive force which has marked Chinese history for thousands of years and which the Middle Kingdom has by no means lost even today.¹⁰

¹⁰ *Die Welt*, Hamburg, January 4, 1964.

Moreover, Indonesian nationalists were forcibly reminded last autumn that their country's Communist Party was in reality a fifth column of Peking. Even so, there is far from a general awareness of the Chinese danger. There are still many who do not comprehend that the war in Vietnam is only one element in China's drive to alter the global *status quo* in her favor, that if the USA were to pull out of South Vietnam "wars of national liberation" would very quickly flare up in countries such as Burma and Indonesia. China's possibilities should not be underestimated; the Vietnamese conflict has proved that her supporters are able to fight on for years and years if necessary, and it is also clear that under other circumstances China could use the considerable sums of money which she is pouring into the conflict for economic aid as a means of gaining influence in developing countries.

However, Chinese expansion would not stand a chance were it not for the urgent problems confronting the developing countries. The poverty in many of these countries is an ideal breeding ground for "revolutionary wars." The war in Vietnam may be only the first in a series of explosions in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is for this reason imperative to bring prosperity to these regions as soon as possible.

Thus, although the world's leading industrial nations may expect a continuing economic boom, they are threatened with encirclement as a result of a world revolution instigated by the Chinese in the underdeveloped areas. Whether they will be able to cope with this threat is perhaps the biggest question mark hanging over the second half of the present century.

Stefan C. Stolte

The Economy

Manpower Utilization in the USSR

It is a frequent Soviet contention that the problem of training, distributing and exploiting manpower is by no means the same in the USSR, with its planned "socialist" economy, as it is in the West, where the market economy is favored. However, this is only true to a limited extent, as we shall try to show.

For many years now, the Soviets have been dogmatically asserting, in propaganda brochures as well as in economic literature, that only the Soviet-style planned economy, based on public ownership of the means of production, can ensure full employment, and that only the "socialist" system, which is devoid of "parasitic" elements, can ensure that available manpower is used as rationally as possible. We read, for example, in the *Dictionary of Political Economy*:

The socialist economy liquidates unemployment finally and for ever, and enables the labor resources of a society to be utilized in the most rational and exhaustive way possible.¹

Soviet economists maintain that "in the USSR the problem of employment does not exist in the same form as in capitalist countries, where there is unemployment," inasmuch as "the socialist society deliberately keeps the ratio between accumulation and consumption at a level ensuring... constant employment throughout an increasing population."² Nevertheless, there is a growing awareness that unemployment is in fact developing into a real problem. Soviet journalist K. Bukovsky came to this conclusion after a prolonged study of small-town life in the RSFSR, and added:

History shows that we shall not solve this problem [employment] if we devote our attention only to creating industrial complexes and centers and large factories and plants.³

Even Kosygin admitted at last September's plenary session of the Party Central Committee that

There are considerable manpower reserves in small towns, particularly in the western regions of the Ukraine, Belorussia, several regions of Transcaucasia, and also in some of the central regions of the RSFSR. It should be pointed out that one of the reasons for this situation is the tendency of economic organizations, committees and ministries to expand production and build new enterprises primarily in large cities. This can in no way be accepted as correct.⁴

The growth of labor productivity, the size and composition of the labor force, the size of the total wages fund, average wages, the distribution of the labor force according to geographical regions and branches of the national economy, and vocational training are all laid down in the overall labor plan, which has had the force of law ever since 1928, when the First Five-Year Plan came into effect. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of Soviet labor planning remains minimal. Only a small part of manpower circulation, namely vocational training (including advanced training), organized personnel selection, the transfer of workers from one enterprise to another, and the resettlement of collective farm workers, is in fact subjected to directive planning. Even here, however, a *laissez faire* attitude is by no means uncommon. Thus, even in such a booming region as the Maritime Krai, over 80 percent of new workers were engaged on an individual, unorganized, basis in 1963.⁵ Moreover, Soviet planners have consistently miscalculated the size of the available labor force, as we see from the following table:

¹ *Politekhnicheskii slovar* (A Dictionary of Political Economy), Moscow, 1964, p. 238.

² M. Sonin, *Aktualnye problemy ispol'zovaniya rabochei sily v SSSR* (Urgent Problems of Manpower Utilization in the USSR), Moscow, 1965, p. 10.

³ *Novyy mir*, 1965, No. 8, p. 206.

⁴ See, for example, *Pravda*, September 28, 1965.

⁵ L. S. Blyakhman, A. G. Zdravomyslov and O. I. Shkaratan, *Dvizheniye rabochei sily na promyshlennyykh predpriyatiyakh* (The Movement of Manpower Between Industrial Enterprises), Moscow, 1965, p. 21.

**Size of Soviet Labor Force, Planned and Actual,
During Selected Plan Periods, 1933-65**
(Yearly Average)

	Planned	Actual	Discrepancy
Second Five-Year Plan, 1933-37	28,900,000	26,700,000	-2,200,000
Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1946-50	33,500,000	38,900,000	+5,400,000
Fifth Five-Year Plan, 1951-55	44,700,000	48,400,000	+3,700,000
Sixth Five-Year Plan, 1956-60	55,000,000	62,000,000	+7,000,000
Seven-Year Plan, 1959-65	66,500,000	73,200,000*	+6,700,000

* 1964 figure.

SOURCES: *Dirizhiny KPSS i Sovetskogo pravitel'stva po khozynstvennyim voprosam. Sbornik dokumentov* (Directives of the CPSU and the Soviet Government on Economic Questions. A Collection of Documents), Vol II, Moscow, 1957, p. 441, Vol III, 1958, pp. 44 and 686, and Vol IV, 1958, p. 575, *Slovar' sovetskei* (A Dictionary of the Seven-Year Plan), Moscow, 1960, p. 108, *Narodnaya khozynstvennaya SSSR v 1963 godu: Statisticheskiy yezhgodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1963. A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1965, p. 474, *Pravda*, January 30, 1965

Similar miscalculations occurred in the planning of labor productivity; these were subsequently compensated for by increases in the size of the labor force.

There are three systems under which specialized training is provided in the USSR. Eighty to eighty-five percent of skilled workers receive their training in a production enterprise, either on a course or in the form of on-the-job training as a member of a work brigade, 15 percent under the vocational and technical education system and a very small percentage in a "general education school."⁶ Training is centrally administered by the State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education. On-the-job training is limited to a period of six months. It is available to both adults and minors, and costs the state at least 300 rubles per worker. Although in six months the worker can usually do little more than learn a few basic work operations and cannot be given proper instruction in such matters as draft reading and the properties of materials, the training period can only be extended with the permission of the State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education. In general, the training is unsystematic and unsuited to present technical requirements. Practical and theoretical training is given during working hours, which are 4 hours for trainees aged 15-16, 6 hours for those aged 16-18 and 7 hours for those over 18.⁷ On-the-job and course training is followed by a test, on the basis of which the worker is given a proficiency rating by the commission of experts established for such purposes in every Soviet enterprise.

The Soviet worker can extend his qualifications by attending "production technical" courses (i.e., advanced industrial training courses), special schools where "advanced work methods" are taught, technical schools for masters, schools for working and rural youth and various specialized courses, as well as by acquiring related skills. The training period is fixed at one to three months, depending on the worker's trade, the skill he wishes to acquire and his general educational level.

⁶ *Ekonomika Radianskoi Ukrainy*, Kiev, 1965, No. 11, p. 95.

⁷ *Trudovoye pravo: Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar* (The Labor Laws: An Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow, 1963, p. 518.

More systematic instruction is offered by the day, evening and seasonal "vocational and technical schools" (roughly equivalent to trade schools), to which young people are usually admitted after having completed their eight years' general schooling. The training period is from one to three years, depending on the profession studied. The schools provide instruction in about 1,500 industrial and 50 agricultural trades. From 1940 to 1960, they trained 11,515,000 skilled workers, and in 1963 had no less than 1,291,000 students.⁸ The Soviet government is doing everything possible to expand the vocational training system, and in 1965 assigned more funds for this purpose than it had done in the previous four years taken together. However, the funds are not being fully utilized. According to one report, only 9 schools were set up under chemical industry enterprises in 1964 and 1965 instead of the 55 planned.⁹ The number of schools is insufficient, and those in operation are short of equipment and teaching staff. Y. Manevich wrote in *Voprosy ekonomiki*:

In many teaching institutions, the pedagogic and technical [*uchebno-proizvodstvennaya*] basis is in an unsatisfactory state, instruction is frequently based on obsolete equipment and takes no account of the present level of technical progress, let alone current trends, and the colleges are short of class and laboratory equipment, visual aids, tools and textbooks. In many cases, those giving vocational instruction, particularly the masters, have insufficient qualifications and an insufficient level of general education.¹⁰

The teaching of special skills in general education schools, a measure on which Khrushchev had placed great hopes, has proved an almost complete failure. A Soviet selective survey showed that in 1961 and 1962

... of the total number of persons covered who had completed secondary schools in Moscow, Kiev and other large cities, over 60 percent entered higher educational institutions, roughly 27-30 percent decided to continue studying in technical and trade schools and only about 10 percent of tenth- and eleventh-graders went on to productive work.¹¹

The present Soviet leaders have already drastically modified Khrushchev's school reform, although this is not being publicized. Only 4 hours weekly are now being given over to "production training" in secondary schools as against 12 hours previously, and the schools are no longer required to insist that ninth-graders pass an examination for a trade proficiency rating.¹² Soviet experts have, in fact, concluded that the entire system of trade training, in general education schools and elsewhere, must be "critically reviewed" with the object of bringing it more into line with the needs of the Soviet economy.¹³

⁸ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 6, p. 24; *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1961, No. 12, p. 30.

⁹ *Pravda*, November 27, 1965.

¹⁰ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 6, p. 24.

¹¹ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1963, No. 21, p. 9.

¹² *Izvestia*, September 10, 1965.

¹³ See, for example, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 6, p. 25.

Soviet propaganda organs are fond of boasting about the rational, intelligent and "scientific" manner in which the country's labor resources are utilized. Perhaps the major argument advanced in support of this claim in the past has been that the overwhelming majority of the Soviet working population was engaged in the production of goods as opposed to the provision of services. Indeed, until quite recently it was considered that

... the socialist society is concerned in seeing that during the process of planned distribution of labor an ever increasing share of the latter is devoted to the sphere of material production, and that the nonproductive sphere ... is served by a minimal number of workers.¹⁴

The high proportion of workers engaged in production was regarded by the Soviets as significant proof of the superiority of the "socialist" economic system over the "capitalist" one, and was featured yearly in statistical handbooks. Past figures have been as follows:

**Soviet Workers Engaged in Productive
and Non-Productive Work, Selected Years, 1940-63**
(Percentages)

	Productive Work	Non-Productive Work*
1940	87.9	12.1
1950	86.2	13.8
1955	85.2	14.8
1960	83.0	17.0
1962	81.4	18.6
1963	80.8	19.2

* Comprises work in public health and education, housing and communal services, passenger transport, communications, and state and public organizations.

SOURCE *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1963 godu Statistichesky yezhgodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1963: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1965, p. 473.

Now, however, the official view on this point is being revised, and it can be assumed that the present—evidently artificially restricted—rate of increase in the percentage of service workers in the total labor force will soon be stepped up considerably.

The level and growth rate of labor productivity are two other indicators frequently quoted by the Soviets as proof of their rational use of labor.¹⁵ However, even Kosygin was forced to admit at the September plenary session of the Party Central Committee that in recent years the growth rate of labor productivity in Soviet industry had been decreasing. Moreover, the percentage of the total labor force not employed within the public sector of the economy varies according to locality. Thus, whereas the national average is 20 percent, in Moscow and Leningrad it is 6-7 percent and in Siberia 26 percent (very nearly 40 percent in certain Siberian cities).¹⁶ These variations are due to the poor siting of industrial enterprises in general and to the inefficient planning of the development of

¹⁴ *Kratky ekonomichesky slovar* (A Concise Economic Dictionary), Moscow, 1958, p. 266.

¹⁵ See, for example, Sonin, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

¹⁶ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 6, p. 27.

individual industrial regions. Soviet experts admit, for example, that capital investments are distributed unevenly in a number of economic regions.¹⁷

Manpower wastage in the country as a whole and in individual—even highly-mechanized—enterprises is colossal. Fluctuation of manpower alone costs the state 2,000 million rubles yearly, or 1.3 percent of the entire national income. According to the Central Statistical Authority, 231,000,000 man-days were lost in industry in 1961, or over 4.5 percent of the total time worked.¹⁸ Even so, it seems that in general the official labor statistics do not adequately reflect the gravity of the situation, and in view of this certain Soviet economists have suggested that the costly comprehensive registration of lost time be abolished in favor of selective investigations with the participation of the workers themselves—"self-portraits," as they are called in Soviet jargon. M. Sonin, for example, wrote that

... according to statistical data, during the first quarter of 1959 idle time during shifts amounted to 0.66 percent of the total shift time at the Novosibirsk Tool Plant and 0.3 percent at the A. I. Yefremov Plant, while there was apparently none at all at the Turbogenerator Plant. However, workday self-portraits taken during this period produced figures of 22.2, 26.1 and 27.3 percent respectively.¹⁹

Similar checks carried out in Latvian machine-building plants during the period August 1, 1961—August 1, 1962 gave a figure of 11.5 percent per production worker, while economist A. Pelše calculated that in certain plants in the republic 14–15 percent of the workers could be dismissed without affecting output provided that the available working time was used productively.²⁰ The situation is at least as bad, and in some cases considerably worse, in other republics. According to one report, during 1962 the equivalent of 2,000 workers were absent daily in Lithuanian industry as the result of absenteeism, idle time and other causes, while over one million hours of overtime were worked during the same period.²¹ At Siberian enterprises and construction projects, from 12 to 25 percent of the working time lost is due to absence with or without official permission and to idle time during shifts.²²

An analysis carried out by Soviet experts showed that at every single machine-building plant in Moscow the number of white- and especially blue-collar workers is increasing from year to year, despite mechanization and automation and in many cases out of proportion to the expansion of production, the result being that many of the workers are simply redundant.²³ Indeed, until recently Soviet labor planning encouraged enterprises to build up secret labor reserves over the

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28; *Promyshlennost' SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik* (The Industry of the USSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1964, pp. 84–85.

¹⁹ Sonin, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

²¹ *Trud*, September 13, 1963.

²² Sonin, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

²³ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 6, pp. 27–28.

years, labor being cheap in the USSR. The Soviet trade-union newspaper *Trud* commented:

The labor norms provide a loophole for keeping on the staff "dead souls," parasites, persons not required for production purposes, this even in automated enterprises. . . . There are plants in Ufa where the actual manpower surplus is numbered in hundreds or even thousands.²⁴

According to another source, in some enterprises workers made redundant by the installation of an automatic line are retained just in case the latter should "play tricks" and thereby jeopardize fulfillment of the plan.²⁵

A highly conservative estimate based on Soviet sources indicates that the manpower reserve in Soviet industry is at least 2,500,000, or over 10 percent of the total industrial labor force. Since manpower reserves exist, although possibly on a rather smaller scale, in all other branches of the national economy, with the exception of service trades, one can say that there is considerable concealed unemployment in the USSR, quite apart from unemployment in the usual sense, which is growing at an alarming rate.

Soviet economists now frankly admit—previously they were unable to do this—that the manpower utilization problem is becoming more and more urgent. Many economists consider that one of the most important steps toward solving this problem consists in expanding services, and there are suggestions that the number of workers engaged in this sphere should be doubled or even tripled by the end of the century. The relatively large proportion of workers in service trades in the USA is now quoted in Soviet economic literature as something worthy of imitation in the USSR, and not as an example of capitalist extravagance as previously.²⁶ At long last, the Soviet leaders have realized that efficiently organized services are, in the final analysis, a guarantee of greater labor productivity.

At the same time, such "individual" labor as housekeeping and private farming is still frowned upon in the USSR as an idle and unproductive form of activity. According to Sonin,

Under the conditions of socialism, the sphere of individual labor gives way to more productive and incomparably more meaningful labor, namely labor in social production, which besides satisfying the material needs of society constitutes a powerful force in molding a person's outlook.²⁷

Specifically, this means continuing to pursue such policies as drawing extensively on housewives for work in state institutions, although the housewives are thereby prevented from carrying out their natural functions, namely providing their husbands with a pleasant home to come back to, looking after the children, etc., functions which are essential to a healthy society and which do, in fact,

²⁴ *Trud*, November 30, 1962.

²⁵ *Novyy mir*, 1960, No. 7, p. 221.

²⁶ See, for example, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 6, pp. 29–30.

²⁷ Sonin, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

materially help to increase labor productivity, the more so as work becomes more complex and specialized. However, Soviet economists will doubtless soon be compelled to revise their views on the economic importance of housework just as they have been in the case of services.

Most significant, however, is the fact that there is a growing awareness in the USSR of the pressing need to increase labor productivity. At the same time, the economic experts, while recognizing that the country's labor resources are being used wastefully, ascribe this to a failure properly to exploit the advantages of the "socialist" economic system instead of admitting that it is the system itself which is at fault.

F. Hajenko

Soviet Society

The Evolution of Soviet Family Law

Woman's Day, March 8, was recently declared an official holiday in the USSR. A historical background to this event is provided by the following article by Y. Mironenko, which shows how official Soviet policy, as reflected in Soviet family law, was directed first at destroying the family as a "bourgeois" institution and then at restoring its full legal status. What the article does not show, however, is the role played by Soviet women themselves in the evolution of Soviet family law.

One of the first tasks which the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the forerunner of the Soviet Communist Party, set itself upon seizing power in October 1917 was to destroy the family as a "bourgeois" institution. Family relations as they existed in the Russian Empire, as well as the laws which protected them, were declared to be reactionary, un-Soviet and a potential breeding ground for the reemergence of capitalism, which had to be wiped out.

The new leaders did not waste much time. In December 1917, Lenin promulgated a "Decree on the Dissolution of Marriage"¹ and a "Decree on Civil Marriage, Children and the Keeping of Registry Books,"² which replaced the church marriage, basis of the pre-Revolutionary Russian family, by a civil marriage and permitted completely unmotivated divorce, even without the consent and knowledge of one of the marriage partners (a copy of the decree, pronounced by a single judge, was only sent to the address indicated by the petitioner). The inevitable result was that throughout the territory under Soviet jurisdiction marriage was turned into an empty farce. The situation was worsened by the fact that during the first few months of Soviet rule, which were marked by universal anarchy and "revolutionary creativity," many local authorities went far

¹ *Sobraniye zakonov i rasporyazhenii rabochego i krestyanskogo pravitelstva*, Petrograd (Leningrad), 1917, No. 10, Article 152.

² *Ibid.*, No. 11, Article 160.

beyond the provisions of the decrees. A good example is a regulation issued by the Vladimir city soviet in 1918, which read:

Every girl above the age of 18 is hereby declared to be state property.

Every unmarried girl who has reached the age of 18 is obliged, on pain of a severe penalty, to register with the "free love" office of the welfare commissariat.

A woman registered with the "free love" office has the right to choose a male aged 19–50 as a cohabiting partner [*sozhitel-suprug*]. . . . Men also have the right to choose from women who have reached the age of 18.

Interested persons may choose a husband or wife once a month. The "free love" office is autonomous. In the interests of the state, men aged 19–50 have the right to select women registered in the office even without the consent of such women.

The offspring of such cohabitation become the property of the republic.³

This amazing document, it should be noted, was issued in a provincial capital a mere 140 kilometers from Moscow.

As a typical result of the two decrees there were, according to Soviet statistics, 4,913 divorces and only 991 civil marriages in Moscow during the first seven months of 1918.⁴ In other words, the people initially preferred the ecclesiastical to the civil marriage, and only made use of the new regulations in the matter of divorce.

In September 1918 a "Code of Civil Registration, Marital, Family and Guardianship Laws"⁵ was issued on the basis of the two 1917 decrees. The new code, terminologically more precise, clarified a number of points of Soviet family law. Thus, it recognized church marriages concluded before the introduction of the new laws as valid, while stipulating that henceforth marital rights and duties could only be derived from an officially registered civil marriage. The minimum age of consent to marriage was left at 16 for women and 18 for men. Among the positive aspects of the code was that, like the pertinent decree of the previous December, it established equal rights for children irrespectively of whether they had been born in or out of wedlock. The establishment of paternity was precisely regulated. Both partners in marriage were made responsible for the maintenance of needy or infirm grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters (the previous legal definition of the family had included only the married couple and their parents and children). Thus, within a year after having seized power, the Soviet authorities reversed their stand on the family and began to take measures to strengthen and broaden family relations. At the same time, it was stipulated that consenting couples could be divorced by the civil registration authorities; only if one of the partners opposed the divorce was a court hearing necessary. The courts, however, invariably granted the divorce, being merely concerned

³ See A. Khartsev, *Brak i semya v SSSR* (Marriage and the Family in the USSR), Moscow, 1964, p. 139.

⁴ G. Sverdlov, *Sovetskoye semeinoye pravo* (Soviet Family Law), Moscow, 1958, p. 69.

⁵ *Sobranie zakonov* . . . , Moscow, 1918, No. 76, Article 818.

with deciding the fate of the divorced couple's property and their children, if any. In marriages between persons of different nationalities, a change of nationality was only possible at the express request of the party concerned.

The 1918 code and the two decrees of the previous year subsequently formed the basis of pertinent legislation in the other Union republics, having been originally confined to the RSFSR. In 1926, a new code of marriage, family and guardianship laws was adopted in the latter republic. Its most important feature was that it spoke merely of the registration, and not the actual conclusion, of a marriage. The registration was now nothing more than formal proof of the marriage's existence, and did not amount to a marriage contract.⁶ The code also introduced the concept of the "*de facto*" marriage, stipulating that

Persons actually enjoying a marital relationship not registered according to established procedure have the right to formalize their relationship at any time by registering it, in which case the actual period of cohabitation must be indicated.⁷

The code recognized as proof of a marital relationship: mutual recognition as spouse, cohabitation, a display of marital relations before a third party or in personal or other correspondence, and, in certain cases, mutual support and the joint upbringing of children.⁸ In this way, the legal distinction between registered and unregistered marriage disappeared, both forms being placed on an absolutely equal footing as regards such matters as inheritance, alimony, the right to living space, and even pensions and insurance. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that Soviet legal experts now attempt to justify the latter move by saying that whereas the 1918 regulation that marital rights and duties could only be derived from a registered marriage was dictated by the fact that otherwise church marriages would have fallen under the category of *de facto* marriages and would not have been registered at all with the authorities, by 1926 the majority of marriages were registered, so that compulsory registration was no longer required. The 1926 code increased the minimum marriageable age for women from 16 to 18, and stipulated that all divorces must be registered in registry offices.⁹

One of the consequences of the industrialization and collectivization campaign begun in the late twenties and early thirties was a sharp drop in the birth rate (while even today there are no Soviet birth rate statistics for the early nineteen-thirties, Western sociologists have come up with the figure of 28.6 per thousand for 1935),¹⁰ and on June 27, 1936, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On Prohibiting Abortion, Increasing Material Aid for Lying-in Women, Establishing State Aid for Those with Large Families, Expanding the Network of Maternity Homes, Children's

⁶ *Sokrashchenny sbornik kodeksov RSFSR* (Abridged Collection of Codes of the RSFSR), 3rd ed., Moscow, 1930, p. 116.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 117-18.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 118-19.

¹⁰ S. Prokopovich, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR* (The National Economy of the USSR), published by the Chekhov Publishing House, Vol. I, New York, 1952, p. 86.

Grèches and Kindergartens and Increasing Criminal Punishment for Non-Payment of Alimony, and on Certain Changes in the Divorce Law" as a counter-measure.¹¹ As its title suggests, the resolution was aimed principally at abortion, which hitherto had been quite legal. The number of abortions had been increasing all the time, and in 1935 had passed the million mark. The main cause of this rise—and this is admitted by the Soviets themselves—was a sharp drop in the standard of living during the first few years of industrialization. Since the NEP period, food prices had increased by nearly ten times, whereas wages had increased by only two to three times. There was also an acute housing shortage in the cities and workers' settlements. Although the urban population of the USSR more than doubled from 1930 to 1938, the amount of available accommodation remained virtually the same. Millions of young women who had fled to the cities to escape collectivization were compelled to live in barrack-like hostels. It was clear that under such conditions the birth of a child would have handicapped a woman severely, and thus the number of childless families increased.

Under the new resolution, abortion was permitted only if continued pregnancy would have endangered the life of the mother. Offending women were subject to a public reprimand for the first offense and a fine of up to 300 rubles for subsequent offenses, and the doctors involved to a sentence of one to two years' imprisonment. The resolution also provided, for the first time in the USSR, for the payment of family allowances to mothers with many children. For her seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth child a mother received 2,000 rubles yearly until the child's fifth birthday, and for the eleventh and each subsequent child a single payment of 5,000 rubles plus 3,000 rubles annually for four years from the child's first birthday. An unmarried or divorced father was required to pay one quarter of his monthly earnings for the upkeep of one child, one third for two children and one half for three or more children. The penalty for non-payment of maintenance costs ordered by a court was increased from 6 months' corrective labor or a fine of 300 rubles to two years' imprisonment. Divorce fees were increased from 3 rubles to 50 rubles for the first divorce, 150 rubles for the second and 300 rubles for the third.

The prohibition of abortion and the introduction of family allowances for large families had the effect of stepping up the birth rate to 38.7 per thousand in 1937, in which year the natural population increase reached 19.8 per thousand, or only slightly less than the 1928 figure of 21.0 per thousand. However, the high birth rate which the USSR had inherited from pre-Revolutionary Russia did not last beyond the nineteen-thirties; in 1940 it was only 31.2 per thousand, the natural population increase dropping to 13.2 per thousand. After World War II the Soviet birth rate, at around 20 per thousand, was quite normal for Europe, while the natural population increase fell below the 1940 level.¹² This was a consequence of war casualties on the one hand and a marked deterioration in the standard of living on the other.

¹¹ See, for example, *Izvestia*, June 28, 1936.

¹² *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu: Statistichesky yezhgodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1964: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1965, p. 34.

On July 8, 1944, the Soviet government, anxious to make good the heavy war casualties, issued a decree "On Increasing State Aid for Pregnant Women, Unmarried Mothers and Mothers with Many Children, Strengthening Maternity and Child Protection, and Instituting the Title of 'Heroic Mother,' the Order of 'Maternal Glory' and the 'Maternity Medal.'"¹³ Many of the provisions of this decree were undoubtedly progressive. Family allowances were extended to the third child, and children who had died or disappeared during the war were taken into account. The allowances were: a single payment of 400 rubles for the third child, a single payment of 1,300 rubles and 80 rubles monthly for the fourth child (for four years starting from the child's first birthday), 1,700 and 120 rubles for the fifth child, 2,000 and 140 rubles for the sixth, 2,500 and 200 rubles for the seventh and eighth, 3,500 and 250 rubles for the ninth and tenth and 5,000 and 300 rubles for the eleventh and each subsequent child (the allowances were, however, halved under a later decree of November 25, 1947).¹⁴ Maternity leave for women wage- and salary-earners was increased from 63 to 77 calendar days. Expectant mothers were exempted from overtime work (from the fourth month of pregnancy), and breast-feeding mothers from night work. Extra rations, if any, were doubled for expectant mothers, from the sixth month of pregnancy, and also for breast-feeding mothers. Kindergarten and crèche rates were halved for mothers with large families. Humiliating or insulting a mother was made an offense, while the institution of the "Maternity Medal" (first and second class, for mothers with six and five children respectively), the "Maternal Glory" order (three classes, for seven, eight and nine children) and the title of "Heroic Mother" (for ten children), meant that for the first time in Soviet history the mother was officially glorified.

The 1944 decree went so far in its efforts to encourage large families that it increased the special taxes on single persons and persons with small families introduced on November 21, 1941. Whereas the introduction of such taxation had been to a certain extent justified by the exigencies of the war, its increase a comparatively short time before the end of the war must be regarded as nothing less than coercion to found a large family (even parents with two children continued to be affected). The 1944 decree also set up a complicated and tiresome divorce procedure. A divorce now had to be decreed in public, by a court. Intention to sue for a divorce had first to be published in a local newspaper. The suit then had to be heard in a people's court, whose competence, however, was limited to attempting to reconcile the couple. A divorce could only be granted by a city, circuit or higher court, the fees running from 500 to 2,000 rubles.

Article 19 of the decree laid down that no marital rights or duties could be derived from an unregistered marriage, but that the latter *could* be formalized by

¹³ See *Sbornik zakonov SSSR i Ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: 1938-44 gg.* (Collection of Laws of the USSR and Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1938-44), Moscow, 1945, pp. 234-41.

¹⁴ See *Sbornik zakonov SSSR i Ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: 1938-56 gg.* (Collection of Laws of the USSR and Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1938-56), Moscow, 1956, pp. 389-90.

registration. This option amounted to a grave discrimination against women whose marriages were unregistered, and also, of course, against their children. Article 20 even did away with the right of a mother to file a paternity suit and sue the father for the child's maintenance (a right which had existed even in Tsarist Russia). Article 21 stipulated that a child born to a mother whose marriage was not registered was to bear the mother's surname and a patronymic selected by the mother, while a subsequently issued "Instruction on Civil Registration Procedure" ruled that in such cases the father's name was not to appear either in the registry office's records or in the child's birth certificate.¹⁵ Thus, in the twenty-seventh year of its existence, the Soviet state succeeded in reviving a social category, namely that of the illegitimate children, against whose existence the Bolshevik leaders themselves had waged a relentless struggle before the Revolution. The material and legal position of these children, moreover, was now even worse than under the Tsars; under the decree an unmarried mother had to be content with a meager state allowance of 100 rubles a month for one child, 150 rubles for two and 200 rubles for three, payable until the child's twelfth birthday. These allowances were only granted for children born after the decree's promulgation, and were slashed by one half a mere three years and four months later.

The decree of 1944 was certainly motivated by a desire to bolster legalized marriage. However, morally and socially justifiable as it may seem, this desire did in fact reflect the egoism of a ruling privileged class. The decree's exhortation to women desirous of having children to get married legally amounted to nothing less than mockery of such women for whom marriage was impossible in view of the huge surplus of women over men—approximately 20,000,000—resulting from Soviet war losses. One of the aims of the decree may, in fact, have been to protect legal husbands against maintenance claims by "field brides" [*polevye zheny*], i.e., Soviet servicewomen enjoying illicit relationships with their male colleagues.

After Stalin's death, Soviet family law became somewhat more liberal. A Supreme Soviet decree of February 10, 1954, exempted widows whose husbands had been killed or listed as missing during the war, as well as citizens not gainfully employed, from the special taxes imposed on single persons and persons with small families. On April 26 of the same year, the ban on marriages between Soviet citizens and foreigners, imposed on February 2, 1947, was lifted. Under a decree of August 5, a woman was no longer liable to criminal proceedings for having an abortion, although it remained a crime to procure, or to compel a person to procure, an abortion. However, on November 11 of the following year, 1955, abortion was legalized in view of the increasing number of illegal abortions, many of which ended tragically owing to the failure to observe hygienic requirements. A decree of March 26, 1956, increased maternity leave from 77 to 112 calendar days, adding 14 days for abnormal or multiple births. Finally, on December 18, 1957, parents and single women were exempted from the tax of November 21,

¹⁵ See *Zapis aktov grazhdanskogo sostoyaniya: Sbornik ofitsialnykh materialov* (The Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages: A Collection of Official Material), Moscow, 1961, p. 24.

1941, which continued, however, to be imposed on bachelors and childless couples. This marked the end of the liberalization process.

At a Supreme Soviet session of February 1957, Article 14 of the 1936 Constitution was so amended that the Union republics received the prerogative of enacting criminal, civil, labor and family legislation, the competence of the Union government being restricted to the fundamental legislation in these spheres. This had been the position under the previous Constitution of 1924. In 1958 and 1960, the Supreme Soviet approved fundamental criminal and civil legislation respectively, but corresponding labor and family legislation is still in the process of being drafted by the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities of that body. In the meantime, the Soviet press has on several occasions insisted on the need for further changes in Soviet family law, in particular on the need for a return to the simplified divorce procedure of 1926 and for restoring the right of mothers of illegitimate children to file a paternity suit and sue the father for maintenance. The practice of filling in the square intended for the father's name by a dash in the birth certificate of an illegitimate child was also severely condemned. Perhaps among the most typical of such press attacks was an article by Y. Zgurskaya entitled "The Provisions of Matrimonial Law Need Revising," published at the beginning of 1965.¹⁶ Zgurskaya, now First Deputy State Prosecutor of the Ukraine and until 1962 Ukrainian Minister of Justice, sharply criticized the decree of July 8, 1944. She wrote, for example:

The ruling that all divorce petitions must be heard in court was, it seems to us, introduced with a view to erecting artificial barriers against the dissolution of a family However, the thesis that in a society freed from social inequality family life "for the first time becomes life for the family, a life of love" was forgotten.

There is, therefore, nothing surprising in the fact that neither the institution of two stages of divorce court hearings nor the increased divorce court fees succeeded in cutting down the number of divorces.

The latter statement is borne out by statistics. In 1940, just before the USSR entered World War II, the divorce rate was 1.1 per thousand citizens, as against 0.4 in 1950, typical of the postwar years under Stalin. After Stalin's death the divorce rate began to rise rapidly, reaching 1.3 in 1960, since when it has remained more or less stable. The divorce rate is highest in the large cities—3.6 in Moscow and 3.4 in Leningrad, the figures for such typical agricultural regions as the Altai Krai and the Kostroma, Kirov and Bryansk Oblasts being 0.8, 0.9, 0.9 and 1.0 respectively.¹⁷

Zgurskaya also made the point that

. . . depriving a mother of the right to file a paternity suit and sue for the maintenance of a child born to her by a person with whom she is not living in a registered marriage in many cases constitutes an unjust restriction of the mother's rights and an amnesty for men who have behaved dishonestly toward a woman and abused her trust. In

¹⁶ *Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost*, 1965, No. 1.

¹⁷ *Vestnik statistiki*, 1965, No. 1, pp. 93–96.

these cases, the entire burden of maintaining and bringing up the child falls on the shoulders of the mother, while the actual father is not called to account, despite having displayed irresponsible behavior alien to the morality of Soviet man.

Zgurskaya concluded by discussing at some length the problem of the country's illegitimate children, who according to Soviet statistics numbered almost 8,000,000 in 1964.¹⁸ She had the following to say regarding the moral aspect of this problem:

... the fact that it is forbidden to indicate the real father's name in the birth certificate of a child born out of wedlock puts such a child in an unequal position in respect to other children and handicaps it morally and materially. The empty space in the birth certificate where the father's name should be indicated and the absence of any rights *vis-à-vis* the father do the child permanent psychological harm and undermine the basis for its normal upbringing. All this inevitably revives the most backward views on woman and the illegitimate child and contradicts the principles of Communist morality.

Turning to the material aspect, Zgurskaya wrote:

Existing legislation also puts children born out of wedlock in a worse position than children for whom maintenance orders can be obtained as regards material benefits. Unmarried mothers receive 5 rubles a month for each child until the child's twelfth birthday. At the same time, fathers who are or have been legally married are liable for maintenance to the extent of 25 percent of their monthly wages per child until the child comes of age, and even after that if the child is disabled.

To this it should be added that 5 rubles is the price of one-and-a-half kilograms of meat or butter or 5 kilograms of sugar, while the average wage of a Soviet worker is 100 rubles a month.

These and similar press attacks have evidently had a certain effect. On December 10 of last year, a Supreme Soviet decree "On Modifications in the Procedure for Court Hearings of Divorce Cases" was unexpectedly issued. This decree empowered raion and city people's courts to try divorce cases and ruled that it was no longer obligatory to publish one's intention to sue for divorce in a local newspaper, but that was as far as it went.

In conclusion, it may be said that the Soviet leaders are under considerable pressure to abolish the unjust family laws passed under Stalin, but that for some reason or other they are still clinging to these laws. They seem not to realize that the legal discrimination now being practiced against unmarried mothers and illegitimate children in the USSR is hardly a credit to a state which prides itself on being "socialist."

Y. Mironenko

¹⁸ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, July 30, 1964.

The Fate of Russian Historical Relics under the Communist System

The sole reference in the Soviet press to the visit of the world-famous banker Rothschild to the USSR was brief but significant. It read:

Recently, the banker Rothschild dropped in to visit Suzdal. He walked around the town and said:

"These streets are paved with gold. I am worth a lot, but if you were to give me Suzdal for two years I should double my fortune."¹

The sole purpose of this quotation was to underline the inestimable value of Russia's ancient monuments, many of which have been destroyed or have fallen into disrepair. Indeed, of late the Soviet press has been full of appeals for greater respect toward the country's historical heritage in view of its vast educational importance for present and future generations. Moscow journals and newspapers in particular have been giving over more and more space to protests about the fact that many outstanding monuments have been allowed to crumble away, while those remaining are under the threat of demolition. On October 30, 1965, *Literaturnaya gazeta* published an appeal for the preservation of ancient monuments signed by such prominent persons as Aleksandr Nesmeyanov, formerly President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the internationally-famous pianist Svyatoslav Richter, the sculptor Sergei Konenkov, the artist Pavel Korin, the composer Yury Shaporin and writers Vladimir Soloukhin, Aleksandr Yashin, Yefim Dorosh and Anna Karavayeva. The same issue of the journal contained an indignant letter by writer Leonid Leonov giving several instances of cultural sacrilege. Merely in order to make room for additional premises, the administration of the Oriental Museum in Moscow blew up the apses of the Church of the Prophet Elijah—a church which, as Leonov bitterly comments, would have celebrated its three hundredth anniversary later in the year. A beautiful old seventeenth-century wooden church in the Carpathian village of Russkoye Pole, remarkable for its fine architecture and carvings, was torn down to be used as firewood for a school. Leonov also points out that plans to relocate the eighteenth-century wooden church in Kondopoga are tantamount to a demolition order. His indignation reaches its peak when he tells of a proposal to demolish the Alexander Nevsky Lavra, a famous monastery whose graveyard contains the graves of many great statesmen and writers.

Similar outbursts were "The Threatened Masterpieces," which appeared in the Soviet youth newspaper *Komsomolskaya pravda* on October 1, 1965, the masterpieces concerned being the frescos by Andrei Rublev in the Assumption Cathedral in Vladimir, and contributions by Ilya Lavrov, Leonid Panteleyev, Nikolai Moskvina and Alexander Solzhenitsyn in the November 4, 1965, issue of

¹ *Ogonek*, 1965, No. 46, p. 17.

Literaturnaya gazeta, and by the writer and art connoisseur Leonid Volynsky ("Living Suzdal") in the October 28 issue. Suzdal, former seat of a medieval Russian principality, was also the subject of an article entitled "The Fate of the Chronicles in Stone" by V. Nikolayev, which appeared in *Ogonek* at about the same time. The author writes with affection about the old town:

As the centuries passed, there grew up in Russia the town of Suzdal, unique and inimitable... The stonemasons of Suzdal had a bold creative imagination and a range which was remarkable for those times. Their church towers and cupolas reached up dozens of meters into the sky, their monasteries covered an area of several hectares.²

Nikolayev complains bitterly that the beautiful golden gates of the Nativity Church no longer find admirers because the church authorities are too ashamed to admit visitors; the rickety wooden stairs are covered with pigeon-droppings, the window-panes are gone, the ironwork is rusty and there is dirt, dust and rubbish everywhere. Wistfully the author concludes:

Not only frescos and paintings are disintegrating beyond recall. Walls which have withstood many an enemy attack are crumbling away because of human indifference.³

Neglect of historical treasures is by no means confined to the provinces. The Soviet capital itself has set a bad example by ruthlessly destroying hundreds of ancient monuments—a figure of over 400 is given in a letter published in *Molodaya gvardiya* under the heading "Save Our Sacred Treasures!"⁴—under its reconstruction program. A similar fate seems to be in store for the "Old Treasury," a spacious two-storey house in the Pogodin Street built by Moscow University professor and academician M. P. Pogodin (1800–75) to house his remarkable collection of old Russian manuscripts, books and other relics, including boyars' rings. The house is also of historical interest because Gogol lived there, actor Mikhail Shchepkin was a frequent visitor and poet Afanasy Fet gave his first poetry readings within its walls. We read, however, in *Literaturnaya gazeta*:

...unfortunately this unique historical building is now going to rack and ruin. ...The rooms formerly used by Gogol and Shchepkin have now been converted into communal flats.

It has been suggested on more than one occasion to transfer Pogodin's "shack" to the "Kolomenskoye" Museum, in whose grounds many ancient wooden buildings have found refuge. There has been talk of the need to preserve this unique monument for posterity, and at least to make a start by affixing a memorial plaque.

But while these discussions are going on, the house is being prepared for demolition.⁵

This renewed interest in old things is more than mere dilettante antiquarianism, and must be regarded as one of the most significant processes now taking place

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁴ *Molodaya gvardiya*, 1965, No. 5, p. 218.

⁵ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, November 11, 1965.

in Soviet society. First of all, it is focused largely on such relics as churches, monasteries, chapels, burial-vaults, Tsarist palaces, stately homes and the private property of high dignitaries and even rich merchants (which frequently included shops, storehouses, picture galleries, theaters and the like)—in other words, on non-proletarian material culture from an age of Tsars, emperors, kings, princes and emirs. At long last, Soviet archeologists, scientists and writers are turning their attention toward a past from which there are now only pitiful survivals. One of these survivals was described in an article in the journal *Moskva* entitled "The Moscow Seat of the Siberian Tsareviches," namely an old house which turned out to belong to the ducal family of the Tatevs (the Starodub branch of Rurik's line), who played a dominant role in the election of Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich and later during the reign of Peter the First. The following is an excerpt:

Judging from the remains of the ground floor, the house was converted on more than one occasion. The owners decorated it in complete accordance with the current fashion: remnants have been found of stoves made from the so-called "red tiles" common mainly in the first half of the seventeenth century... many objects characteristic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have been found among the remains of the house: fragments of Dutch pipes bearing trade-marks, pieces of gallipots, knives, a small chesspiece...⁶

Such dumb witnesses of Russia's pre-Revolutionary history are termed in Party propaganda "relics of the past," which must be erased from the minds of the Soviet people. Here a few words should be said about the Russian word *perezhitki* used by the Communists to denote such "relics." The word is comparatively new, first appearing in the 1904 *Large Encyclopedia* published in St. Petersburg.⁷ Originally, it was only used in connection with the adherence to primitive customs—for example, that of abducting the bride, prevalent in the Caucasus and Central Asia—which ran counter to progressive thinking and the demands of a civilized society. The word preserved this restricted meaning for quite some time; it is not listed in the 1927 edition of a Moscow encyclopedic dictionary including all political terms and expressions that had acquired a political meaning, neither does it appear in the appropriate volume of the first edition of the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*, which came out in 1939. It only came to be used in its present meaning immediately prior to World War II, and did not become a part of Soviet political terminology until after the war. In the edition of S. I. Ozhegov's *Russian Dictionary* which went to press in 1951, we find the word *perezhitki* illustrated by the phrase "to overcome the relics of capitalism in people's minds."

From then on, the word gained ever greater political currency, being assigned nearly a page in the second edition (1955) of the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*. It acquired particular prominence in the Party Central Committee's resolution "On the Tasks of Party Propaganda Under Present Conditions," published in the first issue of the Party's theoretical mouthpiece *Kommunist* for 1960, while some months before a leading article in *Pravda* entitled "Increase Communist Awareness" had warned:

⁶ *Moskva*, 1965, No. 11, p. 218.

⁷ *Bol'shaya Entsiklopediya* (Large Encyclopedia), Vol. XV, St. Petersburg, 1904, p. 19.

It must be borne in mind that relics of the past are still alive and kicking in people's minds. Over a period of many decades, bourgeois society, its way of life, its morals and its written and unwritten laws have corrupted men's souls...⁸

Among the *perezhitki* listed were mercenariness, individualism, egoism, shirking, speculation, greed and devoutness.

Olga Berggolts' literary scenario "The First Russian," serialized in November 1965 by the weekly *Literaturnaya Rossiya* and the first literary work dedicated to the forthcoming fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution to be published, contains a highly significant episode in which revolutionaries are sorting out captured Tsarist property in the Smolny Institute. They are much impressed by the beautiful linen which they find, but their reaction to certain other valuables is not so favorable:

On one of the plates is a king wearing a magnificent lilac-colored wig with long, carefully-arranged locks reaching down below his shoulders. On another is doubtless the queen. . . the plates are of a beauty and antiquity fit for a museum. . .

No more food will be eaten off such plates. Please excuse us, porcelain comrades. Of course, we are grateful for the crockery. . . But the ones with the pictures of bourgeois and nobles you can take back. We are loath to eat off them.⁹

These words are spoken by a "thinking" Communist in charge of the sorting party, and the attitude which they reflect was adopted toward virtually everything antique. In the books and films of the late nineteen-thirties, Old Russia was deliberately presented in a negative light in order to give the Soviet regime some moral justification. A good example of such falsification was the film "Ivan the Terrible."

Of course, when at the end of 1941 the very existence of the regime was at stake, the Soviet leaders were forced to introduce a kind of ideological NEP, which found expression in the legalization of the Church. Once the crisis was over, they once more closed their ears to public opinion. There is therefore every reason to suppose that the present revival of interest in the past is not only a cultural but a sociopolitical phenomenon as well, the more so because it runs counter to Party regimentation and has religious undertones. The element of opposition to the regime comes out clearly in Leonov's cynical recollection of the "verve" with which the officials now busily engaged in destroying ancient monuments had, during World War II, branded as unpatriotic those cosmopolitan comrades who displayed a disregard for the country's historical heritage.¹⁰ As for the religious undertones, these are evident in Ilya Glazunov's "The Road to Thee," in which the author speaks with deep feeling and profound awe of the Tsarevich Dimitry Church in Uzlich (which stands on the place where the Tsarevich was murdered). Glazunov describes as a "national catastrophe" the painting over by "restorers" of eighteenth-century murals in the church painted in the

⁸ *Pravda*, July 12, 1959.

⁹ *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, 1965, No. 47, p. 6.

¹⁰ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, October 30, 1965.

style of the previous century.¹¹ Also indicative in this respect is the following extract from the letter signed by Konenkov, Korin and Leonov to which we have already referred:

We must take issue with the sanctimonious view of narrow-minded persons that churches and other cultist buildings have a purely religious significance and that the gold cupolas merely contain the "opium of the people" . . .¹²

A more open expression of reverence toward holy things is contained in Glazunov's "Novgorod Tale," where the author pays his respects to the ancient Cathedral of St. Sophia (popularly known as "the Sophia" by the inhabitants of that city):

In olden times, the people of Novgorod used to say: "Where the Sophia is, there is Novgorod," and so we hurried over to the Sophia, whose cluster of small lead-grey cupolas rise up behind the town walls, while the main cupola towers above them all, golden, like the helmet of a duke.¹³

Glazunov then goes on to speak of the "deep emotion" which he experiences when contemplating a famous icon which had once caused the besieging Suzdal armies to flee when displayed on the city walls and thus saved Novgorod from certain capture.¹⁴

In his novel "The Coltsfoot" (a plant whose leaves are smooth on one side and rough on the other), V. Soloukhin contrasts the tawdry manifestations of Soviet propaganda, such as cheap placards, stereotyped slogans and the omnipresent portraits of the country's leaders, with the beauty of Russian icons, "which are now admired by the entire world,"¹⁵ while Leonid Leonov stresses the tremendous influence exerted on the people by churches, monasteries and other monuments:

What is listed in official records as so much rickety woodwork and old stones is for our people a maternal locket which has inspired it to many extremely important victories, including one of recent date.¹⁶

Leonov is saying, in other words, that it was by no means the Party which gave inspiration to the Soviet people in their grueling struggle during World War II. Much the same point is made in the letter signed by Leonov, Konenkov and Korin, which notes that it is around these ancient monuments that "the entire sense of national consciousness crystallizes."¹⁷ A related thought is expressed in Sergei Bondarin's "An Evening in Kizhi," which is centered upon this ancient settlement's beautiful and world-famous church, with its twenty-two cupolas. The author notes the great educational value of this masterpiece of

¹¹ *Molodaya gvardiya*, 1965, No. 10, p. 140.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1965, No. 5, p. 218.

¹³ *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, 1965, No. 36, p. 20.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Molodaya gvardiya*, 1964, No. 12, p. 68.

¹⁶ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, October 30, 1965.

¹⁷ *Molodaya gvardiya*, 1965, No. 5, p. 217.

ecclesiastical architecture, and it is also significant that an editorial foreword describes the sketch as being written on two planes, one dealing with the beauties of the local scenery and the other with the "voice which is speaking to us down the centuries." Although the foreword does not specifically mention the church itself, it pays tribute to the author's sentiments:

The writer calls upon us to cherish the memory of ancient art not solely out of gratitude for the works of the old masters. He rightly insists that an attitude of love and consideration toward antiquity, toward that which bears the imprint of a people's talent and labor, ennobles modern man and furthers the great cause of instilling patriotism into the younger generation.¹⁸

Even dogmatically-inclined Nikolai Rylenkov enthuses in "My Smolensk" over the old churches in that city:

On the hills [of Smolensk] stand little twelfth-century churches, silent witnesses of many national triumphs and disasters. Their perfection of form continues to amaze us to this day, and according to contemporary evidence they were sumptuously decorated inside, so that we can only regret that their murals have not survived.¹⁹

Voices are being raised against the suppression of place names having historical associations. In an article entitled "What Was Wrong With Teply Alley?" V. Bushin protests against the renaming of this old Moscow street and of such towns as Tver, Samara, Perm and Nizhny Novgorod (St. Petersburg is notably absent). He points out that in Moscow alone there are no fewer than eight Gorky, ten Komsomol and twelve Moscow Streets.²⁰ A particularly flagrant example of the disappearance of an ancient name was cited in the journal *Moskva*, i.e., the renaming of Nikolsky Street (called after the Nikolsky Church), which is now October 25 Street.²¹ This Moscow street has a long history. It was here, on April 19, 1563, that Ivan the Terrible opened the "Pechatny Dvor," the first printing house in Russia, where in 1703 Peter the Great issued the first Russian newspaper. The "Pechatny Dvor" was burnt down in 1812, and two years later the Synodal Printing House was built on the same spot. The latter establishment had a large library, founded in the sixteenth century. Another famous building in the Nikolsky Street was the Zaikonospasskoye School, later known as the Slavonic, Greek and Latin Academy, where the writer Antioch Cantemir, the scientist Mikhail Lomonosov, the architect Vasily Bazhenov, the founder of the Russian theater, Fedor Volkov, and many other great men received their education. In 1897, an eighteen-hour meeting between V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko and K. S. Stanislavsky in the "Slav Bazaar" restaurant in the Nikolsky Street resulted in the establishment of the Moscow Arts Academic Theater. Such is the history of a street which has been deprived of its ancient name.

In general, people prominent in the Soviet cultural world are eloquently pleading the case for Russia's historical heritage, and in doing so are accusing

¹⁸ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, November 30, 1965

¹⁹ *Ibid*, November 20, 1965.

²⁰ *Ibid*, October 26, 1965.

²¹ *Moskva*, 1965, No. 11, p. 219

the country's leaders of wantonly destroying material assets of immense value, and pursuing a deliberate policy of defaming past cultural achievements in order to give the impression that their own owe nothing to the past. A striking aspect of this cultural revivalist movement is that it has already become institutionalized, so-called "Motherland" clubs having been established in certain cities on the initiative of Ilya Glazunov for the purpose of "studying and popularizing the memorials of the great Russian culture."²² On February 17, the Moscow branch of the All-Russian Voluntary Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments held a first conference, at which members of the Society's council for the city of Moscow were elected.²³ Under the pressure of public opinion, such measures are being taken as the adoption by the Tula cultural authorities of a plan to complete the restoration of the ruins of the church on the plain of Kulikovo, a project started in 1914 but interrupted by the war. Concluding his account of this development, V. Lednev writes in *Sovetskaya kultura*: "We too will learn to set up worthy memorials to those who shed their blood for the freedom of our Motherland."²⁴

It would, however, be erroneous to conclude from the foregoing that the new protagonists of Old Russia have become true believers. Although their reverence for sacred monuments might appear to be religious in nature, it is not so in fact. Equally erroneous would be the assumption that these people are hankering after a regime and a way of life that has passed irrevocably into history. While rebelling against a heartless and bureaucratic system, they are calling not for a return to the past but for a progressive movement forward into the future.

Although historical analogies are dangerous, a certain parallel may be drawn between the present cultural revivalist movement in the USSR and the Renaissance, which was at first regarded as a turning back to antique culture but which in fact was the birth of a completely new culture. During the Renaissance, men rebelled against the prevailing feudal order and the oppression of scholasticism and, continuing our analogy, we may say that we are now witnessing in the Soviet Union a rebellion against the Stalin brand of feudalism and against the narrow Party scholasticism which has survived into the post-Stalin period.

In general, the revivalist movement may be described as a manifestation of the centrifugal forces released by the ideological concessions forced on the Soviet regime by public opinion. It offers further evidence that people in the Soviet Union are no longer afraid to express views conflicting with the Party line. Perhaps one of the most remarkable aspects of this movement—which has evidently a long way to go before it reaches its peak—is that it is flourishing at a time when the Soviet Communist Party is trying to give fresh impetus to the idea of internationalism. In this conflict between two diametrically opposed forces, it does not appear at present as if the Party will have the last word.

A. Gayev

²² *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, 1965, No. 36, p. 20.

²³ *Izvestia*, February 19, 1966.

²⁴ *Sovetskaya kultura*, November 16, 1965.

REVIEWS

The Periodical Press

One of the favorite themes of Soviet propaganda is that the West, for all its technical achievements, is succumbing to "spiritual decay," and now a special term has been coined for this process, namely "deideologization." This "deideologization" was the subject of an article by Aleksandr Chakovsky entitled "Are They Blessed Who Are Poor in Spirit?," published in a recent issue of the Party's theoretical journal *Kommunist*. Maintaining that the West was full of "nothingness," the author elaborated:

... "nothingness" is a synonym of deideologization. It could also be replaced by the word "emptiness." But it is a strange kind of emptiness inasmuch as it is capable of finding its true reflection in all spheres of human activity, from concrete everyday actions to art (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 4, page 81).

Typical, however, of Communist forecasts of the impending doom of the West is that they avoid all reference to the economic situation and average living conditions in Western countries. This is only understandable in view of the fact that the USSR is lagging behind the West economically, and at its present rate of progress is unlikely to catch up for several decades. A "doomed" system in the throes of "deideologization" has produced economic prosperity and a high standard of living, while an ideologically monolithic system is staggering from crisis to crisis—despite intensive mobilization of the vast potential of a technically advanced nation. The state of the national economy was, in effect, the sole item on the agenda of the Twenty-Third Party Congress, prior to which it was given extensive coverage in leading Soviet press organs. A typical contribution was an article bearing the title "Make Better Use of Production Reserves!" published in the issue of *Kommunist* from which our first quotation was taken, where the importance of the economic reform adopted last September was emphasized:

The main purpose of the economic reform is to bring about an improvement in the country's economic management by correctly combining centralized planned management with increased economic initiative and independence on the part of the enterprises, intensifying the economic stimulation of production and enhancing the material interest of the workers in the results of their labors (*ibid.*, page 5).

It was further noted that during the 1966–70 Five-Year Plan, capital investments by the state are to amount to one half of the total for the period 1918–65 (page 6). The planned investment of such a huge sum constitutes a desperate attempt on the part of the Soviet leaders to bring about the desired economic upswing. It is also, of course, further strong evidence that the Soviet economy is in a very bad way. Hints as to why this should be so are to be found in the same issue of *Kommunist*, in an article by A. Dovba and V. Chernykh entitled "The Growth of Labor Productivity in Industry," where we read, for example:

From 1959 to 1965, over one million metal-cutting machines, more than 200,000 press-forging machines and thousands of automatic and mechanized production lines went into operation, as well as considerable numbers of large power units, blast furnaces, coking blocks and rolling mills.

However, despite the comparatively large scale on which new equipment has been introduced, the mechanization of labor in industry remains at a low level: there is still an extremely large amount of manual labor being done in enterprises. According to data from the Institute for Scientific Research into Labor, in 1965 the proportion of workers engaged in manual labor was roughly 50 percent, and even higher in specific industries: in the coal mines, for example, it was over 60 percent (*ibid.*, pages 18–19).

The authors further complain of the failure to exploit technological possibilities to the full. They write:

Production technology is indissolubly linked with the economy of materialized labor, in particular raw and other materials, as well as of live labor. In machine-building and metal-working, for example, metal wastage is in excess of the norm, reaching 25 percent of the metal used. Excessive amounts of steel are being used in rolling. In this country, the output of usable rolled steel expressed as a proportion of the steel smelted is a mere 67–68 percent, as against 75 percent in the USA (*ibid.*, page 21).

In his article "Economic Stimulation of Technical Progress," V. Dozortsev expresses the view that such stimulation is hardly feasible under existing conditions. He tells how at one plant he was asked the following question:

We must pay an inventor a fee—the maximum fee at that. If we do come up with the money, fulfillment of the prime cost plan is jeopardized, and thousands of workers are deprived of their bonus. What are we to do? (*Ibid.*, page 26.)

The author says that cases where technical progress is hindered by the planners are no rarity, commenting that "centralized management of technical policy... is only effective when administrative methods are supported by, and based on, economic methods" (*ibid.*, page 28).

In general, the line taken by the Party press is that the country's economic ills can be cured by implementing the directives issued by the Party's Twenty-Third Congress. The tasks facing the Party under the 1966–70 Five-Year Plan are listed in an editorial published by the journal *Partiinaya zhizn* in its fifth issue for 1966 under the heading "A New Stage in Communist Construction." Among the most formidable are: increasing the national income by 38–41 percent; securing a rational utilization of manpower; increasing industrial and agricultural production; raising production efficiency on the basis of technical progress; and improving national economic management. Particular attention is devoted to agriculture. We read:

The principle task in the field of agriculture... is to achieve a considerable increase in crop and livestock production in order the better to satisfy the growing demand of the population for foodstuffs and that of industry for agricultural raw materials (*Partiinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 5, page 7).

The nature of the goals set in the sphere of electric power generation indicates that here too the situation is far from rosy, despite recent successes. These goals are:

... to cut construction costs, reduce the cost of each unit of newly commissioned capacity below existing levels, slash construction periods to the established norms and bring production units into operation in a coordinated fashion [*kompleksno*] (*ibid.*, page 14).

That the transport sector is also lagging is suggested by the fact that roughly 152 thousand million rubles are earmarked for capital investments in transport, communications and industry alone, a sum which represents almost one half of the total for the entire economy. The leading sector, judging from the statements of leading Soviet politicians and economic experts, is construction, which can boast of numerous real achievements in the form of power stations, extensive irrigation systems, industrial combines and a valuable contribution toward the country's housing problem. The construction industry, however, can merely provide the framework for general industrial development, quite apart from the fact that it, too, is by no means beyond reproach. In an article entitled "Builders on the Eve of the Twenty-Third Party Congress," A. Etmekdzhiyan, First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Building Affairs (Gosstroi), concluded:

During the past Seven-Year Plan, labor productivity in construction rose by 53 percent. Nevertheless, we are still lagging badly behind the USA in this respect. This is due to the still inadequate exploitation of mechanization means and the rated capacities of building industry enterprises, and also to a considerable wastage of manpower and materials (*Partinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 4, page 13).

Etmekdzhiyan further complains that alterations and repairs made necessary by poor-quality work are costing the country "several millions of rubles annually." He speaks of the "systematic non-fulfillment of plans for reducing the prime cost of construction and assembly work" and "serious shortcomings in the... system of planning, financing and accounting" being used in the industry (*ibid.*, page 14). To this, it may be added that the Soviet building industry also suffers from the lack of long-term plans.

Of course, the above fragmentary evidence on the state of the Soviet economy must be viewed in the light of Soviet reticence as regards the latter's weak points. On the subject of the national standard of living, in particular, the Soviets offer little definite information but many promises. Typical in this respect is the article "Prosperity is the Goal" by N. Lagutin in the journal *Novoye vremya*. Lagutin writes that under the new Five-Year Plan the national income will show an average yearly growth rate of 6.7-7.1 percent as against 6 percent during the previous five-year period 1961-65 (*Novoye vremya*, 1966, No. 13, page 3). This is hardly an impressive rate of increase when it is considered that, as Lagutin himself remarks, a considerable proportion of Soviet industrial workers receive a wage of only 50-60 rubles a month.

Thus, the Soviet economy is only limping along, despite massive capital investments and the mobilization of the country's vast manpower resources, while the economies of the "doomed" countries of the West are running smoothly. This is doubtless due to the fact that the economy as such is an integral part of the socialist system, which rejects the idea of private property and thus stifles private initiative, the mainspring of a normal economy (Soviet research, on the other hand, occupies a leading position, being beyond the reach of the planners, although, of course, under the supervision of the Party, which can set research targets). In other words, the Soviets, their involved organizational measures notwithstanding, are paying the price for breaking the natural laws of economics.

A. Gayev

Dva goda v vosstavshem Kitaye, 1925–27: Vospominaniya

(Two Years in Insurgent China, 1925–27: Reminiscences)

By V. V. VISHNYAKOVA-AKIMOVA

Published by the "Nauka" Publishing House for the Institute for the Study of Asian Peoples of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, 1965, 390 pp.

Books about China by Soviet authors, even if they concern a comparatively remote period, can by no means be regarded as being of purely historical interest. In view of the inter-state and inter-Party conflict between the USSR and Communist China, it must always be asked to what extent the events described in such a book affected the course of Sino-Soviet relations, and, if the book is about the growth of the Communist movement in China, to what extent its interpretation of events conforms to the official Chinese or Soviet historiography.

This is particularly true of V. V. Vishnyakova-Akimova's book inasmuch as it deals with a period of modern Chinese history when Soviet influence on Chinese politics was at its peak and the Chinese Communist Party really nothing more than a satellite of its Soviet counterpart. On the other hand, it was during this period that the USSR suffered its first political defeat, when Stalin's intervention in China's internal affairs brought about a catastrophe which very nearly ended in the complete annihilation of the Chinese Communist Party. The writer not only took part in these events herself, but was also the wife of a Soviet military adviser to the Kuomintang, Vladimir Mikhailovich Akimov, who worked together with Blücher—perhaps better known in the West as Galen, which is a corruption of his assumed Russian name of Galin. Akimov later rose to the rank of Major General.

*

According to her own account, Vishnyakova-Akimova, then a student, left for China in June 1925 on her own initiative in order to improve her knowledge of the Chinese language and the Chinese way of life. In March of that year, Sun Yat-sen, the "father of the Chinese revolution," had died, as a result of which a

struggle for power had broken out among his would-be successors. The Soviet government and the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were pursuing a double-dealing policy *vis-à-vis* China, maintaining diplomatic relations with the official Chinese government in Peking and at the same time supporting the Kuomintang, which had established itself in Canton and was preparing for the Northern Expedition, which two years later was to lead to a nation-wide victory for the Kuomintang and utter defeat for the Chinese Communist Party. In addition to this, the Soviets were involved in the intrigues of various Chinese war-lords.

By the time Akimova arrived in China, the first stage of Soviet intriguing, during which the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks had tried to form an alliance with the northern war-lords Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu, had come to an end, both "Marshals" then being regarded by Moscow as "imperialist lackeys" and the embodiment of Chinese "reaction." Even now, forty years later, Akimova adheres to the official Soviet view prevailing at that time, according to which Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu were lackeys of British and Japanese capitalism and political developments in China amounted to a struggle between the "revolutionary" forces as represented by the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communist Party and the "Christian General" Fêng Yü-hsiang and the "counter-revolutionary" forces, who included everyone else.

Having arrived in China in a private capacity, as she says, Akimova proceeded to take up residence in the Soviet Embassy in Peking and was soon caught up in the maelstrom of political events when she was invited to join a group of Soviet advisers as an interpreter. This brought her into contact with a number of prominent personalities sent by Stalin to China for the purpose of ensuring the victory of the "revolutionary" forces. They included the political adviser to the Kuomintang, Borodin, and the military adviser, Blücher, whom we have already mentioned. Both men were subsequently liquidated on Stalin's orders, or "subjected to repression during the time of the personality cult," as Akimova delicately puts it. Borodin survived the longest of all; he subsequently held positions in TASS and the Soviet Information Bureau and was liquidated only in 1949.

When Akimova arrived on the scene there were three groups of Soviet advisers in China, two attached to the armies of Fêng Yü-hsiang and one working directly with Chiang Kai-shek in Canton. The two former were the Kalgan group led by Vitovt Kazimirovich Putna, subsequently Soviet military attaché in Japan, Germany and Great Britain, and then by Vitaly Markovich Primakov, and the Kaifeng group led by Anatoly Yakovlevich Klimov. Writes Akimova:

Our advisers included some of the Red Army's best men. Many had joined the Party before the Revolution and suffered imprisonment and exile under the Tsars. Almost all of them had diplomas from the Military Academy, which in 1925 was renamed the Frunze Military Academy, or from a higher specialized military school, and held the military order of the Red Banner. This order—at that time the highest military decoration—was conferred sparingly, and those awarded it twice were few

and far between. Among our military advisers, however, there were those who had been awarded the order three times. Their fate was a sorry one. Most of them perished during the difficult days of 1937 and 1938 (page 55).

It is significant that Akimova tries to defend Fêng Yü-hsiang—who by going over to Chiang Kai-shek in 1927 betrayed his Soviet advisers as well as the Chinese Communist Party—by references to his behavior in 1933 during the conflict with Japan and to his attacks against Chiang Kai-shek in 1946 while in the USA. By this time, however, Fêng no longer had any influence on Chinese affairs. He refused to become a puppet of Stalin and always acted in his own interests. Akimova describes him in the following terms:

Marshal Fêng Yü-hsiang, the "Christian general" as he was usually called in the imperialist press, was a devout Christian and expected his subordinates to be the same. He was certainly an outstanding personality, strong-willed and progressively-minded. There is no disputing either his organizational talents or his personal charm, to which some of our comrades succumbed. Some of us used to say, for example, that Primakov was "in love" with Fêng Yü-hsiang. There were, however, comrades who took a different view of Fêng. They considered that he was over-confident, did not initiate anyone into his plans, did not tolerate equals and, most important of all, was an erratic politician who frequently vacillated and went back on decisions he had made earlier (page 96).

This basically positive characterization indicates that the present leaders of the Soviet Communist Party are not prepared to disavow Stalin's policy toward China during those years (there is every reason to believe that Khrushchev was not prepared to do so either) despite its disastrous consequences. Evidently, the Soviets are aware that such a disavowal would merely be grist to the Chinese mill.

It is quite obviously a sore point with Akimova that the Soviet advisers in China had to contend not only with the Chinese "reactionaries" and Western "imperialists" but also with "White" émigrés who were extremely active politically and frustrated Soviet intrigues on more than one occasion. Bristling with indignation, Akimova writes of her compatriots:

They were a bunch of cut-throats and strike-breakers, prepared to come out against the revolutionary movement in China at any time. No sooner had the anti-British boycott begun in China than the press was full of reports that unemployment among the White émigrés in Harbin, Hankow, Tientsin and Shanghai had come to an end, since the British were taking them on instead of the striking Chinese workers. Hundreds of White émigrés left Shanghai for Hongkong to work as waiters in hotels. In Tientsin, over one thousand White Guardists were admitted to a police school by the British. While passing through Shanghai, I saw a squad of the international settlement's Russian policemen. It was such a disgusting spectacle of moral decay that even now I cannot recall it without becoming agitated (page 113).

Although these words, like most of Akimova's book, are written from an extremely biased standpoint, it is a fact that large numbers of Russian émigrés served in the armies of the anti-Soviet war-lords, considering that by doing so they were carrying on the fight against Communism in which they had been

engaged during the Civil War. As Akimova herself points out, there were at that time over 120,000 Russian émigrés in China. They constituted the largest foreign minority in the country and their influence should not be underestimated. Akimova's fury at their activities is only too understandable.

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The author has only second-hand knowledge of the fate of Fêng Yu-hsiang's armies and the behavior of the "Marshal" himself, since at the beginning of February 1926 she was transferred to Canton, where she worked for a time under Borodin. She arrived when the struggle between the Soviet advisers and the Chinese Communists on the one hand and most of the Kuomintang leaders on the other was at its peak. At that time Chiang Kai-shek, whom Stalin regarded as his principal ally in China, was becoming more prominent. Akimova's comments about him are extremely derogatory, but it seems clear that they are recent additions, since at the time she would never have contemplated saying anything against Stalin's favorite. Here again, Akimova insists on depicting everything in black and white, alleging that Chiang Kai-shek was a mere "puppet" of the big Chinese capitalists, with whom he had been associated from the very beginning of his career. She writes:

Since at that time his military career was not meeting with any success, Chiang Kai-shek decided to go in for speculation on the stock exchange together with his Shanghai and Chekiang friends, who were big shots on the city's stock exchange. They were a bunch of sharks, who dealt in stocks of non-existent enterprises, callously ruined thousands of people and raked together colossal profits without any risk to themselves. Chiang Kai-shek got rich extremely quickly. It was here, on the Shanghai stock exchange, that he acquired useful contacts which he later used against the revolution (page 187).

All this is completely in line with the legend which Stalin subsequently fabricated in order to explain away his abysmal failure in China. After the pogrom which Chiang Kai-shek carried out against the Chinese Communists when he took Shanghai in 1927, the Soviet press began alleging that Chiang had been paid to do this by the "imperialists." One of the most knowledgeable experts on this period of Chinese history, Conrad Brandt, wrote:

This was how a solid Marxist materialist had to explain Chiang's defection; but how seldom materialist images conform to material data! Chiang had not abandoned his drive to the north; before very long, even Moscow could not help admitting that, after all, he continued to fight the war-lords. And for that matter the imperialists too: it very soon became obvious that if they opened their coffers to him he requited them ill for their kindness. Actually, there is no evidence apart from tendentious gossip that he received any money at all from foreign sources in Shanghai. Otherwise he would scarcely have felt so much need to squeeze money out of his compatriots, out of the Chinese businessmen to whom Moscow thought him subservient. He pressed them hard because they would not pay—because, contrary to Moscow's assumption, they balked at financing the operations of their

reputed agent. Only by threatening them with jail and by carrying out his threat in a few prominent instances did he finally raise the full amount which he had asked them to furnish.¹

It goes without saying that the Soviet advisers, Borodin in particular, are depicted by Akimova as out-and-out idealists interested only in helping on the Chinese revolution and driving the Western "imperialists" out of China. Stalin is not mentioned once, neither is there any word of Borodin's attempts to infiltrate members of the Chinese Communist Party into leading positions in the Kuomintang. It is clear that Stalin could not afford to admit that Chiang Kai-shek had outwitted him, and it seems that the present Soviet leadership is also unwilling to disclose Stalin's role in the debacle.

Among the prominent figures whom Akimova met while she was working in Borodin's house was a Vietnamese by the name of Li—nicknamed Li An-nam by the Soviet advisers—to whom Borodin was giving refuge. Writes Akimova:

I vividly recall his rather short, scraggy frame in the loose-fitting white linen suit of European cut, his attentive, somewhat melancholy gaze, and his walk, which was that of a very tired or very sick man. He spoke French, English and the Kwang-tung dialect well, and also knew Russian. I took lessons in Vietnamese from him, and he appeared to enjoy teaching me. His attitude to us was friendly but reserved; he never told us what he was doing or what he had done in the past. We knew nothing about him except that the French imperialists had set a high price for his capture and that the Kuomintang government had granted him political asylum (pages 257–58).

Li was none other than Ho Chi Minh.

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It is significant that Akimova's description of the events and personalities of this period fits in very neatly with the present official Chinese historiography. Thus, she brands Ch'en Tu-hsiu, then Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, as a "deviationist," and claims to have realized even at that time that Wang Ching-wei, on whom Stalin set his hopes after breaking with Chiang Kai-shek, would prove to be a traitor to the cause.

Akimova's description of the Northern Expedition is of particular interest. She writes that Chiang Kai-shek was a vacillating, panic-stricken leader, a mere puppet of the Soviet advisers, who were responsible for all the military successes. It is not, however, explained how Chiang was able to bring the expedition to a successful conclusion and then go on to defeat the war-lords after the advisers had been recalled.

In December 1926, after the "revolutionary" forces of the Kuomintang had gained a series of victories over the northern war-lords and liberated the valley of the Yangtze, Chiang Kai-shek set up his own government in Nanchang,

¹ Conrad Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China: 1924–27*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1958, p. 118.

while a part of the Canton government, together with the Soviet advisers, moved over to Wuhan. These developments marked the final phase of Stalin's Chinese adventure. Although the Wuhan government, for which Akimova herself worked, had its own army, most of the latter's officers sympathized with the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek personally, the result being that this army gradually melted away. Chiang Kai-shek proceeded to impose a boycott on Wuhan, the results of which soon made themselves felt, and it was clear that the Soviet advisers were fighting a losing battle in their attempts to regularize the alliance between the Chinese Communist Party and the left wing of the Kuomintang, thereby isolating Chiang Kai-shek and setting the Chinese revolution on the road to Communism. An alliance with the greater part of the Kuomintang, particularly with the latter's armed forces, was of prime importance for the Chinese Communist Party, which at that time had only 12,000 members and was incapable of operating successfully without Kuomintang support. It was in Wuhan that the Kuomintang's agrarian commission was set up, which included Communists (one of them was Mao Tse-tung, the future ideologist of the peasant revolution, who at that time was virtually unknown). Akimova has the following to say about this commission:

Three weeks before the congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Hankow, the well-known Kuomintang agrarian commission started work.... The Chinese Communist Party was represented by Mao Tse-tung (head of the Party Central Committee's peasant section) and T'an P'ing-shang (Minister of Agriculture). Advisers to the commission were M. O. Razumov and someone else.... After numerous sessions the commission folded up, after having failed to reach agreement on a single concrete issue. It was the commission, however, which came up with the idea of "politically" confiscating only land belonging to the counter-revolutionaries (pages 349-50).

We are informed in a footnote that "the Communists, being in the minority, were unable to exert a decisive influence on the commission's activities." This is perhaps the best example of the specious reporting in which Akimova's book abounds. The Kuomintang's agrarian commission was formed specifically for the purpose of preventing the confiscation of land belonging to Kuomintang officers who were landowners, since the latter could hardly be expected to fight for a system which threatened to dispossess them. Not only the Chinese Communists but Stalin himself knew and approved of the commission's objectives. Stalin, in particular, was greatly alarmed at the prospect of a victory in China by an Anglo-Japanese coalition—a product of his fevered imagination—which he regarded as a threat not only to the Chinese revolution but also to the territorial integrity of the Soviet Far East. It is ironical that Mao Tse-tung should have been a member of the commission, and Akimova's allegation that it was there that the "idea of 'politically' confiscating only land belonging to the counterrevolutionaries" arose may well be a dig at the present Chinese Communist Party leader, who most certainly has no desire to be reminded of his activities on the commission.

In general, the Chinese Communists in Wuhan were in a highly unenviable position. Throughout the Yangtze valley the peasants were rising up against the landlords and the war-lords, but it was the latter who were supplying the Wuhan government with troops and material resources. By siding with the peasants, the Wuhan government would have merely been cutting its own throat. Although it was by then clear that the alliance between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party could be maintained no longer, some of the latter's leaders insisted on challenging Chiang Kai-shek by unleashing a nationwide class war. Moscow was against such a move, and thus the Chinese Communists did, in effect, become accomplices in the "misdeeds" which according to Akimova were chiefly responsible for the collapse of the Wuhan government. Needless to say, the author says nothing about the role played by the Soviet government in these developments. For her, everything was either "black" or "white," the right-wingers being "black" and the left-wingers "white."

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Thus, Stalin's Chinese adventure ended disastrously. His intervention had enabled Chiang Kai-shek, the arch-enemy of the Chinese Communists, to take firm control of the entire country. When Borodin and Blücher arrived in China, the Kuomintang was a poorly organized, heterogeneous group referred to contemptuously by Stalin as "only half a party." Since the Kuomintang had no military power of its own, its fate rested entirely in the hands of a few war-lords. When Borodin came he reorganized the Kuomintang along Communist Party lines, while Blücher gave it an army which was considered first-class by Chinese standards. Stalin, thinking that he could use Chiang Kai-shek as a puppet to be discarded when no longer required, had Borodin put him in charge of the Whampoa Military Academy, and later of the entire Kuomintang forces. Chiang, however, turned the tables on Stalin and used the Soviet advisers for his own ends. Worst of all from the Soviet point of view was the fact that as a result of Stalin's actions the Chinese Communists were for a time reduced to the status of "coolies of the Kuomintang."

The Soviet intervention in China came to an end in the summer of 1927. Large numbers of Soviet military and political advisers were escorted out of the country. Borodin himself had to flee through the Gobi Desert. Marshal Fêng Yü-hsiang, upon whom Stalin had also placed great hopes, went over to the side of the victorious Chiang Kai-shek. In July 1927, Vishnyakova-Akimova also had to leave a China which had embarked upon a course completely different from that earmarked for it by the Soviet advisers.

In conclusion, Akimova tells of her motives for writing the book—motives which naturally have nothing to do with the pursuit of historical truth. She writes:

I have come to the end of my reminiscences. As a witness to the many gripping and significant events of those years, I should like to conclude by saying that the Soviet people, the Soviet government as well as the Soviet citizens then working in China always considered the cause of the Chinese revolution as very much their

- own and spared no effort on its behalf. We loved and still love the Chinese people, and wish them happiness and prosperity. We are bound by years of persistent struggle, by the blood which we have shed together. Unity was always the guarantee of our triumphs (page 375).

These closing words are evidently meant as a reproach directed against the present Chinese leaders for having failed to preserve this unity, and it is this implied reproach which lends Akimova's book much of its current significance. The book is also interesting for the student of Chinese history inasmuch as it reflects the official Soviet view of the events in question. It must further be admitted that Akimova, despite her tendentiousness, which is particularly apparent in her habit of giving people such emotionally-toned labels as "traitor," "flawless knight," etc., succeeds in conveying the atmosphere of the period concerned. The book contains in addition several little-known facts about the activities of the Soviet advisers in China and their subsequent fate. As we have already seen, the overwhelming majority of these advisers lost their lives during Stalin's purges, and this may well be the reason for the colossal blunders committed by Stalin in his postwar relations with the Chinese Communist Party, which he gravely underestimated. Having virtually wiped out this dedicated band of specialists, Stalin was subsequently forced to rely for advice and information on China on dilettantes whose opinions were based more on Marxist-Leninist theory than on a knowledge of Chinese affairs.

A. Kashin

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

March 1966

1 Public meeting dedicated to tenth anniversary of creation of East German People's Army opened in Moscow by Head of Central Political Department of Soviet Army and Navy, Army General A. A. Yepishev. Speech delivered by First Deputy Chief of General Staff of Soviet Armed Forces, Army General P. F. Batitsky.

Soviet "Venera-3" space probe reaches Venus after flight of three-and-a-half months.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-111."

2 Announcement that conference on "The Collective and the Individual in a Socialist Society" is being held in Moscow by Soviet Academy of Social Sciences and East German Institute of Social Sciences.

Third session of Soviet Arts Academy comes to an end, V. A. Serov having been elected President and M. G. Manizer and V. S. Kemenov Vice-Presidents.

Announcement that twenty-fifth session of Comecon's Standing Commission for Transport and tenth session of its Standing Commission for Coordinating Scientific and Technical Research took place in Moscow February 22-28 and February 24-28 respectively.

Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman N. V. Podgorny receives departing West German Ambassador Horst Gropper.

3 Announcement that regular meeting of Franco-Soviet standing commission for cultural, scientific and technical relations has come to an end in Paris, after having produced agreements on expansion of exchange programs in these fields.

Delegation of Soviet journalists arrives in Karachi on two-week visit following invitation by Pakistani government.

Announcement that regular plenary meeting of USSR Supreme Court has been held under chairmanship of A. F. Gorkin. Legal practice in cases involving establishment of jural facts and illegal production and distribution of narcotic, potent and poisonous substances discussed. Deputy Chairman of Supreme

Court, V. I. Terebilov, reports on USSR delinquency figures for 1965, noting that in certain areas criminal delinquency is on the increase.

4 Announcement that Soviet-Somalian cultural agreement for 1966 has been signed in Mogadiscio.

Announcement that oblast and krai Party conferences are coming to an end.

Soviet-Rumanian convention abolishing transit visas, as well as entry and exit visas for business trips and visits to relatives and friends, signed in Bucharest.

5 Announcement that Chairman of Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin will visit UAR during first half of May in response to invitation by UAR President Nasser.

Death of poetess Anna Akhmatova.

6 Announcement that Council of Ministers has adopted resolution to expand economic faculty of Azerbaidzhan State University in Baku into Institute of the National Economy under Azerbaidzhani Ministry of Higher and Special Secondary Education.

Announcement that in view of return of secondary "general education" schools to a ten-year schedule and absence of vocational training facilities in many of these schools, Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers have adopted resolution "On a Partial Adaptation of Work Training in the Secondary General Education School," under which the schools are to provide secondary general and polytechnical education as well as a "labor upbringing," and vocational training only where facilities exist. Draft of decree on corresponding amendment of law "On the Strengthening of Ties Between School and Life and the Further Development of the Public Education System in the USSR" submitted to Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Announcement that Soviet governmental delegation led by Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers M. T. Yefremov has arrived in East Berlin en route for Leipzig Fair.

- 7 Cooperation agreement between "Novosti" Press Agency and Baktar News Agency of Afghanistan signed in Moscow.
- 8 Publication of Party Central Committee's message to Soviet women on occasion of International Woman's Day.
Publication of TASS denial of Western press reports of death of Soviet specialists in street fighting during military coup in Ghana.
- 9 Announcement that protocol on scientific cooperation between Soviet and East German Academies of Sciences during 1966 has been signed in East Berlin.
Director-General of Finnish Posts and Telegraphs arrives in Moscow.
Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal, highest award of World Peace Council, awarded to Valentina Nikolayeva-Tereshkova, first woman astronaut and presidium member of Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace.
- 10 Newly appointed West German Ambassador to USSR, von Walther, arrives in Moscow.
Delegation of Soviet doctors led by First Deputy Health Minister of Uzbek SSR U. Aripov leaves for Thailand to participate in conference of Asian countries convened by UNICEF to discuss problem of improving situation of children and young people in these countries.
- 11 Constituent conference of All-Union Society of Philatelists ends in Moscow, Doctor of Geographical Sciences E. T. Krenkel having been elected board chairman.
Conference of Soviet university and college administrators and teachers comes to an end in Moscow, after having discussed measures to improve academic and teaching work of higher and secondary special educational institutions.
- 12 Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers and Gosplan Chairman N. K. Baibakov leaves for East Berlin for negotiations on further development of Soviet-East German economic relations.
Death of Soviet biochemist N. M. Sisakyan, Chief Academic Secretary of Presidium of USSR Academy of Sciences.
- 13 Announcement that Soviet economic delegation led by Chairman of Presidium of All-Union Chamber of Commerce M. V. Nesterov has arrived in Tokyo for First Conference of Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet Business Cooperation Committees, scheduled to begin on March 15.
- 14 Agreement signed between Moscow State University and Humboldt University (East Berlin) on cooperation in 1966. Agreement calls for exchanges of teachers, students and literature.
Negotiations between representatives of Aeroflot and Japan Air Lines begin in Moscow.
Cambodian Deputy Premier Son Sann arrives in Moscow to open exhibition of Cambodian national achievements, scheduled to open on March 17.
- 15 Collaboration program for 1966 between Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and Soviet-Mongolian Friendship Society on the one hand and Executive Committee of Mongolian Peace and Friendship Organizations and Mongolian-Soviet Friendship Society on the other signed in Ulan Bator.
- 16 Announcement that Havana is being developed into large modern fishing port with Soviet aid.
Agreement on formation of Soviet-East German Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Collaboration signed in East Berlin.
Soviet space capsule "Kosmos-110," with two dogs on board, Veterok and Ugolek, lands safely.
- 17 Exhibition of photographs taken by TASS photographers in 1965 opens in Moscow.
Announcement that meeting of Executive Committee of International Union of Architects has opened in Moscow. Agenda includes: training of architects; improvement of Union's information publications; organization of Union's Ninth Congress, to be held in Prague in 1967 on the theme "Architecture and Man's Living Environment."
Announcement that new Ulyanovsk experimental atomic power station, located in Melekes, has gone into operation.
Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-112."
Publication of Supreme Soviet Presidium decree calling for elections to Supreme Soviet on June 12.
Exhibition of Soviet consumer goods opened in Pyongyang to mark seventeenth anniversary of signing of Soviet-North Korean economic and cultural collaboration agreement.

18 Announcement that conference of Soviet and UAR fishery experts has come to an end in Moscow.

Soviet-Yemeni cultural exchange program for 1966 signed in Moscow.

Announcement that Technical Council of Power and Electrification Ministry has approved plan, drawn up by Leningrad public aviation design office, for examining technical and economic aspects of construction of airships and their national economic application.

Deputy Director-General of International Labor Organization, C. W. Jenks, arrives in Moscow to discuss questions arising from Soviet participation in the Organization's activities.

Newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to Hungary F. Y. Titov presents credentials to Hungarian President Istvan Dobi.

19 Collaboration agreement between Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and Soviet-Rumanian Friendship Society on the one hand and Rumanian Society for Friendly Relations with the Soviet Union on the other signed in Bucharest.

Announcement that candidates are being nominated for Central Electoral Commission for elections to Supreme Soviet.

Promulgation of Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree fixing number of electoral districts for elections to Council of Nationalities at 32 for a Union republic, 11 for an autonomous republic, 5 for an autonomous oblast and one for a national district, one representative being elected in each electoral district.

Publication of joint communiqué on visit of Cambodian Deputy Premier Son Sann to USSR.

Announcement that Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko and Head of Political Department of Swiss Federal Council, Willy Spuhler, have exchanged greetings telegrams on twentieth anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations between their countries.

20 Soviet-American agreement on exchanges in science, technology, culture, education, medicine, agriculture and other fields in 1966 and 1967 signed in Washington.

Announcement that Council of Ministers and Party Central Committee have adopted resolution "On Improving the Organization

of the Creation and National Economic Application of Computing Devices and Automatic Control Systems."

Announcement that Council of Ministers has approved plan for organizing new system for planning and stimulating industrial production.

21 Secretary General of Venezuelan Communist Party Jesus Faria arrives in Moscow after two-and-a-half years' imprisonment in a Venezuelan jail.

Kosygin receives Afghan Foreign Minister Nour Ahmad Estemadi prior to latter's departure for Kabul after course of medical treatment in USSR.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-113."

22 Announcement that Supreme Soviet Presidium has issued decree forming 767 electoral districts for elections to Council of the Union, and 750 for elections to Council of Nationalities, one representative being elected for each district.

Soviet-Japanese conference on littoral trade opens in Niigata, Chairman of Presidium of All-Union Chamber of Commerce M. V. Nesterov heading Soviet delegation.

Soviet-Algerian exchange program for 1966, covering fields of science, culture, health, education and sport, signed in Algiers. USSR to send over 300 medical workers and 400 teachers to work in Algerian hospitals, secondary schools and higher educational institutions.

Opening of joint session of Mechanics and Control Processes Department of USSR Academy of Sciences and Scientific and Technical Council of Ministry of Instrument Making, Automatic Devices and Control Systems devoted to prospects for application of computers in national economy.

23 Announcement that Society for Soviet-Pakistani Cultural Relations has been founded, with Soviet Geology Minister A. V. Sidorenko as Chairman.

24 British Disarmament Minister Lord Chalfont arrives in Moscow.

25 Supreme Soviet Presidium issues decree confirming in office 27 members of Central Electoral Commission for elections to Supreme Soviet, including the Chairman, V. V. Grishin.

- 26 Announcement that Kosygin is to visit Finland in June in response to invitation made by President Kekkonen during his visit to USSR in December 1965.

Tenth anniversary of foundation of Joint Nuclear Research Institute in Dubna.

Plenary meeting of Party Central Committee approves report to be delivered on Committee's behalf by First Secretary L. I. Brezhnev at Twenty-Third Party Congress.

- 27 Leninogorsk Zinc Plant goes into operation.
- 29 Twenty-Third Party Congress, attended by 4,943 delegates, opened in Moscow by Party Central Committee First Secretary L. I. Brezhnev. Congress elects its Presidium, Secretariat and Editorial and Mandate Commissions. Agenda: Report of Party Central Committee (speaker L. I. Brezhnev); report of Party's Central Auditing Commission (Commission Chairman N. A. Muraveva); Congress directives on 1966-70 Five-Year Plan (A. N. Kosygin), election of central Party organs.
- 31 Launching of Soviet lunar probe "Luna-10," which is to be put into an orbit round the Moon.

Supreme Soviet Presidium issues decree proclaiming Geologist's Day, the first Sunday in April, a public holiday.

Changes and Appointments

- 6 M. I. Misnik appointed Deputy Chairman of Gosplan.
Kh. T. Peterson appointed Deputy Minister of Melioration and Water Economy.
- 12 V. I. Rubtsov appointed Chairman of State Forestry Committee.
- 13 I. G. Balyasinsky appointed First Deputy Chairman and V. A. Belousov Deputy Chairman of State Purchasing Committee.
G. A. Dushin and G. A. Kozlov appointed Deputy Chairmen of State Forestry Committee.
- 20 Announcement that M. L. Ryabova has been appointed Deputy Finance Minister.
- 25 M. N. Vsevolzhsky replaces A. A. Titarenko as First Secretary of Zaporozhe Oblast Party Committee.
- 27 V. D. Belyayev appointed Head of Central Microbiological Industry Department of Council of Ministers.

Notes on Contributors

DAVLETSHIN, T. Born in 1904. Studied law and economics in the USSR, where he was researcher and teacher prior to World War II. Writer on questions of law and economics in the Soviet Union and also on the history and culture of the Tatar people. Now a member of the Learned Council of the Institute for the Study of the USSR and a regular contributor to its publications.

GALAY, NIKOLAI. Born 1902 at Staritsa, Tver Province. Studied and later taught on General Golovin's advanced courses on military science in Paris, 1927—39. Served with the White Army during the Civil War and, as a battalion commander, with the Vlasov Army in World War II. Senior associate of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, specializing in military affairs and Soviet foreign policy. Editor of the *Bulletin*.

MAJSTRENKO, I. W. Born 1899 at Oposhnya, in the Poltava Province. Graduated in 1924 from the Kharkov Institute of the National Economy. Worked as a journalist; 1931—36, taught at the Kharkov Institute of Journalism. Emigrated to the West during World War II, subsequently publishing articles and books in various languages on questions of politics and economics in the USSR, including *Borot'vism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism* (New York, 1954).

KRUZHIN, PETR. Born 1921 in what is now Kalinin Oblast. Left school in 1939 and entered an officers' training school, from which he graduated in 1941. While at school and in the army, was an active member of the Komsomol. Taken prisoner by the Germans in 1942 and joined the Vlasov movement in 1943. Since then has written on political subjects and Soviet youth (including "A Young Communist" in *Thirteen Who Fled*, New York, 1949). Assistant Editor of the *Bulletin*.

STOLTE, STEFAN C. Hungarian journalist. Imprisoned in Hungary from 1949 to 1956. Released during the Hungarian Revolution. Now a free-lance journalist in Munich, specializing in Soviet-satellite relations.

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
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ARTICLES

Recent Soviet Relations with Afghanistan

WILLIAM B. BALLIS

¹ For companion pieces to this article, see the author's contributions on "Soviet-Turkish Relations During the Decade 1953-63" (*Bulletin*, 1964, No. 9) and "Soviet-Iranian Relations During the Decade 1953-64" (*Bulletin*, 1965, No. 11).

As one of the countries bordering on the southern regions of the USSR, Afghanistan has in the past few years presented a special relationship to the Soviet Union. In this article, we shall discuss the background to these relations and attempt to outline their economic, political and military aspects.

In the nineteenth century, Imperial Russia had designs on Afghanistan as part of her policy of southward expansion. With their advance into Central Asia in the third quarter of that century, the Russians moved close to northern Afghanistan. Agreements delimiting the border between the two countries were signed in 1885 and 1895. While the boundary thus became fixed, it corresponded to neither strategic nor ethnic realities, for it did not put all the non-Afghan tribes on the Russian side, where many of their co-tribesmen lived. Later on, Great Britain took over the control of Afghanistan's foreign relations with the consent of the country's ruler, and in the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 Russia acknowledged the British sphere of influence as covering Afghanistan. After the end of World War I, an Afghan mission went to Moscow and a Soviet mission to Kabul. Emir Amanullah, who ascended the Afghan throne on February 27, 1919, found himself engaged in a dispute with the British for harboring Indian nationalists who were using Afghanistan as a base for operations against the British in India. Amanullah refused British demands for their expulsion, and succeeded in negotiating the Treaty of Rawalpindi of August 8, 1919, whereby Britain recognized the complete independence of Afghanistan. This enabled Amanullah to negotiate with the Russians, and as a result of the exchange of missions in 1919, formal diplomatic relations between the two countries were established, resulting in the Treaty of Friendship signed on February 28, 1921.

In the meantime, Lenin had sent a letter to Amanullah endorsing the Pan-Islamic movement. He wrote:

At present, flourishing Afghanistan is the only independent Moslem state in the world and fate sends the Afghan people the great historic task of uniting about itself all enslaved Mohammedan peoples and leading them on the road to freedom and independence.¹

¹ Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, London, 1930, Vol. I, p. 286.

An agreement concluded with Afghanistan by Lenin—incidentally signed a few days before the Kronstadt Revolt in March 1921—provided for subsidies of gold, munitions and assistance in constructing a telegraph line from the Soviet frontier railroad terminal Kushka to Kabul. In this way, the Soviets began to fill the power vacuum in Afghanistan left by the British withdrawal.—At this time, Britain had no legation in Kabul.

Later, however, Amanullah became less disposed to favor Soviet influence in Afghanistan when, in the latter part of 1921, it became known how the Soviet authorities were treating the Afghans' coreligionists in Bukhara and other parts of Soviet Central Asia. At the same time, he began to show a more favorable regard for Britain: on November 22 of that year, he concluded a treaty with Britain exchanging diplomatic missions and affording Afghanistan certain transit and customs privileges in India. Nevertheless, Soviet aid to Afghanistan and Soviet influence in that country did not come to an end in the twenties. Amanullah permitted the Soviets to establish a branch of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, and accepted Soviet offers to lend engineers for public works and instructors for the air force. In 1926, a pact of neutrality and non-aggression was concluded between the two countries—one of the series of such pacts which the USSR initiated at that time with states bordering on its territory.

As a well-known specialist in Middle Eastern studies puts it:

There is no doubt that, while maintaining the appearance of utmost correctness, Russia was consistently pursuing a slow but certain policy of penetration. She was, in the first place, taking full advantage of Amanullah's anti-British frame of mind to proffer various forms of collaboration, which the unstable ruler, believing himself very shrewd, accepted as a counterbalance to British influence. In the second place, Russia very skillfully exploited the fact that the northern part of Afghanistan was inhabited by Turkish-speaking minorities divided from their Soviet-governed brethren by an ill-protected and rather artificial boundary.²

Soviet territorial contact with Afghanistan created a favorable position for influencing Afghan policy, and the USSR, using road and railway construction, telegraph and trade development, continued to foster amicable relations with Afghanistan. Since the border between the two countries was not determined by geographical features, the USSR had an unusual opportunity for determining its socio-economic relationship with the northern part of Afghanistan, even though this region was politically under Kabul.

On January 14, 1929, under pressure from insurgent chiefs, Amanullah abdicated. Shortly before, the USSR had expressed a readiness to send troops to his aid, and in fact Soviet forces did enter the country, but to no avail. After a period of turmoil, a new ruler, Nadir Shah, ascended the throne on October 16. Nadir succeeded in consolidating the country's economy without resorting to the services of either Soviet or British experts, and with regard to both the USSR and Great Britain he pursued a policy of neutrality and independence. In 1930,

² George Lenczowski, *The Middle East*, 3rd ed., Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1962, pp. 238–39.

a crisis occurred in diplomatic relations with the USSR concerning the northern border of Afghanistan. Soviet troops were sent in, but the affair was settled after refugees from Bukhara had been removed by Nadir to the south.

In November 1933, Nadir was assassinated. He was succeeded by his son, Mohammed Zahir Shah, who continued his father's foreign policy. The new ruler did conclude a trade agreement with the USSR, but rejected the latter's request to establish a trade commission in Afghanistan. During World War II, there was some tension between the two countries over German and other Axis nationals employed in Afghanistan, who, with the exception of those enjoying diplomatic status, were expelled by the Afghan government. During the war, Soviet-Afghan trade showed a tendency to decline, but revived when the war was over. The USSR exported petroleum, cotton goods and sugar, and imported wool.

Economic Relations

The USSR has used economic relations as the principal means for obtaining a favorable relationship with Afghanistan.³ In 1950, a new trade agreement was signed between the two countries. The Soviets continued to impress upon the Afghans the achievements of Soviet technology in transforming neighboring Uzbekistan into a modern economy, and sponsored visits by Afghan intellectuals to Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, etc. The economic changes in Uzbekistan prompted the Afghan government to concern itself more with developing that part of its northern territory adjacent to the Soviet Union. This area had cultural and religious affinities with the peoples of Soviet Central Asia.

The trade agreement of July 1950, which was to run for four years, provided for the USSR to send machinery and transport equipment in exchange for minerals. During the period covered by the agreement, the USSR sent entomologists, veterinarians and petroleum experts to Afghanistan. In April 1953, it also sent a technical mission to build accommodation for storing wheat.⁴ In January of the following year, the USSR lent Afghanistan 3,500,000 dollars at 3 percent interest to construct flour mills and wheat elevators. (This interest rate was slightly lower than that offered to Afghanistan by the United States.) Other aid followed. In May 1954, the USSR supplied equipment for Afghanistan's leading hospital. In the summer of that year, the USSR began work on a pipeline to carry gasoline from Termez, on the Soviet border, to Mazar-i-Sharif, the next important Afghan town sixty miles south. In the most dramatic project, the USSR gave a loan of 2,000,000 dollars to pave the main streets of Kabul. The loan had originally been requested from the United States, which refused the request on economic grounds, and this gave the USSR an enormous advantage over the USA as regards prestige with the Afghan government.

³ For a discussion of Soviet-Afghan trade as compared with the USSR's trade with other Asian countries, see Joseph S. Berliner, *Soviet Economic Aid*, New York, 1958.

⁴ *The Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, Mass., April 29, 1953.

Total Soviet aid in 1954 amounted to 8,000,000 dollars. During this initial period of large-scale Soviet aid, visits between the two countries increased. In 1954, Afghan physicians visited the USSR, and the next year they were followed by journalists and athletes. In 1954, Soviet intellectuals visited Afghanistan. In 1955, it was reported that the number of Soviet technicians there was around five hundred.⁵ The culminating point was reached when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Afghanistan in December 1955 during their journey to India and Burma. On this occasion, the Soviets presented Afghanistan with a fully equipped hospital of 100 beds and fifteen ZIS-155 buses for the city of Kabul, with 77 cases of spare parts. A Soviet-Afghan communiqué of December 18 spoke of the need for considering further economic and technical cooperation between the two countries, particularly in agricultural development, the construction of a hydroelectric station, irrigation installations and automobile repair shops and the reconstruction of the Kabul airfield, and for concluding the necessary agreements. The communiqué also stated that the Soviet government had offered a long-term credit of 100 million US dollars.⁶ The agreement on this credit was signed in Kabul on January 28, 1956, Afghanistan agreeing to repay the loan in the form of exports at a rate of 2 percent interest over a period of 22 years starting eight years after utilization.⁷ This was the result of Afghanistan's preparation of a five-year plan providing for the construction of aerodromes and roads,⁸ though priority was given to agricultural development, including irrigation facilities.⁹ Under the terms of the credit, the USSR agreed to build two hydroelectric plants, three automobile repair shops, a laboratory for chemical fertilizers, an artificial fertilizer factory, a motor road from Kabul north through the mountains to Mazar-i-Sharif, a military airport at Kabul, irrigation facilities, and an automatic telephone exchange in Kabul; in addition, the USSR undertook to conduct a "disinterested" search for oil.¹⁰ On March 1, 1956, the loan was implemented by an agreement providing for the despatch of technicians and technical equipment and by a number of further agreements.¹¹ On March 24, an agreement establishing regular air communications between Moscow and Kabul was signed in Kabul. A week or two later, it was reported from London that on April 2 a Soviet medical team had left Moscow to lecture at Kabul University.¹²

From 14 percent in 1951, the USSR's share of Afghanistan's foreign trade rose to 30 percent in 1956.¹³ Principal items imported from the USSR were oil,

⁵ *Soviet Technical Assistance*, Staff Study No. 7, Subcommittee on Technical Assistance Program, July 12, 1956, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C.

⁶ *Izvestia*, December 20, 1955.

⁷ *Ibid.*, February 1, 1956, p. 4. According to *The New York Times* of January 25, 1956, the signing took place on January 24.

⁸ *Dawn*, Karachi, January 25, 1956.

⁹ *The Times*, London, January 28, 1956.

¹⁰ *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 9, 1957.

¹¹ *The Hindu*, Madras, June 28, 1956.

¹² *Ibid.*, April 5, 1956.

¹³ *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, as quoted in *Soviet News*, London, August 3, 1957.

automobiles and machinery, which accounted for 75, 40 and 23 percent respectively of Afghanistan's imports of these commodities. In return, Afghanistan exported to the USSR more than 60 percent of her lambskins and a large share of her cotton, wool, dried fruit and oil seeds.¹⁴

Economic penetration of Afghanistan by the Communist bloc has eclipsed that by the United States. In addition to the hundred-million-dollar credit of 1956, the Soviet bloc has put in some 25 million dollars in arms shipments, and in 1957 there came the first Soviet MIG-17 and T-34 tanks. Afghanistan's ability to draw economic aid from the Soviet Union is due to her geographical position, for she has an 800-mile common border with the Soviet Union and China and a wedge-like location between Iran and Pakistan. She has literally capitalized on her being a neighbor of the USSR and also on her sharing borders with other pivotal states.

Trade pacts between the two countries were negotiated and signed every one or two years. That for 1958, signed in Kabul on February 14 of that year, provided for the exchange of Soviet machinery, oil products, cotton fabrics and sugar for Afghan cotton, wool, raw hides and dried fruit.¹⁵

The Soviet Union continued to assist in the economic development of Afghanistan by sending technicians. As part of the agreement on the development of hydroelectric projects, it was reported in November 1958 that Uzbek engineers would work with their Afghan counterparts. "The Soviet scientists," the report said, "will help the Afghan specialists to survey the lands adjoining the Aru-Darya and help them find the best pattern for their irrigation."¹⁶ Further technical assistance was revealed in a report from Moscow that the USSR had signed a contract for the supply of large quantities of radio equipment for use between the main cities of Afghanistan.¹⁷

An economic delegation from Afghanistan which had arrived in Moscow on March 14, 1959,¹⁸ was received by Khrushchev, and on April 27 a trade agreement for 1959 was signed.¹⁹ On May 5 of that year, Mikoyan received Ghulam Mohammed Sheirzad, the Afghan Minister of Trade.²⁰ In May, it was reported from Moscow that the Afghan government had requested a Soviet anti-locust team.²¹

As a result of protracted discussions in Moscow, an agreement on economic and technical cooperation was finally signed on May 28, 1959.²² Among other things, the agreement provided for the construction of a 525-mile motor road from Kushka *via* Herat to Kandahar, for which the USSR was to supply the machinery and the engineering skill. This road runs parallel to much of the

¹⁴ *Dawn*, January 9, 1957.

¹⁵ *Soviet News*, February 18, 1958.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, November 13, 1958.

¹⁷ *The Times*, January 23, 1959.

¹⁸ *Soviet News*, March 16, 1959.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, April 10 and 29, 1959.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, May 6, 1959.

²¹ *The Daily Telegraph*, London, May 20, 1959.

²² *Soviet News*, June 2, 1959.

Iranian-Afghan border, and links southern Afghanistan with the Soviet road system at Kushka. This road follows a plan of Tsarist days to build a railroad through Afghanistan and the Indian border province of Baluchistan (now Pakistan) to the Arabian Sea. In World War I, this railroad was built as far as Herat by the Russians with British assistance.

The year 1959 saw a considerable revival of Soviet assistance in the form of economic projects in Afghanistan. Uzbek engineers produced plans for two hydroelectric stations.²³ The USSR showed great astuteness in employing Uzbeks for this work: the psychological advantage was much greater when it could assign to Afghanistan experts who had the same religious and cultural background but at the same time were "dedicated" Soviet technicians. In addition, the USSR continued to render technical assistance under the agreement of March 1, 1956, which had provided for Soviet aid in training Afghan personnel for the Jelalabad irrigation canal.²⁴ Further assistance took place in highway construction: Soviet engineers helped to build a highway across the Hindu Kush, which shortened the existing route from Kabul to Kyzyl Kala on the Amu-Darya (Oxus) River by 125 miles.²⁵ In this work, the Soviets used the latest equipment: on the Kushka-Herat-Kandahar road, they employed helicopters to transport supplies and equipment over the difficult terrain.²⁶

Agreements were signed under the provisions of the agreement of March 1, 1956, such as that signed in Kabul on January 20, 1960, concerning Soviet aid in building a hydroelectric power station in the Naglu area, planned to be one of the country's largest power plants in general.²⁷

The 1960 trade protocol was signed in Kabul on February 4, 1960.²⁸ During this year, Soviet economic assistance continued to increase, especially in road-building and the manufacture of motor vehicles. On July 3, Zahir Shah dedicated an automobile plant in the presence of Soviet Minister of Transport Kalabokhov.²⁹ On December 22, the trade protocol for 1961 was signed: this envisaged an increase of 15 percent in trade between the two countries.³⁰

During 1961, arrangements were made for the despatch of Soviet physicians to combat cholera,³¹ entomologists to deal with locusts³² and professors to augment institutions of higher learning.³³ On October 16, the two countries signed in Moscow an agreement on economic and technical cooperation in connection with Afghanistan's second five-year plan.³⁴

²³ *Ibid.*, June 4, 1959.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, August 25, 1959.

²⁵ *The New York Times*, November 5, 1959.

²⁶ *Soviet News*, February 1, 1960.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, January 27, 1960.

²⁸ *Dawn*, February 6, 1960.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, July 4, 1960.

³⁰ *Soviet News*, December 31, 1960.

³¹ *Ibid.*, January 6, 1961.

³² *Ibid.*, April 15, 1961.

³³ *Dawn*, November 11, 1961.

³⁴ *Izvestia*, October 19, 1961.

January 1962 saw the signing in Kabul of a five-year trade agreement for the years 1962–66. As on previous occasions, the USSR agreed to export oil products, motor vehicles, industrial equipment and machine tools in return for wool, cotton, fruit, oil seeds, lambskins and other goods.³⁵ On January 24, an agreement on technical assistance during the same period, 1962–66, was also signed.³⁶

These agreements follow the pattern not only of earlier agreements between these two countries but also of those concluded between the USSR and other Asian countries such as India.³⁷ A general trade pact is concluded for a period of several, usually five, years; then each year an agreement is drawn up for that year and also periodically detailed agreements on specific questions. For example, a few months after the general pact of January 1962 had been concluded, an agreement on housing construction was signed by the USSR and Afghanistan in April in addition to a general architectural plan for the city of Kabul.³⁸

The trade pact for 1963 was signed in Kabul in March of that year.³⁹ On the cultural and propaganda front, the Soviets continued to be active: on April 29, a cultural cooperation pact was signed in Kabul.⁴⁰ Visits were an important instrument of Soviet cultural and political propaganda: in October 1963, Brezhnev paid an official visit to Afghanistan, as he did to Iran; the previous year, the King of Afghanistan had been welcomed to the Crimea by Khrushchev, and in October 1958 Voroshilov, Brezhnev's predecessor, had visited Afghanistan.

In the main, Soviet relations with Afghanistan have followed the same pattern as with India.⁴¹ By means of economic assistance, trade agreements and cultural exchanges, the USSR has been striving to prevent Afghanistan's foreign policy from being aligned with the West.

Political and Military Relations

To some extent, Afghanistan's dependence upon the Soviet Union has been connected with her conflict with Pakistan over Pashtunistan (Pushtunistan), a buffer area between eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan which, according to some sources, wants to be independent of the latter country.⁴² In 1957, Pakistan, confronted by bellicose threats from Afghanistan concerning the area, closed its border with Afghanistan, and in May of that year the USSR offered Afghanistan transit rights across Soviet territory.⁴³ In July of that year, Mohammed Zahir Shah paid a seventeen-day visit to the USSR, during which he not only

³⁵ *Soviet News*, January 18, 1962.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, January 31, 1962.

³⁷ See William B. Ballis, "Recent Soviet Relations with India," *Studies on the Soviet Union*, New Series, Vol. III, No. 1, Munich, 1963.

³⁸ *Soviet News*, April 18, 1962.

³⁹ *Dawn*, March 15, 1963.

⁴⁰ *Soviet News*, April 30, 1963.

⁴¹ See Ballis, *op. cit.*

⁴² *The Hindu*, August 2, 1953.

⁴³ *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 9, 1957.

- received further pledges of technical and other aid but also was assured of Soviet support for his country's aspirations to separate the disputed area from northern Pakistan. When the West refused to accept Afghanistan's position on self-determination for the five to seven million of her fellow tribesmen living under Pakistani rule, the Afghan government turned to the USSR. A spokesman of the Afghan Foreign Office is reported to have stated to an American economist then visiting the country: "The Afghan government was obliged to use Russia after the United States showed itself unwilling to correct the situation."⁴⁴

"Using Russia" did not, however, imply that Afghanistan would become a political dependency of the Soviet Union. While she has accepted large amounts of Soviet aid, her economy and political structure have not become Communist-oriented. A small number of her intellectuals are Marxists, but there is no Afghan Communist Party and Communist propaganda is banned. According to recent German visitors to the country, "there are no Communist propaganda pamphlets or newspapers in Afghanistan. Apparently, even the Soviet advisers and technicians are refraining from propagating Soviet theories."⁴⁵ The Moslem religion is a powerful force impeding the spread of Communism. As for politicians, the former prime minister Sardar Mohammed Daud, one of the strongest forces in Afghan politics of recent years, is not a Communist, even though he believes in the state control of business. Further, when the Afghan Foreign Minister Prince Sardar Mohammed Naim visited Moscow in February 1959, it was reported that he refused to enter into a new political and military agreement.⁴⁶

On the military side, a crisis occurred in 1959 in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan at the time when the United States concluded alliances with the latter country and Iran, and it was reported that Soviet units entered Afghanistan and occupied positions at Herat, straddling the main road connecting the country with Iran.⁴⁷ The Afghan Embassy in London denied the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan,⁴⁸ and the report was also denied by TASS.⁴⁹ The USSR did, however, render Afghanistan military assistance: in January 1960, it was reported by a Pakistani newspaper that 100 Soviet MIG fighters had been presented.⁵⁰ In December of the following year, the same source reported that the USSR and Afghanistan were in a secret military pact,⁵¹ which Marshal Sokolovsky had signed during a visit to Kabul. Following his departure, the Soviet military mission in Afghanistan was supposed to have been greatly increased. In February 1964, an agreement was signed allowing Soviet planes to use Afghan airports.⁵²

⁴⁴ Peter G. Franck, *Afghanistan Between East and West*, Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 11.

⁴⁵ Gunther Nollau and Hans-Jürgen Wiehe, *Russia's South Flank*, New York, 1963, p. 112.

⁴⁶ *The New York Herald Tribune*, February 8, 1959.

⁴⁷ *The Daily Telegraph*, May 11, 1959.

⁴⁸ *The Times*, May 14, 1959.

⁴⁹ *Soviet News*, May 15, 1959.

⁵⁰ *Dawn*, January 20, 1960.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, December 29, 1961.

⁵² *The Asian Recorder*, New Delhi, 1964, p. 5699.

Relations between the two countries had become very friendly some time before this. At a meeting of the Supreme Soviet on December 12, 1962, Khrushchev remarked:

The Soviet government highly prizes the friendly policy of the Afghan government, headed by Prime Minister M. Daud. This year, we had a very useful meeting with the King of Afghanistan, Mohammed Zahir Shah, which further strengthened the good-neighborly relations between our countries.⁵³

Recent Developments

On March 10, 1963, the government of Sardar Mohammed Daud was replaced by that of Dr. Mohammed Yussuf, who was the first commoner to become prime minister. During the early months of the Yussuf government, Brezhnev visited Afghanistan. On this occasion, perhaps as a result of the new government's policies, Afghanistan agreed to an ambitious project of Soviet aid in both personnel and materials for the establishment of a polytechnic institute, which was to be on a level with other institutions of higher education. Previously, the Soviets had confined their educational activities to Russian language courses.⁵⁴

On September 4, 1964, Kosygin, then First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, together with Mohammed Zahir Shah opened the Soviet-built highway across the Salang Pass in the Hindu Kush.⁵⁵

Cultural relations between the two countries continue to flourish. On December 28, 1964, a twenty-four-man Afghan cultural delegation left for the Soviet Union under the cultural exchange agreement.⁵⁶

Soviet economic assistance also continues to develop. In July 1965, it was announced in *Pravda*:

Our southern neighbor Afghanistan is busy building a power plant in Naglu with a capacity of 67,500 kilowatts. Extensive work is being done in the field of geological prospecting . . .

More than 30,000 workers in various specialties have been trained in Afghanistan. With the building of the Jalalabad Irrigation Canal alone, our specialists were able to instruct 4,600 Afghans in various professions.⁵⁷

In general, the USSR's policy toward Afghanistan has so far been typical of its policy toward all its neighbor states, and any appreciable change seems unlikely. In all probability, Soviet influence will continue to be promoted by means of economic and military assistance and also by Soviet support in the question of Pushtunistan.

⁵³ *Pravda*, December 13, 1962, p. 4.

⁵⁴ Theodore S. Gouchenour, "A New Try for Afghanistan," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1965, p. 13.

⁵⁵ *Pravda*, September 5, 1964.

⁵⁶ *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Washington, D.C., 1965, p. 195.

⁵⁷ *Pravda*, July 28, 1965, p. 5.

Continuing the series of royal visits paid to the USSR in 1957 and 1962, King Mohammed Zahir Shah and Queen Umairah went to Moscow in August 1965. Met at the airport by Kosygin, now Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Mikoyan, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, they were entertained for eleven days in Moscow and later in the Crimea.⁵⁸ No communiqué was issued at the end of this visit, but its purpose was obviously to promote relations between the two countries. On the other hand, Zahir Shah visited Germany and the United States in 1963, and both he and his prime minister seem committed to a policy of neutrality in the struggle between East and West. One observer's comment is as follows:

Afghanistan's fundamental policy of neutrality, which has been constant in its latter history, by necessity as well as choice, still remains unchanged. Observers have regarded Afghanistan as rather more than less within the sphere of the Soviet Union during the past decade, particularly since Mohammed Daud allowed the first major influence into the country in his effort to speed its development.⁵⁹

Khrushchev's policy toward Afghanistan has been continued by his successors. At the invitation of the Soviet government, Dr. Yussuf visited the USSR April 21–30, 1965. An official joint communiqué, issued on April 30, after enumerating all the Soviet officials with whom the Afghan representatives had conferred, emphasized the economic and cultural cooperation between the two states, mentioning the opening of the Salang Pass highway, the completion of the Jalalabad Canal, the Kushka–Herat–Kandahar highway, gas development, housing and urban construction and the joint use of the Pave and Amu-Darya rivers. On foreign policy, the communiqué stated:

The Soviet Union has supported and is supporting most resolutely the unceasing efforts of the countries of Asia and Africa and the non-aligned countries in their struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism, to which Afghanistan is constantly making a worthy contribution.⁶⁰

On Vietnam, it stated:

The two sides emphasized their apprehension concerning the serious exacerbation of the state of affairs in some parts of the world, especially in Vietnam, which represents a growing threat to the cause of peace.⁶¹

This statement might have been much more strongly worded, and its relatively mild tone perhaps indicates the wishes of Afghanistan not to become too closely identified with the Soviet Union in matters of foreign policy.

In October 1965, unstable political conditions precipitated by violent student demonstrations led to the resignation of the Yussuf cabinet. Dr. Yussuf was reappointed prime minister, but a few days later, on October 29, he resigned once more. His successor was another commoner, Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal,

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, August 8, 1965.

⁵⁹ Gouchenour, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁶⁰ *Pravda and Izvestia*, April 30, 1965.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

former ambassador to the United States and member of Dr. Yussuf's two previous cabinets.⁶² Maiwandwal gives every appearance of following the same independent foreign policy as his predecessor.

In the last decade, Soviet-Afghan relations have assumed primarily an economic form. It may be said that Afghanistan has become economically dependent upon the USSR, and it might be expected that this dependence would extend to political affairs; in fact, however, this development has not yet, at any rate, taken place. One of the main reasons for this lies in the economic assistance rendered by the United States, coupled with the general distrust of Communism throughout the Moslem world.

The author wishes to express his thanks to the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies and the Center for Russian Studies of the University of Michigan for a grant to do the research required for this study.

⁶² *The New York Times*, November 7, 1965.

Soviet Military Medicine

HEINRICH SCHULZ

Soviet military medicine—military medicine being regarded as a separate branch of medicine in the USSR—is officially considered to have originated on December 4, 1917, when Lenin put his signature to a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR setting up the Central Military Medical Department, the body responsible for all army medical services. In the following January the Department was made subordinate, as were all other medical institutions on Bolshevik-occupied territory, to the newly formed Council of Medical Boards, and later to the People's Health Commissariat under N. A. Semashko established on June 11, 1918. It remained, at the same time, subordinate to the Revolutionary Military Council. The centralization of all Soviet medical services under the People's Health Commissariat proved its worth during the Civil War, when conditions were such that civilian and military health measures were closely interwoven. On June 15, 1918, the Central Military Medical Department, hitherto controlled by a *kollegiya* or board, was placed under a single head by order of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. The Department was, at the same time, entrusted with the organization of medical facilities for all the armed forces. Despite considerable organizational and financial difficulties the Department was soon able, thanks to experience gained during World War I, to offer the army a combined therapeutic and evacuation system—which even today is one of the main features of Soviet military medicine—a special Evacuation Section, with a Main Evacuation Board composed of representatives from government departments, the Red Cross, etc., being created for this purpose.

There is no denying that during the early days of the Civil War there was a good deal of bungling in the Soviet medical service, despite intelligent planning, much of which embodied principles to be found in the service today, such as surgical treatment close to the front line, anti-epidemic precautions and "stage therapy" (*etapnoye lecheniye*), a system under which evacuation is reduced by the provision of treatment in "stages," a wounded or sick man being passed back from base to base for further treatment as required. It was proposed, for example, to establish transit and isolation centers (*raspredeliteli-zagraditeli*) in army, division and front service areas which would sort out the slightly-wounded and infectious cases and give them on-the-spot treatment, as well as carry out all necessary anti-epidemic precautions. The majority of such measures remained on paper. Nevertheless, the Soviet military medical service was able to chalk up a number of successes during this early period. The number of hospital beds, for example, increased from 20,000 in March 1918 to 118,600 in July 1919, 227,320 in January 1920 and 397,496 in July of that year (at which time the Red Army had a strength

of about five million).¹ Surgical, infectious diseases, VD and other special hospitals were set up in the evacuation centers of armies and fronts, and ophthalmic and ears, nose and throat wards in hospitals at front evacuation centers. Hygiene instruction and mass inoculation were instituted. During 1919 and 1920 the service had over 10,000 doctors, of whom roughly 4,000 caught typhus and over 800 died.²

After the Civil War, the Soviet military medical service was confronted with the tasks of improving standards of hygiene, sanitation and physical fitness in the armed forces. Simultaneously, its material position improved rapidly. Large hospitals and a network of sanatoria and health resorts were placed at its disposal. The service began to train its own personnel, and facilities were created for the medical selection of recruits and keeping of individual medical records, supplemented by periodical checks, of military personnel. In 1929, as a consequence of the enhanced role of the armed forces under Stalin, the Central Military Medical Department was transferred from the People's Commissariat for Health to that for Military and Naval Affairs. The practical consequence of this measure was to place the Soviet military medical service in a highly advantageous position *vis-à-vis* its civilian counterpart. Thus, the military medical authorities were not only freed from civilian control but authorized to draw on the civilian medical system for medicaments, medical equipment, trained personnel, training facilities, etc. (medical schools, for example, were compelled to expand considerably and also to specialize the military medical training for doctors and intermediate medical personnel which they had been offering since 1924). They were also empowered, in the interests of national defense, to order the civilian health authorities to carry out sanitation and anti-epidemic measures in a given area, adapt their medical facilities for possible use by the military, manufacture medical equipment and medicaments for the latter and undertake research of importance to military medicine. A considerable amount of research was done on this basis in the fields of traumatology and emergency and field surgery, such outstanding surgeons as V. A. Oppel, N. N. Burdenko, S. I. Banaitis, N. A. Bogoraz, M. M. Diterikhs, Y. Y. Dzhanelidze, N. N. Yelansky, S. S. Girgolav, V. V. Gorinevskaya, R. R. Vreden, F. F. Berezkin, P. A. Kupriyanov, V. S. Levit, V. A. Shaak and N. N. Priorov being mobilized for this purpose. From 1932 until the beginning of the war, problems of military surgery were regularly discussed at all Soviet surgical conferences. Such problems included the treatment of gunshot wounds, the prevention and cure of wound infection, traumatic shock, burns, the disinfection of hands, blood transfusion, stage therapy and military neurosurgery. Civilian health institutions were also commissioned by the military to work on the problem of combatting epidemics among the armed forces, in particular by means of killed and live vaccines, serums and phages. The general principle was that military medicine was allowed to draw freely on the achievements of civilian medicine but not *vice versa*.

¹ *Bol'shaya Meditsinskaya Entsiklopediya* (Large Medical Encyclopedia), 2nd ed., Vol. XVII, Moscow, 1960, col. 593.

² *Ibid.*, col. 594.

At the same time, the Soviet military medical service as such was considerably improved and became more specialized. Mechanization, motorization, the development of new types of offensive and defensive weapons, and the consequent emergence of new branches of the armed forces raised a host of medical problems, first and foremost the physiological effects of the various specialized forms of military service (particularly service in tank and aviation units). Aviation medicine and military epidemiology made their appearance as separate disciplines, and more rational personnel selection methods were developed.

In June 1929 a *Manual on Medical Evaluation in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army* was issued, which laid down basic principles regarding stage therapy, the sorting of the sick and the wounded, etc. The manual stipulated that horse transport was to be used for evacuation purposes, and that transport was to be provided by the next highest command. It did not, however, stress the need for the continuous evacuation of casualties from the battlefield, and made only a fleeting reference to the need for specialization among medical institutions. In 1933, the stage therapy system was further elaborated in military medical service regulations which stipulated that skilled medical care had to be made available as close to the troops as possible, and that serious and light casualties had to be evacuated in separate streams. Nevertheless, these regulations also had a number of weaknesses. Light casualties, for example, were to be sent to hospital not *via* the division medical base but *via* a collection post at the division supply relay point, which had insufficient qualified surgeons. The task of sorting out casualties devolved on the battalion medical base, which, although it had a qualified doctor on its staff, was in no position to perform this function adequately.

During the next few years the Soviet military medical service became motorized, while the period 1935-37 saw the appearance of medical companies and battalions, which were respectively equipped for setting up regimental and division medical bases. Facilities for the speedy provision of medical, including surgical, care were thus greatly improved. The medical battalion incorporated the previously separate therapeutic, evacuation and anti-epidemic units; it was highly mobile, and well equipped and staffed. Later, special motorized surgical detachments were formed.

From 1938 to 1940, the Soviet military medical service was tried during the hostilities with Japan and then Finland, and found to be wanting. Criticism was leveled in particular at: the lack of standard principles for the treatment and evacuation of casualties; the inadequate training of medical orderlies and instructors, which caused delays in getting casualties out of the battle zone and off to the medical bases; the practice of assigning to each battalion a trained doctor who could have been adequately replaced by a doctor's assistant; the lack of a hospital department in the medical battalions; the existence of division hospitals; the practice of keeping excessive quantities of medical stores at the regimental medical bases, which cut down the mobility of the medical companies; and the practice of applying primary sutures. One of the steps taken as a result of this reappraisal was to do away with the collection points for light casualties and rule that hence-

forth the latter were to be sent straight to the division medical bases for surgical treatment. In addition to this, in July 1940 a Learned Medical Council was set up under the Central Military Medical Department and told to make a thorough evaluation of all experience gathered by the medical services of the Russian Imperial Army, the Red Army (during the Civil War) and foreign armies. The Council, whose 30-man Presidium included some of the country's leading medical experts, was credited with the fact that the Soviet military medical service entered World War II well-organized and armed with standard operational procedures. Forecasting that a major war involving the Soviet Union would be prolonged, bloody and fast-moving, the Council, in elaborating tactical principles for the Soviet military medical service, took special account of the need for mass evacuation facilities, highly mobile medical units and a smoothly functioning administration.

The therapeutic and evacuation system in particular was adapted to the demands of a major war. This system was aimed at providing first aid within the shortest possible time, followed by further treatment as required during the course of evacuation by stages. Evacuation was to be carried out "by medical prescription" and with due regard for the military situation. Evacuation and therapy were combined in a single process, the evacuation serving merely to secure uninterrupted therapy, which in turn was split up into first aid, and pre-doctor, doctor and specialized treatment. The system, of course, called for the efficient sorting of casualties as well as for standardized medical procedures and appropriate medical records.

In 1940 and 1941, doctors were accordingly replaced by doctor's assistants in rifle battalions, the medical battalions were reinforced by surgeons as well as hospital departments for temporary hospitalization purposes, division hospitals were abolished and the number of medical installations at army level increased, in particular in the form of detached medical reinforcement companies. The question of medical supplies was also reexamined.

By 1941, a number of excellent manuals for military doctors had made their appearance. They included *Military Hygiene*, by F. G. Krotkov, the *Military Medical Manual*, *Wound Therapy in War* (edited by N. N. Petrov), and handbooks on field surgery by M. N. Akhutin, N. N. Yelansky, P. A. Kupriyanov and S. I. Banaitis and on the organizational and tactical aspects of military medicine by B. K. Leonardov and A. F. Vishnievetsky. In the same year, almost immediately after the beginning of the invasion, the Learned Medical Council was responsible for the publication of two new handbooks, entitled *Instructions on Field Surgery* and *Instructions on the Use of Sulfonamide Preparations in Military Units*; their appearance meant that for the first time in the country's history doctors were given an authoritative set of basic principles for the treatment of wounded persons.

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The initial period of World War II was an extremely difficult one for the Soviet military medical service. Owing to casualties and organizational chaos, there was a grave shortage of medical personnel, in particular orderlies and

stretcher-bearers. All field installations had to be set up while the Soviet armies were on the retreat. In the early days of the war, the establishment of many installations in the frontier regions was interrupted by the rapid advance of the Germans, while those in the rear had not yet had time to come up to the front. A large number of medical installations and supply depots were knocked out by the German air force. Soviet medical personnel had to perform their duties under constant bombardment, while hospitals were under constant threat of capture. The situation was worsened by the fact that only 20 percent of the doctors had organizational experience.³ The extensive use of artillery, mortars, tanks, bombers and ground attack aircraft meant an extremely high density of fire and a high casualty rate. Of the total number of gunshot wounds suffered by the Soviet army during the war, 56.8 percent were caused by shell and mine splinters, while over half were accompanied by bone damage.⁴

During the first year of the war, first aid and pre-doctor care were provided in the battalions without medical bases' being set up. Treatment at the regimental medical bases was limited to the saving of lives, while most of the division bases' activity consisted in emergency operations. Surgical work was largely concentrated at the army and front hospitals. Conditions were such that many forms of treatment perfected in peacetime, including blood transfusion, anti-shock therapy and specialized treatment, could not be given during the initial evacuation stages, and even in many hospitals. There were difficulties in inducing doctors to treat wounds without the application of primary sutures (later, however, the new technique came to be universally adopted at the front line and thoroughly proved its worth). Army hospitals, although short of beds, had to provide for primary wound surgery, the temporary hospitalization of non-transportable patients and short-term therapy for the mild cases. They also had to arrange for the evacuation of patients to the front hospitals, in which, for all intents and purposes, any specialized treatment began. The front hospitals too, however, had an extremely limited amount of bed space, so that evacuation to rear areas was considerable. As of January 1, 1942, 64.2 percent of the hospital beds set aside for troop casualties were in rear areas, 28.4 percent in front hospitals and only 7.4 percent in army hospitals.⁵

In the intermediate period of the war, from November 1942 to the end of 1943, when the Soviet army went over to the attack, it became possible for the first time to put the therapeutic and evacuation system into practice (an indication that the system was designed for an attacking rather than a defending army). The military hospitals gradually followed the Soviet armies westwards. As of January 1, 1943, 55.1 percent of the available bed space was located in army and front hospitals—as opposed to hospitals in rear areas—and one year later 65.2 percent. As a result, the evacuation of patients to rear areas slackened off considerably, there being a corresponding increase in the number of patients who could be

³ *Meditsinskaya gazeta*, 1965, No. 17, p. 4.

⁴ *Sovetskoye zdravookhraneniye*, 1965, No. 5, p. 5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

given a complete and time-saving course of treatment in an army or front hospital. According to Soviet statistics, 32.7 percent of all patients were returned to active duty from army and front hospitals in 1941, 68.8 percent in 1942 and 85 percent in 1943, a figure which remained more or less constant until the end of the war.⁶

During this intermediate period, basic surgery became concentrated in the division medical bases, where up to 75 percent of all operations were performed.⁷ At the regimental bases even such complex treatment as blood transfusion, anesthesia of the area of fracture of a long tubular bone, and vagosympathetic blocking was given. The army hospitals became centers of specialized treatment, and came to include neurosurgical, orthopedic and thoracoabdominal hospitals. Such a division of medical labor made it possible to give on-the-spot treatment to infectious cases, without having to evacuate them to the rear and thus run the risk of infecting the civil population, to return 90 percent of casualties to front-line service within a short time, and to combine the treatment of walking wounded (for whom there were also special army hospitals) with military and political instruction.⁸

During the intermediate and final stages of the war, an extremely valuable contribution to the cause of Soviet military medicine was made by the so-called "top specialists" of the Central Military Medical Department and the military medical departments of the fronts, and by the specialists attached to the armies and evacuation centers. These specialists, some of whom had been recruited from civilian medical institutions and were prominent in their field, passed on their experience to the army doctors by means of lecture tours, joint conferences, etc.⁹ Among the beneficial consequences of such guidance was that surgeons in medical battalions and mobile hospitals learned to curb the pernicious over-hastiness with which they had been treating wounds, particularly cranial wounds. As a result, although the percentage of cranial wound casualties rose from 4.9 in the first year of the war to 7.4 in the fourth, increasing numbers of such casualties could be returned to active service, and the death rate among them decreased. The same was true of chest wound casualties. Perhaps the major achievements of the "top specialists," however, were to abolish the practice of applying blind sutures to freshly treated wounds, and to arrange for the separate treatment of the sick and slightly wounded, who as a result were returned to troop duty in increasing numbers.¹⁰

During the third and final phase of the war, when the Soviet forces were advancing through foreign territory, the emphasis in the Soviet military medical

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Bolsbaya Meditsinskaya Entsiklopediya*, 2nd ed., Vol. XVII, col. 626.

⁸ *Sovetskoye zdoravookhraneniye*, 1965, No. 5, pp. 7-8.

⁹ Medical experts called up into the Soviet army during the war included four academicians, 22 Honored Scientists, 275 professors, 308 Doctors of Medical Sciences, 558 lecturers, approximately 2,000 Candidates of Sciences and tens of thousands of specialists. Many of them had had work published, both during and after the war (See *Bolsbaya Meditsinskaya Entsiklopediya*, 2nd ed., Vol. XVII, col. 633).

¹⁰ *Sovetskoye zdoravookhraneniye*, 1965, No. 5, p. 9.

service was on the organization of mobile units capable of keeping well up with the front. Antibiotics came into their own.

According to Soviet statistics, during the entire war the Soviet military medical service succeeded in returning to active duty 72.3 percent of the wounded and 90.6 percent of the sick.¹¹ The accuracy of these figures is difficult to judge in view of the tremendous difficulties involved in keeping accurate casualty reports under combat conditions, and particularly during a retreat, while the major work on the service's war performance¹² was clearly compiled in excessive haste.

The combined therapy and evacuation system was rated a success. Lieutenant-General D. Kuvshinsky, head of the Central Military Medical Department, wrote at the beginning of last year that the system had "secured the fullest and most effective use of all the advantages of the Soviet military and civilian health services" and "furthered the development of military and medical science as well as military medicine." Kuvshinsky also commented proudly that during the war there had been no epidemics, either among the armed forces or among the civilian population, that by the end of the war about 1,500,000 blood donors were donating over 1,100,000 liters of blood for front-line troops, and that by this time over 200,000 Soviet women were working as Red Cross helpers in rear evacuation hospitals and in the towns and villages, particularly those which had suffered German occupation.¹³

After the war was over, the Soviet military medical service was reorganized, as was its civilian counterpart (also, it may be added, in accordance with military requirements). In Siberia and the Soviet Far East in particular, an extensive network of hospitals, sanatoria and other medical institutions was established and a number of new medical teaching and research institutes opened.¹⁴ The pharmaceutical and medical instrument industries were expanded accordingly. The appearance of nuclear weapons confronted Soviet military medicine with a host of fresh problems, such as the changed working conditions in the armed forces and the probable massive incidence of radiation injuries and burns in a future atomic war. Standardized medicaments, medical equipment and prophylactic and therapeutic techniques were developed. Individual and collective protection against ABC weapons and the pathology and therapy of radiation injuries received special attention, while military hygiene became more important than ever before.

It is realized in the Soviet Union that the roles of evacuation and therapy will be subject to constant change in a future atomic war; in some cases evacuation to the deep rear will be impossible or unnecessary, while in others it will be imperative. In other words, stage therapy will often be impracticable. It is also realized that the closest possible cooperation between the military and civilian medical services will be called for.

¹¹ *Bolskaya Meditsinskaya Entsiklopediya*, 2nd ed., Vol. XVII, col: 627.

¹² *Opyt sovetskoi meditsiny v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine* (Soviet Medical Experience During the Great Patriotic War), 35 vols., Moscow, 1951-55.

¹³ *Meditsinskaya gazeta*, 1965, No. 16, p. 2.

¹⁴ See Heinrich Schulz, "Public Health Services in Siberia and the Far East," *Review of Soviet Medical Sciences*, published by the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1965, No. 3.

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

Culture

Socialist Realism Begins a New Offensive

For the third time since state awards have existed in the USSR, Soviet literature has been given the cold shoulder. The first occasion was in 1958, at the height of the bitter struggle waged by the Party against the literary revolt known as the "thaw." That writers were being deliberately punished for their "free-thinking" tendencies was clear from the observation made at the time, that "a prize is at one and the same time a form of encouragement and a form of criticism."¹ The second occasion was last year, when creative literature was again ignored and only the sector of journalism was honored by the award of a prize to S. Smirnov for his documentary series on the defense of the fortress of Brest-Litovsk.² The reasons for this were doubtless the fact that the previous year had seen the publication of a number of works that had provoked the Party leaders' disapproval and the growing conflict between writers of the progressive and dogmatic schools. Now punishment for disobedience has been meted out again. This is even less surprising in view of the fact that this year's candidates for literary prizes included writers at whom the Party leaders look very much askance—namely, Voznesensky, Martynov and especially Yury German.

The resolution of the Twenty-Third Party Congress devoted its tenth and penultimate paragraph to problems of literature and art:

The Congress attaches great importance to developing the literature and art of socialist realism. The Party expects of creative workers new and important works that shall impress us by the depth and truthfulness of their reflection of life, by the strength of their ideological *elan* [and] their high artistic skill, actively assist in molding the spiritual physiognomy of the builder of Communism [and] educate in Soviet people lofty moral qualities, devotion to Communist ideals [and] a feeling of civic duty, Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism.³

These lines contain little that is new, but nevertheless it would be a mistake to imagine that literature and the arts really occupy tenth place in order of importance. The congress was, of course, officially devoted to economic problems, but other departments of the country's life were also touched upon, including the one with which we are concerned here. The importance of the arts under a Communist system hardly needs stressing: as the most important means of ideologically influencing the masses, their morganatic marriage with the prosaic problems of economics becomes inevitable.

In his report on behalf of the Central Committee, Brezhnev devoted considerable space to literature and art, drawing attention to causes of dissatisfaction:

¹ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, April 24, 1958.

² *Pravda*, April 22, 1965.

³ *Ibid.*, April 9, 1966.

Unfortunately, such journeymen of the arts are to be found who, instead of helping the people, choose to specialize in denigrating our regime and slandering our heroic people. Of course, these are only isolated cases, which by no means express the feelings and thoughts of our creative intelligentsia, which is indissolubly linked with the people and the Party. These renegades scoff at what is most holy for every Soviet man—the interests of the socialist homeland. It goes without saying that the Soviet people cannot ignore the shameful activities of such people. It treats them as they deserve.⁴

This should not be taken merely as an approving comment upon the recent trial of the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel, but rather as a warning to the considerable body of Soviet writers who have independent opinions and who are championing freedom of expression. Altogether, it constitutes a principle of the Party's policy with regard to literature and art. This is confirmed by the response which Brezhnev's words found during the subsequent course of the congress. The response came from leading Party officials. A. A. Yepishev, head of the Central Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy, when dealing with the ideological struggle, dwelt principally on evidence of a dissatisfactory state of affairs in literature. He called for stricter control of writers:

The slightest relaxation of attention to ideological work, a lowering of demands in respect of arming cadres with revolutionary theory and the ideological content of works of literature may lead to annoying *contretemps*. This is evidently why on occasion "works" appear which bear traces of apoliticalness, lack of ideological principles, and, in some cases, quite simply anti-Soviet tendencies.⁵

Yepishev involuntarily implied that the "freethinkers" are far from few in number:

Those lacking ideological integrity and guilty of petty-bourgeois dissoluteness reveal themselves in the fact that some under the banner of freedom of creation, others under the pretext of fighting consequences of the personality cult, yet others under the cloak of "championing" historical truth and authenticity, in fact are co-quetting before the mirror of history and are trying to detract from the heroic history and struggle of our Party, the nation and its army, the glorious fighting and revolutionary traditions of older generations, denigrate Soviet reality [and] minimize the greatness of our victory over fascism in the last war.⁶

Not surprisingly in view of his position, Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary S. Pavlov dealt with this question in some detail. He too accused writers who refuse to comply with the Party's demands. Remarking that successes were understandably sometimes accompanied by failures, he added: "We cannot, however, justify the artist who, unable (or unwilling) to get a clear idea of the dialectics of life, takes refuge in a small and musty world of self-analysis, defamation [and] modernist philistinism."⁷ The significance of the parenthetical "or unwilling" needs no stressing.

⁴ *Ibid.*, March 30, 1966.

⁵ *Izvestia*, April 5, 1966.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Pravda*, April 4, 1966.

First Secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee V. Konotop declared:

Certain works of literature published recently, particularly in the columns of such journals as *Novy mir* and *Yunost*, and also, unfortunately, certain films and stage productions sometimes give a distorted idea of our Soviet life, isolated shortcomings and difficulties are presented with relish, skepticism and apoliticalness are cultivated and responsible officials are deliberately contrasted with the collectives. In publishing ideologically harmful works, responsible officials of journals and publishing houses are voluntarily or involuntarily departing from the Leninist principles that literature should show Party spirit [*partiinosť*] and be rooted in the people [*narodnost*].⁸

The speech made by First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee N. Yegorychev was even sharper in tone, being peppered with expressions such as "a one-sided reflection of the past and present," "a conciliatory attitude toward alien views and feelings," "elements of nihilism and skepticism," "ideological saboteurs," "narrow-minded peevishness," etc. He particularly drew attention to one group of artists and writers, of whom he said: "Unfortunately, there are also people who think not so much about their duty to the people as about what will be said about them abroad."⁹ Yegorychev attributed this to a spirit of "political devil-may-care," and urged the need to "apply the Party line militantly and consistently in creative collectives."

Significant of the Party leaders' desire to suppress the champions of artistic freedom, or at least to belittle them in the public eye, is the fact that A. Tvardovsky, candidate member of the Party Central Committee, editor of *Novy mir* and a well-known poet, was not elected a delegate to the congress, whereas other writers of much less importance, such as Sergei Baruzdin, Mikhail Dudin, Sergei Mikhalkov, Mikhail Alekseyev and A. Koptelov, did attend. The "dogmatic" school, on the other hand, was well represented, including V. Kochetov, N. Gribachev, G. Markov, N. Rylenkov and V. Kozhevnikov. (At the Twenty-Second Party Congress, it was Tvardovsky who delivered the main speech on behalf of the writers.)

It is of interest to see what writers had to say at the recent congress. The Party leaders were followed by G. Markov, Secretary of the Board of the Union of Writers of the USSR, who began with the dubious assertion that Soviet literature was as old as the Soviet regime. (For some time after the Revolution, the leading writers were men to whom one could hardly apply the epithet "Soviet.") Markov proceeded to bang the drum for socialist realism, which, he said, "provokes especial indignation among our enemies." The main point of his speech was a condemnation of writers' "free-thinking" tendencies:

In recent years, we have seen the appearance of works [of literature] in which deep artistic analysis of the complex problems of today gave way to superficial descriptions, one-sided views or literary mannerisms, which on closer inspection proved to be nothing but an imitation of the fashionable models of bourgeois litera-

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, March 31, 1966.

- ture. In every case, the result was the same: the overall picture of our life was distorted, reality was artificially confined by the artist to the circumstances of a single fact or event, mostly isolated from the general current, and came into conflict with the truth . . . of our age.¹⁰

In his contribution, Sholokhov even outdid the "dogmatics" in his condemnation of progressive writers. Apart from his attacks on those whose works have been published abroad, his attitude to persons (and collectives) championing writers who have been condemned and "subjected to repression" is of interest:

I am not ashamed of those who have slandered their homeland and dragged in the mud everything that is most sacred to us. They are amoral. I am ashamed of those who tried and are trying to defend them, whatever their motives for doing so may be.

I am doubly ashamed of those who offer their services and apply for condemned renegades to be entrusted to them on bail.¹¹

The following passage is also remarkable:

All the time I keep thinking of one thing. If these young rascals with their black records had been living in the memorable period of the twenties, when sentences were passed on the basis, not of strictly delimited articles of the criminal code, but of a "revolutionary sense of justice," these werewolves would have received a far more severe punishment.¹²

These attacks, taken in conjunction with Sholokhov's extremely unconvincing, even helpless, analysis of the work of Soviet writers, offers further evidence in support of the view that the award of last year's Nobel Prize for Literature was misguided.

From these excerpts, it is fairly clear that although the congress was primarily devoted to economic questions, literature and art occupied an important place in the proceedings, and that here most attention was devoted to the conflict between progressive writers and the supporters of Party conservatism. It becomes more difficult to grasp the full scale of this conflict since many literary contributions are either not published at all or publication is held up for long periods with the result that they lose some of their force and topicality. Despite the severity of the censorship, however, some things get through. We may take as an example the novel by the Belorussian writer V. Bykov, *The Dead Feel No Pain*, which was published in the first two issues for this year of *Novy mir*. This gives a vivid portrait of the typical Stalinist, the fanatical and heartless Communist, in the characters of Captain Sakhno and the state prosecutor of a military tribunal, Major Gorbatyuk. Although no coward, Sakhno always manages to be out of danger. For him, all considerations of humanity fade before the law. Without hesitation, he shoots wounded men when his unit is forced to retreat and imposes the death sentence for negligible offenses. He decides the fate of a German prisoner with the words, "Strangle him!"

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, April 4, 1966.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, April 2, 1966.

¹² *Ibid.*

Another example of the recent tendency in Soviet literature to portray the Stalinist not as a blind executor of orders but as embodying all the qualities which were responsible for the lawlessness of the Stalin era may be found in V. Popov's novel recently published in *Moskva*. One of the characters is a certain Karygin, who became an oblast Party committee secretary in 1937:

At thirty, [he is] an oblast committee secretary, invested with the power to punish or pardon, to decide all questions, both economic and political . . . But the main thing is that whatever he does he gets off scot-free; he has unlimited possibilities for suppressing discontent and criticism. If they attack you at a meeting, you can label [the critic] a slanderer who is undermining the authority of the oblast committee secretary and consequently the authority of the Party which gave him this post . . .¹³

Such literature on the Stalin era was condemned by speakers at the congress, particularly Yepishev. The Party leaders had clearly decided to stick to the orthodox ideological line with regard to literature and to tolerate departures from Communist dogma only in the economic sphere. In general, ideological principles are considered to be of greater importance than the country's economic structure and the Party's organizational activities. If this had not been so, the Communist system would have collapsed after the introduction of NEP. At that time, the Party temporarily sacrificed its basic economic principles while holding fast to its ideological line. Thus, whatever temporary concessions it may make, the Party can on no account allow its own members to take the ideology lightly. Party members, for example, were in no wise concerned by the legal recognition of religious bodies during World War II. Since ideological positions are all-important, it follows that art, as the sole means of implanting this ideology in the masses, must be firmly confined to a subsidiary role. The teachings of the founding fathers of Communism, Marx and Engels, and the heritage of the practical revolutionary Lenin are studied, if at all, only by the theoreticians, not by the masses, which can only be reached by emotional means, and now that the romantic appeal of the Revolution has faded and a critical approach is spreading the Party leaders are obliged to take whatever measures seem necessary in order to preserve the appeal of art. Thus, the freedom of action that has been granted to science and technology remains forbidden fruit as far as literature and the arts are concerned.

This attitude of the Party is reflected in the representation of writers' organizations in the higher Party organs. Only two writers, Sholokhov and Korneichuk, have retained their positions as full members of the Central Committee, and of the three who were formerly candidate members—Tvardovsky, Surkov and Gribachev—only the last has survived in this position.

According to long-established tradition, writers' congresses and similar meetings are held soon after a Party congress, while the latter's resolutions are still fresh in people's minds. The next congress of the Union of Writers of the

¹³ *Moskva*, 1966, No. 1, p. 53.

USSR is to take place this year. Preparations for this event are already under way, and are dominated by the line adopted at the recent Party congress. During the second half of April, the board of the Writers' Union of the RSFSR held a plenary session at which the Party's demands were presented by the "non-Party dogmatic" N. Sobolev, who said:

At this [the Twenty-Third Party] Congress, questions of literature fortunately received very close attention, which was friendly but at times also severe. The most important conclusion, as may also be seen from the speeches at our plenary session, is yet another firm assertion of the Leninist principle of the Party spirit of literature, departures from which, as the opinions of congress delegates showed, lead to regrettable and sometimes dangerous results.¹⁴

In his address, M. Alekseyev gave an account of the state of affairs in the main *genres* of literature and emphasized the viability of socialist realism. He declared:

The tasks imposed on the Party and the people at the Twenty-Third Congress... oblige writers to put their entire literary household into a state of complete military preparedness and to mobilize all types of weapons, all *genres* of literature.¹⁵

A similar tone was adopted by a number of other writers, chiefly of the dogmatic school:

Today's urgent need is for the creation of full-blooded artistic characters in which the best features of our contemporaries—worker, kolkhoznik, intellectual, soldier—are accumulated.¹⁶

The first meeting of this kind to take place in the Union republics after the Party congress was the fifth congress of the Tadzhik Writers' Union, devoted to the stabilization of the subsidiary role of literature. Much attention was given to young writers who displayed "a retreat into the intimate world of personal experience, sometimes an incomprehensible *Weltschmerz*."¹⁷

In this way, the Party leaders hope to put an end to the "unsatisfactory state of affairs" which provoked so much comment at the Party congress. Neither the congress nor the meetings that followed, however, appeared to recognize the one serious obstacle in their path, namely, the process of spiritual emancipation, which is constantly gaining momentum.

A. Gayev

¹⁴ *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, April 29, 1966, p. 3.

¹⁵ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, April 26, 1966.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, April 28, 1966.

The Economy

Unemployment and Manpower Migration in the USSR

The effect of technical progress on society, especially on labor relations, is now the subject of intensive study in the East as well as in the West. The effect on labor relations has been particularly great. The nature of work, the attitude toward work and working conditions are undergoing profound changes. Automation, while cutting out physical labor and bringing material benefits to the workers, has vastly increased the demands on their powers of concentration. Old professions are disappearing and new ones emerging, necessitating large-scale retraining and making the acquisition of a specialty more difficult. The result is increasing unemployment and manpower migration.

However, although automation knows no distinction between political systems, Soviet economists stubbornly cling to the view that technical progress under capitalism is detrimental and under socialism beneficial to the worker's interests. In the West, they say, technical progress is turning the worker into a mere appendage of his machine and crippling him physically and psychologically. It is being used as a means of intensified exploitation of wage labor and boosting the profits of the capitalists, and is the cause of growing unemployment.¹ References to adverse social consequences of automation in the West are quoted as confirmation of these views.

Nevertheless, it is clear even from the Soviet press that the problems raised by the new technological revolution are much the same in the USSR as they are in the West. Thus, whereas even in the late fifties the Soviets were claiming that redundancy and the need to place a redundant worker in another factory in the same or a different industry were not characteristic of Soviet industry, they are now being forced to admit that this is no longer so. It is admitted, for example, that "manpower redundancy due to increased labor productivity is one of the results of stormy technical progress," and that the problem is in need of "serious attention"² in view of the circumstance that "in certain branches of industry it is becoming more and more typical for manpower to be released from enterprises and redistributed territorially and among branches."³

Although redundancy due to technical progress, being a new phenomenon in the USSR, is not reflected in Soviet statistics and has yet to be subjected to impartial scrutiny by the country's sociologists, a fair picture can be obtained from figures for individual enterprises and industries. In 1962, for example, redundancy of this kind in enterprises under the Moscow City Sovnarkhoz was responsible for the dismissal of 7,225 workers, and in 1963, 8,007 workers. In

¹ See, for example, *Politekonomichesky slovar* (A Dictionary of Political Economy), Moscow, 1964, pp. 257-58.

² *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 18, p. 65.

³ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 6, p. 37.

the same year, 1963, there were 5,220 dismissals from enterprises under the Central Urals Sovnarkhoz.⁴ During the period 1966–70, it is proposed to shut down roughly half of the printing houses and one third of the wood-processing plants operating in Leningrad in 1964, as well as dozens of casting, forging and rolling shops and numerous domestic industry shops in that city.⁵ During the period 1958–62, the number of wage- and salary-earners in the coal industry dropped by 94,400, in the lumbering industry by 112,700 and in the peat industry by 46,400.⁶ Toward the end of 1965, D. Gridasov, Chairman of the Donetsk Oblast Executive Committee, suggested the establishment of consumer goods enterprises in the Donbass in order to absorb coal miners who would become redundant after exhausted pits had been closed.⁷ Other industries so affected include the cotton-ginning, hemp, jute, linen and food industries.⁸ Indeed, the annual growth rate of the total Soviet industrial labor force has long been declining—from about 10 percent before World War II to 4.5 percent in 1955–60 and 3.6 percent in 1961–64,⁹ while now there are cases of a factory expanding while its staff decreases.¹⁰ Even Kosygin, in a speech before the Party Central Committee's plenary session of last September, conceded that there was a growing employment problem in the European USSR.¹¹

It has always been the Soviet contention that unemployment is only to be found in capitalist countries; in the USSR it disappeared once and for all when centralized planning was introduced at the end of 1930. In 1936, the right to work was legally anchored in the new Constitution. The abolition of unemployment was held up as one of the greatest achievements of the Soviet system. In its yearly reports on the fulfillment of economic plans, the Central Statistical Authority invariably stresses the absence of unemployment.¹² At the same time, there are increasingly numerous references in the press to such phenomena as high manpower fluctuation, manpower surpluses, errors in labor planning and poor distribution of labor reserves. In fact, these terms prove upon closer examination to be euphemisms for various forms of unemployment.

Let us take high manpower fluctuation, for example. In the USSR this is a permanent feature of the economy, and is primarily a consequence of low living standards. In Soviet industry, there are about 3,000,000 changes of job each year; since the average interim period between jobs is slightly over one month, the annual loss of working time amounts to approximately 100,000,000 man-days,

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁵ L. S. Blyakhman, A. G. Zdravomyslov and O. I. Shkaratan, *Dvizheniye raboshei sily na promyshlennykh predpriyatiyakh* (The Movement of Manpower Between Industrial Enterprises), Moscow, 1965, p. 9.

⁶ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 6, p. 31.

⁷ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, October 20, 1965, p. 13.

⁸ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 6, p. 31.

⁹ Percentages calculated on the basis of absolute figures in the statistical yearbook *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR...* (The National Economy of the USSR...), Moscow, for the appropriate years.

¹⁰ See, for example, *Pravda*, February 1, 1966.

¹¹ *Pravda*, September 28, 1965.

¹² See, for example, *Pravda*, February 3, 1966.

a figure which in 1963 amounted to 1.5 percent of the total time worked.¹³ In the West, such "floating" workers are classified as unemployed; in the USA, roughly one half of all unemployed persons are accounted for by those out of work for periods of one month or less between jobs. In the USSR, such unemployment falls under the heading of manpower fluctuation.

Soviet employment figures vary widely from region to region. Thus, whereas in the country as a whole 20 percent of all workers are not employed in state or cooperative organizations, in Moscow and Leningrad the corresponding figure is 6–7 percent, while in certain regions it is over 30 percent.¹⁴ Roughly one in every five collective farm workers (expressed in terms of round-the year workers) is not engaged in communal production.¹⁵ Proposals to resuscitate cottage crafts have found a lively echo in the Party's theoretical mouthpiece *Kommunist*;¹⁶ when these crafts were abolished, for ideological reasons, after the mass collectivization campaign, millions of collective farm workers were deprived of the possibility of using their winter spare time productively. Other press organs have stressed the need for regularizing seasonal labor—particularly in fishery enterprises, whose young workers generally remain in the unskilled category—only to be told by the labor recruitment authorities that seasonal labor could not yet be dispensed with since it acted as a cushion for absorbing superfluous labor in overpopulated regions as well as unskilled workers made redundant by mechanization and automation.¹⁷ In fact, skilled workers are also being hired for unskilled seasonal labor.¹⁸ Even seasonal labor, however, is only a partial solution to the unemployment problem, since it lasts for nine months of the year at the very most; for the rest of the year the workers are unemployed, and receive no unemployment benefits for the simple reason that officially there is no unemployment in the USSR.

The recent reorganization of industrial management and the tentative introduction of certain free market principles into the economy will bring about a significant rise in unemployment. The management of an enterprise now has to worry about making a profit, in addition to fulfilling the plan. It has a free hand in deciding how many workers to employ—only the wages fund remains fixed—, and will therefore obviously try to get along with as small a staff as possible. Emergency manpower reserves will doubtlessly vanish. Indeed, when the reforms were experimentally implemented at Moscow Automobile Combine No. 1 in May 1965, the staff was at once cut by almost 7 percent.¹⁹

Young people under 18 are finding it particularly difficult to find employment. The Soviet press is full of reports of pupils leaving secondary school who are turned away from factories, frequently without grounds. Many remain idle for

¹³ *Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye*, 1963, No. 7, p. 88.

¹⁴ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 6, p. 27.

¹⁵ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 18, p. 67.

¹⁶ See, for example, *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 18, pp. 65–74 and 1966, No. 2, pp. 84–90.

¹⁷ *Oktyabr*, 1964, No. 6, pp. 199–200.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1963, No. 6, p. 163.

¹⁹ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 18, p. 69.

years on end, become habitual drunkards, form gangs and become generally antisocial.²⁰ According to *Komsomolskaya pravda*, the average Soviet manager asks himself, when deciding whether to hire a minor:

Why should I? Minors have a shorter working day. They are entitled to longer leave and additional free days. They cannot be put on the night shift, neither can they be made to do overtime. On top of all this, the youngsters have to be disciplined! The result is that the plan is disrupted.²¹

Some out-of-work youngsters sarcastically ask the authorities whether they would not stand a better chance of obtaining employment abroad.²² Others turn to the press for help. One newspaper reported:

A tall fellow came into the editor's office. Exhaustion and despair were in his eyes. He unwound his scarf, rubbed his bristly chin with his fist, and began: "They fired me, illegally. I wrote and asked for help, for a reexamination of my case—all in vain. This is my second month without work, and I've got myself into debt. How can such things happen?" exploded the visitor. "We read in the newspapers and hear in reports that there is no unemployment... But in life, I suppose, it's different."²³

The situation will become even more serious when, as a consequence of the curtailment of the period of instruction in secondary general education schools by one year, almost 2,700,000 pupils will graduate simultaneously from the tenth and eleventh grades later this year, i.e., three times the number who graduated from the eleventh grade in 1965. Including graduates from eight-year schools, the total number of school-leavers in the USSR this year will be over 6,500,000.²⁴ The Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers have accordingly adopted a resolution "On Measures to Expand the Training and Placement in National Economic Employment of Young Persons Completing General Education Schools in 1966."²⁵ Gosplan specialist Y. P. Voronin noted that, under this resolution, only 26 percent of secondary general education school graduates and 81 percent of eight-year school graduates would be able to continue their studies in secondary, trade or technical schools or in higher educational institutions. This, said Voronin, would necessitate the construction of a large number of additional educational institutions, and in the past such construction plans had been consistently underfulfilled. Even so, employment would still have to be found for 2,700,000 young people. For this purpose, it was proposed to set up youth employment commissions at republic, krai, oblast, city and raion level within a month.²⁶

²⁰ See, for example, *Komsomolskaya pravda*, April 9, 1964.

²¹ *Ibid.*, June 5, 1962.

²² *Leninskaya pravda*, March 1, 1964.

²³ *Komsomolskaya pravda*, April 9, 1964.

²⁴ *Trud*, February 15, 1966.

²⁵ See *Pravda*, February 6, 1966.

²⁶ *Trud*, February 15, 1966.

In fact, the growing employment problem had already given rise in the early sixties to press proposals for the establishment of organs with functions similar to those of the labor exchanges abolished around 1930. These labor exchanges had, in addition to placing workers in employment, given material assistance to the unemployed. Evidently in order to avoid arousing unpleasant associations, the projected organs are to be innocuously designated as "for placing workers in employment," "for the redistribution of manpower," etc. (In certain cities, "labor departments" and "labor desks" already exist.) V. Shubkin, for example, wrote in *Kommunist*:

In order to manage manpower resources effectively, it is extremely important, in our view, to organize interdepartmental territorial centers for planned manpower distribution, which would, first of all, regularly inform the public on manpower requirements, and secondly inform the planning and economic authorities of available manpower reserves. This would cut down the losses involved in manpower placement.²⁷

Professor Manevich, a labor expert, was even more specific in the journal *Voprosy ekonomiki*, calling for the creation of employment agencies which would be responsible for both the registration and redistribution of manpower. Manevich expressed surprise at the absence of such institutions in a country where virtually all aspects of economic and cultural life were subjected to planning, and went on to make an even more far-reaching suggestion. In the interests of the Soviet economy and the Soviet worker, he wrote

...it would be expedient for white- and blue-collar workers released as a result of technical progress to be in some way materially provided for while seeking fresh employment.²⁸

This, of course, is nothing more nor less than a plea for the introduction of unemployment benefits such as are paid in all industrial countries of the free world.

The publication of such frank words on the unemployed problem in an authoritative journal of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR caused considerable uncertainty in the Soviet press world, and a spate of explanations, reassurances, etc., appeared, most of them by non-specialists. Typical was a *Pravda Ukrainy* article entitled "How the Employment Problem is Being Solved in the USSR," by political commentator M. Maksimov. Maksimov expressed respect for the views of Professor Manevich as being those of a competent authority on employment problems, and also conceded that "in a number of enterprises in the central regions there is a certain surplus of manpower." However, said Maksimov—and this was the main theme of his article—these people were by no means unemployed; they were either being kept "in reserve" in case their enterprise should subsequently be expanded, or else would only be dismissed when other work had been found for them.²⁹

²⁷ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 3, p. 52.

²⁸ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 6, p. 29.

²⁹ *Pravda Ukrainy*, September 7, 1965.

. It is true that the practice of keeping manpower reserves had been followed at certain enterprises. It is also true that the director of an enterprise is responsible for finding fresh employment for workers made redundant as a consequence of technical advancement. At the same time, there are many ways in which a director can evade this responsibility, particularly under the new planning system, which regulates only the wages fund of an enterprise and not the size of its staff. In numerous cases, a redundant worker is offered a new job in some remote and inhospitable area as Siberia or the Soviet Far North, and is thus virtually confronted with the alternative of giving notice or being dismissed for failing to comply with the management's instructions. The majority of workers are apparently choosing the first alternative in order to avoid blotting their work book. Thus, a selective investigation carried out at 129 Moscow enterprises in June-July 1963 revealed that, of the total number of leavers, a mere 0.85 percent transferred to other enterprises while 19.2 were dismissed because of a reduction in force or a cutback in production and 61.2 percent handed in notice on their own initiative.³⁰

The labor shortage in Siberia, the Far North and East and Kazakhstan is commonly adduced as proof of the absence of unemployment in the USSR. This, however, is true only in respect of certain categories of workers, such as construction workers and general laborers. Other pertinent factors to be remembered are that the regions concerned show the highest percentage of workers not employed in state enterprises, and also, of course, that by no means every worker finds it possible to migrate to these regions (for family reasons, because of the climatic conditions, etc.).

In the past, forcible resettlement was carried out in the USSR for both political and economic reasons, with a total disregard for the tremendous human suffering thereby caused. It was regarded as a means of bringing the peoples of the Soviet Union closer together and of creating a new Soviet man, in accordance with Lenin's pronouncement that "unless the population becomes mobile it cannot develop."³¹ In fact, practical resettlement policy was governed more by Lenin's demand that "it must be possible to move tens and hundreds of thousands of workers to wherever the Soviet authorities need them."³² At present, manpower redistribution is in the hands of the Central Departments for the Resettlement and Organized Recruitment of Workers (Orgnabor) in the various republics. The Orgnabor authorities have been in existence since 1947; previously, the enterprises themselves had recruited their own workers from within a given assigned area.

A recruited worker has to conclude a labor contract for a period of not less than one year. In the case of work in the Far East, the minimum period is two years and in the Far North five years. Under the contract, the enterprise is obliged to provide the worker with work in his particular specialty (or retrain him if the

³⁰ Blyakhman, Zdravomyslov and Shkaratan, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

³¹ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), 4th ed., Vol. III, Moscow, 1950, p. 246.

³² *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXI, Moscow, 1950, p. 476.

latter is not available), accommodation (at a fixed rent), furniture and household equipment, meals, medical, social, cultural and educational facilities, as well as normal working conditions.³³ In fact, however, these obligations are frequently not met by the employer, such infringements not being considered sufficiently serious to warrant nullification of the work contract.

Although officially the organized recruitment of workers takes place on a strictly voluntary basis, there are in practice numerous departures from this principle, some of them being in complete accordance with existing Soviet laws. As we have already mentioned, officially there is no unemployment in the USSR, while under an RSFSR law of May 4, 1961, a person who is without work for a protracted period can be arraigned for "parasitism" and expelled to a prescribed area for two to five years. This leads to situations such as that depicted by *Komsomolskaya pravda*, in which a number of young people were called into the Mtskheta (Georgia) raion Komsomol committee headquarters and told bluntly that they could either go to work on construction sites in Siberia on Komsomol tickets or else be expelled from the republic as "parasites."³⁴

It was originally planned to resettle approximately 6,000,000 workers in the eastern part of the Soviet Union during the period 1960-80;³⁵ since according to the 1959 census the average Soviet family consisted of 3.7 persons, 1.7 of whom were out at work, it can be reckoned that over 13,000,000 persons would be involved in such a resettlement program. Now, however, it seems evident that this plan has collapsed. According to official Soviet data, the rate of immigration into Siberia and the Far East is constantly lagging behind the rate of emigration from these regions.³⁶ It is frankly conceded in the Soviet press that organized recruitment has been a failure; *Sovetskaya Rossiya* referred to the Orgnabor offices as "travel agencies."³⁷ It is, for one thing, uneconomic, the cost of sending a worker to Siberia running to 500 rubles.³⁸ Many Soviet economists have come to the conclusion that

...large-scale resettlement in the industrial centers of Siberia and the North and East from such regions as the Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics, the Moldavian SSR and the western regions of the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSR's cannot be successful because the difference in living conditions is too great.³⁹

They therefore recommend solving the employment problem by stepping up industrial development in these more civilized regions, particularly in rural areas, pointing out that such countries as Japan, France, Western Germany, Italy and Switzerland have had good experience in this respect. It is being further suggested that recruitment should be on a genuinely voluntary basis, and that the

³³ *Trudovoye pravo: Entsiklopedichesky slovar* (The Labor Laws: An Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow, 1963, p. 39.

³⁴ *Komsomolskaya pravda*, May 25, 1963.

³⁵ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1961, No. 6, p. 9.

³⁶ *Sotsialistichesky trud*, 1965, No. 9, p. 153.

³⁷ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, January 11, 1966.

³⁸ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 6, p. 27.

³⁹ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 18, p. 71.

provisions of work contracts be adhered to religiously, in the interests of both the worker and the national economy as a whole. Although there is still support for the arbitrary planning system which concedes the director of an enterprise dictatorial rights in respect of his workers, even to the extent of forbidding them to leave the enterprise or even the district,⁴⁰ the general feeling is that this system is completely unacceptable at a time of increasing economic liberalization and growing emphasis on material incentives for the workers.

The recent growth of unemployment in the USSR is a natural consequence of the transition to free market principles in economic management. Official recognition of the existence of unemployment and measures to alleviate the material hardships it entails are in the interest of all concerned.

F. Hajenko

⁴⁰ See, for example, *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 3, pp. 52-53.

REVIEWS

The Periodical Press

When commenting upon the recent Party congress, the entire Party periodical press did its best to make it clear that the delegates gave their complete approval to the dismissal of Khrushchev in October 1964 and to the policies of his successors. In a leading article, *Kommunist*, for example, says:

The main features characterizing the work of the Twenty-Third Party Congress were its complete unity on the political line of the Central Committee... (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 6, page 4.)

The article goes on:

As the Congress noted, the October [1964] plenary session of the Party Central Committee was of first-rank importance for the work of the Party [and] the further progress of our society along the road to Communism. It [the Central Committee meeting] demonstrated the Party's fidelity to the precepts of Lenin, its monolithic unity and solidarity. The decisions of this and subsequent plenary sessions of the Central Committee, unanimously approved by both Party and people, played a tremendous part in establishing and developing Lenin's principles of Party and state leadership, further consolidating the Party's ranks [and] raising the creative activity of Communists and all workers (*ibid.*).

A leading article in *Partiinaya zhizn* followed the same line:

... the Congress revealed its complete unity on the political line of the Central Committee, both in domestic and in foreign affairs.

The Congress delegates, expressing the will of all Communists, noted with great pleasure the tremendous positive influence which the October [1964] plenary session of the Central Committee exerted on all aspects of the life and work of Party and state. They warmly approved the decisions of the March and September plenary sessions of the Central Committee, at which a new and genuinely scientific approach to the leadership of the economy was worked out and the principles of the Party's economic policy at the present stage of our development were determined (*Partiinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 8, page 4).

The fact that the Party press is now attaching particular importance to the Congress's approval of the Central Committee's decisions of October 1964 inevitably attracts attention. If nothing else, it shows that the present Party leaders had been concerned whether the Congress would approve of Khrushchev's removal or not, and that now the Congress is over they are congratulating themselves on a great victory. If this interpretation is correct, it may be supposed that until the Congress had completed its work they were the victims of something like an inferiority complex.

As one reads the comments on the Congress proceedings, it becomes clear that it was faced with three main tasks, namely, approving the directives on the five-year plan for 1966-70, the draft decisions on the consolidation of the Party

and the proposals for improving the ideological education of the country's population. On the subject of the first of these questions, we read:

The five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR in 1966–70 is a new and important stage in the struggle of the Party and the Soviet people for the creation of the material and technical basis of Communism and the further strengthening of the country's economic and defense capacity (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 6, page 8).

It is emphasized, however, that

... the main economic task of the new five-year plan, as is pointed out in the directives of the Twenty-Third Congress, consists in ensuring a considerable growth of industrial production, high and constant rates of agricultural development and, as a result, achieving a considerable improvement in the people's living standard [and] a fuller satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of all Soviet people, on the basis of an all-out exploitation of the achievements of science and technology, the industrial development of all social production [and] the enhancement of its efficiency and labor productivity (pages 8–9).

Here there is an obvious tendency to present the forthcoming five-year plan, the eighth in the series, as one designed chiefly to satisfy the "material and cultural needs" of the Soviet population. It will be recalled that the promises to introduce a radical improvement into the population's living standard go back to 1953, when Malenkov was in power. Khrushchev was also not slow to hand them out. These promises have found their place in anecdotes about Soviet life, but have not so far found fulfillment. This is not, of course, to say that they never will be fulfilled, but the grounds for optimism are not very great.

The chief social task of the five-year plan is to speed up the rate of improving the national well-being. A tremendous part in the solution of this task will be played by the considerable approximation to one another—envisaged by the directives—of the rates of increase in the production of the means of production (Group A) and of consumer goods (Group B). . . . Whereas during the preceding five-year plan the increase in the volume of industrial production in Group A amounted to 58 percent and that in Group B to only 36 percent, during the forthcoming five-year period, with an increase in the total output of all industry of 47–50 percent, the production of Group A products is to rise by 49–52 percent and of Group B products by 43–46 percent (page 9).

Unfortunately, nothing is said in these commentaries about the actual results that may be expected from this planned redistribution of investment in favor of consumer goods production. It may be supposed that this is because the authors of the five-year plan directives are themselves not yet entirely clear how the improvements they are planning will look in practice.

The commentary goes on:

Another important social task of the five-year plan is [to ensure] further progress in overcoming substantial differences between town and country, steadily raise the material and cultural living standard of the rural population and approximate it to the living standard of the urban population (*ibid.*).

Once more, nothing definite is said about the way in which the problem is to be solved. The situation is different, however, when the directives on the five-year plan with regard to agriculture are dealt with:

Primary importance is being attached to the development of agriculture. The task has been set of improving this important sphere of material production in order to satisfy more completely the country's need for agricultural products. On the basis of the mechanization, chemicalization and electrification of agriculture, it is intended to increase labor productivity [and] steadily, step by step, to bring agriculture up to the level of industry in respect of technical equipment and the organization of production (*Partiinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 8, page 6).

This difference in the treatment of social and economic tasks in rural areas suggests that the Congress's demand for an approximation of the living standard of collective farmers to that of the urban population has at present little importance except for propaganda purposes and is unlikely to be realized to any extent during the forthcoming five-year period. It would seem that state funds allocated to rural purposes will in the main be devoted to the intensification of kolkhoz production and not to social reforms.

Finally, the commentators hold out the following prospects for the Soviet population as a result of the successful fulfillment of all plans during the forthcoming five-year period:

By increasing the volume of production, labor productivity and the national income, a further improvement in the well-being of the workers will be ensured during the five-year period that has just begun. Real incomes will increase by approximately 30 percent per head of the population during the five-year period. In this connection, the Party has adopted the principle that an increase in workers' incomes must principally take the form of a growth in the monetary wages of white- and blue-collar workers and...in the rates of labor remuneration in the communal economy of collective farms. Alongside the raising and normalization of wages, it is intended to lower retail prices for goods in proportion to the growth in their output and in labor productivity. It is planned to effect a gradual introduction of a five-day working week for wage- and salary-earners with two free days, while retaining the existing total duration of working time. Pensions for wage- and salary-earners and collective farmers will be further improved, [and] the abolition and reduction of income taxes will be continued. Allocations for housing construction will be increased and the quality of housing improved (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 6, page 10).

It will be seen that these plans depend on a number of circumstances which may or may not be realized. The most important of these is an increase in labor productivity, which in the USSR is something of a problem: it was pointed out at the Congress that the growth of labor productivity has become slower. Another point which stands out is the promise to introduce gradually a five-day working week while retaining the existing total number of hours worked. Since the average working week in the USSR is now 41 hours, this measure, presented by Party propaganda as evidence of the authorities' concern for the workers' welfare, would make the Soviet citizen's working day the longest in the civilized

world. This in turn will inevitably lead to increased sickness, accidents at work, and family friction.

The commentaries of *Kommunist* and *Partiinaya zhizn* would seem to imply that for the overwhelming majority of the Soviet population the new five-year plan will be one of great physical exertion rather than one of improved living conditions. We read, for example:

Even the best plan, however, is not in itself a guarantee of success. . . . It is the duty of Party organizations to mobilize and lead the nation's creative forces, to step up the activity of every Communist, every official, all workers, in the fight for the realization of the five-year plan. In every city, in every village, in every enterprise—everywhere an atmosphere of great enthusiasm for work must be created, the unconditional execution of the tasks of the five-year plan must be ensured. Of primary importance here is the further development of socialist competition and the movement for Communist labor as the chief forms of mass participation in the building of Communism (*Partiinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 8, page 8).

Dealing with the Congress's decisions relating to the strengthening of the Party, the Party press emphasizes in particular:

For the successful realization of. . . [these] economic plans, it is essential to continue raising the level of organizational Party work, to take all measures for activating the masses of Communists [and] to get every Party member to fulfill his *avant-garde* role (page 9).

This is noteworthy in view of the fact that after the economic reform adopted in September last year rumors appeared about a reduction of the role of the Party in economic affairs. The quotation just given indicates that, on the contrary, the Party is not yet inclined to surrender control of the economy to economic officials.

An important factor in strengthening the Party, according to the commentators, is the proper selection and education of leading officials, of whom we are given a very complimentary picture:

The Party has brought up and promoted to leading positions a large army of ideologically steeled, energetic and highly-qualified officials, who with the *élan* and the businesslike methods typical of our regime carry out the Party's general line. The quality of leading cadres is improving continually. Now Party and state organs are headed, in general, by skillful organizers who enjoy the respect of Communists and non-Party men (page 11).

The article, however, goes on:

The interests of the cause demand the further advancement of young officials, in which connection one must always bear in mind the necessity of correctly combining old and young cadres (*ibid.*).

From this it may be concluded that during the next few years the Party leaders will rely in the main on the old élite which emerged under Khrushchev and that its replacement will take place in the normal course of events. On the other hand, it may be that these compliments were paid to the old élite merely in order to reassure it, while in fact its removal is being planned in order to bring younger

forces in to occupy responsible posts in the Party and the state. The ambiguous reference to the further advancement of young officials does not exclude this possibility.

The commentaries state that a particularly important means of educating "cadres" is to keep a check on the way in which individual functionaries carry out the directives of Party and government. We read:

This check on the execution [of these directives] must be carried out not desultorily but regularly. Its purpose is to help to remove errors and find the best and most correct solutions to tasks confronting Communist collectives. Oblast, city and raion Party committees and primary organizations have begun to concern themselves more with questions of checking the execution [of directives].... Party control must, however, be made even more effective (page 11).

The following passage is noteworthy:

Party-organizational and mass-political work in the new conditions must be especially flexible and correspond to the particular circumstances. Here, as also in the management of the economy, subjectivist conduct and artificial forms are completely inadmissible. It is essential to develop in officials [a sense of] personal responsibility and businesslike methods, to teach responsible officials to strive for success with the least possible expenditure of resources and time (page 12).

The writer remarks that rigidly conservative Party men (*partiinye rutinery*) and bureaucratic administrators—a description which to some extent fits most of the present Party élite—are threatened with removal from their posts if they do not reform.

Considerable space is devoted to the question of maintaining the purity of the Party ranks, a question which also received quite a lot of attention at the Congress. It has already been pointed out in these columns (see *Bulletin*, 1965, No. 11, pages 48—56, and 1966, No. 1, pages 33—36) that under Khrushchev's one-man rule the admission of new members into the Party proceeded at an artificially high rate (on the average, 600,000 a year), as a result of which the Party included many persons who compromised it by their conduct. The forecast was made that the number of admissions to the Party would probably fall sharply and that a purge would be carried out in the Party's ranks after the Twenty-Third Party Congress was over. This forecast has now proved largely justified. It was stated at the Congress that on the first day of its proceedings there were 12,471,000 full and candidate members of the Party. Since there were 12 million at the beginning of 1964, this would mean that the rate of admission has been reduced since Khrushchev's removal to about 235,000 a year. The Congress introduced a number of amendments into the Party Statute designed to make admission to the Party more difficult: from now on, young people can enter the Party only *via* the Komsomol, and the minimum length of time that sponsors of candidates for admission must have belonged to the Party has been increased. In addition, the principle that the Party systematically purges its ranks was incorporated in the Statute. This amounted to a sanction from the Congress to carry out a large-scale purge.

These decisions are dealt with by the commentators as follows:

Concern for the purity of the Party ranks, a demanding attitude to those newly accepted into the Party—this is a law in the life of the Party and all its organizations. The Congress imposed on all Party organizations the obligation to adopt a more careful approach to [the question of] admissions to the Party, to observe strictly the demands of the Statute, in order that genuinely progressive and class-conscious workers, collective farmers and intellectuals actively participating in Communist construction should be admitted into the Party's ranks. . . . The Party will systematically rid itself of unworthy [members], those who violate the Program and the Statute, who compromise the name of Communist by their conduct (page 12).

The commentators devote much attention to the problem of ideological education in general—a sign that there is much cause for dissatisfaction here. One has only to take the state of Communist theory, which obviously does not correspond to the present requirements of the country's political and economic life: having developed no farther than the end of the nineteenth century, it not only does not assist the present Party leaders in the carrying out of any reforms that prove necessary but, on the contrary, provides fuel for the opponents of these reforms. Not surprisingly, therefore, the *Partiinaya zhizn* commentator writes:

The chief task of our scholars and scientists is to study important problems of economics and politics, philosophy and sociology, history and law and the other social sciences in close connection with the practice of Communist construction. They are called upon to study thoroughly the direction and character of the process of the formation of Communist social relations, the improvement of the state system and development of socialist democracy, the forms and methods of economic management, questions concerning the scientific organization of labor, the content and methods of Communist education and other topical problems (page 13).

He implies that Khrushchev's de-Stalinization did much to promote opposition to the regime. We read:

Certain difficulties in the ideological education of the workers, especially youth, were created by the subjectivist and insufficiently Party approach that was occasionally tolerated in the study of questions of theory and Party history and in the assessment of the activities of individuals (page 14).

Opposition was also promoted by the fact that

In the columns of certain journals, on movie screens and the stages of theaters there appeared from time to time works which contained ideological errors [or] gave a one-sided and false picture of our past and present (*ibid.*).

In conclusion, the reader is told:

We must finally abandon the mistaken idea that ideological work is the exclusive concern of specialists in this field of Party work. . . . Ideological work is the business of our entire Party, of all Communists (page 16).

The primary aim of all ideological education is to instill an attitude of implacable opposition to bourgeois ideology, the commentators say.

The Twenty-Third Congress pointed to the need for raising the revolutionary vigilance of Communists [and] all Soviet people [and] for unmasking the ideological sabotage activities of imperialism against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 6, page 11).

Thus, the entire question of the ideological education of Soviet citizens would appear to be a matter of reinforcing political control in all spheres of Soviet life.

By way of conclusion, it remains to point out that these commentaries on the work of the Twenty-Third Party Congress scarcely deal with the economic reform approved by the Central Committee last September, which is only mentioned in passing in connection with the directives on the new five-year plan. Here the emphasis is not on the fact that this reform was supposed to grant enterprises greater economic freedom but on the assertion that the reform represents an improvement in planning. From this it may be concluded that the reform has not yet been finally approved in the form in which it was presented to the Central Committee in September.

Petr Kruzhin

The Penkovsky Papers

By OLEG PENKOVSKY

Introduction and Commentary by FRANK GIBNEY. Foreword by EDWARD CRANKSHAW.

Translated by P. DERIABIN

Published by Collins, London, 350 pages, and by Doubleday and Co., New York, 1965

Through their simultaneous publication in Britain and America toward the end of last year and the issue of a German translation at the beginning of this year,¹ the secret papers of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, sentenced to death by a Soviet court in May 1963 for spying for the West, have become widely known in the free world. The reprinting of individual chapters and the appearance of reviews in the columns of numerous important newspapers and periodicals in the West have further contributed to their fame. Yet another contribution to the sensation they produced was the reaction of the Soviet authorities and the Soviet press. When the editors of the *Washington Post*, who had been the first to begin reprinting individual chapters of the Papers, refused to comply with a Soviet demand to discontinue their publication, the Moscow correspondent of this paper was deported from the USSR.² In addition, the Soviet government made diplomatic representations to the British and American authorities, declaring that publication of the book represented a hostile act *vis-à-vis* the USSR and constituted a renewal of the cold war.

¹ Oleg Penkovskij, *Geheime Aufzeichnungen* (trans. Otto Merk), Droemer Knaur, Munich—Zurich, 1966, 408 pp.

² TASS foreign release, November 25, 1965; *Washington Post*, November 26, 1965.

The motive given for this reaction, namely that the book was a falsification, was immediately undermined by the very nervousness and the nature of the reaction itself. Things went so far that the normally very uncommunicative Soviet intelligence organs gave interviews on their own initiative to representatives of the Western press, including the *Spiegel*,³ in which they stressed the insignificance of the case and the low intellectual and moral level of the main figure involved. Similarly, Soviet press reports of the trial represented Penkovsky as a demoralized individual who had entered the service of Western intelligence for material gain.⁴

A number of circumstances accompanying the case show that the Soviet authorities immediately attached great importance to it and continue to do so. Chief Marshal of Artillery Sergei S. Varentsov, Commander in Chief of Artillery and Ground Missile Forces, was demoted, retired from the service and expelled from the Party Central Committee in connection with the affair:⁵ Varentsov had been associated with Penkovsky during the war, but was not connected with the latter's postwar duties. In 1963, General of the Army I. Serov, head of the Central Intelligence Department of the General Staff and Penkovsky's superior officer, disappeared from his post and has not been officially mentioned since. The fact that Serov, deputy to Abakumov and Beriia under Stalin and after Stalin's death Chairman of the State Security Committee, managed to survive all his colleagues in the political police, i.e., the leading generals in the state security service, and yet came to grief over the Penkovsky affair shows the exceptional importance which was attached to it. Finally, it became known from Western sources that the affair had obliged the Soviet leaders to carry out extensive changes in the personnel of their intelligence service abroad: some three hundred officers of the military diplomatic (i.e., intelligence) service were recalled from foreign posts (page 19).

An indirect consequence was the feverish development during 1964-65 of a special branch of Soviet literature dealing with spies and Chekists, which praised the competence, steadfastness, devotion and self-sacrifice of the "glorious Chekists" in their fifty-year struggle against the "intrigues of the imperialist enemy" within the USSR as well as military intelligence agents like Sorge, Abel, Lonsdale and others.⁶ Some Western critics were led by the chronological facts to believe that the Penkovsky Papers were a countermeasure by Western agencies in reply to this literary manifestation of the cold war.

We do not know what really prompted the Anglo-American intelligence agencies to permit the publication of part of Penkovsky's notes, but it may be observed that what has been published hardly redounds to these agencies' credit, a fact which must have been obvious beforehand. It transpires that they not only can claim no credit for having recruited Penkovsky but in response to his

³ *Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, January 10, 1966, pp. 54-59.

⁴ *Pravda*, May 8 and 11, 1963.

⁵ *Izvestia*, May 30, 1963; *Pravda*, June 21, 1963, p. 1.

⁶ See A. Gayev, "The Noble Chekists," *Bulletin*, 1965, No. 3.

overtures even displayed timidity and indecision. In 1961, Penkovsky had literally to exert himself in order to achieve any collaboration. After all direct attempts to establish contact with foreign representatives in Moscow had met with suspicion, he conveyed the offer of his services to the United States embassy through the agency of some American students. An offer of collaboration from such a prominent person as Penkovsky, a Deputy Division Chief in the Foreign Relations Department of the State Committee for Coordinating Scientific Research of the USSR Council of Ministers, seemed an act of provocation designed to compromise accredited persons in the embassy (page 70). It was only when Penkovsky met Greville Wynne, a British businessman, in the course of routine work that the desired contact could be established. Wynne believed Penkovsky and agreed to convey his offer, together with certain documents, to London. Thus, the West owed the opportunity of acquiring the services, not of an ordinary double spy but of a collaborator prompted by idealist motives, to the intuition of a man who was prepared to take a risk although he was not a professional intelligence agent.

In his Introduction, Frank Gibney states that his aim was to provide some editorial explanation for the following questions: (1) Who was Colonel Penkovsky and what was his real position? (2) What did he tell the West? (3) What was the historical context in which he gave his information? (4) Why did he do it? (Page 21.) The book is designed accordingly, its main part being composed of two elements—Penkovsky's text, arranged in chapters, and a brief commentary by Gibney to each chapter describing the background of events in relation to the particular problem discussed.⁷ Mr. Gibney, whose commentaries display a high degree of political competence, explains that it seemed essential to adopt this mode of procedure since, with the exception of the first chapter describing his personal background, the Papers are fragmentary and show little attempt at order.

This latter circumstance, it may be said, to some extent dispels the doubts expressed by some critics as to the documents' authenticity. What spy, so these critics said, especially one knowing that he is under observation, composes a well-written book on his activities? The very fact that the Papers came to be written at all becomes easy to understand when one bears in mind the chief purpose that their author set himself: this was not to give a report on his spying activities, but to explain what decided him to betray his government, the Communist Party and the privileged class to which he belonged:

... I have never been on trial for a criminal or political offence; I have been awarded thirteen decorations—five orders and eight medals ...

I am beginning the notes that follow to explain my thoughts about the system in which I live and my revolt against this system.

⁷ Chapters containing the text of Penkovsky's notes and (all except the first) a commentary by Gibney are entitled: "Background"; "Soviet Military Intelligence"; "Penkovsky's Official Work"; "Political Comments"; "Khrushchev and the Generals"; "Espionage Notes"; "The Soviet Elite"; "Nuclear Weapons and Missiles" and "Domestic and Foreign Policy."

I would like people in the West to read what I am saying here, because they can learn much through my experience. I can expose Khrushchev's fallacies and deceptions by facts and actual examples. . . . I am fully aware of what I am setting out to do—I ask that you believe in my sincerity, in my dedication to the *real* struggle for peace (page 39).

These sentences are taken from the first page of the Papers. The following are from the final paragraph, dated August 25, 1962, when their author felt that the net was already closing around him:

The most important thing is that I am full of strength and anxious to continue this work. To tell the truth about this system is the goal of my life (page 266).

Only in the light of this goal can one grasp the inner logic of these apparently chaotic notes.

It may now be said that Penkovsky's attempt to say something about the Communist system that had previously been unknown was unsuccessful: Despite the extremely interesting details that he gives, his disclosures about the life of the upper class in the Soviet Union do not in fact offer anything that had not been known in the West. The totalitarian system, with its intrigues, its fawning, corruption, favoritism and protection, is already sufficiently well known, and further information on these subjects was hardly of sufficient importance to justify Penkovsky's risking his life: Penkovsky was not aware that the West knows a great deal but closes its eyes to dangerous and disagreeable phenomena in the (wrongly understood) interests of peace. On the other hand, Penkovsky's notes, while passing over the details of his own work for the West, give detailed descriptions of the way in which Soviet intelligence is organized, the political situation in the armed forces, the conditions under which Soviet specialists can devote themselves to work on the latest techniques, etc. The quality and significance of these descriptions would appear to be very varied: the authoritative, detailed and extremely important information on the structure of the GRU's intelligence organization and its activities abroad—Chapters II, III and VI—is the best thing in the book, but these accounts are intermingled with others that are considerably less precise and on occasion, particularly in the technical sphere, inexcusably inadequate, as, for example, Chapter VIII on nuclear weapons and missiles.

Many of these weaknesses have already been pointed out by Western critics: the publishers of the German version, for example, point out such mistakes and inaccuracies in a number of places.⁸ The main fault is the failure to observe one of the fundamental principles of all intelligence reports, i.e., to distinguish between information obtained by one's own observation and duly checked, on the one hand, and that derived from hearsay, on the other, and with regard to information in the latter category to establish its probability, possibility or doubtfulness on the basis of one's own judgment. Penkovsky mixes his own observations and those of other competent persons with

⁸ E.g., on pp. 263, 264 and 268 of the German edition.

rumors, anecdotes, pieces of gossip, etc., which were circulating in Soviet society, and presents the whole in the light of his own emotions.

On the other hand, both Gibney and the Soviet prosecutors at the trial make it clear that Penkovsky made very extensive use of his camera during his spying activities: during the sixteen months in which he was working for the West, he passed on some five thousand photographed items of secret military, political and economic intelligence from the archives of the GRU and the Defense Ministry (page 26). The book's weakest chapter, that on nuclear weapons and missiles, must on no account, of course, be considered as reflecting the real results of Penkovsky's work. From reports of the trial, in particular Wynn's interrogations, it is clear that the Soviet authorities made every effort to ascertain the nature and content of the materials passed on by Penkovsky, and naturally these materials were not released from Western archives for publication.

The book is important for the way in which it mirrors the feelings of a man who belonged to the upper crust of Soviet society and enjoyed all its privileges and nevertheless rose in solitary and determined rebellion against the regime and all the dangers it conceals for the world. As Penkovsky portrays them, these dangers lie in the fact that the leaders of the Party Central Committee, whose decisions are final, exploit the achievements of military technology and make use of every opportunity that presents itself to their extensive espionage network. These opportunities are exploited in the dangerous business of playing (so to speak) with atomic fire for the sake of a policy hovering on the brink of war. Penkovsky was in fact firmly persuaded that Khrushchev, for whom he nurtured an almost morbid hatred, was capable of unleashing an atomic war as soon as he felt himself strong enough.

It is noteworthy that Penkovsky's eyes were opened during the very period which in the West it is usual to associate with the liberalization of the regime: this was the period of peaceful coexistence, the literary "thaw," diminishing pressure from the organs of state security and the gradual disintegration of the Iron Curtain—in a word, everything which in the West awakened bright hopes of an evolution of the regime toward more peaceful policies. At this very stage, Penkovsky saw the dangers, not only for his own country but for the entire world, which lay in the adventurous policies of Khrushchev and his associates. It is also noteworthy that Penkovsky's sixteen months of intense work for the West coincided with two crises in international affairs, those over Berlin in 1961 and Cuba in 1962, when the threat of a global war disturbed not only Penkovsky but the entire West.

The results of his work did not become generally known until two years after his death. The well-informed American journal *Newsweek* observed:

Penkovsky knew full well that eventually the Soviet security apparatus would find him out. But if the story that has been accepted in intelligence circles over the past few years is correct, he may at least have had the satisfaction of knowing that it was his greatest contribution to the West that led to his final downfall.

. The journal goes on to explain:

Three days before John F. Kennedy delivered his dramatic ultimatum to Khrushchev at the height of the Cuban missile crisis, the story goes, the late President asked his advisers how he could be sure he was not touching off a nuclear war. He was told that the only way to find out was to check with "our most secret source in Moscow." "Do it," said the President—and 32 hours later the answer came back: "Soviet nuclear forces not in a state of war readiness."

The "secret source," of course, was Penkovsky, and the message he sent probably cost him his life.⁹

Penkovsky was in fact arrested immediately after, on October 22, 1962. Gibney writes in his Introduction:

A key factor in this [the successful American confrontation with Moscow in October 1962] was American ability to identify the extent and nature of the Soviet missile sites on Cuban soil. The millions who breathed their sigh of relief after that confrontation will probably never know the degree to which the disclosures of one Soviet officer made the American success possible (pages 19–20).

Thus, two mutually opposed qualities of Penkovsky's are vividly revealed in his Papers: on the one hand, the authoritativeness of his information—both political and strategic—due to his own intellectual abilities, his high connections and the opportunities provided by his high position; on the other, however paradoxical this may seem, his lack of professionalism as a spy. Penkovsky is wrongly known in the West as a "master spy": it is enough to compare his activities with those of the well-known Soviet spy in the USA, Abel, who was a real master of his craft.¹⁰ Nevertheless, it was Penkovsky who succeeded, for the first time in its history, in shaking the Soviet intelligence system. The answer to this paradox may be found, not in his evidence at the trial, but in the sober assessments of his Western colleagues, quoted by Gibney.

The real underlying motivation of Penkovsky, of course, was the one thing which the Soviets could never admit: he was making a protest against the regime on behalf of the people. . . . He neither possessed nor sought accomplices. . . . He declared war on his society and he used whatever weapons were at hand (page 285).

Gibney continues:

It would be idle to conclude that Penkovsky was a reasonable, stable person. He was a zealot. He was possessed. He was vain and over-confident, surely, in thinking that he could carry on his secret work indefinitely. He was hardly mindful of the great danger in which he had placed his family, although he loved them and ultimately made his confession to save them (pages 285–86).

In this last point, he was to some extent successful: neither his wife nor his daughter nor his great-uncle, General of the Army Valentin A. Penkovsky, now Deputy Minister of Defense and an inspector of military training, has been victimized. But in order to achieve this Penkovsky had at the trial to ascribe to him-

⁹ *Newsweek*, New York, November 8, 1965, p. 30.

¹⁰ See James B. Donovan, *Der Fall des Oberst Abel*, Frankfurt on Main, 1965.

self "the meanest qualities, . . . the love of an easy life . . . complete corruption," even though it was admitted at the trial that of the three thousand rubles received for his photographic expenses, two thousand were later returned.

Thus, the notes themselves and the editor's commentary reveal to us the figure of a man who had made the difficult choice between national feelings and the supranational interests of humanity as a whole and, as a lone fighter against the regime, had shown exceptional courage. Gibney's assessment is as follows:

Was Penkovsky completely committed to the West? From what he wrote and the extent of what he did, there can hardly be any doubt . . .

Penkovsky's initial overtures towards the West were made from disgust at the Soviet system. His visits there turned this into a more positive sentiment. He was deeply impressed by his experience of an open society. He wanted his own people to enjoy this society . . .

If he was a flawed hero, he was a hero nonetheless and a most uncommon man (pages 286-87).

These words, coming from an Englishman, have a new ring. Even whole groups who went over to the anti-Communist side, as for example the Russian anti-Communist movement led by General Vlasov in World War II, were previously termed "renegades." At the Nuremberg Trials in 1946, all such movements were branded as "treacherous"; this term was applied by the court to people who, faced with the choice between the universal values of freedom and right on the one hand and national feelings and the duty to fight for their own state irrespective of what this state stood for on the other, elected the former. Penkovsky has broken through this narrow Western view, as is clearly shown by Gibney's commentary, which points out to Western readers that the complex political phenomenon of people of one and the same nationality fighting in mutually opposed ideological camps is characteristic of our era.

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In conclusion, a word should be said about Penkovsky's place in Soviet society, both social in the normal sense of the word and also functional. It is already well known that he belonged to the upper ruling stratum, to the élite which enjoys the confidence of the regime: a staff officer in the Central Intelligence Department, whose work was camouflaged by the rank of a Deputy Division Chief in a State Committee, i.e., a high-ranking official in an institution of ministerial status; an officer patronized by Marshal Varentsov, with the prominent political worker General Gapanovich as his father-in-law and General of the Army I. Serov as his immediate superior, with whom he was bound not only by service connections.

It is more difficult to determine Penkovsky's functional position within this upper stratum. By virtue of his education he was a regular artillery officer with specialized training, a graduate of the Frunze officers' academy and the Dzerzhinsky Artillery Academy, where he had attended a course in military missiles.

In this respect, he was clearly a member of the "technocracy." On the other hand, his graduation from the Military Diplomatic Academy and the whole of his subsequent career show him in a different aspect—in the functions of a political *apparatchik*. After completing artillery school, he became a battery political officer (*politruk*). After the end of the Soviet-Finnish War, he was sent to the Political Department for Komsomol work in the Moscow Military District. Despite the German invasion, he was retained for this work in rear formations, and only with difficulty did he succeed in the second half of 1943, i.e., when the turning-point had already been reached; in getting out to front-line service. He finished the war as commander of an artillery regiment, and almost immediately afterward was sent as a student to the Frunze Military Academy. After a short period of staff duties in the Moscow Military District, he studied at the Military Diplomatic Academy, the so-called "spy's academy"; from now on, he had nothing more to do with combat-service, being transferred to intelligence work with the General Staff Central Intelligence Department.

Which of these two aspects, those of the technocrat and the political *apparatchik*, predetermined his revolt against the regime? It may be replied that both were responsible, each in its way and in its turn. The technocrat's knowledge enabled him to see particularly clearly what nuclear missile warfare means. A film about an atomic test which he saw while at the Military Diplomatic Academy produced a powerful impression upon him. But it was the *politapparatchik* in him that appreciated the danger of the latest weapons when controlled by a totalitarian regime under an irresponsibly-minded leader, and it was this realization that prompted him to resist. In the West, many sociological studies have been devoted to the role of technical progress and the growing importance of the "managers" as the "gravediggers of Communism." Such studies ignore one thing: the technicians and the managers create the conditions which make social and political changes possible but do not bring these changes about, since they are blind to such things; the changes come about when the significance of economic and technical developments comes to be appreciated, and this is the role of the politicians and ideologists. Penkovsky was not an ideologist, but he was capable of comprehending the political significance of such developments. Penkovsky's case alone does not provide an adequate basis for generalization, but there is already evidence to suggest that not only single-handed opponents of the regime but also men capable of exerting an ideologically destructive influence on Communism may emerge from the class of the *apparatchiki*, and these are the men who will be in a position to overcome the inertia of the Communist system and direct social progress into new paths. Thus, Penkovsky's case reflects in microcosm large-scale social and political problems which have yet to be solved.

N. Galay

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

April 1966

- 1 Announcement that Central Statistical Authority's handbook *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1965 godu* (The USSR in Figures in 1965) has come out.

Soviet-Nepalese cultural and scientific exchange agreement for 1966 signed in Moscow.

- 2 Soviet-Singapore trade agreement signed in Singapore.

Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi has talk with Chairman of Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin and Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko.

- 3 Soviet moon probe "Luna-10" goes into lunar orbit.

Announcement that group of Soviet atomic submarines under command of Rear Admiral A. I. Sorokin has recently completed over month-and-a-half-long round-the-world voyage. The submarines passed through Antarctic waters, and traveled approximately 40,000 kilometers without surfacing.

Geologist's Day celebrated for first time.

- 4 Soviet-Chinese air traffic agreement signed in Moscow.

Twenty-Third Party Congress approves report of Party Central Committee First Secretary L. I. Brezhnev.

- 5 Soviet-North Korean trade agreement for 1966 signed in Pyongyang.

Kosygin gives speech on 1966-70 Five-Year Plan at Party Congress.

- 6 Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-114."

- 7 Members and candidate members of Party Central Committee, and members of Central Auditing Commission, elected at Party Congress.

Soviet parliamentary delegation led by Deputy Chairman of Supreme Soviet Presidium J. I. Paleckis leaves for Canberra to attend spring sessions of Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Soviet-Algerian trade protocol for 1966 signed in Algiers.

- 8 Final day of Twenty-Third Party Congress. Plenary session of new Party Central Com-

mittee elects Politburo (formerly Presidium) members and candidate members, Party Central Committee secretaries and Chairman of Party Control Committee. Central Auditing Commission elects its Chairman. Resolutions adopted on Brezhnev's speech, Five-Year Plan and changes in Party Rules (young persons under 24 to be admitted to Party only via Komsomol, sponsors to have at least 5 years' Party service, downgrading to candidate member to be abolished as punitive measure, etc.). Closing speech delivered by Brezhnev.

USSR signs contract on provision of technical assistance to Tunisia in construction of dam across river Rezal.

- 11 Announcement that civil engineering institute has been set up in Brest-Litovsk.

- 12 Space Day.

Announcement that international group of researchers at Joint Nuclear Research Institute in Dubna has discovered that element 104 is chemically analogous to hafnium.

First session of Central Electoral Commission on elections to Supreme Soviet opened in Moscow by Commission's Chairman, V. V. Grishin.

Chief of Staff of Iraqi Army, Major General Abdul Rahman Muhammad Aref, arrives in Moscow at head of Iraqi military delegation.

Comecon symposium on automation of thermal power stations ends in Kiev.

- 13 Group of leading officials of Polish people's councils led by Vice-Premier Nowak arrives in Moscow for exchange of experience in the local administration of economic and cultural construction.

Delegation of Soviet jurists led by Supreme Court Chairman A. F. Gorkin arrives in Ulan-Bator to study operation of Mongolian judicature and participate in celebrations of latter's fortieth anniversary.

Third session of Franco-Soviet commission on color television opens in Moscow.

Regular passenger service between Leningrad and Montreal opened by Soviet diesel ship "Aleksandr Pushkin."

- 14 East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer arrives in Moscow.

Afghan delegation led by Deputy Trade Minister Omar arrives in Moscow to conclude negotiations on Soviet-Afghan trade in 1966.

Tenth session of Soviet-Japanese fisheries commission ends in Moscow.

- 15 Chairman of Soviet patent agency "Litsenzintorg" V. Salimovsky announces at press conference that agreements on sale of Soviet licenses have been concluded with firms in 12 countries, including Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Sweden.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko confers with his East German colleague Otto Winzer.

Soviet governmental delegation led by Chairman of Council of Union of Supreme Soviet I. V. Spiridonov leaves for Baghdad to attend funeral of President Abdül Salam Muhammad Aref, killed in an air disaster.

Commander of Finnish Defense Forces Lieutenant-General Keinonen arrives in Moscow on official visit following invitation by Soviet Defense Minister Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky.

Soviet delegation led by Automobile Industry Minister A. M. Tarasov leaves for Rome for negotiations with "Fiat" automobile firm.

Conference of RSFSR law enforcement officers opens in Moscow. Participants include Chairman of State Security Committee V. Y. Semichastny and Procurator General R. A. Rudenko. Speech on measures to combat hoodliganism given by Minister for Preservation of Public Order of the RSFSR, V. S. Tikunov.

- 16 Agreement signed in Yaoundé between Soviet Union and Cameroon Republic on construction and equipping of agricultural and forestry schools in latter country.

Chairman of State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education A. A. Bulgakov leaves on visit to UAR following invitation by UAR Minister of Economics, Foreign Trade and Planning.

Soviet military delegation led by Defense Minister R. Y. Malinovsky arrives in Budapest on friendly visit.

- 17 Publication of Party Central Committee's May Day slogans.

Chairman of State Committee for Sound and Television Broadcasting N. N. Mesyatsev and official of Italian radio and television

network sign agreement on expanded exchange of programs and personnel.

Announcement that two-day meeting of administrative council of "Photointernational," a permanently operating facsimile network embracing Soviet and East European information agencies, has come to an end in Moscow. Past experience and further improvements were discussed.

Announcement that first issue of weekly newspaper *Knizhnoye obozreniye* (Book Review), an organ of the State Press Committee, is to come out on May 5, replacing journal *Novye knigi* (New Books).

- 18 Syrian Premier Dr. Yousef Zain arrives in USSR on official visit.

Economic Affairs Commission of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions meets to discuss switch to five-day working week.

- 19 Twenty-second session of Comecon's Executive Committee, devoted to problems of economic, scientific and technical cooperation, including coordination of 1966-70 five-year plans, opens in Moscow.

Seminar for senior republican law enforcement and state prosecution officials, attended by Procurator General R. A. Rudenko, begins in Moscow.

First All-Union Students' Conference opens in Moscow. Delegates include heads of scientific societies, design offices and cultural associations, as well as Komsomol and trade union officials. Minister of Higher and Special Secondary Education V. P. Yelyutin speaks on measures to improve teaching in higher educational institutions.

Announcement that Soviet trade union delegation led by secretary of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions P. T. Pimenov has left for Budapest to attend session of commission for revising Charter of World Federation of Trade Unions.

Talks take place in Moscow between Kosygin and Syrian Premier Zain. Participants also include Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers V. N. Novikov and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Soviet-Chinese protocol on trade during 1966 signed in Peking, Deputy Foreign Trade Minister I. T. Grishin being the signatory for the USSR.

- 20 Indian Communist Party delegation led by Secretary General Rao arrives in Moscow for

talks on problems of international Communism following invitation by Party Central Committee.

Plenary session of RSFSR Writers' Union opens in Moscow. Agenda: preparations for 50th anniversary of establishment of Soviet regime, and tasks facing writers as a result of resolutions adopted at Party Congress. Speech delivered by Board Secretary M. Alekseyev.

Soviet governmental note calling for admittance of Eastern Germany to UNO handed over to Security Council President and UNO Secretary General.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-115."

- 21 Announcement that RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has disbanded the republic's People's Control Committee, whose functions now devolve on USSR People's Control Committee.

Gromyko arrives in Rome on official visit following invitation by Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani.

Meeting devoted to twentieth anniversary of East German Socialist Unity Party opens in Moscow.

Publication of Central Statistical Authority's report on fulfillment of state industrial plan for first quarter of 1966.

- 22 Publication of list of winners of Lenin Prizes for achievements in science, technology, space and art.

Soviet-Syrian economic collaboration agreement signed, Kosygin being the signatory for the USSR.

Delegation of leading local officials of Australian Communist Party arrives in USSR to study Soviet Party work.

- 23 Announcement that agreement between USSR and Congo (Brazzaville) on cultural and scientific collaboration in 1966 has been signed in Moscow.

Nomination of Supreme Soviet candidates begins.

Announcement that group of pilgrims led by Mufti Babakhanov, Chairman of Ecclesiastical Administration for Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, has returned to USSR from Mecca and Medina.

Soviet-Italian agreement on economic, scientific and technical collaboration signed in Rome following negotiations between visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Italian

leaders. Agreement calls for expanded collaboration in agriculture, industry, transport, communications and construction. Expansion of trade and cultural and tourist exchanges also discussed.

- 24 Publication of TASS announcement that USSR will be carrying out test launchings of space rockets into specified area of Pacific during period April 25-July 31.

- 25 Second all-Union conference of "USSR-Japan" Society opens in Moscow.

All-Union conference of volunteer book propagandists, convened by State Press Committee and Komsomol Central Committee, begins in Moscow. Speech on "Books to the Masses!" delivered by Deputy Chairman of State Press Committee Y. Y. Khomutov.

General meeting of members and corresponding members of USSR Arts Academy, devoted to tasks facing Academy as a result of Party Congress resolutions, comes to an end in Moscow. Topics discussed included means of inducing arts academicians to produce ideologically meaningful works, and dearth of paintings and sculptures with working-class themes.

USSR signs contract with Cuba in Havana on supply of geological prospecting equipment during 1966-67.

Council of Ministers adopts resolution reducing state retail prices of canned apples and plums.

Third Soviet radio and television communications satellite in the "Molniya-1" series put into high elliptical orbit.

Board Chairman of State Bank A. A. Poskonov leaves for Paris as guest of his French colleague.

- 26 Publication of joint communiqué on visit of Syrian Premier to USSR.

Ninth plenary meeting of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions opens in Moscow. Agenda: tasks facing Soviet trade unions as a result of Party Congress resolutions. Speech delivered by Council Chairman V. V. Grishin.

Presidium Chairman of Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries N. V. Popova and Chairman of National Committee for Bulgarian-Soviet Friendship sign agreement on cooperation between their countries' friendship societies in 1966.

- Tashkent hit by severe earthquake. Brezhnev, Kosygin and governmental commission headed by Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers I. T. Novikov arrive to inspect damage.
- Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-116."
- Plenary board meeting of Soviet Film Workers' Union, devoted to tasks imposed on Soviet cinema by Party Congress resolutions, opens in Moscow. Paper delivered by First Board Secretary L. A. Kulidzhanov.
- 27 Brezhnev and Kosygin tour state farms in Golodnaya Steppe after having inspected earthquake damage in Tashkent.
- Announcement that protocol on cultural exchanges between USSR and Guinea in 1966 has been signed in Conakry.
- Announcement that plan for cultural collaboration between USSR and Uganda in 1966 has been signed in Kampala.
- Annual meeting of members and corresponding members of Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (VASKHNIL) held. Subjects discussed include tasks facing Academy's institutions as a result of Party Congress resolutions, and activities of Academy's Presidium in 1965.
- Gromyko received by Pope Paul VI in Rome.
- Deputy Foreign Minister N. P. Firyubin and Pakistani Ambassador to USSR exchange ratification instruments of cultural and scientific collaboration agreement between their two countries.
- 28 Announcement that state commission has signed certificate of acceptance of 1,000,000-kilowatt Votkinsk Hydroelectric Power Station, which is to supply entire Western Urals area.
- Conferences begin for reviewing Supreme Soviet candidates submitted by enterprises, state and collective farms and scientific and educational institutions.
- Announcement that twenty-second session of Comecon's Executive Committee has come to an end in Moscow, special attention having been paid to production specialization and cooperation.
- Contract on Soviet participation in "Expo-1967" world fair in Montreal signed in Moscow, Deputy Foreign Trade Minister and Secretary General of Soviet section of Fair, B. A. Borisov, being the signatory for the USSR.
- Presidium of Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace holds broadened meeting, attended by representatives of non-state organizations, to discuss Party Congress resolutions and measures for expanding and intensifying activities of Soviet peace advocates, and to hear information on World Peace Council session to take place in Helsinki June 13-15.
- Brezhnev and Kosygin inspect field work on farms in Krasnodar Krai.
- 29 Announcement that rich gold deposits have been discovered in vicinity of ore-mining enterprises in Angren-Almalyk industrial region (near Tashkent).
- Meeting of Council of Founders of "Novosti" Press Agency held under chairmanship of astronaut V. Komarov. Report on Agency's activities in 1965 given by board chairman B. Burkov.
- Chairman of Supreme Soviet's Foreign Affairs Commission B. N. Ponomarev receives Finnish M.P. Vaino Leskinen, in Moscow to discuss the Finno-Soviet tourist trade.
- Announcement that decision has been taken to set up Olympic training center in vicinity of Lake Issyk-Kul (Kirghiz SSR), since this region is climatically similar to Mexico City, where the 1968 games are to be held.
- Brezhnev and Kosygin leave Krasnodar for Moscow.
- 30 Announcement that Party Central Committee, Council of Ministers and All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions have adopted resolution "On Increasing the Material Interest of Tractor and Machine Operators in State Farms and Other State Agricultural Enterprise in Raising Production," to come into effect on June 1.
- Publication of May Day parade order by Commander of Moscow Garrison and Moscow Military District, Army General A. Beloborodov. Parade to be taken by Defense Minister Malinovsky and commanded by Beloborodov.

Changes and Appointments

- 5 Y. I. Volsky appointed Ambassador to Argentina, replacing N. B. Alekseyev, who is transferred to other work.

- 7 Members and candidate members of Party Central Committee, as well as members of Central Auditing Commission, elected at Party Congress.*
- 8 Election of Party Central Committee Politburo (formerly Presidium) members and candidate members, Party Central Committee secretaries, and chairmen of Party Control Committee and Central Auditing Commission.*
- 14 F. K. Knyazev elected First Secretary of Kurgan Oblast Party Committee, replacing G. F. Sizov, who has been elected Chairman of Central Auditing Commission.
- 15 Augusta Voss elected First Secretary of Latvian Party Central Committee, replacing A. J. Pelše, who has been elected Politburo member and Chairman of the Party Control Committee.
- Jurys Rubenis elected secretary and Presidium member of Latvian Party Central Committee.
- 19 T. B. Guzhenko appointed First Deputy Minister of the Merchant Marine, replacing Y. V. Savinov, who has been transferred to other work.

* See "The Twenty-Third Party Congress. III—Personnel Changes" in the May issue of the *Bulletin*. A supplement listing leading members of the Soviet government and Communist Party will appear in a later issue.

INSTITUTE ACTIVITIES

Problems of East-West Trade

From April 13–16, 1966, a conference on "Problems of East-West Trade" was held in Mittenwald (West Germany) by the Büro Bonner Berichte, the Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft (German Employees' Union—DAG) and the Institute for the Study of the USSR. The 41 participants included two members of the West German Parliament, one from the CDU and the other from the SPD, the DAG Educational Secretaries of Bavaria, the Rhineland-Palatinate, Berlin, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein, an official of the German Chamber of Commerce, members of the Institute staff, including the Director and Deputy Director, and representatives of West German firms engaged in trade with Communist countries.

The first speaker, Mr. Eberhard Gelbe-Haussen (Geneva), began by surveying Soviet foreign trade policy since 1917, and proceeded to analyse present policy, which, he said, was permeated by the Soviet Union's desire to break out of its self-imposed economic isolation and had three principle aims: to procure high-quality machinery and equipment indispensable for Soviet economic development; to further Soviet political objectives by trade with the non-Communist world; and to strengthen the Soviet hold over the "people's democracies." The latter, on the other hand, saw foreign trade as a means of securing independence from Moscow. Mr. Gelbe-Haussen expressed the view that Comecon integration had failed hopelessly to secure Soviet domination in Southeastern Europe, and in this connection recommended extensive economic cooperation with the East European countries in order to support their efforts to achieve independence. As he put it: "Whoever buys Soviet oil is supporting Communism; whoever buys Rumanian oil is supporting the centrifugal tendencies in Communism." The speaker finally made a plea for an intensification of trade between Western Germany and Communist China on the basis that the latter country was the enemy of Western Germany's enemy, i.e., the USSR, and hence Western Germany's natural ally.

Stefan C. Stolte (Munich) then spoke on recent Soviet-bloc efforts to boost East-West trade.¹ His contribution was based largely on an article by Stanislaw Kozinski, a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party, published in the July 1965 issue of the Soviet-bloc monthly *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. Kozinski had three proposals: long-term trade agreements; production cooperation, financed by Western credits, such as that practiced between Poland and the West German firm of Krupps; and trilateral trade agreements between the "socialist" countries, the "capitalist" countries (or individual concerns) and the developing countries. Under these agreements, any country could compensate for a passive balance with another by an active balance

¹ See Stefan C. Stolte, "New Proposals for East-West Trade," *Bulletin*, 1965, No. 11.

with a third; the necessarily passive balance of the developing countries would be jointly financed by the other two groupings. In commenting on these proposals, Mr. Stolte emphasized that the expansion of East-West trade was largely a matter of credits; these credits, however, should not be granted on terms set by the intended recipients alone, neither should they be made the subject of political blackmail. In the same way, any trilateral agreement of the type suggested should not be allowed to bring political gains in the developing countries for the East alone.

Economist Albert Feller, from the Büro Bonner Berichte, submitted a paper on "Military Security and East-West Trade." He maintained that the USSR was continuing to give top priority to building up its armaments industry, and backed up this assertion with the following quotation from Marshal Sokolovsky's book *Military Strategy*:

In the present era, the fight to achieve peace and gain time requires in particular a purposeful strengthening of the military might of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp founded on the development of its productive forces and uninterrupted growth of its material and technical basis.

Mr. Feller concluded that the Soviet Union was primarily interested in acquiring from the West equipment, materials and scientific and technical knowledge of military importance. It was therefore imperative for the West to continue to impose an embargo on the export of certain goods to Communist countries; at the same time, such restrictions should be constantly adapted in accordance with the political situation and technical progress. Under certain circumstances, it might be more of a military risk to export computers than steel mills in view of the vital importance of modern electronic equipment for the execution of an atomic counter-strike in a future nuclear war.

The speaker then turned to another military aspect of East-West trade. Sokolovsky himself, he said, had pointed out that in a nuclear war

... both belligerent parties will be subjected to nuclear strikes in the first few hours ... and as regards the technical implementation of mobilization and troop transportation ... will probably be more or less equally placed. Thus, the side which succeeds in pushing deep into enemy territory during the first few days will naturally have the opportunity of exploiting the results of its own nuclear blows.

In 1965, said Mr. Feller, the railroads accounted for 71.3 percent of all transport in the Soviet Union, shipping 15.6 percent, pipelines 6.8 percent, road transport 6.2 percent and air transport 0.07 percent. The railroad network, however, was extremely wide-meshed; the lack of alternative routes made it highly vulnerable to attack. The motor road system was woefully inadequate; whereas in 1961 the USA, with an area of 9,300,000 square kilometers, had 4,900,000 kilometers of road, of which 3,400,000 were hard-surfaced, in the same year the USSR, with an area of 22,400,000 square kilometers, had a mere 270,000 kilometers of roads (5 percent of the US road network), of which only 77,000 kilometers were hard-surfaced, the remainder vanishing in a sea of mud

during spring and fall. In view of this, said the speaker, it might well be asked whether it was not advisable to place an embargo on the export of such items as roadbuilding machines and railroad equipment.

The next paper, "World Politics and Trade with the East," presented by Dr. Theodor Zotschew (Kiel), reflected a more optimistic view of the world situation. Dr. Zotschew called for a considerable expansion of trade between Western Germany and the East, noting that there was already stiff competition for the Eastern market among the leading Western countries, and defended the West German government's decision to grant China a credit for the construction of a steel mill in the following terms:

When a credit of over DM 350,000,000 was recently guaranteed for deliveries to China, there was the usual storm, although all the world knows that during the past two years alone no less than 27 complete industrial installations have been supplied to China by firms in all the Western industrial nations, so that the present German deal with China merely means the twenty-eighth Western industrial installation for China.

According to Dr. Zotschew, the Comecon countries are actually trying to force their friendship upon the West. He said:

A more compliant and elastic policy, especially in the economic sphere, toward all the European Communist countries, the people's democracies in particular, is also called for by the circumstance that, in the life of both individuals and peoples, nothing has worse consequences than unrequited goodwill, unrequited friendship and, most of all, unrequited love.

The speaker, however, was virtually alone in expressing such an extreme point of view. The general opinion was that although many Comecon countries were showing increased interest in trading with the West, they remained loyal members of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, Dr. Zotschew presented some interesting statistics, which showed that Comecon was infinitely more isolated from the rest of the world than its Western counterpart, the EEC:

Comecon and EEC Foreign Trade, 1963
(Dollars per Head of Population)

	With Other Members of the Same Bloc	With All Countries
All Comecon Countries	68	104
Bulgaria	174	219
Czechoslovakia	229	331
Eastern Germany	218	268
Hungary	163	249
Poland	74	122
Rumania	66	103
USSR	37	64
EEC Countries	177	437

Equally interesting were the figures given by Dr. Zotschew to illustrate the degree of dependence of the six East European satellites on trade with the Soviet Union, and *vice versa*:

**Share of the USSR in the Foreign Trade of the East European
People's Democracies, 1963**
(Percentages)

Bulgaria	53.5	Hungary	34.2
Czechoslovakia	38.9	Poland	33.7
Eastern Germany	53.2	Rumania	41.9

**Share of the East European People's Democracies in
Soviet Foreign Trade, 1964**
(Percentages)

All East European Comecon Members	58.0
Bulgaria	7.1
Czechoslovakia	12.1
Eastern Germany	17.6
Hungary ..	6.3
Poland	9.0
Rumania	5.9

The last two speakers were Dr. Konstantin Pritzel (Berlin) and Professor Erik Boettcher (Münster), who presented papers on "The Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany and East-West Trade" and "The Problem of East-West Trade and the German Question." Of particular note was Professor Boettcher's view that the Sino-Soviet conflict would not make it any easier to solve the German question; on the contrary, this conflict was causing the USSR to stiffen its attitude toward Western Germany in order to avoid being accused by Peking of betraying the Communist cause.

The conference closed with a round-table discussion moderated by Mr. Albert Feller. The participants were Professor Boettcher, Dr. Zotschew, Messrs. Haase and Selbmann, members of the West German Parliament, the former representing the CDU and the latter the SPD, Mr. S. C. Stolte and Dr. Kurt Tudyka (Erlangen). The general opinion was that normal trade relations with the Comecon countries were desirable, although doubt was expressed as to the political dividends which such relations might bring, and that long-term credits should be granted at least to individual Comecon members. Mr. Haase expressed regret that, at a time when the Soviet bloc showed signs of crumbling, the Western countries were unable to coordinate their policies in respect of trade with the East.

As regards trade with Communist China, this was rejected outright by Mr. Stolte, who opened the discussion on this sphere of East-West trade, on the grounds that that country was in a state of ideological warfare with the entire world, including the USSR, and was striving to undermine the *status quo* by guerilla tactics. Mr. Stolte made the point that shipments which were negligible in Western eyes could materially enhance the military potential of Communist guerillas; thus, in Vietnam, the Viet Cong rebels needed only 15,000 tons of

supplies for every 1,000,000 tons required by the Americans. Western Germany in particular was obliged to show understanding for the US position on China, since it was on the US that the security of Western Germany and West Berlin largely depended. After these words by Mr. Stolte, the advocates of trade with China became silent; Mr. Selbmann even voiced disappointment at the West German government's deal with China.

In general, the conference showed that the problem of East-West trade had still not been given sufficient thought. This applies particularly to trade with China, a matter which is still largely approached in an ignorant and speculative fashion.

The proceedings of the conference were recorded, and will be published as a special issue of *Sowjetstudien*, the Institute's German-language periodical.

S. C. S.

Religion and the Changing Intellectual Outlook in the USSR

From Soviet books, articles and press reports, it has long been apparent that important elements in Soviet society are dissatisfied with the officially promulgated tenets of Marxism-Leninism and are searching for an alternative to what they consider an obsolescent ideology. In order to assess the role that religion is playing in this process, the Institute for the Study of the USSR convened an International Symposium on "Religion and the Changing Intellectual Outlook in the USSR," and specialists from seven countries, seventy-three in all, met at the Institute from April 25 to 27, 1966, to discuss this subject.

"Peaceful coexistence with other philosophies within the Communist-ruled countries will scarcely be achieved in practice as long as Communism is a world view," concluded Prof. Dr. Gustav Wetter, an eminent Roman Catholic authority on Communism and religion, in his opening remarks to the symposium. Speaking before an audience of noted scholars brought together from seven countries, Dr. Wetter stated his conclusion in a paper examining changes in the attitudes of various Communist parties toward religion. He pointed out that an acceptance of plural philosophies under Marxist-Leninist ideology will be difficult to achieve principally because of the claim of Communist parties to absolute leadership.

Dr. Paul B. Anderson, of the Centre de Recherches et d'Etude des Institutions Religieuses in Geneva, spoke on the problem of alienation in a society that recognizes neither spiritual nor religious ideals. Soviet ideologists, he said, are beginning an intensive study of Western existentialists in connection with the problem of man's alienation from his environment, which is the theme of one of Marx's early works entitled *The German Ideology*. They are particularly hostile to existentialism because of its affinity with Marxism and beg the question by insisting that alienation can only exist in a bourgeois society. Soviet ideologists

find it necessary to take Western thinkers such as Sartre, Jaspers, Heidegger and Kierkegaard to task, Dr. Anderson went on to say, because of a widening interest in their works among Soviet intellectuals who are trying to rejuvenate Marxism. That these Western thinkers are being given such serious attention in booklets intended for wide circulation is a measure of the challenge they represent to Marxist dogma and suggests that the most fundamental tenets of Marxism are being called in question.

Following Dr. Anderson, the Rev. Dimitry Konstantinow, of the Russian Orthodox Church in the United States, discussed the relationship between the younger generation of Soviet citizens and the Orthodox Church. Quoting from the Soviet press and from statements by Western visitors, he called attention to "continuing, perhaps even growing interest" in religion not only among older people but also among youth. He also stressed that Soviet "scientific atheists" are abandoning the claim that Christ is a purely mythical figure and are beginning to treat him as an historical personage.

"In spite of the captive state of the church in the Soviet Union, enforced for almost half a century now, the forces of spiritual resistance have not run dry," said Mrs. Nadezhda Teodorovich, Institute Senior Researcher on religious questions. Basing her report on data from the Moscow Patriarchate, Mrs. Teodorovich challenged the pessimistic conclusion drawn by Josef Olsr in 1948 in the book *Il Cristianesimo nell' Unione Sovietica* that a severe crisis would befall the Russian Church when the older generation passed on. Citing statistics to show that the clergy in the Soviet Union is not dying out for lack of replacements, Mrs. Teodorovich contended that the forces of the Church in the USSR are concentrated not only among the "obsolescent" generation of the clergy and the faithful, as counted on by theoreticians of militant Communism, but also among youth, young wards of the regime who are consciously choosing to serve the Church.

An outline on pseudo-religious rites in the Soviet Union prepared by Prof. Nikita Struve, an authority on the Russian Orthodox Church who is affiliated with the Sorbonne, was read at the symposium. Struve noted that in Soviet society secular institutions have been created as a parallel to religious institutions. He mentioned in particular "marriage palaces," which are intended as a substitute for churches in wedding ceremonies, and secular holidays, such as "Women's Day" and "Miner's Day," which are meant to take the place of ecclesiastical feasts.

Commenting on Prof. Struve's report, the Rev. Michael Bourdeaux, of the Centre de Recherches et d'Etude des Institutions Religieuses in Geneva, observed that the Soviet leaders had introduced a number of secular holidays in an obvious effort to replace those in the calendar of the Orthodox Church and called attention to cosmonaut's days, which at present are tending to supplant what were formerly saint's days.

Mr. Peter Reddaway, of the London School of Economics, an exchange scholar at Moscow University in 1963-64, stated that the search for new ideals is probably more widespread in the Soviet Union now than at any time since the

years before the Revolution. Among ordinary people and particularly among the creative and technological intelligentsia, he said, an attempt is being made to reestablish certain principles of common decency such as loyalty to one's friends and to one's conscience. Mr. Reddaway observed that "religious inclinations of widely varying sorts are on the increase, however little they may manifest themselves on the surface." He cautioned that such trends must be kept in perspective to avoid creating an impression of a more feverish search for new ideals than is in fact taking place, but, citing first-hand experience and recent works of literature, concluded that "at least some forces for personal, cultural, and political renewal are at work and growing."

Mr. Martin Dewhirst, of Glasgow University, remarked in this regard that construction of a new philosophy to replace Marxism-Leninism would be difficult to achieve because of the Soviet citizen's reluctance to begin thinking about philosophical questions for fear of where such speculation might lead. He noted that lack of leisure time in Soviet society probably kept the individual from reflecting extensively on philosophical questions and added that the present ruling class shows little tendency toward meaningful spiritual renewal.

In the same vein, Prof. Jack Miller, also of Glasgow University, pointed to the vested interest of Party members and intellectuals in continuing to think along traditional lines if only to preserve the props of a system that sustains them both materially and psychologically.

Prof. Edwin B. Morell, of Brigham Young University, Utah, suggested that the persistence of certain ethical and moral ideas in the Soviet Union could be traced to the work of such organizations as the Komsomol and the trade unions, which, while denying the existence of God, have been teaching durable Judeo-Christian ethics of personal behavior. Mr. Reddaway expressed some doubt about this, suggesting that the propagation of such ideas by official Communist organizations would tend to discredit them among "seekers" of a new point of view in Soviet society, since such persons have an extremely apathetic attitude toward "official" pronouncements.

In his report to the symposium on "Changes in Soviet Medical Ethics as an Example of Efforts to Find Stable Moral Values," Dr. Heinrich Schulz, Director of the Institute, defined three clear-cut stages in the history of Soviet medical ethics. The first stage, the period immediately following the revolution, was characterized by an attempt to do away with traditional medical ethics and introduce class discrimination, in the face of opposition from the medical profession. During the second stage, roughly from 1930 to the death of Stalin, medical ethics, including the principle of medical secrecy, were rejected completely as remnants of the past. Doctors were state employees and were thus obliged to act exclusively in the interests of the state. The third stage, from the death of Stalin to the present, has, in Dr. Schulz's view, been marked by a search for a new medical ethic and a tendency to return to traditional values. Class discrimination and other violations of traditional medical ethics are being increasingly condemned in Soviet medical literature. Dr. Schulz concluded that the future of

Soviet medical ethics is encouraging, particularly in the light of efforts to discover and insist on a tenable moral framework for life.

Dr. William C. Fletcher, Director of the Centre de Recherches et d'Etude des Institutions Religieuses in Geneva, turned to a discussion of Protestant influences on the outlook of today's Soviet citizen. The Russian Baptist protest, he said, had succeeded in modifying some of the state's measures during the current antireligious campaign. He remarked further that "this demonstration of the movement's strength adds significance to the fact that—theological and ideological considerations aside—the dynamics of the Baptist movement seems to parallel the dynamics of the Party, and the Baptists thus represent a potential competitor to Communism." Dr. Fletcher added:

The significance of the Baptist movement will only increase in the more pluralistic society which, hopefully, is emerging in the USSR. Should the evolving Communist Party broaden its appeal by discarding some of its more zealous aspects or should the Party disappear entirely, it would not necessarily mean that a vacuum would be left in Soviet society. For the Baptists could then hope to reach the same sort of people that the Party used to reach.

On the final day of the symposium, Dr. Georg von Stackelberg, a specialist on Soviet Central Asia, argued that the link between national and religious consciousness among the twenty-five million Moslems of the Soviet Union is responsible for their intense resistance to atheistic propaganda. He said: "Moslems in the Soviet Union defend Islam not only as a religion but also as an integral part of their national culture and national traditions." This, Dr. Stackelberg contended, accounts for the increasing influence of Islam among the Soviet peoples.

Commenting on Dr. Stackelberg's report, Col. Geoffrey Wheeler, of the Central Asian Research Center in London, insisted that although heavy antireligious pressure had been brought to bear, Moslems in the Soviet Union had nevertheless been no more—perhaps even less—affected by militant atheism than the Christian population and that in vigorously resisting atheism they were expressing their response to Great-Russian chauvinism as well. Col. Wheeler also commented that the Soviet attitude toward Islam is affected by the emergence of China as a world power. The Soviet leaders fear that the Chinese may use the five million Moslems of Turkic nationality in the Sinkiang Province to influence Moslems in the neighboring areas of Soviet Central Asia. To date, Col. Wheeler observed, the Soviet leaders have been cautious with regard to this question, and China is not mentioned in the Soviet Central Asian press.

Another speaker, Dr. Hans Lamm, of the Munich Volkshochschule, who had just returned from a trip to the Soviet Union, reported on the role of the Jewish minority in Soviet life. Dr. Lamm pointed out that though genocide is not an accurate term to use in describing official Soviet policy toward the Jews, what is happening can be referred to as "culture-cide." As a group, he said, the Jews in the Soviet Union had been shattered: the Soviet government had fought them on religious, cultural and national grounds and opposed them

as a group suspected of bourgeois attitudes and international ties. Mentioning that the ultimate solution to the Jewish problem lay, according to Lenin and Stalin, in the annihilation of the Jews as a group, Dr. Lamm stated that since 1960 the number of synagogues in the Soviet Union has been reduced from 400 to a mere 62 for a Jewish population of from 2,500,000 to 3,000,000. In conclusion, he asserted:

Though as individuals they can continue to live and work creatively in the Soviet Union, if concepts of Soviet rule prevail, the Jews as a distinctive group are destined sooner or later to die out. At present, they are bound together less by religion or culture than by their answer to question No. 5 in their passes, identifying them as members of a Jewish nationality enjoying few, if any, minority rights and suffering from some forms of discrimination.

Dr. Lamm also remarked in passing that the Bible, even as a work of literature, is practically unknown in the Soviet Union.

In her report, Mme. Zinaïda Shakhovskaya, a writer and critic from France, underscored the importance of religious themes beginning to appear in Soviet literature. She remarked that a new energy, a fresh spirit, exists in Soviet literature which is closely associated with the search for new ideals taking place in the Soviet Union and which is expressed in such lines as those of the poet Soloukhin: "To live on earth and in spirit aspire to heaven / That's the sweet destiny of man."

Summing up the work of the symposium, Mr. Max Hayward, of St. Antony's College, Oxford, noted a general agreement among the participants that an ideological and spiritual vacuum had developed in Soviet society and that Marxism-Leninism had proved to be a very short-lived answer to the main problems of life. He commented that since Stalin's death the Soviet leaders had failed in their efforts to infuse new life into official Communist doctrine, which no longer appeals to the younger generation of Soviet citizens, and indicated that there is evidence of dissatisfaction with Marxism-Leninism even in works published within the Soviet Union, particularly by the younger writers. He went on to say that these indications are supplemented by the reported accounts of foreigners who have resided in the USSR.

Mr. Hayward told the symposium that it had provided a great deal of factual material attesting to the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and had shown that there is a corresponding search for new values to take the place of this bankrupt ideology. So far it is difficult to speak of anything more than a widespread search being conducted, he said, but there is clear evidence of a renewed interest in the answers that the various religions offer to the central questions of human existence.

In conclusion Mr. Hayward stated that "continuing restriction, not to say persecution, of the various religious groups in the USSR indicates a sensitivity on the part of the authorities to this search for new ideals and a fear that younger people may turn increasingly to religion in the course of this search."

R. F.

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
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ARTICLES

Science, Ideology and Cybernetics in the USSR

C. OLGIN

The following article represents a revised version of the paper "Cybernetics and Ideology" delivered by Mr. Olgin at a conference of teachers and research workers on the USSR held by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London at the end of April this year.

Threatened with ideological repression in the immediate post-Stalin era and later elevated to the status of a superscience and kingpin of Communist construction, cybernetics has since Khrushchev's departure once more been patently at loggerheads with the Party ideology as understood by influential sections of officialdom. There is not as yet, and probably there never will be, any question of overt ideological repression, but advance in the vital field of the theory of the planning, government and control of the Soviet economy on a national scale has been both very slow and very cautious. In parallel, there has been a marked decrease in the eagerness of the editorial board of *Voprosy filosofii* to publish treatises by cyberneticians and cybernetically-minded scientists devoted to the speculative or metaphysical aspects of the new science, so popular around 1962. Whether officially sponsored or not, interest continues unabated in technical cybernetics (computer design) and the application of cybernetics in all scientific disciplines (including the social sciences, with the significant exception of political economy) and in the operational control of single industrial plants and transport. When studying the penetration of cybernetics into Soviet life, there seems therefore to be a case for distinguishing those branches of the subject that are considered ideologically neutral from others that are not. Most writers dealing with the relation between Soviet science and Soviet ideology identify the latter with Soviet philosophy, i.e., the current version of Dialectical and Historical Materialism. This was also the approach of the present writer in an earlier analysis of the relation between ideology and cybernetics.¹ It offers, however, no explanation for the avatars of theoretical cybernetics in political economy or, on closer inspection, for the known cases of an ideological repression (or lack of repression) of other scientific disciplines. Partly because of this, the present writer felt it incumbent upon him to enquire into the ideological status of Dialectical and Historical Materialism so as to arrive at a definition of the essential features of the Party ideology more in consonance with the known facts concerning Communist prac-

¹ See C. Olgin, "Soviet Ideology and Cybernetics," *Bulletin*, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1962, No. 2, and "Soviet Ideology and Cybernetics—II," *ibid.*, 1962, No. 6.

tical policies in general and the treatment of science, including cybernetics, in particular. The present paper gives a very brief account of the best-known cases of the ideological repression of scientific disciplines and reexamines the treatment of cybernetics in the light of such a definition.

Ideology and Science in the USSR: The Conventional Approach

Communist ideology is more usually than not identified with Marxist or Marxist-Leninist philosophy (the new title was adopted in the latest textbook *Marksisitsko-Leninskaya filosofiya*—Marxist-Leninist Philosophy—which came out in 1965, a long overdue amendment), i.e., with Dialectical and Historical Materialism as expounded in authoritative textbooks, philosophical journals, etc. If we accept this version, and further accept the widely held opinion that Communist ideology is directly responsible for all repressions in the Soviet scientific world, we should expect to find repressions taking place whenever theories opposing some posits of Dialectical and Historical Materialism respectively are advanced in science, natural and social. We should further expect the violence and duration of repression to mount with the opposition between scientific theory and philosophical posit. There is much evidence to show that this conventional approach to the relation between ideology and science is based on a misapprehension of the essence of Communist ideology.

What are the facts?

In natural science, the most severe and prolonged repression was that directed against genetics and geneticists. It requires, however, considerable ingenuity—one might even say outright disingenuousness—to deduce a condemnation of modern genetics from the principles of Dialectical Materialism. The next severest, steadiest and most prolonged repression in natural science was that directed against all schools of psychology trying to oppose primitivized Pavlovism (including, incidentally, those founded by Pavlov's pupils who refused to abide by the primitivizations). But primitivized Pavlovian reflexology happens to be very close to mechanistic Behaviorism, definitely opposed by Dialectical Materialism as expounded under Stalin.

The third best-known case of ideological repression offers the best proof for the inadequacy of the conventional approach. Einstein's relativization of the most fundamental parameters of physical entities and processes was, for a time, bitterly opposed by Dialectical Materialists as inimical to the concept of an "objective reality existing outside and independently of our consciousness," essential to Dialectical Materialism. So far as concerns scientific theory as taught at Soviet institutions of higher education and as applied in practice, the repression in fact never took place, and Relativity, from 1958 onward, became "the mainstay of Diamatist physics."² Practically the same thing took place with the indeterminacy principle of quantum mechanics.

² See C. Olgin, "Physics and Dialectical Materialism," *Bulletin*, 1960, No. 5; and "Soviet Views on the Metaphysics of Relativity," *Studies on the Soviet Union*, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, New Series, Vol. I, No. 1, 1961.

Ideological repression, for reasons which will be examined below, has been applied far more consistently and at times really savagely in the social sciences. But adherence to Historical Materialism was no guarantee against repression. Thus, Pokrovsky's school was suppressed altogether, though faithfully adhering to Marx's "materialist view of history," and economists actually liquidated who never said or wrote anything opposed to the political economy of Historical Materialism.

These inconsistencies, the haphazard attacks, the prolonged repression of some theories rather than others, equally or more opposed to Dialectical or Historical Materialism, particularly the very great difference in the treatment of natural and social sciences respectively, have passed unnoticed over here. What was noticed was the willingness of philosophers to amend or abandon altogether doctrinal points held to be sacrosanct, a willingness attributed over here wholly and, in this respect, wrongly to the spread of scientific thought in the USSR.

Coupled with numerous and well publicized departures of Soviet leaders from the norms of Marxism as understood by most Western students of Marx, this retreat of the ideologists, the continual piecemeal adjustments to Dialectical and Historical Materialism to suit the requirements of science and technology or the actions of leaders, led to the widespread belief that Communist ideology is a "dead dog," or, as George Kennan puts it more elegantly, "a light reaching us from a star a long time extinct."

A more attentive study of the business end of Communist ideology—Party programs, Party Congress and Central Committee resolutions, or such textbooks as Stalin's *The History of the VKP(b) : A Short Course* and the much more recently published *Foundations of Marxism-Leninism*³—would show that this is not yet the case and would also show that we must look for the essential features of the Party ideology elsewhere than in Dialectical and Historical Materialism.

What is Communist Ideology?

In an earlier analysis of the penetration of cybernetics into the Soviet world of ideas from the attack in 1953 to the apotheosis of the new science in 1960,⁴ the present writer adopted the conventional approach, noting that Dialectical Materialists were still embarrassed by doctrinal problems such as whether machines can think, what constitutes the unity of the world, what cybernetical information is in the light of the Leninist theory of reflection, etc., but that Historical Materialists—or, at any rate, that section of them who specialize in "scientific Communism"—were ready and willing to adopt cybernetics as the science of governing and controlling the activities (particularly the economic activities) of the Constructors of Communism, i.e., the population of the USSR.⁵ Subsequent developments on the cybernetical front together with a study of the evolution of Communist economic theory convinced the writer that the conventional or

³ *Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma* (The Foundations of Marxism-Leninism), Moscow, 1959.

⁴ See Footnote 1.

⁵ *Bulletin*, 1962, No. 6, p. 4.

formal approach to the problem of what constitutes the essential features of Communist ideology is definitely misleading; also that the phenomenon known as the Party ideology can only be studied intelligently as part and parcel of the birth and development of contemporary totalitarian Communism (there were, of course, many previous manifestations of similar movements) and, in particular, of Communist political economy.⁶ It will be said that this is a Marxist approach and therefore, by definition, unscientific. To this the writer can only reply that it has provided him with a clue to the above-mentioned puzzling inconsistencies in the relation between ideology and science in general and cybernetics in particular.

Marxists maintain that in every society there is a dominant ideology determined by that society's socio-economic structure: a set of general concepts expressing the interests of the dominant class and at the same time providing a logical and/or moral justification for its dominance. We may or may not accept this definition as valid for non-Communist societies. With one significant reservation it seems, however, to fit admirably the ideologies of Communist parties in power. The reservation is that the socio-economic structure of Communist-dominated countries has not developed of its own accord but is a product of the consistent application of certain posits of Communist economics constituting the inner and highly active core of ideology upon the social body from the moment of seizure of power.

These posits are axiomatic—not necessarily irrational, but not ultimately subject to either empirical or logical analysis. In so far, therefore, they are a dogma as well as a lead to action. They are also a dogma in so far as they were not invented by Lenin and his Bolsheviks but were inherited by them from the Founding Fathers of Marxism. The first posit, with obvious moral or even religious derivations, is that private ownership of anything that can be sold or hired for profit, and more particularly the use of such profit to acquire more property of the same kind (and not only private ownership of the “means of production,” as officially maintained by Communists) is an obstacle to “real” progress. The second, a product of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century rationalism, is that “real” progress is identical with a maximization of the production of material goods. Out of these twin posits, Marx, with the help of Hegelian dialectics, produced his synthesis of the inevitable collapse of capitalism and equally inevitable advent of proletarian revolution. Suspicious of Marx’s “inevitabilities” and even more suspicious of the proletariat’s, let alone the peasants’, willing acceptance of Communism, Lenin adds a third axiomatic though certainly not irrational posit: After seizure of power and for an unspecified time to come, production, distribution and even consumption of any goods, spiritual as well as material, must, so far as it is at the moment practicable, proceed under Party control.⁷

⁶ See Constantine Olgin, “Ideology and Economics,” *Studies on the Soviet Union*, New Series, Vol. III, No. 3, 1964; and P. J. D. Wiles, *The Political Economy of Communism*, Oxford, 1962.

⁷ There are passages in Marx’s political and polemical works, particularly in the “Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League,” indicating that Lenin was not altogether original in his insistence upon control of the masses by the Party and of the Party by an inner core of professionals.

Anyone who doubts that this constitutes the inner and active core of Party ideology, to which all leaders have remained as faithful as external and internal circumstances permit, is invited to go through the records of Marxist-Leninist parties from the split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks to the "manifesto of the contemporary era," the new Soviet Party Program; or, if he cannot face the labor involved, to ask a Party member for his opinion. To these three basic and dogmatic posits of Communist ideology, Historical and Dialectical Materialism serve as shells, giving the dogma an air of philosophic-scientific respectability; *via* their Hegelian laws and categories, they also connect the dogma to every aspect of reality, in particular, to the concrete sciences. The concrete content of these categories (e.g., Necessity, Chance, Social Being, Social Consciousness) can be changed and are changed with changing situations; some categories can be given temporarily less or more importance (struggle of opposites, unity of opposites), some even temporarily jettisoned (e.g., the Law of Negation of Negation under Stalin). But the central tripartite dogma remains unchanged and unchangeable so long as the Party remains in being and its dominant group, in the first place the heirs of Lenin's professional revolutionaries, the *apparats*, directly in charge of maintaining the "socialist relations of production" (i.e., seeing to it that means of production and product remain, so far as possible, under Party control) remains in power.

Ideology—Information

Repression of scientific thought is considered, and rightly so, as a symptom of general blockage of information, a particularly dangerous symptom for a regime committed by its own dogma to raise industrial and agricultural productivity to a level unreachable under capitalism. Yet, as we well know, these repressions did occur under Stalin and have, as we are now informed, continued to occur under the Khrushchevian administration, despite all asseverations that the Party would not tolerate them. Why? Was Lysenko re-elevated after his temporary disgrace and the computerization of statistics and of industrial plant control neglected because philosophers told Khrushchev that this was the Marxist-Leninist way to the construction of Communism? The supposition is as childish as it is unnecessary. Khrushchev admittedly adhered to the primitivized version of "Socialist Realism" produced by Stalin's ideologists showing total disregard for anything like creative development in art. As regards science and technology, essential to maximization in the production of material goods, we can have no doubt that he was genuinely, indeed desperately, anxious to aid unimpeded development. What he faced was a blockage of information, an inevitable consequence of the application of Communist ideology, so it seems; not because Dialectical and Historical Materialism are taught but because the concretization of the principle of negation of private ownership of property, at the present stage of our technical and moral development, at any rate, seems impossible without a dictatorial rule which, unlike purely political dictatorships, must be total. It must penetrate as deeply as practicable into the economic as well

as into the political-cultural life of the dominated society. All totalitarian dictatorships are, of course, inimical to the free circulation of some information, yet must allow for a minimum of freedom in certain specific fields if the national production potential is to be kept at a safe level.

But not all totalitarian dictatorships (e.g., Hitler's Germany or Mussolini's Italy) are so ideologically committed as is Communism to the principle of the full development of the forces of production, which demands the free circulation of information in science, technology and the economic field. Again, all dictatorships produce stresses and strains in dominated societies, which they attempt to cover up with disinformation. Communist dictatorships, however, produce the greatest stresses and strains precisely in the field where they are supposed to remove them, i.e., in the organization of the "masses" for the production, distribution and consumption of material goods. Hence the perennial dilemma. Communism, as Lenin said and as every leader, Stalin not excluded, repeated, cannot win unless the economics of socialism—in the first place production per head of the population—become more efficient than those of capitalism. This is impossible without the free circulation of socio-economic as well as technical and scientific information. But this, in turn, is impossible because the myth of the willing acceptance by the masses of socialist relations of production and the *a priori* economic superiority of these relations over capitalist relations must be maintained. The incidence of blockage and distortion of information, rising to plain falsification of fact in Communist-dominated countries, may therefore be expected to be unequal and have different causes.

In the case of the USSR, ideologically neutral information will be affected accidentally as part of the general tendency to blockage and other social effects of a Communist dictatorial rule in a socialized Russian Empire—e.g., Soviet chauvinism, "personality cults," "sycophancy," plain chasing after lucrative posts by scientists as well as functionaries, etc. Ideologically vital information, in the first place economic data (whether relating to the national economy as such or to the economics of individual enterprises), information on public opinion with respect to Communist economics in practice, in general on the social sciences serving the maintenance of "socialist relations of production," is affected deliberately and systematically. Only information favorable to the basic posits of Communist ideology is allowed to circulate freely. Subject to the reservation regarding the general tendency to blockage and distortion which is here automatically intensified, unfavorable socio-economic information may be available to rulers. For the general public, including students of economics and sociology, disinformation has, to date, been the rule rather than the exception. As late as the end of the Khrushchevian era, demands by younger sociologists to stick to facts which they could see with their own eyes were condemned as creeping empiricism, and it seems very unlikely that his successors will ever allow economists to conduct research throwing doubt upon the basic dogma of an *a priori* superiority of a socialist over a capitalist national economy. (This last point does not mean that statistical data are automatically falsified. They are, however, pre-

sented in such a manner that it takes a trained observer with comparative Western figures to guess at the real situation on the economic and socio-economic "front" of Communist construction.)

Ideological Swings—Information

The above should help to explain the haphazard incidence of repression in the ideologically neutral field of natural science [on the one hand and the strict control of information in the economy and the subservient social sciences on the other. We have still to deal, however, with the specific cases of liquidation of the "economists" in the thirties, the execution of the head of Gosplan in 1947, the suppression of political economy as a science over some ten years of Stalin's reign and, at a lower level, the suppression of Pokrovsky's school over an even longer period. The explanation usually given here is very close to that advanced by Khrushchev's ideologists when the order to "de-Stalinize" was given, namely, Stalin's "subjectivism" and "voluntarism" in economic matters, backed by the use of terror, and his proneness to ignore the operation of economic laws and the facts of history; but, with the exception of the use of terror, the same accusations are already being leveled at Khrushchev's economic policies and his famous Party reorganization intended to make the Soviet economy work. Without going so far as to maintain that Stalin's and Khrushchev's personal characteristics were altogether without their effect upon the way in which the business of governing the USSR was conducted, the present writer considers it worth while looking for more objective factors which operated behind the so-called "voluntarism" of either dictator. A main objective factor, one feels certain, was the conflict between the economics of Communism and the requirements of the Soviet economy as such. Any leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is ultimately dependent for his own and the Party's survival on real as opposed to propagandistic successes on the economic front. Unlike other dictators, however, he is also committed to a program aimed at a progressive elimination of economic individualism, liquidation of the private sector of production and suppression of any activities which could possibly lead to the re-establishment of capitalism. To say that capitalism is Soviet Communism's most dangerous enemy seems trite—it is, after all, the *leitmotiv* of Communist propaganda—but Communists will not admit that it is an internal as well as an external enemy (except when "brotherly" parties quarrel, as in the case of Chinese accusations leveled against the Yugoslavs and in the end against the USSR of condoning the growth of capitalism at home). It is not, of course, capitalism as we understand it, a highly organized system of investment for profit managed for the shareholders by specialists; it is capitalism of the most primitive kind, protean and therefore most difficult to control: the agricultural capitalism in embryo of the individual peasant doing his best to enlarge his private plot, acquire seed and equipment by any means including pilferage, to build a larger house, in the end to hire labor; the agricultural capitalism of enterprising kolkhozes, which on numerous occasions are caught "speculating," i.e., hiding reserves and waiting for a favorable moment

to throw their produce on the market, illicitly using kolkhoz transport or illicitly hiring it for the illicit movement of goods; the totally illicit, still primitive, but quite sizeable "entrepreneur" capitalism in ancillary industry and, of course, various "gray" and genuine black market trading activities within the "socialist sector of production" in industry as well as in agriculture. The objective factors motivating and facilitating these departures from the "norms of socialist methods of production" are rooted in the methods themselves—central planning plus the absence of a genuine free market;⁸ but they could hardly have produced the present situation without the help of "subjective" factors, i.e., capitalist tendencies among the "masses." These tendencies were, under Stalin, labeled "survivals of capitalism in the consciousness of Soviet citizens," and were officially expected to die out. Under Khrushchev, they were more realistically called "private ownership instincts," and were even traced back to some features of "socialist relations of production," in particular scarcities in consumer goods, low pay and inadequate housing, which the Khrushchev administration tried to remedy. But, if historical precedent is anything to go by, an increasing availability of "the good things in life" after a period of privation merely intensifies these "instincts," and there is plenty of evidence to suggest that this is precisely what is taking place in the USSR.

The "private sector" of production, with all its licit, semilicit and altogether illicit ramifications in distribution and consumption, fed as it is by "objective" as well as "subjective" forces, has, of course, been a feature of the Soviet economy from the moment the Bolsheviks seized power. Without it, the country's total production potential would fall disastrously (as it fell whenever attempts were made to suppress it on a national scale), and the Soviet leaders must by now be well aware of the fact. Ideologically, however, this is apparently still inadmissible. The theory of a "peaceful coexistence" of the private and socialist sectors of production, distribution and consumption as a method of Communist construction was developed by a group labeled by Stalin as "enemies of the people" and liquidated accordingly—namely, the "economists"—and they have yet to be rehabilitated.

It may seem out of place in a paper devoted to the interaction between Communist ideology and a science which made its appearance only some ten years ago to hark back to events which took place in the twenties and thirties; but in the first place there is a direct line of thought connecting the theories of the "economists" with those propounded by the leaders of today's mathematician-economists, particularly the late Academician Nemchinov in the USSR and Prof. Oskar Lange in Poland, whose services were enlisted by the Communist authorities in the proposed cybernetization of Communist economies. It is in fact said that the instrumentalia of the mathematization of economic planning on a national scale were developed in embryo in the course of "genetic" or "balanced" planning in the NEP period.

⁸ See Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economy: An Introduction*, London—New York, 1961; Wiles, *op. cit.*; and Olgin, "Ideology and Economics."

Second, and perhaps more important, the “economists” formed part—and a very active part indeed—of a political movement headed by the repentant Bukharin with a definite political program which, in fact, for some time received Stalin’s wholehearted support. Summed up very briefly, the program, then known as the theory of “right-wing Communism” and later labeled “right-wing deviation,” “wrecking,” etc., visualized NEP, not as a brief tactical retreat after the *débâcle* of War Communism (the first Bolshevik all-out attack on private property), but as a more or less permanent feature of Communist construction, which would proceed uninterruptedly even though at a snail’s pace.⁹ It would be a period of peaceful coexistence between the private, or capitalist, and the socialist sectors of production under the aegis of a Communist regime holding absolute political power. The socialist sector (which already included all heavy industry and a considerable proportion of light industry), financed by the sales of its own produce and by preferential governmental loans, was bound to win in the long run—first, because Marx had said that socialist production would be more efficient than capitalist, and second, because the regime, holding a monopoly of banking, foreign trade and transport, with the construction of Communism as its final aim, would, by the use of “economic levers” (but strictly avoiding “administrative measures”), help Marx’s “inevitable” to become realities.

Very similar ideas are being advanced in the USSR today, though not as yet with the Party’s official approval, and it is significant that in the recent disputes between the extreme reformists, whom we might as well call “geneticists,” and their opponents, terms like “encouragement of elemental commercialism” and “NEP” have been used by the latter.¹⁰ To say that we are witnessing the rebirth of political “right-wing Communism” would be premature: for one thing, the extreme reformists do not as yet have a political leader or theoretician. But to overlook the possibility of the emergence of such a movement and to neglect the role cybernetics may play in favoring its birth is in the present writer’s view unpardonable.

At any rate, we have before us historical examples of two extreme and opposite ways of constructing Communism—the one adopted by Bukharin and his “economists,” the other by Stalin after his break with Bukharin, whose assistance he no longer needed after having dealt with Trotsky and the Left Opposition. Whether Stalin’s “second revolution”—the campaign of forced collectivization and forced industrialization—was launched because the internal enemy (resurgent capitalism) and the external enemy (capitalist encirclement and the birth of German fascism) threatened the USSR or because he saw in it a means of perpetuating

⁹ *XIV sess VKP(b) : Stenografichesky otchet* (The Fourteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: A Stenographic Report), pp. 135–36, as quoted in N. Valentinov, *Doktrina pravogo kommunizma : 1924–1926 gody v istorii sovetskogo gosudarstva* (The Doctrine of Right-Wing Communism: The Years 1924–26 in the History of the Soviet State), Munich, 1960, pp. 13–14.

¹⁰ See the review of articles and readers’ letters published under the heading “Socialist Management and Production Planning” in *Kommunist*, 1964, No. 15, pp. 51–52, concerning an article by V. Nemchinov published under the same title, *ibid.*, 1964, No. 5. A protest against Nemchinov’s “full-blooded” *khozraschet* was also made by Liberman.

his reign has always been a matter of conjecture. For his part, the present writer, after going through the records of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth Party congresses, is inclined to say that the truth lies somewhere between the two. In regard to ideology, Stalin provided his own justification for his swing from the "Right" (economic levers, "genetic planning") to the "Left" ("teleological" planning demanding the application of "administrative measures" and rigid planning in terms of goods) in a perfunctory epitaph to his victims:

The fall of the "economists" and Mensheviks is explainable, among other things, by the fact that they did not recognize the mobilizing, organizing and transforming power of advanced theory, advanced ideas, and, lapsing into vulgar materialism, virtually reduced their role to nothing, thereby condemning the Party to passive vegetation.¹¹

It should be noted that both Stalin's "teleologists" and the "geneticists" could, and did, with perfect right claim to be ideologically good Marxists; for Marx's political economy is a two-faced Janus, the one side evolutionary and *quasi* democratic, as in *Das Kapital* (unless deciphered, as was done by Dühring), the other revolutionary and autocratic, as in *Anti-Dühring* and the Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League. So, of course, is his famous "dialectical method." The method was described by a reviewer of the first edition of *Das Kapital* as indistinguishable from that which must be used by anyone studying the development of society as a scientifically analysable process (i.e., tracing regularities in the past in order to extrapolate them into the future), which pleased Marx immensely.¹² Some fifty years later, however, when polemicizing with the "renegade" Bernstein, the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* in a burst of candor described the famous "method" in very different words:

Bernstein, this petty bourgeois..., this erstwhile admirer of...the rational method, never understood Marx's dialectics as the method of thinking in contradictions..., a method which overcomes the contradiction of concepts by a process which overcomes the contradiction of phenomena.¹³

The first definition could well have been adopted by the "geneticists" and the second by their opponents the "teleologists," though few of the latter's successors, still entrenched in various economic planning, research and educational institutions, would commit themselves to the actual wording (never repeated, to the writer's best knowledge, in any Soviet publication).

In regard to information, the swing from right to left had the expected result: first progressive blockage, particularly in economics, then falsification. In agriculture, total production fell and continued to fall; in industry, wastefulness in the use of resources increased as plant after plant was erected amid fanfares to the "great leader" and the irresistible forces of the "masses" made "conscious"

¹¹ *Istoriya Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bolshevikov): Kratky kurs* (The History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: A Short Course), Moscow, 1954, p. 112. (First published 1938.)

¹² See the preface to the second German edition of the first volume of Karl Marx' *Das Kapital*.

¹³ *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Large Soviet Encyclopedia), 1st ed., Vol. V, Moscow, 1927, col. 700.

by the spread of Marxism under the leadership of the "vanguard of the proletariat." But the myth of increased efficiency and productivity under socialism (announced as constructed) had to be maintained. Some relaxations in "administrative measures" against private economic activities in the late thirties somewhat mitigated the effect of Stalin's "second revolution," increasing the total output of both agriculture and industry; some further concessions to the private sector were made during the war, and it is not impossible that the wartime head of Gosplan, Voznesensky, was toying with the idea of taking up where the "economists" had left off and that this was the reason for his execution. (In his book *The Wartime Economy of the USSR During the Patriotic War* no mention of this is made, but just about the same time some economists began to propound ideas leading to a reduction of the socialist "forces of production," i.e., the sale of the MTS.)¹⁴ Stalin, at any rate, seems to have sensed danger. In September 1952, his "work of genius," *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, was published. A few months later, the Nineteenth Party Congress adopted it as essential to the plan for the "developed advance toward Communism." Essentially a restatement of "teleologist" Marxism in economics, it meant that all concessions to the private (including the collective) sector could at any moment be withdrawn. Stalin died, and within a very few years—at the Twentieth Party Congress, to be precise—Stalin's way to Communism was attacked along with what was described as various other "effects of the personality cult." In particular, Mikoyan demanded the unblocking of economic information, in the first place statistics—still, as he put it, "kept under lock and key"¹⁵—and a revision of textbooks on political economy—two years after the first textbook since Stalin's "second revolution" had appeared! What has happened since then as regards the relation between information and ideology, particularly in the vital sector of economics, is probably best described as the result of a tug-of-war between "teleologism" and "geneticism" under a demagogic dictator releasing "administrative" constraints on the "private sector" with one hand and tightening them with the other; and this was still the situation at the Twenty-Second Party Congress, when Khrushchev, from predilection or necessity but certainly not realizing what cybernetics really meant, ideologically if not programmatically took a plunge on the cyberneticization of Soviet economic planning. An intriguing and still unclarified feature of this tug-of-war on the economic front bearing directly on the problem of unblocking information is that the Central Committee's own economic organ, *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, from around 1960 onward published articles and reports criticizing planning in terms of goods, saying in so many words that Gosplan had lost effectual control of the Soviet economy, while the organ of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, *Ekonomicheskyy vestnik*, continued on something very close to the "teleologists'"

¹⁴ See J. V. Stalin, *Ekonomicheskiye problemy sotsializma v SSSR* (Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR), Moscow, 1952 (Reply to letter of Sanina and Venzher).

¹⁵ *XX s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Stenografichesky otchet* (The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Stenographic Report), Vol. I, Moscow, 1956, p. 324.

line, which was also the line of most approved textbooks on political economy published during the period.¹⁶

Ideology—Cybernetics

Cybernetics has been called a concrete science, a science of sciences (including the social sciences), a bridge between the sciences and even a philosophy with political implications. It originated in the West at the time when Soviet chauvinism and Stalin's personality cult were at their worst. Expression of original thought was taboo and blockage and distortion of information on ideologically vital matters at a maximum preparatory to Stalin's "developed advance toward Communism." Yet, apart from Stalinist ritual terminology ("a pseudo-science in the service of imperialism"), the article in *Voprosy filosofii* which launched the attack said little more against cybernetics than had been said in Western conservative circles (including some scientists), namely: (1) that it tried to introduce methods of mathematical analysis into regions which must be reserved for philosophical and moral thought; (2) that it tried to reduce the organic to the inorganic and denied that specificity of life; (3) that it threw doubt upon the uniqueness, perhaps even the very existence, of the human soul (in Marxist terminology, consciousness); (4) that it did all this without sufficient foundation in concrete experiment. What is more, the attack, though taken up throughout the satellite countries, had virtually no sequel.¹⁷

Such uncommon reserve in the treatment of a theory that could be construed as an attempt to supplant Dialectical and Historical Materialism as sources of knowledge of "the most general laws governing the development of the world, including human society" cannot be simply explained by the fact that Stalin had died some months before the publication of the article in *Voprosy filosofii*: de-Stalinization was still two years ahead. There was not even any talk of remodeling Dialectical Materialism, and the social sciences remained under the tight control of the Historical Materialists until quite recently. Probably two factors made a really virulent attack (such as was delivered at the time and even much later against "bourgeois" philosophical, sociological and economic theories) inadvisable. The first was that cybernetics, in embryo, was already installed in the form of the mathematization of natural processes in physics and also, since the war at any rate, in actual techniques and machinery of control with built-in "feedback" (nuclear processes, astronautics, rocket ballistics, gunnery). The second was that Wiener had nothing to say on the vital subject of socialist *versus* capitalist methods of production and could even be interpreted as a severe critic of capitalism. Moreover, influential Party members like Mikoyan, perhaps Malenkov himself, must have been aware that Stalin's way to Communism meant economic

¹⁶ E.g., *Politicheskaya ekonomiya* (Political Economy), Moscow, 1960; *Politicheskaya ekonomiya: Kommunisticheskiy spсоб proizvodstva* (Political Economy: The Communist Method of Production), Moscow, 1963; *Kurs politicheskoi ekonomii* (A Course of Political Economy), Moscow, 1963; and *Kurs lektsii politicheskoi ekonomii* (A Course of Lectures in Political Economy), Leningrad, 1963.

¹⁷ The article, signed by "Materialist" and entitled "Whom Does Cybernetics Serve?" appeared in *Voprosy filosofii*, 1953, No. 5. (See Olgin, "Soviet Ideology and Cybernetics," *Bulletin*, 1962, No. 2.)

ruin and were already preparing to veer toward "genetic" planning or at least toward the proper processing of economic information, in which the use of computers could obviously be of tremendous help. But it was also evident that the writer of the article in question, who, contrary to all previous and subsequent practice in senior ideological publications, was allowed to remain anonymous, was intent on detaching cybernetics as the theory of computers with or without "feedback" (of which one hears that he was not an enemy) from the philosophical-sociological content of Wiener's treatise. In this he seems to a considerable extent to have been successful. Ideological attacks on cybernetics ceased, but for a number of years no attempt was made to develop anything like a philosophy of cybernetics or to integrate it with Dialectical and Historical Materialism or the social sciences. As late as the All-Union Conference on the Philosophical Questions of Natural Science (1958), where cybernetics was officially elevated to the status of the "highest achievement of human thought" destined to help Soviet science and technology, the authors of the paper on cybernetics, Sobolev and Lyapunov, for example, thought it advisable to dissociate themselves from any philosophizing and even went out of their way to condemn attempts made to follow and extend Wiener's speculations into the realms of philosophy and sociology.¹⁸ Pressure in this direction, however, was evidently mounting, even though little material was being published. For this development, two factors appear to be responsible. In the first place, practically every better-known work on cybernetics was translated into Russian and published, including works whose authors, like Wiener, regarded cybernetics as something more than a concrete natural science or even a bridge between sciences. Secondly—and this passed completely unnoticed in the West—the ban imposed in 1947 at Stalin's orders on the exploitation of Lenin's excursions into Hegelian logic was lifted in 1955 and the publication of his *Philosophical Notebooks* hurriedly ordered in a mass edition as volume thirty-eight of his *Collected Works* (Fourth Edition). This is not to say that Soviet speculative cybernetics directly and systematically reflects Lenin's quasi-Hegelian dialectics (as does the most consistent effort so far at marrying Dialectical Materialism with cybernetics, made in a recently published Russian translation of a work by the prominent East German philosopher Georg Klaus),¹⁹ but the very fact of Stalinist suppression and the difficulties experienced by accredited philosophers (all of them ex-Stalinist sycophants) in incorporating Lenin's departures from his own earlier materialist orthodoxy (in *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*) into officially approved philosophical textbooks such as *The Foundations of Marxist Philosophy* made it obviously tempting for scientists and even in the end philosophers with a penchant for cybernetics to exploit its philosophic possibilities.

The first attempt of this kind was at any rate made very soon after the publication of the *Philosophical Notebooks* (and also of Wiener's book on cybernetics,

¹⁸ See C. Olgin, "Science and Philosophy in the USSR," *Bulletin*, 1960, No. 12.

¹⁹ G. Klaus, *Kybernetik in philosophischer Sicht*, Berlin, 1961. The Russian translation is *Kibernetika i filosofiya* (Cybernetics and Philosophy), Moscow, 1963.

which came out in Russian in 1957) by P. K. Anokhin, a brilliant pupil of Pavlov and reputedly the discoverer in physiology of the principle of "reverse afferentation" (reverse feedback in organic systems), which the Pavlovian reflexologists had ignored.²⁰ From then on, but particularly after the all-Union conference in 1958, at which Anokhin attacked Sobolev and Lyapunov for shirking the philosophical aspects of cybernetics,²¹ articles and reviews of works both theoretical and frankly speculative began to appear in practically every issue of the organ of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, *Voprosy filosofii*. Whether this was done on orders from above in the hope that somehow or other a synthesis with Dialectical Materialism would be worked out is difficult to say. In this hope officialdom in Soviet philosophy must at present feel frustrated. To date, only two writers have made a serious attempt to achieve this synthesis. The first is the above-mentioned Klaus, but the review in the postscript to the Russian edition of his work, though in many ways complimentary, finds him at fault on two important points—his inability to cope with the problem "Can machines think?" from a Marxist point of view without dragging in something like the Kantian "thing in itself," and, what is more serious, his suggestion that cybernetics should form a universal connecting link between Dialectical and Historical Materialism and all concrete sciences.²² The second writer is the late Prof. Oskar Lange, prominent Polish economist, Deputy Chairman of the Polish Council of State, a Communist with very pronounced Western leanings (he actually worked on planning during World War II in the USA), whose work *The Whole and Development in the Light of Cybernetics*, like Klaus's, was brought to the attention of Soviet philosophic circles²³ but unlike the latter book has not yet been translated into Russian—and may never be, because Lange, in giving a cybernetic interpretation to every law and to the most important categories of Dialectical Materialism, sails right into functionalism and wholeism. With few exceptions, Soviet writers in speculative cybernetics either ignore Marxist laws and categories altogether or treat them in very cavalier fashion, evoking ineffective and increasingly infrequent protests from orthodox Dialectical Materialists. One of these exceptions—and a typical one—is a work by I. B. Novik, a candidate of philosophical sciences, entitled, somewhat misleadingly, *Cybernetics: Philosophical and Sociological Problems*—misleading because the sociological part is a mixture of abuse of "bourgeois sociology" and selections from Western "left-wing" authors pointing to the inhumanities to which the "capitalist" use of automation leads.²⁴ This is typical of a good many Soviet works on cybernetics

²⁰ See Olgin, "Soviet Ideology and Cybernetics—II."

²¹ *Filosofskie problemy sovremennoy yestestvoznaniya: Trudy Vsesoyuznogo soveshchaniya po filosofskim voprosam yestestvoznaniya* (Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Natural Science: Proceedings of the All-Union Conference on Philosophical Questions of Natural Science), Moscow, 1959, pp. 404–5.

²² Klaus, *op. cit.* (Russian translation), p. 491.

²³ The book, *Całość i rozwój w świetle cybernetyki* (Warsaw, 1962), was actually the subject of a discussion published by the Polish journal *Studia filozoficzne* (1963, Nos. 3 and 4). A review of this discussion was then printed by *Voprosy filosofii* (1964, No. 10).

²⁴ I. B. Novik, *Kybernetika: Filosofskie i sotsiologicheskiye problemy* (Cybernetics: Philosophical and Sociological Problems), Moscow, 1963.

published in the late Khrushchevian era. It was not typical of Novik's previous work—mostly articles, "reviews" and papers delivered at conferences chiefly concerned with the relation between information and negentropy. This subject also figures largely in the philosophical part of the book, which is ably handled except where dialectics is concerned. Here we find, not a dynamic synthesis in the manner of Klaus, but a series of illustrations of the compatibility between the laws of cybernetics and those of Dialectical Materialism.

Stiffer resistance was for a time offered by the Historical Materialists, nor was there much evidence of an interest of cyberneticians in sociological questions beyond micro-socio-metrics. The situation, however, changed radically after the publication of the new Party Program and the Twenty-Second Party Congress. Cybernetics, already established solidly as an indispensable link between concrete natural science disciplines and as a powerful instrument of scientific investigation in its own right, was once more elevated, this time to the status of chief instrument (in the hands of the Party, be it noted) for the government and control of all activities of the "builders of Communism," i.e., the population of the USSR, and more particularly of economic planning. A special Commission for Complex Problems of Cybernetics was accordingly formed, and its head, Academician A. Berg, coined a specific Soviet definition which would have satisfied the late Norbert Wiener himself—namely, as "the science of government and control of complex dynamic systems," the systems in question obviously being extended to cover human society.²⁵

This was the position in 1961, when the present writer was composing the above-mentioned analysis of the relation between Dialectical and Historical Materialism and cybernetics. The ideologists' resistance had by then been completely broken, and some of them, accepting the consequences, were obviously strenuously studying cybernetics and joining the scientists in developing the metaphysics of cybernetics, just as others had done in the case of Relativity and quantum mechanics. Since then, also, the integration of cybernetics or cybernetical methods into the theoretical side of every discipline of natural science and, with one significant exception, into all the disciplines of social science has proceeded apace. The exception (which the writer, using, as stated, the "conventional approach," failed to foresee) is political economy. If the "functional approach" to ideology as here outlined had been adopted, this error could have been avoided. For it is clear that, apart from lowering the overall effectiveness of the use of resources, Khrushchevian dithering, coming on top of Stalinist economics, has resulted in a stupendous tangle of information, false and true. And it is furthermore clear that influential groups in the new administration are far less confident than Khrushchev was that the tangle can be straightened out by cyberneticians without doing damage to their own group interests.

Bearing in mind all that has been said above, it would seem that the study of the interaction between cybernetics and Soviet ideology (which is really only beginning) may usefully proceed in three directions.

²⁵ *Kibernetika—mysleniye—zhizn* (Cybernetics, Thought and Life), Moscow, 1964, p. 11

1. The penetration of cybernetics into the "ideologically neutral field," particularly natural science. Here there are no obstacles and the penetration may be expected to proceed without interruption, increasing the prestige of cybernetics as the leading science, perhaps (if Klaus's proposals are in the end accepted) as the philosophy of science. This last development, unless compensated by a complete reconstruction of Dialectical and Historical Materialism (for example, rewelding them into something like Sartre's Dialectical Reason and treating them as moral-philosophical rather than as scientific-philosophical disciplines), would mean a very severe blow to Marxist-Leninist philosophy and its exponents.

2. The attempts of cyberneticians, scientists and ex-Dialectical Materialists to construct something approaching world pictures, sometimes around Dialectical Materialism (*vide* Klaus), sometimes ignoring official Marxist-Leninist philosophy altogether. Here, development may not have any practical influence in the immediate future; but an eventual substitution, for example, of Bogdanov's concept of progress for that of Marx and Lenin could in the long run have quite important political and socio-economic implications.

3. The direct interaction between cybernetics and Communist political economy. Here, as stated, the real clash is yet to come. "Genetic" planning is likely to be favored by cyberneticians, with political sympathies playing a not unimportant role. So far, however, they have done no more than criticize the Khrushchevian methods (or rather lack of methods) and put forward minimal requirements for beginning their studies, falling far short of "geneticism."²⁶

²⁶ At the Conference of Teachers and Research Workers on the USSR, the materials used by the author included appendices giving some brief information of recent articles and other publications falling into the last two sections, and it is hoped to publish them in an extended version in coming issues of the *Bulletin*. As regards the first section, the task of tracing the penetration of cybernetics falls properly on writers dealing with the separate disciplines of science and technology. To the present writer's best knowledge, at any rate, there seems to be no essential difference between the situation in the East and the West as regards theory. From what one hears and also from what one reads in Soviet specialized literature dealing with applied cybernetics, practical application, whether from lack of "hardware" (there have been reports of coming purchases from IBM) or from a persistent lack of trained programmers, is making very slow progress.

The Soviet Economy: From Libermanism to Liberalism?

JAN S. PRYBYLA

The Problem

In spite of impressive quantitative performance over the years, the Soviet economy continues to suffer from inefficiency in all but a few priority sectors. Although everyone in the Soviet Union knew about it all along, the phenomenon was never seriously analysed, nor was it officially recognized as a built-in failing of the system. It was, on the contrary, treated like sin—to be repressed and punished rather than prevented and cured.

Waste and inefficiency manifest themselves in the Soviet Union in two forms: the poor quality of many goods and services, and poor planning and management.

Shoddy goods mean rapid obsolescence, antiquated styling, lack of novelty, narrow range, frequent breakdowns, and inadaptability to the needs of the job for which the goods are intended. Shoddy service means delays, inconvenience, poor attention to detail, faulty distribution, seller-buyer conflict, and lines outside stores. Unsatisfactory goods and services, in other words, result in a misallocation of material resources, a brain drain, and psychological wear-and-tear. In a sellers' market (where the demand for commodities greatly exceeds the supply) there will be, to use a Soviet expression, little "concrete" evidence of the disease: even the shoddiest products and the poorest service will be snapped up by goods-hungry customers and by industrial users working against the norm. In a buyers' market (where the supply of certain goods exceeds the demand), the "concrete" manifestation of low quality is the piling up of unsold commodities in stores and warehouses, and consumer resistance to rude store attendants, clerks and hotel-keepers. Between 1955 and 1963, inventories of non-food consumer goods in wholesale and retail trade had risen in monetary terms from 12,500 million rubles to 30,600 million rubles. Much of this increase was accounted for by goods rejected by customers.

Unsatisfactory planning and management erupt at all times in a rash of bureaucrats. The bureaucrats fall into two categories: those whose existence is sanctioned by law, and the illegitimate but indispensable *tolkachi*, ZIS-men, or pushers. The legitimate bureaucrats are gainfully employed by the state in planning, accounting, managing, supervising, administering, inspecting, and in a multitude of related tasks. The illegal pushers are hired by socialist enterprises to fill the gaps, unclog the bottlenecks and generally smooth out the unevenness of the plan. Like the private plots of the collective farmers and the kolkhoz market, they are individual initiative called to the rescue of administrative socialism.

Here are a few telling, but not untypical examples. The RSFSR has today more than three million accountants. The Novo-Kramatorsk Machine Factory counted 600 inspectors in a single year. In 1959, the Kazakh Gosplan changed its allocation of rolled steel 538 times, and in 1958 the RSFSR Council of Ministers issued 140 statutory orders to secure additional supplies for the Moscow City Sovnarkhoz—and this after a reform which was supposed to cut down red tape. The late V. S. Nemchinov estimated that if something radical were not done about the quality of Soviet planning and if the growth rates typical of the fifties continued, then by 1980 (the inaugural year of full Communism), the entire adult population of the Soviet Union would have to be employed in economic planning and administration. And where, one might ask, would the pushers then come from? Eight thousand of them invaded the offices of the Dnepropetrovsk Sovnarkhoz in 1959. This sort of thing obviously cannot go on.

The root causes of poor quality were and are the primitive analytical tools used by the overcentralized planners and a system of incentives which until recently took account of and rewarded or punished only one dimension of managerial performance: gross output. The trouble thus lies both at the center and at the periphery of the system.

Let us deal first with the center. Briefly, the planning establishment tries to do too much, from too high up, with too little. The "too little" refers to the crude materials-balances methods used by the planners and to the paucity of reliable information. If economic planning means anything, it is the continuous flow and processing of more or less accurate information. Information there is all right, tons of it, but like the goods which are its end product, its quality leaves much to be desired. Planning information is "good" when it enables the planner to measure accurately the cost of alternative courses of action (plan variants). This the present Soviet system does not do. The Soviet planners are so busy counting and measuring nails down to a fraction of an inch that they have no time left to compile and evaluate more than one or two variants of the overall plan. They are thus rational about the physics of nails but irrational about the need for nails in any given situation. One hesitates to bring up another dreadful thought, namely, that even the "bad" information is worse than it looks because it is falsified many times over on its way up from the enterprises.

What is to be done? Clearly one must tackle both the existing tools and the type of information currently available to the planners. There are better tools in the world than those used by Gosplan. Input-output analysis, linear programming and electronic computers come to mind. The Soviets under the able leadership of men like Kantorovich, Novozhilov, the late V. S. Nemchinov, Dorodnitsyn and others have actually been moving in this direction for some years. High-speed electronic computers are the common denominator. There is, however, a problem here. First of all, there are at the present time about 30,000 computers in the world, most of them in the United States. It is probable that whatever the Soviets decide to do about their planning, they will have to import a fairly large number of computers from abroad. This presents some delicate problems of

foreign exchange allocations, but the obstacle is not insuperable. But there is more. If the computers are to be applied to the planning machinery in its present shape, the Soviets will need (and this is a Soviet estimate) something like one million computers working day and night at the rate of 30,000 operations per second. Assuming that the world computer population does not crack under the strain (or the Soviet foreign exchange reserve for that matter), there will still be the problem of setting up an integrated computer network and training large numbers of skilled operators and analysts. The net result may well be quicker bad planning. That is because computers have to be fed information, and it really does not make much sense to process more rapidly the present avalanche of trivia.

So the call has gone out for decentralization. Now, there are two kinds of decentralization. The first is administrative, geographical and "formalistic" from the economist's standpoint. It means dividing among many agencies a job that used to be done by one agency—a sort of socialist putting-out system. The nails are still "planned" as of old, but now in many places. Formalistic decentralization is the centralizers' idea of progress; it has the advantage of being readily comprehended by the Party people whose jobs may be shifted but not eliminated. The concept is, therefore, welcome in Party circles. Khrushchev's sovnarkhoz reform was of this species, and still the pushers kept coming.

The second kind of decentralization is something very different. The underlying idea is to reduce the volume of irrelevant information by allowing the periphery to participate in the decision-making process on a broad front. In this case, the central planners reserve for themselves only a limited number of influential coordinating decisions and leave the rest to enterprise managers. Petty tutelage is minimized (though not totally eliminated), and perhaps only 4,000 integrated computers may be needed. Decentralization through the economic emancipation of the enterprise manager involves a surrender of much decision-making power by the center. It is, therefore, a move toward economic liberalism.

Libermanism, more cautious and in many respects more orthodox, tackles the problem from the other side, i.e., from the enterprise end. From the point of view of the history of Soviet economic thought, the significance of Libermanism was not that it proposed something spectacularly new, but that it was singled out for official recognition, discussed widely on a substantive rather than ideological basis, and applied experimentally though in modified form.

At the enterprise end, the problem of waste and inefficiency is one of incentives. The managerial bonus system (as well as worker incentives) concentrated until 1964 on the gross value of output. This led to all kinds of distortions of managerial behavior, including the almost complete stifling of initiative and innovation, sacrifice of quality for quantity, and the dissimulation of productive capacity by directors anxious to make sure that the quantitative indices sent down from above were attainable with the minimum of risk. In the setting of a highly bonus-conscious society (basic salaries and wages being purposely set at low levels), appeals to socialist consciousness and proletarian duty meant little.

The Liberman Solution

The trouble, Liberman thought, was that the major incentives were not only misguided, but buttressed by a multitude of detailed instructions thought up by administrators at the top, on the basis of administrative art rather than economic science.¹ What Liberman did not say was that socialist economic science did not exist. It had been nipped in the bud by Stalin back in 1928. The centrally-spawned targets (which, while they hampered managerial initiative, usually boiled down to one main incentive) included total quantity, product assortment, product destination, delivery dates, supply sources, sticky purchase and sales prices, the enterprise wages fund, number of workers, grades of skill, labor productivity, planned profit or loss, production costs, capital investment, capital saving, new technology, and many more.

The elements of the now celebrated "Liberman Proposal" were as follows. First, the enterprise managers were to be free to determine most of the details of the plan, including labor productivity, number of workers, wages, production costs, capital investments, savings and new technology. "Shadow indices" for these things were to be worked out by the central planners, but they were not to be communicated to the enterprises. This clearly was meant to meet possible objections from the centralizers. The central planners would, however, still hand down enterprise targets for volume of output according to assortment of products, and delivery schedules. "These," Liberman cautioned, "must be drawn up with the maximum consideration for the direct ties between suppliers and consumers."

Second, the managers would be answerable to the central authorities only for their overall performance measured by a single index, profits, or more exactly, the "profitability rate." The profitability rate was to be calculated as a ratio of profits to the total (fixed and working) capital of the enterprise. Absolute profits were to be calculated on goods actually consumed and not, as in the past, on goods delivered (but often unusable). The central planners were to work out a "profitability norm" for various industrial branches and enterprises within those branches. This profitability norm would have to take into account an enterprise's attempt to introduce new goods (lower norm), and would remain in force for a number of years, the idea being to encourage innovation and avoid punishing an enterprise for good performance by raising norms in the wake of high profitability rates. Bonuses would be scaled to the profitability rates, and to that only. To make managers aim high, Liberman worked out a device for rewarding fulfillment rather than overfulfillment of the profitability rate plan submitted by the enterprise. Since profits were to be computed as a percentage of capital, it was in the manager's interest either to increase his absolute profits by using current inputs of labor and raw materials more efficiently, or to pare down his demand for

¹ See Y. Liberman, "The Plan, Profits, and Bonuses," *Pravda*, September 9, 1962; "The Plan, Profits, and Bonuses," *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, November 10, 1962; "Once Again on the Plan, Profits, and Bonuses," *Pravda*, September 20, 1964; "The Plan, Direct Ties, and Profitability," *Pravda*, November 21, 1965.

excess capital. How about managers who tried to increase their profits by inflating the prices of new products? Liberman's answer was that this would be resisted by factory purchasers who needed low prices on the goods they bought so as to make their own profits. In place of the former "formal" (turnover tax) control over industrial prices, there would be control through demand resistance.

All this is quite technical and looks plausible, but what is it trying to achieve and, what is more interesting, would it work? Broadly speaking, what Libermanism is trying to achieve is to make Soviet socialism work better, that is, with less waste motion and inefficiency than hitherto; by releasing grass-roots initiative and resourcefulness, which, it assumes, is still around even after thirty years of Stalinist conformity. It proposes to eliminate much busy work (that is, save the planning principle from being destroyed by its own inner contradictions) and to instill into the executors of the plan some, at least, of the characteristics of the entrepreneur. The end product, it hopes, will be better quality all round, fewer bureaucrats and a minimum of pushers.

Libermanism concentrates on managerial incentives embodied in the profitability rate. In the wide-ranging discussion which followed Liberman's article published in *Pravda* in September 1962, another idea came to the forefront, that of direct contracting between producers and retailers (an idea implicit in Libermanism). The purpose of direct contracting is to cut out the state middleman and thus get rid of the sort of situation that at one time faced the Moscow Likhachev Automobile Plant, which in order to obtain its annual supply of ball bearings from the GPZ factory next door had to furnish 400 pounds of supporting documentation to fourteen planning agencies.

At first glance, it might appear that what Libermanism has done is to substitute one unidimensional target (profit) for another (gross output). This, Liberman argues, is not so, because profit synthesizes many dimensions of managerial behavior. Unfortunately, in the Soviet setting this happens to be untrue. The reason is that Soviet prices—even after the comprehensive reform of 1955—do not even remotely reflect relative resource scarcities. They are not the outcome of seller-buyer bargaining, but simple accounting and control devices used by the central planners to check on plan operation. Industrial and wholesale prices in the Soviet Union are the numerical expressions of leadership ideology, and not too reliable at that. "But we have changed prices many times," pleads Liberman, "and yet we are still not satisfied with them. Why is this?" The answer he gives is politically wise but economically irrelevant: "Because prices are a matter of complete indifference to enterprises." Now if prices were allocating and signaling devices reflecting relative resource scarcities and not transmission belts for administratively determined allocative decisions, they would be of compelling interest to the enterprises. When they are Stalinism, Khrushchevism, or Brezhnev-Kosyginism in Arabic numerals, they are of course "a matter of complete indifference to enterprises" except insofar as they can be manipulated by enterprise accountants to show that what was done was actually what the leadership *via* the central planners' control figures wanted to be done. Economic liberalism is

allocative rationality in the former sense. Libermanism goes less than half way. It uses the vocabulary of rationality (profit), but leaves the substance very much as it was. What, to quote but one instance, is the meaning of the profit rate (expressed as a ratio of profit to capital) when there is no price tag on capital? How is the relative scarcity of land measured, when there is no rent? The Soviet mathematical economists are aware of this problem, but they have been strangely silent throughout the great Liberman debate.

The Experiments

"I think," Professor Liberman wrote in November 1962, "that an experiment in a single district would provide documentation and verification, but accomplish nothing more." An experiment in a couple of districts was what the Soviet leaders ordered in July 1964 with a six months' deadline. From an ideological point of view, the decision was significant if only because it showed that pragmatism on a narrow front took over from the traditional dogmatism of the Party die-hards. The two pilot projects were the Bolshevichka clothing plant in Moscow and the Mayak clothing firm in Gorky. Since clothing manufacture is not a priority activity of the workers' state, nobody (with the exception of the Chinese, who promptly rose to the occasion) could accuse the leadership of ideological deviation.

The Bolshevichka and Mayak experiments were Libermanism modified, combining as they did the profit criterion with direct contracting between producers and retailers. However, profitability in this experiment meant profit earned as a percentage of the total cost of production (*sebestoimost*) and not, as in Liberman's proposal, profit as a percentage of total capital investment. Central controls were retained on the prices of established clothing, but enterprise managers were given much freedom to adjust prices to cover additional costs of technical innovations. The prices of new clothing were then written into the producer-retailer contracts. However, this freedom to make price adjustments to cover additional cost was not extended to the profit markup, with the result that innovational clothing (i.e., that wanted by the consumers, bought by them, and showing up in the sales volume) was not permitted to manifest itself in the enterprises' profitability rate—a key idea of Libermanism. The profit margins on new clothing were fixed by the existing price lists. Result: excellent sales during the six months of the experiment for both enterprises and a decline in their profits, both absolutely and as a rate. In short, what was wanted by the consumers was less "profitable" than what was wanted by the planned indicators of profitability.

Were the profitability criterion to be retained under those circumstances, the managers who produced the wanted goods would be punished by having their bonuses whisked away. The criterion was, in fact, kept during the six months of the Bolshevichka-Mayak experiment, but the problem was noted. In the course of 1965, the system was extended to about four hundred enterprises in the light industry and to a large number of retail stores, restaurants and selected food processing

plants. A somewhat different experiment in the Ukraine involved three machinery and metalworking plants, a number of coal mines and two light industry plants. The lessons learned in the Bolshevichka-Mayak experiment were applied to that involving the four hundred enterprises. The criterion of managerial success was shifted to the fulfillment of the sales plan on condition that the profit plan was also fulfilled. This was not quite what Liberman had in mind and his role in the experiments is unclear. As we shall see, he was later to be vindicated by another shift in official policy (September 1965), which redefined the profitability rate as a ratio of profits to production capital (rather than profits to production cost).

It must be said in favor of the evaluators of the Bolshevichka-Mayak experiment that they saw through the fog of apparent failure (low profits and profitability rates) to the satisfied smile on the face of the consumers. The Soviet state did not collapse in a fit of atomistic anarchy, which, as the dogmatists see it, is the lot of capitalistic market economies—with which, paradoxically, Soviet producers are urged to catch up. The Party did not disintegrate. There was no commitment to the central planners as to assortment and delivery schedules (the commitment was made instead to retail customers directly), no commitment as to profits, costs of production, labor productivity, number of workers, and the total wage bill. That satisfied the rationalists (“revisionists” as the Chinese call them). But there was commitment to the center with regard to profitability plan (profit divided by cost of production), central approval was needed for price adjustments initiated by managers in response to additional costs stemming from quality improvements stipulated in enterprise contracts, and central control over new investments in fixed and working capital was retained. Basic wage and salary scales continued to be established centrally, and adjustments in prices of inputs written into enterprise contracts had to obtain central approval. That made the centralizers happy. In short, applied neo-Libermanism was a political compromise. The managers, of course, were not too pleased since low profits and profitability rates affected their bonuses, tied as these were to the profitability index. Judging by the accelerated turnover of goods produced by both enterprises, customers seemed to have been quite happy about the whole thing.

The September 1965 Plenum and After

In his report to the plenary session of the Party Central Committee of September 27, 1965, Kosygin revealed the Soviet government's intention to extend the neo-Liberman system of management incentives and plan indicators to some branches of industry in 1966 and to all industry in 1967–68.² At the same time, a thorough price reform was to be initiated and introduced gradually in 1967 and 1968. Khrushchev's regional economic councils were abolished and a number of industrial ministries once again set up. Thus, administrative centralization was to be combined with economic decentralization. This was understood by both the administratively-minded centralizers and the economically-oriented rationalizers, two among a number of contending parties in the post-Stalin Soviet state.

² For the Party-state resolutions on management reforms and Kosygin's report, see *Pravda*, September 28, 1965, and October 10, 1965.

The approach to price reform, it must be said, does not augur well for the rationality of the cumbersome Soviet economic machine. Here is what V. Sitnin, chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee's State Price Committee, has to say about it. "In a number of instances, unsubstantiated prices set without taking objective economic criteria into account have been in effect in our economy. This led to a loss of authenticity of many economic calculations and opened the way for subjective decisions." So far so good. But there is analytical trouble ahead. "It is evidently time," Sitnin writes, "to adopt the practice of setting prices for a definite period. On expiration of the specific time during which this or that product is technically progressive, the prices should be automatically lowered."³ This is poor thinking on what prices are all about. It is precisely price which should indicate when this or that product is technically progressive and not the other way round. In short, price flexibility is to come from the planners (on what basis?) and not from the "objective economic criteria" for which Sitnin earlier makes such an eloquent plea. To make matters worse, the guideline for price setting is to be the "average socially necessary expenditure of production," a pre-1870 brew of Marxist vintage. These average socially necessary expenditures of production are "the average level toward which the production of the majority of enterprises in the branch inevitably gravitates." It sounds incredible, but here it is. The Soviet non-mathematical economists have got as far as Ricardo. In charge of a complex, industrialized, modern economy, they continue to ignore the margin of decisions and reason from average levels, average expenditures and inevitable gravitations.

As far as managerial incentives are concerned, the proposed reforms are cautious and rather hesitant, but they do tend in a promising direction. Compared with the present state of things, the number of indices confirmed for enterprises from above is, indeed, reduced. Compared with Liberman's original proposals and even with the Bolshevichka-Mayak experiment, the picture is less liberal. Nine major indices for managerial behavior are still in the hands of the central planners. These include assignments for volume of output sold (replacing the discredited gross output index), basic assortment, group assignments for "the most important items" (e.g., power, fuels, metals, chemicals, building materials, the more important foodstuffs), profit and profitability rates (expressed in the Liberman manner as a ratio of profit to production assets), the enterprise wages fund (Liberman had hoped that this would be a "shadow index"), payments into and appropriations from the budget, the volume of centralized investments and the putting into operation of production facilities and fixed assets, introduction of new technology, and indices of material and technical supply. So, one may ask, where has all the reform gone?

The answer is that progress toward economic rationality in the Soviet Union is measured in inches. Quite frequently the inches point in the wrong—irrational—direction. This time the trend is unmistakably correct in a non-ideological sense.

³ V. Sitnin, "Price is an Important Tool of Economic Management," *Pravda*, November 12, 1965.

The latest reforms boil down to this. Managerial success is to be measured by what appears to be a combined index of profitability and output sold. Managerial bonuses will be tied to this criterion. The size of the incentive fund (a deduction from profits) will depend on the growth of output sales, or on profits and the level of profitability stipulated in the plan. The profitability norms stipulated by the plan will be set for a number of years and overfullfillment of the plan will count for less than the fulfillment of indices stipulated in the plan. This, it is hoped, will induce enterprises to uncover reserves in good time and accept higher plan assignments. The profitability rate is made meaningful by the introduction of a charge on capital (socialist interest), rent payments, or the use of accounting prices. The incentive fund is to be increased according to the share of new types of output and the additional income received by the enterprise from price increments for raising the quality of its products. Direct contractual arrangements are to be made with wholesalers and retail associations rather than directly with individual buyers (this is not original Libermanism). There are a few exceptions, but in general the rule will apply. In a recent gesture of loyalty, Professor Liberman not only concurred, but reversed his previous position. "The establishment of the most rational ties," he wrote, "is not a spontaneous matter, but an extremely important act of long-term planning." And on what principles will that act of long-term planning be based? Administrative art, as in the old days, or inevitable gravitations?

The Open End

What is perhaps most striking about the Soviet economic reforms since 1964 is that they cannot be discussed profitably except in highly technical economic terms. This is new, and it is unusual. Past reforms were mainly administrative and ideological. For the first time since 1920, the Soviets are applying economic remedies to economic ills in a burst of prudence and pragmatism. The scope is still insufficient. The key to the problem is fundamental price reform and, in spite of a new round of tinkering, it does not appear as if the Soviets had yet fathomed the mysteries of rational resource allocation and general equilibrium. The present Soviet leaders still give the impression of being of two minds about the whole thing mainly because price reform means Party reform. They hope that a larger volume of goods will make the changeover less painful, yet the very purpose of the reform is to eliminate waste motion in the process of making more goods. Sheer volume is not a Soviet problem at all. Sooner or later, the "inevitable gravitations" of repressed market forces will make themselves felt more acutely than ever, and when that happens Libermanism will have to plunge into liberalism or die.

Professor Liberman expresses the hope that the central assignments will be treated more as guidelines than as strict and inflexible orders, and that in time the more important among them (e.g., the wages fund and gross output indices for some items) will wither away. This may well be so. It all depends on how those in the political saddle will react to the discomforts of an unwieldy economy.

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

Religion

Further Proof of the Incontrovertible

The desire of Soviet politicians to establish contact with ruling circles in the Catholic and Protestant Churches in the West is demonstrated by the audiences granted by the Pope to Adzhubei and Gromyko and by the presence of representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate at the General Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Delhi and at the Second Vatican Council. The following article by the Rev. D. Konstantinow analyses a sensational document which accuses Patriarch Aleksii and the ruling hierarchy of the Orthodox Church in the USSR of direct connivance with the antireligious policies of the Soviet regime. Revealing as it does the existence of deep resentment among the rank and file of the Orthodox clergy and laity with regard to the policy of the Church's leaders, this document places the representatives of the free churches in the West, who are also seeking contact with the Church in the USSR, in a difficult position, confronting them with a number of problems the solution of which is not simplified by the high ecclesiastical rank of the Church leaders involved.

Toward the end of last year, a document of exceptional significance was delivered to the persons to whom it was addressed in the USSR. By various channels it also reached the West and was published there in its entirety.¹ This document is an open letter, dated November 21, 1965, to the Most Holy Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Aleksii, composed by two parish priests, Father Nikolai Eshlimen, priest at the Church of the Mantle of the Most Holy Mother of God, in the Lyshchikov Street, Moscow, and Father Gleb Yakunin, priest at the Church of the Icon of the Kazan Mother of God, in the town of Dmitrov (Moscow Diocese). At the same time, copies of the letter, together with an Appendix and an accompanying letter (both dated December 13, 1965), were sent to all diocesan bishops in the USSR (to whom the Appendix was specifically addressed). Further, on December 15, the authors of the open letter, as Soviet citizens, despatched a "Declaration" to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, N. V. Podgorny, and similar declarations to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, A. P. Kosygin, and the Procurator General, R. A. Rudenko, containing a legally-grounded protest against illegal actions on the part of officials of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The letter itself is of such a nature that it is impossible to regard it as a falsification or as an act of provocation. A number of passages contain information of a semi-secret nature, obviously derived from the practical life of the Church and confirming what the secular authorities had desperately tried to conceal in an attempt to prove the opposite to Western public opinion. This information is therefore often specific in character and contains many small details testifying to its authenticity. These details also prove that the authors of the document, whoever they may be, possess considerable experience of church life.

¹ First published in Russian in *Russkaya zhizn*, San Francisco, Calif., April 16-30, 1966. Translation into other languages was supposed to be already in progress.

Here it is pertinent to say a word or two about the authorship of the letter. So far, there are no grounds for doubting that it was written by the two priests whose signature it bears—nor is this really of much importance, for the important thing is that the document provides vivid and convincing evidence of a fairly strong opposition to the policies of the Moscow Patriarchate within the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR. Once their authenticity is beyond doubt, such documents must be treated as having general, not to say historical, significance. It may be added, however, that we have no knowledge of the generation to which the two priests belong—whether they belong to the older, perhaps oldest, generation and so are to be associated with the martyrs who suffered under Stalin, or are young priests trained in the theological seminaries and academies established by the Moscow Patriarchate. In any case, they are honest, uncompromising servants of the Church who sacrificed themselves knowingly in order to secure some kind of influence upon the present situation of the Church in the USSR. The wrath of both secular and ecclesiastical authority will clearly descend upon them, if it has not done so already.

In the interests of objectivity, it should also be pointed out that the very possibility of despatching documents of this kind is connected with the general emancipative tendency which is growing throughout the country. There is a hidden link, for example, between the open letter of Fathers Eshlimen and Yakunin and the trials of Sinyavsky and Daniel and the expulsion of Tarsis from the Soviet Union.

The exceptional importance of the open letter lies in the following facts: (1) it completely confirms what has been written about the situation of the Church in the USSR by the Russian press abroad and by those sections of the foreign press which keep track of the state of religion in the Soviet Union;² (2) it supplements our information with fresh details and also with important facts hitherto unknown in the West; and (3) it completely dispels any illusions hitherto entertained in the West about the nature of the Moscow Patriarchate as a perfectly normal ecclesiastical authority. It is important to note that the two authors of the letter, priests under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, not only attack the latter body but even in part express their disapproval of the course embarked upon by the present Patriarch's predecessor, Sergii, insofar as this led to an unjustifiable sacrifice of the Church's principles and interests to those of the state. The two priests do not, however, necessarily refuse to recognize the justifiability of this course in other respects, particularly the legalization of the Church's position and establishment of normal relations between it and the state.

The letter's confirmation of what has been written by the more realistically-minded among Western and émigré Russian observers is, of course, of great importance. The postulates thus confirmed include the following:

² Of the large quantity of literature that has been published in the West on the subject, mention may be made of M. S. Handler's contribution to *The New York Times* (March 7, 1966) and those by the present writer (*Religious Persecution in the USSR*, published by SBONR, London, Ont., 1965, and "The Results of Soviet Persecution of the Orthodox Church," *Bulletin*, 1965, No. 5), as being most closely related in subject to the documents here under consideration.

the Orthodox Church in the USSR may be fairly described as being in a state of complete captivity, the Moscow Patriarchate being entirely subordinated to governmental agencies;

the Church in the USSR is not a monolithic body, but contains within its ranks much opposition to the ecclesiastical policy of the Moscow Patriarchate: as the letter (end of section two) puts it, "in the Russian Church there are thousands of men 'who have not bowed the knee to Baal'";

the Church enjoys widespread support among the people;

religion is being persecuted, primarily by the forcible closure of many churches and other places of worship and monasteries (statistics contained in the letter confirm data published in the West concerning the closure of ten thousand churches and of dozens of monasteries);

theological training institutions (seminaries) have been forcibly closed;

the Church's activities are confined to what is necessary for the holding of services, parish priests being deprived of the right to supervise financial and administrative matters and severely limited in the exercise of their parochial duties outside the church's walls;

children are forbidden any part in church services and in some cases are not admitted to Communion;

the performance of rites such as baptism, marriage and burial is severely limited and has to be registered, so that the secular authorities are provided with a further means of exercising pressure on those concerned;

believers are openly persecuted, being discredited in the press and other propaganda media and subjected to "administrative" and other types of pressure;

the year 1957 is confirmed as marking the beginning of this campaign.

As for supplementary information in the letter, this, as stated, comprises completely new facts on the one hand and further details or corrections to information already available on the other. In fact, however, the two categories of information are so closely intertwined that they cannot be treated separately, but must be dealt with concurrently, with indications of their respective importance with regard to existing data. The dependence of the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR—episcopacy, clergy and believers—on the state and the tragic complexity of this relationship is, of course, nothing new, but a passage in the introduction to the letter introduces a new element into our picture of the Moscow Patriarchate's policy. Quoting a phrase used twenty-one years before by Patriarch Aleksii, the authors of the letter declare:

The Russian Church is seriously and dangerously ill, and its sickness is entirely due to the fact that the ecclesiastical administration has failed to fulfill its duty by retreating beyond the line "which must not be crossed."

If the Church in the USSR is described as "dangerously ill" and this sickness is ascribed to the policy of the "ecclesiastical administration" by voices coming from within this Church, by men who are well acquainted with the state of affairs, these voices would appear to deserve credence.

The letter offers unmistakable indications of the present position and function of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, a state body which, instead of merely regulating the relations between Church and state, has for some years now been holding the Moscow Patriarchate in a state of subordination to itself and has been governing it unofficially and illegally. Some characteristic traits of this relationship and how it works in practice are provided by the letter (introduction to section one):

The ecclesiastical administration's especial guilt lies in the fact that it has started to submit to unofficial oral instructions which, in contravention of published Soviet legislation, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church chose as its means for its systematic and destructive intervention in the life of the Church. Orders by telephone, oral instructions, unofficial agreements that are nowhere recorded—this is the atmosphere of unhealthy secrecy which cloaks as in a fog the relations of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church.

It was already known that the secular authorities try to intimidate and to neutralize believers in order to curb the Church's influence, and that for this purpose the registration of all desirous of certain ecclesiastical rites—baptism, marriage, burial—was made compulsory. What to us is new, is the revelation that such registrations were instituted by Patriarch Aleksii himself, in a circular numbered 1917 and dated December 22, 1964. In the relevant passage of the letter (section one, paragraph one), we are told:

The fact is that in recent years an "arrangement" has been set up in the overwhelming majority of parishes whereby the sacrament of baptism is performed only after preliminary and unavoidable registration. Everyone desirous of receiving the [sacrament of] Holy Baptism or of baptizing his children is obliged to submit his passport beforehand to a representative of the church council, who registers it (or the birth certificate) according to a form laid down. In addition, at the christening of children the presence of both parents is absolutely obligatory. Other rites—those of Marriage, the Extreme Unction, Communion administered at home, the Burial of the Dead—are also subject to the same illegal registration.

The administration of the Moscow Patriarchate is aware that the registers of christenings and other church sacraments [*sreb*] are regularly inspected by the local authorities and that until recently were used by the enemies of religion for the gross baiting of those christened, parents who had christened their children, newly-married couples, etc. They were "worked on" at their places of employment or study, were subjected to "administrative measures," made the subject of caricatures on a level with drunkards, debauchees and idlers, their names were constantly associated with uncomplimentary commentaries in the press, etc.

At present, the enemies of religion are continuing to make use records of ecclesiastical sacraments received by the local authorities from the church council in order to pursue the ideological fight with the Church and illegally intrude into the personal religious life of citizens.

A particularly interesting point, to some extent already familiar, is that no instructions conflicting with existing laws are confirmed by the civil authorities in writing. The letter's comment that the practice of registering sacraments

undermines the people's confidence in the Church acquires particular significance in this connection, since neither party has any proof that such-and-such a measure is being undertaken on orders from the secular authorities.

Confirming our information on the forcible closure of churches, monasteries and places of theological instruction, the letter adds that

A flood of complaints and statements signed by thousands of Orthodox [believers] poured into [the offices of] diocesan bishops and the Administration of the Moscow Patriarchate. Diocesan offices during these days were crowded with hundreds of petitioners. Representatives of stricken parishes and monasteries traveled thousands of kilometers to Moscow to seek the protection and patronage of the Most Holy Patriarch.

Alas, their hopes were vain!

These spokesmen for the Church's misery were received in the diocesan offices with polite indifference and cold heartlessness like tiresome applicants.

Although they had an opportunity to render effective aid, most of the bishops of the Russian Church did not find the courage to come to the defense of their flock.

The reaction of the episcopacy is understandable though hardly to be condoned. Not only, however, were some bishops entirely passive; others actually assisted the secular authorities. On the other hand, the letter tells us that some bishops protested against the closures, giving as an example Archbishop Yermogen of Kaluga, in whose diocese no churches at all were closed. The letter states unequivocally that such cases show how the bishops were supplied by Soviet legislation with the means for action, provided they had the courage to use them.

It was already fairly well known that the administration of the sacraments in private homes and at cemeteries was virtually forbidden. The letter tells us that this virtual ban has been in force for five years, i.e., since 1961. In addition, we learn that when the clergy of the Moscow Diocese was being re-registered as usual in 1961-62 its members were asked to sign a secret order of the secular authorities according to which the administration of sacraments in private homes and the holding of the office for the dead in cemeteries were conditional upon the permission of the local authorities. Such permission is virtually never given.

The letter confirms the suspicion that ordinations have to be previously approved by the secular authorities. This is a violation of both civil and ecclesiastical law. In paragraph 5 of section one of the letter, we read:

. . . in recent years, the practice has become established in the Russian Church whereby not a single consecration as bishop, priest or deacon takes place without the inevitable previous sanction of officials of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. Employing the same well-tried methods of behind-the-scenes dictatorship, officials of the Council do everything possible to hinder the consecration of persons whom the Council considers a potential force capable in the future of resisting the illegal acts of the atheists designed to destroy Holy Church. Guided by this principle, officials of the Council carry out a tendentious screening of those graduating from theological training establishments, hypocritically pretending concern for the welfare of the Church; they hinder the ordination of

worthy priests who have no theological education, they refuse to permit persons who have received a higher lay education to devote their energies to the service of Holy Church, etc.

In addition, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church promotes the penetration into the clergy's ranks and the further professional advancement of persons who are morally unstable, of little faith and in some cases completely without principles, capable of serving an evil cause—the demoralization of Holy Church—and at a suitable moment of abandoning Christ completely.

This provides further evidence that the present state of affairs is the result of connivance by the Moscow Patriarchate.

In the conclusion to the first section, the authors of the letter write:

When summing up everything that has been set forth, the following must be said: the illegal registration of baptisms, which puts the priests of the Russian Church in the position of denunciators of those who have entrusted themselves to the patronage of Mother Church, the closure on a mass scale of churches, monasteries and theological schools, the virtual cessation of [the administration of] sacraments in private homes and of requiems at cemeteries, the anti-Gospel, heartless and illegal practice of forcibly removing children from the Church, finally, the disastrous interference of the atheists in the appointment of the clergy—these are the bitter fruits and the unassailable evidence of the unconditional subordination of the Moscow Patriarchate to the unofficial verbal dictates of atheist officials.

The second section of the letter is concerned with the reform of parish organization more or less forced upon the Church and adopted at the assembly of bishops convened in 1961. This reform conflicts not only with the usual parochial practice but also with the decisions of the Council of 1945 on the administration of the Russian Orthodox Church. What the authors of the letter have to say on this subject contains almost nothing new; moreover, certain details of their conclusions are somewhat debatable with regard to ecclesiastical practice, particularly in the Western world, since here opinions in ecclesiastical circles are divided. The important point is that the reform represents a typical attempt by the secular authorities to undermine the position of the Church, limit the powers of parish clergy and disorganize parish life. Moreover, the attack is based on the materialist view that the Church's economy is the basis of everything.³ This is why the reform deprives the parish priest of all administrative and economic functions.

For us, the significance of what the letter has to tell us on this subject is that the reform gave freedom of action to undesirable elements in the parishes which previously had not been able to act openly, and that the executive committees of the church councils, now independent of the parish priest, fell into the hands of the local secular authorities and officials of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, who did with them what they wanted.

³ See the present writer's contribution on the parish reform to *Russko-Amerikansky Pravoslavny Vestnik*, New York, 1962, No. 4, and that by A. Bogolepov on the legal position of the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR to *Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov v SSSR: Sbornik* (The Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR: A Symposium), Munich, 1962.

The authors of the letter remind the Patriarch that at the assembly of bishops in 1961 he justified the removal of financial and other administrative matters from the hands of the parish priest with a reference to the passage in the Acts of the Apostles (vi, 6—8) about the appointment of “seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom” to attend to “daily ministration” and to “serve tables.” The writers are canonically perfectly right when they maintain (section two) that the appointment of the seven “deacons”

. . . not only gives no grounds for “releasing” a pastor from the control of the economic and administrative activities of his parish but, on the contrary, undeniably testifies to the fact that the subordination of *all* spheres of church life to the hierarchical principle is the true Apostolic Tradition.

The authors ask, understandably, why the highest ecclesiastical authority in the land has been transformed into an obedient tool in the hands of atheist officials and why the clergy is keeping silent about this lawless state of affairs. Their answer, while containing nothing essentially new, nevertheless helps us to get a clearer picture:

. . . at the present time there are a number of bishops and priests in the Russian Church who are deliberately promoting lawlessness. They are the men who won for themselves inglorious fame by their assiduous closure of churches, who have more respect for any instruction from the local representative [of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church] than for the Gospel and the Church’s canons, who bar children from Holy Communion, desecrate everything that is holy, sell their brothers and, having altogether lost the fear of God, assist the enemies of religion in their ambition to destroy Holy Church . . .

. . . In the Russian Church there is a whole group of bishops and priests at present active who under a cloak of piety are deliberately and actively distorting the spirit of Russian Orthodoxy. These people have conceived the evil design of corrupting the Russian Church—implanting in it a spirit of lukewarmness, a spirit of servility and pharisaism, the noxious spirit of “this world,” and they would like to transform the highest ecclesiastical authority into a den of officialdom, a kind of “ministry for the affairs of the Orthodox denomination,” authorized to restrain and regulate the religious emotions of believing citizens.

The picture is further clarified by the following passage:

A second not inconsiderable danger lies in the fact that the overwhelming majority of bishops and priests, even those who are extremely dissatisfied with the present situation of the Russian Church, remain silent and by their terrible silence help to aggravate this situation. Here we mean, not those whose silence comes from fear or despair—these motives are themselves so reprehensible that they require no special censure—but those bishops and priests who try to justify their silence by “considerations of a higher order.”

One is impressed by the authors’ reforming zeal and by the scope of their criticism, from which it is clear that they are men of much more than average culture, capable of independent thought and conscious of what they write.

The twentieth century—a tragic century of world wars and great social upheavals, a century of rapid scientific development and ever-increasing technical might, a

century of great discoveries and no less great errors—has confronted Holy Church with the spiritual need for a new creative reformation of Christian teaching [*Uchitel'stva*]. At the present day, the necessity of such a reformation is acutely felt by the whole of Christendom. The most convincing evidence of this is provided by the Second Vatican Council of the Catholic Church and the active preparations by World Orthodoxy for the [Pan-Orthodox] Ecumenical Council. There is no doubt that the Russian Church has a special calling to [serve] the great ecumenical cause of the new Christian Rebirth.

The third section of the letter consists of an historical outline of the development of Russian Orthodoxy in connection with the development of general Russian culture. Here, the authors protest vigorously against the ecclesiastical reform of Peter I and the practices of the Russian state church of the subsequent synodal period, i.e., against the reduction of the highest ecclesiastical authority to the status of a governmental department. Reminding the reader that the best representatives of the Church and also many representatives of secular culture in their time protested against the practices of the state church, the authors warn against the repetition of such practices. Much erudition is displayed in the handling of this question. The authors state unambiguously that the leaders of the Moscow Patriarchate, beginning with Metropolitan Sergii (Stragorodsky)'s period of office as Deputy to the Patriarch have gradually revived "synodal" practices in the Russian Orthodox Church and, moreover, revived them in a much more oppressive form, since the ecclesiastical administration, then under the control of a state official who was a Christian, is now controlled by officials who are atheists.

What, it will be asked, do the authors of the letter recommend the Patriarch to do? The course of action they propose may be reduced to the following: first, to summon a new Council of the Russian Church, which should have a broad representative basis and complete freedom in the conduct of its proceedings; and second, to appeal to the secular authorities to regularize the relations between Church and state and to stop the illegal interference in ecclesiastical affairs by various secular agencies, including the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. The demands which according to the authors of the letter should be addressed to the secular authorities list all the illegal actions and activities pursued by the dictatorship.

The authors also declare that the Russian Orthodox Church is growing from day to day and that the demand is also growing for an immediate consideration of the existing situation. This fits in with what we already know about the movement of religious opposition which began several years ago. Of particular interest in this connection is the information conveyed in the Appendix to the letter that in the summer of 1965 eight bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church, headed by Archbishop Yermogen of Kaluga, submitted to Patriarch Aleksii a statement criticizing the decisions of the Bishops' Assembly of 1961. According to the Appendix, the reaction to this criticism was that the Archbishop was summoned to the Holy Synod, which on the Patriarch's instructions pointed out to him the illegality of his conduct. When the Synod attempted to persuade him to withdraw his signature from the statement, the Archbishop refused and

assumed entire responsibility for it. In November, the Patriarch, acting under pressure from officials of the Council, who adopted as pretext complaints submitted by the chairman of the Kaluga Oblast Executive Committee, conveyed a wish to the Archbishop that the latter should ask for "indefinite leave," to which the Archbishop responded with a request to be transferred to another diocese. The immediate reaction of the Synod was to release Archbishop Yermogen from his diocesan functions and instruct him to take up residence in the monastery at Zhirovitsy.

Much of what is contained in the letter is repeated in the declaration sent by the authors to Podgorny, Kosygin and Rudenko. This contains a protest against violations by the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church of Soviet legislation concerning religious denominations, and devotes especial attention to the registration of clergy, which has become illegal insofar as it no longer implies mere acknowledgment but also *approval* of clerical appointments by the secular authorities, so that members of the clergy can actually be deprived of their "registration," a practice condemned by the authors of the letter together with interference by the secular authorities in the performance of ordinations. Disapproval is expressed of the discrimination against religious-minded persons by insisting on the registration of baptism, marriages, funerals, etc.

In conclusion, it may be said that the letter is a document of exceptional importance for a detailed understanding of what is going on in religious life in the USSR. The appearance of the letter is, perhaps, an indication that the opposition that is growing within the Russian Orthodox Church has attained a degree of organization and strength enabling its representatives to come out into the open without fearing the consequences. The authors conclude their letter with a brief quotation from the Song of Solomon:

"Many waters cannot quench love, neither can the floods drown it" (Cant. 8:7). The movement for the summoning of a new All-Russian Ecclesiastical Council that shall really show the bright face of the Russian Church has begun and, with God's grace, will not cease until this Council has been called.

Rev. Dimitry Konstantinow

Party Affairs

The Party Oligarchy After the Twenty-Third Congress

The Twenty-Third Party Congress and the subsequent plenary session of the newly-elected Party Central Committee saw the formal establishment in office of the incumbents of the top political posts in the USSR.¹ The new 25-man oligarchy under Secretary General Brezhnev, comprising the Politburo members and candidate members, the Central Committee secretaries, and Central Auditing

¹ At the Congress, 195 members were elected to the Central Committee (as compared with 175 at the Twenty-Second Congress) and 165 (155) candidate members, as well as 79 (65) members of the Central Auditing Commission.

Commission Chairman Sizov, was officially empowered to decide the fates of 230,000,000 Soviet citizens.

It cannot be said that the Congress elected the top Party organs in the true sense of the word. As always, the members of the latter were selected from persons already holding prominent positions in Party, state and other bodies, who were put up as candidates by the outgoing Presidium (renamed Politburo) to be formally voted into office at the Congress.

The Central Committee is generally elected so that the top Party organs, the state legislative and executive agencies, and Soviet society, comprising the "public" (*obshchestvennye*) organizations (e.g., the trade unions), the scientific and cultural community, and the workers and peasants,² are represented in a given proportion. The recent Congress was no exception in this respect. Of the 195 full members of the new Central Committee, 164, or 84 percent, are deputies of the Supreme Soviet, the country's legislative body, while 184 (94.3 percent) hold high posts in the Party, state administration, "public" organizations or the world of learning.

Selection of the Party élite starts with the election of delegates to the Party Congress, whose composition is a mirror of the Party itself. Let us now examine the composition of the body of delegates at the Twenty-Third Congress and the changes made in the Party leadership at the latter.

First of all, there were more delegates at the Twenty-Third than at the Twenty-Second Congress in 1961, a reflection of an increase in the number of Party members and candidate members from 9,700,000³ to 12,400,000⁴ during the interim period. The proportion of delegates with a pre-Revolutionary Party record sank to a new low of 0.3 percent (as compared with 37.8 percent at the Fifteenth Congress in 1927, 26.9 percent at the Sixteenth Congress in 1930, and 1.5 percent at the Twentieth Congress in 1956). This means that the Old Bolsheviks have virtually bowed out of the Soviet political arena. At the same time, the overall educational level of the delegates has shown a considerable upswing. No less than 55.5 percent of those at the recent Congress had a higher education, as against a mere 10 percent at the Sixteenth Congress; 806, or 16.3 percent, had a higher Party-political education, 81 were academicians (compared with 38 at the Twenty-Second Congress), and 260, or 5.2 percent, were Doctors or Candidates of Sciences (compared with only 139 at the Twenty-Second Congress).

The professional composition of the body of delegates, on the other hand, has been relatively stable. Party officials (and by this we mean full-time Party officials) have invariably accounted for a considerable percentage of delegates—58.2 percent at the Fifteenth, 53 percent at the Sixteenth, and 40 percent at the Seventeenth Congress (1934). The proportion of Party officials remained at about this level until the Twenty-Second Congress, when it dropped to 24 percent.

² It should be remembered that the state farm workers also come under the general heading of "workers" or "wage-earners," the term "peasants" referring more to the collective farm workers.

³ *XXII съезд Коммунистической партии Советского Союза, 17–31 октября 1961 года: Стенографический отчет* (The Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, October 17–31, 1961: Stenographic Report), Moscow, 1962, pp. 356–60.

⁴ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 15, p. 4.

This was evidently a consequence of an attempt on the part of Khrushchev, who had set himself up as a "people's tribune," to turn the Congress into a "congress of all the people" by giving the lower Party echelons greater representation. Indeed, V. Titov, Chairman of the Congress Mandate Commission, stated:

The professional composition of the body of Congress delegates reflects the principle written into the drafts of the Program and Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the effect that the Communist Party is the party of all the people.⁵

At the Twenty-Third Congress, the percentage of Party officials was virtually the same, namely 24.3, the actual figure being 1,204 out of the 4,620 delegates with a full vote. (Secretaries of Party organizations at raion level and above accounted for 744, or 15 percent, of the delegates.) However, the Party officials account for 184, or 42 percent, of the 439 members and candidate members of the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission, and for 44 percent of the 195 Central Committee members proper.

These figures are indicative of the significance attached to the Party *apparatus* by the Party leadership. In general, persons are included in the top Party organs on the basis of the importance of their current position and in accordance with a certain "distribution key," as is clear from the following breakdown of the 439 members and candidate members of the two bodies:

**Distribution of Members and Candidate Members of Party Central Committee
and Members of Central Auditing Commission According to Professional Category**

Professional Category	Absolute Number	Percentage of Total	Professional Category	Absolute Number	Percentage of Total
Party <i>apparatchiki</i>	184	42.1	Trade Union Officials	11	2.5
State <i>apparatchiki</i>	141	32.1	Economic Managers	7	1.6
Members of Armed Forces	36	8.2	Scientists and Educators	12	2.7
Diplomats	23	5.2	Cultural Workers	5	1.1
Workers and Collective Farmers	14	3.2	Unknown	6	1.3

In other words, the vast Soviet state apparatus, including the armed forces and the diplomatic service, is represented by only 45.5 percent of the members and candidate members of the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission—little more than the Party apparatus with 42.1 percent. The economy has a representation of only 7.3 percent (in the form of the workers and collective farmers, the trade union officials and the economic managers). This circumstance, remarkable in a country which ranks as the world's second largest industrial power, shows that Soviet industrial policy will continue to be decided by the Party *apparatchiki*, and not by the economic managers. Finally, we have the extremely low figure of 3.8 percent for the scientific, cultural and educational sector.

There is also a noticeable discrepancy between the proportion of Party members in various professional categories and their representation in the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission. Only 9.1 percent of all Party

⁵ XXIII Sessd . . . , p. 426.

members are employed in the state and Party apparatuses, which nevertheless have a representation of 74.2 percent. On the other hand, 16.5 percent of all Party members work in the fields of science, culture and education, which, as we have seen, have a representation of a mere 3.8 percent.

Of the 175 members of the Central Committee elected at the Twenty-Second Congress 76, or 43.2 percent, had not been in the old Central Committee or Central Auditing Commission. This was due partly to the policy of "renewing the cadres," partly to the removal of the "anti-Party group" including Malenkov and Molotov. At the time, the overwhelming majority of Western observers attributed this reshuffle to a desire on the part of Khrushchev to surround himself with loyal supporters. If this speculation had been correct, one would expect that at the recent Congress, by which time Khrushchev had long become a political corpse, his protégés would have been run out of office as well. However, this did not happen on any large scale. In fact, only 26 of the 195 members of the new Central Committee are newcomers—a mere 13.5 percent as against 43.2 percent at the previous Congress. Of course, as First Secretary of the Central Committee, Khrushchev did have some influence on who was to be elected, but not nearly as much as was commonly thought at the time. Looking back, we can say quite definitely that the Central Committee apparatus has a decisive say in the selection and appointment of cadres thanks to the *nomenklatura* system,⁶ which reduces the opportunities for selection on the basis of personal ties. That Khrushchev's ouster has had little or no effect on the composition of the new Central Committee becomes even clearer when we examine the fates of the 24 full members not reelected in this capacity. Thus, only 13, including Khrushchev himself and Satyukov, were removed because they no longer held any position sufficiently important to warrant membership. Nine, including Ilichev and Mukhitdinov, were not reelected because they were engaged in work incompatible with membership, Rozenkov was reelected a candidate member of the Central Committee and Sizov a member of the Central Auditing Commission.

The Party as a whole, and not only its leading organs, is becoming less and less of a true "workers'" party, as the following figures show (a slight adjustment, however, should be made for the fact that the 1930 percentages of wage-earners and collective farm workers include persons who, while once belonging to these categories, had risen to leading positions):

Social Composition of Soviet Communist Party, 1930 and 1966
(Percentage of Total Number of Members and Candidate Members)

	Wage-Earners	Collective Farm Workers	Salary-Earners
1930	61.4	21.7	16.9
1966	37.8	16.2	46.0

SOURCES: *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Large Soviet Encyclopedia), 1st ed, Vol XI, Moscow, 1930, col. 533, *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No 13, p. 14.

⁶ See K. A. Krylov, "Party Protection and Privileged Status in Soviet Society," *Bulletin*, Munich, 1966, No. 3.

Although the Party leaders profess to be anxious that the Party should contain a high percentage of workers (Brezhnev said at the Twenty-Third Congress that "the working class must continue to occupy a leading position in the social composition of the Party"), Party admission figures tell a different story. Thus, whereas the proportion of new members belonging to the working class was 70 percent in 1927, 73.4 percent in 1928 and 81.2 percent in 1929, at the Congress Brezhnev quoted a figure of 47.6 percent for the period 1961–66.⁷ At the Congress, only 23 percent of the delegates were wage-earners and 11.2 percent collective farm workers.

The Party leaders themselves are not happy about this state of affairs. Kapitonov, Chairman of the Congress Mandate Commission, tried to divert attention from the preponderance of "bureaucrats" at the Congress by proclaiming that "1,141 workers were elected to the Congress, which is 72.4 percent of the total number of delegates working in industry."⁸ It would have been more honest of Kapitonov to base his calculation on the total number of delegates instead of merely on those "working in industry" (as if there were no delegates working in other fields); as we have seen, in fact only 23 percent of the delegates were workers.

The percentage of workers decreases sharply toward the top of the Party hierarchy. In the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission it is only 3.2, while not a single member of the present 25-man Party leadership is a worker, or has even recently been one, all being *apparatchiki* pure and simple. True, by social origin 11 members are workers, 11 peasants and only 3 salary-earners, but this is no criterion, since most Soviet citizens today began their working lives in one of the two former categories.

The Party leadership, it should be added, constitutes a body of highly-experienced and highly-qualified Party and state *apparatchiki* with an average of 24 years' service at oblast committee level and above. Kulakov has the shortest record, 11 years, and Suslov the longest, 35 years. Eighteen are Party, six state and one trade union *apparatchiki*. Thus, there is no dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR, as Lenin envisaged, but rather a dictatorship of the bureaucrats, a dictatorship of the Party apparatus—even within the Party itself.

Also of interest is the fact that all the present Party leaders have a higher education, as compared with 90.5 percent of their predecessors. Fifteen received a higher education in technical disciplines, seven in the humanities, such as history, philosophy and the theory of education, and three in agriculture. There is no doubt that most members also have a higher Party-political education.

Although the Party leadership has been steadily losing its old revolutionaries year by year, the overwhelming majority of its members are *apparatchiki* of the Stalinist school. Thus, although the new leadership only has one member—the newcomer Pelše—with a pre-Revolutionary Party record (the old one had two),

⁷ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 13, p. 14.

⁸ *Pravda*, April 1, 1966.

and only two who became members during the Revolution (Suslov and Ponomarev), twenty of its members have a pre-1941 record, while the remaining two, Masharov and Shcherbitsky, joined the Party during the war.

The 25-man leadership contains 15 Russians, 4 Ukrainians, 2 Belorussians, a Latvian, a Georgian, a Kazakh and an Uzbek. The average age of its members is 55 (that of the previous leaders was 57). The old leadership had 4 members under 50, the present one has 6.

Of the 11 Central Committee secretaries, 4 (Secretary General Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Suslov and Shelepin) are full members of the Politburo, and two (Demichev and Ustinov) candidate members. Kirilenko is apparently still responsible for exercising control over the RSFSR's top Party organs, a function which he in fact exercised as a First Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee's now dissolved RSFSR Bureau. Suslov remains the Party's behind-the-scenes ideological boss, and at the age of 65 is even less a candidate for the leadership than before. Shelepin, however, who at the comparatively young age of 48 has already acquired considerable experience of leadership as head of the Komsomol and later of the security and "people's control" organs, has excellent prospects of rising to the pinnacle of Party and state power.

Since the free world has more contact with Soviet diplomats than with any other sector of the Soviet élite, it might be as well to dwell on their representation in the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission. The diplomats are the fourth largest group in these two bodies, accounting for 23, or 5.2 percent, of their members and candidate members. Western observers, on the other hand, are in the habit of regarding the appointment of a top Party or state official to an ambassadorial post as a demotion, as a form of exile.

Of the diplomats elected to the top Party organs at the recent Congress, 34.7 percent entered the diplomatic service from the Party apparatus, 30 percent from the state apparatus, 26.2 percent directly from higher diplomatic training institutions, 4.4 percent from the trade union apparatus and another 4.4 percent from the educational field. The Party makes extensive use of the diplomatic service for exercising control over foreign Communist parties, particularly those of the Soviet-bloc countries. As we see from the following list, the Soviet ambassadors to the latter countries are also representatives of the highest body in the world Communist movement, namely the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party:

**Soviet Ambassadors Who Are Also Members or Candidate Members
of Party Central Committee or Central Auditing Commission**

Abrasimov.....	Eastern Germany	Pegov	Algeria
Aristov.....	Poland	Puzanov	Yugoslavia
Basov	Rumania	Ryzhov	Italy
Benediktov	India	Shcherbakov	North Vietnam
Chervonenko	Czechoslovakia	Smirnovsky	Great Britain
Dobrynin	USA	Solovov.....	Mongolia
Gorchakov	North Korea	Titov	Hungary
Lapin	China	Zorin.....	France
Organov	Bulgaria		

Thus, of the 17 countries listed, 9 are Soviet-bloc countries, two are "brotherly" countries with which the USSR is in a state of conflict, namely China and Yugoslavia, another two are countries in which the USSR is striving to gain more influence, i. e., India and Algeria, while the remaining four are major world powers (the USA, Great Britain, France and Italy).

Summing up, we can say the following. Firstly, supreme power in the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet state is concentrated in the hands of a 25-man oligarchy of Party *apparatchiki*. Secondly, no substantial changes can be expected in the Party leadership in the immediate future. Thirdly, the military men and the diplomats have a strong position in the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission, being the third and fourth largest groupings respectively after the Party and state *apparatchiki*. Fourthly, the technocrats predominate in the top Party echelons; fifteen members of the leadership have a higher technical education, as we have seen, while even of the diplomats in the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission 34.7 percent have a higher technical and 13.7 percent a higher agricultural education. Finally, the recent top-level Party elections appear to presage an intensification of the Party dictatorship.

A. Lebed

The Communist Bloc

Marxism-Leninism and East-West Economic Competition

One of the basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist teaching in the sphere of political economy is that capitalism, owing to the insoluble conflict inherent in its production relations, is doomed and will inevitably be supplanted by "socialism" and Communism. The first section of the Party Program adopted by the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961 accordingly bears the title "The Historical Inevitability of the Transition from Capitalism to Socialism." Capitalism is described as "the last system of exploitation," which after having "gigantically developed productive forces" became "the greatest hindrance to social progress." We read further:

The growing conflict between productive forces and production relations is forcibly confronting mankind with the task of tearing off the rotten husk of capitalism, unfettering the powerful productive forces which man has created and using them for the good of society as a whole.¹

It is the contention of Marxists that only they are capable of saving the world from capitalist confusion. The USSR is to prove the validity of this contention, and the Party Program accordingly promises to

¹ *Pravda*, November 2, 1961.

...increase the volume of industrial production by approximately two-and-a-half times within the next ten years, thus exceeding the level of industrial production in the USA, and by at least six times within 20 years, thus leaving the present total volume of US industrial production far behind.²

A resolution also adopted by the Twenty-Second Congress was more specific:

Fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan [1959–65] will raise the economy of the Soviet Union to such a level that only a short time will be subsequently needed to...also overtake the USA as regards production per head of population. This will mean the world-historical victory of socialism over capitalism.³

Since 1961, however, the Soviets have become wary of making such optimistic forecasts, and an examination of some pertinent statistics shows why. First of all, let us consider Soviet and US industrial growth rates since 1961:

US and Soviet Industrial Growth Rates, 1962–70
(Percentages)

	USA	USSR
1962	7.9	9.5
1963	4.6	8.1
1964	6.1	7.1
1965	8.0	8.5
1966	—	6.7*
1966–70	—	50.0*

* Planned increase.

SOURCES. Supplement to *Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus*, East Berlin, 1965, No 11, p. 1, *Népszabadság*, Budapest, January 62, 1963, and March 9, 1966, *Pravda*, March 22 and December 8, 1965, and April 6, 1966

On the basis of Khrushchev's assertion before the Twenty-Second Congress that Soviet industrial production was running to about 60 percent of the US level,⁴ we arrive at the following table:

US and Soviet Industrial Production, 1961–70
(In Percentages of US Industrial Production in 1961)

	USA	USSR
1961	100.0	60.0
1962	107.9	65.7
1963	112.9	71.0
1964	119.8	76.0
1965	129.4	82.5
1966	138.1*	88.0**
1970	179.0*	123.8**

* Estimated figure.

** Planned figure.

The estimates for US industrial production in 1966 and 1970 are based on an assumed annual rate of increase of 6.7 percent, which was the average for the period 1962–65. Another point to be mentioned is that although the Soviet Five-Year Plan calls for an overall increase of 50 percent in industrial production by 1970, the planned increase for 1966 is only 6.7 percent, i.e., the same as the US average for 1962–65; if this rate remains constant, the overall increase by 1970 will be a mere 38.3 percent, and Soviet industrial production will still be only

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, November 1, 1961.

⁴ *Ibid.*, October 18, 1961.

63.7 percent of that of the US in 1970, just as it was in 1965. However, even if Soviet industrial production increases as envisaged by the Five-Year Plan, it will amount to only 69.2 percent of the US figure in 1970 and less than 80 percent in 1980—always assuming, of course, that the US growth rate does not suffer any significant decrease. It is quite clear that the USSR has little hope of catching up with the USA as regards overall industrial production, let alone *per capita* production, in the foreseeable future.

Indeed, the Soviets have been surprised by two developments: a slackening-off of the growth rate of Soviet industrial production, and a fresh boom in the USA. In 1961, the US growth rate was as low as one percent,⁵ while that of the USSR was an impressive 9.2 percent.⁶ At that time, the Soviets doubtless really believed that the Marxist references to decaying capitalism and the superiority of the “socialist” economic system were being vindicated. However, the circumstance that the draft of the Party Program had spoken merely of exceeding the “present” (1961) level of US industrial production by 1970⁷ indicates that even then the Soviet leaders had certain qualms about throwing down the gauntlet to the USA. Now, as we have said, the Soviets have changed their tune. At the Twenty-Third Party Congress, the subject of competition with the capitalist world was touched on in only the vaguest of terms, and there was no date set for catching up with America. In his report to the Congress, Brezhnev contented himself by saying that

...the Soviet Union has continued to strengthen its positions in the economic competition with the major capitalist countries. The last few years have once more confirmed that uninterrupted expansion of production at high and, what is most important, steady rates is a natural law of the development of a socialist economy in our country. Such development is beyond the reach of capitalist countries. This is an indisputable advantage of socialism over capitalism.⁸

The pertinent passage of the subsequently adopted resolution was almost identically worded,⁹ and although it spoke of “new victories” in economic competition with capitalism its tenor is very restrained in comparison with the brash announcements made at the previous Congress.

It is also significant that the second most important Communist industrial country, Eastern Germany, has fallen as least as much behind its “capitalist” counterpart, Western Germany. This we see from the following table:

East and West German Industrial Growth Rates, 1963–65
(In Percentages of Previous Year and of 1962 Level)

	1963	1964	1965
Eastern Germany	4.3 (104.3)	6.7 (111 3)	6.1 (118 1)
Western Germany.....	3.6 (103.6)	9.3 (113 2)	5.7 (119 7)

SOURCES *Pravda*, March 22, 1965, *Neues Deutschland*, East Berlin, January 15 and February 3, 1966

⁵ Supplement to *Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus*, East Berlin, 1965, No. 11, p. 1.

⁶ *Népszabadság*, Budapest, February 11, 1962.

⁷ *Pravda*, July 30, 1961.

⁸ *Ibid*, March 30, 1966.

⁹ *Ibid.*, April 9, 1966.

Although the average growth rate of industrial production is still somewhat higher in the USSR than in the USA, it is doubtful whether it will remain so for very much longer; the Soviet growth rate planned for 1966 is actually lower than the rate achieved by the USA in 1965. One might say that the USSR is gradually running out of steam in the economic race. In fact, this race is of decisive importance for the fate of Communism, an ideology which stands or falls with the thesis that capitalism has had its day and the world must turn to Communism for further economic progress. The circumstance that both elements of this thesis have been severely shaken must surely be making many Communists ask themselves whether they are not fighting for a lost cause.

Stefan C. Stolte

The Economy

The Soviet Oil-Refining Industry

All in all, the oil-refining industry can be rated as one of the more flourishing sectors of the Soviet economy. In 1964, the total amount of oil refined was apparently of the order of 180,000,000 tons¹ (oil production in that year was 223,600,000 tons).² The figure for 1965 is not available, but the production of 72-octane automobile gasoline rose by 48 percent, that of low-sulfur diesel fuel by 30 percent, that of winter diesel fuel by 14 percent and that of benzene by 50 percent.³ In the same year, oil products and gas accounted for 52.1 percent of total fuel production, as compared with 23.5 percent in 1955.⁴

The development of the Soviet oil-refining industry during the past 25 years has been considerable. In 1940, the last full year prior to the USSR's entry into World War II, roughly 22,800,000 tons of oil were refined, total oil production running to 31,100,000 tons. The USSR then had 20 oil refineries, including two at Drogobych in the Western Ukraine, a territory annexed in the previous year. These refineries were located in the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and Azerbaidzhan (chiefly in the Baku region), each having an average annual capacity of slightly over one million tons. Aviation gasoline accounted for 20 percent of all refined products.⁵

Upon the German invasion in June 1941, the refineries in Drogobych were lost, and the Soviet oil industry came under heavy bombardment. As the German forces advanced, the Odessa, Kherson and Berdyansk cracking plants, the Tuapse refinery and refineries in the Grozny region were dismantled and evacuated to

¹ This figure represents the difference between total production and exports (crude oil not being used in the USSR itself), assuming annual losses of approximately 3 percent at the refineries (see below).

² *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 9, p. 11.

³ *Neftyanoye khozyaystvo*, 1965, No. 11, p. 2.

⁴ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 9, p. 10.

⁵ *Neftyanoye khozyaystvo*, 1965, No. 5, p. 1.

safer areas. Oil equipment which could not be evacuated was destroyed if at all possible. In the Grozny oil area alone, 2,163 wells were put out of action. The Krasnodar refinery, however, fell into the hands of the Germans, who subsequently destroyed it upon their retreat. Large quantities of equipment failed to reach its destination, being either bombed *en route* or prematurely unloaded at points later occupied. Over one thousand wells in the Baku oil fields were mothballed, allegedly because there were no longer adequate facilities for transporting the oil to the central regions.

The evacuated equipment was used to build refineries in Syzran, Krasnokamsk, Krasnovodsk and Vannovsky (Uzbekistan) and expand refineries in Orsk and Ishimbai. In December 1942, a refinery was completed at Komsomolsk-on-Amur. As a result, by the beginning of 1945 no less than 22 percent of the USSR's oil refining capacity was located in the eastern part of the country, as against 13 percent in 1941.⁶

According to Soviet sources, the country's oil refineries succeeded in producing sufficient gasoline for war-time needs. It is alleged that right from the beginning of the war considerable work was done at the Baku, Grozny and Krasnodar refineries to broaden the range of high-octane gasolines by precise rectification. In Baku and Grozny, a number of thermal cracking installations were reequipped for thermal reforming within a very short space of time. As a result, the production of aviation gasoline rose by 45 percent during the latter half of 1941. Thus, the production of B-74 gasoline shot up from 0 to 16,900 tons. At the Grozny refinery alone, output of B-78 gasoline rose from 7,200 to 18,500 tons. Although in 1942 the total production of aviation gasoline fell, it picked up again and in 1944 was two-and-a-half times above the 1940 level, having increased its share in overall gasoline production from 20 to 36 percent.⁷

Such information, however, is designed to divert attention from the absolute figures for the production and refinement of oil in the USSR during the war. In fact, it is known, again from Soviet sources, that Soviet oil production as a whole fell from 31,500,000 tons in 1940 to 19,000,000 tons in 1945, having sunk to considerably lower levels during the intervening years. The production of gasoline must have also dropped. In the same way, the Soviet claim that imports of oil products played only a minor role in the Soviet war effort, since they amounted to little over 5 percent of total domestic oil production,⁸ is equally dishonest when it is considered that in the course of the war the USSR received 2,670,000 tons of high-octane aviation gasoline under Lend-Lease.⁹

After the war, all the thirteen evacuated or destroyed refineries were reinstalled, and four new ones built in Gurev, Kuibyshev, Krasnovodsk and New Ufa, while others, such as those in Syzran and Orsk, were greatly expanded. As a

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁹ J. Carl, *Das amerikanische Leih- und Pacht-Gesetz*, Frankfurt/Main, 1957, p. 57.

result, in 1949 overall refinery output and the output of major oil products exceeded prewar levels for the first time.¹⁰ This success, however, was largely due to the exploitation of new deposits in eastern regions, such as Tataria, Bashkiria and the Kuibyshev Oblast, where the oil contains high percentages of resins, paraffin and sulfur (the content of the latter reaching 3 percent in some cases). The refining of these sulfurous oils necessitated the use of expensive alloyed steel equipment capable of resisting the increased corrosion involved, and a completely revamped technology.

First of all, the thermal cracking installations were converted for thermal reforming. Later on, thermal cracking installations were used for the light cracking of heavy products such as black, tar and flux oils and the catalytic reforming of gasoline. This combination of techniques was first practiced in Baku, and subsequently found extensive application in Bashkiria. By 1963, catalytic reforming had come to be regarded in the USSR as one of the most advanced oil refining methods, but at the present time, pending the construction of the required capacities, thermal reforming is the order of the day, although it produces 20–27 percent less gasoline, whose octane rating, moreover, is 5–7 points lower.¹¹

In view of the fact that the sulfurous oils from the eastern regions will continue to be largely responsible for the upswing in Soviet oil production, Soviet scientists are looking hard for new and improved methods of winning high-grade products from these oils. Their attention is becoming increasingly focused on hydrocracking, a process in which heavy hydrocarbons and other organic compounds in the crude oil are broken down in the presence of hydrogen under pressure so as to produce lighter products, chiefly motor fuels. Since this process requires large quantities of expensive hydrogen it has not as yet found wide industrial application in the USSR, but Soviet experts predict that it will soon come into its own.¹² At the present time, the products of Soviet oil refineries, in particular motor fuels, are in general below world standards, since most refineries are inadequately equipped for modern secondary refining processes.

According to present plans, in 1970 almost 70 percent more oil is to be primarily refined than in 1963, and 50–70 percent more gasoline, kerosine, diesel fuel and lubricating oil produced. The octane ratings of automobile gasolines are to be pushed up to 95 and more, and the sulfur content reduced (that of diesel fuels to 0.2 percent and less). The thermal stability of jet fuels is to be increased and their raw material base expanded. Greater emphasis is to be placed on the production of low-congelation fuels. The operating characteristics of motor oils are to be improved. High-octane gasolines are to account for 70.7 percent of total gasoline production and low-sulfur diesel fuels 88.4 percent of total diesel fuel production.¹³

¹⁰ *Neftyanoye khozyaystvo*, 1964, No. 9–10, p. 19.

¹¹ V. Sukhanov, *Kataliticheskiye protsessy v neftepererabotke* (Catalytic Processes in Oil Refining), Moscow, 1963, pp. 136–37.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 203–4.

¹³ *Neftyanoye khozyaystvo*, 1964, No. 9–10, pp. 20–21.

In order to achieve these goals, existing refineries are to be modernized and new ones built. The new refineries are to have capacities of 12,000,000–18,000,000 tons of crude oil annually, as compared with a maximum of 6,000,000 tons for refineries now in operation, and are to consist of two or three independent installations each with a capacity of 6,000,000 tons. However, refinery construction and modernization in the USSR is lagging badly. A refinery in Omsk, for example, has been under construction for no less than twelve years. The construction of a refinery in Perm is also behind schedule, despite the fact that it has been classified as a crash project. Operational deadlines for some units have been overrun by up to four years. By the time a refinery goes into operation it is generally obsolete, resulting in endless reconstruction, which is, moreover, carried out in a haphazard fashion. Equipment frequently becomes unusable after having been stored for lengthy periods under unsuitable conditions, sometimes out in the open, and cannot be replaced in time because of the inertia of Soviet bureaucracy.¹⁴

Fulfillment of the program for expanding the Soviet oil refining industry will also, of course, be dependent on steady supplies of crude oil to the refineries. Here, too, there is plenty of room for improvement. In 1964, supply difficulties caused the Tuapse refinery to be idle for periods of two to three days at a time.¹⁵ This refinery receives its oil from the relatively nearby deposits at Grozny and Krasnodar, and so there is every reason to believe that delays will be even more serious in the case of refineries such as that under construction at Ryazan, which is to be supplied from Western Siberia.

At the same time, little by little the supply situation is being improved. Since last year the Gurev refinery has been receiving its oil from the Mangyshlak fields, instead of from Tataria as previously. Last December, the 140-kilometer-long Ishim–Tyumen pipeline went into operation. Early 1967 should see the completion of the 1,000-kilometer-long pipeline from Ust-Balyk to Omsk; the Omsk refinery will then be able to receive its oil by pipeline from Western Siberia instead of by rail from Bashkiria and Tataria. The refinery in Polotsk has now switched over from eastern to local Belorussian oil.¹⁶

Another problem facing the Soviet oil refining industry is that of cutting down losses of oil and oil products. Annual crude oil wastage is 4.25 percent at the Grozny refineries, 3.5 percent at the Orenburg refinery and 4.72 percent at the Omsk refinery. At Bashkirian refineries, losses still amount to 1.12–1.63 percent despite having been greatly reduced.¹⁷

The USSR exports much of its oil and products. Figures for recent years have been as follows:

¹⁴ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1965, No. 1, p. 14.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1964, No. 44, p. 18.

¹⁶ *Neftyanoye khozyaystvo*, 1965, No. 11, p. 2.

¹⁷ See *Europe and Oil*, Munich, February 1964, p. 14

Soviet Exports of Oil and Oil Products, 1962-64

	(Tons)		
	1962	1963	1964
Oil	26,300,000	30,200,000	36,700,000
Oil Products	19,100,000	21,100,000	19,900,000

SOURCES: *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR za 1963 god. Statistichesky obzor* (The Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1963. A Statistical Survey), Moscow, 1964, p. 25, *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR za 1964 god ...* Moscow, 1965, p. 61

Soviet Exports of Gasoline, Diesel Fuel and Black Oil, by Countries, 1963-64

	Gasoline		Diesel Fuel		Black Oil	
	1963	1964	1963	1964	1963	1964
Total	3,342,200	2,747,200	7,488,400	6,851,400	8,576,400	9,056,300
Afghanistan	69,400	75,700	—	—	—	—
Austria	19,700	13,500	—	—	—	6,000
Belgium	—	—	224,400	62,700	143,700	105,900
Brazil	—	—	31,800	—	—	—
Bulgaria	408,200	214,800	408,000	230,200	747,100	808,300
China	455,400	269,900	333,200	79,500	—	—
Cuba	189,300	136,800	11,000	192,100	198,200	752,000
Czechoslovakia	101,000	108,100	—	—	—	—
Denmark	—	—	—	—	380,000	459,400
Eastern Germany	231,600	187,100	351,700	235,200	—	—
Finland	—	—	1,307,600	1,483,000	478,800	817,500
France	31,100	42,200	510,200	491,000	483,400	439,700
Great Britain	—	—	—	—	180,700	27,900
Greece	—	—	106,000	176,200	615,000	503,600
Hungary	77,800	107,200	239,700	158,400	54,700	98,400
Iceland	47,100	46,600	187,800	191,600	104,000	101,100
India	—	—	278,800	350,400	—	—
Italy	—	—	—	—	981,400	669,100
Japan	—	—	491,400	509,700	569,000	589,900
Mongolia	80,600	89,200	47,300	58,400	—	—
North Korea	238,300	209,100	162,200	168,700	—	—
Norway	—	—	194,000	165,600	59,600	67,800
Poland	890,900	818,200	639,700	617,100	549,300	564,500
Sweden	—	—	542,400	305,100	2,465,900	2,424,000
Syria	—	—	34,200	130,300	—	—
UAR	37,700	24,800	4,700	14,500	3,100	1,600
Western Germany	—	—	898,700	634,500	1,400	—
Yugoslavia	—	—	146,300	131,400	—	—

SOURCE: *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR za 1964 god. Statistichesky obzor* (The Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1964. A Statistical Survey), Moscow, 1965, pp. 62-63

There is a considerable disproportion between the Soviet oil producing and oil refining industries. Refinery construction periods are, as we have seen, excessively long, running to 9-12 years. The annual export of crude oil amounts to 36,700,000 tons, that of oil products to only 20,000,000 tons. Nevertheless, both categories of exports constitute the USSR's principal source of gold. In 1964, the USSR accounted for 44,000,000 tons¹⁸ of the 364,000,000 tons of oil and oil

¹⁸ *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR za 1964 god. Statistichesky obzor* (The Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1964: A Statistical Survey), Moscow, 1965, pp. 61-63.

products imported by Western Europe (these items, in turn, account for over 10 percent of the total value of Western Europe's imports).¹⁹ The USSR sells oil to the capitalist countries for 14 dollars a ton and to Soviet-bloc countries for 22 dollars a ton. These sales enable the USSR to pay for everything it needs from the West in the way of machinery, nonferrous metals, grain, etc., purchases which the USSR could not finance from its gold reserves alone.

G. A. Vvedensky

Appendix

Oil Refineries in Operation or Under Construction in the USSR

AZERBAIDZHAN

Name of Refinery	Location, etc.
Baku V. Sturua Cracking Plant	Baku
Baku Budenny Oil Refinery	Baku
Baku Andreyev Oil Refinery	Baku
New Baku Oil Distillation Plant	Baku
Baku Stalin Oil Refinery	Baku
Baku Gasoline Plant	Baku
V. Sturua Oil Refinery	Nakhichevan

VOLGA-KAMA REGION

Volgograd Oil Refinery	Volgograd; went into operation in 1959 well behind schedule
Volgograd Oil Distillation Plant	Volgograd
Gorky 26 Baku Commissars Oil Refinery ...	Gorky
Krasnokamsk Oil Refinery	Krasnokamsk (Perm Oblast); reconstruction completed by 1955
New Gorky Oil Refinery	Kotovo (Gorky Oblast); went into operation in 1959 well behind schedule
New Kuibyshev Oil Refinery	Kuibyshev
Yaroslavl D. I. Mendeleyev Oil Refinery ...	Yaroslavl; completed in 1965
New Yaroslavl Oil Refinery	New Yaroslavl; in final stage of construction
Perm Oil Refinery	Perm; under construction
Saratov Oil Refinery	Saratov; reconstruction carried out from 1951 to 1965
Syzran Oil Refinery	Syzran (Kuibyshev Oblast)
Otradny Natural Gasoline Plant	Otradny (Kuibyshev Oblast)

URALS REGION

Ishimbat Oil Refinery	Ishimbat (Bashkiria)
Orsk Oil Refinery	Orsk (Orenburg Oblast)
Chernikovsk Oil Refinery	Chernikovsk (Bashkiria)
New Ufa Oil Distillation Plant	Ufa; reconstructed 1951-55
Khalilovo Oil Distillation Plant	Khalilovo (Orenburg Oblast)
Orenburg Oil Refinery	Orenburg

¹⁹ *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1965, No. 7, p. 121.

SIBERIA

Name of Refinery	Location, etc
Omsk Oil Refinery.....	Omsk; under construction
Krasnoyarsk Oil Refinery	Near Krasnoyarsk; under construction
Angarsk Oil Distillation Plant	Angarsk (Irkutsk Oblast); in operation since 1965
Kritovo Oil Refinery	Kritovo Station (Krasnoyarsk Krai)
Komsomolsk Oil Distillation Plant	Komsomolsk-on-Amur (Khabarovsk Oblast)
Khabarovsk Oil Distillation Plant	Khabarovsk

CENTRAL ASIA

Vannovsky Oil Refinery	Vannovsky (Ferghana Oblast)
Krasnovodsk Oil Refinery	Krasnovodsk
Kokand Oil Distillation Plant	Kokand
Nebid-Dag Oil Distillation Plant	Nebid-Dag (Turkmenia)
Pavlodar Oil Distillation Plant	Pavlodar
Ferghana Oil Refinery	Ferghana
Oil refinery (name unknown).....	Chimkent

UKRAINE

Drogobych Oil Refinery	Drogobych
Drogobych Oil Refinery No. 2	Drogobych
Berdiansk Oil Refinery.....	Berdiansk (Zaporozhe Oblast)
Berdiansk Cracking Plant.....	Berdiansk
Konstantinovka Mendeleyev Oil Refinery ..	Konstantinovka (Donetsk Oblast)
Kremenchug Oil Refinery.....	Kremenchug
Odessa Oil Refinery	Odessa
Kherson Oil Refinery	Kherson

NORTHERN CAUCASUS AND (EASTERN) BLACK SEA REGION

Batumi Oil Distillation Plant .. .	Batumi
Grozny Oil Refinery	Grozny
Grozny Gasoline Plant	Grozny
Krasnodar Oil Distillation Plant	Krasnodar
Neftegorsk Oil Refinery	Neftegorsk (Krasnodar Krai)
Tuapse Oil Refinery.....	Tuapse (Krasnodar Krai)

NORTH-WESTERN REGION

Mozyr Oil Refinery	Mozyr (Gomel Oblast); under construction
Polotsk Oil Refinery	Polotsk (Vitebsk Oblast); under construction
Oil refinery (name unknown)....	Kirishi (Leningrad Oblast); under construction

CENTRAL AND OTHER REGIONS

Moscow Oil Refinery	Lyubertsy (Moscow Oblast)
Ryazan Oil Refinery.....	Ryazan; under construction
Kapotnya Oil Refinery	Kapotnya (Moscow Oblast)
Ukhta Oil Refinery	Ukhta (Komi ASSR)
Gurev Oil Refinery	Gurev (Kazakhstan)

REVIEWS

The Periodical Press

The fact that it was a recording of the "Internationale" and not of the Soviet national anthem or, shall we say, a specially-composed March of the Cosmonauts, i.e., that it was a revolutionary song relegated to the archives twenty-five years ago, that was mounted in the moon satellite launched in time for the Twenty-Third Party Congress is a point not without its significance, stressing as it does the line recently adopted by the Soviet Communist Party. The Congress is associated with this line by the entire central press of the USSR, despite the fact that it was supposed to be dealing with economic questions.

In the numerous commentaries printed in the leading Party journals, much space is devoted to the Congress's decisions relating to the Party Statute. An example is a leading article in *Kommunist* on "Changes in the Statute of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Inner Life of the Party," according to which these changes are designed to strengthen and improve further the Party's organization. The article gives the following data on the present strength of the Party:

There are now in the Party almost twelve-and-a-half million persons, the majority of whom are workers and collective farmers. More than 72 percent of the total number of Communists working in the national economy are occupied in [various] branches of material production (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 7, page 4).

This means that the Party today is, quantitatively speaking, an imposing army distributed among all sectors of the country's political, economic and cultural life. That it is qualitatively less imposing may be seen from the following:

Unfortunately, as a check of a number of Party organizations carried out by the Central Committee before the congress showed, some of these organizations had not been devoting proper attention to selecting the best people among the applicants for admission to the Party. Certain Party committees quite simply urged Party organizations to force [the rate or number of] admissions, sometimes assessing the level of organizational and political educational work of a Party organization by the number of those admitted as full and candidate members to the Party (page 5).

The authors of the article deal at some length with the question of admitting young people from the Komsomol to the Party. Previously, Komsomol members had almost automatically been transferred to the Party after a certain period of time. Now, the minimum age for this transfer has been raised to twenty-three. The reader is told:

This means that every young person preparing for entry into the Party will receive his preliminary schooling in the youth political organization and be able to show his worth in work in the Komsomol. For the better, more active section of youth, raising the age limit for admission to the Party *via* the Komsomol will not prove an obstacle to their ambition to become Communists (*ibid.*).

It is admitted that the previous arrangement, according to which the recommendation of a Komsomol raion or city committee was equivalent to that of a single Party member and, moreover, was not specifically required, was unsatisfactory. Now, in order to make admission to the Party stricter, such Komsomol recommendations are specifically required, while a recommendation from a Party member is only valid if he has been a member for at least five years. Moreover, admission by the primary Party organization must now, like exclusion, be carried by a two-thirds majority vote.

Later, we read:

The Statute, among other measures of Party discipline, provided for the transfer of Party members to [the status of] candidate members for the period of one year. After this period had lapsed, the person transferred to candidate's status could be accepted as a Party member according to the usual procedure. Every year, several thousand Party members were reduced to candidates by way of punishment, many of them for offenses that are incompatible with the title of Communist (page 7).

Here we are once more confronted with the fact that persons of doubtful reputation have been thoughtlessly admitted to the Party. The impression conveyed by this and many similar articles is that between Lenin's times and the latest congress the purity of Marxist theory, Party practice and Communist ethics have undergone a sea change. The eras of Stalin and Khrushchev emerge like a chain of errors.

Reviewing such a prolonged period, the authors pass over the reign of terror and write almost exclusively of the need to restore Lenin's principles of Party and communal life, which are regarded as a panacea. Under the rubric "Party Policy: Leninism in Action," N. Inozemtsev writes on "Leninism: The Scientific Basis of Soviet Foreign Policy." He asserts that problems arising from the mass of new developments and profound changes in the international scene can be solved only by "Marxist-Leninist science." The key is provided by "revolutionary dialectics," which enable one not only to make a correct assessment of any given situation but also to foresee future developments. He says:

The spirit of revolutionary dialectics, the insistence upon the concrete analysis of a concrete situation, a strictly scientific approach to [the question of] assessing the mutual relations of class forces within each country and on a worldwide scale—[all this] permeates every part, every aspect, of Marxist-Leninist theory, including its principles regarding questions of foreign policy and international relations (pages 12–13).

The author then raises questions of revolutionary strategy and socialist practice, the most important of which are the interaction of the national and international tasks of the revolution, the relationship between economics and politics, and the elaboration of a foreign policy that shall secure victory in the fight "against imperialism, for peace, democracy, national independence, socialism and Communism."

The main feature of current Party policy is the repeated emphasis on the importance of internationalism. Nevertheless, national consciousness has begun

to make itself felt in the USSR, and this applies not only to the larger but also to the smaller nationalities. During the last few years, the Soviet press has been producing more and more evidence of an interest in the past and of a patriotic *élan* which is national in form but by no means Communist in content. One can also detect a striving for truth and for personal freedom. Quite naturally, the Party leaders see in such manifestations a threat to the very foundations of the Communist system, and they are consequently seeking a channel in which to divert the emotions underlying them, in particular national and patriotic feeling.

Here it is important to bear two developments in mind. On the one hand, as we have noted, the notion of "internationalism" has gained very considerable currency in the Soviet Union. In the meaning of class (i.e., proletarian) solidarity, it is applied only in official Party circles. For other people in the Soviet Union, it approaches the idea of cosmopolitanism, in the better meaning of the word. A good example of this is the fact that in Soviet literature we find with increasing frequency the idea that all men on earth are members of the same family, in which no one is essentially better or worse than the others, in which no one is entirely in the right or in the wrong. This idea comes out in the writings not only of men who are acknowledged as particularly gifted writers but also of journalists with literary pretensions. For these people, the idea of internationalism is by no means necessarily connected with political principles.

On the other hand, the idea of "Soviet patriotism" has also undergone an interesting metamorphosis, and here again literature and journalism show how the specifically Soviet element has been winnowed out of the idea. The most significant detail is the omission in many cases of the epithet "Soviet." Instead, other expressions are adopted which often have no political connotations. People speak and write of the Russian past, of historical values, of the historical heritage, of traditions that have grown up independently of any political regime. In recent years, Soviet literary and art journals have devoted much space to memoirs, essays and other literary productions which concerned themselves with the past, to works of art of bygone periods, to historical figures. And in nearly every case there is little or no attempt to pass any political judgment upon works of art, persons or events.

Thus, the Party's understanding of internationalism and of patriotism has come under pressure, and the Party is now doing what it can to restore the Communist signification of these terms. A somewhat elastic interpretation of the "tasks" of the revolution on the national and international planes has been adopted, in which the example of the country "where the socialist revolution has been victorious" is put to good use. The October Revolution is presented as a triumphal advance of the nations toward their political ideal. Thus, Inozemtsev says in his article:

. . . the correctly-found political course helped the working class of Russia to carry out as effectively as possible not only its basic internal tasks but also its international obligations to the world proletariat and the international liberation movement (page 14).

Campaigning for proletarian internationalism, Communist theoreticians naturally make full use of quotations from Marx and Engels and from the practical revolutionary Lenin. According to them, the entire Soviet people, guided by the Party, adopted long ago a completely new, Communist patriotism which may be identified with proletarian internationalism. The latter concept they explain as follows:

Proletarian internationalism was and remains one of the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy. It finds expression in relations with the brotherly socialist countries, in support for the working class and all workers in the capitalist countries, in the close cooperation with the national liberation movement and the young developing countries, in the determined and persistent struggle of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for combined action by all revolutionary forces and primarily for the strengthening of the unity of the international Communist movement, for genuinely egalitarian and brotherly relations between all parties, and against nationalism and hegemonism (pages 17-18).

The political tone set by the new Central Committee is reflected not only in *Kommunist* but in all the other Party publications. The journal *Partiinaya zhizn* has a leader entitled "Forward to New Victories of Communism under the Leadership of Lenin's Party!" Among other principles of a general nature, we find the following reference to "international education":

Our Party indissolubly associates the formation of a scientific world outlook and a Communist ethic with an international education. The strengthening of the friendship and unity of the multinational Soviet people and the development of its bonds with the brotherly peoples of the socialist countries, with the Communist parties and the workers of the entire world was, is and will be the most important task of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (*Partiinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 8, page 15).

The leader goes on to appeal to all Soviet scientists and scholars to study and draw conclusions from the progress already made in solving the nationality problem in the USSR and help to improve the international education of the workers. The same issue contains a sketch entitled "The Communist Hymn Resounds in the Universe," which begins as follows:

The sixth day of the Twenty-Third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began in unusual fashion. The chairman announced that a letter addressed to the delegates had been sent by the scientists, designers, engineers, technicians and workers who had taken part in developing, building and launching the automatic station "Luna-10." They stated that an artificial satellite of the Moon had been put into orbit around the Moon for the first time. The melody of the Party hymn, the "Internationale," transmitted from the satellite, resounded in the hall, as it did over the entire planet (page 18).

The same issue of *Partiinaya zhizn* contains a contribution by R. Mamedzade, Secretary of the Sumgait City Party Committee (Azerbaijan), "In the Spirit of Internationalism," which follows the current Party line in describing the brotherhood of the nations under the Soviet regime. He writes:

In our young city there are over fifty of the nationalities and peoples of the Country of the Soviets [represented]. On one occasion, I mentioned this figure to a foreign guest.

"In our country there are only two nationalities," he replied, "but we come up against big problems. You have over fifty, and have no difficulties."

I had to explain to him that we have no grounds for difficulties of this kind. The socialist system in itself presupposes, not friction, but friendship among peoples. But, of course, this is not achieved without effort (pages 54-55).

With the last remark one can agree wholeheartedly: such a situation is the result of persistent and systematic effort on the part of the army of Communist propagandists. Even so, the desired results are not always achieved. Often the Communists' efforts are in vain: this may be seen from the lengthy commentaries and other materials which the central Party press is publishing on the problem of internationalism.

A. Gayev

Publications of the Institute for the Study of the USSR:

REVIEW OF SOVIET MEDICAL SCIENCES, Vol. I, No. 3, 1964, 64 pp. (In English.)

This issue contains the following articles: "Historical Background and Features of the Soviet Health Service," by Heinrich Schulz; "The Soviet Dental Service," by Heinz Müller-Dietz; "The Birth and Abortion Rate in Czechoslovakia," by Rudolf Urban; and "Medical Ethics in the USSR," by Heinrich Schulz. There are also summaries of the proceedings of the eighteenth and nineteenth sessions of the General Assembly of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, and the usual Chronicle of Events.

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REVIEW OF SOVIET MEDICAL SCIENCES, Vol. II, No. 2, 1965, 72 pp. (In English.)

This issue contains the following articles: "Sex Education in the Soviet Union," by Waltraud Müller-Dietz; "Sex Education in East Germany," by Klaus Riecken; "The Status of the Doctor in East Germany," by Eva Maria Kraus; "Development of the Samobor Health Center in Yugoslavia," by Adalbert Georgijević; "Blood Changes in Dogs on Rocket Flights up to an Altitude of 473 Kilometers," by Sigmund Volk; "Perception of Light and Color Through the Skin," by Heinz Müller-Dietz; "The Sankelmark

Study Group," by Hans Harmsen, and "Boris Yegorov—The First Doctor in Space," by Heinrich Schulz. There are also translations of two articles from *Meditsinskaya gazeta*, "The Philosophical Basis of Medical Ethics," by A. Izutkin, and "The Individual and the Doctor," by V. Davidovich, and a "Chronicle of Events" for the period April-September 1965.

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REVIEW OF SOVIET MEDICAL SCIENCES, Vol. II, No. 3, 1965, 72 pp. (In English.)

Articles in this issue are: "Public Health Services in Siberia and the Far East," by Heinrich Schulz; "Fibrinolysis Research in the Soviet Union," by Eva Maria Kraus; "Standards of Hygiene in Slovakia," by Rudolf Urban; "Ophthalmological Care for Children in the USSR," by Y. I. Kovalevsky and N. N. Nikitina; "Neurological Services in the Ukraine," by R. A. Vinitsky; and "Problems of Space Immunology," by R. Petrov. There is also a summary of the proceedings of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, and the usual Chronicle of Events.

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ARABIC REVIEW, No. 10, 1964, 88 pp. (In Arabic.)

This issue contains: "Equality of Women in the USSR," by Ramazan Traho; "A Decade of Soviet Foreign Policy," by Stefan C. Stolte; "The

Real Position of Islam in the USSR," by A. Kunta; "Religious Persecution in the Soviet Union," by Nadezhda Teodorovich; "North Caucasian Literature," by Ramazan Traho; "Recent Azerbaijani Literature," by S. Tekiner; "The Position of Turkestan Literature," by Vely Zunun; a "Chronicle of Events"; and "Institute News and Notes."

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ARABIC REVIEW, No. 11, 1965, 71 pp.
(In Arabic.)

The issue contains: "The Nationality Question in the USSR after the Death of Stalin," by P. Fedenko; "The Soviet Communist Party," by Herman Akhminov; "The Policy of the Soviet Party Central Committee Toward the National Languages of the Peoples of the USSR," by Ramazan Traho; "Liberian and Comecon," by S. C. Stolte; "Zig-Zags of De-Stalinization," by P. Fedenko; a review of Mikhail Rukin's *Russia in Central Europe* by Adnan Berdi-Murad; and a "Chronicle of Events."

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PROBLÈMES SOVIÉTIQUES, No. 10, 1965, 92 pp. (In French.)

The first three articles in this issue, "Military Power in Soviet Policy," by Raymond Garthoff, "The Soviet Approach to the Modern Military Revolution," by Nikolai Galay, and "Implications of the Sino-Soviet Dispute," by Malcolm Mackintosh, are a selection from papers read at an international symposium entitled "The Impact of the Modern Military Revolution on Strategy and Foreign Policy," held at the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich on October 20-22, 1964. (The articles were published in English in *Studies on the Soviet Union*, New Series, Vol. IV, No. 2.)

In "The Soviet Agricultural Balance in 1964," A. Arkhimovich comes to the conclusion that despite good weather conditions during that year Soviet agriculture did not succeed in overcoming its chronic crisis. This conclusion is based on the fact that data on the harvest were systematically falsified in Soviet press reports and on information concerning the backwardness of mechanization and the inadequacy of supplies of mineral fertilizers.

On the basis of statistical material, George Vvedensky, in "Industry in the Transcaucasian Republics," surveys industrial development and plan fulfillment in Armenia, Azerbaijani and Georgia, and discusses questions concerning their economic collaboration.

In "The Economic Discussion and the Recent Reform in the USSR," Roman Zybenko analyses proposals of the economic theoreticians Liberman and Trapeznikov, which were partly incorporated in the reform but which could do little to remove the inadequacies of price formation, which are due to the nature of the system.

In a further contribution, "The Law of the Priority of Heavy Industry and Economic Realities in the USSR," Zybenko maintains that in order to increase the supply of consumer goods, considerable sums must also be invested in agriculture, light industry and the manufacture of chemicals. Since, however, the Soviet government is not prepared to reduce investments in heavy industry, it attempts to solve the investment problem by raising labor productivity.

In "The Future of the USSR in the Light of its Agriculture," Roy D. Laird sets forth the difficulties of Soviet agriculture that are due to the nature of the system and discusses prospects for the immediate future, which will depend to a considerable extent on the progress made in developing the "new Soviet man."

The issue closes with a review by Y. Margolin of Isi Leibler's *Soviet Jewry and Human Rights*.

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SOWJETSTUDIEN, No. 19, 1965, 112 pp.
(In German.)

The first article in this issue, by Herman Akhminov and Ülo Aden, is entitled "They are the Worms that Consume the Revolution: The Petty Bourgeoisie in Communist Calculations." The authors examine the development and theoretical foundations of the present political line of world Communism, which advocates an alliance with the petty and middle bourgeoisie in the non-Communist states, and back up their observations with numerous quotations from Marx and Lenin.

In "Philosophy and Individual Sciences in Dialectical Materialism," Vera Piroshkova examines critically the presentations offered by the contemporary Marxists Kedrov, Pavlov and Deborin of the relation between philosophy and individual sciences, and takes the view that this relation is not clearly defined in Marxism and never can be.

In an introductory essay on "Boris Pasternak and the German Poets," Irene Bushman outlines Pasternak's artistic development, which was molded by his contact with German poetry and philosophy.

Recent Soviet attempts to rid the people of "religious rubbish" and introduce Soviet rites of contemporary significance are discussed by Nadezhda Teodorovich in "New Soviet Holidays and Rites," where it is pointed out that these new rites, representing as they do an arbitrary and artificial mixture of old popular traditions and Soviet innovations, are misguided in their very conception and doomed to die out.

In "Orientalisms in Soviet Russian Music," Bayram Riza, taking as his point of departure the classical composers, who regarded orientalisms merely as an element of color, analyses the work of Soviet composers who, having been sent to the republics of Central Asia to promote Russian cultural development, are prepared to make doubtful concessions to the regime and to local audiences.

Sigmund Wolk's report on "Women on the Chessboard: State and Development of Women's Chess in the USSR" is followed by "The USA and Vietnam: Desire and Reality," in which Rodger Swearingen gives a convincing presentation of the attitude of the American government to Communist aggression in Vietnam and subjects criticisms of US policy in Vietnam to careful analysis.

The issue closes with a chronicle of Institute activities.

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STUDIES ON THE SOVIET UNION (New Series), Vol. V, No. 2, 1965, 122 pp. (In English.)

The first part of this issue consists of four papers delivered at the symposium entitled "The Soviet Take-Over Generation," held by the Institute in Munich September 6-8, 1965.

Professor Vladimir G. Tremblé, of Franklin and Marshall College, Pa., USA, discusses the loosening of the Party's grip on economic studies since Stalin's death and the changes in the present planned system that may result ("Revival of Soviet Economics and the New Generation of Soviet Economists"); Professor Jack Miller, of Glasgow University, attempts in "Tomorrow's Industrialists" to show that official Soviet ideology has been used to make the existence of the Party apparatus seem essential but that now a new kind of technocrat-

politician is emerging, with a consequent erosion of ideology.

In "The New Generation in the Soviet Armed Forces," Nikolai Galay discusses the different mental outlook of the young officers and soldiers in the Soviet Union under the impact of the revolutionized craft of war in the atomic age. He illustrates the tensions between the generations and the tighter control by the Party over an army which is now less easy to indoctrinate than formerly.

Andrei Lebed tries to trace the methods by which the senior posts in the Soviet Party and government apparatus are filled ("The Soviet Administrative Elite: Selection and Deployment Procedures").

Constantine Olgin, in "NEP or back to Stalin?" analyses the above papers from the standpoint of his own "model" of the way in which Soviet society is developing and suggests that the 1965 economic reforms in the Soviet Union herald neither re-Stalinization nor far-reaching liberalization.

Herman Akhminov reviews the events since the former Soviet leader's fall in "One Year Without Khrushchev," claiming that these events prove that the Soviet system is in the throes of a crisis.

In "Centralization of Industrial Management in Turkestan," Tamurbek Davletshin gives examples of the defects in this sphere which are causing production to lag behind targets.

The issue closes with an article entitled "A Soviet Economist Looks at the Manpower Problem," in which Fedor Hajenko points out the unusually frank nature of a study (which he reproduces in full) published recently in the Soviet Union and clearly designed to sound the alarm over a critical situation in which some sectors of Soviet industry have surplus workers while others are starved of manpower.

There are reviews by Y. Margolin of Isi Leibler's *Soviet Jewry and Human Rights*, by F. Hajenko of V. I. Markov's *Wage Differentiation in Soviet Industry*, by G. Vvedensky of I. N. Izakson's *Helicopter Construction in the Soviet Union*, by C. Olgin of Vol. II of *L'URSS: Droit, Economie, Sociologie, Politique, Culture*, and by S. Kirsanov of the issues for 1964 of *Voprosy ekonomiki* and *Planovoye khozyaystvo*.

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

May 1965

- 1 May Day. Military parade on Red Square commanded by General of the Army A. P. Beloborodov.

Announcement of Lenin Peace Prize Winners: Jamsaragiin Sambu (president of Mongolian Parliament); Joseph P. Courtis (Nigerian "public figure"); Miriam Vire-Tuominen (Finland, member of World Peace Council); Miguel Angel Asturias (Guatemalan novelist); Giacomo Manza (Italian sculptor).

Announcement that oil has been struck at Krasnogorskoje (Udmurt ASSR).

- 2 Delegation from Italian General Labor Confederation led by Secretary-General Agostino Novello arrives in Moscow following invitation by All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions for discussions on trade union problems and extension of Soviet-Italian trade union contacts.

- 3 Announcement from Yakutsk that new diamond deposit has been discovered. It has been named after Twenty-Third Party Congress.

Mr. Roy Mason, Minister of State at British Board of Trade responsible for shipping, arrives in Moscow in response to invitation by Merchant Marine Minister V. G. Bakayev.

- 4 Exhibition of Rumanian national economic achievements opens in Moscow.

Joint delegation from East German National Front and German-Soviet Friendship Society arrives in Moscow to attend celebrations of twenty-first anniversary of end of war against Germany.

- 5 Announcement that first issue of Soviet Agriculture Ministry's new journal *Luga i pastbishcha* (Meadows and Pastures) has come out. It is to appear every two months.

Announcement that 117-kilogram topaz crystal has been discovered near Zhitomir.

Chairman of Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin receives Mr. Roy Mason.

Protocol and financial agreement signed in Turin under which Fiat automobile firm is to help set up factory in USSR and cooperate

with Soviet organizations in sphere of automobile construction.

Writer Mikhail Sholokhov, with family, leaves for Japan following invitation by Japanese Literary Association.

Press Day.

International astrophysics symposium begins in Byurakan observatory. Symposium is devoted to problems connected with study of active processes taking place in nuclei of remote galaxies.

- 6 Announcement that USSR and Italy are to conclude consular convention.

Announcement that Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani has accepted invitation to visit USSR.

Announcement that State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy and French Atomic Energy Commissariat have worked out broad plan for cooperation in research on high-energy particles. This cooperation, which is to take place within agreement signed on May 4, 1965, includes joint use of French 6,000-liter liquid-hydrogen chamber to be installed in Soviet 70,000,000,000-electron-volt proton accelerator now under construction in Serpukhov.

Chairman of Supreme Soviet Presidium N. V. Podgorny receives Governor of Tokyo, in USSR as guest of Moscow City Council Executive Committee.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-117."

Cultural and scientific cooperation agreement between USSR and Ruanda signed in Moscow.

- 7 Radio Day.

Announcement that local electoral commissions have begun registering Supreme Soviet candidates.

Publication of Party Central Committee's Supreme Soviet election address.

- 8 Group of Russian Orthodox Church priests and believers, led by Metropolitan Nikodim of Leningrad and Ladoga, returns to Moscow

after pilgrimage to Jerusalem and Mount Athos.

Zambian parliamentary delegation led by National Assembly Speaker Wesley P. Nyirenga arrives in Moscow on official visit following invitation by Supreme Soviet.

Announcement that large oil deposit, the Stepanovskoye, has been discovered in Western Urals. It is located near pipeline leading to Perm refinery.

- 9 Publication of Soviet Defense Minister Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky's order on occasion of twenty-first anniversary of victory over Germany.

British Technology Minister Frank Cousins arrives in Moscow in response to invitation by State Committee for Science and Technology.

- 10 Announcement that meetings of people's control workers are being held throughout USSR to discuss implementation of Party Congress resolutions.

Meeting on economic problems posed by Party Congress resolutions, organized by Economics Department and Institute of Economics of USSR Academy of Sciences and editorial board of Party journal *Kommunist*, begins in Moscow.

Soviet governmental delegation led by Chairman of Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin and including Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, Power and Electrification Minister P. S. Neporozhny and Deputy Defense Minister and Commander in Chief of Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Fleet S. G. Gorshkov, leaves for UAR on official visit.

Protocol on Soviet-Afghan trade in 1966 signed in Moscow.

- 11 Soviet delegation led by Fisheries Minister A. A. Ishkov leaves for Pyongyang to take part in 17th session of Soviet-Korean commission on scientific and technical cooperation.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-118."

- 12 Conference of directors of philosophical and sociological institutes of European "socialist" countries opens in Institute of Philosophy of USSR Academy of Sciences. Purpose of the conference is to exchange experience in the study of major problems of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and discuss joint efforts to combat

"bourgeois" ideology. Soviet delegation is headed by Academician F. V. Konstantinov.

Soviet-Indian cultural and scientific exchange program for 1966-67 signed in Delhi. Program calls for exchanges of scientists and higher education teachers.

Sixth plenary session of DOSAAF Central Committee comes to an end in Moscow.

Delegation from Union of Soviet Journalists, led by *Izvestia* chief editor L. N. Tolkunov and including Y. Y. Grigorev (*Pranda*), P. A. Naumov (*Za rubezhom*) and L. L. Stepanov (*Ogonek*), leaves for Austria.

Broadened meeting of College of USSR State Prosecutor's Office (*Prokuratura*) opens, attended by state prosecutors of Union republics and several autonomous republics, krais, oblasts, cities and raions. Emphasis placed on need to intensify measures against hooliganism.

- 13 Party Secretary General L. I. Brezhnev returns from three-day unofficial visit to Rumania paid at request of his Rumanian counterpart N. Ceausescu.

Announcement that Komsomol has instituted its own "Badge of Honor."

Announcement that Soviet scholars M. V. Keldysh, L. A. Artsimovich and A. S. Lure have been elected honorary foreign members of American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Deputy Foreign Minister L. F. Ilchev passes on to British Ambassador Sir Geoffrey Harrison Soviet note of protest over British government's decision to allow West German troops to train on British territory during summer and autumn.

- 14 Ninth plenary session of Komsomol Central Committee establishes agenda for Komsomol's Fifteenth Congress: Central Committee report (speaker Central Committee First Secretary S. P. Pavlov); report of Central Auditing Commission (Commission Chairman R. A. Musiyevsky); elections of central organs.

Announcement of formation of Soviet-Cambodian Friendship Society, with Deputy Health Minister V. A. Dvoryakovsky as Board Chairman.

- 15 Announcement that higher nautical school subordinate to Fisheries Ministry is to be set up in Kaliningrad in 1966.

- 16 Third International Congress on Metal Corrosion opens in Moscow.

Conference held in Moscow by Defense Ministry and Central Political Department of Army and Navy on "The Military-Patriotic Education of Soviet Youth and our Fighting Men Through Literature and Art in the Light of the Resolutions of the Twenty-Third Party Congress." Introductory speech delivered by General of the Army A. A. Yepishev.

International exhibition of agricultural machinery opened in Moscow by First Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers K. T. Mazurov.

Seventeenth session of Soviet-Korean commission on scientific and technical cooperation comes to an end in Pyongyang.

Tanzanian economic delegation arrives in Moscow for talks on economic and technical cooperation.

King Savang Vatthana of Laos, accompanied by Queen and Prince Si Savang, arrives in Moscow on a visit to the USSR following invitation by Supreme Soviet Presidium. During his stay he will relax on Caucasian Black Sea coast and visit various Soviet cities.

- 17 Fifteenth Komsomol Congress opens in Moscow. Speech delivered by Party Secretary General L. I. Brezhnev. Report delivered by Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary S. P. Pavlov.

Brezhnev flies to Vladivostok to award Order of Lenin to Maritime Krai for successes in economic development.

Second all-Union conference of "France-Greece" Society held in Moscow, Academician B. A. Rybakov being reelected council chairman.

Announcement that Director General of Algérie Presse Service has arrived in Moscow in response to invitation by TASS.

- 18 Komsomol Central Committee institutes "Lenin Komsomol" prizes for literature and art, to be awarded annually on Komsomol Day, October 29. Winners will receive a laureate diploma, a badge, and 5,000 rubles.

Soviet "Molniya-1" satellite launched on April 25 sends back pictures of the Earth from an altitude of 30,000-40,000 kilometers.

Announcement that Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers have adopted

decree "On Increasing the Material Interest of Collective Farm Workers in Developing Communal Production," under which collective farms are recommended to pay their workers guaranteed wages in cash and in kind from July 1 onwards on the basis of state farm pay scales.

- 19 Publication of joint communiqué on Kosygin's visit to UAR.

Announcement that oil deposit, possibly second largest in Central Asia, has been discovered at Barsa-Gelmes.

Announcement that Soviet delegation of railroad and electrical industry specialists led by Railroad Communications Minister B. P. Beshchev has arrived in Paris in response to invitation by French ministers.

Publication of Soviet reply to West German government's note of March 25.

Soviet-Yugoslav trade agreement for 1966-70, calling for trade to the value of about 2,600,000,000 dollars during this period, signed in Belgrade, Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev being the signatory for the USSR.

Soviet-North Korean cultural and scientific cooperation agreement for 1966 signed in Moscow.

- 20 Party delegation comprising First Secretary of Leningrad City Committee G. I. Popov and Party Central Committee official P. A. Naumov leaves for West Berlin to attend First Congress of West Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SED).

Announcement that Council of Ministers and Party Central Committee have adopted resolution "On the State of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assisting the Army, Air Force and Navy (DOSAAF of the USSR) and Measures to Improve its Work," which calls for special attention to preparing youth for military service.

Announcement that delegation of Soviet specialists led by First Deputy Chairman of Moscow Council Executive Committee, Candidate of Technical Sciences Y. T. Samodayev, has left for London to attend international congress on factory manufacture of concrete.

Kosygin receives British Technology Minister Frank Cousins. Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers V. A. Kirillin also present.

Delegation of Soviet engineers arrives in Damascus to render assistance in construction

of "hydrotechnical center" on Euphrates under Soviet-Syrian economic cooperation agreement.

- 21 Fifteenth Komsomol Congress comes to an end. S. P. Pavlov reelected First Secretary of Komsomol Central Committee. V. T. Ivanov elected Chairman and V. V. Dardinets Deputy Chairman of Komsomol's Central Auditing Commission.

- 22 Announcement that Supreme Soviet Presidium has instituted orders and medals for services rendered by individuals, collectives and oblasts in national economic development.

- 23 Supreme Soviet Presidium issues decree implementing new "Statute on Diplomatic and Consular Missions of Foreign States on the Territory of the USSR." This statute regularizes relations between these missions and Soviet institutions and gives the former wider privileges and immunities.

Supreme Soviet Presidium institutes Power Engineer's Day, to be celebrated annually on December 22 (December 22, 1920, was the opening day of the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, at which the state plan for the electrification of Russia was adopted).

Plenary session of Moscow branch of Union of Soviet Journalists held. *Pravda* chief editor K. I. Zarodov delivers report on tasks facing branch as a result of Party Congress resolutions. Board secretary of Union of Soviet Journalists V. I. Chernyshev announces that Second All-Union Congress of Soviet Journalists will be held September 28-30 in Moscow.

- 24 Soviet-Syrian scientific and cultural exchange program for 1966-67 signed in Moscow.

First Deputy Defense Minister Marshal A. A. Grechko receives Director of French Higher Institute of National Defense.

Yugoslav State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Nikežić arrives in Moscow as guest of Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-119."

- 25 Party Central Committee meets in plenary session in Moscow to discuss question of boosting crop yields by intensifying land melioration. Report delivered by Minister of Melioration and Water Economy Y. Y. Alekseyevsky.

Announcement that first of 28 volumes of reference work *Istoriya industrializatsii SSSR* (The History of the Industrialization of the USSR) has come out.

Supreme Soviet delegation led by Supreme Soviet Deputy and First Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers K. T. Mazurov leaves for Rawalpindi on exchange visit in response to invitation by Pakistani National Assembly.

UN-organized international seminar on reclamation of pastureland comes to an end in Alma-Ata.

Opening to shipping and air traffic of area of Pacific barred on December 14, 1965, on account of Soviet testing of space vehicle landing systems.

- 26 Gromyko receives head of Tanzanian economic delegation, Finance Minister A. H. Jamal.

Soviet-Tanzanian economic and technical cooperation agreement signed.

Academician P. L. Kapitsa elected honorary member of Swedish Academy of Sciences.

- 27 Delegation from Mali's Sudanese Union Party, headed by its Political Secretary, Idrissa Diarra, arrives in Moscow in response to invitation by Party Central Committee.

Second all-Union conference of "USSR-France" Society opens in Moscow. Speech delivered by presidential council member Ilya Ehrenburg.

Plenary session of Party Central Committee comes to an end after major speech by Secretary General Brezhnev and adoption of resolution assigning 15,000,000,000 rubles for land melioration.

- 28 Publication of TASS statement warning, in connection with Syrian government's appeal to members of UN Security Council regarding tense situation on her borders and in Near East in general, that USSR would not remain indifferent toward "attempts to disturb peace" in her immediate vicinity.

Soviet-North Vietnamese cultural and scientific cooperation agreement for 1966 signed in Moscow.

Frontier Guard's Day.

- 29 Publication of TASS statement in connection with conference on economic and cultural

cooperation among countries of Asia and Oceania to begin in Seoul on June 14.

Chemist's Day celebrated for first time.

- 30 Party delegation led by Secretary General Brezhnev leaves for Prague to attend Thirteenth Congress of Czech Communist Party.

Publication of TASS statement in connection with incident between USA and Cuba at Guantanamo military base.

Constituent congress of All-Union Society of Geneticists and Selectioners opens.

Second International Oceanographic Congress, to last until June 9, opens in Moscow. Its theme is "Ocean Research for the Good of Mankind."

Supreme Soviet Presidium institutes Light Industry Workers' Day, to be celebrated each year on second Sunday in June.

- 31 Second all-Union conference of Soviet-Korean Friendship Society held, Light Industry Minister N. N. Tarasov being elected board chairman.

Announcement that Marshal M. V. Zakharov, Chief of General Staff of Soviet Armed Forces and First Deputy Defense Minister, has left for Stockholm on exchange visit in response to invitation by Chief of Swedish Defense Staff, Major-General Almgren.

Announcement that conference of commissions of International Union of Official Travel Organizations has come to an end in Moscow. Special attention was paid to preparations for International Travel Year, 1967.

Changes and Appointments

- 4 A. N. Abramov appointed Ambassador to Dahomey, replacing A. M. Kuchkarov, who is transferred to other work.
- 5 M. A. Prokofev appointed Minister of Education of the RSFSR, replacing Y. I. Afanasenko, who is transferred to other work.
- 6 P. S. Dedushkin appointed Ambassador to the Lebanon, replacing D. S. Nikiforov, who is transferred to other work
- 15 I. I. Brazhnik appointed First Deputy Chairman of Council for Religious Affairs.
- B. A. Dubovikov appointed Deputy Chairman of Committee for Standards, Measures and Measuring Instruments.
- B. I. Solovov appointed First Deputy Minister of the Light Industry.
- 19 A. A. Smimov, previously Ambassador to Western Germany, appointed Ambassador to Turkey, replacing N. S. Ryzhov, who is transferred to other work (see below).
- 22 N. S. Ryzhov appointed Ambassador to Italy, replacing S. P. Kozyrev, who is transferred to other work.
- V. I. Alekseyev appointed First Deputy Chairman of State Committee for the Supervision of Work Safety in Industry and Mining.
- V. I. Glazyrin appointed Deputy Chairman of State Committee for Material and Technical Supply.
- V. A. Nikolayuk appointed Deputy Chairman of State Forestry Committee.
- 25 S. K. Tsarapkin appointed Ambassador to Western Germany.

Notes on Contributors

OLGIN, C. Born in Orel in 1904. Emigrated to the West after the Revolution. B.Sc. (Eng.), University of London; Associate Member of the Institute of Electrical Engineers, London. Since World War II, has made a study of Soviet philosophy and ideology.

PRYBYLA, JAN S. Born 1927 in Katowice, Poland. Associate Professor of Economics, Pennsylvania State University. Author of numerous studies on the Soviet and East European economics published in journals in the USA, Great Britain, France, Switzerland, Germany, Canada, Australia and South Africa.

KONSTANTINOW, REV. D. In the USSR, specialized in the study of printing and publishing; author of numerous articles and books on the subject. Since World War II, in emigration. Now a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church in the United States. Author of a number of articles published by the Institute on religious subjects.

LEBED, A. I. Born 1903 in Kremenchug. Mechanical engineer. Member of the Research Department of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, head of its Biographical Section since 1956. Specialist in Soviet transportation; coauthor of *Soviet Waterways: The Development of the Inland Navigation System in the USSR* (Munich, 1956).

STOLTE, STEFAN C. Hungarian journalist. Imprisoned in Hungary from 1949 to 1956. Released during the Hungarian Revolution. Now a free-lance journalist in Munich, specializing in Soviet-satellite relations.

VVEDENSKY, G. A. Engineer, received technical education in Moscow. Before World War II, worked in Soviet industry. On the staff of the Institute since 1954, specializing in questions of Soviet industry.

KRUZHIN, PETR. Born 1921 in what is now Kalinin Oblast. Left school in 1939 and entered an officers' training school, from which he graduated in 1941. While at school and in the army, was an active member of the Komsomol. Taken prisoner by the Germans in 1942 and joined the Vlasov movement in 1943. Since then has written on political subjects and Soviet youth (including "A Young Communist" in *Thirteen Who Fled*, New York, 1949). Assistant Editor of the *Bulletin*.

BULLETIN

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ARTICLES

Speculative Cybernetics

C. OLGIN

The following article is a considerably expanded version of one of the two appendices to the paper on cybernetics and ideology which was published in a revised form in the July 1966 issue of the *Bulletin*.

Cybernetics and Dialectical Materialism

In the article dealing with the role played by Communist ideology in the development of Soviet cybernetics,¹ the present writer did his best to show that, contrary to a widespread opinion in the non-Communist world, actual repressions, just as in the case of other sciences, could seldom be traced back to the fact that Dialectical Materialism was and still is the only officially permissible philosophical basis for Soviet science as a whole.

This judgment can, perhaps, be extended to cover speculative cybernetics, but requires qualification. More than any other science, physics not excluded, cybernetics has prompted some of its exponents to launch into flights of imagination and abstract generalization where scientific theory merges into philosophy—into fields, that is where Dialectical and Historical Materialism stands on guard. This feature of the new science did not escape the notice of Soviet and satellite Dialectical and Historical Materialists. It is certainly no coincidence that cybernetics was only attacked when its speculative-philosophic aspects began to draw public attention in the West; nor was it accidental that the attackers showered compliments on Norbert Wiener, the Father of Cybernetics, and his colleagues as the creators of workable theories while condemning their imaginative excursions into the fields of sociology, anthropology and *Naturphilosophie*. The reason for this selectivity and restraint was, as stated in the above-mentioned article, undoubtedly the fact that cybernetics, as the science of designing, constructing and operating electronic computers processing information with “negative feedback” features, together with all the mathematical instrumentalia involved had some years earlier become indispensable in vital sectors of Soviet defense and was already fairly fully developed, largely on the basis of Western experience. It is true that the attackers, not stopping at purely philosophic issues, also denied the applicability of cybernetics to such disciplines of natural science as biology and medicine and, of course, to all the social sciences; but

¹ See C. Olgin, “Science, Ideology and Cybernetics in the USSR,” *Bulletin*, 1966, No. 7.

similar protests against cybernetics' pretensions to universal applicability were current in the West at the time the attack was launched, and are not unknown even now.

It should also be noted that accredited Soviet philosophers had learnt a good deal from their defeat shortly before at the hands of physicists and mathematicians over Relativity and Quantum Mechanics.² Instead of dogmatically asserting the inviolability of some fundamental posits of Dialectical Materialism on which cybernetics appeared to throw doubt, e.g., substantive materiality as the main factor ensuring the unity of the world, the categorical (and, illogically, again substantive) differentiation of the world into inorganic, organic and "human-social" forms of motion, the chief attacker appealed to common sense, to humanitarianism and even to positivism in science,³ all of which speculative cybernetics offends.

This early example of new tactics in dealing with Western ideas pending their integration into the corpus of Dialectical Materialism, *viz.*, detaching them from their (positivist or frankly idealist) background and from their implications, has become standard for the post-Stalin activities of accredited Soviet philosophers. It succeeded up to a point in the case of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics; it failed almost completely in the case of cybernetics, for reasons which, it is hoped, will become apparent to readers of the present article.

The stages in the development of speculative cybernetics as a rival to Dialectical and Historical Materialism and the decisive role played in this process by the swing in Communist policy (particularly in the economy) from Stalinism to Khrushchevianism were outlined in the main paper. For the sake of convenience, however, a few salient facts are repeated here. The de-Stalinization of Soviet political economy, officially initiated at the Twentieth Party Congress, was followed (and, so far as published material is concerned, was in fact preceded) by similar moves in the fields of science and philosophy. The condemnation of Stalinist "Great-Russian chauvinism" in 1954-55 resulted in a spate of Russian translations of works by Western scientists, in which the authors' philosophical views were left unexpurgated. These naturally tend to take the form of speculative flights of imagination, which, as stated, are more frequent in cybernetics than in any other discipline, theoretical physics not excluded. In the forewords or commentaries, Soviet readers were warned against the ideological pitfalls of uncritical reading and admonished to abide by the tenets of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The central idea—the functional approach to all phenomena—was by and by accepted as operationally sound; but the ontological implication—the primacy of functional over substantive characteristics in determining categories of reality—continued to be refuted. After 1955, however, when the decision was taken to publish Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* in a mass edition, the position

² See C. Olgin, "Soviet Views on the Metaphysics of Relativity," *Studies on the Soviet Union*, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, New Series, Vol. I, No. 1, 1961.

³ *Voprosy filosofii*, 1953, No. 5. (See Olgin, "Science, Ideology and Cybernetics in the USSR," p. 14, Footnote 17.)

should have changed, for, among other unorthodoxies, Lenin had tentatively advanced the thesis of the primacy of function over substance in his transcripts from Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*.⁴ With this, the way to the acceptance of cybernetics (or at least its mathematics) as theoretically applicable to any branch of science, social as well as natural, was open and a number of Soviet scientists with physiologists in the lead took it. From this to the development and integration of speculative cybernetics into the corpus of official Soviet philosophy is only a step. It was never taken. On the contrary, development of the subject continued to be discouraged, although there is little doubt that in private a good number of Soviet scientists were anxious to embark upon it and that a section of the philosophers were equally anxious to help them by exploiting to the full Lenin's unorthodoxies. In public, however, the scientists (with one solitary exception) accepted the rules of the game, while Soviet philosophers for their part made no attempt to introduce functionalism into Dialectical Materialism. The exception among the scientists was, typically, a physiologist—namely, P. K. Anokhin, who, as stated in the main paper, in the spring of 1957 expanded in the columns of *Voprosy filosofii* Wiener's ideas on "negative feedback" as one of the main, if not the main, principles of world organization.⁵ As late as 1958, the position remained unchanged. At the 1958 conference on philosophical problems of natural science, cybernetics was elevated to the status of a super-science of universal applicability, but the co-authors of the only paper on the subject, leading computer designers Sobolev and Lyapunov, specifically avoided philosophic issues and Anokhin was left to cry in the wilderness alone with appeals to develop them and bitter reproaches to the two co-authors for having failed to do so.⁶

A change in the fortunes of speculative cybernetics was, however, on the way. Throughout the late fifties, the clamor for a radical modernization of the Soviet economy, particularly of the unwieldy and increasingly ineffective apparatus of planning and control, had been rising. This patently demanded the mathematization and eventual automation of processes—the first step toward the cyberneticization of government and control. Progress in automation, however, was limited to production and distribution processes, and even here had been slow. So far as can be judged, it had been nil as regards the cyberneticization of central planning organizations, where the idea of handing over the business of the final analysis of data, let alone that of decision making, to giant computers met with understandable resistance from the orthodox economist-planners, who viewed the mathematics of cybernetics with suspicion and were in any case devoted to the overall methods developed under Stalin, i.e., the

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), 4th ed., Vol. XXXVIII, Moscow, 1958, pp. 188, 422 and 444. (See Constantine Olgin, "The Philosophy of V. I. Lenin," *Studies on the Soviet Union*, New Series, Vol. III, No. 3, Munich, 1964.)

⁵ *Voprosy filosofii*, 1957, No. 4.

⁶ *Filosofskie problemy sovremennoy yestestvoznaniya: Trudy Vsesoyuznogo soveshchaniya po filosofskim voprosam yestestvoznaniya* (Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Natural Science: Proceedings of the All-Union Conference on Philosophical Questions of Natural Science), Moscow, 1959.

formulation of plans in accordance with Central Committee directives and transmission of orders, together with the blame for non-execution, to lower echelons. This very idea, it appears however, was "sold" to Khrushchev, sometime around the close of the fifties, as being eminently suitable—in fact, indispensable—for the successful construction of Communism.

The new Party Program expressly singled out cybernetics as the superscience, the science of government and control of the Soviet masses, destined to solve what Lenin called "organizational problems" (a distinctly functionalist and non-Marxist term, be it noted) on the vastest scale. Whether cybernetics in the economy really demands (as most Western specialists seem to think) or not (as Soviet cyberneticians maintain) the introduction of a free market on the largest scale and whether Khrushchev had been "sold a pup," or was consciously driving toward true economic liberalization are questions which need not concern us here. With the overt approval of the head of the Party and, following him, of senior ideologists, cybernetics, from 1961–62 on, could be considered as an organic and highly important component of Communist ideology—the first concretization, in fact, of the doctrine of "scientific Communism," which under Khrushchev was crowding out Historical Materialism and its exponents. Accordingly, speculative cybernetics, as an American sovietologist specializing in cybernetics recently pointed out, became all the rage.⁷

From then onward, cyberneticians were actually urged by senior ideologists to abandon the shelter of technicalities and empiricism, where they had remained since the attack of 1953, and solicited to develop speculative cybernetics—naturally, from "positions of Dialectical Materialism." This many of them did, though hardly in the manner expected of them. For example, at the 1962 monster conference on philosophical problems of cybernetics (an assembly of over one thousand scientists, flanked by philosophers, senior ideologists and Party functionaries, welcomed by Khrushchev in person), leading cyberneticians, mathematicians, physiologists and psychologists came forward with highly speculative theories, most of them carrying the imprint of "advanced" or functional dialectics and some of them outstripping the ideas of Western "ultras" who had in most cases been their inspirers.⁸ (A significant omission was the lack of any contribution on philosophical problems of Communist economics in the light of cybernetics—a point regretfully noted two years later by the chairman of the conference, Academician A. Berg.)⁹ The results could hardly have pleased the Party ideologists or Khrushchev himself. The resolution passed at the end of the conference enjoined upon scientists greater concentration on features of speculative cyber-

⁷ Lee Kerschner, "Cybernetics: Key to the Future?," *Problems of Communism*, Washington, D.C., November-December 1965. Mr. Kerschner takes exactly the opposite view of the causes of repression and delay in the development of scientific and technical cybernetics—namely, the influence of Soviet philosophy (*viz.*, Dialectical and Historical Materialism), and fails altogether to note the connection between such repression and the politico-economic interests of the Party.

⁸ Papers read at the conference (less that by Kolmogorov) will be found in *Kibernetika—mysleniye—zhizn* (Cybernetics, Thought and Life), Moscow, 1964; reports of the proceedings in *Voprosy filosofii*, 1962, Nos. 10 and 11.

⁹ *Kibernetika—mysleniye—zhizn*, p. 11.

netics likely to help in Communist construction and an easing off on sheer abstraction, but the question why the scientists had been allowed a virtually free hand in preparing the papers in the first place remains unresolved. This freedom from ideological restraint in developing speculative cybernetics within the very wide limits of "advanced dialectics" and in some cases beyond them continued to be enjoyed by Soviet "ultras" for some two years after the conference—for as long, in fact, as the Khrushchevian slogan of the triumphant march toward Communism, under the banner of Marxism but under the actual guidance of cybernetics, remained in force. Such was the ideological prestige of the superscience that in the 1963–64 issues of *Voprosy filosofii* articles dealing with laws and categories of Dialectical Materialism *in abstracto* or in connection with some concrete scientific discipline (previously the bulk of material listed under Dialectical Materialism) became a rarity. Their place was taken by articles on cybernetics and allied disciplines, *viz.*, the theory of systems, symbolic logic, etc., not negating Dialectical Materialism and still listed under this title, in fact often incorporating references to its laws and categories but treating the latter as purely philosophic generalizations—a working basis for a scientific world outlook but not yet a working model of the universe as claimed by Dialectical Materialists.

One can legitimately speak of this period as the epoch of the "cyberneticization" of Soviet philosophic thought, and it is in this period that two determined attempts were made by Communist writers to effect a systematic blending of the laws and categories of Dialectical Materialism with the main elements of cybernetics.¹⁰ It should be noted that these attempts were the work of satellite and not Soviet authors. It should be further noted that in the latest approved textbook on Marxist-Leninist philosophy to appear in the USSR (published after Khrushchev's fall but obviously in preparation during his tenure of supreme power)¹¹ half a page is all cybernetics gets, the treatment being distinctly positivistic or perhaps, better said, empiricist. Had Khrushchev been shocked by the unorthodoxies of some cyberneticians at the 1962 conference? This would seem to be a very likely supposition. Nor could a man like Ilichev, chairman of the Party Central Committee's Ideological Commission and a notorious ex-Stalinist "sycophant," be expected on his own initiative to press for the introduction of speculative cybernetics or Lenin's late "functionalism" into textbooks on Dialectical and Historical Materialism.

Be this as it may, in the short period of Khrushchevian enthusiasm for the new superscience, Soviet cyberneticians, some of them obviously using Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* for ideological justification if not actual inspiration, managed to publicize in the columns of *Voprosy filosofii* and in special publications some very unorthodox ideas which caught orthodoxy on the wrong foot.

¹⁰ G. Klaus, *Kybernetik in philosophischer Sicht*, Berlin, 1961; and O. Lange, *Całosc i rozwój w swietle cybernetyki* (The Whole and Development in the Light of Cybernetics), Warsaw, 1962 (see *Bulletin*, 1966, No. 7, p. 16, Footnote 23). The Russian translation of Klaus's book (with a lengthy review in the postscript) is *Kibernetika i filosofiya* (Cybernetics and Philosophy), Moscow, 1963.

¹¹ *Markistsko-Leninskaya filosofiya* (Marxist-Leninist Philosophy), Leningrad, 1965. (Edition of 150,000 copies, 544 pp.)

Mind-Body

We shall now proceed to consider the three main directions of speculative cybernetics, the first of which is the "mind-body problem," the relation between the ideal and the material, or, in popular literature, "Can machines think?"

The proceedings of the Conference on the Philosophical Problems of Cybernetics and the review in the postscript to the Russian edition of the book by Klaus show that, apart from Marxist terminology, the differences between conservatives, moderates and "ultras" are very similar to those which divided, and to a considerable degree still divide, our own scientists, not excluding the cyberneticians themselves.¹² The conservatives adopt the compromise solution, an unavowed dualism, and talk of "consciousness" (often used as a synonym for "thought" or "movement of ideas") as the "internal aspect of physiological processes which take place in man's brain, the highest form of organized matter, and nowhere else." It is therefore impermissible to credit either animals or artifacts, no matter how complex, with the ability to think or possess a consciousness. Their position, however, is being steadily undermined, not only by cybernetical "ultras," who, like Turing over here, regard "consciousness" as something of a "ghost in the machine" with which scientists are not concerned, but also by moderates with progressive Dialectical Materialists in the lead. Criticism falls into three well-defined categories: first, that it is impossible to deduce from Dialectical or Historical Materialism that Nature cannot produce a higher form of organized matter than the human brain; secondly, that it is equally impossible, from the positions of Dialectical Materialism, to prove that conscious thought (e.g., the solution of complex problems, in particular induction) demands a specific substratum (e.g., albumen); thirdly—and here one senses the influence of Bogdanov's concepts of the role and nature of "organized experience"—critics question the insistence of conservatives on the decisive importance of "substance" and "substantive attributes," as opposed to function, as the features by which "objects" reveal themselves. If two objects composed of different substances react to outside influences in an identical manner, what right have we to maintain that they are "essentially" different? "Idealistic" philosophers might point out that even extreme cyberneticians do not visualize the creation of artifacts preoccupied with fears and hopes, joys and sorrows, proper to the human soul. But a Marxist "soul" or consciousness is something very different from its existential counterpart—condemned as a survival of bourgeois ideology. It is a streamlined affair, strictly functional in a rationalistic sense, a product of the rational collaboration of individuals forming a "collective" for the specific and sole purpose of transforming Nature in their own (mainly if not exclusively) material interests. The defense of the conservatives is therefore nowadays reduced to tautology (automata "think" automatically), prevarications (ignoring the difference between essential and non-essential attributes) and sometimes

¹² For example, at the third annual meeting of the Institute of Philosophy (New York, 1959), reported in Sidney Hook (ed.), *Dimensions of Mind* (New York University Press, New York, 1960)

unconscious surrender (higher "systems" than human individuals, with different society-forming substrata—"society" in the above Marxist sense—, may exist and be "conscious").

Information—"Theory of Knowledge"—Negentropy

Although, as stated, orthodox philosophers (who were and still are enjoying the support of conservative scientists) were finding it hard to ward off the offensive of the "ultras" on the "can-machines-think" sector, a direct decision in favor of the latter is unlikely; for, as pointed out by some of the "ultras" themselves (both here and in the USSR), "thinking" is a portmanteau term with a variety of meanings and seldom used at the level of scientific theory and practice. There is, however, a cybernetical category not only legitimately used by scientists but actually mathematically defined and closely connected with logical processes, *via* which, particularly for Marxists, agreement on philosophic issues, including "can machines think," should be possible. Nevertheless, agreement seems to be as far away as ever; in fact, one can say that confusion reigns complete. The fault here, however, lies not entirely—not even mainly—with the dogmatism of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The theory of information, historically, was derived from the theory of probability to serve the needs of telecommunication, long before cybernetics was heard of. At this point, scientists could, in their search for economy and efficiency in transmission, legitimately concentrate on the quantitative measurement of information carried by signals, totally ignoring the inherent value or semantic content of signals and messages, i.e., information in the common understanding of the term. As in a number of cases in the era dominated by philosophical positivism, the measurement was in the end confounded with the entity measured and the problem of the nature of the entity itself either tacitly ignored or overtly denied scientific status.

This was the situation when the first cyberneticians adapted the basic concepts as well as the mathematics of the theory of information to their own needs, whereupon its close connection with the general theory of organization and systems became apparent. The storing, processing and transmission of something very similar to telecommunications "information" was shown with the help of cybernetics to be an essential feature of the organic world down to the cell, perhaps to the unimolecular level, permitting a retention of the level of entropy and sometimes a lowering thereof. It is also, of course, the main function of computers and an essential stepping-stone to the creation of the more complex and, properly speaking, cybernetical artifacts. The conclusion as to an intrinsic connection, if not identity, between entropy—or rather, its inverse "negentropy," or measure of organization—and cybernetical "information" (a single formula covers both) was inescapable. But Western cyberneticians in their vast majority still refuse to concern themselves with the problem of information, just as they avoid enquiring, at the philosophical or at least speculative level, into the dynamics of organization and disorganization. Such positivistic indifference is doctrinally impermissible for Marxist-Leninists; yet it is a fact not without

significance that this is precisely the attitude of Soviet orthodoxy when it comes to the question of what "information" is, just as it was in the case of Relativity. The mathematical-logical findings of empirically proven theory are pragmatically accepted: the philosophic-ontological issues are left untouched. For this, of course, there is an excellent reason. The Marxist-Leninist "theory of knowledge" is built around the Diamatist category of "reflection." This, in the eyes of progressive Dialectical Materialists and (significantly) of a section of non-Marxist cyberneticians, is closely connected with "information." The way to integration, however, was and still is barred for the orthodox by Marx's crypto-dualism (which treats mental processes as mere disembodied reflections of processes taking place in the material world and, moreover, contradicts itself by maintaining that logical processes cannot take place anywhere outside man's head) but not for the "ultras," who, as usual, found all the ideological justification they needed in Lenin's unorthodoxies. As early as 1904, in his otherwise highly orthodox *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*, Lenin, while condemning Spinoza's quasi-conscious "monads," advanced the notion that it was logical to credit the smallest particle of matter with an attribute akin to feeling, *viz.*, "reflection."¹³ The notion, of course, is not original—it is over two thousand years old and probably as old as philosophy itself—but it was so original for a Marxist that it remained suppressed over most of Stalin's reign. With this suggestion in hand and with the further and later ideas of Lenin contained in his *Philosophical Notebooks* and the letter to *Pod znamenem Marksizma*,¹⁴ Soviet Dialectical Materialists had every justification as well as some working material for developing a proper "theory of reflection" and a workable "theory of knowledge."

Until the arrival of cybernetics, the philosophers preferred to do nothing beyond playing around with "subjective dialectics" in detachment from the theory and practice of psychology, or, when occasion permitted, accusing Pavlovian "reflectologism" of "vulgar materialism." For this lapse, Lenin himself is partly to blame, because, while indicating that the "theory of reflection" denies an absolute opposition or break between the ideal and the material, he also insisted, perhaps in deference to Marx, perhaps through ignorance of philosophical-scientific terminology, that the opposition or break *must* be treated as absolute in "gnoseology" (an expression invariably treated as synonymous with "theory of knowledge"). Marx's crypto-dualism thus remained firmly entrenched in the USSR (as is the unavowed dualism of Western "common sense" views on the process of cognition), covered over by "dialectical" jargon, by talk of "true consciousness" being the "social form of the movement of matter" and other tricks of the Dialectical Materialist's trade. Cybernetics is forcing the issue over here and, after initial stalling on speculative cybernetics, appears to be forcing it even more rapidly in the USSR. We saw it undermining the positions of orthodoxy on the sector of mind-body relations; it seems only a question

¹³ Lenin, *op cit.*, Vol. XIV, Moscow, 1947, p. 81 (repeated in the "Philosophical Notebooks," *ibid.*, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 443–44).

¹⁴ See *Bulletin*, 1959, No. 1, p. 4.

of time when Marxist crypto-dualism will be eliminated on the wider front of gnoseology and the theory of reflection, or at least reduced from ontology to methodology, where it properly belongs.

In their search for a Diamatist interpretation of the theory of information and its connection with the concept of organization, Soviet and satellite philosophers took up the "theory of reflection" where Lenin had left it, but tacitly dropped his dualistic "gnoseology." Reflection, they argue, is essentially the ability of all material objects to emit impulses, "signals" bearing some relation to the essential feature of the emitting object, and to accept and register those emanating from others. A definite relation exists between the "reflected" and the "reflecting" object, the changes in the one being registered in "coded" form by the other. At a certain level of complexity of objects or systems, this acceptance, registration and return emission becomes not only "coded" but selective, being organized in accordance with a specific program or plan imposed on, inherited or developed by the systems concerned. "Reflection" then becomes the acceptance, storing and processing of cybernetical "information."

As stated, orthodoxy to date had shown neither willingness nor ability to integrate, at the philosophical textbook level, the cybernetical category of information with that of orthodox Marxist-Leninist reflection; but neither have the progressives and the "ultras" been openly attacked for their manner of handling the problem. The terms "reflection" and "information" are in fact almost invariably coupled in textbooks on cybernetics where philosophic issues are not entirely avoided, and orthodoxy invariably suffers even when writers are obviously at pains to safeguard it. In one of the very few comprehensive introductory works on cybernetics with frequent references to the categories of Dialectical Materialism¹⁵ (to be distinguished from the above-mentioned works by satellite authors, where the emphasis is on philosophic issues and an acquaintance with the elements of cybernetics on the reader's part is subsumed), the author is forced off the path of orthodoxy in one place and into prevarications in another when dealing with information. The content of a signal, the reader is told, is "the message (or information) concerning the acting [i.e., reflected] object which the signal carries; its form, the manner in which information exists, is expressed."¹⁶ This is perfectly acceptable at the level of common speech and equally so in a functional approach; it is, however, a near-inversion of orthodoxy in Marxian terminology, which is used throughout the book wherever philosophical questions are involved (as is here patently the case, the passage being printed in italics). For information, not being "material" or "substantive," must by orthodox definition be coupled with the category of "form" and certainly not with that of "content." (The conundrum is, of course, the logical consequence of orthodoxy's insistence upon the universal supremacy of "matter" over the immaterial reflection, and of the material "content," or

¹⁵ V. D. Moiseyev, *Tsentralnye idei i filosofskie osnovy kibernetiki* (The Central Ideas and Philosophic Foundations of Cybernetics), Moscow, 1965, p. 324.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

substance, of objects over the "form" of their existence, i.e., motion or change in space and time.) In a work purporting to deal with the philosophical aspects of cybernetics from the standpoint of Dialectical Materialism, the author might have been expected to go into the question "Can machines think?" This he advisedly avoids, but is caught by a similar question posed by the concept of cybernetical information. Is "machine" information (*masbinnaya informatsiya*) identical with information stored, processed and passed on by organisms, in particular by the human brain? The "ultras" would reply that this is a question of quantitative measurement or functional adequacy in specific situations; but this would place (and does place, in the eyes of "ultras") some existing machines above the level of the lower animals and the theoretically possible artifacts above man. Such an inversion in the hierarchy of orthodox "substantive" categories is, of course, inadmissible, and the author is forced to wander off into vague perorations on the historical or "genetic" characteristics of information, which, to him, are decisive.¹⁷ (This, incidentally, is a point worth noting for those who consider "geneticism" as incompatible with orthodox Dialectical Materialism.)

In fairness to our author and his conservative colleagues, it should be noted that Western scientists attempting to grapple at the popular level with the philosophical aspects of information have also more often than not ended in a tangle. Starting from positions of philosophic positivism and the theory and practice of telecommunications, one of them, for example, states that the measure of information of a signal is its unexpectedness, and extends the argument to cover whole messages without any qualifying comment.¹⁸ On this reading, information contained in any communication, whatever its relation to reality, is to be measured by its "unexpectedness": the announcement of the end of the world tomorrow, for example, carries more information than the prognoses of a meteorological station, a science-fiction strip more than the announcement of the launching of a manned rocket, etc. This might still be acceptable if (as is frequently assumed) the term "information" were used by cyberneticians in the limited context of the technicalities of sending, receiving, storing or processing messages. In fact, however, it is extended without any qualification (except occasionally, as in the case of genetics, where the term "structural information" is sometimes used) to cover—if it is not actually identified with—the degree of organization. We are told, again without any qualifying comment, that the processing and storing of cybernetical information allows organisms to maintain the level of organization (or, more cogently, its inverse, negentropy) and, under specific circumstances, raises it. Extended further, as it often is, to cover social groups, this would mean that messages whose sender suffers from hallucinations or is engaged in spreading commercial, military or political "disinformation" help to raise or at least maintain his level of organization.

The twin problems left unresolved in speculative cybernetics, those of the inherent (or "user") value of information and its connection with the dynamics

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 183–85.

¹⁸ W. Sluckin, *Minds and Machines*, Penguin Books Ltd, Harmondsworth, 1954 and 1960, pp. 82–84.

of organization, give no peace to Soviet "ultras." Reproaches addressed to those Western cyberneticians who gloss over these points or declare them to lie outside the field of cybernetical theory abounded during the apogee of cybernetics, but, so far as can be judged, domestic progress in this direction was nil. The solitary Western writer who attempted to find a way, the French scientist Professor Léon N. Brillouin, was highly complimented in extensive reviews of his works, and his idea of connecting numerically the unit of thermodynamic entropy with that of cybernetical information (the suggested relation being of the magnitude of 10^{10}) was met with particular sympathy.¹⁹ The idea, however, produced no further repercussions in Soviet speculative cybernetics, perhaps because of the disapproval of conservative scientists, perhaps because the search would bring the "ultras" and the progressive dialecticians too close to the ideas of A. A. Bogdanov, with his "tectology" and "empiriomonism." That Soviet technical as well as speculative cybernetics has already reached an ideologically dangerous proximity with the latter becomes clear from the following comparison. In Soviet technical literature, A is generally said to reflect B if changes in B cause isomorphous (univalent) changes in A. Writing just before his final break with Lenin, Bogdanov defined causality, "reflection" or the non-dynamic connection between two objects in the following manner: "If complex A is reflected in some complex B, then the reflection [in B] is only functionally determined by the reflected [A]."²⁰ Incidentally, Bogdanov extended this concept, which is the basis of isomorphism, to connections between logical processes taking place in two systems, i.e., to the exchange and processing of information regardless of substantive differences or similarities. It should be noted in this context that Lenin's contribution to the development of the idea of the universality of the quality of "reflection" in the material world is limited to a single aside in his *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* and a transcript of Abel Rey's suggestion that something in the nature of "memory" is a quality of all material objects. When this and his unsophisticated attempts to justify Marx's crypto-dualist "gnoseology" are taken into consideration, the suspicion arises that in both cases—that is to say, in 1906, the year of writing *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*—Lenin was borrowing from Bogdanov, a dangerous political rival whom he set out to destroy by attacking his philosophical views. This would go some way toward explaining the brevity in dealing with two questions of cardinal importance in a philosophy purporting to be monistic-materialistic as well as scientific. It would also help to explain Lenin's subsequent search for a more adequate answer to the puzzle (which Bogdanov had failed to solve) in Hegel's dialectical logic (rejected *in toto* by Bogdanov for reasons which are not altogether apparent and in Abel Rey's treatise on the relation of science and philosophy). It is indeed a piquant thought that Lenin's unscrupulous and brutal defamation of Bogdanov prevents Soviet philosophers from claiming—this time perfectly legitimately—that yet another science, in fact a superscience, was conceived in embryo by a Russian and, moreover, a Bolshevik.

¹⁹ See *Bulletin*, 1962, No. 6, pp. 16–17.

²⁰ A. Bogdanov, *Empiriomonism: Stati po filosofii* (Empiriomonism: Articles on Philosophy), Vol. II, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 23.

Cosmogony—Dialectics

In his attempt to "transcend" the orthodox Marxist treatment of the laws and categories of Dialectics as scientifically-empirically founded, Sartre reproached Engels precisely on this point. "Why four laws and not ten or one?" And if science today substantiates that Engels was right, what guarantee is there that tomorrow he will not be proved wrong? This is certainly one of the weakest points of Dialectical and Historical Materialism, the exponents of which until quite lately claimed scientific validity for their doctrines and at the same time immunity from empirical-scientific criticism on grounds which remained largely unspecified. In point of fact, the Marxist-Leninist picture of the evolution of the world, treated extremely sketchily in all textbooks on Dialectical and Historical Materialism, is, apart from Marxist jargon, not very different from that produced by the "vulgar materialists" at the close of the nineteenth century. There was an evolutionary process which left its traces on our planet; organisms evolved from simple to more complex in "jumps" which could have been mere accelerations of the evolutionary rhythm; the simple forms could not compete with the more complex in the struggle for existence or adjust themselves with equal success to changes in the medium; the organic developed from the inorganic because there had not been any organic matter when the evolutionary process started. To this has now been added the theory that ponderable matter arose from the "condensation" of imponderable matter; ponderable matter is more complex and therefore less "probable." There is no aim in the whole process until one comes to man, because everything can be explained without it;—if you disagree, you are unscientific and idealist.

It is not so difficult as some people imagine to find in this materialist-deterministic picture of evolution the bits and pieces necessary to illustrate the validity of the laws and categories of Dialectical Materialism. From Engels onwards, this is what most exponents of the subject have been doing, and this is, of course, why textbook Dialectical Materialism is not a philosophy but a *Naturphilosophie* trundling behind the advance of science. This point has not passed the notice of the more astute Western critics of Dialectical Materialism. What has escaped their notice is that Lenin, in his *Philosophical Notebooks*, expressed dissatisfaction with this treatment, which he called *illustratorstvo*. (Engels, according to him, engaged in it only for the sake of popularizing Dialectical Materialism.) What Lenin wanted was a rationalistic substantiation of the Hegelian thesis of the unity of logic, dialectics and the theory of knowledge, demanding that the more complex or concrete categories be derived logically from the simplest and most abstract, starting with Being, Nonbeing, Becoming. To do so, however, without deifying dialectics and, by derivation, human thought, introducing teleology or emergent evolution, hyloism or wholism, and finally space-time philosophy, seems impossible, as witness Sartre's valiant but fruitless effort to "found" "dialectical reason" and transcend Engel's Marxism without transcending or jettisoning Marx. Why is the world organized the way it is and not otherwise? Why should there be progress, order, at all and what is the criterion and moving

force? These are questions which our positivists dismiss as pseudo-questions or at least as not belonging to "meaningful propositions," and so would the vast majority of our cyberneticians. Dialectical Materialism, however, pretends to answer them, and so do some Soviet cyberneticians—and not always in line with the requirements of officialdom. Nor can they, since the rehabilitation of Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*, easily be found guilty of falling into the trap of "idealistic" bourgeois thought. The question "why is the world organized the way it is?" was, in fact, posed publicly, very soon after the publication of the *Philosophical Notebooks*, by Pavlov's brilliant pupil, the above-mentioned Anokhin, who was repressed under Stalin for "idealistic deviations" together with Orbeli (though not nearly so severely). In his contribution, already mentioned, to *Voprosy filosofii*, Anokhin, chiding Wiener for stopping short of drawing philosophic conclusions from the results of his practical and theoretical work, suggested "reverse afferentation" (a stronger term than "negative feedback") to denote the cyclic nature of most if not all processes taking place in systems, as one method of approach to the study not only of organisms and artifacts but of the world structure.²¹

"Reverse afferentation" creates order; take it away, and chaos reigns. This would certainly seem to be the case for higher organisms up to and including human society, and the political implications for dictatorships are obvious. But what about the lowest organisms and the inorganic world? Anokhin did not attempt and has not to date attempted to produce an answer. Another physiologist, a winner of the Lenin Prize, went some way toward answering the question some years later, again in the columns of *Voprosy filosofii*. In an article on the "Modeling of Information and Programs of Complex Systems," M. M. Amosov, of Kiev University, dealt *in abstracto* with the phenomenon of "systems" (defined as groups of elements so strongly interconnected that outside influences on individual elements can usually be ignored), each of which is in turn composed of subsystems. Thus, each system is both an upper and a lower system with a program of its own which it tries to execute. It is, or may be, prevented from doing so by several factors—internal resistance (from its own subsystems), interference from equivalent systems or the influence of the main program of the larger system to which it belongs. Each level of programs (or "storeys") has its own code or language containing ever more information as we go up the scale; a higher language is not fully and critically analysable in terms of a lower or of its own but only in terms of a still higher code.²² The writer confesses that he was fascinated by this theory, which may be of no practical value to science but could in politics obviously be used to demonstrate the fallibility of any program of any system, including that of the Communist dictatorship, and in fact could be extended to cover the thesis of the possible existence of systems infinitely more complex and therefore higher than humanity as a whole, with programs which we were obeying without knowing exactly why—something, we submit, near to a "cybernetical" proof of the existence of the Deity and a whole hierarchy

²¹ *Voprosy filosofii*, 1957, No. 4.

²² *Ibid.*, 1963, No. 12.

of angels. The idea has, understandably, not been taken up in the USSR; but the distinguished mathematician Kolmogorov shocked his audience at the Conference on the Philosophical Problems of Cybernetics by postulating that artifacts of ever greater complexity could be constructed until they began to reproduce themselves, creating ever higher systems (repeating here the ideas of John von Neumann), and that this was indeed the view of contemporary Dialectical Materialists on evolution.²³

Neither Amosov nor Kolmogorov was overtly attacked for "idealism." As stated, however, the conference's resolution contained a paragraph asking scientists to stick to theories which could be applied in practice to help in the construction of the material and technical basis of Communism, and Kolmogorov's contribution was not included in the collection of papers published. The absence of Amosov from the conference also demands explanation. On the other hand, Kolmogorov's more factual suggestion that we should abandon our concept of life as something which can only evolve on certain substrata, giant DNA molecules, albumen, etc., and develop a purely functional approach was echoed in many articles, particularly in the postscript review in the Russian edition of Klaus's book. Holding on to the traditional view that substantive differences and similarities between objects and classes of objects are decisive, i.e., that content is primary and form secondary, Klaus postulates that two systems, even if identically reacting to identical changes in medium, must be held to be different if constructed of different materials—to which his reviewer reacted with the sarcastic reference to the "unfindable Kantian thing in itself, which refuses to manifest its identity by any outward effect."²⁴ It seems indeed an unanswerable argument, and could be supported by reference to Lenin's transcript from Hegel's definition of the real: "Not things but the laws of their movement are materialistic."²⁵

Postscript

The relevant appendix to the paper on cybernetics and Soviet ideology as well as the present article were prepared on the basis of an analysis of materials, particularly articles and reports in *Voprosy filosofii*, published in the USSR prior to the close of 1965, and more particularly during the period of the apogee of cybernetics, which appears to have come to a close a year earlier. For reasons that will be examined in an article dealing specifically with the impact of cybernetics on Communist economics, cybernetics dropped out of the vocabulary of the Soviet Communist leaders soon after the departure from supreme office of its high patron N. S. Khrushchev. Since then, the volume of contributions by "ultras" to *Voprosy filosofii* has dropped sharply and the pungency of their arguments greatly diminished. The place vacated by speculative cybernetics, however, was reoccupied not by Dialectical and Historical Materialism but by contributions on disciplines allied to cybernetics, particularly the theory of

²³ *Ibid.*, 1962, No. 11, p. 147.

²⁴ Klaus, *op. cit.* (Russian translation), p. 493.

²⁵ Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 82.

systems or organization. It is arguable, therefore, that future studies in the development of speculative cybernetics should include materials where cybernetics is not mentioned by name (as it was not in Amosov's article). In the context of the present enquiry, it is, in the present writer's view, essential to note the following points. The effect of the development of theoretical and speculative cybernetics on Dialectical Materialism must be examined at three distinct levels: first, that of textbook Dialectical Materialism, where the effect has been practically nil to date; second, that of the post-Khrushchevian "general line" laid down in an authoritative article in *Kommunist* by A. Berg and the "ultra" (now, more properly, ex-"ultra") I. B. Novik—a compromise between orthodoxy and the minimum demands of technical-theoretical cybernetics;²⁶ and third, that of "advanced" or "functional" Dialectical Materialism, obviously reserved for the few *cognoscenti*. Finally, we must note that a book by a pronounced dogmatist, A. D. Vislobokov's *The Dialectics of the Process of Cognizing Nature, and Cybernetics*, was passed under the sharpest critical review in an early 1966 issue of *Voprosy filosofii*,²⁷ and, most significantly, the same issue carried a report on a seminar on the general theory of information in which the name of A. A. Bogdanov is mentioned as one of the founders of the discipline and without any reference to his political feuds with Lenin.²⁸

²⁶ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 2.

²⁷ *Voprosy filosofii*, 1966, No. 2, pp. 157–65.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

The Communist Bloc

The Generation Problem in China, and its Implications for Sino-Soviet Relations

For a brief period after Khrushchev's overthrow, many Western observers thought that a *rapprochement* between Moscow and Peking was in the offing. After all, during the last few months of his tenure of office, the boisterous First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party had increasingly become the focal point of Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda, which described him as a man with whom reconciliation was absolutely impossible. Everything hostile to Chinese policies came to be known in Peking under the heading of "Khrushchevism." Subsequent developments, however, were to show that it was not Khrushchev, or at least not he alone, who was responsible for the critical state of Sino-Soviet relations, and very soon the Peking propaganda machine began talking of the "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" which had taken hold of the USSR and which was spreading throughout the world Communist movement. Now, when it is being widely speculated that a struggle has begun for the succession to aged, ailing Mao Tse-tung, it may well be asked whether the Chinese leader's demise will open the door to a restoration of the unity which once existed between the two Communist giants.

This question is difficult to answer for a number of reasons. Although the complexity of Mao's personality and his role in the Chinese Communist movement make it quite impossible to draw parallels with Soviet developments, there have been numerous debates in the Western press on whether to call Mao a Lenin or a Stalin. It would be perhaps more correct to say that he is Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky rolled into one. Mao may be compared to Lenin inasmuch as he was the first undisputed leader of the Chinese Communist movement and led this movement to victory in his own country using his own tactics. He is comparable to Stalin inasmuch as at the beginning of his career he had nothing like the unchallenged authority enjoyed by Lenin within the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks, being forced to resort to intrigue. In this sense he is just as much an *apparatchik* as Stalin was. Finally, Mao may be compared to Trotsky insofar as he is an adherent of the theory of "permanent revolution," which he developed and adapted to modern conditions. Unlike Trotsky, however, Mao, the father of Communist China, leaves this theory behind as the legacy of the unquestioned leader of his country.

It is difficult to say to what extent such recent developments on the Chinese political scene as the dismissal of Peng Chen and the purge of "right-wing bourgeois elements" are manifestations of a power struggle among Mao's would-be successors. There is, however, evidence which suggests that what is

taking place is merely a systematic purge or else an "inner-Party struggle" of the kind described by Liu Shao-chi, now President of the Chinese People's Republic, in 1941:

Inner-Party struggle is absolutely indispensable to protecting the purity and independence of the Party, to guaranteeing that the Party's activities constantly proceed along the lines which represent the highest interests of the proletariat, and to preserving the Party's basic proletarian character. With this object in view, inner-Party struggle must be conducted from two sides, or on two fronts. This is because the enemy's ideology influences the Party from two directions, attacking the Party from both the Right and the "Left." This is expressed in the Party by Right or "Left" opportunism.¹

A puzzling feature of the current purge is that Peng Chen (together with his subordinates Teng To, Liao Mo-sha and Wu Han) has been accused by the Party of "right-wing deviationism," whereas one would have thought that he was guilty of left-wing deviationism, if anything. It was Peng Chen who represented the Chinese Communists at the Indonesian Communist Party's forty-fifth anniversary celebrations in May of last year, and it can be assumed that he was one of the points of contact between the two parties. He was thus in all probability one of the staunchest supporters of the ill-fated "September 30th" movement which led to the annihilation of the Indonesian Communist Party. This would certainly make him guilty of "left-wing adventurism." Possibly Peng was guilty on both counts, possibly his enemies in the Politburo and the Central Committee seized on his mistakes as a welcome opportunity for eliminating him from the group of Mao's potential successors.

On the whole, however, it is idle to speculate on who will succeed Mao, especially in view of the strong likelihood that after his death China will come under a collective leadership (in fact, the country has been run by a collective leadership for some time now, Mao merely laying down the general political line). A satisfactory answer to the question of Mao's successor can be obtained, if at all, only by analysing the overall situation in China, particularly in the Chinese Communist Party itself. One thing, however, is certain: the present Chinese leadership, the "Old Guard," so to speak, has no more pressing concern than to ensure that "Maoism" does not become "polluted" and that the Chinese revolution proceeds in an orderly fashion. Alarmed at the upsurge of "revisionism" in the USSR, the Chinese leaders are doing everything they can to bring up the younger generation to be "worthy heirs of the revolution." The "generation problem" was the central theme at the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Young Communist League held in June 1964, and has dominated the national press ever since. At the afore-mentioned congress, Hu Yao-pan, Secretary General of the Young Communist League, warned:

The period of socialism is a historical period of transition from capitalist society to Communist society; it is a period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. What distinguishes this period is that classes and class struggle still exist, that the struggle

¹ Liu Shao-chi, *On Inner-Party Struggle*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1954, p. 1.

between the road of socialism and the road of capitalism remains, that the question of "who will win" is still unresolved, that there is still a danger of capitalism making a comeback. . . . The new bourgeois elements and new rich peasants are the social foundation of modern revisionism. Once the revisionist forces occupy a dominant position, a socialist society will evolve into capitalism. It is precisely in anticipation of this situation that imperialism has never for a single moment forgotten to implement towards the socialist countries a strategy of achieving victory by peaceful means.²

An Tzu-wen, a member of the Party Central Committee and Director of the latter's Organization Department, was even more specific:

Class enemies are attempting to usurp control over some areas of the Party and government by putting on Communist hats and brandishing People's Government signboards so that they can carry out counterrevolutionary policies to protect the interests of the exploiter class. . . . Viewing the development in the Soviet Union, our class enemies at home have decided that the day would soon come for them to resume power. . . . They say that whoever wins the hearts of the youth will gain state power. On the one hand, they instill reactionary ideology into the minds of their own children, inducing them to follow the road to capitalism and feudalism. On the other, they undertake to corrode and poison the minds of our revolutionary cadres and the great masses of youth in order to remove the corner-stones of socialism and to sink roots for revisionism. In short, they are determined to continue to struggle against us on the issue of successors.³

Of course, this problem is not new in China. It can be said to have arisen back in 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party leaders decided to desist from "liquidating the bourgeoisie as a class" and instead make use of the latter's technical knowledge for national reconstruction purposes. This decision did not spring from humanitarian motives; the bourgeoisie was the sole source of technical specialists, and the Party knew that in such a backward country as China it could not build up its own army of "proletarian" specialists fast enough. As a result, scientific and "cultural" workers continued to be recruited from the ranks of the bourgeoisie, while those that were not came very much under the latter's influence. The Party's injunction "to be a Red and be an expert" did not help matters; only in rare cases did the "Reds" become experts, while the latter turned "pink" at the very most.

It was, therefore, only a matter of time before "right-wing deviationism" came to the surface—in Hu Fū-na's group and the "hundred blossoms" experiment, for example—and to this day the Party is under pressure from the "right-wing elements," particularly among the specialists (in which category ministers appointed on the basis of technical qualifications rather than past Party affiliations must be included). The gravity and complexity of the Party's struggle for revolutionary continuity was clearly reflected in a speech by Party Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping at the third broadened session of the Eighth Central Committee back in 1957. Said Teng:

² *Peking Review*, 1964, No 28, pp 9–10

³ *Hongqi*, Peking, December 22, 1964.

The elimination of the bourgeoisie is a fundamental question for the socialist revolution. The bourgeoisie, and especially its intellectuals, now constitute the main force that can challenge the proletariat. Politically they still have status, capital and influence, and the proletariat needs their knowledge. But unless they firmly undertake socialist remolding, clashes between them and the proletariat will be inevitable. The only way out for the bourgeois intellectuals is to remold themselves and serve the socialist economic base. Otherwise they risk becoming "gentlemen suspended in the air who couldn't touch either heaven or earth."⁴

As we have seen, since these words were spoken the problem has remained unsolved, while the Party's confidence in the victory of "socialism" has diminished.

Indeed, compared with the generation problem and the problem of revolutionary continuity, the question of Mao's successor is of secondary importance. Here the situation is paradoxical; the ageing Party leadership, while constantly stressing the need to educate worthy heirs to the revolution, is stubbornly clinging to power, and as yet has not admitted a single member of the younger generation to its ranks.

Let us take the Politburo's Standing Committee, for example, where the real power lies. Its seven members are, with dates of birth: Mao Tse-tung (1893); Liu Shao-chi (1898); Chou En-lai (1898); Chu Te (1886); Chen Yun (1908); Lin Piao (1908); and Teng Hsiao-ping (1900). As we see, even the youngest members, Chen Yun and Lin Piao, are close on 60; both men took part in Mao's "long march" and are typical representatives of the "Old Guard."

Neither Lin Piao, who suffers from poor health, nor the aged Chu Te seems to be taking a very active part in the Standing Committee's work, while as for Chen Yun, virtually nothing has been heard of him since 1962, and whether he is still a member of this select body is difficult to say. Probably the most important members of the Standing Committee are Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Liu has been President of the Chinese People's Republic since 1959, while Teng is the Party's Secretary General. These two men appear to have the real power in the Party, and may be expected to lead, at least initially, any collective leadership that may arise after Mao's death. They are hardly likely to make any departure from Mao's "permanent revolution" theory, which, it should be remembered, embraces China herself as well as the rest of the world. Teng is an out-and-out Party *apparatchik* noted for his radical views; for the last few years he has been leading the campaign against "right-wing bourgeois deviationism." As for Liu Shao-chi, in many respects he is probably even more radical than Mao. Liu was director of the "cave university" for training Party cadres in Yunnan, and in one of his lectures, which were subsequently published in a brochure entitled *How to Be a Good Communist*, we read:

At all times and on all questions, a Communist Party member should take into account the interests of the Party as a whole, and place the Party's interests above his personal problems and interests.... He should have only the Party and the

⁴ *Saturday*, Geneva, December 1957, p. 107.

Party's interests uppermost in his mind and not considerations of a personal character. He should ensure that his personal interests accord with the Party's interests or even merge with them. Thus, when his personal interests conflict with the Party's interests he will be able to submit to the Party's interests and sacrifice his personal interests without the slightest hesitation or reluctance.⁵

There are many other passages reflecting Liu's fanatical dedication to Communism. Like Mao, Liu is sincerely convinced of the superiority of "socialist awareness" over technical might, of the "spiritual atom bomb" over the atom bombs of the "imperialists." On more than one occasion, he has taken a most active part in the ideological dispute with the Soviet Communist Party, a matter on which he is scarcely likely to agree to any sort of compromise.

Attention has already been drawn to the high average age of the members of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo. That the situation in this respect is little better in the Politburo as a whole is apparent from the following list of the remaining members and alternate members of this body:

Members

	Date of Birth	Other Positions
Chen Yi	1901....	Foreign Minister
Ho Lung	1896....	Deputy Premier; Chairman of Physical Culture and Sports Commission
Li Fu-chun	1901....	Deputy Premier; Chairman of State Planning Commission
Li Hsien-nien	1908....	Deputy Premier; Minister of Finance
Li Ching-chuan	1905....	First Secretary of Southwest Bureau of Party Central Committee
Liu Po-cheng	1891....	Vice-Chairman of National Defense Council
Peng Chen*	1900....	
Peng Teh-huai**	1898....	Deputy Premier
Tan Chen-lin	1902....	Deputy Premier; Director of Agricultural and Forestry Administrative Office
Tung Pi-wu	1886 ..	Vice-President of Chinese People's Republic

Alternate Members

Chang Wen-tien**	1901....	
Chen Po-ta	1904. . .	Editor of Party journal <i>Hongqi</i>
Kang Sheng	1899....	Member of Party Central Committee Secretariat
Lu Ting-yi	1907....	Deputy Premier; Director of Propaganda Department of Party Central Committee
Po Yi-po	1907....	Deputy Premier
Ulanfu	1903....	Deputy Premier; Chairman of Nationalities Affairs Commission

* Peng was recently dismissed from the position of First Secretary of the Peking Party Committee, whether he also lost his position in the Politburo is not known

** Apparently in disgrace

As we see, even the youngest Politburo member, Li Hsien-nien, is approaching 60, and can thus hardly be considered as an "heir to the revolution." On the other hand, this homogeneous age structure of the Politburo means that the latter's members are unlikely to begin quarreling over policy after Mao's death; in all probability they will close ranks and intensify their efforts to nurture a new

⁵ Liu Shao-chi, *How to Be a Good Communist*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1953, p. 51

generation of faithful Maoists. In short, the composition of the Politburo gives no grounds whatsoever for supposing that Moscow and Peking will move closer together after Mao's death. Most of the Politburo members, moreover, have already burnt their bridges behind them in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Let us now consider the following list of the youngest members of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee:

Members

	Date of Birth	Other Positions
An Tzu-wen	1909....	Director of Organization Department of Party Central Committee
Hsiao Hua	1915....	Director of General Political Department of People's Liberation Army
Hu Yao-pang	1915....	First Secretary of Young Communist League
Liao Cheng-chih	1908....	Chairman of Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission
Wu Hsiu-chan	1909....	Director of International Liaison Department of Party Central Committee

Alternate Members

Fang Yi	1915....	Director of Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries
Lo Kuei-po	1915....	Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Liu Hsiao	1907....	Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Saifudin	1910....	Chairman of Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region
Tan Chi-lung	1912....	First Secretary of Shantung Party Committee
Yen Hung-yen ..	1908....	First Secretary of Yunnan Party Committee

Theoretically, of course, there is the possibility that this group will produce an opposition movement. This possibility, however, is remote: the average age of the members of this group is still high, and it was one of the youngest of them all, Hu Yao-pang, who called for China's youth to be brought up to be worthy "heirs to the revolution." All the members of this group can be considered as belonging to the "Old Guard": their outlook has been molded by personal experience of partisan warfare, with its constant risk of capture and execution, and—here is probably the main reason for their adherence to Mao's theories—by their rout of the incomparably better armed and equipped Kuomintang army. These men saw with their own eyes how the "atom bomb of socialist awareness" proved victorious over the technical might of the "capitalists" and "imperialists," and are convinced that even today China's domestic and foreign policy problems can best be solved by aggressive tactics. In other words, no alternative to Maoism and the present leadership appears to be in sight.

There are, however, two further questions connected with China's problem of revolutionary continuity. The first is whether the Party will be successful in educating a take-over generation worthy of the revolution, and the second is whether Mao's successors will be able to come up with any alternative to the present general political line.

The first question depends largely on how realistic the Party leaders are prepared to be. Here the latter appear to be taking no account of the changed

circumstances under which later generations joined the Party. The first-generation Chinese Communists went through the hard school of partisan warfare. In deciding to become Party members, they opted for a life full of dangers and deprivations. Those who joined Mao in the late twenties had seen virtually the entire first Central Committee of the Party shot before a Kuomintang firing squad. The education of these veteran Communists was more akin to natural selection. Most of them were, to all intents and purposes, confronted with the choice of victory or death. Chinese citizens who joined the Party after the civil war had ended in 1949 were faced with no such alternative, most joining for reasons quite different from those of their predecessors. Nevertheless, they are expected to display exactly the same qualities as the latter. The "Old Guard" demands the following from the "heirs to the revolution":

1. They must be genuine Marxist-Leninists.
2. They must be revolutionaries who wholeheartedly serve the overwhelming majority of the people of China and the whole world.
3. They must be proletarian political leaders capable of rallying and working with the overwhelming majority. Not only must they unite with those who agree with them, but they must also be good at uniting with those who disagree and even with those who formerly opposed them and have since been proved wrong.
4. They must set an example in applying the Party's democratic centralism, must master the method of leadership based on the principle of "from the masses, to the masses," and must cultivate a democratic style of work and be good at listening to the masses.
5. They must be modest and prudent and guard against arrogance and impetuosity; they must be imbued with the spirit of self-criticism and have the courage to correct mistakes and shortcomings in their work.⁶

The Party leadership, disturbed by the arrogance of the medium- and lower-ranking Party cadres and by the general tendency of Party members to rest on their revolutionary laurels, is doing all it can to prevent the "demagnetization" of the Chinese revolution and the sclerosis of the Party. Its principal instruments are purges, massive propaganda campaigns and the setting up of "heroes" for the guidance of Party cadres.

These "heroes" are depicted as fanatical Communists devoid of personal interests and living only for the Party and the future of China. Their fictitious nature is suggested by the improbably detailed accounts of their lives given by the press. The first of these supermen to appear on the scene was Lei Feng, a peasant's son who became an officer in the People's Liberation Army. Apparently Lei, who was killed in an accident, had all his life kept a diary, which subsequently came into the hands of a Party functionary. The latest addition is Wang Chie (the name Chie, incidentally, means "hero"), who, perhaps significantly, was of middle-class peasant origin and thus scarcely satisfied the requirements of class

⁶ *Peking Review*, 1964, No. 32, pp. 13-14 (subheadings inserted in translation of editorial entitled "Cultivating and Training Millions of Successors to the Proletarian Revolution" in *Jen Min Jih Pao*, Peking, August 3, 1964).

purity. A native of Shantung Province, Chie joined the army in 1960, gaining a reputation for professional competence and "socialist awareness," and the Young Communist League in 1962. On August 14, 1965, by which time he had become a platoon commander, Chie was sent to a people's commune in Kiangsu Province to train a people's militia detachment. During the training, ammunition lying on the ground began to explode. Chie promptly flung himself on top of it and was killed; his action saved the lives of twelve trainees. He was only 23.⁷ Chie's courageous act impressed the "Old Guard," which is trying particularly hard to encourage such a self-sacrificing attitude among Chinese youth in view of China's possible involvement in the Vietnamese war. Typical in this respect was an editorial in the December 8, 1965, issue of the journal *China Youth News*, which contained the following passage:

Victory cannot be won without cost in terms of bloodshed and sacrifices. It is the greatest glory and highest value that a minority of people sacrifice themselves in order to win the nation's liberation and the happiness of the majority.

In the same vein Lo Jui-ching, Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army, declared at a meeting held to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the victory over Japan:

Only by being unafraid of shedding blood and making sacrifices can bloodshedding and sacrifices be reduced, and only by having a small number of people shed blood and making sacrifices can we ensure that the majority of people need not shed blood and make sacrifices.⁸

In general, however, it can be said that the Chinese leaders' efforts to secure revolutionary continuity are not as yet proving particularly successful. The aftermath of the civil war and numerous Communist experiments is becoming increasingly manifest. The overwhelming majority of young Chinese dream not of revolutionary struggle but of a quiet and secure existence. Huang Huo-ching, First Secretary of the Party's Liaoning Provincial Committee, ascribed the "moral disintegration" of the lower Party cadres to the failure of leading cadres to evaluate correctly the personal qualities of candidates for leading posts. Huang gave numerous examples to illustrate his point; in one case, he said,

... a young man was trained and was successively appointed to be a leader of a militia company, a deputy leader of a militia battalion, and a secretary of the [Young Communist] League branch. However, as the wrong man was chosen, and the methods of training were also questionable, this young man later became arrogant and conceited, divorced himself from the masses, and even violated the law and discipline.

Huang had the following to say on the selection of suitable cadres:

The selection of "successors" and their training are two problems which are mutually related and yet are distinct from each other. They may be compared with the problems of selecting seed and nursing seedlings in agriculture. Seeds generally

⁷ See, for example, *Ta Kung Pao*, Peking, November 13, 1965.

⁸ *Hsinhua*, September 4, 1965.

have to be carefully cultivated before they can grow into strong seedlings.... To know the character of a person sometimes requires a rather long period of time.... Can we, then, guard against choosing the wrong people? Yes, we can. That is, from the very beginning, we must carry out the class line firmly. First, candidates accepted for training as revolutionary successors and particularly as elements of the leadership hardcore should, in the main, be selected from among the poor and lower-middle peasants—those who have keen political thinking and good class origin. In judging a man, the masses not only look at his class origin but also consider his family environment and the practical influence exerted on him by the social environment.⁹

Finally, Huang drew attention to the five ideals formulated by Mao which we have already quoted. These ideals, he said, had been advanced by the ruling class of a Communist society—the proletariat—, just as ruling classes in the past had established their own ideals for the guidance of future generations.

Whether the Chinese leaders will succeed in creating a worthy take-over generation depends, of course, on developments both inside and outside China. Should China be involved in a major war, for example, the Chinese people would doubtless produce any amount of heroes, including those of the Communist brand. Internally, on the other hand, the Party leaders are faced with a grave difficulty; since they have so far failed to bring about a social revolution within China, and since such a revolution can scarcely be expected to come about in the near future, they will have to continue relying on the bourgeois specialists and wasting their energies on fighting “right-wing bourgeois elements” and “revisionists.” In this connection, it would be as well to realize that in all probability Soviet developments and Soviet propaganda are having almost no effect on Chinese affairs. The demands made by the Chinese rightists and those made by Soviet theory and practice are comparable only insofar as they reflect similar problems.

One thing is certain: power in present-day China is in the hands of the fifty- and sixty-year-olds, the veterans of the “long march,” and is likely to stay there after Mao’s death, if only because the campaign to educate “heirs to the revolution” is being focused on the twenty- and thirty-year-olds rather than the forty-year-olds. Thus, it cannot be expected that Mao’s death will lead to any radical reappraisal of China’s policy toward the Soviet Union, her evaluation of the world situation, or her expansionist tactics.

There remains the question whether Mao’s successors will have any alternative to present Chinese policy. Here it must be pointed out that within the framework of Maoism China has already carried out numerous experiments, ranging from the “great leap forward” to the comparatively liberal economic policies of the initial and present periods of the Chinese People’s Republic’s existence, from Bandung to outright aggression and expansion. Mao, in fact, was his own revisionist in that he attempted to adapt his theories to changing political and economic conditions. Theoretically there is only one alternative to Mao’s political

⁹ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, May 21, 1965.

line, namely, total renunciation of all pretensions to being a great power and submission to the Soviet Union in all matters of domestic and foreign policy for the sake of Soviet aid. Needless to say, the possibility that any future Chinese leadership would follow such a course is remote indeed.

The Sino-Soviet conflict arose primarily because the Chinese leaders could neither renounce their great-power pretensions nor realize them by following the Soviet path. On the other hand, it would be wrong to say that China ever claimed leadership of the Communist camp. Mao and his associates knew full well that China was too weak for this, and that such claims would merely result in destroying the Communist camp's "monolithic unity," which was particularly beneficial to China. In actual fact, the Chinese claims were very much more modest—although none the more realistic for that. The Chinese leaders wanted to join the Soviets in working out a general political line for the Communist camp, and to have the right of vetoing Moscow's decisions. Moscow, of course, could not accept this, for the simple reason that the two countries were developing along completely different lines, and what was China's meat was the USSR's poison as regards both national and world Communist interests.

This state of affairs has not since changed, neither will it change after Mao Tse-tung's demise. A powerful China with all her major economic problems solved will be in a better position to cooperate with the USSR than a weak China compelled to further her great-power claims by open expansion and the instigation of civil wars in backward countries. China is in a vicious circle. She can only solve her economic problems with the assistance of the technical intelligentsia, but it is precisely the latter group which is coming in for especially harsh treatment at the hands of the anti-intellectually inclined Chinese leaders. The technical intelligentsia does not have the slightest chance of seizing power, or even of exerting any kind of influence on the general line of Chinese policy, in the immediate future. This means that the present crisis in China may be expected to last at least another ten or fifteen years, with considerable attendant dangers for world peace. Responsible politicians would do well to view China not only as a nuclear power equipped with intercontinental rockets but also as a state ruled by an "Old Guard" which firmly believes in the superiority of "socialist awareness" and bent on violent world revolution. In short, China may go the way of Japan, which developed into a major industrial nation but continued to be ruled by a feudal, militaristic aristocracy which failed to comprehend that new means of waging war call for radically new policies.

A. Kashin

Agriculture

Mechanization of Agriculture in the USSR

The Five-Year Plan adopted at the Twenty-Third Party Congress calls for a 25-percent increase in agricultural production. Soviet farms have been asked to try particularly hard to produce more grain (the planned increase here being 30 percent) and livestock produce.¹

The pace of agricultural mechanization is to be boosted accordingly. The number of tractors is to be increased by 1,790,000, that of trucks by 1,100,000, that of tractor trailers by 900,000, that of truck trailers by 275,000 and that of grain combines by 550,000. The number of excavators is to be increased by 330 percent above the 1963 level, that of bulldozers by 130 percent and that of scrapers by 120 percent. All in all, the monetary value of the agricultural machinery pool is to show a rise of 190 percent.²

In his Congress speech, Party chief Brezhnev justified these ambitious plans by arguing that production on the country's state and collective farms could not be raised without "continual saturation with machinery."³ Thus, once more the Party has been forced to concede that Soviet agriculture is insufficiently mechanized, after having boasted for so many years that under Soviet rule agriculture had become the "largest highly-mechanized branch of the socialist economy."⁴

According to the Party press, the Central Committee plenary meetings on agriculture held in March and September of last year, and particularly the recent Party Congress, produced an "unprecedented labor upsurge" on state and collective farms. It was claimed, for example, that greater efficiency was being displayed in the repair of agricultural machinery and in the preparation of seeds for the spring sowing campaign. Such claims are usual after major Party gatherings. In fact, the indications are that field work is being carried out no better this year than before. Thus, it was recently admitted in the press that hardly anywhere were tractors being used rationally during the height of the field work. The farms have failed in their attempts to transfer their tractor pools to a two-shift system because of the shortage of tractor drivers. Although increasing numbers of tractor drivers are being trained in mechanization schools and on crash courses, tens of thousands of tractor drivers and other machine operators are leaving the farms for industrial and forestry enterprises, where pay and living conditions are better. The result is that the drivers continue to work "only one shift, and half-heartedly at that."⁵

In an effort to cut down sowing times, many farms make their tractor drivers work 24 hours at a stretch. However, this is merely resulting in reduced labor

¹ *Izvestia*, April 10, 1966.

² *Tekhnika i sel'skoye khozyaystvo*, 1966, No. 3, p. 3.

³ *Izvestia*, March 30, 1966.

⁴ See, for example, *Entsiklopedichesky sel'skokhozyaystvennyy slovar-spravochnik (kratky)* (A Concise Encyclopedic Agricultural Dictionary), Moscow, 1959, p. 482.

⁵ *Selskaya gazeta*, Minsk, April 24, 1966.

productivity and more slipshod work. Indeed, two-shift operation is the only answer; Soviet experts have calculated that its introduction would be tantamount to the utilization of an extra 700,000 tractors.⁶

Failure to prepare machinery for the spring sowing in Siberia was duly noted by the newspaper *Selskaya zhizn*:

Tens of thousands of agricultural machines are awaiting repair in Siberian regions. In the Altai Krai, for example, over 11,000 tractors have not left the workshops, in the Novosibirsk Oblast 6,000 and in the Omsk Oblast another 6,000.... Almost everywhere the situation as regards the preparation of machinery is worse than last year. In the Altai region 500 tractors less had been repaired by February 1 than by the same time last year, in the Omsk Oblast 200 less, etc.⁷

This state of affairs is by no means confined to Siberia. In Turkmenia, for example, 2,500 tractors had not been repaired in time for the spring sowing.⁸ Since by the end of 1964 there were 36,800 tractors in the Altai Krai, 17,300 in the Novosibirsk Oblast, 18,500 in the Omsk Oblast and 15,800 in Turkmenia,⁹ nearly 30 percent of the tractor pool in the three Siberian regions and 17 percent of that in Turkmenia was affected.

Moreover, the quality of the repair work is as bad as ever. On numerous occasions, tractors leaving the workshops of "Selkhoztekhnika" (the all-Union association responsible for the sale and repair of farm equipment) with a seasonal serviceability certificate break down on the way to the farm and are subsequently found to have serious defects.¹⁰ In a *Pravda* article of November 23, 1965, entitled "The Village is Waiting for Reliable Machines," quality control specialist K. Safonov frankly conceded that "the technical level, durability and reliability of many agricultural machines leave much to be desired." During the past year, he said, "Selkhoztekhnika" had returned approximately 15 percent of all purchased machines to the factory for major repairs. This drastic measure, however, had failed to produce any positive result; the percentage of defective tractors returned to seven plants had actually increased. "Selkhoztekhnika" specialists had tested over one thousand tractors of various makes and found that a considerable percentage broke down prematurely. At two factories 178 tractors were tested, and all found to be defective.

Although some plants try to improve the quality of their products, the results are usually negative. The "Serp i molot" plant in Kharkov, for example, made over one thousand design changes in one of its engines in the space of three years, only to receive more complaints about the engine than ever before.

⁶ *Selskaya zhizn*, January 19, 1964.

⁷ *Ibid.*, February 10, 1966.

⁸ *Selskaya gazeta*, April 24, 1966.

⁹ *Selskoye khozyaystvo SSSR: Statistichesky sbornik* (The Agriculture of the USSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1960, p. 638; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu. Statistichesky yezhegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1964: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1966, p. 381.

¹⁰ *Selskaya zhizn*, February 17, 1966.

This is a sad reflection on the competence of the technical staff of one of the USSR's largest agricultural machinery plants.¹¹

Poor organization is another reason for the low quality of Soviet agricultural machinery. The Minsk Tractor Plant, for example, gives a 3,000-hour guarantee with its tractors, whereas the majority of the 800 components received from outside suppliers have guarantees of only 1,000–2,000 hours. As a result, the plant has had to scrap every fourth tire received from the Dnepropetrovsk Tire Plant, and every fourth cylinder and distributor.¹²

Spare parts are being produced in excessive amounts, but unfortunately on a "tonnage" basis, so that their quality is markedly inferior to that of parts in new machinery (during the course of a single year the "Selkhoztekhnika" of the RSFSR returned over one million spare parts to the makers). Sometimes an enterprise sends out as spare parts pieces of equipment already rejected by the customer. A plant in Noginsk, for example, foists its rejected fuel equipment on "Selkhoztekhnika" in this manner, knowing that the latter organization is short of such spare parts.¹³ It is therefore not surprising that many collective farms have resorted to the practice of acquiring new machinery purely for "cannibalization" purposes.¹⁴

The range of spare parts is excessively large. The spare parts catalogue of the "Belorus" tractor, for example, is a massive tome of 580 closely-printed pages. Even an experienced storeman cannot always find his way around the spare parts jungle. The manufacturers, moreover, refuse to cooperate on standardizing even the smallest parts, so that there are cases when a simple nut for an ordinary tractor plow will not fit a plow of identical design made by another manufacturer.¹⁵

One of the results of all these shortcomings has been a sharp decline in the average daily tractor performance. Over the last few years, it has been 14 percent in the collective farms and 21 percent in the state farms. The performance decline was particularly great on state farms in Kazakhstan (35 percent), Azerbaidzhan (33 percent), Turkmenia (31 percent) and the Ukraine (23 percent).¹⁶

Labor mechanization is even more inadequate on the livestock-breeding sector. Only about one-quarter of all cows on state and collective farms are milked mechanically. Dung collection on stock-raising farms is only seven percent mechanized, and fodder distribution even less. Even such a simple procedure as watering the animals is only half mechanized. The cause of this sorry situation is the lack of machinery. Most stock farm machinery is manufactured in small, ill-equipped enterprises, and is not only of poor quality but extremely expensive; for example, a fodder steamer with a wooden trough and an ordinary conveyer costs 1,400 rubles.¹⁷ A widely popularized milking machine

¹¹ *Pravda*, November 23, 1965

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, December 14, 1965.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, January 5, 1965.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, December 14, 1965.

¹⁶ *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaystva*, 1965, No. 12, p. 20.

¹⁷ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, December 14, 1965.

which the farms were put under strong pressure to acquire proved so unsatisfactory that 36,000 of them, worth 100,000,000 rubles, have piled up in the storehouses of "Selkhoztekhnika," while thousands more are standing idle on the farms.¹⁸ At the recent Party Congress one of the delegates, a milkmaid, complained that during the course of a single shift she frequently had to carry as much as one-and-a-half tons of cow feed since more often than not the conveyers were not working.¹⁹

On many farms, extreme negligence is displayed in the handling of machinery. Machinery is sometimes left standing out in the fields because no parking area, covered or otherwise, has been set aside for it. Plows and harrows lie embedded in the mud, seeders, often stripped of vital parts, are left to the mercy of the elements, the grain germinating in their hoppers. Soviet experts have calculated that if agricultural equipment were to be properly looked after its service life could be extended by 30–40 percent and 500,000,000 rubles annually saved on repairs.²⁰

If the ambitious agricultural mechanization plans are to be realized, many new machine-building plants will have to be built and existing plants radically re-organized. More and better qualified engineers, designers and other specialists will be required. At the present time, it takes from five to ten and more years to put a newly conceived agricultural machine on the market, so that more often than not it is obsolete from the very start. A mere 15–17 prototypes per year are given a positive rating by the state testing authorities.²¹ At the Congress, state farm director Dombrovsky complained of the lack of an efficient potato harvester, and added that a cabbage harvester had been in the design stage for 14 years and a grain combine suitable for use in non-black-earth zones for about 17 years.²²

On May 16, an international exhibition of agricultural machinery, at which 20 countries were represented, opened in Moscow. Just before the exhibition opened, the chairman of its organizing committee, Minister of Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Construction I. F. Sinitsyn, declared in an article that Soviet agricultural machinery had "given a good account of itself" in Europe, the Near East, Africa and Latin America. Boasted Sinitsyn:

As regards the production of powerful tractors and modern agricultural machines, our industry has firmly occupied first place in the world.²³

If this is so, one may well ask why mechanization is having so little effect on Soviet agricultural production and on the material situation of the Soviet agricultural worker. Certainly, the amount of available horsepower is impressive compared with what it was in Tsarist Russia—approaching ten times as much, in fact, as we see from the following table:

¹⁸ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, November 18, 1964.

¹⁹ *Izvestia*, April 5, 1966.

²⁰ *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaistva*, 1966, No. 12, p. 29.

²¹ *Mekhanizatsiya i elektrofikatsiya sotsialisticheskogo sel'skogo khozyaistva*, 1966, No. 1, p. 2.

²² *Izvestia*, April 16, 1966.

²³ *Selskaya zhizn*, May 15, 1966.

Horsepower Available to Agriculture in the USSR and Tsarist Russia

	1916	1963	1964
Mechanical Horsepower	200,000	201,600,000	214,800,000
Tractors	—	70,400,000	77,400,000
Combines	—	31,500,000	33,300,000
Automobiles	—	78,500,000	79,700,000
Electric Power Plants ..	—	21,200,000	24,400,000
Animal Horsepower	23,700,000	4,000,000	3,800,000
Total	23,900,000	205,600,000	218,600,000

SOURCES: *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1958 godu* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1958: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1959, p. 485; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu*... , Moscow, 1965, p. 378.

However, grain production, for example, has not risen by anything like the same proportion:

Grain Production in the USSR and Tsarist Russia (Tons)

1913	86,000,000
1962	140,183,000
1963	107,492,000
1964	152,071,000
1965	120,564,000

SOURCES: *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1958 godu* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1958: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1959, p. 352; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu*... , Moscow, 1965, p. 296; *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1965 godu: Kratkiy statisticheskiy sbornik* (The USSR in Figures in 1965: A Concise Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1966, p. 74.

Taking average annual grain production during the period 1962–65 as 130,000,000 tons, we can say that an almost tenfold increase in the amount of horsepower available to Soviet agriculture has been accompanied by an increase of only about 50 percent in grain production (implementation of the agricultural side of the new Five-Year Plan, incidentally, will require 520,000,000 horsepower).²⁴ The cause of this discrepancy is that in some kolkhozes, as the Soviet governmental newspaper *Izvestia* has pointed out,

... conditions are not yet ripe for the effective application of their machinery. They are simply not able on their own to maintain the machines, keep up a staff of engineers and technicians and provide the necessary services.²⁵

Indeed, on many farms the financial burden imposed by the acquisition and maintenance of machinery is the main cause of low wages. The situation is worsened by the fact that the machines are of too large a capacity, and hence uneconomic to run, for the smaller farms, a circumstance quite unknown under free land utilization conditions. It is clear that "saturating" the farms with unsuitable and poor-quality machinery will not help Soviet agriculture to overcome its permanent crisis.

S. Kabysb

²⁴ Based on figures in *Pravda*, February 20, 1966.

²⁵ *Izvestia*, December 26, 1964.

Domestic Affairs

Education and Science under the Party's Control

Since the beginning of the Communist regime in Russia, education and science have figured largely in all the Party's political and economic plans. The education of new generations in a Communist spirit and the ambition to create "the new Soviet man," the training of qualified specialists in all branches of the economy and the strengthening of the country's economic and military potential—all these and many other tasks have always been closely associated with the country's systems of education and academic research. Since the war, as the sphere of Soviet political influence widened, so competition with the USA in all branches of science and technology turned progress in education and science into a weapon in the struggle for enhancing Soviet prestige. According to the new Party Program,

It is a point of honor for Soviet scientists to consolidate the advanced positions which Soviet science has won in major branches of knowledge and to take a leading place in world science in all the key fields.¹

Finally, the need for greater prestige in the field of science has increased as a result of the weakening of the USSR's leading position in the Communist bloc.

According to their place in the state system, all research and higher educational institutions in the USSR may be divided into three main groups: (1) the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the academies of sciences of the Union republics, together with the branches (*filialy*), departments and institutes subordinated to them; (2) places of higher education; and (3) specialized research institutes and other bodies attached to ministries and state committees.

As the central body in the field, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR is directly subordinated to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which approves its research plans. The political bias of its work is laid down in its constitution and elsewhere. The constitution of 1959, for example, says:

The Academy of Sciences of the USSR carries out...research promoting all branches of science in the USSR. By its...research and its entire activity, the Academy...actively participates in the building of a Communist society in the USSR [and] promotes the cause of defending the socialist conquests of the workers and strengthening peace throughout the world.²

The officers of the Academy are also, so to speak, politically well under control. President M. V. Keldysh and over one-third of all the vice-presidents and members of the presidium are either full or candidate members of the all-Union or Union-republic Party central committees. Keldysh himself is well characterized

¹ *Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Adopted by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1961, p. 117.

² *Nauchnye kadry v SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov i spravocnik materialov* (Academic and Scientific Workers in the USSR. A Compilation of Documents and Other Materials), Moscow, 1959, p. 287.

by the speech he delivered at a general meeting of the Academy held in July 1963 to discuss ideological questions. On this occasion, he said:

The conditions necessary if Soviet science is to occupy first place in the world in all the main branches are: close attention to questions of ideology, the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory based on all the leading achievements of natural science, the development of a materialist world outlook on the basis of these achievements, [and] ceaseless resistance to the penetration of reactionary views in science.

He went on:

In our day, science is becoming more and more closely associated with the life of society. All the victories of Soviet science are placed at the service of Communism.³

After such a speech from the President, it is not surprising to find the meeting adopting a resolution which begins by calling for active support for the Party:

[Resolved] to consider active support for the Party in ideological work [and] the all-out strengthening of the role of science in developing the Communist world outlook [and] in the ideological and scientific education of the people to be the most important task of all academic institutions and scholars.⁴

It should be added that since the removal of Khrushchev Keldysh has altered the style of his political speeches and adopted a more businesslike, down-to-earth tone better suited to the style of the new leadership.

Places of higher education are controlled by the Ministry of Higher and Special Secondary Education of the USSR, whose functions include the supervision of all work connected with the training of "highly qualified specialists" in all branches of the economy, the preparation of textbooks and teaching handbooks for higher and special secondary educational institutions, the organization of courses of further training for teachers, the promotion of research, assisting the Union republics to train specialists, and establishing foreign relations in this sphere.⁵ At present, this ministry is headed by a metallurgist, Party Central Committee member V. P. Yelyutin.

To what extent higher education is subordinated to the Party's political designs may be seen, among other things, from the regulations of 1961 on higher educational institutions. According to them, the "principal tasks" of such institutions include

the training of highly-qualified specialists who are educated on the basis of Marxist-Leninist teaching, have mastered the latest achievements of . . . [Soviet] and foreign science and technology, are well acquainted with the practical side of their work [and] are capable not only of fully exploiting modern equipment but also of creating the equipment of the future;

³ *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, 1963, No. 8, p. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁵ L. M. Vicavsky, V. L. Geikhman and A. V. Rubtsov, *Spravochnik po pravovym voprosam vysshetshskoly* (Handbook on Legal Questions of Higher Education), Kiev, 1965, p. 8.

the carrying out of scientific research promoting the solution of the tasks of Communist construction.⁶

At many places of higher education in the Soviet Union, including the Patrice Lumumba University of Peoples' Friendship, founded for this purpose in Moscow in 1960, students from various countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America receive political instruction apart from their normal studies. In addition, in Burma, India, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Guinea, Indonesia, Mali, Algeria, Kenya, the United Arab Republic, Afghanistan, Tunisia and elsewhere the USSR has built schools and centers which employ no small number of Soviet lecturers and professors and which receive Soviet teaching material of a political nature.⁷

As for the third group mentioned above, comprising specialized research institutions attached to the appropriate ministries and state committees, these are subject to frequent changes as regards the bodies to which they are subordinated, as a result of periodical reorganizations of economic administration.

In 1961, the Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers of the USSR set up a State Committee for Coordinating Scientific Research, for the purpose of controlling and coordinating the work of all these three groups of institutions. The chairman of this committee is a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Minister of Higher and Special Secondary Education and other senior officials of the most important departments and ministries are *ex officio* members.⁸ In the course of time, this committee was reorganized several times,⁹ and in 1965, in connection with the reorganization of the system of industrial management, was reconstituted as the all-Union State Committee for Science and Technology. Its functions then included

... the drawing up, jointly with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, of proposals on the main lines of development of science and technology in the country; organizing the study of scientific and technological problems affecting more than one branch; supplying scientific and technical information; supervising the application of the achievements of science and technology in the national economy; and maintaining liaison with foreign countries on questions of scientific and technical cooperation.¹⁰

Thus, despite the variety of organizational forms, activities and functions, educational and research institutions and the state committee in charge of them are all ultimately subordinated to the Council of Ministers. Even this body, however, described (in Article 64 of the Constitution) as "the highest executive and administrative organ of state power of the USSR," is not the highest authority:

⁶ *O kommunisticheskom vospitanii i utverplenii svyazi shkoly s zhiznyu. Sbornik dokumentov* (Communist Education and Strengthening the Ties Between School and Life: A Compilation of Documents), compiled by M. M. Deineko, Moscow, 1964, p. 290.

⁷ See the speech by Kosygin at the first graduation ceremony of the People's Friendship University, *Pravda*, June 30, 1965.

⁸ *Ibid.*, April 12, 1961.

⁹ *Izvestia*, March 5, 1963; *Pravda*, January 26, 1964.

¹⁰ *Izvestia*, October 3, 1965.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR conducts all its work under the direct leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In respect to organization, this control is facilitated by the fact that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, his deputies and many ministers are elected members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The most important measures executed by the Council of Ministers of the USSR are discussed beforehand by the highest organs of the Party.¹¹

In fact, the chairman, A. N. Kosygin, and two of his first deputies, K. T. Mazurov and D. S. Polyansky, are also members of the present Party Central Committee Politburo. Of the remaining deputy chairmen and members of the Council of Ministers, forty-four are full and thirty-three candidate members of the Central Committee, and six are on the Central Auditing Commission of the Party. Further, of the chairmen of the councils of ministers of the Union republics, who are *ex officio* members of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, fourteen are members of the Party central-committee presidiums (now bureaux) of their respective Union republics, and one, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR G. I. Voroňov, is on the all-Union Party Central Committee Politburo.

Some idea of the extent of the Party's control of scientific and educational institutions in the USSR may be obtained from a list of the Party's functions in this field, given in a monograph published by the Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Here we read:

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

- a) elaborates the ideological foundations of science and fights ideological distortions in science;
- b) lays down the main tasks facing science and scientists at various stages in the development of science; leads the struggle for a close association of science with the practice of Communist construction;
- c) is in charge of work on the distribution of scientific workers, concerns itself with the training of new scientific cadres;
- d) examines in its leading organs the state of individual branches of science, sometimes of individual scientific institutions, [and] takes steps to improve their work;
- e) directs the work of state bodies in charge of scientific institutions;
- f) conducts organizational work in scientific institutions, industrial and other enterprises ensuring the fulfillment of plans for scientific research and the application of scientific achievements in practice;
- g) issues guiding instructions on questions concerning the legal regulation of scientific work.¹²

For the execution of these and other, no less complex, functions, and also for the purpose of keeping everything under supervision, the Party has two main systems at its disposal. The one comprises the section for science and educational

¹¹ Ts. A. Yampolskaya, *Organy sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo upravleniya v sovremenny period* (Organs of Soviet State Government at the Contemporary Period), Moscow, 1954, p. 169.

¹² G. I. Fedkin, *Pravoye voprosy organizatsii nauchnoi raboty v SSSR* (Legal Questions Concerning the Organization of Scientific Work in the USSR), Moscow, 1958, p. 26.

institutions which exist in all Party committees from the all-Union Central Committee down to the level of oblast and krai: this system operates from outside, and duplicates a similar system controlled by the government. The other is the system of Party organizations within the research and educational institutions. At the beginning of 1965, for example, there were 69,086 primary Party organizations in educational, scientific, medical and other institutions, the average membership of such organizations in scientific institutions being 86.¹³

The Party Central Committee can make whatever use it likes of this complex system (here only sketched in outline) for its own far-reaching aims in both domestic and foreign policy. Soviet scientific workers and specialists are, for example, sent to the underdeveloped countries as part of the campaign for promoting Communist expansion by peaceful means. Brezhnev gave the following account in his report on behalf of the Central Committee to the Twenty-Third Congress:

About six hundred industrial, agricultural and other plants are being built in countries of Asia and Africa with the help of our planning organizations and with the participation of Soviet building specialists. In many of these countries, Soviet geological surveying parties are at work in the jungle or in sun-baked deserts helping these young states to discover their mineral wealth and place it at the service of the national economy. Over one hundred educational and medical institutions and scientific centers have been or are being built in these countries with the cooperation of the Soviet Union. During the last five years, the number of students from the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America studying at places of higher education and tekhnikums in the USSR has almost doubled. During the same period, the number of Soviet teachers, physicians and other specialists in the field of culture now working in twenty-eight countries of Asia and Africa has increased fourfold.¹⁴

Since in the present struggle between two worlds issues are often determined in the classroom or the laboratory, the Party continues to devote much effort to the task of winning for the Soviet Union a leading place in all the most important branches of science and technology.

S. S. Voronitsyn

¹³ *Partinaya zhizn*, 1965, No. 10, pp. 16-17.

¹⁴ *Pravda*, March 30, 1966.

REVIEWS

The Periodical Press

Last month saw the publication of the five-hundredth issue of the journal *Oktyabr*, which throughout its existence has been the mouthpiece of the literary dogmatists. When it was founded in the first half of 1924, its editor was Semen Rodov, a mediocre versifier who stood for the complete subjection of literature to politics. The first members of the editorial board—L. Averbakh, A. Bezymensky, G. Lelevich, Y. Libedinsky, A. Tarasov-Rodionov and A. Sokolov—were all members of the Party. The latest issue quotes the chief point in the declaration made in the introductory article to the journal's first issue: "Our place is on the class positions of proletarian literature, against bourgeois and reactionary literature" (*Oktyabr*, 1966, No. 6, page 180). Of course, on various occasions in the past the journal has published the work of writers not belonging to the dogmatist school, including Leonid Leonov, N. Aseyev, E. Bagritsky, M. Svetlov, V. Katayev, Aleksei Tolstoi and S. Kirsanov, but now, under the editorship of V. Kochetov, it plays the role of Party gendarme on the literary front.

Since the middle of the thirties, it has been a tradition to hold meetings of writers' organizations immediately after a Party congress in order to discuss the latter's decisions and resolutions. The Twenty-Third Congress was thus followed by a meeting of the Writers' Union of the RSFSR, the proceedings of which were reported in detail by *Oktyabr* but by no other literary monthlies. This was presumably done not only in order to propagate the Party's demands but also to demonstrate once more the journal's position. The report devotes considerable space to the question of "socialist realism," the "positive hero" and patriotic subjects. The first of these is coupled with the "monolithic nature" of Soviet literature, which is tantamount to saying that no independent thought is tolerated. Then we read:

Another fundamental tradition of our literature is the social, class, Party approach to the representation of all phenomena of life. The ideals of our Party and people long ago became the sacred ideals of Soviet literature (page 215).

Party ideals must be represented by positive heroes. Writer V. Lipatov is quoted as saying:

For me personally, the problem of the positive hero is, so to speak, my daily bread. If the positive hero is taken away from me, then take my pen and try to write for yourselves. . . . If the bourgeois can place the positive hero at the service of pork stew and the dollar, then God himself ordained that we should place him at the service of the construction of Communism! (Pages 216–17.)

It is noteworthy that the words "de-heroization" and "innovation" (*novatorstvo*) are ironically placed in quotation marks; such things, apparently, have no place in Soviet literature. In the interpretation of the editors of *Oktyabr*, the problem of the positive hero is linked (in a good sense) with the name of Stalin:

When assessing the role of Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief [Stalin], certain authors write in an ironical, contemptuous tone, asserting that representatives of Headquarters were usually a hindrance. But then, one may ask, who was in direct command of the troops? Insofar as these "shafts of criticism" are directed at Stalin without adequate grounds, it may be concluded that such authors are merely attempting to illustrate the notorious quip about using a globe of the world to direct military operations (page 217).

This passage is admittedly a summary of the speech delivered at the meeting by Colonel General M. Kalashnik, of the Central Political Department of the Army and Navy, but it is clear that his views are shared by the journal's editors.

Similar use is made of the contribution made by A. Nikulkov, who deprecated objectivity and praised tendentiousness. The following passage has the editors' support:

Literature can live only when it draws on the facts of reality. But the "truth of facts," which is characteristic of any literature of any class, is unthinkable without the truth of tendentiousness. . . . We have our own, Communist, bias, to which we swear allegiance frankly and impartially. And it should be our sole criterion for measuring any system of facts that is offered to the people in a [literary] work (page 220).

The report painstakingly notes the attacks made on the more or less progressive literary journals, particularly on *Novy mir*:

It is distressing to find that such a reputable journal as *Novy mir* has for a long time been conducting a disreputable critical "game without rules." Certain critics on this journal make hash of literary productions, choose quotations as they like and then with bitter pleasure produce from this raw material what they choose to see in our literature (page 221).

Not only this report but the entire section headed "literary criticism" in this issue expresses the present line of the Party in matters of literature and art, and also, as stated, the conservative-Communist outlook of the magazine itself. Its editors assert:

Taking advantage of this five-hundredth issue of *Oktyabr*, we are merely looking back on the journey that has been completed so far, in order to consider some milestones on this journey and with even greater confidence proceed in the direction that was chosen long ago (page 182).

The current campaign of repression in the field of literature and art is reflected not only in *Oktyabr* (where it is taken up with obvious approval). It should go without saying that *all* Soviet publications serve the same master, *viz.*, the Party. The fact that literary newspapers and magazines in the USSR come out under the auspices of the Union of Writers is virtually without significance. The distinction between progressive and dogmatic publications, which has been observable in post-Stalin times, is mainly due to the existence of various groupings within the Communist leadership. Naturally, the views and sympathies of the editor play a certain part; the same is true of the identity of the writers who are

associated with each individual journal; finally, there are the traditions that have grown up around the journal; but despite all these factors the fact remains that all publications in the field of literature and art are obliged to reflect the Party line.

Editor of *Moskva* Y. Popovkin publishes in his magazine an article "Together with Party and People," in which, following the Party line, he stresses that the latest Party congress is of great importance not only for workers in the economy but also for writers, whose thoughts will inevitably keep returning to the congress's decisions. Remarking that Soviet literature is closely bound up with the practical activity of people working in various branches of the country's economic life, he goes on:

How many passionate arguments they had with creative workers in the congress lobbies on new books, films and plays! And when the discussion was continued from the congress rostrum, delegates spoke of the fate of Soviet literature with the same concern as when speaking of economic problems, and writers and art workers talked not only about books, painting and music, but about the worries of economic officials, foresters and farmers. Our literary affairs have become the concern of the whole Party; the congress once more underlined the tremendous importance of the *belles-lettres* and art of socialist realism for transforming society, and recognized the successes achieved. (*Moskva*, 1966, No. 5, page 160).

The views expressed by the editor are all derived from two sources: passages taken from Lenin, and the decisions of the Twenty-Third Congress. According to him, occasional remarks of Lenin's on literature are of permanent significance and the Party, following Lenin and showing ceaseless concern for art and literature, has recently (one must suppose, since Khrushchev) been assuring the successful development of this field. At the same time, of course, Popovkin is obliged to touch on that considerable section of Soviet literature which does not entirely conform with the Party's demands. He writes:

Many [Congress] delegates spoke with chagrin of works which lead the reader away from the seething constructive life of our people into bourgeois shallows, sometimes into the obscure backwaters of life. True and uncompromising words were addressed at the congress to Moscow's literary and art workers. Party delegates from the capital did not—and could not—ignore ideological errors in the columns of certain Moscow journals, in a number of films and plays (page 162).

Molodaya gvardiya also pays its tribute to the Congress's decisions. The June issue contains an article, "The Physiognomy of Good and Evil," on the question of the positive hero, in which the author attempts to link this hero, the out-and-out Communist, with new states of mind that have recently appeared in Soviet society. The article begins:

With growing frequency, present-day *belles-lettres* organically combine civic motifs with the successful search for a positive hero, an interest in spiritually rich personalities with a clearly expressed feeling for the motherland (*Molodaya gvardiya*, 1966, No. 5, page 272).

The positive hero is described in the best possible light: in addition to political qualities, he is ascribed with the highest virtues; he must be a fighter for the good

in the widest meaning of the word. He must be a model of virtue, and search for moral criteria.

Quarrels about heroes...develop into disputes about ethical norms. And these norms are, in their turn, the product of social development, they are indissolubly connected with the...structure of society. Hence the acerbity and the topicality of discussions on questions of ethics. It [sometimes] happens in this artistic dispute that the author piques himself on the positiveness of his favorite, who provokes antipathy in the reader (page 273).

Since the magazine is intended for young readers, the article deals mainly with youthful heroes. We are told:

Our young heroes, unfortunately, are ashamed not only of big words but also of civic feelings. Sometimes they engage in battle—in the name of abstract ideas of opposing evil on behalf of an equally abstract good.—And that only when things are at their best. If you take a close look at these fighters for truth, you not infrequently discover an egoist. They care for nothing apart from their own welfare and the affections of their girl friends (page 277).

Personal happiness is, indeed, somewhat grudgingly recognized, but presented as something of quite secondary importance, without any decisive influence on people's lives, particularly if they are heroes of Soviet literature. Disapproval is expressed of the poet Yevtushenko, of whom the paper remarks:

The absence of a moral ideal leads to a lack of moral discipline, to the loss of borderlines and reference points, to [the habit of] measuring the world by what one has in one's pocket (*ibid.*).

Maintaining that most modern Soviet literature differs completely from the case just quoted, the author nevertheless complains that not even the most careful analysis of the emotional experiences of many literary heroes reveals any high moral qualities. He names many literary works in which the central figure fails to satisfy this requirement. Other reforms which he proposes include the suppression of the "scandalous vocabulary" commonly employed by many literary heroes and the exclusion of violent behavior, e. g., the use of physical violence on occasions when the hero is angry. Finally, he proposes the establishment of strict norms of conduct strongly reminiscent of what constitutes *bon ton*.

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In this brief survey of recent issues of Soviet literary journals, we have so far confined ourselves to the theoretical aspect. As for literary contributions to the issues for May and June, they are pretty colorless, doubtless because of the stricter Party supervision which has resulted from the decisions of the latest Party congress.

It has always been one of the aims of the Communist leaders to hinder progressive developments in the sphere of literature and art, for which purpose every possible means is exploited. The section of criticism and bibliography in a recent issue of *Kommunist* opens with a contribution entitled "The Artist's

Responsibility to Society." This is a review of a book which came out in Moscow in 1964 under the title *Artistic Method and Creative Individuality* and under the auspices of the Academies of Sciences of the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Evidently, this belated review was necessary in order to promote the present Party line, which is reflected in the title of the review. The reaction of progressive literary circles to the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel and the appearance of a number of "non-conformist" books since then have evidently made it necessary to say something about the responsibilities of the artist. We read:

Responsibility to society has always been a distinguishing feature of the work of leading artists. In contemporary society, under conditions of a strenuous ideological conflict, its importance is particularly great (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 9, page 119).

The artist is required to "take cognizance of" his responsibility to society as "a new and substantial limit to artistic freedom." This somewhat casuistic interpretation of the artist's freedom is backed up by a quotation from the book under review:

The book stresses that under socialism creative individuality "has at its disposal such an inner freedom and such a wealth of possibilities that the sphere of investigation becomes unlimited" (pages 119-20).

The reviewer expresses his disapproval of the "individual artistic method," and concludes:

Manifold variety of manner and style is developed on the foundation of the single creative method of socialist realism (page 120).

And so the struggle goes on between artistic freedom and the dictatorship. Sometimes it is a frontal attack, sometimes a circling movement. The important thing is that the threat from the Party continues to meet resistance.

A. Gayev

A Guide to Marxism

By P. H. VIGOR

Published by Faber and Faber, London, 1966, 253 pp.

Although over a century has passed since the publication of the Communist Manifesto, and although almost one third of the world's population is being forced to live under Communism, the average person in the West still has only an extremely vague idea of the essence of Communist teaching. He judges political and other developments in the Communist world on the basis of his experience of life in a democratic society, where things evolve naturally and not as a result of arbitrary experimentation by national leaders within the framework of a given set of dogmas. This appears to be the only explanation for the fact that Western public opinion is constantly being surprised by many happenings in the Communist world which are recognized by those conversant with Marxism-Leninism as merely logical consequences of the practical application of that philosophy.

A Guide to Marxism, by P. H. Vigor, an instructor at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, England, is an attempt to remedy this state of affairs. Although the author emphasizes at the beginning of his book that his aim is to give an exposition rather than a criticism of Marxist theory, he departs from this principle on a number of occasions, particularly in cases where the discrepancy between Marxist theory and practice is only too apparent. Thus, noting that although, according to Marxism, Communist revolutions must take place in economically developed countries, they have in fact occurred exclusively in economically backward countries, he writes:

This means that one of the three following propositions about them [the backward countries] must be true:

1. Marx was wrong.
2. They are not truly Socialist, let alone Communist.
3. The difficulties and near disasters, the privations and the miseries, the oppressions and the persecutions which all these societies have admittedly suffered stem from the one fact that Marx was right; and that they should not have launched the Revolution when they did, but should have waited until they had achieved a strong, stable and prosperous Capitalism before embarking on Communism (page 21).

Here the reader is invited to draw his own conclusions, one of which must surely be that if Marx's early disciples, in particular Lenin, had rigidly adhered to the tenets of Marxism, Communism would today be confined to a handful of political sectarians instead of being a major world problem.

The author emphatically rejects the pretensions of Marxism—and almost all political and economic theories for that matter—to be “scientific.” He comments:

...one of the most remarkable things about the theory of Marxism is the enormous proportion of belief that it contains as compared with that of fact. To one disputed piece of analysis he adds ten assumptions; and these he uses to make three predictions, none of which has been verified. Such a proportion of conjecture to fact in the case of a theory about electrons would hardly recommend it to physicists; yet one of the most interesting things about Marxism is the way in which scientists, who would not dream of adopting such a weakly supported hypothesis in their own work, are prepared to accept it unquestioningly in the realm of politics and economics (page 126).

Vigor accordingly reduces Marx's theories to ten “beliefs,” eight “inferences” and three “predictions,” which culminate in the belief that sooner or later capitalism will collapse and a Communist society be built up on its ruins. Marx himself did not have anything specific to say on the nature of such a society, but the author does not confine himself to an analysis of Marx's teaching alone, going on in the second part of his book to examine Marxism as adapted by Lenin to the conditions of a later period, i.e., Marxism-Leninism, which, he says, is the only brand of Marxism to have been so far practiced in Communist countries. The point is made that Lenin transformed Marxism from a series of declamations and theories into a concrete, and ultimately successful, action program by his teaching on the “new type of party” and the “dictatorship of the proletariat”

and his extension of the concept of "imperialism" from Western Europe to the colonies of the "imperialist" powers. Vigor notes that although Marx himself had spoken of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," he had not attempted to explain what he understood by the term; for Lenin, on the other hand, this concept was an important weapon in his struggle to hang on to the power which he had forcibly acquired. The author correctly points out that the dictatorships of the proletariat of Marx and Lenin have only the name in common, and is also probably correct in his assertion that Lenin himself evidently did not expect that his "dictatorship of the proletariat" would survive for over forty years.

A Guide to Marxism also examines Stalin's contributions to Marxism-Leninism, in particular his insistence that "socialism" could be built in one country (Marx and Lenin had both envisaged a socialist revolution breaking out in all the economically backward countries simultaneously), as well as his insistence on the omniscience and all-embracing role of the Party, and follows up with an analysis of Khrushchev's "revisionism," manifested in his policy of peaceful coexistence, which contradicted Lenin's teaching that capitalism would develop into imperialism and militarism and that an armed conflict between socialism and imperialism was inevitable.

Particularly noteworthy is the author's comment that the Chinese Communists have not, as maintained by many Western experts, introduced any essential changes into the teaching of Marx and Lenin, but have merely rejected Khrushchev's "revisionism," this being the only difference between the Chinese and Soviet brands of Marxism-Leninism.

The most interesting part of Vigor's book, however, is perhaps that which treats of the practical application of Marxism in the USSR. The opinion is widespread in the West that the Soviet Union is a classic imperialist state which employs Marxism merely as a camouflage. However, even the extremely brief analysis of the Soviet political and economic system offered by Vigor makes it clear that Marxism in the USSR is not only theory but practice, a circumstance which is particularly apparent in the economic sphere. Vigor points out, for example, that the Soviet economy is based on a combination of centralized planning and state ownership of the means of production (except in the sphere of land ownership, where for economic reasons it has not yet been possible to implement this principle fully, a circumstance evidenced by the existence of collective farms), just as Marx said a socialist economy should be. Marx considered exploitation, as he understood it, to be a mortal sin, and exploitation is punished severely under Soviet law—except, of course, that practiced by a "socialist" state in respect of its members, a form of exploitation not included in Marx's calculations. Most indicative, however, in the author's view is the fact that the Soviet economy is oriented toward the Marxist positions on consumption and demand, prices, the scarcity of labor and materials, and interest on capital. He considers that failure to charge interest on capital is causing particular harm to the Soviet economy:

This would not matter in the slightest if the USSR possessed capital in abundance; we know, however, from the speeches of Mr. Khrushchev that actually it does not. Nevertheless, the Russians, thanks to their Marxist heritage, are deprived of a most effective means of restricting the use of capital; while at the same time they make it difficult for their planners to decide correctly which is economically the preferable between a scheme which demands a lot of capital but has low operating costs, and one which has high operating costs but needs a smaller amount of capital (pages 197–98).

Vigor also examines the “liberal” tendencies in Soviet economics, including, of course, the theories of Professor Liberman, as well as the new Party Program promulgated in 1961. Turning to the question of Marxist ethics, he makes the following point:

Most (though not all) Westerners regard certain things as being morally right, or morally wrong, at all times and under all circumstances. Thus, it is always right to love your neighbour; murder is always wrong. In dealing with other Westerners, therefore, they have a common set of criteria by which they can, if they choose, test the desirability of a given course of action. But in dealing with Marxists there is no such common ground. It is therefore simply not possible to settle an argument with them by reference to ethical principles—by saying, for instance, that the consequence of a particular policy would be murder, and you cannot commit murder. From a Marxist point of view, you can—in certain circumstances. Arguments with Marxists therefore have a tendency to drift on unresolved, because our means of solving them is in this case ineffective (page 223).

The author thus shows that when the West reproaches the Communists for unscrupulousness and amorality it is talking into thin air. Unscrupulousness and amorality are the quintessence of Marxist ethics. Communists reject the idea of a universally valid morality; for them, morality is always the morality of the ruling class. They observe only their own moral code, on the basis of which an action is justified or not according to whether it is to the advantage or disadvantage of the Communist cause.

The appearance of *A Guide to Marxism* at the present time is particularly welcome, since it reminds us that despite the “liberalization” which has taken place since the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union remains very much a Communist state. The present tendency in the Soviet Union to move away from Communism, a tendency whose existence is not denied by Vigor, is not to the liking of the Soviet leaders, who continue to think as Marxists and whose aim, reforms and changes notwithstanding, is to preserve the basic dogmas of Marxism in their pristine state, since Marxism alone can justify their dictatorial powers.

A most helpful glossary of Marxist-Leninist terminology is appended.

A. Kashin

Assistance Economique et Pénétration Industrielle des pays de l'Est en Afrique

By ROMAIN YAKEMTCHOUK

Published by the Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales,
Léopoldville, 1966, 104 pages

M. Romain Yakemtchouk, now Professor of Political Science at the Lovanium University in the Congo, has produced a work which despite its relatively small size is both important and topical. Since they acquired independence, the young states of Africa have been continually confronted not only with their own economic problems but also with the question how to react to offers of aid from countries of the Eastern bloc. Their leaders are aware of the necessity of building up their countries' economies and developing their foreign trade. Many of them lack the capital necessary for exploiting their natural resources, and have to look for it elsewhere. They also have to find a market abroad for their excess production, principally in the form of raw materials.

The questions that inevitably arise are numerous. If they want credits, should they turn to the former metropolitan country in Europe, or should they look elsewhere? Is it preferable to confine their dealings to a single country? What are the respective advantages and disadvantages of commercial relations with countries of the East and of the West? Is the Communist "model" of economic development valid for the African countries and, if so, to what extent? Which branches of the economy should be developed first? How can a newly-independent country obtain credits for developing its economy and promoting its foreign trade without losing its political independence?

Professor Yakemtchouk guides us through the labyrinth of these problems. He describes the methods and implications of trade with the East-bloc countries, devoting a separate analysis to the East European countries, including the USSR, on the one hand and Communist China on the other. The attitude of these countries in matters of trade depends among other things on Communist political doctrine and on the aims pursued by their foreign policy, although purely economic considerations are not without their importance in the activity of these countries in Africa. Apart from this, economic aid is a factor in the East-West conflict, in which Africa constitutes an important theater. In addition, it is a theater of competition between the Soviet Union and China. In this complex situation, one may suppose that the African states are anxious to protect their interests while ensuring that they do not become isolated from the world market. The author devotes a chapter to the techniques employed by the East-bloc countries in their economic relations with the African states, describing the different stages which have marked this process of gradual economic penetration.

The book does not, however, confine itself to analyses and comparisons or to purely theoretical considerations. Much of it is taken up with an account of the commercial and financial activities of the East-bloc countries in Africa, in which no fewer than twenty-two young states are involved. During the course of this

account, it soon becomes clear to the reader that this economic aid is distributed not according to the respective needs of the African states, but according to their strategic importance.

Professor Yakemtchouk's book may be recommended to all those interested in the economic and political problems of Africa, who will find a well-documented presentation of the facts and much matter for reflection. The reader's attention is drawn to links—sometimes scarcely perceptible—between the economic activity and the political aims of the East-bloc countries. From this, it becomes obvious that the claim of these countries to be aiding the states of Africa from disinterested motives is suspect. Any economic exchange is normally made in the interests of the parties concerned. As soon as one of them claims to be disinterested, the question arises: what are the real aims of the party which is apparently prepared to make economic sacrifices?

R. Zybenko

Publications of the Institute for the Study of the USSR:

ARABIC REVIEW, No. 12, 1965, 79 pp. (In Arabic.)

The issue contains: "Lenin's Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," by Herman Akhminov; "The 'New Man'," by George Pismenny; "The Future of Communism in Africa," by N. Hosny; "The Role of the Arts in the Formation of the 'New Man'," by Bayram Rıza; "The Concept of a 'State of All the People'," by Tamurbek Davletshin; and "Analyses of Important Developments in the Soviet Union."

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STUDIES ON THE SOVIET UNION (New Series), Vol. V, No. 3, 1966, 106 pp. (In English).

In "The Soviet Offensive in Asia," Alexander Kashin shows how clumsy and rigid Chinese policy in Asia over the last two years has provided the Soviet leaders with the chance to seize the initiative, although this counteroffensive is full of risks, since it might involve the Soviet Union in a direct clash with the United States in the Vietnam war, which is likely to remain the focus of Sino-Soviet rivalry.

In "A Decade of De-Stalinization," Herman Akhminov suggests that the latter was largely a tactical maneuver by Khrushchev to secure his position and cannot be regarded as a deviation from Communism, as the Chinese claim.

In "Unity in Diversity or Diversity in Unity," John Ducoli discusses relations between the Soviet and Italian Communist parties after Khrushchev and Togliatti.

In "Soviet Colonialism in Turkestan," Tamurbek Davletshin makes an effort to prove that the Central Asian republics are being exploited by Moscow through its centralized economic policy and that their culture is being submerged as more Slavs enter the region.

Stefan Stolte examines the present state of Comecon ("COMECON Through Soviet Eyes"), showing the growing tendency toward independent action on the part of its members and pointing out that the gap between the backward and the advanced members is causing tensions, thus aggravating Soviet fears of an antichinal development.

In "The 'Communist Labour' Movement," Fedor Hajenko traces the rise of this Party-inspired means to secure higher productivity, illustrating its virtual redundancy under the new conditions of Soviet industry, where emphasis is being laid on rationalization and incentive rather than on mass movements that end in stagnation, as in the case of "Communist labour."

In "The Crisis in the Field of Biology," Grigory Gagarin describes the damage caused to this branch of science in the Soviet Union by the dominance of Lysenko, who secured the repression of the study of genetics in his effort to impose his own questionable methods. The author points out that despite the eclipse of Lysenko, his

followers still have influence and may try to hinder biological research untrammelled by dialectical materialism.

"Mechanization of Agriculture," by Simon Kabysb, collates evidence for a shortage of agricultural machinery which is aggravated by wasteful methods of utilization and negligence. This is standing in the way of higher labor productivity.

George Vvedensky attempts in "The Soviet Aluminium Industry" to give the reader a picture of the present stage of development region by region, and Ivan Eakalo's "Post-Graduate Research in the Soviet Union" draws on Soviet sources which indicate that the authorities are concerned at the inadequate number of students pursuing scientific research and the poor quality of many theses produced, due in part to the fall in educational standards caused by the 1958 school reform. The drive to stimulate high-quality students to pursue research is being hindered by the lack of adequate facilities in many Soviet universities, especially in the peripheral regions.

The issue closes with reviews by S. Kirsanov of *Zheleznodorozhnyi transport and Elektricheskiye stantsii* (issues for 1964) and by B. Riza of Karlhanns Berger's *Die Funktionsbestimmung der Musik in der Sowjetideologie*, and Institute News and Notes.

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ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA UNION SOVIÉTICA, No. 16, 1965, 76 pp. (In Spanish.)

This issue is composed of the following articles (with original titles and indications of source): "Soviet Literature: To Be or Not To Be?" by A. Gayev (*Bulletin*, 1965, No. 6); "Historical Survey of Soviet Anthropological Studies," by Heinrich Schulz (*Review of Soviet Medical Sciences*, Vol. I, No. 4); "Soviet Agricultural Reforms Since Khrushchev," by Keith Bush (*Bulletin*, 1965, No. 7); "Social Security in the Soviet Union," by Fedor Hajenko (*Studies on the Soviet Union*, New Series, Vol. IV, No. 3); "The Soviet Army Emerges as a Political Force," by Abdurakhman G. Avtorkhanov (*Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union*, No. 375); and "Alcoholism in the USSR," by Bruno Lustig (*Review of Soviet Medical Sciences*, Vol. I, No. 4).

DERGI, No. 42, 1965, 80 pp. (In Turkish.)

This issue contains the following articles: "Soviet Interpretation of the Formation of the Russian Empire," by P. Fedenko; "Nationalism in Turkmenistan," by Dr. Edige Kirimal; "The Soviet Army as an Instrument of Policy," by Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov; "Mongolia Between the Chinese and Soviet States," by A. Kashin; "Production of Cotton in Soviet Turkestan and Azerbaidzhan" and "Industry in Transcaucasia" by G. A. Vvedensky. The issue closes with Institute news and a chronicle of events.

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DERGI, No. 43, 1966, 80 pp. (In Turkish.)

The issue contains: "The Problem of Colonialism and the Achievement of Independence by Colonies," by P. Fedenko; "The Training and Employment of Leading Cadres in the Soviet Union," by A. Lebed; "Soviet Economic Reforms and the New Generation of Soviet Economists," by Professor V. Tremli; "A New Generation in the Soviet Armed Forces," by N. Galay; "About the Tenth Anniversary of the Bandung Conference," by S. Tekiner; reviews by S. Tekiner of *Velikaya druzhba azerbaidzhanskogo i russkogo narodov* (The Great Friendship Between the Azerbaidzhani and Russian Peoples) and by M. Ülkusal of Alexandre Bennigsen and Ch. Lemerclier-Quelquejay's *La presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920*; and the usual chronicle of events.

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DERGI, No. 44, 1966, 80 pp. (In Turkish.)

This issue contains: "The Yakutian Turks," by V. Dubrovsky; "The Nature of Soviet Colonialism in Turkestan," by Tamurbek Davletshin; "Soviet Antireligious Propaganda and Islam," by N. A. Teodorovich; "The USSR and the Liberation Movement," by P. Urban; "The Sino-Soviet Conflict and its Implications," by R. A. Rupen; "The Legend of the 'Socialist Nation,'" by S. Tekiner, and reviews by P. Fedenko of *Central Asian Publishing and the Rise of Nationalism* (Edward Allworth) and by Dr. Edige Kirimal of *Funfzehn Jahre Rotchina* (Alexander Kashin). The issue closes with the usual chronicle of events and Institute news.

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

June 1966

- 1 All-Union Society of Geneticists and Selectioners founded in Moscow, Corresponding Member of USSR Academy of Sciences B. L. Astaurov being elected President.

Soviet Communist Party delegation led by Politburo Candidate Member and Party Central Committee Secretary P. N. Demichev leaves for Vienna in response to invitation by Central Committee of Austrian Communist Party.

Soviet Foreign Ministry protests against alleged anti-Soviet campaign in Canada and acts of provocation toward Soviet Embassy in Ottawa.

Second Plenary Board Meeting of USSR Architects' Union held to discuss preparations for 50th anniversary of October Revolution and 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth.

- 2 Plenary board meeting of All-Union "Znaniye" Society held in Moscow to discuss decisions made at Twenty-Third Party Congress. Report delivered by Party Central Committee Member and Corresponding Member of USSR Academy of Sciences V. P. Yelyutin. Academician I. I. Artobolevsky elected Board Chairman in place of Academician V. A. Kirillin, who had asked to be relieved of this position.

- 3 Publication of TASS statement that first Soviet moon satellite, "Luna-10," has completed its mission.

Broadened meeting of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions held. Report delivered by Council Chairman and Politburo Candidate Member V. V. Grishin on "The Broad Development of Land Melioration for the Purpose of Obtaining Consistently Large Harvests of Grain and Other Crops."

- 4 Announcement that surveying work is being carried out in preparation for construction of subway in Kharkov, due to start in 1967.

Information exchange agreement between TASS and Nepalese counterpart signed in Katmandu.

- 5 Soviet Communist Party delegation led by Secretary General L. I. Brezhnev returns to Moscow from Prague after having attended

Thirteenth Congress of Czechoslovak Communist Party.

Soviet Communist Party delegation led by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary A. N. Shelepin leaves for Ulan-Bator in order to attend Fifteenth Congress of Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.

Announcement that four-day all-Union seminar, organized by board of All-Union "Znaniye" Society and social science departments of USSR Academy of Sciences, has been held to discuss problems of Marxist-Leninist theory in the light of Twenty-Third Party Congress. The over 800 participants included chairmen of republican, krai and oblast scientific-methodological councils for propagation of philosophy, political economy, history, and state and law, as well as readers in Marxism-Leninism.

- 6 First Soviet-Polish symposium on complex study of scientific development opens in Lvov.

Delegation of representatives of Soviet "public" [*obshchestvennye*] organizations, led by Party Central Committee Candidate Member and Secretary of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions I. M. Vladychenko, leaves for Belgrade to attend Sixth Congress of Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia.

- 7 Twenty-Third session of Comecon's Executive Council opens in Moscow.

Fifth session of Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries held in Moscow. Report on Union's activities and tasks facing it as a result of Party Congress decisions delivered by presidium chairman N. V. Popova. Resolution adopted to hold all-Union conference in December.

Princess Ashraf Pahlevi of Iran arrives in Moscow in response to invitation by Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Announcement that Chief of General Staff of Armed Forces and First Deputy Defense Minister, Marshal M. V. Zakharov, has returned from visit to Sweden.

Four-day all-Union conference on scientific organization of industrial management con-

vened in Moscow on initiative of State Committee for Science and Technology, All-Union Council of Scientific Societies, and other scientific organizations.

- 8 Announcement that broadened plenary session of RSFSR Supreme Court, attended by chairmen of ASSR Supreme Courts, krai, oblast and circuit courts, and certain people's courts, has been held to discuss results of RSFSR courts' anti-crime campaign and tasks of judicial organs as affected by Party Congress decisions.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-120."

Construction of 116-kilometer-long Central Ferghana Canal begins on banks of river Naryn.

Chairman of Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin receives Lord Erroll and Mr. Scott from London Chamber of Commerce.

North Korean economic delegation led by Vice-Premier Li Joo Yun arrives in Moscow.

- 9 Second International Oceanographic Congress comes to an end in Moscow.

Soviet-North Korean economic talks begin in Moscow. Soviet delegation led by Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers V. N. Novikov.

Announcement that delegation of Soviet journalists has been in Sweden, meeting political leaders, businessmen and other influential persons.

Two-day constituent congress of All-Russian Voluntary Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments comes to an end in Moscow. Participants included high-ranking ministerial and Party and Komsomol Central Committee officials, as well as persons prominent in scientific and artistic circles. Deputy Chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers V. I. Kochemasov elected Chairman of Society's Central Council at plenary meeting of latter.

- 10 Delegation of Soviet trade union representatives led by I. I. Melnikov, secretary of Central Committee of Agricultural and Procurement Workers' Union, leaves for Damascus in response to invitation by Syrian General Peasants' Federation.

Death of I. I. Anisimov, Director of A. M. Gorky Institute of World Literature and President of "USSR-Switzerland" Society.

Delegation of French Communist Party officials arrives in Moscow on study visit of Soviet Communist Party organizations.

Kosygin receives group of senior officials and students from French Higher National Defense Research Institute. Chief Marshal of Armored Troops P. A. Rotmistrov and Head of Defense Ministry's Foreign Relations Department, Lieutenant General M. S. Maslov, also present.

Announcement that Presidium of Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace has approved Committee's delegation to meeting of World Peace Council scheduled for June 13-16. Delegation to be led by A. K. Korneichuk and include Ilya Ehrenburg, B. N. Polevoi and Metropolitan Pimen.

Regular meeting of Central Electoral Commission for Supreme Soviet elections held in Moscow to review election preparations. Report delivered by Commission Chairman V. V. Grishin.

Meeting of All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences devoted to expansion of agricultural production on irrigated and drained land opened in Moscow by Academy's President, P. P. Lobanov. Report on "Scientific Problems in Increasing Soil Fertility and Farming Standards" delivered by Academy's Vice-President, I. I. Sinyagin.

Signing of Soviet-Polish economic and technical cooperation agreement for 1966-70. USSR to assist Poland in oil and gas prospecting and construction and equipping of industrial enterprises.

Delegation from Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and Soviet-East German Friendship Society, led by Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers and Party Central Committee Member V. A. Kirillin, arrives in Berlin for Eighth Congress of German-Soviet Friendship Society.

- 11 Brezhnev receives Rumanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu on latter's request.

Cooperation agreement between TASS and Agence France-Presse signed in Paris.

- 12 Elections to Supreme Soviet of seventh convocation held.

Light Industry Workers' Day celebrated for first time.

Kosygin, accompanied by First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov and other Soviet officials, leaves for Helsinki on official visit.

Construction of Riga Hydroelectric Power Station begins.

- 14 Announcement that international conference of military historians convened by UNESCO has come to an end in Leningrad.

- 15 Publication of Supreme Soviet election results. Candidates returned by 99.76 percent of voters.

All-Union conference of trade workers opens in Moscow. Report delivered by Trade Minister A. I. Struyev.

All-Union conference of chemical industry workers held in Moscow. Report delivered by Chemical Industry Minister L. A. Kostandov. Particular attention devoted to problems involved in switch-over of chemical industry to new planning system.

- 16 First session of Soviet-East German governmental commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation comes to an end in Moscow.

Conference of Soviet, East German, Czechoslovak, Polish, Rumanian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Cuban and Mongolian Ministers of Higher Education ends in Moscow.

Franco-Soviet protocol on cooperation in isoprene production signed in Paris.

Conference on "The Modern City and Architectural Monuments," attended by over one hundred representatives of republican, krai, oblast and city boards of USSR Architects' Union, opens in Moscow.

Acting permanent representative of USSR at UN, P. D. Morozov, hands UN Secretary General U Thant Soviet draft for a treaty "On Principles for the Activities of States in the Exploration of Cosmic Space, the Moon and Other Heavenly Bodies."

Soviet trade union delegation led by Chairman of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions V. V. Grishin leaves for Tokyo in response to invitation by General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (SOHYO).

- 17 Announcement that Chilean Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, William Thayer Arteaga, has arrived in Moscow in response to invitation by State Committee for Labor and Wages.

Deputy Chairman of Supreme Soviet Presidium M. Khokhlov receives visiting delegation from International Committee of Red Cross led by Committee's President, Samuel Alexandre Gonard.

Announcement that exhibition of French books dedicated to coming visit of President de Gaulle has been opened in All-Union State Library of Foreign Literature in Moscow.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-121."

Politburo Member and Party Central Committee Secretary P. N. Demichev receives Higher Education Ministers of "socialist" countries, who have been attending a conference in Moscow. Minister of Higher and Special Secondary Education V. P. Yelyutin and Head of Party Central Committee's Department of Science and Educational Institutions S. P. Trapeznikov also present.

Announcement that Soviet-Hungarian cultural and scientific cooperation agreement for 1966-70 and additional protocol to agreement for 1967 have been signed in Moscow.

- 18 Announcement that meeting of Foreign Ministers of Warsaw Pact countries has been held in Moscow in preparation for conference of Pact's Political Consultative Committee to take place in Bucharest at the beginning of July.

Announcement that Soviet Committee for Relations with Asian and African Writers has decided to hold broadened meeting of Soviet and Afro-Asian writers in latter half of August.

- 19 Publication of resolution of Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers in accordance with that passed at May plenary session of Party Central Committee on "The Broad Development of Land Melioration for the Purpose of Obtaining Consistently Large Harvests of Grain and Other Crops"

Medical Worker's Day.

Publication of joint communiqué on Kosygin's official visit to Finland June 10-18

- 20 French President Charles de Gaulle arrives in USSR on official visit.

Union-republican Party Central Committees meet in plenary session to discuss role of republican Party organizations in promoting land melioration.

Large oil deposit discovered south of Buzuluk (Orenburg Oblast).

Soviet and Canadian trade delegations reach agreement in Moscow on prolongation of current trade agreement for further three-year period.

Soviet-North Korean agreements on economic and technical cooperation and trade

- during period 1967-70, as well as protocol on cooperation in sphere of fisheries, signed in Moscow.
- 21 Soviet-French talks on international problems and furtherance of mutual relations begin in Moscow, the USSR being represented by Brezhnev, Kosygin, Chairman of Supreme Soviet Presidium N. V. Podgorny and Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, and France by President de Gaulle and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville.
 - 22 All-Union Conference of Meat and Milk Industry Workers opens in Moscow. Minister of Meat and Milk Industry S. F. Antonov gives speech on tasks facing the industry.
Announcement that Second All-Union Report and Election Conference of Soviet-Austrian Society has taken place, composer D. D. Shostakovich being elected chairman of Society's central board.
Twenty-fifth anniversary of German invasion of Soviet Union.
 - 23 All-union seminar on the "sociology of spiritual life" opens in Academy of Social Sciences attached to Party Central Committee. Topics to be discussed include the role of mass propaganda media in molding public opinion and the extent to which the Komsomol is satisfying Soviet youth's spiritual requirements.
Announcement that Soviet-Rumanian truck traffic agreement has been signed in Bucharest.
 - 24 Announcement that sessions of Union-republican Supreme Soviets are in progress.
 - 25 Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees that first session of Supreme Soviet of seventh convocation shall be held on August 2 in Moscow.
Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-122."
Pakistani military delegation, the first ever to visit the USSR, arrives in Moscow.
Announcement that consultative council of Supreme Court has held conference on problem of improving work of courts.
 - 26 Announcement that plenary sessions of Union-republican Party Central Committees are in progress. Resolutions are being adopted re-naming the Presidiums of these Committees "Bureaux".
Announcement that Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers have adopted resolution "On the Public Enlistment of Youth for Vital Five-Year Plan Construction Projects," under which 250,000 young people, chiefly from urban areas, are to be sent to work on such projects during the period 1966-70.
Supreme Soviet delegation led by Supreme Soviet Deputy and First Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers D. S. Polyansky leaves for Ottawa in response to invitation by Canadian Parliament.
Soviet Youth Day.
 - 27 Delegation from USSR Parliamentary Group led by latter's Chairman, I. V. Spiridonov, and including newly-elected Supreme Soviet Deputies, leaves for the Netherlands in response to an invitation by Dutch MPs.
General assembly of USSR Academy of Sciences meets in Moscow to discuss melioration and irrigation problems.
UAR naval detachment pays courtesy visit in Sebastopol.
 - 28 All-Union Conference of Criminal Investigation Workers opens in Moscow. Participants include Chairman of Supreme Court A. F. Gor-kin, Chairman of People's Control Committee P. V. Kovanov and Procurator General R. A. Rudenko, who delivers speech on measures to improve work of criminal investigation and public order authorities.
Announcement that Brezhnev and Podgorny have been in Kazakhstan for several days "visiting major construction projects and inspecting the sowing situation."
 - 29 Talks between Soviet leaders and President de Gaulle continue in Kremlin.
"USSR-Mexico" Society established, First Board Secretary of USSR Film Workers' Union L. A. Kulidzhanov being elected chairman.
Supreme Soviet Presidium institutes new holiday, "Trade Worker's Day," to be celebrated annually on fourth Sunday in July.
 - 30 Soviet-French agreement on cooperation in peaceful space research, as well as agreement on scientific, technical and economic cooperation, signed in Kremlin (among other "documents").
Prince Bertil of Sweden arrives in USSR on unofficial visit. His tour is to include Lenin-grad, Tbilisi, Yerevan, Odessa and Yalta.
Announcement that large quarriable gold deposit has been discovered in Kyzylkum Desert (Uzbekistan).

Changes and Appointments

5 N. F. Krasnov appointed First Deputy Minister of Higher and Special Secondary Education.

A. D. Lemberansky appointed First Deputy Head of Central Department for Microbiological Industry under Council of Ministers.

12 S. S. Nikitin appointed First Deputy Head of Foreign Tourism Department under Council of Ministers.

D. Z. Levitsky appointed Deputy Chairman of State Committee for the Supervision of Work Safety in Industry and Mining under Council of Ministers.

Notes on Contributors

OLGEN, C. Born in Orel in 1904. Emigrated to the West after the Revolution. B.Sc.(Eng.), University of London; Associate Member of the Institute of Electrical Engineers, London. Since World War II, has made a study of Soviet philosophy and ideology.

KASHIN, A. Born 1927 in Shanghai, son of a Russian émigré family. Grew up in China. In 1946, took Soviet citizenship and until 1948 worked as a TASS correspondent. In that year, wrote an open letter to the Shanghai press renouncing his Soviet citizenship on ethical grounds. After the Communists' seizure of Shanghai, was several times arrested and in 1952 expelled from China. Since then, has been living in Western Germany and working as a free-lance journalist.

KABYSH, S. Born 1890 in Belorussia. Economist. Senior member of the research staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, specializing in developments in Soviet agriculture.

VORONITSYN, S. Born in 1926 in Yugoslavia. Graduated in 1960 from Frankfurt University in sociology. Has published work in various journals. Now on the staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich.

GAYEV, ARKADY. Journalist. Worked for *Pravda* and *Izvestia* and also for the Soviet regional press from 1921 until World War II, since when he has been living in Munich. A regular contributor of articles on Soviet literature and the Soviet press to the publications of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

ZYBENKO, R. Born in Prague, 1927. Economist and member of the research staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR. Graduate in economics of the University of Louvain.

INSTITUTE ACTIVITIES

Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Dispute

Specialists on the USSR, China, Vietnam and other countries in Asia, forty-five in all from seven countries, including two Vietnamese and three others who came directly from Saigon, participated in the Sixth International Symposium of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, "Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," which was held in Munich from May 31 to June 2, 1966.¹

Dr. I. Milton Sacks, Fulbright Visiting Professor at the Universities of Huế and Saigon, opened the symposium with a background paper tracing the underlying historical and sociological trends that have led to the current situation in Vietnam. Beginning with the Geneva agreement of July 1954, which, he said, was essentially a military truce dividing Vietnam territorially but offering no satisfactory solution to what was fundamentally a political conflict, Dr. Sacks dealt with parallel historical developments in the two Vietnams, stressing internal considerations. He remarked that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with its enforced land reform and thought control, had developed along typically Communist lines into an authoritarian, economically low-level people's democracy heavily dependent on aid from the Soviet Union and Communist China.

In South Vietnam, Dr. Sacks went on, the overthrow of the relatively autocratic Ngo dinh Diem regime in November 1963 unleashed repressed political forces such as that represented by the Buddhists, whose dramatic movement is today the focus of mounting instability in South Vietnam as forces of regionalism and civilian elements conflict with military rule. It was the military that dominated the entire governmental system in South Vietnam, said Dr. Sacks, although it was still doubtful whether the military hierarchy would remain in power.

The discussion following Dr. Sacks' remarks established that the Buddhists enjoyed more widespread support in their successful efforts at toppling the regime of Ngo dinh Diem than they do today. The present crisis was described as a struggle to determine whether the Saigon government or the Buddhists would control the elections scheduled for September of this year.

Mr. Patrick J. Honey, Reader in Vietnamese Studies at the University of London, called attention to the impact of American bombing on the political and economic structure of North Vietnam. The bombing, according to Honey, has led to a modification of the state plan, emphasis now being placed largely on agriculture and local industry and on a concurrent decentralization of administration. To counteract the effect of this "regionalization," as Honey termed it, and maintain central political control, the Lao Dong, the North Vietnamese Workers' Party, has had to disperse political "cadres" throughout the countryside. This, he said, has created a strain upon the Party organization.

¹ It is proposed to publish the papers presented at the symposium in a forthcoming issue of the Institute's quarterly *Studies on the Soviet Union*.

Dr. Robert A. Rupen, Visiting Professor at the Institute and Symposium Chairman, raised the question of motivation, asking why the North Vietnamese could apparently go on indefinitely while the South Vietnamese seemed to get war-weary. Dr. Rupen suggested that the South Vietnamese were caught between two forces and could not agree with either, and that increased American presence in South Vietnam led to increased anti-American feeling.

Commenting in this vein, Dr. Sacks remarked:

While it is true that you have not had elsewhere in Vietnam the kind of overt anti-Americanism that came to the fore in the demonstrations in Da Nang and Hué, make no mistake about the fact that the American presence in Vietnam is a grievous problem for every Vietnamese who is a nationalist and every Vietnamese who is a patriot and every Vietnamese who has some sense in his head about the future of his country. Now, it may be that Westerners, people in this room, have experience with Americans coming and going and helping in reconstruction and so on, but their experience is that when the white man comes, he's not so easy to get rid of. They have lived with the white man and whether he is French or American makes very little difference. From that viewpoint, the Vietnamese intellectual or the Vietnamese leader, even if he recognizes that he has to depend on American support to deal with the problem of the Vietcong, does so with very serious, grave doubts in his inner psyche. He feels that this in a way is a violation of his country's sovereignty. He feels that he has to depend on a foreigner, and he feels psychologically inferior to the Northerner, who has no Western troops fighting on his side. He wants freedom and independence for his country, and he is paying for the fact that nationalism in Vietnam is not and has not been a cohesive force against the Communists. Don't underestimate those feelings for one moment and don't underestimate the importance of them as a political, live fact in Vietnam in terms of American relations with that area. It poses serious problems for the American forces that are there. It is increasingly so as the number of American soldiers is augmented, because you cannot control the behavior of ordinary Americans who find themselves in a cultural environment that is quite different. And if we had trouble in Europe because of the differences between Americans and Europeans, with the French or English or Germans, then multiply that by a factor of a thousand for the situation in Vietnam. This is a very difficult and complex question. It does not mean, however, that such people are prepared or want to throw us out, or support the victory of the Vietcong because they feel that they want to get rid of Americans. It does not take that form. But it does take the form of stubborn insistence in many ways and in a thousand public attitudes showing that they understand that it is not so easy to live with the big American who comes from over the seas and who has to be tolerated, given the difficulties that the people in South Vietnam have to face.

Reporting on Soviet-Vietnamese relations since 1954, Prof. William B. Ballis, of the University of Michigan, stated that while Moscow was compelled by ideology and current strategy in wars of liberation to give aid and comfort to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its war against the South, it was against direct participation itself on any large scale in this war. Ballis argued that Moscow would like a "negotiated settlement" of the Vietnam war on terms that would

not damage the USSR's revolutionary image as the supporter of anti-colonial national-liberation movements. He pointed out that the recent tendency of Soviet economic and military assistance for North Vietnam to surpass that of Communist China might put a greater limitation on the maneuverability of Soviet power in Southeast Asia, and concluded that the outcome of events in Vietnam might depend on the genuineness of the Soviet desire for a *détente* with the West and on the importance of this *détente* for the security, growth and welfare of the Soviet state.

Taking issue with Prof. Ballis's conclusions, Mr. R. Rockingham Gill, Soviet affairs analyst, maintained that the Soviet Union was not bringing pressure to bear on Hanoi for a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict and, in fact, does not feel such a settlement to be necessary. In the Soviet view, he said, a continued escalation of military defensive aid to Hanoi will bring an end to the Vietnam war along lines acceptable to the Soviet Union. He concluded that the war in Vietnam has had surprisingly little effect to date on Soviet foreign policy and that the war no longer constitutes, as it did in 1965, an insurmountable obstacle to other agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union.

On the second day of the symposium, M. David Galula, author of *Counter-Insurgency Warfare*, told the participants that "most of the real assets in this war, with the exception of purely military superiority, are still well entrenched in the Vietcong's hands." Analysing the military situation in Vietnam with a view to determining what it would take to defeat the Vietcong, M. Galula presented facts and figures on the relative size and kinds of forces on both sides and proceeded to discuss other—in his view, more important—considerations such as that the war effort is still limited, notably on the American side; that the war is not conventional, lacking a definite front; that the Vietcong are still operating beyond the guerilla stage, far from having entirely lost the initiative; and that while the political situation is clear-cut and stable for the Communists, it is very confused for the other side.

Commenting on M. Galula's remarks, Mr. Malcolm Mackintosh, of the Stanford Research Institute, stressed that the military headaches created for the Soviet Union by Vietnam ought also to be borne in mind. "It is the Americans who can escalate the military conflicts," he said. "The Soviets have no military initiative in Vietnam."

Mr. John Erickson, of the University of Manchester, supported this contention, pointing to the unconventionality of the war as a factor compelling modification of the outdated command structure of the Soviet military as well as the build-up of unconventional forces. Mr. N. Galay, of the Institute, considered that Mr. Erickson had underestimated the USA's military possibilities in Vietnam, in particular (1) the unlikelihood of large-scale Soviet intervention, and (2) the possibility of making more aggressive use of American air and airlanding forces against North Vietnam.

"The North Vietnamese leadership is at present more intent on obtaining maximum aid from both the Soviet Union and Communist China than with

tying itself completely to one or the other," said Dr. Joachim Glaubitz, of the Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien in Cologne, in his paper to the symposium. Dr. Glaubitz explained that North Vietnam could not rely entirely on the Soviet Union, however great the amount of Soviet aid offered, because Communist China was in a position to block most of this assistance. On the other hand, exclusive dependence on Communist China might jeopardize urgently needed Soviet military and economic aid in addition to allowing China too much control over North Vietnamese internal and foreign policies. It was for geographical reasons that Communist China exercised somewhat more influence over North Vietnamese policies than did the Soviet Union, concluded Dr. Glaubitz, adding that it was doubtful whether Hanoi was in a position to insist on a peace settlement of which Peking did not approve.

Prof. Harold Hinton, of the Institute for Defense Analyses in the United States, continued the discussion on relations between Communist China and Vietnam, stating that Communist China wanted the war in Vietnam to go on without major escalation on either side or direct involvement on its own part until the National Liberation Front gained a dominant political role in South Vietnam. Communist China did not want fully-fledged satellites in Southeast Asia, Prof. Hinton asserted, since these would be both troublesome and expensive. Rather the Chinese were seeking to create a Southeast Asia comprised of small friendly countries. Prof. Hinton went on to say that China would not want a united Communist Vietnam to control both Cambodia and Laos and that North Vietnam was not in a position to break with Communist China, whose leaders regarded the war in Vietnam as a test of the applicability of Maoist revolutionary doctrine to the entire underdeveloped world. Chinese military dispositions in the vicinity to date appeared strictly defensive, he said. Thus, the conditions under which the Chinese had said they would intervene seemed unlikely to materialize, and the Chinese leaders were doubtless exaggerating the seriousness of the Vietnamese crisis in their propaganda partly for domestic political effect.

In assessing the effect of Vietnam on Communist Chinese policy, Alexander Kashin, a free-lance writer for the Institute who lived in China for 26 years, suggested that Communist Chinese leaders would have had to invent the war in Vietnam if it did not already exist. "Vietnam represents just about Peking's only hope for recovering from recent political setbacks throughout the world," he said.

Turning to a discussion of the economic effects of the war in Vietnam on Communist China, Dr. Bernhard Grossmann, Director of the Institut für Asienkunde in Hamburg, stated that aid from Communist China to North Vietnam had so far had little influence on the Chinese economy and that any increase would probably be offset by a reduction in commitments to other countries. Consequently, he said, as long as Communist China does not become directly involved in the Vietnam war, assistance rendered to North Vietnam will have no major effect on her internal economy. Dr. Grossmann also noted that the Vietnamese war provides the leaders of Communist China with an excuse to enforce

war-time austerity at home in an effort to heighten production for their third five-year plan.

Dr. Morton Halperin, of Harvard University, disputed Dr. Grossmann's last point, arguing that the Communist Chinese leaders do not need to rely on foreign adventures such as the Vietnam war to enforce increased production at home. Dr. Halperin said that the rulers in Peking were more concerned about revisionism both at home and in Communist parties abroad than about the war in Vietnam, which might now be creating more liabilities than opportunities for Communist China. At best, according to Dr. Halperin, the Vietcong will be able to fight for twenty years and perhaps bring the war to a successful conclusion. At worst, there is the danger either of escalation into a nuclear war with the United States or of a Geneva-style conference at which the Soviet Union might take credit for any gains in Vietnam.

In the day's concluding report, Mr. Joseph Kun, specialist on Far Eastern affairs, remarked that the primary issues of the Sino-Soviet conflict have remained essentially unchanged since Khrushchev's displacement but that the war in Vietnam has introduced a number of new arguments into Sino-Soviet polemics, including in particular that regarding Communist unity. The slogan "united action," he said, serves as an effective device on the part of the Soviets to underscore the uncooperativeness of the Chinese Communists in working out a common policy with other Communist countries for assisting North Vietnam.

At the last session of the three-day symposium, Dr. Rupen told his audience that they had offered ample evidence of strongly committed anti-Communist groups seeking to form an effective, viable government in South Vietnam and of genuine commitment on the part of the South Vietnamese people to building a truly independent state.

Summing up the work of the symposium, Dr. Rupen said that the participants had almost unanimously agreed on the unlikelihood of a military defeat for American forces such as that suffered by the French at Dien Bien Phu. Other points of agreement, he added, were that North Vietnam has controlled the South Vietnamese Liberation Front from the first, that the latter's indigenous South Vietnamese component is weak and insignificant, that North Vietnam relies largely on the Chinese example in the conduct of revolutionary warfare, and that North Vietnam is strongly resisting Chinese interference and deliberately leaning on the USSR to counterbalance it.

Dr. Rupen went on to point out that Vietnam is not a cause of the Sino-Soviet conflict and that a settlement there will not end the dispute. The problem, he said, is a convenient issue for China to exploit in challenging the Soviet Union as leader of world Communism. China's inability to offer substantial material assistance, coupled with United States escalation of the war, causes North Vietnam to turn to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, however, will not assist North Vietnam to such an extent as to involve itself in a war against the United States. The danger of a war frightens China less than the Soviet Union and the United States, but Chinese domestic, economic and political difficulties

compel caution. Dr. Rupen therefore concluded that there will be no ultimate confrontation of Communism and democracy developing out of Vietnam.

Earlier in the day, Mr. Patrick J. Honey discussed North Vietnam's "model" of strategy and tactics for revolution, concentrating on important elements of the war in South Vietnam that may be said to have universal applicability. Mr. Honey traced the origins of the war in South Vietnam and the formation of the Vietcong and then proceeded to describe the constituents of a universal model of people's warfare. Among these, he included an emotive "cause," isolation of the central government, joint political and military operating techniques, the tactic of the united national front, the tactic of mass organizations, a suitable terrain, a rear base, overseas political activities, and international Communist front organizations. Mr. Honey pointed out that numerous features of the war in South Vietnam derive from the earlier anti-French war or are peculiar to Vietnam itself. He concluded:

The South Vietnamese war, therefore, while embodying much that is typical of classic "people's war" strategy and tactics, has fallen short of the ideal in several respects and has departed altogether from the accepted model in others. The reasons for these divergences are undoubtedly local Vietnamese ones, but they do detract from the claim that this war should be regarded as a model for "people's war" elsewhere.

In describing the impact of the Vietnam war on Japan, Dr. Richard Storry, of St. Antony's College, Oxford, said that while the position of the Japanese government regarding the conflict is essentially pro-American, Japan is nevertheless walking a tightrope. On the one side is the possibility of the war spreading beyond the boundaries of Vietnam. On the other is the possibility of an American withdrawal, succeeded perhaps by a reappraisal of America's obligations throughout the Far East. Both contingencies, from Japan's point of view, are alarming since, in the last resort, the Japanese are not quite ready to shape their own foreign policy in isolation. Bereft of the American "umbrella," they would be ill-equipped to obtain the full benefits that may be garnered from the Sino-Soviet dispute. "Yet, owing to the Vietnam war," Dr. Storry concluded, "it is precisely the American connection with Japan that might conceivably bring China and Russia together again in their policies in the Orient."

As a prelude to a panel discussion on United States policy in Asia, Mr. Fritz Ermarth, Soviet affairs analyst, pointed out what he considered to be two fundamental gaps in the current debate in the United States on Asian policy. "The first shortcoming," he charged, "has been the failure to clarify for American policy the relationship between the Vietnam problem and the United States view of China as a power in Asia. Secondly, the debate has failed to relate the policy of containment in Asia to United States policy toward the Soviet Union."

The panel, which consisted of Prof. William Griffith (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Prof. Erich Kordt (University of Cologne), Mr. W. A. C. Adie (Oxford University) and Professors Sacks and Hinton, addressed itself to current American policy in Vietnam and the American concept of containment of

Communist China. The panel members agreed that if the United States were to be defeated or forced to withdraw from South Vietnam, the repercussions would be felt throughout Asia and especially in those countries bordering on Vietnam and China. Prof. Griffith pointed out that an American defeat in South Vietnam, either military or political, would also have a serious effect on Soviet-American relations, possibly encouraging the Soviets to give more forceful support to revolutionary wars in other parts of the world. While all participants were in general agreement with the fundamental aims of American policy in Vietnam, Dr. Sacks disputed some of the methods being used. He stated that the United States has not yet been able to develop a viable doctrine of counter-insurgent warfare and that, in particular, the aid program with its predominantly rural orientation has been unable to meet the growing problems of South Vietnamese cities. The participants saw the containment of Chinese expansion in Asia and elsewhere as a necessary component of American foreign policy in the foreseeable future.

R. E. P. and R. F.

Announcement

During the Fall Semester of 1966, the University of Oklahoma, in cooperation with the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Germany, is organizing a regular Russian Language and Soviet Area Study Program, which will last from September 20, 1966, to January 12, 1967, with up to 15 credit hours and including a study tour of the Soviet Union.

Courses

The program of study may be selected from the following courses. Discussion sessions for area courses will be held.

Courses	Title	Credit Hours	Language
Russian 3	Russian Reading	3	Russian
Russian 23	Russian Composition	2	Russian
Russian 123	Russian Phonetics	3	Russian
Russian 192	Intensive Intermediate Russian (Russian Reading, Composition and Conversation)	8	Russian
Russian 207	Advanced Russian Conversation	3	Russian
Russian 211	Advanced Russian Composition	3	Russian
Russian 316	Recent Soviet Literature	3	Russian
Russian 401	Problems in Research	2-4	Russ.-Eng.
English 11	English for Foreign Students	4	English
Economics 390	Readings in Selected Fields of Economics	1-4	Russ.-Eng.
Economics 470	Seminar in Economic Development of the Soviet Union	3	Russ.-Eng.
Sociology 344	Contemporary Soviet Society	3	Russ.-Eng.
Political Science 263	Soviet Institutions and Development	3	English
Political Science 361	Problems of Communism (Original Writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev)	2	English
Political Science 350	Soviet Foreign Policy and Strategic Power	3	Russian
Independent Research	Russian, Political Science, Sociology, Economics, etc., for Ph.D.-599, M.A.-499, Directed Reading 226	2-4	Russ.-Eng.
Russian 226T	Field Trip to the Soviet Union	2	Russian

Prerequisites

One year college-level Russian for Russian 3, 23, 123; two years' college-level Russian for Russian 192; otherwise, three years' college-level Russian or equivalent proficiency.

Undergraduate or graduate students in good standing. (Courses numbered 200 or above carry graduate credit.)

Instruction and Facilities

Language.—Emphasis will be on conversation, grammar, problems in the use of Russian, and special vocabulary (all with native specialists).

Faculty.—American university and Institute staff will conduct courses.

Library.— The Institute-Library has one of the largest collections of Soviet publications outside the USSR.

Classes.— All instruction will be given in the Institute building.

Study Arrangements.— Each student will be assigned a study desk in an office at the Institute.

Special Lectures.— Visiting American and European Scholars.

Housing and Transportation

Students will live in inexpensive pensions near the Institute building or in private homes. Room costs include breakfast.

Students may take other meals at conveniently located restaurants of their choice.

Snack lunches may be eaten at the Institute building.

Ship travel arrangements for students will be made with convenient sailing dates in early September (to Europe) and return in mid-January (from Europe).

Study Tour to the Soviet Union

Leave Munich November 1, 1966, and return November 16, 1966. Requests have been made for visits to principal cities in Russia, Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as to East and West Berlin.

Costs

Approximate cost of tuition, room, meals and transportation from New York to Munich and return: \$1,220. Tuition is based on 10 credit-hour enrollment.

Cost of optional tour to the Soviet Union: \$280.

Financial Aid

Some financial aid is available based on need.

An assistantship will be awarded from among those selected to participate.

Application and Information

For application and further information write to:

Professor John G. Eriksen, Chairman
Russian Studies Committee
University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma 73069
U.S.A.

Registration

September 20, 1966, at University of Oklahoma, Munich Center, Mannhardtstrasse 6, 8 Munich 22, Telephone 22 06 81, Germany.

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No. 25

January-March

1966

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
Published Three Times Yearly

University of Queensland Press
St. Lucia, Queensland

September 1966

SUPPLEMENT

Leading Positions and Personalities in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government



Since the publication of the last supplement, there have been numerous changes and the lists have now been revised as of August 3, 1966. The section "Changes and Appointments" at the end of the *Bulletin* will provide the information needed to keep the lists up to date.

For the sake of brevity, positions at all-Union level are not fully specified. For example, Andrei A. Gromyko is Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR: "of the USSR" is here omitted. Reference to Union republics other than the RSFSR is by the simple adjective: e.g., Demyan S. Korotchenko, member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, is described as Member, Ukrainian Central Committee Bureau, and Chairman, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium. Party committees are referred to simply as committees, and in the case of those below the level of a central committee the republic is not mentioned at all. Thus, Vladimir V. Shevchenko, First Secretary of the Lugansk Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, is listed as First Secretary, Lugansk Oblast Committee. Membership of the Union-republic supreme soviets is not indicated.

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PART I

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Politburo of the Central Committee

Members

BREZHNEV, Leonid I.	PODGORNY, Nikolai V.
KIRILENKO, Andrei P.	POLYANSKY, Dmitry S.
KOSYGIN, Aleksei N.	SHELEPIN, Aleksandr N.
MAZUROV, Kiril T.	SHELEST, Petr Y.
PELŠE, Arvids J.	SUSLOV, Mikhail A.
VORONOV, Gennady I.	

Candidate Members

DEMICHEV, Petr N.	MZHAVANADZE, Vasily P.
GRISHIN, Viktor V.	RASHIDOV, Sharaf R.
KUNAYEV, Dinmukhamet A.	SHCHERBITSKY, Vladimir V.
MASHEROV, Petr M.	USTINOV, Dmitry F.

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Secretary General

BREZHNEV, Leonid I.

Secretaries

ANDROPOV, Yuri V.	KULAKOV, Fedor D.
DEMICHEV, Petr N.	PONOMAREV, Boris N.
KAPITONOV, Ivan V.	SHELEPIN, Aleksandr N.
KIRILENKO, Andrei P.	SUSLOV, Mikhail A.
USTINOV, Dmitry F.	

Party Control Committee

Chairman

PELŠE, Arvids J.

Central Auditing Commission

Chairman

SIZOV, Gennady F.

Members of the Central Committee

- ABRASIMOV, Petr A. Ambassador to Eastern Germany.
- AFANASEV, Sergei A. Minister of General Machine Building. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- AKHUNDOV, Veli Y. First Secretary, Azerbaidzhan Central Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- ALEKSANDROV, Anatoly P. Director, I. V. Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute of USSR Academy of Sciences.
- ANDROPOV, Yury V. Central Committee Secretary. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- ANTONOV, Sergei A. Mechanic at Lenin Electromechanical Plant (Moscow).
- ARISTOV, Averkly B. Ambassador to Poland.
- ASKAROV, Asanbai. First Secretary, Alma-Ata Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- BAGRAMYAN, Ivan Kh. Marshal of the Soviet Union. Deputy Minister of Defense. Chief of the Rear, Soviet Armed Forces. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- BAIBAKOV, Nikolai K. Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers. Chairman, State Planning Committee (Gosplan). Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- BASOV, Aleksandr V. Ambassador to Rumania.
- BATITSKY, Pavel F. General of the Army. First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Soviet Armed Forces. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- BEISEBAYEV, Masymkhan B. Chairman, Kazakh Council of Ministers. Member, Kazakh Central Committee Bureau. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- BELOBORODOV, Afanasy P. General of the Army. Commander, Moscow Military District. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- BENEDIKTOV, Ivan A. Ambassador to India.
- BESHCHEV, Boris P. Minister of Railroad Communications. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- BODYUL, Ivan I. First Secretary, Moldavian Central Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- BORODIN, Andrei M. First Secretary, Kustanai Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- BORODIN, P. D. Director, Likhachev, Automobile Plant (Moscow). Member, State Committee for Science and Technology.
- BREZHNEV, Leonid I. Secretary General and Politburo Member, Central Committee. Member, Supreme Soviet Presidium.
- BUTOMA, Boris Y. Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- CHERNYSHEV, Vasily Y. First Secretary, Maritime Krai Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- CHERVONENKO, Stepan V. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.
- CHUIKOV, Vasily I. Marshal of the Soviet Union. Head of Civil Defense. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- CHURAYEV, Viktor M. No further information.
- DANIYALOV, Abdurakhman D. First Secretary, Daghestan Oblast Committee. Member, Supreme Soviet Presidium.
- DEGTYAREV, Vladimir I. First Secretary, Donetsk Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- DEMENTEV, Petr V. Minister of the Aviation Industry. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- DEMICHEV, Petr N. Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Candidate Member. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- DYMSHITS, Veniamin E. Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers. Chairman, State Committee for Material and Technical Supply. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- DZHAVAKHISHVILI, Givi D. Chairman, Georgian Council of Ministers. Member, Georgian Central Committee Bureau. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- FEDOSEYEV, Petr N. Vice-President, USSR Academy of Sciences. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- FLORENTEV, Leonid Y. RSFSR Minister of Agriculture. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- FURTSEVA, Yekaterina A. Minister of Culture. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- GAGANOVA, Valentina I. Brigade leader at Vyshny Volochek Cotton Mill (Kalinin Oblast).
- GALANSHIN, Konstantin I. First Secretary, Perm Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- GARBUZOV, Vasily F. Minister of Finance. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

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GRISHIN, Konstantin N. First Secretary, Ryazan Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

GRISHIN, Viktor V. Candidate Member, Central Committee Politburo. Chairman, All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

GRISHMANOV, Ivan A. Minister of the Building Materials Industry. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

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GRUSHETSKY, Ivan S. Chairman, Ukrainian Central Committee Party Commission. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

GRUSHIN, Petr D. Corresponding Member, USSR Academy of Sciences. Designer at machine-building plant in Moscow Oblast.

IGNATOV, Nikolai G. Deputy Chairman, Supreme Soviet Presidium. Chairman, RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

KÄBIN, Ivan G. First Secretary, Estonian Central Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

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KAVUN, Vasily M. Chairman of collective farm in Vinnitsa Oblast. Member, Supreme Soviet Presidium.

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KHOLYAVKO, Vladimir V. Steel maker at Makeyevka metallurgical plant.

KIRILENKO, Andrei P. Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

KIRILLIN, Vladimir A. Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers. Chairman, State Committee for Science and Technology. Vice-President, USSR Academy of Sciences. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

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KISELEV, Tikhon Y. Chairman, Belorussian Council of Ministers. Member, Belorussian Central Committee Bureau. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

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- NIKOLAYEV, Konstantin K. First Secretary, Sverdlovsk Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- NIKOLAYEVA, Tatyana N. Secretary, All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

- NOVIKOV, Ignaty T. Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers. Chairman, State Committee for Building Affairs (Gostroi). Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- PATON, Boris Y. Deputy Chairman, Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet. Presidium Member, USSR Academy of Sciences. President, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- RUDNEV, Konstantin N. Minister of Instrument Making, Automatic Devices and Control Systems. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- RYABIKOV, Vasily M. First Deputy Chairman, State Planning Committee (Gosplan). Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SEMICHASTNY, Vladimir Y. Chairman, Committee for State Security. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- SHCHETININ, Semen N. First Secretary, Irkutsk Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SHELEPIN, Aleksandr N. Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SHELEST, Petr Y. Member, Central Committee Politburo. First Secretary, Ukrainian Central Committee. Member, Supreme Soviet Presidium.
- SHEVCHENKO, Vladimir V. First Secretary, Lugansk Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- SHKOLNIKOV, Aleksei M. First Deputy Chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SHOKIN, Aleksandr I. Minister of the Electronics Industry. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SHOLOKHOV, Mikhail A. Board Member, Union of Writers of the USSR. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SHVERNIK, Nikolai M. No further information.
- SINITSA, Mikhail S. First Secretary, Odessa Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SKOCHILOV, Anatoly A. First Secretary, Ulyanovsk Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SLAVSKY, Yefim P. Minister of Medium Machine Building. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SMIRNOV, Leonid V. Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SNIEČKUS, Antanas J. First Secretary, Lithuanian Central Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- SOKOLOV, Tikhon I. First Secretary, Orel Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- SOLOVEV, Leonid N. Ambassador to Mongolia.
- SPIRIDONOV, Ivan V. Chairman, Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet. Chairman, USSR Parliamentary Group.
- STEPAKOV, Vladimir I. Head of Propaganda and Agitation Department of Party Central Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- STRUYEV, Aleksandr I. Minister of Trade. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SURGANOV, Fedor A. Second Secretary, Belorussian Central Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SUSLOV, Mikhail A. Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- TABEYEV, Fikryat A. First Secretary, Tatar Oblast Committee. Member, Supreme Soviet Presidium.
- TIKHONOV, Nikolai A. Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- TITOV, Fedor Y. Ambassador to Hungary.
- TITOV, Vitaly N. Second Secretary, Kazakh Central Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- TOKAREV, Aleksandr M. First Secretary, Kuibyshev Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- TOLSTIKOV, Vasily S. First Secretary, Leningrad Oblast Committee. Member, Supreme Soviet Presidium.
- TRAPEZNIKOV, Sergei P. Head of Science and Educational Institutions Department of Party Central Committee. Member, State Committee for Science and Technology. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- USTINOV, Dmitry F. Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Candidate Member. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- USUBALIYEV, Turdakun U. First Secretary, Kirghiz Central Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- VASHCHENKO, Grigory I. First Secretary, Kharkov Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- VASILEV, Nikolai F. First Secretary, Belgorod Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- VATCHENKO, Aleksei F. First Secretary, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

VERSHININ, Konstantin A. Air Chief Marshal. Deputy Minister of Defense. Commander in Chief of the Air Force. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

VOLKOV, Aleksandr P. Chairman, State Committee for Labor and Wages. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

VORONOV, Feodosy D. Director, Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine.

VORONOV, Gennady I. Member, Central Committee Politburo. Chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

VOROSHILOV, Kliment Y. Marshal of the Soviet Union. Member, Supreme Soviet Presidium.

YAKUBOVSKY, Ivan I. General of the Army. Commander, Kiev Military District. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

YASNOV, Mikhail A. First Deputy Chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

YEFREMOV, Leonid N. First Secretary, Stavropol Krai Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

YEFREMOV, Mikhail T. Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

YEGORYCHEV, Nikolai G. First Secretary, Moscow City Committee. Member, Supreme Soviet Presidium.

YELYUTIN, Vyacheslav P. Minister of Higher and Special Secondary Education. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

YEPISHEV, Aleksei A. General of the Army. Head of the Central Political Department of the Army and Navy. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

YESHTOKIN, Afanasy F. First Secretary, Kemerovo Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

YUNAK, Ivan Kh. First Secretary, Tula Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

ZAKHAROV, Matvei V. Marshal of the Soviet Union. Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. First Deputy Minister of Defense. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

ZHIGALIN, Vladimir F. Minister of Heavy, Power and Transport Machine Building. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

ZIMYANIN, Mikhail V. Editor, *Pravda*. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

ZOLOTUKHIN, Grigory S. First Secretary, Krasnodar Krai Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

ZORIN, Valerian A. Ambassador to France.

ZVEREV, Sergei A. Minister of the Defense Industry. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

Deceased:

RUDAKOV, Aleksandr P.

Candidate Members of the Central Committee

ABDURAZAKOV, Malik A. First Secretary, Tashkent Oblast Committee. Candidate Member, Uzbek Central Committee Bureau. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

AFANASEV, Pavel Y. First Secretary, Magadan Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

ALEKSEYEVSKY, Yevgeny Y. Minister of Melioration and Water Economy. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

ALIKHANOV, Enver N. Chairman, Azerbaidzhan Council of Ministers. Member, Azerbaidzhan Central Committee Bureau. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

AMELKO, Nikolai N. Admiral. Commander, Pacific Fleet. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

ANGELEV, Dmitry D. Director of state farm in Rostov Oblast.

ANTONOV, Aleksei K. Minister of the Electrical Engineering Industry. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

ANTONOV, Vasily I. First Secretary, Astrakhan Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

AVRAMENKO, Stepan S. First Secretary, Amur Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

BAKAYEV, Viktor G. Minister of the Merchant Marine. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

BANNIKOV, Nikolai V. First Secretary, Karaganda Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

BAZOVSKY, Vladimir N. First Secretary, Novgorod Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

BELSKIKH, R. A. No further information.

BOCHKAREV, Aleksandr P. Chairman, Saratov Oblast Executive Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

BRATCHENKO, Boris F. Minister of the Coal Industry. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

BREKHOV, Konstantin I. Minister of Chemical and Oil Equipment Production. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

BUBNOVSKY, Nikita D. First Secretary, Khmel'nitsky Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

BUDENNY, Semen M. Marshal of the Soviet Union. Member, Supreme Soviet Presidium.

BULGAKOV, Aleksandr A. Chairman, State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

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CHIRYAYEV, Gavril I. First Secretary, Yakut Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

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DEMENTEVA, Raisa F. Secretary, Moscow City Committee.

DENISOV, Georgy Y. First Secretary, Murmansk Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

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GORODOVIKOV, Basan B. First Secretary, Kalmuck Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

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- ISLYUKOV, Semen M. First Secretary, Chuvash Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- KANDRENKOV, Andrei A. First Secretary, Kaluga Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- KOSHEVOI, Petr K. General of the Army. Commander in Chief, Soviet forces in Germany. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- LIGACHEV, Yegor K. First Secretary, Tomsk Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- LOBOV, Semen M. Admiral. Commander, Northern Fleet. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- LOGINOV, Yevgeny F. Colonel General of the Air Force. Minister of Civil Aviation. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- RUBENS, Vitalijs P. Chairman, Latvian Council of Ministers. Member, Latvian Central Committee Bureau. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- RYKOV, Vasily N. Second Secretary, Turkmenian Central Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SEME NOV, Vladimir S. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- SENKIN, Ivan I. First Secretary, Karelian Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SERBIN, Ivan D. Head of Central Committee Department for the Defense Industry. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SHAURO, Vasily F. Head of Central Committee Culture Department. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SHCHELOKOV, Nikolai A. Second Secretary, Moldavian Central Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SHCHERBINA, Boris Y. First Secretary, Tyumen Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SHEREMETOV, A. S. No further information.
- SHEVCHENKO, A. F. No further information.
- SIDORENKO, Aleksandr V. Minister of Geology. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- SKULKOV, Igor P. First Secretary, Kostroma Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- SMIRNOV, Aleksandr I. First Secretary, Chita Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- SMIRNOV, Aleksandr N. First Secretary, Ivanovo Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- SOKOLOVSKY, Vasily D. Marshal of the Soviet Union. A general inspector of the Ministry of Defense. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- TOKA, Salchak K. First Secretary, Tuva Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- TOLKUNOV, Lev N. Editor, *Izvestia*. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- URAYEV, Petr V. First Secretary, Mary Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- VADER, Artur P. Second Secretary, Estonian Central Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- VLADYCHENKO, Ivan M. Secretary, All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.
- VORONINA, Praskovya A. First Secretary, Bauman (Moscow) District Committee.
- VOROTNIKOV, Sergei I. Brigade leader in Pit No. 1, "Kommunarskugol" Trust, Lugansk Oblast.
- VSEVOLOZHSKY, Mikhail N. First Secretary, Zaporozhe Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
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- YANGEL, Mikhail K. Member, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.
- YEGOROV, Anatoly G. Editor, *Kommunist*.
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ZAKHAROV, Mikhail Y. Turner in Podolsk engineering works.

ZARODOV, Konstantin I. Editor, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*.

ZHURAVLEVA, Marina I. Secretary, All-Union Komsomol Central Committee.

ZHURIN, Nikolai I. First Secretary, Aktyubinsk Oblast Committee. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

ZOTOV, Vasily P. Minister of the Food Industry. Deputy, Supreme Soviet.

First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Union-Republic Communist Parties*

Ukrainian SSR	SHELEST, Petr Y.
Belorussian SSR	MASHEROV, Petr M.
Uzbek SSR	RASHIDOV, Sharaf R.
Kazakh SSR	KUNAYEV, Dinmukhamed A.
Georgian SSR	MZHAVANADZE, Vasily P.
Azerbaijan SSR	AKHUNDOV, Veli Y.
Lithuanian SSR	SNIEČKUS, Antanas J.
Moldavian SSR	BODYUL, Ivan I.
Latvian SSR	VOSS, Augusts E.
Kirghiz SSR	USUBALIYEV, Turdakun U.
Tadzhik SSR	RASULOV, Dzhabar D.
Armenian SSR	KOCHINYAN, Anton Y.
Turkmen SSR	OVEZOV, Balysh
Estonian SSR	KÄBIN, Ivan G.

* There is no separate Communist Party of the RSFSR

PART II

The Council of Ministers of the USSR*

Chairman

KOSYGIN, Aleksei N.

First Deputy Chairmen

MAZUROV, Kiril. T. POLYANSKY, Dmitry S.

Deputy Chairmen

BAIBAKOV, Nikolai K.	NOVIKOV, Ignaty T.
DYMSHITS, Veniamin E.	NOVIKOV, Vladimir N.
KIRILLIN, Vladimir A.	SMIRNOV, Leonid V.
LESECHKO, Mikhail A.	TIKHONOV, Nikolai A.
YEFREMOV, Mikhail T.	

Heads of Ministries

Minister of the Aviation Industry	DEMENTEV, Petr V.
Minister of the Automobile Industry	TARASOV, Aleksandr M.
Minister of Foreign Trade	PATOLICHEV, Nikolai S.
Minister of the Gas Industry	KORTUNOV, Aleksei K.
Minister of Civil Aviation	LOGINOV, Yevgeny F.
Minister of Machine Building for the Light, Food and Household Equipment Industries	DOYENIN, Vasily N.
Minister of the Merchant Marine	BAKAYEV, Viktor G.
Minister of the Defense Industry	ZVEREV, Sergei A.
Minister of General Machine Building	AFANASEV, Sergei A.
Minister of Instrument Making, Automatic Devices and Control Systems	RUDNEV, Konstantin N.
Minister of Railroad Communications	BESHCHEV, Boris P.
Minister of the Radio Industry	KALMYKOV, Valery D.
Minister of Medium Machine Building	SLAVSKY, Yefim P.
Minister of the Machine and Hand Tools Industry	KOSTOUSOV, Anatoly I.
Minister of Communal, Building and Roadbuilding Machinery	NOVOSELOV, Yefim S.
Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry	BUTOMA, Boris Y.
Minister of Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Construction	SINITSYN, Ivan F.
Minister of Transport Construction	KOZHEVNIKOV, Yevgeny F.
Minister of Heavy, Power and Transport Machine Building	ZHIGALIN, Vladimir F.
Minister of Chemical and Oil Equipment Production	BREKHOV, Konstantin I.
Minister of the Electronics Industry	SHOKIN, Aleksandr I.
Minister of the Electrical Engineering Industry	ANTONOV, Aleksei K.
Minister of Higher and Special Secondary Education	YELYUTIN, Vyacheslav P.
Minister of Geology	SIDORENKO, Aleksandr V.
Minister of Health	PETROVSKY, Boris V.
Minister of Foreign Affairs	GROMYKO, Andrei A.
Minister of Culture	FURTSEVA, Yekaterina A.
Minister of the Light Industry	TARASOV, Nikolai N.
Minister of the Timber, Cellulose, Paper and Wood-Processing Industries	TIMOFEYEV, Nikolai V.
Minister of Melioration and Water Economy	ALEKSEYEVSKY, Yevgeny Y.
Minister of Special Installation and Construction Projects	YAKUBOVSKY, Fuad B.
Minister of the Meat and Milk Industry	ANTONOV, Sergei F.

* Members are listed in the order laid down under the Constitution. No distinction is made between "all-Union" and "Union-republic" ministries.

Minister of the Oil-Extracting Industry	SHASHIN, Valentin D.
Minister of the Oil-Processing and Petrochemical Industry	FEDOROV, Viktor S.
Minister of Defense	MALINOVSKY, Rodion Y.
Minister for the Preservation of Public Order	To be appointed
Minister of the Food Industry	ZOTOV, Vasily P.
Minister of the Building Materials Industry	GRISHMANOV, Ivan A.
Minister of Education	To be appointed
Minister of Fisheries	ISHKOV, Aleksandr A.
Minister of Postal Services and Telecommunications	PSURTSEV, Nikolai D.
Minister of Agriculture	MATSKEVICH, Vladimir V.
Minister of Trade	STRUYEV, Aleksandr I.
Minister of the Coal Industry	BRATCHENKO, Boris F.
Minister of Finance	GARBUSOV, Vasily F.
Minister of the Chemical Industry	KOSTANDOV, Leonid A.
Minister of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy	LOMAKO, Petr F.
Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy	KAZANETS, Ivan P.
Minister of Power and Electrification	NEPOROZHNY, Petr S.

Heads of Departments at Ministerial Level

Chairman of State Planning Committee (Gosplan)	BAIBAKOV, Nikolai K.
Chairman of State Committee for Building Affairs (Gosstroil)	NOVIKOV, Ignaty T.
Chairman of State Committee for Material and Technical Supply	DYMSHITS, Veniamin E.
Chairman of People's Control Committee	KOVANOV, Pavel V.
Chairman of State Committee for Labor and Wages	VOLKOV, Aleksandr P.
Chairman of State Committee for Science and Technology	KIRILLIN, Vladimir A.
Chairman of State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education	BULGAKOV, Aleksandr A.
Chairman of State Purchasing Committee	KORNIYETS, Leonid R.
Chairman of State Forestry Committee	RUBTSOV, Vasily I.
Chairman of State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations	SKACHKOV, Semen A.
Chairman of Committee for State Security	SEMICHASTNY, Vladimir Y.
Chairman of All-Union Association for the Sale of Agricultural Machinery to State and Collective Farms ("Selkhoztekhnika")	YEZHEVSKY, Aleksandr A.
Chairman of Board of State Bank	POSKONOV, Aleksei A.
Head of Central Statistical Authority	STAROVSKY, Vladimir N.

Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics*

RSFSR	VORONOV, Gennady I.
Ukrainian SSR	SHCHERBITSKY, Vladimir V.
Belorussian SSR	KISELEV, Tikhon Y.
Uzbek SSR	KURBANOV, Rakhmankul
Kazakh SSR	BEISEBAYEV, Masymkhan B.
Georgian SSR	DZHAVAKHISHVILI, Givi D.
Azerbaijani SSR	ALIKHANOV, Enver N.
Lithuanian SSR	SUMAUSKAS, Motejus J.
Moldavian SSR	DIORDITSA, Aleksandr F.
Latvian SSR	RUBENS, Vitalijs P.
Kirghiz SSR	MAMBETOV, Bolot
Tadzhik SSR	KAKHAROV, Abdulakhad
Armenian SSR	MURADYAN, Badal A.
Turkmen SSR	GAPUROV, Mukhamednazar
Estonian SSR	KLAUSON, Walter J.

* Under Article 70 of the Soviet Constitution, the Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics are *ex-officio* members of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

PART III

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

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PODGORNY, Nikolai V.

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Deputy chairmen are chairmen of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics (see below)*

Secretary

GEORGADZE, Mikhail P.

Members

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BREZHNEV, Leonid I.	NURIYEV, Ziya N.
BUDENNY, Semen M.	NUTETEGRYNE, Anna D.
DANIYALOV, Abdurakhman D.	PETROVSKY, Ivan G.
DZHALALOV, Mannap	PUKHOVA, Zoya P.
KASATKINA, Anna I.	SHELEST, Petr Y.
KAVUN, Vasily M.	TABEYEV, Fikryat A.
KONOTOP, Vasily I.	TOLSTIKOV, Vasily S.
KUNAYEV, Dinmukhamed A.	VOROSHILOV, Kliment Y.
MASHEROV, Petr M.	YEGORYCHEV, Nikolai G.

Chairmen of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics

RSFSR	IGNATOV, Nikolai G.
Ukrainian SSR	KOROTCHENKO, Demyan S.
Belorussian SSR	KOZLOV, Vasily I.
Uzbek SSR	NASRIDDINOVA, Yadgar S.
Kazakh SSR	NIYAZBEKOV, Sabir B.
Georgian SSR	DZOTSENIDZE, Georgy S.
Azerbaijani SSR	ISKENDEROV, Mamed A.
Lithuanian SSR	PALECKIS, Justas I.
Moldavian SSR	ILYASHENKO, Kirill F.
Latvian SSR	KALNBERZINŠ, Jānis E.
Kirghiz SSR	KULATOV, Turabai
Tadzhik SSR	KHOLOV, Makhmadula
Armenian SSR	ARUTYUNYAN, Nagush Kh.
Turkmen SSR	KLYCHEV, Annamukhamed
Estonian SSR	MÜÜRISSEPP, Aleksei A.

* While this is the general rule, PALECKIS has not yet been appointed a deputy chairman

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ARTICLES

Monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church

N. TEODOROVICH

Monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church have had a checkered fate, both under the Tsars and under the Soviet regime. Monastic foundations began to appear after the conversion of Rus to Christianity in the tenth century. At first, they served purely religious ideals. Until the establishment of the metropolitan see of Kiev in the eleventh century, they neither owned any property worth mentioning nor enjoyed state privileges. Even Soviet antireligious propaganda does not deny that in the early period they promoted both cultural progress and the establishment and development of the Russian state. Considering the reading and copying of books to be a devotional exercise, they encouraged interest in enlightenment; monastic schools for instruction in the elements of reading and writing were set up, and groups of copyists and translators came into existence; in the twelfth century, chronicles of contemporary events began to be kept. At the same time, the monasteries contributed to the raising of moral standards; demanding moral virtue from prince and peasant alike, they helped to spread a feeling of Christian brotherhood. Their growing wealth, due to the monks' hard work and strict discipline of obedience, gradually created a basis for charity work; monastic hospitals and almshouses were set up, food was supplied to the victims of natural disasters—droughts, fires, etc.

Those monks to whom a hermitic way of life was more suited than the communal existence in the monasteries went to live in forests or on the shores of distant lakes and rivers. Rumors about them spread among the faithful, and their habitations began to attract pilgrims, many of whom settled there. Settlements grew up which in the course of time developed into townships, whose inhabitants were engaged in cultivating virgin land. Young novices in search of spiritual guidance accepted the hermits' discipline and settled there permanently, with the result that what had originally been hermitages developed into large monastic settlements with a communal way of life.

In order that their deceased relatives might be prayed for, offerings were brought by the faithful, the rich among them presenting the monasteries with land, sometimes whole villages or estates, or objects of value to beautify the monasteries' chapels or their most deeply revered icons. In this way, the monasteries also grew rich from gifts brought from outside.

Monasteries in outlying regions rendered services of various kinds to the state: by preaching the faith among the local non-Russian peoples, they added new members to the family of nations ruled over by the Orthodox state and so promoted the state's policy of colonization, while those monasteries situated in

border areas were of importance for the country's military defense. In return, the state began to grant them various privileges, exempting them from many taxes and from the jurisdiction of the secular authorities and granting them the right of jurisdiction over their serfs. This proved a turning point in the life of the Orthodox monasteries, after which their aura of holiness began to fade. From this time on, one of their main concerns was to curry favor with the rich and powerful. It was no longer the piety of its inmates, but the extent of its wealth and privileges that determined a monastery's importance. Idlers and parasites were attracted by the monastic way of life, where privileged monks received special fare and even intoxicating liquor was consumed.

The growing worldliness of the monasteries aroused discontent among the faithful. To a considerable extent, it was responsible for the heresy of the Strigolniki in the fourteenth century, provoked the disapproval of Nil Sorsky in the following century, and led to the first secularization of ecclesiastical property, carried out by Ivan III in the latter half of the fifteenth century, when the lands confiscated from the monasteries were transferred to the "boyars' children."

After this, the treatment meted out to the monasteries by the Russian tsars and emperors varied according to their personal likes and dislikes. A negative attitude to them was shown by Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and by his younger son Peter the Great. Under Anna Ivanovna, there was even an attempt to secure the monks' extinction: it was virtually forbidden to take monastic vows, and homeless beggars and invalids were installed in place of monks who had died. Under Catherine II, the number of monasteries was reduced and the administration of those monastic estates that were left was entrusted to a special body in the Synod composed of lay persons.

Since, however, the monasteries helped to meet certain spiritual needs and also were an indispensable institution for training the higher (regular) clergy, their complete liquidation was impossible. Even under rulers whose personal attitude toward the monasteries was unfavorable, governmental restrictions were occasionally removed, privileges previously withdrawn were restored, and gifts to the monasteries once more began to swell their possessions. This applies to Peter the Great, Anna Leopoldovna, Yelizaveta Petrovna and Alexander I, among others.

At the end of the nineteenth century, monks and nuns constituted 0.06 percent of the Orthodox population of Russia. As of July 1, 1896, the total number of monasteries and hermitages was 769, of which about 90 percent were in European Russia, 5 percent in the Caucasus, 0.4 percent on Polish territory, 0.4 percent in Finland, and 4.1 percent in the Asiatic possessions. Their numbers in the central provinces (*gubernii*) of Russia were as follows: Vladimir Province, 30; Vologda Province, 20; Kostroma Province, 16; Moscow Province, 54; Nizhny Novgorod Province, 26; Novgorod Province, 39; Tambov Province, 20; Tver Province, 27; and Yaroslavl Province, 24.¹

¹ *Entsiklopedichesky slovar* (Encyclopedic Dictionary), Brokgauz and Efron, Vol. XIXa, St. Petersburg, 1896, p. 730.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, when revolution was in the air, interest in the monasteries heightened—for a variety of reasons; some regarded them as reliable sources of spiritual strength and the home of a possible spiritual rebirth, while others saw in them a symbol of Russia's decadence. While some monasteries such as that at Sarova, south of Nizhny Novgorod (now Gorky) or the Optina *pustyn*, near the town of Kozelsk (south of Kaluga), were noted for their piety and constantly attracted pilgrims, others were now little more than repositories for sacred relics, the burial places of tsars, treasuries of historical objects: it was precisely this historical aspect which chiefly interested the liberal intelligentsia, on which the monasteries of this period were no longer themselves capable of exerting any cultural influence. Their charity work had also become negligible: although their income from various sources was fabulous (apart from the sale of candles, payments for the offering of prayers, burial dues, etc., there was the income from the lease of land and property, fishing rights, etc.), in 1892 Orthodox monasteries in Russia maintained a relatively insignificant number of hospitals (134, with 1,593 beds) and almshouses (84, with accommodation for 1,237 persons).²

For the most part, the material activities of the monasteries of this period differed little from those of the large estates and other enterprises in lay possession. As far as the state was concerned, they were assuming excessive importance as landowners, financiers and employers; in religious life, they promoted the emergence of dissenting sects; and as regards society as a whole, they aroused the ire of the poorer peasants and urban population. To those who took the interests of the Church to heart, it was clear that monastic life must be reformed.

At the beginning of World War I, there were 1,025 Orthodox monasteries in the Russian Empire.³ The increase as compared with the number in 1896 was probably due to the return of dissident monasteries to the Orthodox faith and the adoption of monastic status by female communities founded on the initiative of laywomen for charitable and missionary purposes. These communities observed the monastic rule.

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The decree issued in January 1918 on the separation of Church and state deprived the Church—including, of course, the monasteries—of its property. This measure provoked no especial protest, the faithful remaining fairly indifferent until the actual existence of the monasteries was in danger. In 1919, an "explanatory statement" issued by the Eighth Department (at that time concerned with ecclesiastical matters) of the People's Commissariat of Justice declared:

The fate of the monasteries depends on the decision of the local deputies' soviets as regards the functions which they shall find necessary to assign to them, as: sanatoria, farms, educational institutions, accommodation for crippled soldiers, or [their] adaptation for any economic requirements.⁴

² *Ibid.*, p. 732. On the monasteries' income, see D. Rostislavov, *Opyt issledovaniya ob imushchestvakh i dokhodakh nasbikh monastyrei* (An Essay in the Study of the Property and Income of Our Monasteries), St. Petersburg, 1876, and *Voyennyi ateist*, Kiev, 1963, No. 4, p. 59.

³ Report of the Oberprokuror of the Holy Synod for 1914 (Petrograd, 1916).

⁴ *Revolyutsiya i tserkov*, 1919, No. 7, pp. 39–40.

This declaration was to have far-reaching consequences. For the "activists," it was the signal for a violent attack: the monasteries were invaded by crowds who desecrated the sanctuaries, committed outrages upon sacred relics and subjected the monks and nuns to humiliating treatment.⁵ Well realizing that opportunist elements had left the monasteries at the very beginning of the Bolshevik *coup* and that those who were left were prepared to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their religious vows, believers considered it their duty to defend the rights and dignity of people who had chosen the monastic way of life and to protect monastic property of historical and artistic value.

Paradoxically enough, not only the creation of official "commissions on the protection of ancient monuments" but also the transformation of monastic treasuries into antireligious museums helped to preserve some of the valuables of the famous Kiev-Pecherskaya Lavra, the monastery on the Solovki Islands, and other institutions.⁶ As a measure of self-defense, monastic settlements reconstituted themselves as agricultural and other artels, but this ruse was soon unmasked by the secular authorities. At the third congress of Soviet judiciary workers, held in 1920, it was resolved to

...consider the granting of special rights and privileges (rights of agricultural communes, production communes, etc.) to religious collectives as inadmissible and opposed to the interests of the revolution.⁷

In 1921, a number of monastic communes were liquidated, others "purged of monastic elements."⁸ By the end of the twenties, there was not a single monastery existing openly and not a single monastic commune. It was impossible for a novice to take monastic vows. In this campaign, the Communists were actively assisted by the episcopacy of the *Obnovlenskaya tserkov*, a body composed of the extreme leftwing Orthodox episcopacy and clergy which arose in the Soviet Union in the early twenties with the object of finding a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet regime and which rejected monasticism. The present writer herself witnessed the taking over of the Nunnery of the Transfiguration in Minsk by representatives of this body: mounted militia had to intervene in order to drive a crowd of would-be defenders back from the entrance to the monastery church and from the entrance to the cells.

In the twenties, most of those in monastic orders were subjected to persecution and finished their days in prison or in labor camps. Of their heroic conduct in imprisonment and in exile, much has been written by eyewitnesses in the émigré press.⁹ Monks and nuns who succeeded in escaping in time from monasteries due for destruction became dispersed among the civilian population, on whom they

⁵ *Pravoslavaya Rus*, Jordanville, N.Y., 1955, No. 14, p. 12; M. Polsky, *Novye mученики russiiskie* (New Russian Martyrs), Vol. II, Jordanville, N.Y., 1957, pp. 248-57 and 261-63.

⁶ See, e.g., *Chasovoi*, No. 359, Brussels, 1955, p. 21.

⁷ Prof. B. V. Titlinov, *Tserkov vo vremya revolyutsii* (The Church During the Revolution), Petrograd, 1924, p. 157.

⁸ *Revolutsiya i tserkov*, 1922, No. 1-3, pp. 41-43.

⁹ See *Khristiansky golos*, Munich, September 23, 1955; Polsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 257-61.

exerted a spiritualizing influence as the representatives of a calling characterized by devotion to religious ideals and rejection of earthly ambitions.¹⁰

In 1939–40, as a result of the annexation of the Baltic states, the Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia and Bessarabia, the Soviet Union once more had monasteries owning much land and other property on its territory. The upper hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate, collaborating with the Communist authorities, made every effort to include the hitherto free churches in these territories in their own system.¹¹ Monastic property, whatever its nature, was nationalized, and the numbers of monks and nuns was reduced under various pretexts.¹²

With the arrival of the Germans in World War II, monastic life revived in the territories occupied by them, and the local population took a lively part in this revival. In the Eastern Ukraine, monasteries were reestablished in buildings that for decades had been used for profane purposes. The initiators were former monks and nuns who had, so to speak, reemerged from the underground. The German occupation authorities put no obstacles in their path. The religious revival was further promoted by the establishment of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in the areas of the Ukraine that had been evacuated by the Bolsheviks. In Eastern Belorussia, on the other hand, a revival of the monasteries was not realized.¹³

The immediate postwar years in the USSR also proved favorable for the monastic revival. Stalin considered it expedient to continue the tolerant policy that he had adopted at the beginning of the war, his intention evidently being that the resultant illusion of a "reform" of Communism should enhance the enthusiasm with which the work of reconstruction was being pursued. Sacred relics, ecclesiastical vessels and robes and revered icons were returned to the monasteries from the museums. Landed property acquired during the German occupation was not confiscated, and the monks, believing in the permanence of the new Soviet policy toward the Church, in accordance with tradition set about the task of reestablishing their economic life, planting orchards, cultivating vegetable gardens, setting up apiaries, even building power stations and mills and acquiring technical equipment. Their products rapidly grew in quantity and found an easy market. Those in the cities pursued various crafts, lace-weaving, embroidery, the making of robes, etc. Laymen were allowed to take monastic vows: during this period, several members of the intelligentsia who had served with distinction in the war entered monasteries. Inturist was only too ready to allow foreign visitors to see the intense activity of the monasteries.

¹⁰ See *Tserkovnyi Vestnik Zapadno-evropeiskoi yeparkhii*, Paris, 1929, No. 2, p. 16.

¹¹ *Patriarkh Sergii i yego dukhovnoye nasledstvo* (Patriarch Sergii and his Spiritual Legacy), Moscow, 1947, p. 227.

¹² Friedrich Heyer, *Die orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945*, Cologne, 1953, pp. 168–69.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 170–72; W. Alexeev, "L'Eglise Orthodoxe russe sous l'occupation allemande (1941–1944)," *Irenikon*, No. 29, Chevetogne, 1956; Igumen Georgii, "Iz vospominanii o tserkovnoi zhizni v SSSR pri nemetskoj okkupatsii" (Recollections of Ecclesiastical Life in the USSR under the German Occupation), *Vestnik*, Institut for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1957, No. 2.

According to official data of the Moscow Patriarchate, there were 69 monasteries with 5,000 inmates in 1958.¹⁴ On the basis of information in the Soviet press, it has proved possible to compile a fairly complete list of them,¹⁵ from which their geographical distribution may be classified as follows: In regions annexed by the USSR in 1939–40, there were 25 monasteries and five small hermitages (*skity*) in the Western Ukraine and Transcarpathia; two monasteries in Western Belorussia; three in the Baltic states, and twelve monasteries and one *skit* in Bessarabia and Moldavia. On former German-occupied Soviet territory, there were 23 monasteries and two hermitages (*pustyni*) in the Ukraine and one monastery in the RSFSR. Finally, on territory that had not been occupied by the Germans, there was one monastery (the Troitse-Sergiyeva Lavra) in the RSFSR. Thus, 67 monasteries as well as six *skity* and two *pustyni* have been identified as having existed at that time. The other two are apparently the monastery at Mtskheta, in Georgia,¹⁶ and another, somewhere in Bessarabia or Transcarpathia, which has escaped the attention of the press.

The Moscow Patriarchate, counting on the moral capital that it had accumulated by its patriotic services during the war, accepted the assurances of loyalty offered by representatives of the Party and so harbored no doubts about the stability of the monasteries' position. Consequently, in the book on the Russian Orthodox Church which it published in 1958, it stressed the economic security of the monasteries:

The overwhelming majority of the present-day monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church... are communal. The Soviet state recognizes their right, on the basis of civil legislation, to own land, livestock, industrial equipment, repair workshops and other economic enterprises.¹⁷

A publication of this kind—which, moreover, was intended for export—must have gone through the Party censorship; consequently, the Party itself must have been interested in the publication of such statements by the Church. Nevertheless, during the same year (1958), in connection with the preparations for the announcement of a transition to the building of Communism, the Party launched a further antireligious campaign, which began with the closure of many churches and especially monasteries. The tactics of toleration were no longer necessary, and understandably so: if in Tsarist times the monasteries sometimes disturbed the country's economic equilibrium and therefore could not always be tolerated, in the Soviet state they were in flat contradiction to the entire Communist

¹⁴ *Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov: Ustroistvo, polozheniye, deyatelnost* (The Russian Orthodox Church: Organization, Status and Activity), Moscow, 1958, p. 83; *Church Times*, July 18, 1958 (as quoted in W. Kolarz, *Religionen in der Sowjetunion*, Herder, Basle, 1963, p. 74); *Yedinaya Tserkov* (The One Church), New York, 1961 (as quoted in G. Grabbe, *Pravda o Russkoi Tserkvi na rodine i za rubezhom* [The Truth about the Russian Church at Home and Abroad], Jordanville, N.Y., 1961, pp. 170–71).

¹⁵ Compiled on the basis of data from the *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, the Soviet periodical press, and Heyer, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ The monastery is still in existence, although much neglected, according to foreign visitors (see *Digest des Ostens*, Königstein/Taunus, 1965, No. 9, pp. 4–5).

¹⁷ *Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov*..., p. 105.

economy. The voluntary and communal labor of the monks, based on the principles of brotherhood and self-discipline and characterized by high productivity, seemed like a living reproach to the inefficient labor of the collective farms, a living exposure of the principles of Communism. The services and the general atmosphere in the monasteries breathed a spirit of calm seclusion which offered a welcome refuge from the Soviet way of life. Those who had suffered bereavement found especial solace in the prayers that were offered up for the dead. Consequently, the monasteries had come to be visited by large numbers of Soviet pilgrims, who, taking small icons, prayer leaflets and water drawn from sacred wells with them, returned home inspired by a feeling of peace and goodwill. This then prompted others to go. Apparently, after their return home the pilgrims did not break their connection with the monasteries but sent them gifts of money and began to organize assistance for the poorest of them. In this way, a widespread network came into existence consisting of people who took a different view of life from that officially approved. Such a phenomenon was radically opposed to the Communist education of the masses.

Particularly disagreeable to the secular authorities was the attraction that monastic life had for some members of the younger generation. The Soviet press was full of warnings of this danger. A few examples may be quoted. One newspaper reported that a certain Vera K., a Komsomol member and student at a radio technical school, had entered a monastery.¹⁸ Another stated that girls aged 18–20 were entering nunneries in Transcarpathia, at one of which the novices were girls who had finished seven-year school “with the highest marks.”¹⁹ The same paper later published an article headed “You Won’t Do That, Lida!” This took the form of a “friendly chat” with a young girl who before entering a nunnery had allegedly decided to consult the editors on the matter.²⁰ On another occasion, the press accused a man of having forced his daughter, Tamara L., to enter a nunnery.²¹ A certain lecturer, V. P., complained in the press of the “tremendous influence” exerted on young people by the Zaborsk monastery.²²

In view of such influences and also the fact that the local population showed affection for the monasteries, the Party mobilized its arsenal of well-tried “special methods” for the purpose of putting an end to their existence. These included:

1. The public discrediting of both monasteries and pilgrims by means of attacks in the press. Heads of monasteries were accused of rapacity (*styazhatelstvo*), illegally acquiring automobiles and building materials that were in short supply, of showing a devotion to Russia’s counterrevolutionary past, of having “collaborated” with the Nazis, etc. The monks were accused either of keeping the monasteries in a state of disorder and neglect bordering on outright insanitariness or, on the other hand, of acquiring undue quantities of modern technical equip-

¹⁸ *Komsomolskaya pravda*, July 9, 1953.

¹⁹ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, July 21, 1959.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, July 9, 1960.

²¹ *Komsomolskaya pravda*, August 15, 1961.

²² *Selskaya zhizn*, December 19, 1962.

ment, further, of obtaining enormous sums of money by extortion. They were also accused of moral vice. Pilgrims were accused of parasitism, vagrancy, etc.²³

2. Organization of court trials and publication of accounts of persons who have left a monastery. Evidence was given representing those responsible for monastic administration as rough and intolerant, and mass hysteria reminiscent of the middle ages was alleged. These were typical of the pretexts made for closing monasteries.²⁴

3. Publication of letters from Soviet tourists demanding that monasteries be converted into museums. Some Soviet tourists were shocked by the fact that when they were shown through the caves at the Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra and the Pskovo-Pechersky Monastery their guides were monks. They objected to the explanations offered by the monks of the things they saw, and also to the sale of church candles for illuminating the caves, and demanded that the monasteries and their treasures be handed over to the state.²⁵

4. The publicizing of "voluntary," even "mass" departures of monks and nuns to work in collective farms or in industry. Since 1958, antireligious journals have been publishing statements and articles by the persons concerned in which they described monastic life and expressed pleasure at their "liberation." There were also appeals to those contemplating taking monastic vows, and photographs of the authors were also printed. The purpose was to set an example for others to imitate, and so deplete the monasteries by "natural" means.²⁶

5. The examination of monks by medical commissions with a view to their "hospitalization." The application of this device led to the removal of many who were allegedly found to be suffering from a variety of diseases, including psychological disorders and various forms of tuberculosis. The Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra was considerably depleted in this way, and this method is also being applied to the Lavra at Pochayev.²⁷

6. The application of other methods, particularly to certain of the better-known monasteries. The Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra was closed in 1962 on the grounds that "the waters of the Dnieper had undermined the foundations of the monastery buildings." (This had happened before, but the Tsarist government

²³ *Pravda*, April 24, 1959; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, August 12, 1959; *Komsomolskaya pravda*, October 22, 1959; *Trud*, July 6, 1960; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, December 14, 1960; *Molodoi kommunist*, 1961, No. 8, p. 78; *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, August 11 and October 16, 1962; *Novy mir*, 1962, No. 11, p. 142; *Sovetskaya Latvija*, July 29, 1964; V. Andriyevsky, *Pro Pochayevskuyu lavru* (On the Pochayev Lavra), Kiev, 1960; and G. Gorodnyak, *Pravda o Pskovo-Pecherskom monastyre* (The Truth about the Pskovo-Pechersky Monastery), Moscow, 1963.

²⁴ Andriyevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 35; *Komsomolskaya pravda*, December 13, 1958; and *Pravda Ukrainy*, September 11, 1959.

²⁵ Gorodnyak, *op. cit.*; *Komsomolskaya pravda*, December 13, 1958, and October 22, 1959; and *Selskaya zhizn*, September 14, 1962.

²⁶ *Nauka i religiya*, 1961, No. 9, p. 22; *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, October 27, 1960; *My porvali s religiyey* (We Broke with Religion), Moscow, 1963, pp. 135-44.

²⁷ Nikita Struwe, *Die Christen in der UdSSR*, Mainz, 1965, p. 330; *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, New York, January 4, 1963.

had released funds for strengthening the monastery buildings and the Dnieper bank.) With regard to the Pochayev Lavra, a variety of measures have been adopted. Apart from those already mentioned, fuel allowances have been reduced; not only monks but inhabitants of the town of Pochayev connected with the monastery have been deprived of their police registration, i.e., of permission to reside in the town; sentences of imprisonment or banishment have been imposed by courts on some monks as a deterrent to others. A press campaign is being waged with the object of closing the Pskovo-Pechersky Monastery, which is accused of being anti-Soviet.²⁸

As a result of all these measures, most monasteries in the USSR have been closed. Only the following appear to be still open:

1) in the RSFSR: the Troitse-Sergiyeva Lavra in Zagorsk (Moscow Oblast); the Pskovo-Pechersky Monastery at Pechory (formerly Petseri) (Pskov Oblast);

2) in the Ukrainian SSR: the Svyato-Uspenskaya Lavra at Pochayev (Ternopol Oblast); the Uspensky Monastery at Odessa; the Nunnery of St. Michael in the village of Aleksandrovka (Odessa Oblast); the Pokrovsky Nunnery in Kiev; the Trinity Nunnery in Korets (Rovno Oblast);

3) in the Belorussian SSR: the monastery at Zhirovichi (Grodno Oblast);

4) in the Lithuanian SSR: the Monastery of the Holy Ghost in Vilno;

5) in the Estonian SSR: the nunnery at Pyukhtitsa.

In addition, some monasteries and nunneries may still be in existence in Moldavia and Georgia.

The hostility of the Communist regime to the monasteries is well illustrated by the case of the Pochayev Lavra, over which the threat of closure has been hanging for many years. Its inmates have appealed to the Moscow Patriarchate, and since 1963 copies of these appeals have reached, among others, the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of the United States by various channels. In them, details of the outrages committed by local Party officials are given, together with the names of the latter and of their victims.²⁹

The Moscow Patriarchate, however, seems to show no reaction. Its organ, the *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, describes church life in the USSR in tones that suggest that there is no threat at all. When the existence of the Kiev-Pecherskaya Lavra was directly threatened in 1958–61, neither the Patriarch nor the Exarch for the Ukraine visited the place, despite its exceptional importance in the history of Russian monasticism. The same now applies to the Lavra at Pochayev, which is historically no less significant. In response to protests from churches abroad on behalf of the monastery, bishops of the Holy Synod com-

²⁸ Struve, *op. cit.*, p. 327; Gorodnyak, *op. cit.*; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, August 12, 1959; *Nauka i religiya*, 1962, No. 1, p. 26; and *Krokodil*, 1964, No. 6, p. 7.

²⁹ Struve, *op. cit.*, pp. 328–34; *Vestnik Svietskarskogo Vikariatstva i Pravoslavnogo Dela*, Geneva, 1965, Nos. 1 and 4.

monly issue denials of "malicious" rumors and declare that "nothing threatens the Lavra."³⁰

So far, indeed, the Communist authorities have refrained from finally closing the Pochayev Lavra, perhaps under the influence of Western public opinion. In general, the Soviet press since the removal of Khrushchev has adopted a disapproving attitude toward the use of "administrative measures" in the fight with religion. Antireligious propaganda is noticeably modifying its vulgar tone. *Nauka i religiya* printed some months ago some observations made by Lenin on the subject of antireligious work, in which he says that such work must have a scientific foundation and be conducted in a tactful manner which does not exclude the possibility of a compromise. These observations are presented by the journal as providing an authoritative guide for antireligious propaganda among the Soviet population.³¹ From this, one might conclude that greater tolerance will be shown to those monasteries that still survive in the Soviet Union; but it is doubtful whether the Party will be able to dispense with administrative pressure in pursuing its ultimate aim of rooting out "religious prejudices." A recent issue of *Kommunist*, referring to a twenty-seven-year-old woman worker in a Soviet factory, Tatyana O., who "is dreaming of going into a nunnery,"³² implies that the interest in religion is not dying out among the Soviet younger generation, and that people educated in Soviet schools are still capable of taking a detached view of Soviet propaganda about monastic life.

³⁰ Interview with Metropolitan Pimen, TASS, December 19, 1964; Interview about the Pochayev Lavra, TASS, July 7, 1965.

³¹ *Nauka i religiya*, 1965, No. 10, pp. 2-4.

³² *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 15, pp. 60-61.

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

The Communist Bloc

Two Conferences in Bucharest

On July 4–6, a conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries took place in Bucharest. The following day, a meeting of Party and government leaders of the Comecon countries was held in that city. In the West, both conferences had for months been awaited with considerable impatience. Observers spoke of “grave” dissension in the Soviet bloc, and inclined to the view that differences of opinion similar to those existing in NATO would make their appearance in Bucharest.¹

To what extent have these views proved to have been justified? In order to answer this question, let us examine the background and results of each of the conferences in turn.

The Warsaw Pact Conference

This was doubtless the more important of the two conferences. Its significance was primarily political, even though it produced military-political decisions which lay outside the main sphere of discussion, such as the offer to send “volunteers” to Vietnam. The principle aim of the conference was to reconsolidate Soviet-bloc unity, which was being especially jeopardized by Soviet-Rumanian dissension. The latter first came dramatically to the fore on April 17, 1964, when top Communist functionaries from all over the world—excluding Communist China and the area subordinate to her dictates—gathered in Moscow to celebrate Khrushchev’s seventieth birthday. In fact, the celebrations were used as an occasion for demonstrating solidarity with Soviet policy. The Rumanian Party chief, however, the since deceased Gheorghiu-Dej, not only stayed away from the celebrations but organized a concurrent plenary session of the Rumanian Party Central Committee at which he announced his own position. After this session, a “declaration” was published which has ever since been regarded as the undisputed basis of Rumanian policy. One might describe it as Rumania’s “declaration of independence.” Paragraph VII of the declaration rejects the Soviet Communist Party’s claim to absolute leadership within the Communist movement. It says:

It is the exclusive right of every party to work out its political line, its concrete goals and the ways and means to fulfill them independently, by creatively applying the general truths of Marxism-Leninism and conclusions drawn from an attentive analysis of the experience of other Communist and workers’ parties. There can be no “father” and no “son” party, no parties which are “superior” and none that

¹ See, for example, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, Munich, July 5, 1966.

are "subordinate." There is only the big family of Communist and workers' parties, which are all provided with equal rights. No party has a privileged position or can impose its line or its opinions on other parties.²

These words seem clear enough, and they have frequently been interpreted as signifying the existence of an irreconcilable conflict between the two countries. In fact, however, the Rumanian declaration merely calls for ideological autonomy, and nowhere rejects cooperation with the USSR out of hand, provided that this demand is met. Indeed, the declaration itself did not lead to any visible conflict, since the Soviet leaders were no longer able to sustain the former claim of the USSR and the Soviet Communist Party to the leading role in the world Communist movement; they had, in fact, long been calling for "equal rights" for all Communist parties themselves (although probably with extreme reluctance). Conflicts did arise, however, from the way in which the Rumanians interpreted these rights in specific cases.

Comecon, for example, has been a constant source of dissension. Although Rumania does not reject Comecon cooperation as such, she firmly opposes cooperation which in her view jeopardizes her independence. Typical in this respect was the clash over a plan put forward by Professor Valev of Moscow in February 1964 under which the Danube delta regions of the USSR, Rumania and Bulgaria were to be merged into a single economic region.³ Under this plan, Rumania would have had to subordinate economically to a supranational body roughly 100,000 square kilometers, or 42 percent, of her territory, along with 48 percent of her population; Bulgaria's contribution was to be 38,000, and the USSR's a mere 12,000 square kilometers. Valev's plan provoked a storm of indignation in Rumania, and the USSR was forced to sound the retreat. *Izvestia* declared that "comrade Valev" had displayed a too one-sided approach and completely ignored the "problem of strengthening the national economic complex in each country." His views were incorrect and did not accord with the Soviet Communist Party's policy, which was aimed at strengthening economic ties with "brotherly" countries on the basis of "complete equality and sovereignty."⁴ Rumania has also refused to join Comecon's steel community "Intermetall" and its organization for cooperation in ball-bearing production, to mention two other examples of her independent stand.

National tensions between the two countries are also much in evidence. The Rumanian Communists are not content with making declarations of their present independence. Like their Italian colleagues, they are anxious to rid themselves of the stigma of having been under Soviet patronage in the past. Secretary General Ceausescu, for example, said in a courageous speech on the Rumanian Communist Party's forty-fifth anniversary that even back in the autumn of 1920 the Party had been fighting for its independence in the face of "interference" on

² *Scintila*, Bucharest, April 26, 1964.

³ See "The Problems of the Economic Development of the Danube Regions of Rumania, Bulgaria and the USSR," *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta*, 1964, No. 2.

⁴ *Izvestia*, July 3, 1964.

the part of the Comintern. That the Party had been unable to pursue a truly national policy had been due in no small measure to the practices of the latter body. Between the two world wars, said Ceausescu, the Comintern had nominated as leaders of the Rumanian Communist Party persons who "were not living in Rumania and did not know what the sociopolitical conditions were in the country." During the initial period of World War II, noted Ceausescu, when the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was still in force, the Rumanian Communists had been criticized by the Comintern for organizing opposition to Hitlerite Fascism. The Comintern had demanded that the Rumanian Communists refuse to tolerate Rumania's "being turned into a bridgehead for England and France in a war against Germany and the USSR." Even after this policy had resulted in Rumania's having to cede a large part of her territory to Hungary under the Vienna award of the Axis powers, the Rumanian Communists had continued trying to organize anti-Fascist resistance. However, said Ceausescu,

In this moment of destiny the Rumanian people found themselves alone, bereft of outside support and abandoned by all the European powers. Rumania was compelled to accept the unjust terms of the Vienna dictate. She was thereby placed at the mercy of German capriciousness, which meant the forces of Hitlerite Fascism.⁵

In other words: Rumania had had to forfeit territory because she had been abandoned by "all the European powers"—the Soviet Union included. Ceausescu did not mention that Soviet-German cooperation had also forced Rumania to cede Bessarabia and a part of Bucovina to the USSR, but it was clear from his speech as a whole that the Rumanian Communist Party disclaims all responsibility for these annexations and is not prepared to justify them. Ceausescu's first reference to Soviet-Rumanian friendship came when he spoke of the joint effort of both countries' fighting men on the "anti-Hitler front."

Although this speech of Ceausescu's rattled quite a few skeletons in the Soviet cupboard, the Soviets took it on the chin. Moreover, the Soviet and Rumanian leaders are not averse to giving each other the occasional nationalistic pat on the back. Thus, in a speech delivered on April 4 of this year at the Frunze Military Academy and broadcast to Rumania on the same day by Radio Moscow, the Rumanian Party boss paid tribute to the Soviet "liberation soldiers" who "brought our people its passionately awaited freedom" and expressed gratitude for the "help and assistance of the peoples of the USSR during a period of twenty years." However, perhaps significantly, these passages were omitted from the version of the speech broadcast by Radio Bucharest on the following day and also from that published in the Party newspaper *Scinteia*.

Policy toward China is a particularly touchy aspect of Soviet-Rumanian relations. Determined to preserve her neutrality, Rumania is not prepared to make concessions to either side in the Sino-Soviet conflict. She sent no representatives to the consultation conference held in Moscow in March 1965 because this conference was considered by Peking to be "anti-Chinese." Her neutral

⁵ *Newer Weg*, Bucharest, May 8, 1966.

attitude in the Sino-Soviet conflict also came out during Chou En-lai's visit shortly before the two Bucharest conferences which are the subject of this article. On that occasion, the Chinese Premier assured Rumania of support for her "struggle to defend her sovereignty and independence."⁶ Of course, this assurance is no Chinese guarantee of Rumania's sovereignty and independence, and must be ascribed rather to Chou En-lai's desire to exacerbate existing Soviet-Rumanian conflicts. However, Moscow also appears resigned to Rumania's neutral position in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

As yet there has only been one case of Moscow's displaying real indignation over a Rumanian foreign policy move. This was when a top-level Rumanian governmental delegation went to Washington in May 1964 for economic negotiations on obtaining licenses and technical aid. Snorted Radio Moscow:

... it is curious that those who oppose cooperation with the socialist countries have turned to the capitalist countries in search of technical assistance, for which they are paying out large sums in foreign currency.⁷

Since then, grass has grown over this little quarrel. Rumania still refuses to allow the USSR to dictate whether she shall cultivate economic relations with a Western country or not. On the other hand, it is worth commenting that the Rumanian negotiations in Washington had no foreign policy consequences, and that so far economic cooperation between the USA and Rumania has not been working out well.

We have mentioned only a few of the more important Soviet-Rumanian differences. Typical of all of them, however, is that they have either faded away with time or else been settled.

The preparations for the two Bucharest conferences were also accompanied by dissension. This was clear merely from the fact that the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries held a secret meeting in Moscow in June which lasted for twelve instead of the scheduled three days. Although it was announced that the meeting had taken place in an atmosphere of "friendship and complete mutual understanding,"⁸ Western observers pointed out quite rightly that there were no references to "unanimity" or "complete agreement." At the same time, another speech of Ceausescu's gave rise to further Western speculation. Said the Rumanian Party leader:

We are of the opinion that the peoples of Europe can live in peace. The military blocs are inhibiting cooperation between the peoples; it is therefore time to dissolve the aggressive NATO treaty and, as a consequence, the Warsaw Pact as well, so that relations between the countries of Europe can develop on a new basis. This is the road to security in Europe. We realize, of course, that this cannot be put into practice overnight; the security of Europe, however, can only be guaranteed in

⁶ See, for example, *Peking Review*, June 24, 1966, p. 9.

⁷ Radio Moscow, May 30, 1964.

⁸ TASS, June 17, 1966.

this way. As long as the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty continues to exist, our country, together with the other Warsaw Pact countries, will of course increase its vigilance and consolidate its defense capability.⁹

According to Western press reports, this speech caused considerable displeasure in Moscow. However, Ceausescu had done no more than repeat the Soviet offer to dissolve the Warsaw Pact provided that NATO itself was first dissolved.¹⁰ Nonetheless, it was assumed in the West that the Rumanians wanted to put the stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe on a purely bilateral basis, bypassing the Warsaw Pact, and that they were calling for the rotation of key positions in the Warsaw Pact command among individual members and for consultations prior to any decision involving the use of Soviet atomic weapons.¹¹

We now have before us the documents issued after the Warsaw Pact conference. These were a "Communiqué on the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Countries," a "Declaration on the Aggression of the USA in Vietnam," and a "Declaration on the Consolidation of Peace and Security in Europe." According to the first,

The work of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee, which took place in an atmosphere of brotherly friendship and complete mutual understanding, helped to consolidate further the unity and cooperation of the socialist countries.¹²

In their "Declaration on the Aggression of the USA in Vietnam," the Warsaw Pact countries promised North Vietnam help "on an increasing scale" and offered to send "volunteers" to Vietnam.¹³

The "Declaration on the Consolidation of Peace and Security in Europe" repeated the well-known tenets of Soviet European policy, and proposed the dissolution of the two opposing military blocs and the convocation of a conference on "European security and cooperation." Signed by both the USSR and Rumania, it reveals no differences between these two countries regarding the dissolution of the military blocs. We read:

The states-signatories of this declaration are of the opinion that the necessity has ripened for taking measures to reduce military tension, especially in Europe. A radical means to this end would be the simultaneous dissolution of existing military alliances, which is possible in the present situation. The governments of our states have repeatedly made the point that should the North Atlantic Treaty become invalid the Warsaw Pact would also cease to be effective, and that their place must be taken by a European security system. They hereby solemnly confirm their agreement to the simultaneous liquidation of the alliances named.

⁹ *Neuer Weg*, June 12, 1966.

¹⁰ As, for example, on Radio Moscow, April 24, 1966.

¹¹ See, for example, *Wehrkunde*, Munich, July 1966, p. 339.

¹² *Neuer Weg*, July 8, 1966.

¹³ *Ibid.*, July 9, 1966.

Further:

Should, however, the states-members of the North Atlantic alliance not yet be prepared to agree to a complete dissolution of the military groupings, the states-signatories of this declaration consider it advisable to reach an agreement on dissolving the military organizations of both the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact at once. At the same time, they declare that as long as the North Atlantic Treaty exists and as long as aggressive imperialist circles carry out attacks against peace throughout the world, the states-members of the Warsaw Pact are determined to increase their strength and defense preparedness, maintaining at the same time a high level of vigilance.¹⁴

This declaration in no way contradicts previous declarations of either the Soviets or the Rumanians. Moreover, from the Western point of view it constitutes an improvement in that it contains an offer to dissolve both military blocs simultaneously, whereas previously the talk had been of dissolving the Warsaw Pact only after NATO had been dissolved. As yet, we have no reliable information on the motives for this offer. It certainly has propaganda value. It may have been made with a view to strengthening the hand of the dissatisfied elements within NATO. At the same time, it seems doubtful whether the USSR is really anxious for the Warsaw Pact to be dissolved; she needs it, after all, as an instrument for keeping her own empire together, not only as a counterweight to NATO.

In conclusion, it must be said that neither in the three documents issued after the Warsaw Pact conference, nor in the circumstances attending this conference, were there any signs of disunity. Participants were greeted with the demonstrations of friendship usual on such occasions. At a reception held on July 7 in the Snagov Palace, both Ceausescu and East German Party leader Ulbricht declared that the conference had helped considerably to strengthen the unity of the "socialist" countries.¹⁵

The Comecon Conference

While the Soviet-bloc countries consistently deny the existence of any crisis in the Warsaw Pact, they frequently concede that integration within Comecon is encountering certain difficulties. Shortly before the Bucharest conference, for example, East German economist Gunther Kohlmeier wrote in an article entitled "World Economic Structures and International Socialist Division of Labor," published in *World Marxist Review* (the English edition of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*), that

... in speaking about industrialization in the socialist countries, mention should be made of some negative phenomena that accompanied this process. Industrialization was insufficiently coordinated between the socialist partners who opened new branches of industry, and primarily between them and the already industrially developed socialist countries. The result was a certain parallelism in production, output in small serial quantities, with high costs and unsatisfactory technological

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, July 10, 1966.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, July 9, 1966.

standards, with restricted markets, etc. Moreover, such industrially developed countries as the GDR and Czechoslovakia lagged in readjusting the structure of their industry to meet the demands of scientific and technological progress and the growing international socialist division of labor.¹⁶

Kohlmeier further admitted that Comecon had raw materials difficulties and was failing to coordinate the research of its members satisfactorily.

There are other pointers to a certain crisis in Comecon. Thus, whereas the Comecon statute calls for two council conferences to be held yearly, only two such conferences have been held during the last three years (one in Moscow in July 1963, the other in Prague in January 1965). A council conference is hence long overdue, and the fact that one was not held in Bucharest can only be ascribed to disunity. The recent gathering, it must be emphasized, was not a council conference but a meeting of the Party and government leaders of the Comecon countries. Such meetings are not envisaged under the Comecon statute, and had hitherto been held on only four occasions. They always had an especial significance, usually being aimed at giving Comecon added impetus in a particular area. The meeting held in June 1958 evaluated previous economic cooperation and worked out guidelines for its further development. In February 1960, problems of agricultural cooperation were discussed. In June 1962, a declaration on "The Basic Principles of Socialist International Division of Labor" was issued. Finally, in July 1963, national economic coordination during the period 1966–70 was discussed, and approval given for the founding of a Comecon Bank.¹⁷ The recent conference in Bucharest, however, was by comparison lacking in concrete purpose, at least judging from the final communiqué, which after listing the participants in the conference states merely that the latter

...noted that the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation has developed considerable activity in connection with the coordination of national economic plans, production specialization and cooperation, and the expansion on this basis of economic relations among Comecon members. Participants in the meeting unanimously expressed their pledge to strive to develop mutual cooperation in accordance with the principles of complete equality of rights, respect for sovereignty and national interests, mutual advantage and comradely assistance so as to help further strengthen proletarian internationalism and the unity and solidarity of the countries of the socialist world system. The meeting took place in an atmosphere of friendship and complete mutual understanding.¹⁸

The conference's apparent lack of a concrete agenda seems to indicate that Comecon's problems are not ready to be aired in public. It can only be assumed that the conference was held to demonstrate that Comecon still exists, that it has not been given up as a bad job.

¹⁶ *World Marxist Review: Problems of Peace and Socialism*, Prague-London, 1966, No. 6, p. 23.

¹⁷ For further information on these conferences, see József Kovács and Lajos Vékony, *A szocialista országok gazdasági együttműködése* (Economic Cooperation Among the Socialist Countries), Budapest, 1965, p. 248.

¹⁸ *Neuer Weg*, July 9, 1966.

Many Western observers are of the opinion that Comecon integration has already proved a failure, and certainly the Bucharest conference did nothing to refute this view. The organization, however, still exists, and talk of its breaking up as a result of centrifugal forces still belongs to the realm of speculation. Comecon, moreover, has many achievements to its credit which have received insufficient consideration in the West.

The Warsaw Pact is certainly the more vital of the two organizations. In Bucharest, it came out with a number of resolutions scarcely calculated to win Western sympathies. Most of the resolutions, such as the condemnation of the US role in Vietnam and the offer to send "volunteers" to help North Vietnam, were not new. In general, the Warsaw Pact conference did not bring about any substantial change in the world political atmosphere surrounding the Vietnam conflict.

The conference's proposals in the sphere of European policy, on the other hand, must surely be viewed with some concern in the majority of West European countries, even in the light of President de Gaulle's recent visit to the USSR. That the dissolution of the two opposing military blocs will not bring security to Europe is only too clear. Without the American military presence, Western Europe would be placed at the mercy of the Soviet Army, whose superiority is menacing enough regardless of whether the Warsaw Pact continues to exist or not.

However, what is really important is not so much the proposals and declarations made at the conference, or the possible existence of behind-the-scenes controversy, as the circumstance that the Warsaw Pact countries were capable of putting on an impressive show of unity in respect to policy on Vietnam and Europe such as would be at present impossible for NATO. The present internal difficulties of the Warsaw Pact can therefore not be compared to the profound crisis now plaguing NATO. Rumania, for example, has been described as the France of the Warsaw Pact, but this comparison is erroneous—the economic, political and military potentials of the two countries can no more be compared than their policies—and leads to false conclusions. There is no real proof that the Rumanians would revolt against the Warsaw Pact, merely unverifiable rumors. The fact is that the Rumanians, as we have already seen, are not afraid to display open opposition on any point of Soviet-bloc policy, and they are not displaying opposition in the Warsaw Pact. It is thus premature to suppose that the Warsaw Pact is on the way to disintegration. The dramatization of Soviet-Rumanian bickering should not be allowed to obscure the circumstance that despite their national, economic and political differences, the Soviet-bloc countries still constitute, as Communist states, a united front against the West.

Stefan C. Stolte

Culture

Education Problems in the USSR

The last few decades have seen a remarkable increase in the rate of scientific and technical progress, and this has naturally produced a corresponding increase in the total volume of scientific information as well as in the number of scientists and technicians. Soviet Academician M. Lavrentev has calculated that roughly two-thirds of all the knowledge now possessed by man has been acquired during the last twenty years, and that the present tendency is for the number of scientific workers to almost double every ten years.¹ Soviet experts are of the opinion that these processes will continue at an even faster pace, since in the realm of science man has more to do in the next fifteen years than he has done up to the present time.²

These developments have naturally confronted educators with a host of difficult problems. A steadily increasing volume of information has to be imparted to the student during the limited time available. Some of this information will be obsolete before the student can put it to practical use. Previously it usually took more than a lifetime before an invention or discovery reached the production stage. Specialists were trained in the expectation that their knowledge would be usable for a long time. Now the situation is quite different, and whole new branches of science and technology are emerging with bewildering rapidity.

The educational problems springing from the present fast pace of technical development have been receiving no less attention in the USSR than in other comparable countries. The USSR, in fact, is especially interested in these problems, because its ability to compete militarily and economically with the "capitalist" countries is dependent on whether it can turn out top-grade specialists in large numbers.

Proposals for rationalizing and modernizing the Soviet educational system were made at a conference convened by *Izvestia* in early 1963.³ At this conference, which was attended by such prominent Soviet scientists as A. Kolmogorov, I. Kikoin and V. Kargin, the point was made that educational goals should be set with an eye on the requirements which the trainee specialist would be faced with when he began to work independently. The school should also provide the student with a suitable basis for his further education. Pleas were made for the modernization of school curricula, wider use of modern teaching aids and the formulation of a more advanced theory of training.

The first practical step taken was to review the secondary school curriculum with a view to purging it of obsolete or duplicated material and easing the burden of senior grade students preparing for entry into a higher educational institution as far as possible. A special commission and subcommissions were

¹ *Izvestia*, January 18, 1966.

² *Voprasy filosofii*, 1964, No. 10, p. 72.

³ See *Izvestia*, March 10, 1963.

set up for this purpose at the end of 1964, and it is planned to introduce revised courses for all subjects in 1970 concurrently with obligatory ten-year education. One of the major changes planned is to cut down the period of primary education from four to three years (keeping the entrance age at 7) and prolong the intermediate study period (grades 4 to 8 inclusive) by one year at the expense of grades 9 and 10. In the opinion of the commission experts, the weekly study period should not exceed 32 hours in the senior grades and 24 hours in the junior grades.

The physics and mathematics courses are undergoing the most drastic revision of all, and completely new textbooks on biology are being compiled. The literature course in secondary schools is to be reduced to a mere 560 hours (as compared with 820 hours in 1940 and 654 hours in 1964).⁴ This is causing considerable alarm among representatives of the humanities. At the same time, the eighth grade is to be supplemented by a 35-hour course called "Discussions on Our Society," which is to embrace such purely propaganda themes as "Cuba—Island of Freedom," "Strengthen the Fraternal Community of Socialist Countries" and "Soviet People Assist Their Vietnamese Brothers."⁵

The problem of revising higher education curricula has been considerably complicated by the demand that they be tailored to the requirements of the nineteen-eighties. At present, complained Academician Lavrentev,

... the most vigorously developing branches of technology are in general suffering from an acute dearth of specialists. This is happening because the training of specialists is being planned on the basis of the national economy's present requirements, without regard for the fact that in a given branch of the economy revolutionary developments may be in the offing and that it may very soon need a new type of engineer. As a result, enterprises charged with mastering a new and complex technology waste much time on retraining their own specialists and learn chiefly through mistakes.⁶

It is, however, doubtful whether the necessary measures will be taken in the immediate future, since in the USSR no "revolutionary development" in science or economics, however important it may be, can be taken into account by the planning organizations until it has received official sanction and been fitted into a pattern in accordance with existing ideological and political tenets. Action is generally taken only when further delay would result in the USSR's falling badly behind the West in the field concerned or other grave consequences. The rehabilitation of sociology and cybernetics, and the economic reforms, are cases in point. Fifteen years ago, Soviet education planners, even if they had been aware of the considerable future demand for cyberneticians, and of the fact that in 1965 the demand for economist-cyberneticians would be five times greater than the output of these specialists in Moscow University alone,⁷ could hardly have been expected to have risked making plans for training the required number of ex-

⁴ *Sovetskaya pedagogika*, 1966, No. 2, p. 17.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁶ *Izvestia*, January 18, 1966.

⁷ *Pravda*, February 22, 1966.

ponents of what was then regarded as a "reactionary pseudo-science."⁸ Still less could they have been expected seven years beforehand to begin training economists capable of implementing the economic reforms adopted at the Party Central Committee's plenary session of last September. Paradoxically as it may seem, the rigidly centralized Soviet planning system apparently quite excludes long-term planning of the training of highly-qualified specialists.

Not a single official body has so far dared to mention, as a reason for making an immediate start on retraining economists; the market economy characteristics which in ten years' time will have assumed a major role in the Soviet economy. Indicative in this respect was the following admission by V. P. Yelyutin, Minister of Higher and Special Secondary Education, in a review of higher education plans for 1966. He said:

What, for example, is the exact nature and scope of the knowledge which a modern engineer must acquire in order to be well prepared in economic matters? Unfortunately we cannot as yet give a scientifically substantiated answer to this question. But such an answer must be provided, since however perfect a curriculum may be it will inevitably fail to satisfy somebody. The curriculum has not yet been printed, but already suggestions are being submitted to the effect that it must be revised, that more hours must be devoted to the study of this or that discipline and less to the study of others (the latter, incidentally, is rarely suggested). Study periods, however, cannot be extended indefinitely.⁹

Another serious obstacle to rationalization of the work of Soviet higher educational institutions is that the highly functional and authoritarian higher education system as a whole is inefficient. Despite competitive entrance examinations and end-of-term examinations, on an average only about 70 percent of first-year students graduate (taking a five-year course as a basis). Although this does not compare too badly with the situation in Western countries, where in 1959, for example, between 54 and 90 percent of first-year students sat for the final (diploma) examination,¹⁰ the annual loss of around 200,000 highly-qualified specialists is a source of considerable concern to Soviet educators and science administrators.

A special investigation carried out by Soviet sociological laboratories in 1964 showed that the main reason for this wastage is the inadequate general educational level of young people coming straight from productive work, who are given preference in admission to higher educational institutions.¹¹ They include "heroes of labor" sent by their employers, as well as secondary school graduates who have been putting in the obligatory period of work time either in full-time employment or in a "school for working youth." All have forgotten much of what they learnt in secondary school and have to a certain degree become un-

⁸ See, for example, *Kratky filosofsky slovar* (A Concise Philosophical Dictionary), Moscow, 1964, p. 236.

⁹ *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 1966, No. 1, p. 5.

¹⁰ Friedrich Edding, *Ökonomie des Bildungswesens: Lehren und Lernen als Haushalt und als Investition*, Freiburg (Breisgau), 1963, p. 366.

¹¹ See *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 1965, No. 7, p. 65.

accustomed to mental work. Since the chief purpose of giving preference to these categories of young people in admission to higher educational institutions is doubtless to prevent the proportion of workers' and peasants' children in the latter from sinking, the likelihood that this social privilege will be abolished is remote—despite the expected afflux of members of the numerically large age groups, which will result in severer competition for admission. Indeed, sociologist V. N. Shubkin said quite frankly that

...it must be especially emphasized that the intensification of competition [for admission] to higher educational institutions as a result of an increase in the number of school-leavers may lead to a drop in the percentage of workers' and peasants' children entering these institutions. Measures to counteract this tendency ought therefore to be considered beforehand. This is quite a complicated problem. On the one hand, we must try to give everyone an equal opportunity for acquiring an education. On the other hand, however, owing to differences in the material situation of the family, the education of the parents, the place of residence, the disposition of the network of educational institutions, the level of instruction, etc., young people with equal abilities but having had different schoolings do not in fact have the same opportunity to acquire an education.¹²

Another reason for the inefficiency of the Soviet higher education system lies in the increasing emphasis placed during the last few years on combining study with productive work. In the academic year 1965–66, correspondence course and evening department students made up almost 59 percent of all students.¹³ However, the drop-out rate among correspondence course students is extremely high, generally exceeding 50 percent (as compared with about 8 percent among the day students). In 1964, for example, only 46.5 percent of those admitted to correspondence courses at higher education institutions in 1958 actually graduated.¹⁴

All this, of course, results in a considerable loss to the Soviet economy. Soviet specialists have calculated that average annual state expenditure runs to 970 rubles for a day student, 290 rubles for an evening student and 80 rubles for a correspondence course student (not counting the capital repair and construction costs incurred by the higher education institutions).¹⁵ However, when the 50-percent drop-out rate, leave and travel expenses devolving on employers, and the longer study period are taken into account, the cost of training a correspondence course student is as much as one-third of that of training a day student. Moreover, by no means every correspondence course student who graduates finds it possible to make practical use of his knowledge right away. In *Izvestia* we read:

Strange as it may seem, their fate depends entirely on the administrators of the enterprises and institutions where they work. If the correspondence course students are looked after at a factory they become engineers even before defending their

¹² *Voprosy filosofii*, 1965, No. 5, p. 66.

¹³ *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1965 godu: Kratkiy statisticheskiy sbornik* (The USSR in Figures in 1965: A Concise Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1966, p. 133.

¹⁴ *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 1965, No. 7, p. 85.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

diploma design. There are, on the other hand, cases when a person remains in his old job even after having received his diploma from the higher educational institution, while if he has graduated from a humanities department he may be forgotten entirely. As a result, one half of those who combined education with productive work are not working in their specialty.¹⁶

The poor results of the study-and-work system impelled the Ministry of Higher and Special Secondary Education to stop expanding correspondence course education at the beginning of this year and to shift once more the emphasis to day and evening study.¹⁷ The absence of plans for the curtailment of this inefficient system is doubtless due primarily to the important role which it plays in ensuring that the Soviet citizen can exercise the right to education granted him by the Soviet Constitution.¹⁸

Year by year, the number of applicants for admission to Soviet higher educational institutions considerably exceeds the number of places made available by the education authorities. In 1958, Khrushchey pointed out in a memorandum that during the period 1954-57 over 2,500,000 secondary school graduates did not enter a higher educational institution or a technical school (*tekhnikum*), over 800,000 in 1957 alone.¹⁹ The situation has changed little since then; of the more than 950,000 students who completed secondary school in 1965, only 255,000 were admitted to the day departments of higher educational institutions, over 100,000 entered specialized secondary educational institutions, while the remainder went straight out to work.²⁰ A critical situation can be expected this summer, when as a result of the curtailment of secondary education from 11 to 10 years over 2,700,000 tenth- and eleventh-graders will be graduating simultaneously. Although extra places in higher and specialized secondary educational institutions have been provided, only 26 percent of this vast body of school-leavers can count on continuing their education in such institutions.²¹

Despite all these difficulties, Soviet scientific institutions have so far succeeded, by careful selection and special training of the most able and talented young natural scientists, in satisfying the demands of the scientifically and militarily most vital sectors of scientific and technological development. However, the continued acceleration of scientific and technical progress, the reorientation of the Soviet economic system and the intensification of Soviet scientific and military competition with the West mean that the USSR will not be able to avoid, even at the price of ideological concessions, drastically reforming its present system for training highly-qualified specialists with a view to bringing it into line with current requirements.

S. S. Voronitsyn

¹⁶ *Izvestia*, August 3, 1965.

¹⁷ *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 1966, No. 1, p. 4.

¹⁸ See *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 1965, No. 8, p. 6.

¹⁹ See *Pravda*, September 21, 1958.

²⁰ *Molodoi kommunist*, 1965, No. 10, p. 14.

²¹ *Trud*, February 15, 1966.

Party Affairs

What is "Scientific Communism"?

Marxism-Leninism has long been taught in Soviet higher educational institutions under the headings of "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy (Dialectical and Historical Materialism)," "Political Economy" and "The History of the CPSU," while the academic year 1959-60 saw the introduction of optional courses on "The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Aesthetics" and "The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Ethics." Prior to the 1963-64 reform, instruction in these five disciplines was distributed as follows:

Marxist-Leninist Instruction in Soviet Higher Educational Institutions
Prior to 1963-64 Educational Reform
(Hours Per Year)

Subject	Type of Higher Educational Institution			
	Humanities*	Technical and Agricultural	Medical	Arts
Marxist-Leninist Philosophy	140	90	—	—
Political Economy	300	150	90	90
History of the CPSU ..	220	150	—	—
Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Aesthetics	32	32	32	32
Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Ethics	32	32	32	32

* Including humanities departments of universities

— No data available.

SOURCES: *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 1964, No. 8, p. 66, and No. 12, p. 44

All this instruction, however, evidently proved insufficient for the "Communist education" of Soviet youth, so that yet another obligatory subject, "The Fundamentals of Scientific Communism," was introduced for students in their final year, and Soviet social scientists were commissioned to turn "scientific Communism" into a discipline in its own right. Seventy hours per year is now devoted to the new subject at all Soviet higher educational institutions—at the expense of the other three obligatory Marxist-Leninist disciplines—, made up of 30 hours of lectures and 40 hours of seminar work (in the academic year 1963-64, instruction was 70 hours at universities, schools of economics, law and art and the larger pedagogic institutes, and 20-30 hours at all other higher educational institutions).¹ It may be assumed that there is a special short course for correspondence and evening school students. According to the Party's propaganda organs, the course of scientific Communism is to round off students' Marxist education, turn them into convinced Communists capable of resisting Western attempts to "poison their minds with bourgeois ideology" and in general impress upon them that they are living in an era when the entire world is moving inexorably toward Communism.

There is, at the same time, no specialized textbook on the subject as yet, while the course itself is being constantly revised. After Khrushchev's overthrow, for

¹ *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 1964, No. 8, p. 66; No. 12, p. 44; 1965, No. 3, p. 56.

example, all elements of his particular brands of "subjectivism" and "voluntarism" were eradicated.² The present course is divided into three main sections, namely: "Scientific Communism—An Integral Part of Marxism-Leninism," "The Transition from Capitalism to Communism—The Path of Development of All Mankind" and "The Formation and Development of Communist Society," which in turn include a multitude of themes, some of which are listed below:

- The Subject of Scientific Communism
- The Origin and Development of Scientific Communism
- The Development of the Marxist Theory of Revolution by V. I. Lenin
- The Great October Socialist Revolution—The Beginning of the Transition From Capitalism to Communism
- The General Laws and Variety of Forms of Transition From Capitalism to Socialism in Different Countries
- The General Laws and Variety of Forms of Socialist Construction in Different Countries
- Marxist-Leninist Theory on the Nationality Question, and the Present Day
- Questions of the Strategy and Tactics of Communist and Workers' Parties at the Present Stage
- The Theory of Socialist Revolution, and the Present Day
- The International Revolutionary Working-Class Movement
- The Political Organization of Society During the Period of Transition from Socialism to Communism
- The Formation of Communist Social Relations
- Peaceful Coexistence and the Fight for World Peace
- Communist Education of the Workers
- Communism and Work
- Ways of Overcoming Relics of the Past in People's Minds

From this list, it is clear that the present course of scientific Communism embraces political economy and applied sociology, besides such purely political subjects as historical materialism and Party history. Indeed, the principal objection to the course on the part of students and teaching staff alike is that it constitutes a repetition of ground already covered. In addition, the social scientists object to the attempts now being made to elevate scientific Communism to the status of a fully-fledged science. This feeling of opposition came out clearly at a special conference of Soviet philosophers, historians and social scientists held in Moscow in February 1965. At this conference (which was convened by the journal *Voprosy filosofii*, the "Scientific Council on the Laws of the Development of Socialism and the Transition to Communism" of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Scientific Communism Sections of the Ministries of Higher and Special Secondary Education of the USSR and the RSFSR), Ts. A. Stepanyan, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, frankly admitted that

... at the present stage in the teaching of scientific Communism certain difficulties and obstacles remain. In particular, there are still individual members of the teaching staff—historians, economists and philosophers—who do not comprehend the need for the institution of a course of scientific Communism, a subject now taught in higher educational institutions and Party schools in almost all socialist countries.³

² See, for example, *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 1965, No. 9, p. 7.

³ *Voprosy filosofii*, 1965, No. 5, p. 142.

Stepanyan was seconded by L. V. Sokhan, head of the section dealing with the philosophical problems of Communist construction at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences:

...attempts are still being made to regard the institution of [this] course as a temporary measure and to prevent the creation of suitable conditions for the promotion of research work.⁴

Most remarkable of all, however, was that the conference failed to achieve its goal of putting an end to the five-year-old dispute over such basic questions as what "scientific Communism," as a subject of study, should include, what its "intrinsic laws" and "categories" were, etc. Of the diverging definitions offered we shall quote only a few. Stepanyan, for example, who was the principal speaker at the conference, had this to say:

The subject of scientific Communism is the general sociopolitical and ideological laws governing the preparation, emergence and development of the Communist system, as well as their specific manifestation in different countries.⁵

According to this definition scientific Communism is a third component of Marxism-Leninism, concerned with sociopolitical practice in general and Party activities in particular, as distinct from historical materialism, which is concerned with the universal laws of social development (including, of course, those governing the development of a Communist society), and political economy, which deals with economic laws and problems. However, while emphasizing that scientific Communism was the "main political science" *within* the framework of Marxism-Leninism, Stepanyan went even further by declaring it to be the "logical continuation, development and culmination of the philosophical and economic components of Marxism,"⁶ which was tantamount to a plea for the replacement of Marxism as a whole by its perfected version, namely "scientific Communism." This contradiction ran through the entire conference. G. I. Ilyushchenko, for example, Head of the Department of Scientific Communism at Uzhgorod University, defined the new subject as being concerned with the "sociopolitical laws governing the origination, formation and development of the Communist system" and with the "general laws and specific features of the building of socialism and Communism"⁷ (Stepanyan had used almost the same words when expounding his first thesis). In the same vein, A. M. Kovalev, Head of the Department of Scientific Communism of the Philosophical Faculty of Moscow University, described scientific Communism as "the theory of socialist and Communist construction, which comprises the analysis of the general principles of this construction, as well as the analysis of ways and means of bringing it about,"⁸ G. G. Gabrielyan, Head of the Department of Philosophy of Yerevan University, M. S. Dzhususov, a senior scientific associate at the

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 142-43.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences and M. V. Bagrad, Head of the Department of Scientific Communism at the University of Latvia, were also of the opinion that scientific Communism treated of "the general laws governing the formation and development of the Communist system."⁹ A. K. Kurylev, however, Head of the Department of Scientific Communism at the Institute for Extending Qualifications at Moscow University, maintained, as Stepanyan had done in his second thesis, that scientific Communism was a "direct continuation of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and political economy" without which a "unified and integrated system of Marxist-Leninist science" was impossible. Scientific Communism, said Kurylev, and not historical materialism and political economy, constituted the "theory of socialist and Communist society."¹⁰ Indeed, even Academician M. B. Mitin noted, in summing up the results of the conference, that two main schools of thought had emerged, one of which was trying to "turn scientific Communism into a general theory of Marxism-Leninism as a whole," while the other considered that scientific Communism was a "component part of Marxist-Leninist theory."¹¹

The sundry definitions of "scientific Communism" offered at the February conference were subsequently rejected by D. I. Chesnokov, Head of the Department of Historical Materialism of the Philosophical Faculty of Moscow University, in an article in *Voprosy filosofii* entitled "The Interrelationship Between the Social Sciences and the Place of Scientific Communism Among Them."¹² First of all, Chesnokov considered it erroneous to regard scientific Communism as being concerned with the fundamental laws governing the emergence and development of a Communist society, since the latter field of study was already covered by historical materialism, which embraced the universal laws governing the development of society in general. He also frowned on attempts to draw a dividing line between scientific Communism and other sectors of Marxist teaching by declaring that economic relations were the subject of political economy, social or sociopolitical relations that of scientific Communism, and society as a whole, including the basic laws of its development, that of historical materialism. If scientific Communism were considered to embrace the sphere of sociopolitical relations, he said, many other social sciences would have to be discarded, or at least incorporated into scientific Communism. In general, Chesnokov thought that it would be better to refrain from attempts to limit the new subject rigidly to a particular area of study.

Thus, the introduction of "scientific Communism" as a new subject of instruction in Soviet higher educational institutions and as a separate Marxist-Leninist science is meeting tremendous difficulties of a practical and even more of a theoretical nature. These difficulties spring largely from the Party's unrealistic goal of creating a "new" science which, while in fact repeating the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism, should not be identical with the latter. They are also the

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 149 and 155-56.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1965, No. 3.

result of the unrealistic claims made by "scientific Communism" itself to sole authenticity in the world of Marxist study. Both in the USSR in particular and the international Communist movement in general, there are diverging interpretations of Marxism-Leninism and the histories of individual Communist parties. These interpretations can hardly be said to accord with the "objective course of history." In the same way, Soviet (and indeed Communist) reality is far from obeying the laws of historical materialism. In other words, the criteria being applied to "scientific Communism" have no solid academic basis, in effect amounting to little more than the subjective wishes of Soviet ideologists and manifestations of Party voluntarism. Scientific Communism, in fact, is wide open to arbitrary interpretation, which will lead to all kinds of disputes. Of course, if there is such confusion at the theoretical level, there must be even greater confusion at the teaching level.

As we have already seen, the decision to institute "scientific Communism" as a new branch of learning was largely dictated by considerations of domestic policy, namely, a desire on the part of the Party to promote the Communist education of Soviet students and bring home to the Soviet population that Communist construction in the USSR is a reality. However, foreign policy also played its part. The USSR claims leadership of the world Communist movement, and has already declared that it has finished building socialism and is now building a Communist society. This gave rise to a need for a "new" and "more perfect" doctrine which should not only bolster Soviet prestige but also reorientate Marxist Communist theory on the basis of the experience gained in half a century of Soviet practice. "Scientific Communism" was therefore conceived as such a "logical culmination of Marxist teaching." However, the general confusion as to what "scientific Communism" is and what field of study it should cover hardly suggests that the new "science" will fill the bill.

P. Urban

REVIEWS

The Periodical Press

The Soviet leaders declare that the USSR is the most democratic state in the world; nonetheless they are obliged with increasing frequency to speak of "extending democracy." The democracy referred to is that within the Party, which suggests that the need for improvement is greatest precisely here, i.e., within the organization which is supposed to realize the democratic principle.

The contradiction is less surprising when one bears in mind that the Soviet system is and always has been founded upon dictatorship, an idea with which that of democracy is incompatible. Nevertheless, the Soviet Party leaders are obliged for a number of reasons to bang the drum for democracy.

The tenth issue of *Kommunist* for this year opens with an editorial on "Party Democracy and the Responsibility of a Communist," which starts by presenting the decisions of the Twenty-Third Party Congress as a turning point in the direction of genuine democracy:

The entire meaning and spirit of the Congress's decisions testify to the Party's ambition to arm *every* Communist, whether he be a worker or a collective farmer, doctor or teacher, minister or writer, with a profound understanding of his historical responsibility to the Party, the country, the Soviet people, to the workers of the whole world for the realization of the great ideals of Communism (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 10, page 3).

This is described as a continuation of Lenin's interpretation of democracy. With reference to the Party, however, the editors remark:

The idea that democracy is a state of anarchic wilfulness and irresponsibility in which everyone says and does what he pleases is still to be found, though admittedly seldom. The Party definitely marks out such views as alien to Leninism. Party democracy presupposes *responsibility of the highest order*, which incorporates in itself complete freedom of discussion and criticism and simultaneously the obligation to carry out without fail decisions that have been collectively adopted (page 4).

It is stressed that "democratic centralism" is a principle of Party organization, and so we get the link between democracy and the inevitable centralization.

The first section of the issue under consideration is headed, "The Party is the Leading and Directing Force of Soviet Society." In accordance with this, the social processes which have emerged recently in the Soviet Union and which are linked with the demand of the population for greater democracy are here presented as being due to the Party's initiative. We read:

The development of democracy within the Party and the enhancement on this basis of Communists' activity are vitally necessary in connection with the processes, now going on in Soviet society, of further strengthening and extending socialist democracy and the growth of the social activity of Soviet people (page 5).

In general, the Party is presented as a force guaranteeing democratic development and as a model of democracy in a high form, the construction of Communism being naturally brought in. In this way, the responsibility of the Communist is bound up with democracy within the Party, particular emphasis being placed upon the need for devising means of enhancing discipline and the degree of organization. Here, the Party Statute is referred to:

As we know, the Party Statute bestows not only rights but also obligations upon the Communist. Taken as a whole, these rights and obligations really do allow each Communist, without any exceptions and without any departure from reality, to bear responsibility for the state of affairs in his own organization and in the Party as a whole (*ibid.*).

All these reflections are due to the fact that bureaucracy has become usual in the Party. The article mentions the remark made at a Party congress in Belorussia after certain evidence had been quoted: "There's bureaucracy of the purest water for you in Party work!" Bureaucratic procedures are frequently to be seen in the suppression of criticism, and the article expresses the following view:

Direct, open and bold criticism on matters of principle is a most important constituent part of Party democracy, that essential element without the presence of which neither the development of democracy within the Party nor the strengthening of Party discipline nor the enhancement of the responsibility of the Communist is possible (page 6).

It is also laid down that a differentiated approach to Party members should be combined with the ignoring of rank. In any case, a Communist's education presupposes above all strict discipline:

Without discipline, there is not, nor can there be, any revolutionary Marxist party aiming at the Communist reconstruction of society and called upon to consolidate the broadest laboring masses, led by the working class, in the struggle to attain this goal (pages 9-10).

In general, a lot is said in the article about discipline. One may suppose that one of its purposes is to secure an improvement in the discipline of Party organizations in a democratic way. Speaking of the responsibilities of a Communist, the editors demand that every one in a leading position, whether minister or brigade leader, should carry out faithfully the decisions of Party and government and the instructions of authorized persons, evidently because many officials of higher and lower rank have been displaying undue freedom of conduct. In the concluding part of the article, we are told:

The Party imposes high demands on its members. It also concerns itself with creating all the necessary conditions for carrying out these demands. With the strengthening and development of Party democracy, ever more opportunities are created which help to spread independent action [*samodiyatelnost*] and to strengthen the discipline and organization of the Party mass. To develop Party democracy and on this basis to raise without fail the responsibility of every Communist—that is the task (page 13).

There is a clear link between this leader in *Kommunist* and that in *Partiinaya zhizn* entitled "The Communist: An Active Fighter for the Party." Here emphasis is placed on the broad representation of the Communist Party, with its roughly twelve-and-a-half million members in the USSR. The Party member is described as follows:

The Communist is a vehicle for the most advanced revolutionary ideas. His high-principled convictions help him to see properly the deep-lying processes of contemporary life, clearly imagine the Party's aims and understand which paths must be taken in order to reach these goals (*Partiinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 13, page 3).

According to the journal's editors, the Communist must not only be an active political fighter but must show "high social consciousness," work well, resist stagnation, routine, etc. Evidently, these are qualities that many Communists lack. The education of Soviet youth is also stressed as something important, although the reader is assured that in the Soviet Union there can be no question of the "fathers and sons" problem, since the interests of the older and younger generations coincide:

All Communists must show particular concern for the education of Soviet youth. For the first time in history, our Party, guided by revolutionary teaching, has succeeded in completely merging the main interests of the fathers and sons in their fight for the ideals of Communism. It is essential to continue strengthening the revolutionary spirit in the coming generation (page 6).

The responsibilities of a Party member are supposed to include the political education of the masses: the organizational forms which are necessary if the people are to take an active part in all spheres of social and communal life are, we are told, created and constantly improved during the construction of socialism. This question is discussed in an article in *Kommunist* entitled "The Political Education of the Masses." Here we read:

A Communist education presupposes an active participation by each individual in the entire life of society, in state and social activity, in the work of Party, trade union, Komsomol, cooperative organizations, etc. Only by engaging in a practical way in the many-sided life of society can a man become an active builder of Communism [and] develop the features and qualities which are necessary for this (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 10, page 15).

We are told that nowadays political education is determined by the tasks set by the Party, which include scientific planning, the development of technical progress, and the proper use of labor and material resources. Thus, the problem of the political education of the masses is presented as though it had a great deal to do with economic plans. At the same time, some attention is given to ideological questions, or rather to the need for loyalty to the ideology:

One of the first places in the Party's political work is occupied by the development of ideological conviction. If Marxist-Leninist ideas, the policy of our Party, become the personal convictions of every Communist, every worker, they [i.e., the

Party members and workers] will consciously follow the Party [and] coordinate their actions with the fundamental interests of the people, with the tasks of Communist construction (page 15).

Belief in the ideology is presented as the most characteristic trait of the Soviet citizen, which enables him to orient himself in all social processes and helps him to carry out the tasks imposed on him. According to the writer of the article, this "ideological conviction" is unthinkable without profound and extensive knowledge and without close contact with the realities of life and the tasks imposed by the state. The conclusion he reaches here is interesting:

Political education is closely linked with work, with social practice, in the process of which ideas become transformed into convictions. Consequently, the main criterion for checking the strength of ideological conviction is the practical deeds and the creative initiative of Soviet people (pages 16-17).

Once again, the stress is on practical action, despite all the efforts to improve people's grasp of ideology.

The feeling of responsibility of every worker for the state of affairs not only at his place of work but also in the enterprise as a whole, proprietary [*khozyaiskaya*] concern for national property, is the most important result of political work among the masses (page 17).

In a word, the Party leaders are applying every possible device, whether material or moral, to stimulate the labor of workers and collective farmers. Economic and ideological aims are closely interwoven, preference being given to the former.

The author goes on to speak of the development in people's minds of the feelings of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism. This reference is of great significance, concerning as it does a process of great importance which has lately been observable in Soviet society. During the last few years, both patriotism and internationalism have been developing in the USSR along lines unforeseen by the Party leaders. Soviet patriotism has been yielding ground to patriotism of a purely national kind. Among the intellectual élite, a tendency has crystallized to reassess the past, to reinterpret history. The way people now speak or write about the role of the Church or the development of national culture is quite new in Soviet conditions. This new assessment not only does not coincide with the Party's interpretation, it directly contradicts it. In the same intellectual circles, internationalism has also undergone radical changes. A desire has emerged to regard the non-Communist world objectively, to show greater tolerance toward others' *Weltanschauungen*, etc. Putting it in Soviet terms, internationalism has lost its class coloring, which it had had for many decades. The political leaders are trying to return these two concepts to their former positions. We read:

Political education cannot be complete without the development in people of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism. An international education is a complex process. It embraces the large complex of a man's relationship to his

motherland, to his nation and other nations in our country, to the peoples of the socialist commonwealth, to the fighters for social progress in the whole world, produces in people breadth of views and interests, and a constant concern for the common cause, and engenders an indomitable energy in the service of Communism. And it is not merely a business of acquiring a definite sum of knowledge, but of forming genuinely internationalist convictions which should become a standard of conduct for every Soviet man, determining all his deeds and actions (page 19).

It is not at all surprising that in its effort to revive Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism the Party leaders are devoting their primary attention to youth. What they are aiming at is that youth, as it enters upon an independent life of its own, should take over the baton from the Communists of the older generation, and this means that in both the ideological and the economic spheres young people should be the continuators of earlier Party traditions. Here the emphasis is placed on the struggle with bourgeois ideology:

The political education of Soviet people is impossible without an active fight with bourgeois ideology. In the world arena, we are confronted by an experienced opponent with powerful means and refined propaganda methods at his disposal. Bourgeois propaganda sees its main goal to lie in sowing doubts among Soviet people, especially youth, bewildering them, misinforming them and ideologically disarming them. At the present time, when our links with other countries and, by virtue of this, the channels for the penetration of bourgeois influence into our *milieu* have become widely extended, when the ideological struggle between the two systems has become so acute, Soviet people must be especially vigilant (page 21).

Closely linked with the question of the education of youth is an article by B.¹Mochalov, secretary of the Party committee of Moscow State University, entitled "Party Work in Places of Higher Education." The following passage, which characterizes the attitude of scientists and scholars to Party work, may be quoted:

Certain Communist scholars and scientists still try to avoid active communal work, concentrating their attention upon activities in the learned council and in their departments. At report and election meetings, it is not rare for those proposed as candidates for election to the new Party bureaux themselves to withdraw their names (page 36).

Lack of time for Party jobs is, of course, not the only reason; another is a sharp loss of interest. The Party functionaries, for their part, are striving to effect a return to the conditions of Stalin's day, when academic workers carried out all kinds of tasks which had nothing to do with their academic work. Students are also involved:

At the same time, a scientist or scholar who shuns communal work is often an example for the students. It is no secret that many Komsomol members have no constant tasks. Sometimes people even start thinking that academic and communal activities are incompatible. Drawing in the entire professorial and teaching staff into communal, particularly Party, work is the best means of overcoming this error and of [producing] a creative upsurge in all departments of the life of the collective (pages 36-37).

In view of what we have seen, the following conclusions may perhaps be drawn: First, the "extension of democracy" is designed to strengthen Party discipline and enhance in the eyes of Communists the importance of centralization. Second, the desire to strengthen Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism is complementary to the desire to localize the intellectual emancipation of society. Finally, educational work among youth is primarily directed against objectivism and indifference to political work.

A. Gayev

Diplomat in Wien

By SVEN ALLARD

Published by Wissenschaft und Politik, Cologne, 1965, 248 pp.

We publish here reviews by two different authors, who discuss different aspects of Mr. Allard's book. In our view, the one without the other would be incomplete.

Sven Allard was Swedish Ambassador in Vienna from 1953 to 1965. By virtue of fortuitous circumstances, in particular his friendship with Bruno Kreisky, prominent Austrian politician and Austrian minister of foreign affairs, he played a certain part in the negotiations leading to the Austrian treaty of 1955 and had an opportunity of acquainting himself with the background to this event. However, the main value of the book lies not in the fact that it contains many interesting details relating to these events, but in the author's ability to discern certain political developments which, though occurring within a limited framework, were connected with the course of events in the world at large, which bears witness to his broad understanding of the motives of Soviet policy. On the basis of a limited Austrian problem, he analyses the important question of the factors determining Soviet foreign policy.

Thus, the ambassador of the neutral kingdom of Sweden succeeds in examining the relations between "West" and "East" without prejudice, and draws conclusions which sound like a discord in the chorus of judgments on the essence and development of Communism. While almost the whole world takes the view that Communism is merely the outer shell of national Russia, a "tribute to tradition" or "mere propaganda," this neutral diplomat devotes a whole chapter to the questions: "Is there such a thing as a foreign policy of the Soviet Union," i.e., of the USSR as a state, and "Does Soviet policy pursue the aims of world revolution or national aims?"

In the author's view, the very formulation of the latter question is incorrect and divorced from reality; the two sets of aims coincide. However,

... the pursuance of Soviet national aims is of importance only insofar as they can be used to justify [i.e., provide a pretext for] the furtherance of the movement for world revolution. Thus, the aims of this movement in principle possess an indisputable priority over the interests of the state if the two should come into conflict with one another (page 52).

In accordance with this point of view, the author rejects attempts to present Communist imperialism as a mere continuation of Tsarist tradition, for the aims of Tsarist imperialism

... were limited and, so to speak, local. On the other hand, Communist imperialism, by virtue of its innermost nature, is ideological and international. Its aims are unlimited and therefore global (page 51).

In this goal of world revolution and the strategy adopted for its attainment, the author sees a key to the understanding of various actions of the Soviet leaders. In the concluding paragraph of this chapter, he says:

It is not until one attempts, from this point of view, to analyse, case by case, what is generally called Soviet foreign policy that one is in a position to grasp fully its content and real significance and to understand the surprising and sudden vacillations to which it is subject. Its apparent mysteriousness has its origin in the changing assessment of the general political situation, which prompts the rulers in Moscow to make strategic or tactical modifications (page 57).

A logical result of such an analysis is the author's sharp criticism of "the notion that the Soviet Union, while preserving its Communist façade, is on the road of gradual transition to a bourgeois democracy." On this basis, he assesses various Soviet diplomatic maneuvers in connection with the Austrian State Treaty, signed on May 15, 1955, which established Austria's sovereignty and neutrality and, what was most important, stipulated the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

The main course of events, briefly described by Allard, is well known: at the Berlin conference on the German question (January 25–February 18, 1954), the Soviets showed not the slightest desire to make concessions with regard to Germany, whereas they regarded the settlement of the German question as a prerequisite for a settlement of the Austrian question. This virtually sabotaged all attempts by the Western powers to put an end to the state of war with Austria and to restore her independence. Suddenly, on January 8, 1955, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov declared that the two questions were mutually independent. On February 25, he summoned the Austrian ambassador in Moscow in order to make sure that the switch in the Soviet stand had been properly understood. One month later, on March 24, Molotov proposed that Austria immediately despatch a governmental delegation to Moscow to prepare a state treaty, and then within three days, April 12–15, the problem, which had seemed insoluble for ten years, was settled. What followed—the signing of the state treaty by the representatives of the other powers on May 15, its subsequent ratification and the removal of foreign, including Soviet, troops from Austrian soil—was then only a matter of routine.

Analysing the circumstances which led up to this unexpected turn of events, Allard mentions the views of a number of Western observers who sought for an explanation in considerations of state, *viz.*, a desire on the part of the USSR to protect its own security. He offers a convincing explanation of his own, showing that "the enigmatic zigzags" of Soviet diplomacy become entirely logical and

intelligible if one starts with the assumption that the leaders of the Communist Party and government of the Soviet Union are really Communists and are really pursuing the aims to which they constantly refer." In his view, the Soviet government's decision to conclude and, indeed, impose on the West a treaty with Austria entailing the removal of Soviet troops from Austrian soil was functionally dependent on the Soviet leaders' strategy on behalf of a world Communist revolution in the middle of the fifties. Allard points out that the decision to conclude the Austrian treaty coincides with the Bandung conference of noncommitted countries of April 1955, and that for the strategy of Communism the most important thing at that time was to push the idea of neutrality. On this depended to some extent the inclusion (or not) of Turkey, Iraq and Iran in the Baghdad Pact. For this reason, he says, Austria had to be evacuated, despite all "strategic considerations guaranteeing the national security of the USSR."

To an even greater extent, certain maneuvers connected with the Austrian State Treaty were designed to prevent the ratification of the Paris agreements on the rearming of Germany and her acceptance as a member of NATO. Mr. Allard shows that various stages in the revision of Soviet policy with regard to Austria were directly connected with individual steps taken by the Western powers: the Soviet abandonment of the point of view that the German and Austrian questions were or must be linked (February 8, 1955) came at the moment when the decisive discussion on the ratification of the Paris agreements had begun; not long before the ratification by the French Senate on March 27, 1955, the Soviets proposed on February 25 the immediate summoning of a conference on the Austrian question, which would have meant a further postponement and possibly even abandonment of the ratification of the agreements on the rearming of Germany. And when the Paris agreements were nevertheless ratified, the Soviet government, contrary to its own threats to the West and the expectations of "strategists" who had been trying to comprehend the Soviet leaders' mode of thought in terms of a "normal" defense of the interests of a national state, not only voluntarily surrendered the strategically very important Austrian position but compelled their partners to carry through the conclusion of the treaty in record time.

The idea that the Soviet government made this concession in Europe in order to produce an impression upon some rather unreliable politicians in far-off Bandung may seem improbable to observers accustomed to think in terms of the interests of the national state; but it is impossible to comprehend the inner logic governing the development of world Communism if one does not bear in mind the global scale of Soviet policies.

Allard notes on the basis of his own experience that the idea of the "national regeneration" of Communism is regularly suggested to Westerners by Soviet representatives themselves. In 1944, as the question of his appointment as ambassador to Moscow was being seriously considered, the Soviet ambassador to Sweden at the time, Mme Kollontai, invited him to lunch.

The conversation, which lasted several hours, showed that the main purpose of the... invitation... was to persuade me that the Soviet Union was now on the way to a development along democratic lines...

Allard comments on this intervention as follows:

I listened spellbound to her tactically ingenious arguments. Without in any way insisting on her point of view or creating the slightest impression of wanting to convince me, she sought to convey to me the desired view by her tone of voice, by discreet hints, by revealing unexpected facts, the truth of which I could not check. She wanted me to become persuaded that I had reached [this desired view] by my own observations and conclusions (page 61).

Finally, Sven Allard knows his history. As we see from his book, he is aware that the Western view that the Soviet leaders have abandoned the idea of world Communist revolution and are effecting a gradual transition to bourgeois democracy was born in 1927, when the failure of direct attempts to "carry the flame of revolution" into Germany and China prompted the Soviet Party leaders to concentrate first upon building socialism "in a single country" (page 50). He is aware that it was the belief in a "regeneration of Communism" that drove statesmen such as Roosevelt, US Ambassador to Britain in World War II Davis, and Eduard Beneš to collaborate closely with the Communists and that this led to the Bolshevization of Eastern Europe (page 63).

Following the logic of such views, Allard's analysis attaches no importance to the death of Stalin in the question of Soviet relations to the outside world. He shows that the transition from the policy of expansion to that of "peaceful coexistence"—in Allard's terminology, "defensive tactics"—had been worked out by Stalin, although its realization was left to Khrushchev (pages 75–76).

Allard does not, of course, have a monopoly of these facts, but he remembers them and knows how to estimate their importance for both the past and the future. His achievement lies in the fact that he has decided to remind his readers of things which are known to many, which should be known to all, but which the overwhelming majority of today's observers have either forgotten or failed to understand.

H. Akhminov

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The conclusion of the 1955 State Treaty which gave back Austria its independence, and the resultant withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country, are events unparalleled in the history of Soviet foreign policy. For the politician and historian, the question inevitably arises whether the Soviet leaders abandoned their efforts to Communize Austria voluntarily or owing to the force of circumstances. There were many in the West who viewed the Soviet withdrawal as a good-will gesture, and who even recommended solving the German problem along similar lines. The behind-the-scenes story is set forth by Sven Allard in his book *Diplomat in Wien*. He shows that, contrary to the opinion of a large number of people, the Soviets were in fact trying to turn Austria into a Communist

state, and only their failure to do so, coupled with the persistence of Austrian politicians, impelled them to finally drop this plan. In the late forties, when Zhdanov forecast a severe economic crisis in the USA, the Kremlin leaders were convinced that this crisis would have particularly dire consequences for Europe, and that as a result a number of European countries, Austria included, would go Communist. However, writes Allard,

Without waiting for this to happen, the Communists made no less than three unsuccessful *coups* in Austria during the period 1947–50. At the beginning of May 1947, i.e., shortly before the Communist Party assumed power in Hungary, the first attempt at bringing about a change of regime by force was planned. The preparations began with street demonstrations and strikes staged by the Communist Party. They ended with an attack on the Federal Chancellor's office, which was to have been seized and occupied. A government reshuffle was then to have been enforced. The Communist Party wanted to secure a decisive influence for itself (page 83).

As Allard comments, the Communists evidently based their plans on the assumption that the Viennese police would not be able to offer serious resistance, particularly as the latter were banned from carrying arms under a Soviet order. The *Putsch*, however, failed, largely because the Communists failed to win the cooperation of the trade unions, who in fact opposed them. The threat of intervention by the US military police finally caused the Party leaders to sound the retreat.

After this, the Austrian Communist Party leaders resorted to new tactics. Abandoning their plans for a revolution by violence, they began to apply pressure to certain elements in the coalition government in an effort to secure participation in the latter. There was, at that time, a tendency in government circles to favor Communist participation because of the country's far-from-rosy economic situation and because of a feeling that such participation would soften the Soviet government's tough stand on signing an independence treaty. However, the Austrian Communists overplayed their hand by attempting a Czech-style *coup*, demanding a number of top posts in the government and the right to veto any minister. Allard writes that the plan failed because a member of the People's Party, not initiated because of his anti-Communist sentiments, found out about it and passed on his knowledge to a large Austrian newspaper. The Communist position became even weaker after the announcement of Austrian participation in the Marshall Plan, when the sole Communist member of the government resigned in protest.

The Austrian Communists, however, were not yet prepared to throw in the towel, and in September 1950 made one last *Putsch* attempt, in collaboration with the Soviet occupation forces. Writes Allard:

Even several months before the attempted *coup*, the Austrian authorities could observe a stiffening of the attitude of the Soviet occupation forces. This showed itself in, among other things, an increasing number of arbitrary arrests, ever more frequent excesses on the part of the local Soviet administrative authorities, and repeated attempts of the latter to interfere in internal Austrian affairs. It was also not uncommon for ultimatum demands to be made for the dismissal or transfer of

police officers, etc., whom the Soviets did not like. The main purpose of all this was to incite unrest among the population and intimidate the Austrian authorities. The Soviets hoped thereby to undermine or weaken their resistance in view of the coming trial of strength (pages 85–86).

This *coup* too, which also started with street disturbances and demonstrations, was unsuccessful. The Austrian police did their duty, and—even more important—the trade unions also opposed the Communists on this occasion.

The stalwartness of the Austrian population and the Austrian government, coupled with the uncompromising attitude of the Western occupation forces, had, in the author's opinion, made a Communist revolution in Austria an impossibility. As a result, after the Soviet switch to a policy of "peaceful coexistence," Khrushchev decided to give up Austria, hoping that this would help to reduce international tension and improve the position of the USSR *vis-à-vis* the USA and other Western countries. Thus, after much diplomatic maneuvering and behind-the-scenes negotiations, the treaty which gave back Austria her independence was signed.

The chief value of Sven Allard's book can be said to lie in the fact that the author, as one who both observed and took part in these Austrian developments, clearly demonstrates their uniqueness, and hence the utter inapplicability of the Austrian example to Germany, a part of which has been successfully Communized. An account is given of the speech delivered by Khrushchev in early 1954 at a Central Committee session at which he clashed with Molotov over policy toward Austria (on policy toward countries within the Communist sphere of influence the two men were in agreement). Writes Allard:

Khrushchev began this discussion with a long speech in defense of the new course, and on this basis substantiated the resolution to quit Austria. He insisted that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union must be more elastic than previously. Since the Presidium had decided in favor of this policy, it followed that a compromise solution must sometimes be accepted. In questions of relatively minor importance the Soviet Union must be prepared to make concessions, especially if in the long run they might lead to corresponding or even greater successes for Communism in other spheres. Every compromise of this kind, however, must be limited in time, whereas the advantages which the Soviet Union received in exchange for the concessions should be of a permanent nature. Khrushchev gave a few more criteria [for judging] of what nature a compromise in Soviet eyes should be in order to be considered justifiable. As an absolute prerequisite, he demanded that the unity and strength of the "socialist camp" should not be weakened. Further—and this was no less important—an already established Communist regime possessing a certain stability should not be endangered by a compromise solution (page 206).

As it turned out, Khrushchev's policy, far from producing the successes predicted, resulted in a series of Soviet defeats. Austria, however, received back her independence—not, we repeat, thanks to good will on the part of the Soviet government, but because of the Soviet failure to Communize the country with the aid of fifth columnists and fellow travelers.

A. Kasbin

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

July 1966

- 1 Publication of Soviet-French declaration in connection with visit of French President Charles de Gaulle to USSR. Agreements reached on: the establishment of a joint top-level commission to supervise fulfillment of existing trade, economic, scientific and technical agreements; the conclusion of a consular convention; and the installation of a "hot line" between the Kremlin and the Elysée Palace. Party Secretary General L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of Council of Ministers A. N. Kossygin and Chairman of Supreme Soviet Presidium N. V. Podgorniy accept de Gaulle's invitation to pay official visit to France.

Publication of Soviet-French agreements on peaceful space research and scientific, technical and economic cooperation.

Soviet Finance Ministry issues 20-year 3-percent public lottery-loan

Publication of Soviet governmental statement protesting against US air attacks against Hanoi and Haiphong suburbs.

Kremlin reception for graduates of Soviet military academies opened by Defense Minister Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky. Speech delivered by Brezhnev.

Second all-Union conference of Soviet-Mongolian Friendship Society held in Moscow. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budenny reelected board chairman of the Society.

- 2 Soviet delegation led by Brezhnev and including Kossygin, Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, Defense Minister Malinovsky, Central Committee first deputy departmental head K. V. Rusakov and Soviet Ambassador to Rumania A. V. Basov leaves for Bucharest to take part in conference of Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact countries

Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces, Marshal A. A. Grechko, arrives in Bucharest.

Meeting of General Assembly of USSR Academy of Sciences comes to an end, 46 members and 78 corresponding members having been elected to the Academy.

Announcement that Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers have adopted

resolutions "On Measures to Further Develop the National Fish Industry and Improve the Quality and Range of Fish Products."

Second all-Union conference of Soviet Society for Cultural Relations with Burma held in Moscow.

- 3 Announcement that Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers have adopted resolution regulating planning and construction of monuments. Construction of major monuments to require approval by Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers, their planning to be entrusted to all-Union and Union-republican Culture Ministries.

Announcement that group of Soviet Party workers led by Deputy Head of Central Committee's Science and Educational Institutions Department, S. G. Shcherbakov, has left for East Berlin following invitation by East German Socialist Unity Party to see how latter is coping with problems posed by scientific and technical progress

Soviet governmental delegation led by Politburo Candidate Member and First Secretary of Georgian Party Central Committee V. P. Mzhavanadze leaves for Algiers for Algerian Independence Day celebrations.

- 4 Soviet Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev receives large group of British timber product importers and brokerage firm directors.

Session of USSR Academy of Medical Sciences opens in Moscow. Health Minister B. V. Petrovsky delivers speech on tasks facing Soviet medical science as affected by Party Congress resolutions

- 5 Indian Trade Minister Manubhai Shah arrives in Moscow.

British M.P. Reginald Maudling arrives in Moscow on unofficial visit.

Annual conference of "Novosti" Press Agency opens. Board Chairman B. S. Burkov reviews first five years of Agency's operations.

Publication of Soviet governmental statement on "alarming" situation on Cambodian border

6 President of British Board of Trade, Douglas Jay, arrives in Moscow for opening of second British industrial exhibition in USSR.

Launching of Soviet scientific space station "Proton-3."

Press conference held in Moscow by Committee for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries on occasion of opening of Seventh International Congress of Crystallographers.

7 Publication of communiqué on conference of Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact Countries held in Bucharest July 4-6.

Announcement that regular plenary session of USSR Supreme Court has been held. Report delivered by Supreme Court Chairman A. F. Gorkin on tasks of legal organs as affected by Party Congress decisions. Procurator General R. A. Rudenko among participants.

Presidium Chairman of All-Union Chamber of Commerce M. V. Nesterov gives reception on occasion of fiftieth anniversary of Russo-British Chamber of Commerce, attended by Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers V. N. Novikov, Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev, President of British Board of Trade Douglas Jay, president of British industrial exhibition in Moscow Sir Robert Maclean, President of Russo-British Chamber of Commerce, British Ambassador to USSR Sir Geoffrey Harrison, and others.

Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa García and Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A. I. Alekseyev exchange ratification instruments of trade, payments and credit agreements between their countries.

All-Union scientific conference on "Cultural Monuments of the Russian North" opens in Arkhangelsk.

8 Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-123."

Publication of Warsaw Pact countries' offer to send volunteers to Vietnam.

Announcement that all-Union conference of light industry workers, devoted to question of boosting production of consumer goods and improving their quality, has come to an end.

New Zealand Labor Federation delegation arrives in Moscow on first official visit to USSR following invitation by All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

British industrial exhibition opens in Moscow.

9 Soviet Foreign Ministry delivers note of protest to US government claiming that US air raids against port of Haiphong on July 7 endangered Soviet merchant vessels and seamen.

10 Death of Party Central Committee Secretary A. P. Rudakov.

Fisherman's Day.

11 Delegation of Italian Communist municipal leaders, led by Mayor of Bologna, Fanti, arrives in Moscow following invitation by Party Central Committee to study operation of local soviets.

Agreement on establishment of direct air link between USSR and Canada signed in Ottawa.

Soviet Ambassador to West Germany S. K. Tsarapkin presents credentials to President Heinrich Lübke.

Prince Ahmed Shah Khan of Afghanistan, Honorary President of Afghan Red Crescent Society, arrives in Moscow as guest of Supreme Soviet Presidium.

12 Seventh International Congress of Crystallographers opens in Moscow. Introductory speech delivered by Chairman of Congress's Organizing Committee, Corresponding Member of USSR Academy of Sciences B. K. Vainshtein.

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, accompanied by Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh and others, arrives in USSR on official visit.

13 Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter arrives in Moscow on official visit.

14 Kosygin and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi discuss international situation and Soviet-Indian relations in Kremlin. Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko and Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev are among those participating in the discussion.

Secretary General of French Communist Party, Waldeck Rochet, arrives in USSR on rest cure as guest of Party Central Committee.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-124."

15 TASS rejects US statement that USSR was forewarned of US air attacks against Hanoi and Haiphong suburbs.

Finnish President Urho Kekkonen ratifies Soviet-Finnish consular agreement.

- 16 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson arrives in Moscow in connection with British industrial exhibition.

Announcement that delegation of Soviet "public" workers, led by member of Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, People's Artist of the USSR and movie director S. A. Gerasimov and including Deputy Chairman of Moscow City Executive Committee N. T. Sizov and writer M. N. Alekseyev, has left for Western Germany following invitation by West German "fighters for peace."

Defense Minister Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky receives Guinean military delegation led by Minister for Military and Civic Service General Diallo Lansana.

- 17 Delegation of East German vocational and technical education specialists led by Secretary of State Erich Markowitsch arrives in Moscow.

Metallurgist's Day.

Announcement that Soviet trade union delegation led by Secretary of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions T. N. Nikolayeva has left for Sofia to participate in conference of International Trade Union Consultative Committee for Problems of Working Women.

Publication of joint communiqué on visit of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to USSR.

- 18 Moroccan Foreign Minister Mohamed Cherkaoui arrives in Moscow on official visit.

- 19 Delegation of Hungarian state prosecution officials led by Attorney-General Géza Szénási arrives in Moscow on study visit.

Guatemalan writer Miguel Angel Asturias presented with International Lenin Peace Prize.

Agreement signed in Sofia under which USSR is to assist Bulgaria in construction of 800,000-kilowatt atomic power station, scheduled to become operative in 1974.

- 20 Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-125."

Announcement that shipyard for building small ships and barges has been constructed on Lake Issyk-Kul (Kirghizia).

Announcement that plant for producing metal structures for Urals and Siberian construction projects has been built on outskirts of Nizhny Tagil. Its first stage has a capacity of 35,000 tons per year.

- 21 Long-term Soviet-Bulgarian cultural and scientific cooperation agreement signed in Sofia.

Soviet and North Vietnamese scientists sign program of cooperation between USSR Academy of Sciences and North Vietnamese Committee for Science and Technology in 1966.

Conference of representatives of Soviet agricultural machine-building industry opens in Moscow. Speech delivered by Minister of Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Construction I. F. Sinitayn.

Announcement that all-Union conference of geocryologists has been held in Yakutsk.

- 22 Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko receives UAR Deputy Foreign Minister.

President of Indian National Congress Party K. A. Kamaraj arrives in Moscow as guest of USSR Parliamentary Group.

Announcement that Party Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member A. P. Kirilenko has received head of visiting Guinean military delegation, General Diallo Lansana. Marshal Malinovsky also participated in the discussion.

- 23 Foreign Minister Gromyko leaves for Tokyo on official visit.

Algerian economic delegation led by Minister of Industry and Energy Belaid Abdesslem arrives in Moscow.

- 24 Ninth International Congress on Microbiology opens in Moscow. Especial attention to be devoted to viruses. International exhibition of microbiological equipment to be held concurrently with Congress.

Publication of Central Statistical Authority's report on fulfillment of national economic plan for first half of 1966.

Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers adopt resolution to build passenger automobile plant with capacity of 600,000 automobiles per year in Tolyatti (Kuibyshev Oblast) during 1967-69.

Soviet government adopts resolution to set up state university in Kaliningrad in 1967.

Trade Worker's Day celebrated for first time.

- 25 Consultations take place between Soviet and East German Foreign Ministries under treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation of June 12, 1964. Participants include Foreign Minister Otto Winzer and Deputy Foreign Minister Georg Stibi for East Germany, and First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov and Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov for USSR. Major topic is European situation.

UN Secretary General U Thant arrives in Moscow following invitation by Soviet government to discuss means of improving international situation.

Talks on implementation of economic and technical cooperation agreements begin in Moscow between Soviet and Algerian delegations led by Chairman of State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations S. A. Skachkov and Minister of Industry and Energy Belaid Abdessalem respectively.

- 26 Supreme Soviet Presidium promulgates decree setting up Union-republican Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order of the USSR.

Swedish naval delegation led by Commander in Chief of Swedish Navy Vice-Admiral Åke Lindemalm arrives in Moscow following invitation by Commander in Chief of Soviet Navy.

Party Central Committee, Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet Presidium adopt resolutions calling for tougher measures against hooliganism, including creation of special motorized militia patrols in large cities and broadening of militia's crime-suppressing powers. Supreme Soviet Presidium issues decree increasing penalties for hooliganism.

- 27 Iraqi Premier Abdul Rahman Al-Bazzaz arrives in Moscow on official visit.

Delegation of Turkish Grand National Assembly members arrives in Moscow on official visit.

- 28 Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-126."

- 29 Twelfth session of council of International Bank for Economic Cooperation (the Comecon bank), devoted to credits and accounts in transferable rubles, comes to an end in Moscow.

Soviet-Japanese consular convention signed in Tokyo, Gromyko being the signatory for the USSR.

- 30 Announcement that Soviet government has finally settled for Franco-Soviet "Secam-3" color television transmission system.

- 31 Publication of joint communiqué on Gromyko's visit to Japan.

Soviet Navy Day.

Changes and Appointments

- 3 M. Y. Rakovsky appointed Deputy Chairman of State Planning Committee (Gosplan), being released from position of First Deputy Minister of Instrument Making, Automatic Devices and Control Systems.

V. V. Krotov appointed First Deputy Minister of Heavy, Power and Transport Machine Building.

B. A. Kudrin appointed Deputy Minister of Melioration and Water Economy.

V. I. Semenov appointed Deputy Board Chairman of Construction Bank (Stroibank), replacing T. V. Zinovev.

- 17 V. Y. Isayev appointed First Deputy Chairman of State Planning Committee.

N. A. Bochko appointed Deputy Minister of the Timber, Cellulose, Paper and Wood-Processing Industries.

V. I. Manyakin appointed Deputy Head of Central Statistical Authority.

- 24 V. P. Teslya-Teslenko appointed Deputy Minister of Special Installation and Construction Projects.

N. A. Mukhitdinov appointed First Deputy Chairman of Committee for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries.

Announcement that N. B. Arutyunov, V. V. Boitsov, P. D. Borodin, V. M. Glushkov, Y. M. Kolotyrkin, Y. Y. Maksarev, A. V. Mozalevsky, Y. A. Nazarov, B. V. Petrovsky, S. P. Trapeznikov, A. B. Vernik, V. S. Yemelyanov, N. M. Zhavoronkov and D. A. Zhdanov have been confirmed as members of State Committee for Science and Technology.

ERRATUM

On page 20 of the *Bulletin*, No. 8, 1966, line 35 should read "came to the surface—in Hu Feng's group and the 'hundred blossoms' experiment..."

Notes on Contributors

TEODOROVICH, NADEZHDA. Born in 1907. Attended teachers' and medical colleges and worked for psychiatric and "Mother and Child Welfare" institutions in the USSR. Took part in church affairs during the persecution of the Church in the USSR. After emigrating during World War II, took up the study of religious problems in countries of the Communist bloc. Member of the Research Section at the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

STOLTE, STEFAN C. Hungarian journalist. Imprisoned in Hungary from 1949 to 1956. Released during the Hungarian Revolution. Now a free-lance journalist in Munich, specializing in Soviet-satellite relations.

VORONITSYN, S. Born in 1926 in Yugoslavia. Graduated in 1960 from Frankfurt University in sociology. Has published work in various journals. Now on the staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich.

URBAN, P. Born in Belorussia in 1924. Graduated in history from the University of Louvain in 1954. Member of the research staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, specializing in Soviet historiography and education.

GAYEV, ARKADY. Journalist. Worked for *Pravda* and *Izvestia* and also for the Soviet regional press from 1921 until World War II, since when he has been living in Munich. A regular contributor of articles on Soviet literature and the Soviet press to the publications of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

AKHMINOV, HERMAN. Born 1921 at Arkhangelsk. Studied at Leningrad University, 1939-40; taken prisoner of war, 1942; later studied at Oxford (B.Litt., 1959); member of the Research Section of the Institute for the Study of the USSR since 1957. Writer and lecturer on Soviet problems; author of *Die Macht im Hintergrund* (1950), *Die Totengräber des Kommunismus* (1964), *Breschnev und Kossygin: Die neuen Männer im Kreml?* (1964) and numerous articles.

KASHIN, A. Born 1927 in Shanghai, son of a Russian émigré family. Grew up in China. In 1946, took Soviet citizenship and until 1948 worked as a TASS correspondent. In that year, wrote an open letter to the Shanghai press renouncing his Soviet citizenship on ethical grounds. After the Communists' seizure of Shanghai, was several times arrested and in 1952 expelled from China. Since then, has been living in Western Germany and working as a free-lance journalist.



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
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ARTICLES

Cybernetics and the Political Economy of Communism

C. OLGIN

The following article is a much expanded version of the second of the two appendices to the paper on cybernetics and ideology which was published in a revised form in the July 1966 issue of the *Bulletin*.

In the article dealing with the relationship between science, ideology and cybernetics in the USSR,¹ the present writer put forward his views on the decisive role played in the formation of Party ideology and Party policy by a few basic posits of Marxist-Leninist political economy and on the equally decisive effect of Communist theory and practice on developments in Soviet cybernetics. He also gave it as his opinion that the reverse process, the effect of cybernetics on Party ideology in the field of economics, has hardly begun. To this we must add straight away that developments in this direction cannot be judged by the study of textbooks destined for the millions of students or for run-of-the-mill Party workers freshening up their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism at seminars. Here the effect has been nil. In spite of Khrushchevian enthusiasm for the new science, in spite of numerous references in leaders' pronouncements and authoritative articles, even in the new Party Program, to cybernetics as one of the most important factors in the successful construction of the "material-technical basis of Communism," the men responsible for inculcating the principles of Marxist-Leninist political economy into the brains of the Soviet intelligentsia *en masse* have been allowed to ignore economic cybernetics *in toto*. In late Khrushchevian as well as in post-Khrushchevian textbooks on political economy, cybernetics receives cursory mention in connection with the automation of production, described as a peril to capitalism and a powerful aid to Communism, but of proper cybernetic control of large economic organizations, let alone of the national economy, there is not one word.²

For this indifference to a science and a technique which, according to Khrushchev's "Communist Manifesto of the contemporary era," could do much to transform the theory of Communism into reality, there must, of course, be an explanation. The most obvious is that Khrushchev's known enthusiasm for

¹ See C. Olgin, "Science, Ideology and Cybernetics in the USSR," *Bulletin*, 1966, No. 7.

² E.g., *Politicheskaya ekonomiya: Kommunisticheskiy sposob proizvodstva* (Political Economy: The Communist Method of Production), Moscow, 1963; *Kurs lektsii po politicheskoi ekonomii: Kommunisticheskiy sposob proizvodstva* (A Course of Lectures in Political Economy: The Communist Method of Production), Leningrad, 1963; A. M. Rumyantsev, *O kategoriakh politicheskoi ekonomii* (The Categories of Political Economy), Moscow, 1965; and *O sotsializme k kommunizmu* (From Socialism to Communism), Moscow, 1962.

technical innovations on a massive scale, coupled with the urgent necessity of giving his Party Program a semblance of scientific respectability, encouraged (or forced) his ideological advisers, including senior planners, to underestimate the technical difficulties of establishing proper economic control over any national economy and grossly overestimate the present possibilities of economic cybernetics in terms of finished theory as well as "hardware," particularly of domestic provenance. The super-optimism of the Party Program's promises on the automation of economic control must have become known not only to specialists but to a very wide public as soon as the first steps in practical application were taken, shortly after the Twenty-Second Party Congress, with the installation of computers in large plants, in *sovnarkhozes*, etc., and at the main computing center of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). It was too late to amend the "Communist Manifesto of the contemporary era"; but not too late to keep economic cybernetics and its basis of mathematical economics out of textbooks on political economy. It is, as stated, an obvious explanation; it is probably already being used in the USSR to fend off awkward questions and would find favor over here with that section of our sovietologists and journalists who are getting ready to bury the myth of Khrushchev "the great reformer of the Soviet economy" which they helped to create. It omits, however, some points, more important though not so obvious.

In the first place, though many sovietologists gloss over the matter, the political economy of Communism is not political economy in the accepted sense of the term, i.e., a theory of how best to organize the production, distribution and consumption of material goods for the weal of society regardless of the effect on its political-economic structure or even with the avowed intention of maintaining a political-economic *status quo*. It is, on the contrary, essentially a political teaching on how to transform the political-economic structure of any society, in the first place its property relations (in Marxist terminology, the "relations of production") into a socialist and later into a Communist "basis." Why should mathematical economics and economic cybernetics, which, according to their exponents, have no political axe to grind, be cold-shouldered by Marxist-Leninist economists just because of technical difficulties, which, after all, may be removed in a foreseeable future?

An explanation will, of course, be offered by economist-sovietologists who have already pointed to the practical incompatibility of mathematical economics, built around marginalism, with certain tenets of Communist political economy inherited from Marxist economic theory, particularly the "labor theory of value," and the equal incompatibility of a main feature of any cybernetical control, the famous "feedback of information," with another Marxist tenet, elevated by Lenin and Stalin to the status of a fundamental dogma—namely, centralized command planning.³

³ See Vladimir G. Treml, "Revival of Soviet Economics and the New Generation of Soviet Economists," *Studies on the Soviet Union*, New Series, Vol. V, No. 2, 1965; P. J. D. Wiles, *The Political Economy of Communism*, Oxford, 1962; Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economy: An Introduction*, London—New York, 1961, George Palocz-Horvath, *The Facts Rebel: The Future of Russia and the West*, London, 1964.

On this reading, the men in charge of producing Soviet textbooks on political economy were perfectly justified in waiting until the differences had been smoothed out by specialists.

Evidence that we are here on the right track is plentiful in publications reserved for a more select public, particularly in *Voprosy ekonomiki*, organ of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and a stronghold of conservatism, and *Voprosy filosofii*, organ of the Academy's Institute of Philosophy, where all aspects of cybernetics have been examined in the past ten years. Leaders of the mathematical school of economics have done their best to present their theories as Marxist, in fact Marxist-Leninist. Conservatives, in turn, have showered praise on the mathematicians for their technical achievements, have shown a spirit of compromise over the "labor theory of value" and have conducted discussions over the problem of price formation in a realistic manner.

An examination of the relevant materials shows, however, in the writer's opinion at any rate, that the *rapprochement* is more superficial than real, because the issues have to do with politics as well as with economics; with the question of who shall control and for what ultimate purpose as much as (perhaps more than) with the question of how control shall be reorganized technically.

The idea that the rift in the Party élite on questions of economic policy and its beneficiaries, similar to that which split the Party in the twenties, lay at the back of disputes in the late Khrushchevian era among Soviet economists occurred to the present writer some two or three years ago, when examining the arguments for and against the Liberman plan and the far more advanced recommendations of the late Academician V. Nemchinov.⁴ The "Nemchinovists" were definitely coming close to the "geneticism" of their predecessors the "economists" and were in fact directly accused of this by at least one of their influential opponents; and they were equally definitely voicing the views of a section of the Party élite, managers of plants, sovnarkhoz executives and technicians of every kind. Against them stood the conservatives, successors of the "teleologists" expressing the views of Gosplan and the Party *apparat*, and the subsequent efforts to close the rift do not seem to have been in any way successful. To analyse the line-up of the opposing forces and attempt to forecast the ultimate solution is, of course, not our business here. What interests us is to determine as accurately as possible the positions occupied by cyberneticians and mathematical economists. To most sovietologists or specialists on the subject, the question does not seem to arise. Both disciplines, if ever applied in practice on a large scale, will demand a progressive decentralization of economic controls, the delegation of economic authority and abolition of command planning by directives—all features of "geneticism" eventually leading to true economic liberalization. "Teleologism" (i.e., command planning by directives), on the other hand, according to these experts, forbids not only economic liberalization but effective decentralization

⁴ See Constantine Olgin, "Ideology and Economics," *Studies on the Soviet Union*, New Series, Vol. III, No. 3, 1964, and R. W. Campbell, "Economics: Roads and Inroads," *Problems of Communism*, Washington, D.C., November–December 1965, p. 33.

of any kind and automatically strangles the circulation of economic information without which neither mathematical economics nor economic cybernetics can operate.⁵ Hence the self-evident conclusion.

For a student of Communist ideology, such as the present writer, to argue with experts on the Soviet economy would seem a piece of effrontery—especially since he was practically of the same opinion only a couple of years ago. A more careful examination of the relevant materials, particularly those of more recent origin, shows, however, that the situation was always and still is more complex than appeared on the surface—i.e., that there were and still are more than just two parties to the dispute, anti-mathematician “dogmatist” conservatives and reformist mathematicians; furthermore, that political motives played an important part in seemingly apolitical proposals and criticisms; finally, that cyberneticians proper are only now coming out into the open and not always on the side of “geneticism.”

“Dogmatism”: The Case Against Mathematical Economics

To start with, it must be understood that the present resistance by a section of Soviet economists to mathematization has little to do with the extravagances of overt “liquidationism” under War Communism, when high Party functionaries imbued with Marxist messianism decided that the Soviet economy stood above any economic law; or with the covert “liquidationism” of the era of “great transformations of Nature” under Stalin, when his sycophantic “planners,” imbued with little else than the urge to rise on successive waves of industrialization, declared statistics a bourgeois pseudoscience. It must also be understood that “liquidationism” is not synonymous with “teleologism,” which, in theory at any rate, demands accurate statistics. Statistics were in fact rehabilitated under Stalin. They were then, and probably still are to a certain extent, used to cover up failures and bolster up doubtful successes. But no Soviet economist nowadays, however “dogmatist,” can come out either against statistics and its mathematical instrumentalia or, since the late fifties, against the application of modern mathematical techniques in solving isolated practical problems in production, distribution, and allocation of resources. The “dogmatists’” line of defense against mathematics, however, is still drawn firmly around the principles involved in the formulation of the Party’s economic plans. The country’s leaders may, in fact must, have reliable information on the state of the economy. The main features of the plan, however, cannot be automatically derived from such information by purely mathematical methods. As a leading “dogmatist” put it, “quantitative analysis must be preceded by qualitative analysis.”⁶ A good number of Western economists would no doubt second this statement, and we must note that the leader of the “mathematization” faction of Soviet economists, the late Nemchinov, whether from need for political caution or scientific integrity, strengthened

⁵ See Trembl, *op. cit.*, and particularly Palocz-Horvath, *op. cit.*

⁶ See also N. A. Tsagalov (ed.), *Kurs politicheskoi ekonomii v dvukh tomakh* (A Course of Political Economy in Two Volumes), Vol. II: *Sotsializm* (Socialism), Moscow, 1963, esp. p. 627.

the case of the "dogmatists" against mathematical economics by stating that "the plan cannot jump by itself out of a formula."⁷

Where, then, are the guiding principles for formulating the Party's plans to be found? At ideological-textbook level, the "dogmatists" have their answer pat. The laws of development of Soviet economics such as "proportional growth" or "steady growth of forces of production as a result of strengthening the socialist relations of production" derive from the basic categories of Communist political economy—"socialist labor," "socialist relations of production," "public ownership of production," etc. The laws so derived give the plan its form, its general direction.⁸ It is conceded by the "dogmatists," even at textbook level, that the actual economic content of the plans (how much of what shall be produced, where and how) is to a certain extent determined by statistical information about resources and demands on the spot. But statistics must not be allowed to dictate future developments: this would be *kbvostizm*, a term of disapproval used against the "economists." Resources, both human and material, must be accurately known; they are the "concrete" elements with which the plan is constructed. But they are denied any specific dynamics of development. The dynamics are provided by the "conscious striving of the Soviet masses in the construction of the material and technical basis of Communism under the guidance of their vanguard—the Leninist Party" and a modicum of material incentives. Once this position is adopted (a position which in fact forms the real dividing line between the anti- and pro-"mathematization" factions), it is obviously impermissible to leave the final analysis of data, let alone decisions on the choice of variants on a national scale, to computers, their programmizers or economist-mathematicians, who may look for other dynamics and even question the reality of the approved ones. Hence the insistence on qualitative analysis, on categories of political economy untranslatable into the language of mathematics, on the powers of the Party as final arbiter in the formulation of successive plans which must retain their "directive" character, as opposed to "scientific prognoses" advocated by the mathematicians.⁹

The arrogant assurance of opponents of an all-out mathematization of the national economy leaves them, however, as soon as planning and allied problems such as price formation are tackled at a non-ideological level. For example, the author of the foreword to *Mathematical Methods in Production Planning*, is forced into prevarication if not outright self-contradiction. Following the directives of the July 1960 meeting of the Central Committee, he has no option but to advocate the employment of computers and application of mathematical methods at all levels of the Soviet economy, up to and including the formulation of "running" and "perspective" plans on a national scale. But these plans are orders for the production and distribution of material goods, not "scientific automatic prognoses."¹⁰

⁷ M. M. Fedorovich (ed.), *Matematicheskiye metody v planirovanii proizvodstva* (Mathematical Methods in Production Planning), Moscow, 1961, p. 12.

⁸ Tsagalov, *loc. cit.*

⁹ See *Politicheskaya ekonomiya* (Political Economy), Moscow, 1960, pp. 478–79.

¹⁰ Fedorovich, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–6.

Computers as well as statistical mathematics here operate as bookkeepers superior to any known to date but still with no will or say of their own. To make his meaning quite clear, Fedorovich states: "Mathematical economic theory must not be raised to the status of a separate science (econometrics)... It must serve political economy, not command it,"¹¹ and brings in the above-mentioned passage from Nemchinov to reinforce his position, a very shaky one. For a "running plan" is one of the main operational features of cybernetical control and is unthinkable without the instrumentalia mathematically developed for econometrics.

How the author proposes to operate his "running plan" under the command of political economy is not made clear. Nor is it clear whether he is talking of the economic control of enterprises or technical optimization, which at present (according to the author himself) is all the computers installed in automated plants and transport organizations are doing. Neither the Soviet textbooks on political economy ignoring the question "mathematize or not," nor writers like Fedorovich dealing with the national economy and mathematization and equivocating, nor Western observers in their majority make this very necessary distinction. It is made by economist-cyberneticians proper in the West¹² and, as we shall see, by some, at least, of their Soviet colleagues. As to the difficulties in which the anti-mathematicians find themselves nowadays when dealing with such burning problems as price formation, this aspect of the question "mathematize or not" is well illustrated in a highly informative and (within the limits permissible to senior members of the Institute of Economics) objective work by A. A. Kondrashev.

Regretfully noting the failure of all attempts by experts at the Institute of Economics to come to an agreement on the basic method of arriving at "realistic" prices, Kondrashev notes with satisfaction that the problem has at least been laid bare.¹³ Indeed, even after going through the voluminous material on the subject of both Soviet and Western origin, the present writer was ill prepared to find that the chief bone of contention was the question whether to treat the profit of an enterprise as belonging to the same category as the government turnover tax on its production.¹⁴ The author's contention, that the two do belong to the same category as forms of state profit, acquires especial interest in the context of the present enquiry, because it was also Khrushchev's (whom the author quotes).¹⁵ Also of interest is that some of his colleagues at the Institute were for separating state and enterprise income or profit into two distinct categories.¹⁶ From here to recognition of rights akin to rights of ownership of the means of production

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹² E.g., by Stafford Beer in *Cybernetics and Management* (translated into Russian as *Kibernetika i upravleniye proizvodstvom*, Moscow, 1963).

¹³ A. A. Kondrashev, *Tsena i stoimost' v sotsialisticheskoy ekonomike* (Price and Cost in a Socialist Economy), Moscow, 1963, pp. 89-90.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 90-100.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 159-60.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 101-4.

in industry by collectives of operators is not, it would seem, very far to go. In other words, it is the present writer's contention that behind the technicalities of disputes on methods of price formation, treated over here as a question of adherence to this or that economic theory pure and simple, it is not difficult to discern a cleavage in embryo, even among conservatives, on a political question. What is at stake is the principle of "public" *versus* "collective" ownership of the means of production, of the "one-owner" structure of socialist society defended tooth and nail by Marx and Engels against the "revisionism" of sections of the German Social Democrats inspired by Dühring's vision of producers' collectives as future owners of the factories which they operate.¹⁷ The collective ownership of kolkhoz property, as opposed to the "public" ownership of sovkhozes, has always been recognized in orthodox Marxist-Leninist political economy as a concession dictated by historical necessity, the intermediary step from private to public ownership. It has in any case been largely a myth and recognized as such by the Soviet peasantry, because the Party in practice nullified the prerogatives of the "collectives" which it had granted them on paper. A concession to the collectives or to the management of industrial enterprises, however, would not only be difficult to found ideologically (since it would represent a definite step back as against a temporary halt or slowing down in the "development of socialist relations"), but also much more difficult to keep under control in practice without nullifying the benefits expected from the measure. That the principle of "collective ownership" in industry should find covert sympathizers within the Institute of Economics is, perhaps, significant; equally significant is the fact that at least some Soviet economist-mathematicians, or cybernetician-economists, are against granting any kind of economic autonomy to enterprises and even against commodity trading as understood by reformists proper, i.e., the exchange of goods and services between producers *via* monetary transactions in free competition.

Before closing this brief summary of "dogmatist" opposition to the mathematization of the economy, it is worth noting that the strongest support for it can, paradoxically, be found in works of Western origin, including some very recent ones. Wiener himself, for example, could be quoted with his warnings of dangers inherent in the surrender of ultimate choices in economic policy to computers or their programizers.¹⁸ In another direction, there are economists who consider the mathematization of economic theory as a serious impoverishment of the ideas of their creators.¹⁹

The Case for Mathematizing the Economy: The Anti-Free-Market School

As stated, contrary to the widespread opinion in the West, advocates of thorough mathematization of the Soviet economy are not limited to those who overtly or (as is more often the case) covertly also advocate the introduction of

¹⁷ See Karl Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* and F. Engels' *Anti-Dühring*.

¹⁸ See Norbert Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society*, Boston, Mass., 1950.

¹⁹ Allen M. Sievers, *Revolution, Evolution and the Economic Order*, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1962, pp. 21-22.

practical measures liable to lead to the establishment of a large-scale free market. One of the most vicious attacks on the "dogmatists" opposing mathematization, for example, was delivered by an opponent of this brand of economic reformism, I. Kotov, who, after stating that the application of mathematical methods in economics could no longer be put under question in the USSR, proceeded to mount his attack specifically on the opponents of mathematizing political economy. "In political economy itself, recommendations of a more intensive use of mathematical methods are rare."²⁰ (We may here recall that, writing in 1964 at the apogee of cybernetics, Academician A. Berg noted with regret that of the papers presented at the 1960 Conference on Philosophical Problems of Cybernetics, none was devoted to economics, i.e., to the relation between theoretical cybernetics and Communist political economy.)²¹ Our author, writing, be it noted, after Khrushchev's departure, nevertheless goes very much further than Berg in tracking the real culprits. The trouble, according to Kotov, is that the categories of political economy—"socially necessary expenditure," "proportionality in socialist production," "effectiveness of capital investment"—are not precise enough to be translated directly into statistics.²² Mathematic modeling has shown the way. It was the way taken by Kantorovich, Novozhilov, Nemchinov. A number of posits worked out by these scientists have great significance for political economy, though some of their main ideas and conclusions must be passed under critical analysis.²³ Textbooks and even recent courses on political economy, however, disregard their achievements altogether, and remain divorced from one of the most productive sectors of contemporary economic science, *viz.*, mathematical economics. Kotov's attack soon acquired a political character and was at first directed against the "dogmatists." One of the chief categories of political economy is that of the "acquisition of material goods," i.e., the principle of material interest, distribution according to work done. But, because it is not linked with quantitative analysis, faults occur in its practical application. "Quantitative analysis," says Kotov pointedly, "of real relations in the acquisition of material goods, of the economic forms and methods of this acquisition, is often obscured by general perorations on the merits of social ownership."²⁴ So much for hidden social injustice. As regards the much-vaunted efficiency of production under socialism, Kotov is quite definitely of the opinion that without the mathematization of political economy one of the most important "laws" supposedly operating under socialism—the saving of working time—will, in fact, remain inoperative.²⁵ So far we might be reading a tract by a moderate reformist of the Nemchinov school; but this is an illusion which Kotov hurries to dispel. The Nemchinovist argument that it is impossible to arrive at the intrinsic value of products, a preliminary to insisting that price formation must start with com-

²⁰ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 11, p. 100.

²¹ See *Bulletin*, 1966, No. 8, p. 6.

²² *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 11, p. 100.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

modity trading figures, is, according to Kotov, applicable to capitalism. To extend it to socialism would mean "virtually to deny the possibility of constructing a unified optimal plan for the national economy." "Only a unified balanced plan based on the laws of socialist production [*sic*], reducing real free-market commodity trading] allows the determination of all basic relations affecting value, giving it a quantitative expression." According to Kotov, realistic values, i.e., those approaching "intrinsic or user values," are automatically produced under capitalism by the mechanism of all-round economic competition, and such competition is, by definition, excluded under socialism.²⁶ Most of our experts will no doubt say that Kotov is right on the last point but is suffering from illusions when he talks of alternative methods of arriving at "realistic" prices. Whether they are right or Kotov is not here our concern. For the moment, at any rate, a number of Soviet economists seem to be on Kotov's side, including some cybernetical experts, whom we shall meet later.

The Case for Mathematization: "Full-blooded" Khozraschet

The movement for the all-out mathematization of economic controls and virtual abandonment of directive planning has received the greatest publicity in the West, though not under this title. For reasons which are not clear to the present writer, the ideas of its titular head, the late Academician Nemchinov, and his closest followers, grouped around the Mathematical and Economic Institutes of the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (in the creation of which Nemchinov took a leading part) and the Mathematical Faculty of Kiev University, have been lumped together with those of Professor Liberman, of Kharkov University, under the portmanteau title of "Libermanism." Professor Liberman admittedly would like to see mathematical methods used more extensively, more attention paid to consumer requirements, a reduction in the large number of "norms" and "indices" forced on enterprises from above. He might, in fact, be secretly in sympathy with Nemchinov's overt "geneticism." Officially, however, he has dissociated himself from "geneticism" as well as from all-out "mathematization." As to his own formula for rationalization—profit as the sole criterion of efficiency—this, in the absence of free competition, is not much more than a modified version of the proposals of some of Kondrashev's colleagues at the Institute of Economics, i.e., of directive planning down to the final producer. There is nothing, on paper, in Professor Liberman's proposals that runs counter to the "one-owner" principle, though it might be argued that the influence of consumer demand, spreading back from final consumer to final producer, from final producer to intermediary, etc., would put an end to directive planning and to the "one-owner" principle, and that Liberman is fully aware of this. Such equivocation on cardinal issues must, perhaps, be expected in the USSR even now, and Professor Nemchinov himself, though to a lesser degree, practiced it.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

After publishing his article in which the principle of “full-blooded *khozraschet*” (i.e., virtual commercial independence of enterprises) was put forward, the editorial board asked Nemchinov whether he was for or against the retention of central planning. Under Western conditions, he would undoubtedly have answered that he was against central planning on the strength of Party directives and for the legalization and systematization of existing free market elements, probably for their extension—for the establishment, that is, of something like a mixed economy, for which his brand of central planning is obviously designed. In his answer, however, Nemchinov contented himself with saying that he was not only for the retention of central planning but for strengthening it²⁷—which is, of course, correct insofar as central planning at present is mostly planning on paper with progressively less and less effect (except as a nuisance) on the operation of the Soviet economy. Without such comment, however, it may play into the hands of the “dogmatists,” who with some justification point out that, given time, they might still devise methods of improving central planning without abandoning the “one-owner” (or, as they put it more discreetly, the “one-master”) principle.

In the hullabaloo raised in the West around the “revolutionary” Liberman plan, the far more revolutionary—or, to be precise, “counterrevolutionary”—proposals of the late Academician Nemchinov have received too little publicity. Nemchinov admittedly uses the term “profit” sparingly. His emphasis is on *khozraschet*, a term used under Stalin as well as under Khrushchev. But Stalinist and Khrushchevian *khozraschet* stood and stands simply for accounting. Not so Nemchinov’s, which he distinguishes from Stalin’s and Khrushchev’s by calling it “full-blooded.” It is *khozraschet* in the original meaning, denoting partial or even total economic autonomy granted to enterprises by Lenin on the introduction of NEP (and recognized as such, as we shall see, by Nemchinov’s opponents).

The point is brought out quite clearly in Nemchinov’s article (published in *Kommunist* in mid-1964, the most direct attack on directive planning and on the “one-owner” principle to appear to date in the Party’s senior ideological journal), particularly on one page where the punch is concentrated.

The basic and main condition for improvement in governing and control consists in linking the mechanism of planning with the system of *khozraschet* and the system of communal funds of the enterprise... In this lies the root of the solution to the problem of rational planning and governing of material production. And only in this case can the mechanism of negative feedback be put into operation.²⁸

We note here a direct reference to the requirements of cybernetical controls as an argument in support of the demand that “directive” planning be abolished, which follows immediately.

²⁷ *Kommunist*, 1964, No 15, p 51.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1964, No. 5, p. 77.

Each enterprise must offer tenders with conditions under which it is prepared to execute this or that planned order... Economic planning organizations, for their part, must place their orders only with those enterprises which offer the most advantageous conditions from the point of view of the national economy.²⁹

Here, incidentally, we see the (perhaps deliberate) vagueness of even such men as Nemchinov—for the criterion of what is best for the national economy is left unspecified.

The plan, as Nemchinov points out, must therefore pass through two stages: first, that of a “project” or draft which, to be of any use, must be based on the above-mentioned “plan of scientific prognosis”; then, after the enterprises have accepted it, that of a *zakaz* (to distinguish it from “directive”). “Such a procedure,” writes Nemchinov pointedly, “will complicate matters for the planning organizations, but it is an indispensable filter against manifestations of naked voluntarism.” He goes on: “Such a system may be rightly called the *khozraschet* system of planning, because in it the principles of *khozraschet* and central planning are organically joined.”³⁰ So far, Nemchinov is precise and clear. The picture becomes a little blurred, however, when he comes down to the operational features of the system:

The mechanism of negative feedback must beforehand be so regulated that both the system of *khozraschet* and the system of communal funds would stimulate the fullest execution, by economic associations and enterprises, of orders [and] projects of national economic planning. Long-term normatives, also specified by Liberman, regulating the systems of *khozraschet* relations must be so chosen and corrected that they guarantee and support at all times those national economic proportions which correspond to the basic directives of the plan.³¹

We repeat: Nemchinov, in his basic proposals, is obviously for a proper economic decentralization, for granting enterprises a degree of economic autonomy, and thus by definition against the “one-owner” principle, which was reinstalled by Stalin after the destruction of economic “geneticism” and of political right-wing Communism in the late twenties, and of the social groups which supported it in the thirties. This principle Khrushchev, in spite of all his measures of decentralization, which were always limited to administration, left untouched. Nemchinov wants to abolish it. But how does he propose to ensure that the emancipated enterprises will work for the national weal as understood by the Party? He talks about “constraints” made effective with the use of “linear programmizing,” and the extensive use of computers. It is, of course, possible that modern mathematical techniques, finally cybernetics, will achieve what NEP planning failed to achieve in the twenties once the fear of terror was removed—i.e., the resurgence of “elemental” capitalism.

This must have been the view of the late Nemchinov and must still be that of his followers. It is not, however, the view of their opponents, a point vividly

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

brought up in Kotov's article and equally vividly in comments on Nemchinov's article, a brief selection of which is here given.

For Nemchinov's Proposals: G. Zakharov, senior scientific associate of the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, insists on greater freedom for enterprises. But how to ensure that this freedom is not used prejudicially to the interests of the national economy? His answer is as unsatisfactory as Nemchinov's: "Create a complex of corresponding conditions The optimal relation between single enterprises and society as a whole must be found. . . . Attainment of planned profits must be made the measure of successful coordination." (We note a direct line leading to or from "Libermanism.") Zakharov, on the other hand, is more precise than Nemchinov on one important point. Enterprises must openly compete for orders and be responsible for losses due to nonexecution. But planning organizations placing the order must be considered as party to a commercial contract and made responsible for any losses the enterprises incur as a result of faulty planning. This, at present, they are not.³²

I. Ioffe, then Head of the Department of New Techniques in Technical Governing of the Belorussian Sovnarkhoz, stressed the necessity of liberating sovnarkhozes from detailed surveillance by organs of Gosplan.³³

N. Antonov, assistant manager at the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant, demands the abandonment of a *volevoi* (subjective) approach to planning and the establishment of profit as the only criterion of efficiency. Of the same opinion were "Comrades" Klyucharev (Finance Department, Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant), Averkin (Kuibyshev Machinebuilding Plant) and Paramonov (Institute of Aviation).³⁴

Against Nemchinov's Proposals: Dr. M. M. Fedorovich, maintained that freedom of competition, freedom to accept or refuse orders under conditions of scarcity, would undermine the plan and lead to unemployment and the closure of plants. In the suggested system of *khozraschet* planning, he says, there is nothing essentially new:

In combination with material stimulation on basis of profits, it is nothing more or less, in his opinion, than a return to the commercial accounting which functioned under NEP. It should more correctly be called . . . "commercialism" It would lead . . . to the liberation of elements of *stikhiinost* under cover of an enlargement of initiative. [It] would complicate planning still further. . . . We should not break up . . . the system functioning at present, not replace it by something new, but improve it, adapt it to higher demands. Directive planning . . . is the basis of a socialist economy.

B. Vladimírsky, former manager of a plant, asserts that "*the idea of combining the interests of single enterprises with that of the state is a fallacy.*" What is suggested (by Nemchinov) is that the starting point should not be the national economy but "interests," the gains of single undertakings, and this, according to Vladimírsky,

³² *Ibid.*, 1964, No. 15, p. 48.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

is fundamentally wrong. Planning must be improved by strengthening, concentrating the powers of leading organizations (in the first place, of course, the State Planning Committee).³⁵

Professor Liberman said that if the suggestions were adopted, the planning organization (i.e., the State Planning Committee) would become an economic person or entity endowed with its own economic interests. How could one, under such circumstances, guarantee the predominance of heavy industry? Liberman's own suggestion was to combine (directive?) planning with the broadest use of material stimuli.³⁶

The contributions of supporters and critics seem to show the political demarcation line quite clearly. On the one side, there are the so-called "dogmatists" (Fedorovich's and Vladimirsky's contributions were chosen as the most typical and pungent) defending the existing system, because, however inefficient, it ensures the prevalence of the "one-owner" principle—of which the guardians of political economy at the Institute of Economics, backed by hard-bitten managers of the old school and, of course, the whole economic wing of the *apparát*, are principal beneficiaries. On the other, there are the Nemchinovists, the technicians who seem more concerned with improving the Soviet economy as such and ousting the *apparát* from controlling positions than with maintaining Khrushchev's "developed advance toward Communism."

The exception is Professor Liberman, who, whether intentionally or not, avoids the crucial problem how to clear up the present tangle of antagonistic interests between planners and producers (which some of the more enlightened opponents of mathematization, such as Kondrashev, freely recognize)³⁷ without abolishing "directive" planning and thus drastically curtailing the rights of Gosplan.

Political Economy and Cybernetics

There is, perhaps, no better introduction to the narrower subject of the present relation between economic cybernetics proper and Marxist-Leninist political economy than the pithy reply of a leading "dogmatist," M. Kolganov, of the Institute of Economics, to the arguments of mathematician-economist Kotov, nor a better warning against acceptance of the term "dogmatist" when used by Soviet mathematical economists against their opponents as proof of the latter's irrational unwillingness, or technical inability, to exploit scientific advance:

There are nowadays few economists who would deny the necessity of applying mathematical methods to economic research... But there are still mathematicians who deny the usefulness of studying the foundations of economic science [*scil.*, Leninist-Marxist political economy].³⁸

Kotov, according to Kolganov, though dissociating himself officially from the Nemchinov conception of reform, would in the end be found by his side,

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 51–52.

³⁷ Kondrashev, *op. cit.*

³⁸ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1966, No. 5, p. 73.

because he accepts the basic posit of the "mathematizers" (actually advanced by Kantorovich) that "the mathematical formulation of the problem [the search for the optimum] contains its solution."³⁹

Unreal is their attempt to represent scientific planning in the form of an automatic, virtually self-regulating system of computing centers... as was correctly pointed out by the head of the Central Statistical Office in his article... Unreal also is their other attempt... to represent national economic planning in the form of an extremal problem... All this belongs to the realm of utopia... and the sooner this is realized, the sooner the work of applying mathematical methods can be switched from the solution of fruitless utopian problems to the solution of problems of real economic import.⁴⁰

Are the proposals of the mathematicians utopian *per se* because, as many Western economists hold, a country's economy, even when centrally controlled as in the USSR, presents too vast, too complex a problem, with the "hardware" and programmizers available now and in the foreseeable future? Or, are they utopian because the real political power, extending into economics, lies with those whose interests would suffer if the "foundations of economic science," i.e., Marxist-Leninist political economy, were relegated to the archives (as almost overtly demanded by the Nemchinovists) or "algorithmized" (as suggested by Kotov)? The present writer is of the opinion that both factors are responsible for the present lull in the advertised "cyberneticization of Communist construction."

There is evidence that the "hardware" would still be totally inadequate even if the struggle between the opposing factions of economists were resolved. But there is, as we have tried to show, as yet no evidence of such an agreement on fundamental issues. And there is evidence of a well-known phenomenon of Soviet economic life: "passing the buck."

In 1962, head of the Commission for Complex Problems of Cybernetics Academician A. Berg declared that the necessary equipment and personnel (computers of sufficient complexity and variety and teams of programmizers able to deal with the gigantic task of selecting, storing and processing economic information on a national scale) were standing by—but could not go into action because Soviet economists could not agree on uniform indices of efficiency and criteria of optimization. But two years later, N. I. Kovalev, head of the Main Computing Center of Gosplan, describing in some detail the scheme of economic cybernetical control on a national scale, mentioned the complexity of the problem and singled out the inadequacy of "hardware" as one of the main obstacles to progress.⁴¹ Had the "economists" meanwhile come to an agreement?—Hardly, for Kovalev speaks of "natural value" indices, inter-branch balances in terms of goods⁴² which the Nemchinovists condemn as unrealizable, and at the same time

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ N. I. Kovalev, *Vychislitel'naya tekhnika v planirovanii* (Calculating Techniques in Planning), Moscow, 1964.

⁴² *Ibid.*

offends the "dogmatists" by talking, along the lines of Kotov, about "quantizing" the basic elements of Marxist-Leninist political economy. Finally, we have a little later a statement in an article by two cyberneticians dealing with the problem of the practical economic application of computer techniques, which could not have been made if either Berg or Kovalev had been right:

One of the main problems in creating a unified single network of computing centers is the design of more adequate computers. Those at present put out by the home industry are not as yet suitable for processing economic information, i.e., they do not possess a sufficient volume of operational memory, the speed of input and output of information is insufficient, the arrangements for transcribing information are not reliable enough, etc. It is necessary to underline that the basic requirements in design of state network computers must be determined precisely by the specific features of economic information.⁴³

It seems that the authors are confident that such machines could be developed in the USSR, and that they will be produced on the lines developed in the USA, with standard blocks and of standard potency, but in three types as opposed to the five stages of IBM 360, of which the authors speak with great respect.

The insistence of the last two authors quoted on the specificity of computers designed to handle economic information casts a light on the reason for the inadequacies of Soviet "hardware" some five or six years after Berg's confident announcement. It would seem that neither Berg nor even the "mathematizers" of either school of thought were fully conscious of the technical complications of economic optimization based on a network of computers; or, if they were, they kept quiet about it, because to disclose these difficulties would have meant playing into the hands of the anti-mathematizers.

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Before closing our survey of the present position on the front of "economic cyberneticization *versus* Marxist political economy," we give below extracts from two very recent articles by economist cyberneticians showing:

1) That some Soviet specialists, at any rate, have fully absorbed the ideas on the subject of their Western colleagues, in particular those of United Steel's chief cybernetician Stafford Beer, whose book in a Russian translation appeared in 1963.

2) That they are by now fully aware of the political implications of economic cybernetics, particularly for the Communist world, and are carefully avoiding identification with Nemchinov's reformism.

Some arguments of the first of these two authors, N. V. Adfeldt, writing on "Problems of Organizing the Management of the National Economy," could in fact serve the cause of "teleological" or, better said, ideologically directed planning. The authority for his recommendations, politically, is the Central Committee plenary session of October and November 1965, which condemned "Khrushchevian

⁴³ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 3, pp. 97-101.

methods," "administrative habits," "arbitrary decisions for effect," etc., as inimical to the "effective exploitation of resources in creating the material and technical basis of Communism."⁴⁴ His ideological authority is Lenin's dictum that no problem should be treated in isolation, that decisions should be made without haste and only on the basis of a thorough study of the subject backed by genuine scientific theory. This precept, according to the author, was followed for some time after Lenin's death (*viz.*, during the NEP period, although the author understandably makes no mention of this point). Theoretical work, however, was subsequently de-intensified and practically stopped in the thirties. Thereafter, the Soviet economy ran on narrow, empirical, bureaucratic lines.⁴⁵ A reawakening in theoretical work took place after the Twentieth Party Congress, but discussions revealed that some theoreticians treated the Soviet economy as an agglomerate and not as a system,⁴⁶ and made their suggestions in piecemeal fashion. For example, the suggestion to "extend the rights of directors" was made without bringing in the problem of price formation, and the idea advanced that the ruble could be used as a uniform "economic equivalent" inside the limits of state turnover in spite of (the inevitable?) voluntary weighing of values.⁴⁷ So far, the author has spoken as a "moderate" economist. The specifically cybernetical point of view is expressed even more impartially, as far as questions of economics are concerned:

The normal [cybernetical] approach to the problem of controlling plants singly and in groups distinguishes between governing systems (management), governed systems (factory) and medium... But this medium is not merely economic, as held by economists... there is a social medium in which the socialist superstructure and ideology play an important role... Finally, there is a man.⁴⁸

These elements form a complex which Lenin called "organizational relations"—not a Marxist term, be it noted—which must be studied as a whole.

To date, only partial remedies have been offered... But the problem can only be solved after a prolonged systematic study of the "organizational relations complex" by a specially created science.⁴⁹

Concrete economics is patently inadequate for this task, because it does not study undertakings, singly or in groups, as living socio-economic systems. In particular, economics omits an important factor—namely, that every governing system is a governed one in relation to a higher system.⁵⁰

Adfeldt does not mention what his "special science" is, but it is clearly cybernetics as conceived by the more ambitious Western cyberneticians, applied to the

⁴⁴ *Voprosy filosofii*, 1965, No. 3, p. 10.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16. (This is strongly reminiscent, on the one hand, of Amosov's hierarchical pyramid of systems and, on the other, of the ideas of cybernetical control of undertakings expressed in Stafford Beer, *op. cit.*)

study and subsequent control of society. It should be noted that not only the "superstructure," i.e., the machine of political and social control, but ideology itself is included in the field of study—a project ambitious enough to make the political leadership sit up and take notice. But when it comes to producing a definition of the criterion for judging the effectiveness of the use of all national resources, the author, to the present writer's mind at any rate, reveals the limitations of the standard cybernetical approach to global questions of political economy. The criterion suggested is "the relation between used and produced resources," or "the technical-economic potential taken out of the social circuit and returned to it,"⁵¹ a definition vague enough to serve as a platform for both the "teleologists" and their opponents to justify the expansion of consumer goods production as well as its severe limitation, the expansion of a free market as well as its total suppression. Of real interest as a warning to those who expected miracles from the new science is the thesis that cybernetics, at present, must first be applied to the study of the Soviet system and cannot be expected to aid in raising production immediately by being applied piecemeal to industry or agriculture.

The thesis is also a main feature of the second article dealing with cybernetical theory and political economy. The article in question, published after the Central Committee plenary session of spring 1965, which not only condemned Khrushchevian methods in general terms but officially adopted measures designed to cure the effect of these methods in agriculture, is even more pointedly critical of the existing system of planning and control of the economy, disclosing inherent contradictions which no amount of devotion to Communist construction could overcome.⁵² Its author is equally insistent upon the necessity of a "holistic" or organic approach to the question of the control of economic entities, whether it be single undertakings or the economy of the USSR as a whole. He is even more pointedly insistent in his reservations on the immediate applicability of cybernetics. To introduce cybernetical methods of controlling undertakings and planning under the prevailing conditions could do no good and might in fact do harm.⁵³ Writing at a moment when the very *avant-garde* Czech reform proposals had already been published in *Voprosy filosofii*, our author, Akhiezer, goes a little further than Adfeldt in giving a cybernetician's definition of the root of the trouble: "Why has the optimal coincidence of the aims of single undertakings and of society, of micro- and macro-structures, immanent in socialism not yet found fulfillment?"⁵⁴ The reason, according to Akhiezer, is to be found in the system of rigid central command planning, which ignored the dynamics of the lower echelons. So far, this is mere repetition of Khrushchevian perorations on the evils of "over-centralization," "bureaucracy," etc., conveniently forgotten by his successors and by the many Western admirers of the "new-style government." A little further, however, we come across a passage in which the author,

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 1965, No. 7, pp. 33–35.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

using cybernetical terminology, states the case for the main feature of the Czech reform, the theory of "economic levers" replacing Gosplan, ministerial and Party directives in the government of production. "The incursion of higher programs into the lower, regional, single or group undertaking circuits of information," writes Akhiezer, "is inadmissible."⁶⁵

The first article was published six and the second three months before the Central Committee meeting of 1965 which nullified the hopes that the USSR would follow or even lead the radical reformist movement, particularly clearly expressed in the Czechoslovak Party Central Committee's resolution of June 1965, of which a résumé was published, without adverse comment, in the ninth issue for 1965 of *Kommunist*. Its main feature was that with effect from January 1, 1966, directives of the State Planning Committee, except for absolute priorities, would not be passed on to individual undertakings or groups of undertakings; the central plan would be "translated by central governing organizations into the language of material incentives."⁶⁶ We do not know what happened to the Czech reform or to the Czech reformists; but our two authors, whether as a result of bitter experience of Soviet economists or because they possessed inside information, were exercising caution. Akhiezer's solitary burst of cybernetical reformism, for example, is immediately followed by a significant reservation: "To decide on the intensity and scope of reforms is not the responsibility of cybernetics. It is the responsibility of economists and the political leadership."⁶⁷

If one takes the two articles as representing the views of informed cyberneticians in close contact with the practical problems of planning, it would seem that at the moment they would rather not get involved in the dogfight between the reformists and antireformists. If the new regime wants the cyberneticization of the planning and control of the Soviet economy, then certain minimum conditions must be fulfilled before the process of systematic study can begin. To go beyond this minimum before beginning the period of study (which to all appearances may take anything from two to seven years) is inadvisable. In our view, it is this minimum which constitutes the kernel of the "Kosygin reform."

Measures listed in the published resolutions fall far short of the demands of the extreme reformists such as open competition between undertakings, "full-blooded *khozraschet*" (Nemchinov), i.e., profit as the only index, and the full financial responsibility of Gosplan as party to contracts placed. They seem, in fact, to be designed to bring existing illicit or semi-llicit elements of private enterprise and free trade within the socialist sector under control by the only means possible short of reestablishing Stalinist terror, i.e., by legalizing them and thus making it at last possible to apply cybernetics to the study of the system—the essential preliminary to cybernetical control. It seems reasonably safe to

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29. (Even here one has to be careful of identifying every kind of reformism with Nemchinovism, for Akhiezer is cited as one of the critics of Nemchinov's proposals in the discussion of the latter's article.)

⁶⁶ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 9, pp. 39 and 93.

⁶⁷ *Voprosy filosofii*, 1965, No. 7, p. 41.

assume that in this respect both authors here quoted, particularly Adfeldt, were voicing the views of Kosygin, who, some two years ago, confided to a Western economist his ambition to "inventorize" the Soviet economy. Whether the "reforms" will in fact bring "creeping capitalism" under control remains to be seen.

Another open question is the kind of welcome which study teams of "bright young men" from cybernetical institutes will receive from Party committee bosses and old-guard managers accustomed to—and benefiting from—traditional methods of production and product disposal. Meanwhile, it obviously behoves the cyberneticians to be careful on theoretical questions where these touch on the political economy of Communism.

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

The Economy

The Current Economic Reform

The following two contributions deal with different aspects of the current economic reform. That by Mr. Hajenko provides a general commentary, with particular emphasis on the significance of the reform for the Union republics, while that by Mr. Bush offers more detailed information on the progress made so far.

The General Significance and the Position of the Union Republics

The (according to the Soviet leaders) all-embracing economic reform presently being carried out in the Soviet Union is being accompanied by a radical reorganization of national economic management.

In brief, the history of economic management in the USSR has been as follows. From 1917 to 1932, control was exercised *via* the national economic councils. These were subsequently replaced by the people's commissariats, which in 1946 were reconstituted as ministries. The year 1957 saw the reappearance of the national economic councils (*sovnarkhozes*) in the context of extensive decentralization, which gave the republics operational control over all industry. Later, however, the process of decentralization was not only slowed down but put into reverse. From 1960 onwards, radical changes were made in the organizational structure of the *sovnarkhozes* with a view to increasing the power of the central authorities. In 1962, suprarepublican *sovnarkhozes* were established for Central Asia and Transcaucasia. These existed until 1964. A National Economic Council of the USSR was set up to exercise operational control over the republican councils, and in 1963 a Supreme National Economic Council of the USSR was established to coordinate the work of all-Union governmental departments and committees. Finally, in September 1965, it was decided to dissolve the *sovnarkhozes* and return to the system of central ministries, each responsible for a given field.

It is interesting to note that both the decentralization of 1957 and the recentralization of 1965 were officially represented as a return to Leninist principles of management. The arguments for the 1957 reform as set out in the law promulgated on May 10 of that year were as follows. In view of the vigorous growth of the national economy and the immense scope of industrial construction in the Union and autonomous republics, with the number of enterprises and construction projects exceeding the 300,000 mark, it was impossible to "exert tight operational control over production from a few all-Union specialized ministries and departments" which had "outlived their positive role." It was therefore necessary to "extend the rights of the Union republics." Execution of these measures, it was said, would signify a "new stage in implementing the Leninist

principle of democratic centralism," enable centralized management to be suitably combined with the promotion of local initiative, and guarantee, among other things, "the uninterrupted growth of material production," "the successful achievement of technical progress," and "the fullest possible use of national economic reserves." The new measures, it was added, had received "unanimous support during the course of a nation-wide discussion."¹

The reform of 1965 was preceded by a lengthy discussion begun in the autumn of 1962 by Professor Liberman of Kharkov and a number of Moscow economists. The discussion, whose participants included such prominent personalities as V. Nemchinov and V. Trapeznikov, was characterized by considerable frankness and produced a good deal of criticism of the Soviet economic system as well as numerous suggestions for increasing the latter's efficiency. Western economists played an indirect part in this discussion inasmuch as the Soviet press frequently published refutations of their arguments accompanied by copious quotations which gave the Soviet reader a good idea of the substance of Western criticism.

As we have intimated, many of the reasons being given for the necessity of the new reform are identical with those adduced in connection with the reform of 1957, even though the present reform is aimed basically at restoring the organizational forms of industrial management which existed prior to the latter. Once again it is being declared that whereas in the past determining the needs of the national economy had been a "relatively simple matter," the situation was now quite different; the "tremendous growth of the economy" demanded "new and, more perfect methods of economic management."² Although they had proved fully satisfactory in the past, the existing organizational structure of industrial management and the currently employed industrial planning and stimulation methods were no longer in line with modern conditions and productive capacity levels. Just as in 1957, there is talk of a slow-down in the rate of technical progress, the presence of untapped industrial reserves, and the need to promote local initiative and give the republics more rights in the economic sphere while enhancing the role of centralized management.³

What is the cause of this similarity? The explanation doubtless lies in the fact that both reforms constitute searches for a more efficient system of management. The Soviet national economy has now reached a stage of "industrial maturity," so to speak, at which the old forms and methods of fundamentally administrative management, such as practiced during the period of primitive industrial accumulation, are beginning to act as a brake on development. What is more, they have already had a number of grave consequences, such as disproportions between individual branches of the economy and one-sided economic development in individual republics and economic regions. All this has naturally given rise to growing doubts as to the efficacy of the existing planning system.

¹ See the "Law on the Further Perfection of the Organization of the Management of Industry and Construction," *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika* (A Handbook for the Party Worker), 1st ed., Moscow, 1957, pp. 228-29.

² *Pravda*, March 6, 1966.

³ See, for example, *Pravda*, October 1, 1965.

Only since Chairman of the Council of Ministers Aleksei Kosygin admitted their existence at the September 1965 plenary session of the Party Central Committee have these difficulties been discussed fully and frankly. At this meeting Kosygin disclosed that recent years had seen reductions in the national income, industrial production, the rate of return on capital investments and the growth rate of labor productivity, all of which had diminished the effectiveness of social production.⁴

The Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet government hope to remedy this situation with the aid of a number of administrative and organizational measures backed up by far-reaching economic measures. The essence of the new reform as expounded by Kosygin (at the plenary session of the Party Central Committee) and Mazurov (before the Supreme Soviet a few days later)⁵ is as follows.

First of all, the entire system of *sovnarkhozes* is being abolished in favor of all-Union and Union-republican specialized ministries and a network of "independent accounting" (*khozraschetnye*) associations exercising immediate control over groups of enterprises. Such key industries as machine-building, instrument-building, electronics and electrical engineering are to be controlled directly from Moscow *via* all-Union ministries, whose number has been increased from 11 to 22, and the remaining, mostly extractive, industries *via* Union-republican ministries, whose number has been increased from 8 to 25. (The Union and autonomous republics also have their own ministries, responsible for such fields as local industry, education and services. Their number ranges from 10 to 12.) The ministries are to be responsible for planning, production management, technical policy, material and technical supply, financing, labor and wages. They are to combine centralized planning with direct trade links between enterprises. This, of course, calls for wider application of the law of value and the entire range of economic levers (prices, profits, bonuses, credits, etc.).

The index of gross output is being replaced by that of the volume of output sold. The number of indices set by the central planners has been cut to ten, covering basic assortment, volume of output sold, the enterprise wages fund, profits and profitability, payments into and appropriations from the budget, the volume of centralized investments and the putting into operation of production capacities and fixed assets, the introduction of new technology, and material and technical supply. It is quite possible that the number will be reduced still further.

A charge on fixed and circulating production funds is being introduced in the form of interest on capital, which is to become a major source of state budgetary income, replacing such sources as the turnover tax.

The enterprise, as the basic economic unit, is to receive greater independence and scope for initiative. Enterprises are now permitted to approve their own structure and establishment, as well as estimates for administrative expenses, without registering with the financial authorities. Their rights are also being

⁴ See, for example, *Pravda*, September 28, 1965.

⁵ See, for example, *Pravda*, October 2, 1965.

extended as regards the disposal of floating assets, amortization deductions, savings from the wages fund, etc.

The role of material incentives is being enhanced with a view to establishing a direct relationship between a worker's remuneration and the performance of his enterprise as expressed by the volume of output sold, profits and profitability, the latter being determined on the basis of the production funds used, and not prime costs as previously. Special incentive funds for production development, material incentives, social and cultural facilities and housing are to be formed from the profits remaining after payments to the state have been deducted.⁶ Of course, the bulk of a worker's remuneration is to consist of his basic pay as governed by the centrally fixed scales.

Material and technical supply is to remain organized on a territorial basis. Moreover, distribution in kind is to be supplanted entirely by wholesale trading in individual categories of materials and production means, which will make it possible to take account of the quality of the products and establish the performance of individual enterprises.

Although the organizational and administrative changes in industrial management are being carried out without delay, the economic reform as such is being implemented in stages, starting with individual enterprises and branches, and will not be extended to cover all industry before 1968. This is chiefly because the economic prerequisites are to be created during the actual process of reform. Firstly it is necessary, as one source has put it, to "change substantially the structure of social production and eliminate the various disproportions which have arisen in past years."⁷ Secondly, profits and profitability can only be used as indices of an enterprise's efficiency if prices are economically interrelated. In numerous cases, planned prices now in force have been fixed "without regard for objective economic criteria," e.g., in the interests of a given industry or with a view to redistributing the national income among the Union republics.⁸ Such practices, previously considered normal, are now being condemned, since unsubstantiated prices, it is conceded, "create considerable difficulties in calculating economic effectiveness and, what is most important, do not guarantee an equivalent (in terms of labor expenditure) exchange of goods."⁹ In order to remedy this abnormal state of affairs, the cause of mounting dissatisfaction in the individual republics, the specially created State Price Committee has been commissioned to work out a standard price system based on the level of socially necessary labor expenditure on production. The new prices are to be introduced gradually during 1967 and 1968.

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The 1957 reform was carried out under the slogan of more rights for the republics. This slogan was no empty declaration, as is often the case in Soviet

⁶ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 7, p. 5.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁸ *Pravda*, November 12, 1965.

⁹ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1966, No. 2, p. 136.

practice, but was followed up by definite measures. Thus, after the reform, industry under republican control accounted for 97 percent of total national production, as against 31 percent in 1953 and 55 percent in 1955. Under the recent reform, however, entire key industries are being directly subordinated to Moscow. The central planners are to set assignments for individual branches and "territorial complexes," and central accumulation and consumption funds are to be created. Enterprises are to receive their assignments from the respective branches.¹⁰ The republics are left with

...the right to examine and submit to the Union government proposals on the schemes worked out by the USSR ministries and [government] departments for the development and location of a given industry, and on assignments in respect to the planning of new and the reconstruction and expansion of existing enterprises on their [the republics'] territory.¹¹

At the same time, there is much talk of extending the rights of the republics. Kosygin, for example, announced at the Central Committee plenary session of September 1965 that a resolution had been passed which gave the Union republics new rights in the spheres of planning, capital construction, financing, and labor and wages. The resolution has not yet been published, doubtless because of its low propaganda value, so that it is impossible to ascertain the exact nature of these rights, which have been granted primarily in view of the requirements imposed by expanded application of value categories.

Considerable efforts are being made to explain and justify the renewed emphasis on centralism. It is being alleged, for example, that centralized planning is one of the fundamental strong points of the socialist system, and that enhancement of its role is one of the basic laws of socialist production.¹² This despite the fact that until recently the advantages of decentralization were being praised (in the words of Soviet economist A. M. Birman, "'fashionable' views as to the necessity of completely decentralizing economic management were circulating").¹³ Even in a collective work of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR it was admitted that

The management of industry, particularly during the postwar period, has been characterized by excessive centralism, a strengthening of vertical control elements. The solution of many important problems has been held up for considerable periods owing to departmental quarrels and friction. Departmentalism in the management of industry has led to a loosening and disruption of normal territorial and economic ties between enterprises of different branches of industry located in the same economic region, hampered the all-round development of economic regions, republics and oblasts, and resulted in irrational and opposing movements of goods on a considerable scale. The excessive centralization of management has also been

¹⁰ *Kommunist*, 1966, No. 1, p. 50.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1965, No. 18, p. 27.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1966, No. 6, p. 31.

¹³ A. M. Birman, *Nekotorye problemy nauki ob upravlenii narodnym khozyaystvom* (Some Problems of the Science of National Economic Management), Moscow, 1965, p. 42.

reflected in a restriction of the rights of the Union republics regarding economic reconstruction and also those of local Party, governmental and economic organs.¹⁴

The establishment of a common technological and economic policy for the entire Soviet Union, which is the *raison d'être* of the current reform, cannot, of course, compensate for the grave shortcomings involved in national economic management *via* central specialized ministries, namely, disruption of the historical unity of the individual Union republics, and a restriction of possibilities in these republics regarding specialization, cooperation forming and all-round development with a view to exploiting available natural, labor and other resources to the full.

The present swing toward centralism can only partially be explained by objective conditions. First of all, the Soviet government is afraid, not without grounds, that the broadening of market relations may lead to economic chaos, and is hence trying to control and channel this process. This, however, is only a short-term consideration. The two basic factors which are at work here are the nature of the planned socialist system and the centralistic leanings of the Russian majority in the Soviet leadership.

There is a further inconsistency in Soviet economic policy. We read, for example, in *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*:

Of course, in carrying out its economic reforms, each socialist country is governed by its own concrete situation. Certain common elements in the reorganization of economic management cannot fail to assume differing concrete forms in the individual countries. This is understandable inasmuch as the countries of socialism are at different levels of economic development.¹⁵

It is further noted with approval that the "socialist" countries are pursuing independent courses in such matters as the degree of utilization of "money-goods instruments," forms of worker remuneration and the relationship between centralism and democratism in economic life, and that these countries are giving their large trusts and enterprises certain rights as regards seeking outlets to external markets.¹⁶ In the USSR itself, however, the economic reform is being implemented according to a rigid pattern which takes no account of local conditions in the individual republics, even though the latter differ from each other far more than the "socialist" countries as regards economic development. In 1961, the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR produced data to show that average per capita incomes in the republics during the previous five-year period differed by as much as 58.2 percent.¹⁷

It is only natural to ask how the economic reform is being greeted in the Union republics, or, more pointedly, whether there are elements of opposition

¹⁴ *Razvitiye sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR v poslevoynnyy period* (The Development of the Socialist Economy of the USSR During the Postwar Period), Moscow, 1965, p. 28.

¹⁵ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 1, p. 14.

¹⁶ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1966, No. 2, p. 84.

¹⁷ *Razvitiye sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR...*, p. 520.

in these republics to the return to centralism. This question is particularly topical in view of recent signs of a considerable exacerbation of the USSR's nationality problem.

As we have said, the 1957 reform broadened the rights of the Union republics at the expense of the bureaucrats in Moscow. As to be expected, the republican governments promptly began to give priority to developing the economies of their respective republics. Possibilities for the hiring of local nationals were somewhat enhanced, which increased the importance in state institutions of the nationality languages and correspondingly reduced that of Russian. This development was particularly pronounced in Central Asia and Transcaucasia.

Although the progress made by the republics in asserting their individuality was extremely modest in consequence of their still restricted rights, it provoked a storm of protest from the central state and Party organs. The Soviet press began to accuse republican workers and institutions of provincialism, incompetence, favoritism and other sins. Prominent republican state and Party workers were dismissed, transferred or demoted under various pretexts, some being openly accused of displaying nationalistic tendencies. Finally, a campaign was launched in the central and republican press under the slogan of "friendship and the international education of the Soviet people."

Open opposition, of course, is impossible in the Soviet Union, and any objections to the reform that may have been lodged by the republics have not been made public. On the contrary, there are reports that the republican Party central committees unanimously approved the resolutions passed in September 1965 as directives to be rigidly adhered to and acted upon.¹⁸ Nevertheless, there are numerous pointers to the existence in the republics of widespread secret dissatisfaction with, if not organized opposition to, the reform (an analysis of press material on the reform reveals differences as regards the selection of topics to be discussed), which may well prove to be a great hindrance to its implementation.

As we have said, the reform is both administrative, in that it gives greater power to the central authorities, and economic, in that it strengthens market relations. Whereas the first of these features is to the disadvantage of the republics, signifying as it does a drastic curtailment of their already limited sovereignty, the second, by guaranteeing an equivalent (in terms of labor consumption) exchange of goods, gives the republics a much-needed instrument with which to defend their interests.

The central press is devoting much space to arguing the case for an extension of centralism. Lenin's criticism of provincialism is frequently quoted in order to underline the need for a common national economic policy. The republics are accused of "not always [having] set assignments for securing all-Union needs on an adequate basis,"¹⁹ and are reminded that their state plans should be "based on the interests of the entire national economy."²⁰ They are also told that greater

¹⁸ See, for example, *Kommunist Belorussii*, Minsk, 1965, No. 11, p. 5.

¹⁹ *Planovoye khozyaistvo*, 1965, No. 7, p. 25.

²⁰ *Pravda*, October 29, 1965.

rights mean greater obligations toward the all-Union authorities. Particular emphasis is placed on the importance of moral incentives to work, despite the fact that the reform is ostensibly based on increasing material incentives.

Similar utterances, of course, are made by the republican press and leading republican officials. Here, however, priority is given to other questions connected with the reform. No opportunity is lost of stressing that the return to centralized branchwise management does not mean the disruption of already existing inter-branch territorial ties, and that a positive role was played by the sovnarkhozes, during the period of whose existence, it is declared, a start was made on taking definite measures to initiate the all-round economic development of the republics.

The possibility of expanding the influence of value categories and instituting economically substantiated prices is being viewed with keen interest in the republican press, which sees here an opportunity for achieving a more rational distribution of productive forces throughout the USSR. The measures to strengthen centralism are being greeted with insistent calls for the all-round economic development of the Union republics and for balanced economic development in respect of territories as well as branches.²¹ There are reminders that the "problem of evaluating the natural resources" of individual republics in order to bring about their economic parity has still not been dealt with, although it was posed in the late twenties as a problem whose solution was a law of Soviet development.²² Industrially highly promising areas such as Central Asia remain among the most economically backward in the USSR.

Another question being raised is that of legally anchoring the forms and methods of practicing *khozraschet* in order to enable value categories to be used effectively and provide a barrier to arbitrary economic planning. Criticism is being leveled at the practice of locating production capacities on the basis not of economic calculations but of an arbitrary decision by a government official. It is noted that profits transferred to the all-Union budget by the Ukraine exceed budgetary expenditure on that republic "by a considerable amount."²³

The Western press, including the British *Times* and the US *Business Week*, is quoted as saying that the USSR is faced with the permanent dilemma of "retaining sufficient control from the center for fulfilling national tasks and at the same time giving local initiative sufficient opportunities to help increase production efficiency." Although such conclusions are promptly dismissed as absurd and as reflecting a "lack of understanding of the very essence of the economics of socialism,"²⁴ the problem is a pressing one for the USSR. Indeed, the Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan), Y. Chadayev, frankly conceded that "one of the main problems in the perfection of planning is that of effectively combining centralized state planning with broad local economic initiative."²⁵ Moreover, former *Pravda* editor A. Rumyantsev has noted

²¹ See, for example, *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Kazakhstana*, Alma-Ata, 1965, No. 12, pp. 4 and 7.

²² See, for example, *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Kazakhstana*, 1966, No. 3, p. 19.

²³ *Ekonomika Radyanskoi Ukrainy*, Kiev, 1965, No. 11, p. 75.

²⁴ *Ekonomika i zhizn*, Tashkent, 1965, No. 12, pp. 27-28.

²⁵ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 18, p. 26.

that certain economists (presumably from the Union republics) are not satisfied with such formulations and are asking pointed questions as to the "corelationship between methods of centralized and decentralized management."²⁶ This corelationship is recognized in the Soviet press as being a serious problem in "socialist" planning.²⁷ It is, indeed, a problem indigenous to systems in which the plan is a directive or even a law.

The republican press does, on the other hand, accept the further increase of the Party's role as "one of the most important laws of Soviet society."²⁸ Also worthy of note are the reassurances of certain prominent republican personalities. Chairman of the Moldavian Council of Ministers A. Diorditsa, for example, considered it necessary to emphasize that the Party would continue on its Leninist course of "further guaranteeing the real equality of nations and nationalities," devoting particular attention to "those regions of the country which are in need of more rapid development."²⁹ There is evidently considerable popular anxiety in the republics, particularly those that are industrially underdeveloped, lest their economies be once again sacrificed to the needs of all-Union industry, as was the case before the sovnarkhozes came into being.

The question of harmonizing national and local, social and individual interests, and hence all-Union and republican interests, has of late been the subject of serious discussion, and will most probably be settled in favor of republican (local) interests.

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For a long time, the Soviets have been mechanically repeating their dogmatic assertion that "in our country there is no divergence between the interests of society and the interests of the individual," these interests being inseparable from each other.³⁰ Now, however, certain economists have begun to admit, albeit cautiously, the existence of contradictions, and even to point to their source. In a socialist economy, they say, an equivalent exchange of goods takes place and remuneration is according to the labor performed; these two features, however, "make possible under specific conditions a certain disparity between the interests of society, working collectives and individual workers," against which measures must be taken.³¹

It is further declared that "what is good for the state must be good for the production collective and the individual worker."³² Such a statement would, of course, be quite unacceptable in a free and democratic society, and even in the USSR its counterthesis has been published in the press, namely, that "what is good for the worker must be good for the enterprise as a whole" (and logically

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1966, No. 1, p. 51.

²⁷ See, for example, *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1966, No. 1, p. 101.

²⁸ See, for example, *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Kazakhstana*, 1966, No. 4, p. 18.

²⁹ *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, Kishinev, December 28, 1965.

³⁰ See, for example, *Pravda*, June 16, 1965.

³¹ See, for example, *Kommunist*, 1966, No. 6, p. 35.

³² *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1965, No. 47, p. 5.

for the state or society, although this is not said).³³ Although V. Stepanov, Head of the Party Central Committee's Propaganda and Agitation Department, condemned the latter view as conducive to "individualism and anarchism,"³⁴ the fact that it has been publicly advanced will not be without its consequences.

All these questions, raised primarily in the republican press after the Party Central Committee meeting of September 1965, are also receiving the attention of the Party leaders. Party Secretary General Brezhnev, for example, virtually admitted the existence of difficulties in combining state and private interests when he declared in a recent speech to the Moscow electorate:

We have come to the firm conclusion that a more harmonious combination must be reached in the production sphere between the interests of the state on the one hand and the interests of the enterprises and actual producers on the other.³⁵

The latter question, together with that of democratic centralism, was discussed in a number of articles by L. Leontev, a prominent Party economist and a Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, while *Pravda* weighed in with an editorial entitled "In the Interests of All the Peoples of Our Homeland."³⁶ Leontev insistently called for a departure from the "one-pocket" practice (the pocket belonging to the state) and for "equivalence in relations between economic units, enterprises, branches and large sectors of the national economy,"³⁷ measures which would, of course, take most, if not all, of the sting out of the problem of priority of interests. Leontev also quotes Lenin's explanation that democratic centralism

...in no way excludes, but, on the contrary, presupposes the most complete freedom of different localities and even different communities within the state to work out various forms of state, social and economic life...[and] various ways, methods and means of proceeding toward the common goal.³⁸

These instructions of Lenin are unfortunately completely ignored in Soviet practice. The Union republics are instead impressed into a rigid pattern imposed from above in the name of this very same democratic centralism.

The question of legally anchoring the forms and methods of implementing *khozraschet* has also been taken up. In an election speech, Kosygin promised that many Soviet economic regulations would be "reviewed and brought into line with the new system of national economic management."³⁹

Thus, the problem of achieving a just relationship between all-Union and republican interests remains unsolved. However, the very fact that its gravity has come to be officially recognized is a positive sign. Serious objections seem to have been raised by the republics during the process of preparing material on

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Pravda*, June 11, 1966.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, January 21, 1966.

³⁷ *Kommunist*, 1966, No. 6, p. 38.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

³⁹ *Pravda*, June 9, 1966.

the reform for the Central Committee meeting—at least judging from certain statements by top leaders. Mazurov's report before the Supreme Soviet, for example, contains not only the directive that "the cadres of our industry must always act on the basis of state interests" but the blunt warning that anyone guilty of neglecting these interests will be "severely taken to task."⁴⁰ More subtly, Brezhnev declared in the Central Committee that the clash of central and local interests was "a fundamental question, a question of major policy."⁴¹

Management of the Soviet national economy on the basis of increased centralism now has solid legal foundations. The sovnarkhozes have been dissolved, and the specialized ministries have commenced operations in accordance with the appropriate changes in the Soviet Constitution and the constitutions of the Union republics. As regards the economic reform, which is of such vital importance for the republics, this is still in the experimental stage, and before it can be fully implemented a number of economic, political and ideological obstacles must be surmounted. Although 43 enterprises were transferred to the new planning system on January 1 of this year, and a further 180 in April (200 according to some sources), and roughly one-third of all workers will be involved by the beginning of next year,⁴² it is very much open to question whether such economic categories as prices, profits and credits will be able to operate successfully under this system. Nothing definite can be said on this point before 1968, when the new prices are to come into effect.

Indeed, many Party members consider the broadening of commodity-money relations almost as a betrayal of the Communist cause. A. Bachurin, for example, Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, declared that there were still theoretical and practical workers who were insistent as to the "incompatibility of goods relations and the law of value with centralized planning."⁴³ This is not surprising; previously it had been asserted in all Soviet works on political economy that money-goods relations would be gradually restricted with progress along the road to Communism, i.e., already during the period of socialism. Officially, moreover, the USSR has already embarked on the construction of Communism itself. The inertia of the old theories will hardly be conducive to the reform's implementation. Even Party members concede that the economic reforms now being carried out in Communist countries are confronting practical workers in industry with the need to "rethink many familiar concepts."⁴⁴ At the Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, Shelest warned that when going over to the new planning methods "considerable difficulties of an economic and organizational nature" would have to be overcome.⁴⁵

An extremely difficult, if not insoluble, problem for the Communist countries is the establishment of economically rational prices. At an international economic

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, October 2, 1965.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, September 30, 1965.

⁴² See *Izvestia*, May 22, 1966, and *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 18, p. 8.

⁴³ *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, 1965, No. 11, p. 6.

⁴⁴ *Pravda*, June 5, 1966.

⁴⁵ *Rokytnytska bazeta*, Kiev, March 16, 1966.

conference held in Bulgaria at the end of 1964, Academician K. Ostovityanov noted that

...when examining problems of price formation, delegates from the socialist countries proceeded without exception from the Marxist theory of labor value. However, on the question how to apply this theory to the reform of price formation under the conditions of a planned socialist economy, different points of view emerged among the economists of the socialist countries.⁴⁶

Soviet economist Birman noted that

...prices are now being given three functions, each of which clashes with the other two. Firstly, prices are to measure and take into account the expenditures of society on production and the realization of products; secondly, they are to stimulate the production of certain commodities and inhibit the production of others...; thirdly, they are to redistribute the national income, among branches of material production and among the Union republics, as well as the incomes of individual sections of the population.⁴⁷

Soviet economists refute allegations by their Western colleagues that they are now being forced, for the sake of greater efficiency, to resort to wider application of such "capitalist" economic categories as prices, profits and credits by saying that these categories have a different meaning under "socialism." This difference in interpretation carries with it the danger that money-goods relations, just as happened with *khozraschet*, will remain a mere formality. Already it has been commented in the Soviet press that, despite the reform, "certain workers in governmental departments and financial organs are trying to operate with the previous administrative methods."⁴⁸

The economic reform is certainly a most necessary measure, and may give the Soviet economy fresh impetus if consistently carried through. However, so much indecision and ideological timidity is being displayed in this regard that many economists in the West and in the USSR have begun to doubt whether it will be.

F. Hajenko

The Progress Made in Industry

At the September 1965 meeting of the Party Central Committee, Kosygin outlined an extensive program of measures for reforming Soviet industrial planning and management. These were aimed at providing for both further centralization and decentralization of the economy: by reinstating the branch principle of guidance, they are aimed at a more efficient realization of the central planners' preferences while at the same time decentralization will be effected by increasing the executive autonomy of the enterprise manager. The first enterprises have now been operating under the new system for nine months, but as yet insufficient material has been published to make a comprehensive analysis possible. Some of the more meaningful data on the progress and problems of

⁴⁶ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1965, No. 5, p. 153.

⁴⁷ Birman, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

⁴⁸ *Pravda*, June 4, 1966.

the reforms have been assembled below in order to provide concrete illustrations of the theoretical model.

Schedule

The disbandment of Khrushchev's command structure of *sovnarkhozes*, from the level of the economic regions up to the Supreme Council of the National Economy, and the establishment of eleven new all-Union ministries and seventeen new Union-republic ministries were effected rapidly; all enterprises were scheduled to be transferred to the jurisdiction of ministries by January 1966.¹

On January 1, 1966, forty-three enterprises from seventeen ministries went over to the new system of operation. All of the enterprises selected as guinea-pigs had previously turned in above-average performances. Of the total number, twenty-two were machinebuilding plants, five were engaged in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, three in chemical and petrochemical production, six in light industry, four in the food industry and three produced building materials.² The enterprises employed about 300,000 workers and employees.

On April 1, 1966, the second batch of two hundred enterprises was transferred, bringing the total labor force operating under the new conditions to about one million.³ Apparently most of these plants had also registered above-average profitability prior to their transfer. A further 430 enterprises went over on July 1, 1966, bringing the number of workers and employees working under the new system to about 2 million. It appears that no more enterprises will be transferred this year, although Kosygin had indicated to the Twenty-Third Party Congress that a third of all industry would be working under the new conditions by the end of 1966. Thus the transfer would seem to have fallen behind schedule.

As yet, no complete branches of industry have been transferred since none has uniform profitability of the required levels under the existing wholesale structure.⁴ However, new prices were reported to have been introduced for light industry with effect from October 1, 1965,⁵ and a few sub-branches were to be transferred in their entirety to the new system on July 1, 1966.⁶ Among the enterprises scheduled to switch over on this date were two railroads: the Sverdlovsk and Gorky lines.⁷

On January 1, 1967, a series of complete sub-branches will be transferred, including the sugar-refining, transformer construction, cotton, wool, silk, knitwear, hemp and jute, wine, confectionery, aluminum and titanium-magnesium industries.⁸ The remainder of industry is scheduled to be transferred in two stages: on July 1, 1967, and January 1, 1968.⁹

¹ *Izvestia*, December 19, 1965.

² *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 19, p. 19.

³ *Ibid.*, 1966, No. 18, p. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1966, No. 7, p. 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1966, No. 18, p. 8.

⁷ *Izvestia*, May 15, 1966.

⁸ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 18, p. 8.

⁹ *Izvestia*, June 20, 1966.

Problems Peculiar to the Guinea-Pig Plants

Although the forty-three enterprises which began to operate under the new conditions in January had all previously registered high indices of profitability, their 1966 plans for the volume of production, profits and allocations to the budget had all been set and confirmed by the central planners. To operate successfully under the new system, they required a higher rate of profitability than hitherto and were therefore obliged to uncover internal economies and production capacities in order to boost the planned profitability index.¹⁰ Furthermore, since the index or criterion of gross production (*val*) had been replaced by that of goods sold, for the first few months the enterprises had to look for customers who would purchase their centrally-planned assortment of products.¹¹

A problem which was satisfactorily resolved during the introduction of "direct links" between trade and industry, spearheaded by the "Bolshevichka" and "Mayak" garment associations, was that of the level of fines for late deliveries and other breaches of contract. In this instance, textile and leather suppliers were fined 0.3 percent of the value of the contract for each working day's delay; the enterprises themselves were subject to the same scale of fines when their deliveries to stores and trade outlets were overdue.¹² Yet it would appear from an article published before the experiment commenced that the discrimination against the enterprises which existed in the scale of fines before the "Bolshevichka" and "Mayak" scheme still remains: for breach of contract the enterprise must pay 14 percent of the value of the contract, whereas its suppliers must pay only 2 percent of their contract value when they are at fault.¹³ An appraisal of the first quarter's result noted:

... it is also necessary to bear in mind that the external side of the system, which reflects the economic links of enterprises, continues to act as before. Hence there are breakdowns in deliveries, delayed payments of accounts, etc.

If the supplying enterprises were to bear a greater material responsibility for the violation of agreed deadlines [and] delays in the payment of orders, obviously they would take a more responsible attitude to the supply of raw materials and components to consumers, for whom each minute has now to be accounted for.¹⁴

The substitution of the index of realized (paid) commodity output for that of gross output (*val*) is a most progressive step; indeed, some reformers had limited their demands to the introduction of an index of shipped commodity output. However, the delays in payment of up to a month are evidently causing problems, although these could presumably be overcome with some flexibility in the extension of bank credits.

The hesitant attitude of certain ministries has come under fire. "The selection of enterprises to work under the new system in light industry has been made

¹⁰ *Pravda*, February 1, 1966.

¹¹ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 8, p. 28.

¹² *Ibid.*, January 6, 1965.

¹³ *Finansy SSSR*, 1965, No. 11, p. 57.

¹⁴ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 18, p. 8.

haphazardly. Often glasshouse conditions are created for these enterprises, and few expect positive results from them."¹⁵

The most formidable obstacle to the smooth operation of the new methods has been the inertia of the entrenched bureaucracy and its reluctance to abdicate its control over every phase of the enterprise's activity. The main culprits appear to have been the die-hards in the Ministry of Finance, and although explicit condemnation of this rearguard action has yet largely to appear, an editorial in *Pravda* left little doubt as to the identity of the accused:

Unfortunately, old habits have not everywhere been eliminated. In places the raion financial departments and banks, citing outmoded instructions, demand reports on the fulfillment of non-existing plans for the *val* from these enterprises which have been transferred to the new system and fine them, while in other places some departments establish every kind of additional condition for providing bonuses for officials. Party organizations are called upon to eliminate this practice and to clear the road in every way for that which is new...¹⁶

Liberman criticized the delaying tactics of the typical "administrator, unwilling to part with the old ways, [who] may damage the cause of economic reorganization."¹⁷ The professor called for a kind of industrial *ombudsman* who could arbitrate in any dispute between the enterprise and its ministry.

Prices

The success of the new system of planning and management hangs to a large extent upon the reform of wholesale prices; these have remained virtually unchanged since July 1955. Profitability has been adopted as a key criterion of an enterprise's performance, and profits will finance an increasing share of decentralized investment and material incentive payments, but profit calculations cannot be rational and therefore cannot yield rational decisions when carried out within an irrational price framework. At the September 1965 meeting of the Central Committee, the newly-formed State Price Committee affiliated to the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) was charged with

...formulating proposals, to be submitted by January 1, 1966, for the main directives to be followed in fixing wholesale prices for industrial products in accordance with the principle that prices should approximate as far as possible to the socially necessary expenditure of labor.¹⁸

In addition to this requirement, it has been stipulated that prices should ensure a profit for every normally operating enterprise; they must include charges for capital and rent; they must foster the introduction of new and improved products, taking into account both the extra cost of manufacture and the increased utility to the consumer; they must be "flexible, mobile and should in

¹⁵ *Partiinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 11, p. 35.

¹⁶ *Pravda*, May 16, 1966.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, April 24, 1966.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, September 28, 1965.

every way stimulate the development of advanced techniques and technology, while at the same time they must remain stable to a certain degree, firm and not subject to chance fluctuations." Furthermore, their revision may not lead to the raising of any retail prices.

In any revision of wholesale prices, the unenviable Vladimir Sitnin, who is the Chairman of the State Price Committee, is bound to run foul of the lobbyists for such vested interests as the metallurgical, machinebuilding and coal industries, which have long enjoyed preferential treatment. If Sitnin did succeed in formulating acceptable and workable proposals by the deadline, then these have yet to be widely publicized, for his public pronouncements since that date have been tentative and non-committal.¹⁹ The existing price structure gives rise to wild discrepancies in the levels of profitability; for example, many plants operate at a planned loss, while the Nogin Stocking Factory in Moscow has been registering a profitability rate of 178.5 percent.²⁰

Some progress has undoubtedly been made. According to a deputy chairman of Gosplan, "the State Committee for Prices has already worked out the principles for the establishment of new wholesale prices,"²¹ although this may mean little more than did the celebrated claims to have solved the problem of anti-missile defense. This authority went on to report that "a decision was recently taken concerning a change in the level of wholesale prices for the output of light industry as of October 1, 1966," which should enable the enterprises of this sector to go over to the new system during the fourth quarter of 1966. However, the chairman warned, new wholesale prices for machinebuilding, metallurgy, the chemical industry and electric power could not be expected before July 1, 1967. Under consideration was the introduction of new wholesale prices for producer enterprises in a number of the extractive industries while retaining the old prices for the consumers in an effort to expedite the conversion of these industries to the new methods.

A more recent source reported that new wholesale prices were to be adopted for power equipment, radio components and semi-conductors with effect from July 1, 1966, but confirmed that for the majority of machinebuilding products the date for the adoption of new prices remains July 1, 1967.²² Whereas hitherto prices have been based on the average branch-wide prime costs plus a given percentage of profit, the new prices are to be a function of both prime costs and average sector profitability based on basic and working capital.

Prices in heavy industry are

... scheduled to ensure an average level of profits equal to 15 percent of the value of production funds. In branches of light industry, the level of profits should be

¹⁹ See, for example, *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 1, pp. 12-13, and *Izvestia*, February 8, 1966.

²⁰ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 24, p. 17.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 1966, No. 7, p. 4.

²² *Ibid.*, 1966, No. 24, p. 16.

somewhat higher because of differing structures of funds and their faster turnover. Here, for the introduction of the new methods of incentives, a 20–25 percent level of profitability is necessary.²³

Indicators

One of the principal features of the reforms promulgated by the Central Committee in September 1965 was the reduction in the number of indices for the enterprise's activities which were set centrally. These were to be reduced from twenty or thirty or even more to the following ten basic indicators:

- 1) the value of production realized;
- 2) the main assortment of goods to be produced (*nomenklatura*);
- 3) the size of the wages fund;
- 4) the level of profit and profitability, i.e., the absolute profit and its ratio to the fixed and working capital employed;
- 5) deductions from profits into the state budget;
- 6) allocations from the state budget;
- 7) volume of centralized capital investment;
- 8) the putting into operation of productive capacity and basic assets;
- 9) basic tasks for the introduction of new machinery;
- 10) indices of material technical supplies.

However, in their enthusiasm for reducing the number of success indicators, certain enterprises "mechanically carried over this instruction to those indices which should have been calculated at the enterprise itself."²⁴ Norms which have to be set internally by the enterprise for its shops and subunits include labor productivity, gross and commodity output and cost reduction.

Payments for Funds

For the enterprises working under the new system, the rate of interest on fixed and working capital (known euphemistically as "payments for funds") varies between 3 and 8 percent,²⁵ although for the majority it has been set at 6 percent.²⁶ Initially, this will mean that up to 25 percent of the profits generated by these enterprises will be paid into the state budget, but since the interest rate is fixed for a period of several years, the size of payment for funds should decline in relation to the overall profits.²⁷

²³ *Ibid.*, 1966, No. 7, p. 5.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 1965, No. 18, p. 8.

²⁵ *Finansy SSSR*, 1966, No. 3, p. 23.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1965, No. 5, p. 9.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1965, No. 3, p. 23, and *Pravda*, February 11, 1966.

Dispersion of Profits

After an enterprise has deducted the requisite "payments for funds" and interests for credits from its planned profits, it may distribute the balance among three funds: the production development fund, the material incentive fund and the fund for social-cultural measures and housing construction. Normatives for the former two are established by the parent ministry in coordination with the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning Committee and State Bank and for the latter by the ministry in coordination with the State Committee for Labor and Wages, the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning Committee and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.²⁸

For one plant, the Voskresensk Chemical Combine (Moscow Oblast), it was calculated that 7 percent of the plant's total profit would be allocated to the production development fund while 2 percent would go to the social-cultural fund.²⁹

There are three categories of profit to be distinguished in the operation of the forty-three enterprises under the new system. The principal category is the *planned profit*, as arrived at by the central planners in conjunction with the enterprise itself. During the first quarter, this was apparently inadequate to finance meaningful incentives, and the plants therefore undertook to find *additional profits* by exploiting existing resources and making further cost reductions.³⁰ Of this additional profit, one plant had to pay only 10 percent into the state budget and was allowed to retain the remainder; five-sixths of this went to the material incentive fund and one-sixth to the social-cultural and housing fund.³¹ As a general rule, enterprises are allowed to retain between 60 and 90 percent of the additional profits.³² Finally, there are the *above-plan profits*, of which a fairly high percentage is claimed by the state budget. The rationale for this was explained by Kosygin:

The material-incentive funds for encouraging overfulfillment of the plan will be smaller than those paid for fulfilling the indices laid down in the plan. This will encourage enterprises to discover reserves in time and to undertake higher commitments.³³

The Production Development Fund

The production development fund is designed for financing capital investments by introducing new technology, mechanizing equipment, renovating fixed assets and improving the organization of production and labor. It is formed from three sources: allocations from enterprise profits, a part of the amortization deduction intended for full renovation of fixed productive assets, and profits

²⁸ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 19, p. 20.

²⁹ *Pravda*, January 8, 1966.

³⁰ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 5, p. 15.

³¹ *Pravda*, February 11, 1966.

³² *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 6, p. 31.

³³ *Pravda*, September 28, 1965.

from the sale of equipment.³⁴ As the extent of decentralized investment through the growth of the production development fund increases, the powers of the central planners will correspondingly diminish; yet, to judge from the results of the first quarter, when apparently less than 3 percent of total profits were allocated to the production development fund, the conservatives have little reason as yet for agitation.

Unemployment

Under the new system, the size of the enterprise's annual wage fund will still be set by the central authorities, but the manager is given a free hand to regulate the size of his work force and to fix the wages paid. Undoubtedly this has led to a streamlining of the labor force in the enterprises involved; as one director put it:

The introduction of *khovraschet* in shops and sections and the payment of supplemental wages will inevitably lead to the question of reducing the number of personnel or, in other words, to an attempt to fulfill the production program with the least number of people. The solution of this problem will necessitate the transfer of workers from one enterprise to another, from one region to another, and so on.³⁵

An indication of how the staff of even an above-average enterprise can be trimmed was given by the automobile depots which tried out the new methods commencing in May 1965; there cuts in the work-forces of 7 percent and higher were recorded.³⁶ However, until a viable system of labor exchanges has been established, the authorities appear reluctant to give definite information about the number of employees declared redundant by the pilot enterprises. One works committee reached the eminently sensible conclusion that excessive demarcation practices inflated the labor force; specifically, they decided that machine operators be taught to carry the regular overhauls of their machines in addition to operating them. In this way, the number of workers in the plant could be reduced and labor productivity raised, and the resultant economies would swell the incentive fund. "Naturally, the machine operators would have to be paid a little more."³⁷

Results of the First Quarter

As yet, only a brief and incomplete report on the first quarter's results has been published.³⁸ This shows that in order to boost their planned profitability to a level ensuring the desired incentives, the forty-three enterprises took on plans for additional sales amounting to 25 million rubles and for additional profits of 11 million rubles. In the event, all enterprises but one (a cheese factory which fell 17.7 percent short of its sales plan) fulfilled their increased plans and achieved

³⁴ *Rabochaya gazeta*, November 19, 1965, p. 2.

³⁵ *Pravda*, March 14, 1966.

³⁶ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 18, p. 69.

³⁷ *Pravda*, January 8, 1966.

³⁸ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 19, p. 19.

total above-plan sales worth another 25 million rubles. The overall results for the first quarter of 1966 were:

	Planned	Actual	Overfulfillment
	(Rubles)		
Sales	706,600,000	732,000,000	3.6%
Profit	102,200,000	110,300,000	7.9%
Profitability	4.9%	5.2%	

Labor productivity in the 43 enterprises rose by 6.6 percent, whereas the all-Union industrial average rise was 4.6 percent.

On the subject of the distribution of profits, the account in *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* is incomplete. From the 110,300,000 rubles' worth of profits, 19,600,000 rubles were paid into the state budget as "payments for funds" (thus implying an average rate of interest for fixed and working capital of 3.7 percent); 9,600,000 rubles went toward material incentive payments; 2,800,000 rubles were transferred to the production development funds and the best part of 3 million rubles was allocated to "social-cultural" and housing funds. No explanation of what was done with the balance of the profits was given.

Premiums

For the majority of workers and employees taking part in the experimental stage, the sole criterion for the effectiveness of the new methods of operation will be the size of their pay packets. In determining the size of premiums and who shall receive them, enterprise managers appear to have been given considerable freedom (subject, of course, to the directives of their respective ministries, which have been arrived at in consultation with the State Committee for Labor and Wages, the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning Committee and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions). Thus, at one of the plants, which produces automation equipment for thermal power stations, if the plan for the sale of the plants' product is fulfilled, engineering and technical workers in the main shops can expect a bonus of 25 percent and those in auxiliary shops 20 percent, and administrative employees 23 percent, of their regular pay. If the assigned production is carried out down to the last detail, the management is apparently empowered to increase the scale of bonuses up to 40–50 percent of wages; on the other hand, if a shop upsets the sale program of even one product, it will be deprived of its bonus altogether.³⁹ In this plant, the workers' length of service is taken into account when assessing his bonus; this is to discourage the prevalent high rate of labor turnover, and would appear to be general practice. In another plant, a flat-rate bonus of two weeks' pay for each worker was intimated.⁴⁰

However, the figures given in the first quarter's report indicate that, despite the considerable additional sales and profits plan and their overfulfillment, the

³⁹ *Pravda*, February 1, 1966.

⁴⁰ See *The Economist*, London, June 11, 1966, p. 1187.

average increase in the level of bonuses was hardly inspiring. Three types of bonuses were paid out. From the material incentive funds, industrial production workers received average bonuses of 12.7 rubles for the quarter (for the first quarter of 1965, they received 9 rubles). Premiums from wage funds added a further 27 rubles for the average worker and employee; it is not known what they amounted to during the corresponding period of 1965. Finally, a total of 440,000 rubles in non-recurring incentive payments was paid out—an average payment of one-and-a-half rubles for each of the 300,000 workers and employees. Altogether, it is unlikely that the average worker's earnings increased by more than 12 rubles when compared with the first quarter of 1965. Since the all-Union average earnings of industrial production workers in 1965 were 103 rubles a month,⁴¹ the increased bonus would represent, on an average, less than 5 percent of total earnings and this would hardly compensate for the substantially increased work norms. Of course, much depends upon how the bonuses were distributed. If the practice, employed at the Kosino plant, of giving everyone a flat-rate bonus were widespread, then this would give little incentive for individual effort. Yet it is more likely that most plants will follow the lead of the Moscow Plant for Thermal Automation Equipment cited above. The manager of this plant stated bluntly:

In general, we are in favor of maximum differentiation of bonuses. If a man has worked well, let him receive an additional half-salary or even a whole salary. To pay an idler, in addition to his wages, even a small bonus serves no purpose at all.

Or, as the late J. V. Stalin put it: "Egalitarianism is petty-bourgeois nonsense!"

Conclusion

It cannot be denied that the reforms of September 1965, although limited, represent a considerable improvement over the previously existing system. The introduction of interest for capital, the attempt to limit central authority to major decisions of planning and investment, the increased operational autonomy of plant managers, the replacement of the index of gross production by that of sales, the reduction in the number of centrally determined indicators, the introduction of profitability as a chief measure of plan fulfillment, the creation of direct links and the strengthening of incentives—all these cannot but have a positive effect upon the overall efficiency of Soviet industry. On the other hand, the crucial requirement of a rational price system has not yet been met; without it the reforms may go off at half-cock. However, from the admittedly scant and incomplete data released to date, it would appear that, on certain counts, the scope of the concessions and innovations has been too grudgingly modest. Such factors as the surviving discrimination against the enterprise in the use of functional finance, the insignificance of the allocations to the production development funds and the low average increase in the scale of premiums may be attributable

⁴¹ *SSSR v 1965 godu: Kratky statistichesky sbornik* (The USSR in Figures in 1965: A Concise Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1966, p. 126.

to either initial caution on the part of the reformers or resistance to change from the die-hards, or to both. It is clear that there is strong conservative opposition to the full implementation of the reforms; perhaps its ringleaders will be one day publicly identified and pilloried, as Ranković was. It is also certain that the reforms enjoy a wide measure of public support, but this support must be consolidated and fortified by a more equitable distribution of the benefits attained.

Keith Bush

The Communist Bloc

Rumania and Polycentrism

Although "monolithic unity" between the two major powers in the Communist camp, namely the USSR and China, has long ceased to exist, only recently have the implications of the Sino-Soviet conflict for relations between the USSR and its former satellites become clear. The big question of whether the Soviet Communist Party would be able, in the light of the Chinese breakaway, to retain its authority at least in Eastern Europe, or whether here too a new epoch in Communist history was beginning, has now been answered by Rumania, which has laid claim to independence and yet not suffered any reprisals by Moscow. This latter circumstance is highly significant. Whereas the Soviets sent in tanks to crush the Hungarian bid for independence, and in Poland also threatened the use of force, in the case of Rumania their efforts are confined to attempts to camouflage the situation.

A dramatic reminder of the changing political scene in the Communist camp was offered by Chou En-Lai's trip to Bucharest, which demonstrated that the structure of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe has been shattered and that it is no longer strictly correct to refer to Rumania and perhaps to other East European countries as Soviet satellites. The trip and the events surrounding it have been treated as sensational both in the West and within the Communist camp itself. They have placed Rumania squarely at the center of outside interest in the struggle between the factions of the international Communist movement led by Moscow and Peking, not so much because they reflect a shift on the part of Rumania toward the Chinese side, but rather because they signal an outright assertion of independence in matters of foreign policy on the part of a state that has formerly deferred to Moscow. Bucharest is pursuing neither a pro-Chinese nor a pro-Soviet policy. Instead, what is emerging is a distinctly pro-Rumanian policy, and what is sensational about this is that Rumania is venturing away from the Soviet Union in spite of the fact that it is a next door neighbor.

The Sino-Soviet conflict has, of course, constituted an important precondition for Rumania's assertion of independence. In a Communist camp held closely together by a monolithic unity of purpose and action, nothing of the sort could have happened. Nevertheless, the question still arises, how a country that was a docile

satellite of the Soviet Union only yesterday could today permit itself simply to ignore the wishes (it is no longer a matter of directives) of its "big brother." At the root of the Soviet-Rumanian dispute lie problems of an economic nature. Here, the differences began long before many Western observers tend to think, there being evidence that Bucharest inaugurated a policy of economic protectionism as early as 1955, as a result of which Czechoslovakia, which had formerly obtained oil chiefly from Rumania, began instead to depend on imports from the Soviet Union. It is also worth drawing attention to reports in the Western press during the Cuban crisis that the Rumanian Ambassador to the United States had expressed Rumania's intention to remain neutral in the event of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet-Rumanian dispute did not come fully to light until the beginning of the sixties, when Khrushchev—having earlier declared that all socialist states would enter the final phase of Communism at the same time and that developed socialist countries were obliged to assist the underdeveloped ones—called for economic specialization in Communist countries within a framework of economic cooperation. For Bucharest, this meant resignation to Rumania's status as an agricultural state heavily dependent on imports of industrial goods from other nations in the Eastern bloc. As a result, at a meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) in 1962, the Rumanian delegation categorically spoke out against the Soviet plans, claiming that they contradicted the Moscow declaration of 1960. Finally, at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party in March 1963, the Soviet plans were turned down. Since then, Rumania has for the most part gone her own way in elaborating and implementing economic policy.

It is evident that resistance in the economic sphere alone could not produce the desired results, and Rumanian leaders also gambled on nationalism. They were supported by Mao Tse-tung, who went so far as to declare to Japanese socialists in the summer of 1964 that Soviet borders in Asia and Europe ought to be reviewed. He made specific reference to such large territories as Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, which were annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. In view of Rumania's military weakness and, again, her proximity to the Soviet Union, it might seem odd that Rumanian leaders should seize upon Mao's declaration as an indirect means for advancing claims to the areas under question, but they were in fact only trying to make the most of a situation that had conveniently arisen. The Soviet side continues to take their demands seriously, the more so because Rumanian assertions and actions with regard to this issue have led to unrest, at least in Moscow and Kishinev.

Following Mao Tse-tung's declaration, Georghiu-Dej sent a governmental delegation headed by Prime Minister Ion Maurer to Moscow. The delegation spent more than a week conducting discussions with Soviet Party and government officials and presumably raised the question of residual claims to Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, though there was not the least hint of this in the Soviet press. At the same time, the famous Rumanian historian and Marxist, Professor

A. Otetea of Bucharest University, was sent to Holland to study documents at the Institute of Social History in Amsterdam in which Marx speaks in favor of transferring Bessarabia to Rumania and states that Turkey did not have any right to transfer the area to Russia. Shortly after, at the beginning of 1965, a book entitled *Zametki Karla Marksa o Bessarabii* (Karl Marx's Notes on Bessarabia) appeared in Rumania along with a map of Bessarabia on which all Russian and Russified names were replaced by Rumanian ones. The Soviet press took indirect note of the book, using a commentary on it in the Swiss newspaper *Journal de Genève* as a pretext. In a long article, I. Bodyul, First Secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, wrote:

It is pertinent to note that some bourgeois scribblers are leaning over backwards in their efforts to prove that Bessarabia was occupied in 1812 by Russia. In particular, the newspaper *Journal de Genève* wrote about this in its issue of May 7, 1965. It is simply startling where unscrupulousness in choice of means and undue license in interpreting historical facts can lead some bourgeois pen-pushers.¹

Bodyul went on to say that the annexation of Bessarabia was "a progressive phenomenon" even though serfdom existed in Russia at the time. Continuing the polemic against "bourgeois pen-pushers sitting in Bucharest," Bodyul later declared in a speech before the Twelfth Congress of the Moldavian Communist Party, held at the beginning of March 1966:

Apologists for the bourgeoisie strive to discredit and belittle the achievements of the Soviet Union and to sow hostility and animosity among socialist countries. They stir up nationalism and chauvinism, advance territorial claims on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and make demands that the outcome of World War II be reviewed.²

In particular, Bodyul inveighed against foreign "enemies" of socialism who were rousing "nationalist feelings" in Bessarabia.

Rumanian Communists, as we have seen, are not squeamish about invoking Marx and Engels in support of their point of view. In the dispute over Bessarabia, Engels favored Rumania, an opinion that is quoted in a work published by the Institute for the History of the Rumanian Worker's Party. In turn, Bodyul quotes the Rumanian Communists, writing in an article entitled "An Important Century in the History of the Communist Party of Moldavia" that

The just act of Bessarabia's liberation was enthusiastically welcomed by all Soviet peoples, by the whole progressive community of the capitalist countries, including Rumania. In its proclamation of June 23, 1940, the Rumanian Communist Party, which, during all the years of the occupation, supported the just struggle of the workers of Bessarabia for reunification with the USSR, wrote: "Now, when the gigantic strength of a country of socialism has freed Bessarabia and the Northern Bucovina from the heavy yoke of Rumanian imperialism, a real possibility has arisen for the friendship of the peoples of Rumania with a great socialist state."³

¹ *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, Kishinev, November 23, 1965.

² *Ibid.*, March 2, 1966.

³ *Ibid.*, February 9, 1966.

Leaving aside the question of who is right in this particular debate, what is important is that, in the radically changed circumstances of today, Rumania can almost summarily demand a new demarcation of her borders with the Soviet Union and that this barefaced claim does not provoke repressive measures from Moscow. It is difficult to believe that the Soviet side is limiting its reaction to polemics out of considerations of humanity and tolerance. More likely, what plays a decisive role is the weakness of the Soviet leadership, which in view of the disintegration of the Communist camp is not in a position to impose sanctions.

Moreover, the Soviet Communist Party's position has been worsened by the pro-Rumanian sentiments which have evidently begun to appear in Moldavia. At a gathering of Moldavian Party activists held in Kishinev December 22-23, 1965, and reported by the newspaper *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* in its issues of January 5-7, 1966, Bodyul bitterly complained that certain persons whose minds were full of "nationalist survivals," in particular churchmen, sectarians and those who had lost the privileged positions they had occupied under the old social order, were perverting Soviet reality, attempting to sow dissension among representatives of Moldavian society, and spreading unhealthy rumors as well as stories about the "good old days." Bodyul wound up by rebuking Moldavian intellectuals for their negative attitude toward internationalism and brotherly friendship among "the peoples of our country." Similar comments were made by Moldavian Communist Party Secretary Kornovan in a *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* article of December 19, 1965, and by First Secretary of the Kishinev Party Committee Konstantinov at a meeting of Kishinev Party activists on January 12, 1966.⁴ Konstantinov spoke of a loss of class consciousness and patriotic pride. The situation is evidently no better for the fact that most of the responsible Party and administrative posts in Moldavia are held by Russians and other non-natives; at the meeting of Moldavian Party activists, Bodyul said that Moldavians occupied only 35,000 of the 113,000 such posts in the republic's agriculture and industry.

There is no doubt that Rumania is trying to exploit this situation, and that she is having a fair amount of success in this respect. It is, indeed, quite possible that she is keeping alive a spirit of Rumanian nationalism in Moldavia in the hope that she will be able to annex this territory one day.

Much more interesting, however, is the fact that such a territorial dispute can exist at all, albeit in a somewhat veiled form, between the mighty Soviet Union and one of its former satellites. As we have said, the dispute owes its existence to the Sino-Soviet conflict, which after having destroyed the "monolithic unity" of the Communist camp led not to a "condominium" but to a state of "anarchy." Naturally the Rumanian leaders, who like their colleagues in the other Communist countries prefer to govern in their own name rather than Moscow's, at once began systematically exploiting the dissension in the world Communist movement and the attendant loss of ideological authority by the Soviet Communist Party in order to acquire independence in every possible

⁴ See, for example, *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, January 15, 1966.

sphere. (Of course, such a campaign could only be founded on nationalistic tendencies, which are pronounced in countries with a predominantly rural population, such as Rumania has remained to this day.) All traces of Soviet influence in Rumania began to be removed. In 1965, the Rumanian Communist Party Rules were amended; all references to the October Revolution were eliminated, and it was declared that the Rumanian Communist Party intended to apply Marxism-Leninism in accordance with the country's "specific situation," while maintaining friendly relations with all other Communist parties.

Indeed, the Rumanians have adopted a strictly neutral position in regard to the Sino-Soviet conflict, a policy evidenced, for example, by their refusal to take part in the preparatory world Communist Party conference held in Moscow in March 1965. Rumania has derived considerable economic benefits from this neutrality; she has been increasing trade with China at a time when trade between China and the rest of the Soviet bloc has been decreasing (the Soviets are doubtless particularly irritated by Rumanian petroleum deliveries to China, whose fuel situation was being hit particularly hard by the Soviet trade boycott), and is also expanding commercial contacts with the free world.

Bucharest has also stopped supporting the Soviet attacks against Albania, and is now wooing that country. Whereas the USSR does not now have even the most elementary diplomatic relations with Albania, on March 19, 1965, a Rumano-Albanian cultural exchange program was signed which calls for co-operation in the organization of education and also for student and teacher exchanges. In other words, the Rumanians are quite prepared to allow "dogmatists" to teach in their schools.

Some Western observers believe that the Rumanian Communists are attempting to play the role of mediator in the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Each visit to Peking by a Rumanian Party or government official is adduced as proof of this somewhere in the Western press. In reality, the Rumanian leaders are more interested in perpetuating the Sino-Soviet split, though within certain well-defined bounds, since neither a decisive break nor a complete reconciliation between Moscow and Peking would be advantageous for Rumania. It is only the current "cold-war" situation that gives Rumania the possibility of maneuvering between the two principal Communist powers, of exploiting relations with Peking to frighten Moscow. Indeed, it would be hard to think of anything that would alarm the USSR more than the presence of a Chinese ally in the very midst of its sphere of influence.

It was thus not surprising that Chou En-lai's visit to Bucharest led to a flurry of unrest in Moscow. The appearance of Brezhnev in Bucharest on June 10 could hardly have been an unrelated event. In all probability, Brezhnev's visit was precipitated by a fear that the imminent Chinese visit might lead to closer ties between Bucharest and Peking. It is noteworthy that Chou En-lai's arrival was preceded by a number of statements from Rumanian leaders to the effect that the Warsaw Pact was out of date and that it was necessary for individual Communist parties to refrain from interfering with one another.

For China, Rumania is not of interest merely as a partner in an exceptionally advantageous or even quite indispensable trade arrangement. There are additional considerations. Hardly any other gesture on the part of the Chinese leaders could have so clearly demonstrated the failure of Soviet efforts to isolate China as did Chou En-lai's trip. China, far from being isolated, is continually strengthening her relations with the outside world and with "fraternal, socialist states." The choice of Chou En-lai as China's emissary was probably not fortuitous. Peking doubtless realizes that to send a purely Party delegation to Bucharest would compromise the Rumanian Communists. As Premier, Chou En-lai represents primarily the government. Indeed the *rapprochement* is not so much one of parties as one of states. On the other hand, as a member of the Chinese Communist Politburo, Chou En-lai is presumably empowered to conduct negotiations on questions of Party relations.

In fact, however, the Chinese visit placed Rumania in an awkward situation. The Rumanian Communists apparently applied considerable pressure to Chou En-lai to be more moderate in his statements about the Soviet Union. Evidently in order to emphasize Rumania's neutrality, Prime Minister Maurer declared that the Warsaw Pact was a "club of friends" and that Rumanian assertions as to the "obsolescence" of the Pact had been incorrectly understood in the West.

On the other hand, there are certain indications that at the conference of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee held in Bucharest July 4-6 the Rumanian delegates showed a high degree of independence. Apparently the Soviet leaders had hoped to beef up the Pact by giving it a supranational political organization and strengthening military cooperation between individual member-countries; the declaration put out after the conference showed that this hope was not fulfilled. The correspondent of the London *Times* wrote:

From the Rumanian point of view, the conference was evidently a victory for their case, and although the final declaration on European security lends itself to many interpretations and is a compromise between all the conflicting trends, one thing is certain—as with Comecon four years ago, so now with the Warsaw Pact—the Rumanians have succeeded in watering it down.⁵

Indeed, a reform of the Pact giving power to Moscow was not forthcoming.

Significant is the fact that the Soviet press found it necessary to polemicize against Western allegations as to dissension within the Pact. In an *Izvestia* article entitled "Faded Chimeras," N. Polyanov wrote:

Scarcely two days had passed [since the beginning of the conference] before the dreams of certain American politicians had lost their sweetness. They had, after all, been confronted with a stern warning by the Warsaw Pact countries. They had learnt that in a difficult hour for the Vietnamese people the socialist countries of Europe were resolutely declaring: We are rendering and will render the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the increasing moral and political support and diverse aid necessary for the victorious repulsion of American aggression.⁶

⁵ *The Times*, London, July 11, 1966.

⁶ *Izvestia*, July 13, 1966.

However, in speaking of the help being given to North Vietnam by the European "socialist" countries, Polyanov merely delineates the limits of national Communists. It is quite obvious that even the Rumanian national Communists, for all their resistance to Moscow, for all their desire for independence, cannot destroy Communism or even declare themselves to be non-Communists. They are compelled to support the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong simply because to allow the "imperialists" to liquidate Communism in even a small country would be tantamount to conceding them the right to liquidate Communism in any country. Within these bounds, however, the Rumanian Communists are continuing to rock the Communist boat and to undermine the authority of the Soviet Communist Party. Whatever their motives for doing this, the effect is to weaken the entire world Communist movement and to mark out paths which others may come to follow.

Indeed, the question is whether the Rumanian example is capable of imitation by the other East European countries. Theoretically it is, of course; but to predict their future developmental paths is beyond the scope of this article. One thing, however, is certain: Soviet-Rumanian relations deserve the closest attention, and may be expected to attract world interest for some time yet.

A. Kashin

REVIEWS

The Periodical Press

Theoretically, the main social problems in the USSR were solved by the October Revolution and by subsequent measures to reform the economy. Nevertheless, they are still topical and their solution is still regarded as one of the country's most urgent tasks.

An illustration of this is a leading article in the eleventh issue of *Kommunist* entitled "Sociopolitical problems of the Five-Year Plan," in which we read:

In the new five-year plan period, alongside and in close connection with big economic, scientific and technical tasks, important sociopolitical problems imposed by the Party Program will also be solved (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 11, page 3).

Among these problems, prominence is given to the task of reducing the gap between urban and rural life, between mental and physical labor, between the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the intelligentsia. When these differences have been removed, the social, political and ideological unity of Soviet society will be strengthened, the editors say, although during the forthcoming five-year period economic tasks will predominate:

A characteristic feature of the new five-year period will be high rates of growth of communal production and national income. The volume of industrial production will increase by 50 percent, of agricultural production by 25 percent, and the national income will increase by 38–41 percent. All branches of the national economy will develop at higher rates than in previous years (page 4).

This acceleration of production and income is to be achieved by applying scientific and technical improvements on a broad scale and by the "scientific" organization of labor. Another stimulus is mentioned with equal confidence:

One important circumstance must be borne in mind: during this five-year period, the results of the economic reform will undoubtedly already begin to have an effect upon rates of growth of the Soviet economy (page 5).

Generally speaking, the prospects are presented in a rosy light: the development of the economy will be accompanied by an improvement in living standards:

Thus there will be a substantial change of proportions in the national economy, a redistribution of funds in favor of consumer goods production, although the development of producer goods production will continue to have the advantage. The growth in the production of consumer goods will be accelerated by: doubling the output of those branches of heavy industry on which depend the development of the light and food industries, agriculture, trade, housing construction and the supply of cultural and everyday goods; the creation of a firm basis of agricultural raw materials for industry; and increasing the share of consumer goods production in the chemical, machinebuilding and other branches of heavy industry (pages 5–6).

As for the problem of closing the gap separating urban and rural life, hopes are being placed on the significance of the emergence of the kolkhoz peasantry as a new class.

In this connection, it is impossible to ignore the very unsatisfactory state of the country's agriculture, which has been a problem ever since the "new socialist class" came into existence. With regard to the prospects of agriculture, the editors therefore remark: "The main thing is to raise agricultural output [and] ensure that it develops at a consistently high pace" (page 8).

It is proposed to achieve this aim by means of a considerable increase in state capital investments, which will make possible many measures of a cultural and also technical nature. These include in particular melioration, mechanization, and increased supplies of mineral fertilizer. During the five-year period, agriculture is to be supplied with 1,790,000 tractors, 1,100,000 trucks, 900,000 tractor and 275,000 automobile trailers, and 550,000 grain-harvesting combines. This far-reaching reequipment of agriculture, it is hoped, will help to increase the forces of production and bring living standards among the urban and rural population closer together.

This leading article is followed by a section headed "City and Country," which includes four lengthy articles devoted to this subject. One of them, "On Overcoming Important Differences Between Town and Country," is by the First Secretary of the Moldavian Party Central Committee, I. Bodyul, who stresses that the Moldavian economy, as an organic part of the economic system of the USSR, must be rapidly made capable of exploiting to the full the natural and labor resources available. This, he considers, will facilitate the aim of assimilating town and country.

This contribution by the Moldavian Party leader is undoubtedly connected with the fact that Moldavia was annexed by the Soviet Union: the selection of this republic for the purpose of illustrating an important social problem in the USSR is intended to show that the Moldavians essentially belong to the family of Soviet peoples. Another reason for its choice was that the republic is primarily agricultural, so that the problem discussed is there particularly acute. Bodyul writes:

One important aspect of the process of eradicating essential differences between town and village is the development of the socialist consciousness of the broad masses of the kolkhoz peasantry and its assimilation to the level of consciousness of industrial workers. In the solution of this problem as in [the business of] associating the peasantry in the higher organization of production, the most important part belongs to the working class—the leading class of Soviet society (page 38).

Another contribution to this section, on "Topical Problems of the Economic Reform," is by A. Bachurin, a deputy chairman of Gosplan, who dwells chiefly on the question how to plan the rural and urban economies in such a way as to bring them together.

The problem of reducing the gap separating mental and manual labor may, in the editors' view, be solved by constantly improving industrial techniques and raising the workers' cultural level. In the end, they say, unskilled labor will disappear, together with the old division of labor, which binds the worker to a particular trade or profession for life.

...in the course of Communist construction, all the differences between the working class and the peasantry, essential differences between town and country, between mental and physical workers, will be gradually overcome. Under Communism, all men shall stand in an equal relationship to the means of production and have complete equality in the distribution of material and cultural goods. Communism asserts the highest principles of human relations, founded upon the equality, fraternity, mutual respect, friendship and collaboration of competent and all-round people (page 10).

To judge by this, everything is simple: one has only to follow faithfully the plans and decisions adopted by the Twenty-Third Party Congress. What one misses, as so often, is the remembrance of almost half-a-century of past experience. In the early days of Lenin's leadership, the real prospects were nearer to the Communist ideal than today, and in those days, moreover, the Party contained more idealists than it does today. But utopian ideas, when they collide with reality, are bound to suffer defeat. The differences concerned have shown no tendency to disappear for decades; what justification is there, therefore, for supposing that they will disappear during the next five years?

Another problem referred to in the editorial we have been considering is that of relations between the various nationalities of the Soviet Union. These relations are presented as having entered upon a new stage. Again, economics is brought in:

The control figures envisaged by the five-year plan for the development of the economy and culture of the Union republics reflect this new stage in the development of national relations in our country... (Page 13.)

Naturally, Lenin's interpretation of nationality policy is here taken as the point of departure. The authors formulate their position, however, with unusual diplomacy:

All questions of national relations are solved by the Party from the standpoint of proletarian internationalism. We cannot permit national characteristics either to be ignored, which constitutes an infringement of the rights and national dignity of any nation, or to be exaggerated, which leads to national narrow-mindedness (*ibid.*).

Thus, proletarian internationalism must stand higher than national pride and consciousness. This question is dealt with in characteristic fashion. The same issue of *Kommunist* contains an article on "The Great Fatherland War and Historical Science," which inevitably touches on the question of national patriotic feeling. Here, too, proletarian internationalism is given prominence and even treated as one of the reasons for final victory:

The Soviet people, educated in a spirit of the highest patriotism and proletarian internationalism, was deeply aware of the great mission of liberation imposed upon it by history, and spared neither pains nor means to justify with honor the hopes and aspirations of the peoples oppressed by fascism (page 64).

It is significant that in the whole of this article nothing is said about national consciousness or patriotism founded on history, traditions, religion and a general desire for freedom. There is likewise no mention of the "legalization" of the Church in the USSR during World War II. Patriotism and the people's contribution to the war effort are reduced to a matter of Party work and political reeducation.

It is as well here to take a look at reality, to consider the attitude of the progressive intelligentsia of the present-day USSR to this question. Perhaps the best illustration is provided by the fourth part of Ilya Glazunov's epic *The Road to Thee*, published in the June issue of the journal *Molodaya gvardiya*. This part of the work is mainly devoted to the historical role of the Church in the political and cultural life of the people. The significance of the Troitse-Sergiyeva Lavra, for example, is described as follows:

If we look into Russian history, into the very texture of Russian culture, we cannot find a single thread which does not lead to this fountainhead of Russian historical consciousness—to the idea of heroic moral force and soldierly valor. Russian statehood, painting, architecture, literature and science spring from here (*Molodaya gvardiya*, 1966, No. 6, page 257).

Another chapter offers comments on the work of ecclesiastical functionaries. On the subject of Metropolitan Petr, a contemporary of Ivan Kalita, we read:

Ivan Kalita, as the historian tells us, asked Petr to move to Moscow from Vladimir, where the metropolis of ancient Rus had been established after the Tatars had been routed. The metropolitan at that time was of great importance in the country: independent of the princes and appointed by the Patriarch of Byzantium, he was at the same time a solitary symbol of the oneness of Rus. It was of extreme importance for the prince that the metropolitan should live in his city, and the ecclesiastic's unquestionable authority, in view of his support [received from the prince] raised the significance of the prince himself very high in the eyes of all (page 242).

Metropolitan Aleksii, who did much to contribute to the overthrow of the Tatar yoke, is also shown as an eminent politician:

And if the burning "candle" of the Muscovite state, which for decades pursued, undeviatingly and inexorably, the policy of uniting the Russian lands under the rule of Moscow, was not extinguished, this was largely due to Metropolitan Aleksii (page 243).

The self-sacrificing part played by Metropolitan Filipp, who courageously rebelled against the tyranny of Ivan the Terrible and defended the people against the Tsar's *oprichina*, is also emphasized.

Glazunov devotes much space to the icons and murals in Russian Orthodox churches. There is a whole page about the Icon of the Mother of God of Vladimir, where we read:

The entire history of the Russian people is associated with this work. The fate of the icon has been closely followed by the Chronicle, by special "stories" and "narratives" and by learned historical works of former times (page 240).

If one collates the numerous patriotic utterances of members of the Soviet intelligentsia of today, one finds something which has nothing in common with so-called Soviet patriotism. Indeed, one may detect an unmistakeable refutation of the Communist interpretation of the role of the Church. Party theoreticians represent religion as an instrument of spiritual enslavement, while the intellectuals regard it as a vehicle of popular enlightenment, a fountainhead of culture and a stimulus to the highest aspirations.

This change in the meaning of patriotism has been accompanied by a modification of the idea of internationalism. In intellectual circles, one may detect a desire for objective consideration of the non-Communist world, for philosophical tolerance and for a critical treatment of "Soviet reality." The new outlook may be found reflected in the works of such popular writers as V. Nekrasov, K. Paustovsky, Ilya Ehrenburg, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, Boris Slutsky, A. Voznesensky and others. In these circumstances, it is clear that internationalism is bound to lose the narrowly political, tendentious significance that it had for many decades.

It is not surprising to find that the Party leaders are attempting through the press to restore the terms "patriotism" and "internationalism" to their former meaning. In an earlier number of *Kommunist*, there was an article on political education which said:

Political education cannot be complete without developing in people a feeling of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 10, page 19).

This rather unnatural combination does not always occur. In an article by N. Savinkin, deputy head of the Party Central Committee's Department of Administrative Organs, on the work of DOSAAF, we are told:

Particular attention [in DOSAAF] is devoted to strengthening the military-patriotic education of youth and training it for military service, to attracting young men and women on a large scale to study the foundations of military science and practice the military-technical aspects of sport (*Partiinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 15, page 56).

The main purpose of the article is to publicize the work of DOSAAF, and its tone is decidedly militaristic. We are told, for example:

Whenever there is talk of strengthening the military-patriotic education of the workers, some officials raise the question: does this not contradict our policy of peace? Whoever thinks this is profoundly mistaken (*ibid.*).

In this long article, a great deal is said about "military-patriotic education" but nothing at all about proletarian or any other internationalism. Obviously, when it is a matter of the country's defense, internationalism becomes irrelevant.

In a word, in the two planes here considered—the economic and the ideological—, there are obvious conflicts: in the one case, between reality and utopia, in the other, between reality and Party dogma.

A. Gayev

La Légion tchécoslovaque en Russie 1914-1920

By J. F. N. BRADLEY

Published in cooperation with the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1965, 152 pages.

In this study, based on old and new archive material, of the military and political activity of the Czech Legion in Russia from 1914 to 1920, Mr. Bradley demonstrates the tendentiousness and untenability of Soviet allegations to the effect that the conflict between the Legion and the Soviet authorities was provoked by the British and French, and allegations by Czech "bourgeois" historians and memoir writers that the Legion began and subsequently led the struggle against Bolshevism in Russia.

The Czechoslovak Legion in Russia was set up as part of the Allied forces. The intention was to rush the Legion over to France; the Bolshevik Revolution, however, found it in the process of formation, and the subsequent changes on the Eastern Front made it difficult for it to be used. Finally, in February 1918, after an unsuccessful attempt to transfer it to the Rumanian front, the Legion was ordered to leave for France *via* Vladivostok, a corresponding agreement with the Soviet government having been signed. France, however, did not have the ships required to move the Legion, while the Western allies entertained hopes of persuading the Bolsheviks to join in the fight against Germany. The French government was thus compelled to delay the Legion's transfer to Vladivostok. Moreover, units of the Legion were being held up on their way to Vladivostok by the local Bolshevik authorities, who were either threatening to disarm them outright or demanding that they surrender at least some of their arms. At the same time, the Soviet government was busy setting up Czech Communist military units and trying to undermine the Legion from within by propaganda. In the face of these difficulties, the Western allies proposed in April 1918 that a second assembly point be established at Arkhangelsk. This proposal was accepted by the Soviet government, which on April 21 gave instructions for all echelons west of Omsk to be stopped for subsequent transfer to Arkhangelsk. The Czechs, however, separated from each other and from their Western protectors, and fearful of a continued advance eastwards by the Germans, saw in these instructions a "German-Bolshevik intrigue" and categorically refused to turn back. Clashes between the legionnaires on the one hand and local Bolshevik authorities and Czech Communist units on the other became more and more frequent, and on May 21 the Soviet government ordered the disarming of the legionnaires, who thereupon entered into open conflict with the Bolsheviks. By this time, the White Volunteer Army and the insurgent Don region had become solid centers of anti-Communist resistance—the Don Cossack region as well as the Northern Caucasus were being purged of Bolshevik elements—, so that the assertion that the Czech Legion led the anti-Communist struggle is contradicted by the very sequence of events.

In May and June of the same year, the Legion received no leadership or support from the Western Allies. Giving up its previous position of neutrality

vis-à-vis the dissident forces in Russia, the Legion went over to the anti-Bolshevik side and in particular gave protection to the Socialist Revolutionary Movement. Only in late June did the British and French governments, having decided to set up a "second front against Germany," approve the rebellion of the Legion and recognize it as the vanguard of the Allies in the East. They began taking measures to strengthen this front, or at least to unite the anti-Communist forces in Siberia, the French general Janin being appointed commander in chief of the region, but these attempts were desultory and not backed up by effective military aid or outright military intervention. The US government categorically rejected intervention, while the subsequent intervention by the Japanese was basically at variance with the plans of the Western Allies. In this confused and hopeless situation, the First Division of the Legion mutinied, expelling its officers and finally deserting the front. There was also a conflict with Admiral Kolchak, who refused to take orders from Janin, the result being that in January 1919 the Second Division was also withdrawn from the front. The entire Legion was generally demoralized, and wanted nothing more than to return to Czechoslovakia, which by that time had received its independence. The Legion's motto was "To Vladivostok by Force of Arms!" For a considerable period, however, the Legion was kept in Siberia in the hope that it could be compelled to fight on Kolchak's side or else sent to link up with Denikin. Nevertheless, the legionnaires, seeing that military intervention on the part of the Western Allies was not forthcoming, remained inactive and refused to accept any orders. Under these circumstances, on September 28, 1919, the order was given to evacuate the Legion—*via* Vladivostok.

Professor Bradley sheds light on events connected with the beginning of the Civil War and the Bolshevik take-over which hitherto had been little known and misrepresented. From a maze of conflicting evidence, he succeeds in producing an objective historical account.

P. Urban

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

August 1966

1 Party Central Committee discusses impending first session of Supreme Soviet of seventh convocation.

Session held of Councils of Elders of Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities of Supreme Soviet.

Announcement that All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions has adopted resolution on sending Vietnam additional material aid in the form of 500,000 rubles' worth of medicaments, medical equipment, ambulances and other transportation means.

Head of State Civil Aviation Research Institute N. A. Zakharov announces that new Soviet 900-kilometers-per-hour 160-passenger turbojet "TU-154" is soon to replace models "TU-104," "IL-18" and "AN-10" (see also under August 4), and that medium-capacity "YAK-40," to replace "LI-2" and "AN-2" on local lines, is under construction.

Conference of heads of invention departments of Comecon countries begins in Kiev, a Cuban delegation attending in an observational capacity.

Rocket-carrier "Boiky" leaves Sebastopol as flagship of Soviet naval detachment to pay courtesy visit to UAR.

Annual school for cosmophysicists begins in Yakutsk, where Institute of Cosmophysical Research and Aeronomy is located.

West German exhibition of electronic measuring instruments and communications equipment opens in Moscow.

2 First session of Supreme Soviet of seventh convocation opens.

Session of Council of the Union opened by senior deputy K. A. Fedin, First Secretary of Board of USSR Union of Writers. I. V. Spiridonov elected Chairman of Council of the Union, and N. N. Rodionov Chairman of Council's Mandate Commission.

Session of Council of Nationalities opened by senior deputy D. S. Korotchenko, Chairman of Presidium of Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. J. I. Paleckis elected Chairman of Coun-

cil of Nationalities, and A. P. Vader Chairman of Council's Mandate Commission.

Joint session of Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities held under chairmanship of I. V. Spiridonov. Speech on formation of standing commissions of both Councils delivered by Chairman of Supreme Soviet Presidium N. V. Podgorny.

Secretary General of Italian Communist Party Luigi Longo arrives in USSR for holiday.

Delegation from Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace led by Professor F. G. Zakharov leaves for Tokyo following invitation by organizers of Hiroshima-Nagasaki conference.

Tenth anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations between USSR and Nepal.

3 First session of Supreme Soviet of seventh convocation comes to an end. Supreme Soviet Presidium elected (a resolution having been adopted under which latter now consists of a Chairman, 15 Deputy Chairmen—one from each Union republic—, a Secretary, and 20 Members). Council of Ministers constituted.* Soviet government's main domestic and foreign policies approved. Standing commissions of Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities formed, as well as new Union-republic Ministry of Education. Decree "On the Criminal Responsibility of Aliens and Stateless Persons for Malicious Infringement of Traffic Regulations on the Territory of the USSR" approved.

General meeting of USSR Parliamentary Group held. Report on activities of Parliamentary Group's Committee since April 25, 1962, delivered by Group Chairman I. V. Spiridonov. Spiridonov elected Chairman, Paleckis First Deputy Chairman, Supreme Soviet Deputy N. S. Bonov Deputy Chairman and Deputy V. L. Kudryavtsev Secretary of the Group. Bureau members and Section Chairmen elected.

Announcement that Political Literature Publishing House has put out second volume of six-volume *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, which covers period from 1904 to February 1917.

* See footnote on page 61.

- 4 Minister of Civil Aviation Y. F. Loginov announces at press-conference that in one or two years "Aeroflot" will be receiving "TU-134" and "IL-62" jetliners, "TU-154" turbojet and first Soviet supersonic passenger jet, the "TU-144."

Eighteenth International Congress of Psychologists opens in Moscow. First speech delivered by Congress President Professor A. N. Leontev.

- 5 All-Union seminar of secretaries of Party committees of agricultural machinery enterprises opens in Volgograd. Seminar devoted to the problem of educating workers to be economy-minded.

Soviet Foreign Ministry delivers note to US Embassy in Moscow in connection with "new acts of US armed forces respecting Soviet merchant ships in port of Haiphong."

Delegation of Burmese journalists led by editor of government newspaper *Ludu Pidu Neisin* arrives in Moscow in response to invitation by USSR Journalists' Union.

Publication of joint communiqué following visit to USSR of Iraqi government delegation led by Premier Abdul Rahman Al-Bazzaz.

UAR Deputy Premier and Minister for Industry, Mineral Wealth and Electricity, Dr. Mustafa Khalil, arrives in Moscow following invitation by Soviet government.

- 6 Soviet Party delegation led by V. M. Bushuyev, member of Party's Central Auditing Commission and Head of Party Central Committee's Chemical Industry Department, leaves for Bucharest in response to invitation by Central Committee of Rumanian Communist Party in order to acquaint itself with latter party's experience in planning and expanding Rumanian chemical and petroleum industries.

Second session of joint Soviet-Finnish commission on use of frontier water systems ends in Moscow.

- 7 Air show held at Tushino Aerodrome on occasion of opening of Fourth World Aerobatic Championships.

Council of Ministers adopts resolution on expanding hotel facilities for foreign tourists.

Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev leaves for Brazil for trade negotiations.

Floating fish factory "Leningradskaya slava," last of eight built in Western Germany for USSR, launched in Kiel.

Soviet Party delegation consisting of Central Committee Member and First Secretary of Leningrad Oblast Committee V. S. Tolstikov (head of delegation) and Deputy Head of Central Committee's International Department Y. I. Kuskov leaves for Montevideo to attend Nineteenth Congress of Uruguayan Communist Party.

Railroad Worker's Day.

- 8 Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-127."

Rumanian Grand National Assembly delegation led by Vice-Chairman Gheorghe Necula arrives in Moscow on official visit.

Chairman of Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin receives Turkish Grand National Assembly delegation.

Supreme Soviet Presidium's decree "On Increasing Responsibility for Hooliganism" comes into effect.

- 9 Seventh Congress of Representatives of Consumers' Cooperatives of the USSR, attended by representatives from foreign cooperative organizations and from International Co-operative Alliance, opens in Moscow. Report delivered by Board Chairman of Central Union of Consumers' Cooperatives A. P. Klimov.

Iranian parliamentary delegation led by Senate President Jafar Sharif-Emami arrives in Moscow in response to invitation by Supreme Soviet.

- 10 Announcement that Podgotny is to pay official visit to Austria October 10-17.

Professor Vittorio Valletta, Honorary President of Fiat automobile firm, arrives in Moscow.

- 11 Announcement that protocol has been signed in Rio de Janeiro according to which USSR is to supply Brazil with machinery and equipment to a value of up to 100,000,000 dollars during 1966-69 on a commercial credit basis.

- 12 Mali parliamentary delegation led by First Vice-President of National Assembly Yacouba Maiga arrives in Moscow on official visit.

Announcement that large deposits of rich tin ore have been discovered a few dozen kilometers from Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

- 13 Festival of Peace and Friendship Between the Peoples of Northern Europe opens in Murmansk, attended by over 500 guests from polar regions of Sweden, Norway and Fin-

land, as well as delegations from Moscow, Leningrad, Baltic republics, Karelia and RSFSR oblasts.

Physical Culturist's Day.

Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees that third Sunday in September shall be celebrated each year as Forestry Worker's Day.

- 14 Announcement that Council of Ministers and All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions have adopted resolution "On the Organization of an All-Union Socialist Competition in Agriculture."

Announcement that Soviet government has adopted resolution calling for production of extra 588 million rubles' worth of consumer goods, including leather footwear, knitwear, domestic electrical appliances, chemical household products, motor- and pedal-cycles, canned milk and whole-milk products, in 1966.

Announcement that Council of Ministers has adopted resolution calling for expansion of Soviet jewelry industry.

Announcement that Party Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member M. A. Suslov and Party Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev have received First Secretary of Greek Communist Party Koliannis.

Announcement that Soviet Foreign Ministry has declared D. Gavish, Second Secretary of Israeli Embassy in Moscow, *persona non grata* for "activities incompatible with the status of an accredited diplomat."

Announcement that Council of Ministers has empowered directors of industrial enterprises subordinate to all-Union and Union-republic ministries to engage top scientists as consultants. This measure is designed to reduce delays in industrial exploitation of scientific and technical achievements.

Builder's Day.

- 15 Secretary General of UN Trade and Development Conference, Raúl Prebisch, arrives in Moscow.

UNESCO Director-General René Maheu arrives in Moscow in response to invitation by USSR Commission for UNESCO Affairs.

Fifth All-Union Conference on the Use of Trace Elements in Agriculture and Medicine opens in Irkutsk.

Thirteenth World Poultry Congress opens in Kiev.

Agreement signed in Moscow between Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry and Fiat automobile firm on scientific and technical cooperation in construction in USSR of passenger automobile factory with an annual capacity of 600,000 automobiles. Fiat to grant USSR ten-year 300,000,000-dollar credit.

Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees that last Sunday in September is to be celebrated each year as Machine-Builder's Day.

- 16 Seventh session of RSFSR Supreme Soviet of sixth convocation opened in Moscow by Chairman V. I. Krestyaninov. Agenda includes discussion on extending construction of amenities in rural areas (speaker: First Deputy Chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers K. G. Pysin); approval of decrees of RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Session of Council of Elders of RSFSR Supreme Soviet opens in Moscow.

Announcement that construction of the 3,200,000-kilowatt Reft state district thermal power station is under construction in vicinity of Asbest (Sverdlovsk Oblast).

International Congress of Mathematicians opens in Moscow. Introductory speech delivered by President of USSR Academy of Sciences M. V. Keldysh. Academician I. G. Petrovsky elected President of the Congress.

Announcement that new monthly journal *Materialno-tekhnicheskoye snabzheniye* (Material and Technical Supply), organ of the pertinent State Committee, has begun publication.

- 17 Seventh session of RSFSR Supreme Soviet comes to an end. Resolution passed on improving living conditions in rural areas

Senegalese legal delegation arrives in Moscow on study visit in response to invitation by USSR Supreme Court.

World's Poultry Science Association elects Soviet professor E. Penionzhkevich as its President.

Agreement signed in Conakry under which USSR is to help Guinea develop its information service.

- 18 Talks take place between representatives of Soviet Communist Party, including Secretary General L. I. Brezhnev and Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev, and Italian Communist Party, including Secretary General Luigi Longo, on questions of mutual and world interest.

Regular meeting of USSR Commission for UNESCO Affairs held in Moscow. Speech delivered by visiting UNESCO Director-General René Maheu.

Second Soviet-Japanese peace and friendship meeting opens in Khabarovsk. Soviet delegation led by Supreme Soviet Deputy and First Deputy Board Chairman of "USSR-Japan" Society A. P. Shitikov.

International seminar on organization of epidemiological services, arranged by World Health Organization, opens in Moscow.

Secretary General of US Communist Party, Gus Hall, arrives in Moscow for holiday following invitation by Party Central Committee.

Air Force Day.

- 19 Publication of TASS denial of Greek newspapers' allegation that under Soviet-Yugoslav agreement 6,000 Greeks, mainly Communists, are being resettled from USSR to Skopje with a view to creating a "Greater Macedonia" including Greek Macedonia.

UAR Arab Socialist Union delegation arrives in Moscow on study visit.

Announcement that Council for Secondary General Education Problems is to be set up under Ministry of Education to secure fullest possible consideration of Union-republic needs in this sphere. It is to include the Minister, his deputies, the President of the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences, and the Education Ministers of the Union republics. Academy of Pedagogic Sciences of RSFSR to be converted into Academy of Pedagogic Sciences of USSR. RSFSR Council of Ministers given permission to set up Scientific Research Institute for Schools of the Ministry of Education of the RSFSR in Moscow.

- 20 Announcement that oil deposit has been discovered on shores of Lake Chebache, in northern part of Tomsk Oblast.
- 21 Chairman of State Committee for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, S. K. Romanovsky, arrives in Teheran to sign Soviet-Iranian cultural agreement.

Delegation from Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and Soviet-Rumanian Friendship Society, led by latter's Deputy Board Chairman and Member of Supreme Soviet Presidium and Party Central Committee

V. I. Konotop, leaves for Bucharest to celebrate twenty-second anniversary of Rumania's liberation from German occupation.

Announcement that delegation from Rumanian Society for Friendly Relations with the Soviet Union has arrived in Moscow to celebrate this anniversary.

- 22 Deputy Chairman of Supreme Soviet Presidium K. F. Ilyashenko receives Zambian goodwill mission led by Vice-President Kamanga.

Kuwaiti Commerce and Industry Minister Abdulla Al-Jabir As-Sabah arrives in Moscow to discuss expansion of Soviet-Kuwaiti trade.

Soviet government delivers note to West German government protesting against "Law on Exemption from German Jurisdiction for a Limited Period."

- 23 Agreement signed in Conakry under which USSR is to continue assisting Guinea in geological prospecting.

All-Union Food Industry Workers' Conference opens in Moscow. Speech delivered by Food Industry Minister V. P. Zotov, who announces that Soviet food production is to be increased by approximately 40 percent under Five-Year Plan. Participants include Party Central Committee Politburo Member and First Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers K. T. Mazurov and Supreme Soviet Presidium Member A. I. Mikoyan.

Announcement that King Hassan II of Morocco has accepted invitation to pay official visit to USSR.

- 24 Launching of Soviet moon probe "Luna-11."

Publication of TASS statement on allegations made by Western press and Nigerian circles in connection with recent Nigerian military *coup* to the effect that USSR was interested in Nigeria's disintegration.

- 25 Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers pass resolution on continued expansion of physical culture and sport.

Finnish President Urho Kekkonen arrives in Sochi for holiday at invitation of Soviet government, being met at Adler Airport by Kosygin and other official persons.

Signing of Soviet-Zambian cultural agreement, also covering education and health.

Announcement that Board Chairman of "Novosti" Press Agency B. S. Burkov and Information Minister of Congo (Brazzaville)

have signed agreement on cooperation between "Novosti" Press Agency and Agence Congolaise d'Information.

Brezhnev and Podgorny arrive in Kiev to visit international poultry exhibition.

Publication of TASS announcement that during period August 26—October 25 USSR will be launching rockets into area of Pacific having radius of 40 miles and a center with coordinates 26°50' N and 176°10' E.

- 26 First Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers D. S. Polyansky receives Canadian Deputy Agriculture Minister Robert Glen.

Soviet Foreign Ministry delivers note to Chinese People's Republic protesting against "hooligan excesses" in front of Soviet Embassy in Peking.

Discussion takes place in Party Central Committee headquarters between Suslov and First Secretary of (West) German Communist Party Max Reimann on international situation, problems of world Communism, European security, situation in Western Germany and other questions of interest to both parties. Deputy Head of Party Central Committee's International Department, Y. I. Kuskov, also present.

Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees that second Sunday in October be celebrated yearly as Agricultural Workers' Day.

- 27 First Secretary of East German Socialist Unity Party and Chairman of East German State Council, Walter Ulbricht, arrives in Minsk on friendly visit accompanied by wife.

Joint maneuvers of East German People's Army and Soviet Army held in northern part of Eastern Germany.

Soviet-Turkish economic talks begin in Ankara. Soviet delegation led by Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev.

Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-128."

Austrian parliamentary delegation arrives in Moscow on official visit in response to invitation by Supreme Soviet.

All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions gives reception for participants in second Soviet-Japanese peace and friendship meeting. Those present include Central Council's Chairman, V. V. Grishin, and Head of Mass Movements Department of General Council of Trade Unions of Japan, Sukio Iwadare.

Cultural cooperation agreement signed between Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, "USSR-Japan" Society and Tokyo Society for Japano-Soviet Friendship and Relations.

- 28 Miner's Day.

Announcement that, in order to "stimulate production of fine arts works with military-patriotic themes," Council of Ministers has instituted one gold and three silver medals named after Soviet battle painter M. B. Grekov, to be awarded yearly on basis of joint decision by Ministry of Culture, Board of USSR Artists' Union and Central Political Department of Soviet Army and Navy.

- 29 Agreement signed in Belgrade under which USSR is to render Yugoslavia economic and technical assistance in construction and expansion of industrial enterprises.

- 30 Broadened session of Soviet Committee for Relations with Asian and African Writers, at which latter are represented, opened in Baku by Chairman S. Azimov. Main topic of discussion is participation of writers in movement of solidarity with Vietnamese people.

Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees that third Sunday in October be celebrated yearly as Food Industry Workers' Day.

- 31 International conference on low-temperature physics opened in Moscow by Academician P. L. Kapitsa.

Changes and Appointments

- 2 L. V. Spiridonov and J. I. Paleckis elected, respectively, Chairmen of Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities of Supreme Soviet.
- 3 Supreme Soviet Presidium elects its Presidium and constitutes Council of Ministers.*
- 7 G. L. Zhurbenko appointed Deputy Minister of Instrument Making, Automatic Devices and Control Systems.
- 14 A. G. Rutsky appointed First Deputy Minister of Chemical and Oil Equipment Production.

* For details of these changes, see "Leading Positions and Personalities in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government," Supplement to *Bulletin*, 1966, No. 9

N. A. Obolensky appointed First Deputy Minister of the Electrical Engineering Industry.

A. P. Aleksandrov appointed Deputy Minister of Power and Electrification.

- 21 V. F. Stenis appointed Deputy Minister of Higher and Special Secondary Education responsible for personnel.

V. I. Popov appointed Deputy Minister of Culture.

Major Generals of Aviation B. P. Bugayev and L. V. Zholudev appointed Deputy Ministers of Civil Aviation.

A. I. Savinykh relieved of duties of Deputy Minister of Power and Electrification.

- 26 A. G. Kulazhenkov appointed Ambassador to Senegal and Gambia, replacing V. I. Yero-feyev, who is transferred to other work.

- 28 V. N. Tretyakov appointed First Deputy Minister of Instrument Making, Automatic Devices and Control Systems.

- 30 N. P. Vazhnov appointed Ambassador to Iceland, replacing N. K. Tupitsyn, who is transferred to other work.

Notes on Contributors

OLGIN, C. Born in Orel in 1904. Emigrated to the West after the Revolution. B.Sc.(Eng.), University of London; Associate Member of the Institute of Electrical Engineers, London. Since World War II, has made a study of Soviet philosophy and ideology.

HAJENKO, FEDOR. Economist specializing in the economic aspects of labor. Born and educated in the USSR, where he worked for many years in the planning departments of heavy industrial plants. Now a member of the research staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

BUSH, KERRH. Born in 1929 in London. Trained at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University (M.A.). Analyst of current economic developments in the Soviet Union.

KASHIN, A. Born 1927 in Shanghai, son of a Russian émigré family. Grew up in China. In 1946, took Soviet citizenship and until 1948 worked as a TASS correspondent. In that year, wrote an open letter to the Shanghai press renouncing his Soviet citizenship on ethical grounds. After the Communists' seizure of Shanghai, was several times arrested and in 1952 expelled from China. Since then, has been living in Western Germany and working as a free-lance journalist.

GAYEV, ARKADY. Journalist. Worked for *Pravda* and *Izvestia* and also for the Soviet regional press from 1921 until World War II, since when he has been living in Munich. A regular contributor of articles on Soviet literature and the Soviet press to the publications of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

URBAN, P. Born in Belorussia in 1924. Graduated in history from the University of Louvain in 1954. Member of the research staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, specializing in Soviet historiography and education.

1 DEC 1966

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ARTICLES

The Relationship Between the Structure of Society and the Armed Forces as Illustrated by the USSR

NIKOLAI GALAY

The following article, of which we are here publishing the first half (the second half is to appear in the December issue of the *Bulletin*), is the complete text of a paper delivered by Mr. Galay at the Sixth World Congress of Sociology held September 4–11 in Evian (France), in the working group on "The Professional Military Men and Militarism" of the section "Sociology of International Relations." The approximately 2,000 participants in the Congress included over 100 from the Soviet Union, ten of whom were among the 50–60 participants in the author's group. This group was headed by Major General Zhilin, a Doctor of Historical Sciences and Professor at the Frunze Academy, who during the proceedings made an official statement on behalf of the Soviet representatives in the group expressing "rage and indignation" over Mr. Galay's paper, which was termed "cold-war propaganda." Even after the author's reply, however, Zhilin declined to offer any criticism of either the paper's contents or its analytical methods. We leave the reader to form his own opinion of the "objectivity" of this Soviet appraisal.

Preliminary Remarks

The sociology of a country's armed forces may be studied on a large and on a small scale. In the latter case, we are concerned, so to speak, with "microsociology," with a study of the "molecular" structure of the military system as seen from a social point of view. We are, that is to say, concerned with a study of the smallest groups that make up the system and with the problems associated with them—hierarchical relations, authority, frictions and conflicts, organizational and psychological control as revealed in an examination of such small groups taken specifically. Such a study is of great importance for establishing what it is that determines the morale and conduct, both in combat and in everyday life, of the individual soldier and of these primary groups.

In this paper, however, we shall concern ourselves with the subject as seen on a large scale, with what one might term the "macrosociology" of a country's military system. Here we have to do with the character of society and of its main components, i.e., whole strata or classes, and with their influence upon the structure of the armed forces. Such an approach is of importance for determining the part played by these large-scale social groups and also by functional, supra-class organizations—in this case, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—in the functioning of the military system. In addition, there is the influence exerted by the military system upon the structure of society.

The sociological study of military systems, whether on a large or a small scale, inevitably entails great difficulties, mainly due to the problem where to

draw the line between the spheres of influence of social factors on the one hand and of technological factors on the other, for in reality all of them are closely bound together into a single complex which determines the outlook and morale of the individual and of the smallest social groups. Contemporary sociologists interested in military systems as social organisms have done some interesting work in analysing this complex and the "behavior guidance" resulting from it. In addition, the "macrosociological" approach has to take account of the national and racial factors, which on the plane of mass psychology also play their part.

Another important difficulty attendant upon any study of the period beginning with the Industrial Revolution of the last century is that here the social factors have been thrust into the background by technological progress—the discovery of new forms of energy, the emergence of new processes and inventions, which, so far as they concerned the art of war, have been decisive in molding the development of military systems. In the atomic age of today, technology is exercising an even greater influence, not only on military systems, but on the structure of society: the modern military revolution and the Second Industrial Revolution accompanying it are even producing a certain similarity between the military systems of the two political and social antagonists, the USSR and the USA. The shift of emphasis to nuclear missiles, the strategy of the constant mutual nuclear deterrent, the evolution of military systems from armies running into the millions to smaller forces of a semiprofessional character—all this is tending to assimilate the armed services of the USSR and the USA to one another not only in the technological and strategic aspects but also to a certain degree in a social sense.

Despite all this, at every stage the influence of social factors has in fact been of no less importance, by determining the morale and the outlook of both the individuals and the social groups which make up these systems. At more than one stage, this influence has had a no less revolutionary effect than that of technological discoveries. A good example may be seen in the era of the French Revolution and Napoleon, during which, as during the periods immediately preceding and following, there were no outstanding technological developments to obscure the issue. Technologically, the armies of the Revolution and their opponents scarcely differed from one another, whereas socially they were diametrically opposed. The professional armies of Austria, Prussia, England and Russia reflected the more or less feudal regimes of these countries, while the French forces were those of a country that had destroyed the old feudal barriers, proclaimed universal equality of rights and raised patriotism and national pride to the highest place. It was these new social factors that created the dynamic force of the French army, which Napoleon put to good use. Thanks to the new structure of French society, it became possible for the first time since the Punic Wars to create mass armies by means of universal conscription and to equip them by recruiting the services of the country's entire population. The new social basis was reflected both in the aggressive nature of French policy and in the strategy of the French army, which with its greatly increased resources of personnel

automatically adopted a strategy of annihilation, i.e., resolute offensive operations designed to *annihilate* the enemy's forces.

On the other hand, the forces of the Coalition, limited by the narrow social base of a quasi-feudal society and composed of small professional armies which it was difficult to supplement by means of recruitment, were compelled to stick to the old strategy of attrition, i.e., of limited strategic aims, in order to avoid frequent bloody engagements because of the difficulty of replacing losses in men.

The French revolutionary troops' unprecedented maneuverability and relative independence from the then normal "five-days'-march logistics," i.e., the necessity of not advancing farther than five days' march from base stores, enabled them to make better use of the theater of war, i.e., to live off their own and the enemy's territory. The reason for this was the self-discipline of the revolutionary recruits in the French army, which no longer needed to fear the wide dispersion of troops not in action or the danger that troops would desert when sent out in small foraging parties.

The effect of the new social structure was not, however, confined to strategy, but also made itself felt in the tactical sphere. Whereas the feudal armies, cramped together in narrow formations, could maneuver only clumsily when under fire, the French army adopted the tactics of deploying its front ranks, while support was provided by battalions, regimental and divisional columns in the rear. Naturally, these tactics were already known to feudal armies, having been called into existence by the enhanced importance of fire arms, but they were much better suited to the French troops than to the feudal armies: behind the screen provided by the front-line troops, a screen made firmly impenetrable by their social and national consciousness, the main French forces could maneuver conveniently and confidently and on the decisive sector win the advantage necessary for victory.

This digression into a period of military history where the influence of social factors can be examined, as in a laboratory, in isolation from other factors, demonstrates the importance of the social factor. The present day, too, offers extremely interesting material for study, namely, the Communist *coup* of 1917 in Russia and its subsequent social "extension," as exemplified in the creation of the Soviet army and its evolution over almost fifty years. Limitations of space compel us to confine ourselves to a few of the main aspects of the subject, of which the most illustrative are perhaps the following: (1) the chief characteristics of the structure of Soviet society and the Soviet military system; (2) the methods employed in the artificial creation of a new structure of society and of its armed forces; (3) the efficiency of the Soviet military system in peace and war; and (4) the extent to which social factors are capable of exerting an influence upon the country's military system.

The Structure of Soviet Society and the Soviet Military System

The Communist *coup* of 1917 proved to be not only a political but also a profound social revolution, whose chief feature, when considered in the latter aspect, is its artificiality as compared with the evolutionary character of most

social developments in history. This artificiality was due to two important facts—the incongruity of the theoretical prerequisites of Marxist ideology as seen against the background of the social structure of Russia in 1917, and the underestimation of the strength and durability of the national structure of states, of the viability of the very principle of the national state. The revolution took place, not in an industrial country with a powerful proletariat, but in a backward agricultural country of the population of which 85 percent were peasants and 4 percent industrial workers. Under such circumstances, the dictatorship of the proletariat, which numbered about 6,600,000, including something over 250,000 Party members, naturally constituted an inadequate social basis which had to be reinforced by a variety of artificial methods. Within the country, there were numerous political and social enemies of the new regime who could only be broken by the rapid establishment of a powerful military system, with the aid of which the Soviet leaders hoped to carry out an artificial remodeling of society by methods of revolutionary violence.

This powerful military system, however, was needed not only to deal with internal enemies in the Civil War of 1918–21; it was also required to back up the challenge which the Communist regime in Russia threw down to the outside world, calling upon the proletariat of all capitalist national states to follow the example of the Russian social revolution. The appeal issued by the Council of People's Commissars in November 1917 to all the peoples of Europe, who at that time were still involved in a world war and divided into the two camps of the Entente and the Central Powers, to cease military operations immediately and “over the heads of their bourgeois governments” set up their own councils of soldiers’ and workers’ deputies, demonstrated the aspirations of the October social revolution to become a movement of international significance. (Theoretically, this had already been demonstrated some seventy years before in Marx’s *Communist Manifesto*.) It is obvious that a military system was doubly necessary for a country that had set itself the goal of building socialism on a worldwide scale.

Soviet theoreticians, both civilian and military, have on many occasions pointed out that Marx and Engels left neither theoretical nor practical guidance of any kind for creating the military system of a socialist country. In 1958, Marshal Bagramyan wrote:

...the creation of the Red Army was complicated by the fact that we were the first in the world [’s history] who had to build...[such an army] without any kind of experience. Not only that: this question was also not settled in Marxist literature.¹

Marshal Bagramyan is only partly right: both Marx and Engels did attempt—admittedly very half-heartedly—to outline a solution to the problem, but in doing so had in mind circumstances very different from those actually attendant upon the revolution in Russia. Marx envisaged the “dictatorship of the proletariat” as the domination of the overwhelming majority over an insignificant minority, while Lenin was faced with the task of establishing the domination of an in-

¹ *Kommunist*, 1958, No. 2, p. 35.

significant minority over the overwhelming majority. Consequently, as the Communist leaders soon came to realize, Marx's idea that a regular army under socialism was unnecessary and could be replaced by a kind of militia whose officers were elected was inapplicable under Soviet conditions.

Marx's main idea, however, that society and the armed forces should be organized and ruled on a class basis, was adopted. The inadequacy of the revolution's social basis, referred to above, necessitated the artificial creation of a new ruling stratum in the form of the Communist Party, entry into which was open primarily to the working class and which bore the exclusive, also functional, character almost of a monastic order. This organization was placed above the entire system of state and non-state bodies—the soviets at all levels and all the various professional and “public” organizations. Right at the beginning, the Party's role was described by the Soviet leaders in the following terms:

Not one important political or organic question is decided by any state institution in our republic without guiding instructions from the Party Central Committee.²

And again:

The Central Committee is so called because for the soviets, for the trade unions, for the provincial (*gubernskikh*) executive committees and for the entire working class it *is* the Central Committee. . . . Herein is expressed the dictatorship of the Party.³

In accordance with this new structure, the principle of class organization under the Party's guidance was made the basis of the country's new military system. The first decree issued by the Council of People's Commissars on the organization of the armed forces (January 28, 1918) declared:

The old army served as a weapon for the class oppression of the workers by the bourgeoisie. With the transfer of power to the workers and exploited classes, the need arose for the creation of a new army which should be a foundation of Soviet power. . . and provide support for the future socialist revolution in Europe. In view of this, the Council of People's Commissars orders the organization of a new army under the name of Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.⁴

This title included only the social concept—the class nature of the army—and completely ignored its national affiliation. (The analogous designation for the state itself—USSR—did not make its appearance until 1924; at first, the new socialist state was known as the RSFSR, which included the national designation “Russian.”) Thus, the country's armed forces were known right from the beginning by a name which had strong social connotations. The same is true today, for the name “Soviet Army,” adopted in 1946, changes nothing in this respect.

Indeed, not only the name but also the social basis which it stood for were understood right from the beginning in the broadest international sense. According to the Red Army's field service regulations of 1929, “the USSR is a prole-

² V. I. Lenin, *Sobraniye sochinenii* (Collected Works), Vol. XVII, p. 139, as quoted in Col. N. V. Pyatnitsky, *Krasnaya armiya SSSR* (The Soviet Red Army), Part I, Paris, 1931, p. 8.

³ *XII sessiia RKP: Stenograficheskiy otchet* (The Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party: Stenographic Report), p. 207, as quoted in Pyatnitsky, *op. cit.*, *ibid.*

⁴ *Pravda*, February 1, 1918.

tarian state, the first and only homeland for the workers in the world.” As for the Red Army itself, the regulations stated:

As the Soviet Union is the socialist homeland of the international proletariat, so the Red Army is open to the workers of all countries. The Red Army is genuinely the army of the international proletariat.⁵

This principle was demonstrated during the early days of the Red Army, in which international formations, as Soviet historians have pointed out at length, played an important part. In 1918–20, during the Civil War, Latvians, Chinese, Koreans, Czechs, Hungarians, Germans, Austrians, Finns, Rumanians and representatives of many other nationalities are described as having played an active political and military role in the events of the Civil War period, i.e., 1918–20.⁶ (They were recruited from prisoners taken by the Russian army in World War I and also from contingents of foreign workers formed to make up for the shortage of labor in Russia at that time. During World War I, there were 77,000 officers in Russian prisoner-of-war camps—22,000 Germans, 54,000 Austrians and 1,000 Turks and Bulgarians—and about two million men—160,000 Germans, 1,670,000 Austrians and 50,000 Turks and Bulgarians.) During the first few months of 1918, international detachments were organized at four hundred different points in Russia.⁷ During the years 1918–20, foreign “internationalists” made up two divisions, three brigades, 43 regiments, 28 independent battalions, six independent companies (including one Italian and one Turkish), one French platoon and 46 independent mixed detachments.⁸

The morale of these detachments is described by the Hungarian Sándor Sziklai in his recollections as follows: “We realized that here, in the wide open spaces of Russia, the fate of the workers of the whole world was now being determined. It was impossible to sit and do nothing.”⁹ That all this was of practical and not merely symbolical importance may be seen from the fact that the strength of the Red Army amounted to 264,000 men as of May 1, 1918, and to 362,000 two months later, rising by March 1919 to the level of 1,500,000 men, of whom as many as 700,000 were at the front. The presence of between 220,000 and 250,000 foreign volunteers in the Red Army’s ranks was a considerable contribution to Soviet military strength.¹⁰

⁵ V. Degtyarev, *Politrabota v Krasnoi Armii v voyennoye vremya* (Political Work in the Red Army in Wartime), Moscow, 1930, as quoted in Pyatnitsky, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁶ A. Zharov and V. Ustinov, *Internatsionalnye chasti v boyakh za vlast Sovetov* (International Units in the Fight for the Rule of the Soviets), Moscow, 1960, p. 23.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Appendix No. 5, pp. 155–58.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18. In 1918, Sziklai was one of the organizers and political commissar of the Red Army international regiment “Samar’sky Kommunar.” During the Spanish Civil War, he commanded a battalion in a Communist international brigade. In 1943, he was released from a French concentration camp and repatriated to the USSR, where he joined the Red Army. From 1944 on, he was in Hungary, where he was shot by anti-Communists in 1956.

¹⁰ N. Shatagin, *Organizatsiya i stroitelstvo Sovetskoi armii v 1918–20 gg.* (The Organization and Construction of the Soviet Army in 1918–20), Moscow, 1954, pp. 63 and 102.

However, the most important aspect of this phenomenon, which had far-reaching consequences, was the social one. The fact that these foreign volunteers shared the feeling of revolutionary enthusiasm and solidarity of the broad masses of the Russian population prompted the Communist leaders to claim that the October Revolution had opened a new stage in the history of nations and states, a stage whose significance consisted, so they considered, in the fact that the social revolution was doing away with the national principle and replacing it with the social principle. Indeed, it may be said that if the French Revolution prompted the assertion of the national principle, the Communist revolution of 1917 launched a new stage in which national organisms began to be stratified in the social plane. This stratification was a horizontal one—as opposed to the vertical divisions of national boundaries—extending throughout the mass of national organisms along the planes separating one class or social stratum from another. Although this social stratification was to be found to a greater or lesser degree in all states before the October Revolution, it had been broken, so to speak, by the vertical divisions of national or state boundaries, which had been as impenetrable as the watertight compartments of a ship. Thus, for example, although the French and German Socialist Parties had been in contact with one another through the Second International, as soon as World War I broke out they voted in their respective parliaments for all war budgets together with the bourgeois parties and joined the government coalitions of their respective countries, which were now at war with one another.

The Communist revolution in Russia broke through these vertical barriers, and the process of social stratification no longer stopped short at national boundaries but penetrated beyond them, overcoming patriotic feelings and national loyalties. The Communist leaders regarded this as the main source of their strength and felt themselves to be the sole possessors of a new social weapon, an “atomic” weapon capable of causing the social disintegration of their enemies and so bringing them to their final goal, that of a worldwide Communist revolution.

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The application of this new weapon, which could be used both in peace and in war, went through many stages and brought the USSR a number of definite successes, although it also produced an equal number of setbacks. On the one hand, it brought success during the Civil War in the form of victory over the enemies of the Revolution. On the other hand, its attempted application during the operations of hurriedly thrown together units of the Red Army against Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which had emerged during the Revolution by a process of self-determination, ended in 1919–20 in a series of inglorious failures despite the weakness of these states as compared with the Red giant that was the RSFSR. Hopes of provoking the proletariat in these countries to revolt as soon as small Red Army units appeared on their frontiers proved unjustified: the Communist prophet Lenin had underestimated the strength of the national element.

However, there was evidence of the importance of the new social weapon. The naval mutiny and disorders among the troops during France's intervention in southern Russia (1919), the Communist revolt in Hungary, the Communist *Putsch* and social unrest in defeated Germany, the growth of radical feelings in France and finally the strikes all over Europe of workers required to load equipment destined for use against the Red Army—all this testified to the vulnerability of the capitalist states' social foundations, which hampered them in their efforts to counteract the revolution in Russia. Consequently, the Communist leaders, instead of being discouraged by the first failures, drew their conclusions and modified their method of applying the new weapon. It was decided that the destruction by the Red Army of the national forces of the West was a prerequisite for success, and in this way in the middle of the twenties another argument appeared for strengthening the Red Army.

Another consequence of the stability of the national states and its military implications was an important modification of Communist doctrine: Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" was replaced by that of "building socialism in one country," introduced by Stalin with the object of eventually using the mailed fist (as opposed to a mere show of Red Army cavalry raids) to force a way for the effective use of the social weapon. All this necessitated the complete militarization of the new society's basis.

During the subsequent course of history, failures in the application of this weapon and its limited possibilities on more than one occasion affected the ideology and even the social basis itself of the USSR. In the middle of the fifties, the progress of the modern revolution in military technology obliged the Soviet leaders to modify their political doctrine by acknowledging that "wars are not unavoidable in our era," a modification which played an important part in Sino-Soviet disagreements and in the problems caused by the emergence of polycentrism in the Communist camp. Such modifications, however, representing the reverse influence of the military on the political and social system, did not affect the primary importance of social criteria in the Soviet armed forces.

In the course of time, an event of extreme—not to say tragic—significance for Communism occurred: this was the loss of its monopoly of the social weapon. At a critical moment, when the USSR came into conflict with National-Socialist Germany, which had developed an ideocratic system of its own based on a racial materialism (as opposed to the economic materialism of Communism), the USSR's chief weapon, that of social disintegration, came back on it like a boomerang: hundreds of thousands of Soviet subjects went over to the enemy's side in order to advance, weapon in hand, against their own Communist regime. The dialectical school of Communism had not been without its effect on its pupils: the Communist call of World War I to transform the war of states into a war against one's own government came to life again in World War II in a number of anti-Communist movements on Russian territory, as for example in that of General Vlasov. The danger of social disintegration at home became so great that to save their position the Soviet leaders even had, as a temporary measure,

to throw overboard the ideological and social *bagage* of Communism and rely on the national loyalty and patriotism of the population, which had previously been suppressed as something reactionary.

The reason lay in the fact that Soviet society not only harbored the chief faults of capitalism—the exploitation of labor (by the socialist state instead of by the capitalists) and the existence of antagonistic classes—but in the process of “building socialism” had aggravated them very considerably. By the end of the thirties, the attempt to build a socialist society by means of the dictatorship of the Party had virtually resulted in a return to a class state in which the privileged “estate” consisted of the one party that was tolerated, while all other groups—the working class, the collective farmers, the stratum of the technical intelligentsia and, finally, the inmates of the labor camps (who at that time amounted to something approaching eight million, out of a total population of 170 million, or 6–8 percent)—showed every sign of constituting antagonistic classes. This mutual antagonism was moderated only by a common antagonism of all dispossessed groups to the privileged group that was the Party.

In such circumstances, it was only natural and, indeed, inevitable that the new social weapon, of which the Communist leaders considered themselves to be the sole possessors, should suddenly be turned against them. After this monopoly had been lost, the social weapon became the common property of both the socialist and the non-socialist camp. Evidence in plenty of this fact is provided not only by World War II but also by the postwar period. Successes on the Communist side include the artificial implantation of Communist governments in the countries of Eastern Europe, where the Communist regime remained in power even after Soviet troops had been withdrawn from most of these countries. The victory of the Chinese Communists in the civil war (1949) was due to their use of the social weapon against the nationalists. The operations of the North Korean army in the war of 1950–53 and of North-Vietnamese troops against the French during the same period as well as in the present war in Vietnam show that the Communist leaders are in a position to create efficient military systems capable of wielding, *inter alia*, the social weapon. On the other hand, the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the necessity of maintaining Soviet occupation troops on a large scale in Eastern Germany—a necessity occasioned not only by military considerations but also by the powerful social effect exerted on Eastern by Western Germany—demonstrate that social factors may also be put to use by the anti-Communist side. Further evidence is provided by the fact that over twenty thousand Chinese prisoners-of-war refused to return home after the conclusion of the Korean War and sought refuge with their social enemies in Formosa. What is known as the “cold war” is in fact a prolonged skirmishing for position involving the use of the social weapon, i.e., each side is trying to undermine the social structure of the other without resorting to purely military means.

The development of atomic weapons has further increased the importance of social factors: in view of the present balance of nuclear power, a large-scale

war involving the use of atomic weapons has ceased to be a real instrument of politics, while the possibilities of conducting limited wars with conventional weapons are also dwindling because of the danger of their developing into an atomic conflict. Under these conditions, constant activity designed to undermine the opponent's social structure and simultaneously to strengthen one's own social structure is becoming a permanent feature in the life of modern states and an effective instrument of policy.

Despite the successes and failures already noted and in particular their loss of the monopoly of the social weapon, the present Soviet leaders, after almost fifty years' experience in its application, continue to regard it as the most important weapon in their military arsenal. It is not difficult to see that the Communist leaders intend to continue basing their social and military system on the class principle, which is the very principle that called the social weapon into being. The Party continues to be the leading caste in the structure of Soviet society, and its Third Program, adopted at the Twenty-Second Congress, not only proclaimed the forthcoming transition from socialism to Communism but also declared the "very foundation" of the Soviet military system to be the further strengthening of the guiding influence over it of the Party, i.e., the class principle.

It may therefore be asserted that in the foreseeable future humanity will have to live not only with the atomic but also with the social weapon. Herein lies the main "contribution" of the Soviet social and military system to the social development of contemporary humanity.

Methods Used in the Creation of the Soviet Social and Military System

The artificial, inorganic character of the process of building a Soviet social and military system, referred to above, was due not only to the radicalness of the revolution itself but also to measures deliberately planned by the Communist leaders. In their view, the old society and the old Russian army had to be destroyed before a really new system could be built:

Having come to power, the proletariat could not make use of the old state machine in its own interests. It had to destroy, to break up, the old bourgeois state apparatus and create a new one in its place. . . . The old army, by its organization, its purpose and spirit, could not be the mainstay of a Soviet state. The primary task was therefore to destroy it.¹¹

Both Communist and non-Communist historians of the Russian revolution are unanimous in recognizing the complete success of this work of destruction, carried out by Lenin to a considerable extent before the October *coup*. Having concluded a separate—as Lenin called it, a "shameful"—peace with Germany, withdrawn from the war and liquidated the old army, the Communist leaders were in a position to start their constructive work. The essence of their task lay in finding ways of building a socialist structure of society and a corresponding

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

military system in the absence of a proper social basis. Putting it specifically, what they had to do was to secure the domination of a numerically weak "proletariat," i.e., working class, over the new society and its armed forces. With regard to the latter, the approach adopted was the following:

We cannot entrust the right and the duty of defending our workers' and peasants' homeland, weapon in hand, to those small social groups whose interests are opposed to the interests of the workers.¹²

This was written some time later by People's Commissar M. Frunze. The first article of the law on compulsory (not universal) military service stated:

The protection of the USSR is the duty of all citizens of the Union... The armed defense of the USSR is carried out only by the workers... Non-working elements are charged with the performance of other military duties... as part of rear formations (manual labor).¹³

From the social and democratic point of view, this was the opposite of progress. After the liberation of the serfs in 1861 and the subsequent military reform introducing universal military service, Tsarist Russia began to assimilate herself, politically and socially, to those European states which had moved forward as a result of the revolutionary processes of the nineteenth century. This assimilation was realized in a number of reforms carried out by Alexander II, of which the military reform of 1874 abolished the old arbitrary system of recruitment, and drastically reduced the length of service from twenty to five years, in pursuance of the idea of an armed nation instead of a professional army. At the same time, the reform partly did away with the selection of officers according to the purely social criterion, which was largely replaced by the criterion of education. The Soviet military reform on the other hand, abandoned the principle of the equality of rights of all social classes as regards their service to the state, and so amounted to a restoration, in this respect, of the feudal distinctions of Russia of the pre-reform period.

The Soviet leaders were, however, immediately obliged to modify their attitude: the working class being unable on its own to realize the dictatorship of the proletariat and consequently also to be the sole foundation of the military system, the "poorest elements of the peasantry" were also admitted into the army, which consequently became known as the "workers' and peasants' army." These elements, however, were defined by Communist doctrine as "petty bourgeois" and potentially hostile to the Communist regime. Thus, it was the numerical weakness of the working class that was responsible for this first compromise.

As the Civil War proceeded and not only the influx of volunteers but also the mobilization of workers and "the poorest peasants" became inadequate in

¹² M. V. Frunze, *Krasnaya armiya i oborona Sovetskogo Soyuza* (The Red Army and the Defense of the Soviet Union), Moscow, 1925, p. 41.

¹³ "Osnovnoi zakon ob obyazatelnoi voyennoi sluzhbe" (Fundamental Law on Compulsory Military Service), Article 449 (1), 1928, published in *Sobraniye zakonov i rasporyazhenii* (Collected Laws and Decrees), Moscow, 1929.

view of the growing intensity of military operations, the class principle had to be sacrificed still further. As Stalin put it,

We did not succeed in creating the Red Army as a mass army until the second half of 1918, when the land had been parceled out by the peasants and the *kulak* sufficiently weakened. The Soviet regime had had time to establish itself, and then appeared the possibility of launching the slogan of a "permanent alliance with the *serednyak* [middle peasant]." ¹⁴

Despite these compromises, measures were improvised to preserve and strengthen the class principle in the armed forces. They were described by Lenin as follows:

How we proceeded at the most dangerous moments in the Civil War? . . . We concentrated our Party forces in the Red Army, we resorted to the mobilization of our workers, we turned to where the deepest roots of our dictatorship lay. ¹⁵

These improvised measures included special recruitments of volunteers from the working class, both during the period of the Red Guard and after its reformation as the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The appeal was launched: "We call upon all of you young proletarians of St. Petersburg to fight the bourgeoisie to the death." The slogan "Proletarians, to horse!" was issued to gather recruits for the cavalry; the mobilization of all Party members was organized in the various raions of the large cities; the miners of the Donbass were summoned to defend, weapon in hand, the "conquests of the Revolution"; finally, Party members were mobilized in a centralized campaign. This was what Lenin meant when he spoke of "turning to the roots of the dictatorship."

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The Civil War having been brought to a successful conclusion, these measures lost their improvised nature after certain studies had been carried out on the relationship between the social structure and fighting performance of individual units of the Red Army. These studies revealed that some units had served with especial distinction while others had shown themselves to be unstable. Thus, in an article "Ten Years of Party Organization" dealing with the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, V. Chernevsky came to the conclusion that those units that had distinguished themselves generally had a relatively high proportion of workers, *viz.*, from 20 to 27 percent, while the average proportion of workers in Red Army units at that time was about 15 percent. On the other hand, unstable units had between 4 and 10 percent workers. ¹⁶ The article also noted the relationship

¹⁴ J. V. Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Vol. IX, Moscow, 1950, p. 39.

¹⁵ Lenin, *op. cit.*, 5th ed., Vol. XLV, Moscow, 1964, p. 383.

¹⁶ *Voenny vestnik*, 1928, No. 6, p. 20. According to Chernevsky, the percentages of workers were as follows: among those formations which had particularly distinguished themselves, the Eighth Red Cavalry Division had 26.4%, the First Cavalry Army 21.7%, the Forty-first Division 25.8%, the Forty-second Division 22.4%, the Forty-fifth Division 19.9% and the Twenty-eighth Division 19.6%; of those which proved unstable, the Ninth Division had 10.5%, disciplinary units 9.7% and parties of deserters, 3.8%.

between fighting performance and the number of Party members. The result was that the principle of "proletarizing" and "Communizing" the armed forces was deliberately adopted. The working-class element was systematically increased at the expense of the peasant element, an opportunity for this being provided by the decision of 1924 to confine the regular army to a strength of 562,000 men. At the same time, an equally systematic attempt was begun to raise the proportion of Party members, particularly among the officers, with the result that six years later, in 1930, the social composition of the Soviet Army, according to Soviet data, was as follows: 27 percent were of working-class origin, 57 percent were peasants and 8 percent were white-collar workers, etc., while the proportion of Party and Komsomol members constituted almost 60 percent (of a total of 562,000 men, as many as 141,000 were Party and 185,000 Komsomol members).¹⁷

An instruction issued in 1925 on "the distribution of citizens among arms and units of the service" laid down the precise minimum proportion of workers and Party members which the various types of units, according to their military significance, should have.¹⁸ According to Chernevsky, the minimum proportion of workers in naval, railroad and tank formations was 50 percent, in the air force 40 percent; in signals and communications units 30 percent, in OGPU units 25 percent, and in cavalry and artillery units 12 percent.¹⁹

This process of concentrating workers and Party members in the armed forces at the expense of representatives of the peasantry continued unabated until the adoption of the new Constitution in 1936, when the law forbidding "non-labor elements" to serve in combat units was abolished. The extension of military conscription to the entire population of the country in 1936, World War II, with its universal mobilization, and the maintenance of a multimillion army after the war was over involved a brusque departure from established practice in this regard, but even so the Communization of the armed forces continued. At the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952, Minister of Defense Marshal Vasilevsky stated that 86.4 percent of all officers belonged to the Party or the Komsomol,²⁰ and in 1955 Molotov, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that 77 percent of all servicemen fell into this category.²¹ Data concerning elections to Party and Komsomol congresses in the postwar period show that in 1956, of a total of 4,700,000–4,900,000 men serving in the Soviet armed forces, up to 600,000 belonged to the Party and 3,050,000 to the Komsomol; by the Twenty-Second Party Congress, despite the reduction of the total strength of the armed forces to 3,600,000, there were 700,000 Party members and over two million Komsomol members;²² finally, at the time of the Twenty-Third Congress (1966), the army contained 880,000 Communists.²³

¹⁷ Pyatnitsky, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 21.

¹⁸ Instruction No. 107, August 10, 1925. (See Pyatnitsky, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 18.)

¹⁹ *Voenny vestnik*, 1928, No. 6.

²⁰ *Pravda*, October 10, 1952.

²¹ *Ibid.*, February 9, 1955.

²² See N. Galay, "The Numerical Strength of the Soviet Armed Forces," *Bulletin*, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1962, No. 5.

²³ Author's calculation based on I. Kapitonov's report, *Izvestia*, April 2, 1966.

On the other hand, the process of "proletarizing" the army followed a somewhat different course. The concept of "working elements" was modified to include the "working intelligentsia," at that time (1937) numbering some ten million persons. Furthermore, the collectivization and mechanization of agriculture and the emergence of agricultural workers on the state farms obscured the formerly clear distinction between workers and peasants. The adoption of more highly technical equipment in the armed forces demanded officers with better education and technical training, and this necessitated the admission to military training establishments of young men with a non-proletarian background, particularly children of the intelligentsia, for whom entry into the Komsomol and the Party was also made easier. Finally, since not merely the possession of a Party card but also education is today required for advancement to the highest posts in the government, virtually all representatives of the various strata that make up the present ruling class in the USSR belong to the intelligentsia. As a result of all these processes, the "proletarization" of the Soviet armed forces, as it was understood during the initial period of the Red Army, has undergone considerable modifications. As a result of universal conscription, the armed forces reflect the new structure of society. Although the appreciable increase in the proportion of "workers" in the USSR is automatically reflected in the armed forces, the officer corps, by virtue of the demands imposed by modern technology, draws upon the intelligentsia. This results in a certain social distinction between what we would call "commissioned" and "non-commissioned" ranks, so that one can say that the crystallization of new classes in Soviet society has been accompanied by a corresponding social phenomenon in the Soviet army.²⁴

This social distinction was reinforced by the very nature of state military service: in order to create a regular army that was properly disciplined and capable of fighting, it was necessary to enhance the officers' prestige and authority, introduce "one-man command" (*yedinonachaliye*), develop a specifically military ethic and encourage the spirit of service to the state. Thus, instead of becoming an army of a new type, a weapon of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the champion of the interest of the working class, the Soviet armed forces, socially speaking, developed forms that had characterized the armies of not only bourgeois but even more conservative types of state. Under the influence of national and state factors which could not be ignored, the destiny of the Soviet army to serve as a personification of international proletarian solidarity underwent a radical modification. The necessity of relying on the national feelings of what made up the bulk of the army—i.e., the Russian people—and on the patriotism of the population in general and its feeling of responsibility to the state led to the final crystallization of the army's national character. The result of this enforced development was that as regards its social structure the Soviet armed forces were transformed into an organism that was alien within a socialist society and maladjusted to the goal of building Communism.²⁵

²⁴ See also N. Galay, "Social Problems in the Reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces," *Bulletin*, 1960, No. 4.

²⁵ See also N. Galay, "Principles of Command in the Soviet Armed Forces," *Bulletin*, 1955, No. 6.

Hence the question arises: By what means does the Party, under these circumstances, retain its control over the army, and how has it prevented the army from interfering in internal politics? How has it prevented the emergence of a Soviet Bonaparte, the occurrence of a Russian "Thermidor"? The explanation is not difficult to find for the period while Stalin was alive, but is not so easy as regards the years that followed. Here, the explanation may be said to lie in the development of a well-thought-out many-faceted system in which the class principle on which the army had been built up was supplemented by the principle of ideocracy, i.e., the unlimited power of the Party as a functional organization above classes.

Experience had shown that the complete suppression by Party dogma of the country's national and state interests brings the Party itself to the threshold of disaster, since the Party's main strength lies in its ability to dispose of the resources of a large and powerful country, which provide it with a springboard for the achievement of its ultimate aim, that of establishing Communism throughout the world. Consequently, Soviet policy reoriented itself on a practical synthesis of these two mutually opposed principles, a synthesis in which the ideocratic principle must necessarily always be predominant.

For our purposes, it is important to consider the role of the Party and of the Soviet army in the organization of the USSR as a state. The USSR has two aspects—first, as a state and, second, as an organism, over and above the state, standing for an idea. From the very beginning, the Soviet army has had the same dual aspect. *Vis-à-vis* the state as such, the role of the Soviet army is the same as that of any other army: it is an instrument of foreign policy, a means of defending the state from external enemies. On the other hand, with regard to the USSR's other aspect as a supra-state organism, the role of the army is a very different one: here it must be inspired and permeated by the Party ideology. Every soldier in its ranks must not only carry out orders obediently but also be a devoted fighter for Communism. It was this that determined the original social structure of the Soviet armed forces.

The chief method adopted for achieving this difficult aim was, as in other departments of Soviet administration, that of uniting Party and professional functions in one and the same man. Just as the civilian members of the Party Central Committee and its Presidium are in most cases simultaneously responsible officials in the state apparatus—ministers, members of the Supreme Soviet, highly-placed administrative officials, etc.—, so the highest officers in the armed forces are not only charged with important functions in the state apparatus—as minister for defense or his deputies, commanders of various arms of the services or military districts—but also have high Party rank as members of the all-Union or the various Union-republic Party Central Committees. This system is carried down to the junior commissioned ranks, being reflected in the fact, mentioned above, that almost all officers are members of the Party or the Komsomol.

Other devices were also employed. Communist indoctrination of the armed forces was cared for by a system of Communist education and by the control

exercised by the Central Political Department of the armed forces (at first independently, later—after the introduction of *yedimonachaliye*—in subordination to unit commanding officers) *via* an apparatus extending throughout the army down to the smallest Party cells. In addition, “special purpose” officers of the NKVD (later MGB and KGB) and the system of military state prosecutors provided the Party with, so to speak, another eye and arm for observing and punishing violations of the Party’s will in the armed services. Further, the military influence in the Party’s central agencies and the army’s opportunities for playing a political role were curbed by the manner of selecting candidates for the highest military posts. These men had, of course, to satisfy not only professional demands but also the requirement of political reliability; at the same time, they had to be without any particular desire or gift for acquiring political independence. In other words, marshals and senior generals admitted to the higher Party agencies must not be political stars of the first magnitude. Examples from both the Stalin and post-Stalin periods, including those of Frunze (1926), Tukhachevsky (1937) and Zhukov (1946 and 1957), show that, by one means or another, including the firing squad (Tukhachevsky) and subjection to an unnecessary surgical operation (Frunze), every possible candidate for a politically independent role is eliminated. Finally, the encouragement of rivalry, intrigues, denunciations and mutual distrust among the upper military hierarchy is another means of securing its political neutralization.²⁶

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Thus, the Party’s dominance in recent years has been maintained. Indeed, it was actually strengthened by the social reform carried out by Khrushchev at the beginning of the sixties. According to the new Party Program, referred to above,

Party leadership of the Armed Forces, and the increasing role and influence of the Party organizations in the Army and Navy, are the bedrock of military development.²⁷

The purpose of the reform, which was carried out surreptitiously by means of the law on a “new large reduction of the Soviet armed forces,”²⁸ was to deal with the situation of the army described above as that of an organism alien to a socialist society. Apart from economic and strategic considerations, this reduction also had a social aspect in the cold purge of the officer corps. Not only were over 250,000 officers, i.e., about one-third of the officer corps, removed from active service, but large numbers of them were socially degraded, from the privileged upper and middle strata to the position of ordinary manual or white-collar workers.²⁹ No more than one-third of them succeeded in finding civilian

²⁶ See also N. Galay, “The Soviet Army and Domestic Policy,” *Bulletin*, 1960, No. 10.

²⁷ *Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1961, p. 101.

²⁸ See Nikolai Galay, “Social Problems in the Reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces,” *Bulletin*, 1960, No. 4.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

employment which corresponded more or less to their status as former officers, i.e., in Party, governmental or trade union organizations, as teachers, engineers, technicians or kolkhoz officials. The rest had to accept jobs as ordinary workers.³⁰ Their material circumstances also deteriorated sharply, since only those who had completed their full term of service—20 or 25 years—were entitled to a pension. The officers removed from active service were primarily those who were politically less reliable and did not belong to the Party; nevertheless, those that remained were aware of the constant threat of being likewise affected, i.e., not only dismissed from the service but also socially (and hence also financially) degraded.

By this destructive reform and a number of other measures, the Soviet leaders hoped to put a stop to the weakening of Party influence in the armed forces. At the same time, a number of progressive measures were undertaken with the object of breaking down the social barriers which had divided the army into a large number of substrata—officers of general, senior and junior field rank, junior officers, cadre N.C.O.'s and the rank-and-file—and reducing the antagonism which marked their relations. Another object was to modify the nature of military discipline. Generally speaking, these measures represented an attempt, by means of Party influence and indoctrination, to introduce a new spirit into the armed forces, considered as a social organization. Some of the themes currently being pursued by political propaganda in the armed forces are significant. It is insisted, for example, that the important thing for relations between superiors and subordinates is the fact that all alike have "sprung from the working masses," all of them are "defenders of the conquests of the Revolution" and "builders of socialism." Relations with subordinates should be on a "warm, friendly" footing, and commanding officers are required to entertain at their homes all subordinate officers, together with their families, at least twice a month. Formal marks of respect for rank have been modified, by way of "democratizing" military relations. Finally, an attempt is being made to displace the unreasoning type of discipline by "self-discipline," based on conviction and the force of example instead of on the fear of punishment.

All this was set forth in the new military regulations adopted in 1960 and in official commentaries to them, with the purpose of breaking down social barriers that had become more insuperable than they had been in pre-Revolutionary times. This stage is not yet complete, and it is as yet too early to judge the effects of Khrushchev's military reforms. His successors are continuing the reform without change.

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When reviewing the course followed by this process of artificially creating a social structure for the Soviet armed forces, one is struck by one dominating feature. This is the uninterrupted and inevitable conflict between, on the one hand, the theory and practice of building a Communist military system and,

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

on the other, the realities of life and the outlook and way of life which are common to all, including Communist, military organizations. Thus, fifteen years after its adoption, the principle of basing the armed forces on a single class had to be replaced by that of universal conscription. During the severe trials of World War II, the proletarian slogans of the Revolution had to be replaced by appeals to patriotic feeling. Party indoctrination and Party control of the army are constantly in conflict with servicemen's consciousness of forming part of the state machine, and this produces a division of loyalties and of orientation in the mind of each individual soldier. Finally, the materialist outlook of Communism is opposed to the feeling of being prepared to make the last sacrifice in a higher cause, a feeling which should permeate all armies as the only ethical reason for their existence.

With the aid of a series of compromises, the Soviet leaders have indeed succeeded in creating their particular military system, as they have created their own "socialist" society. However, both the one and the other are founded on social components which are mutually opposed. In the case of the armed forces, this duality may easily be seen, on the basis of their performance in wartime conditions, to be the main feature of their morale and fighting qualities.

The Nature and Status of "Arbitrazh"

S. KUCHEROV

The following article by Dr. Kuchеров describes the historical background and discusses the legal nature of *arbitrazh*, an organization charged with the settlement of all disputes between state bodies. Whether this organization is of the nature of a court or a state administrative agency is still a subject of debate among Soviet jurists, many of whom support the latter view. Dr. Kuchеров, on the other hand, shares the opinion of those Soviet jurists who see in it a kind of special court.

A Soviet definition of the term *arbitrazh* reads as follows:

In the USSR, *arbitrazh* is a state organ which settles disputes concerning property between state, non-state [*obschestvennyimi*] and cooperative institutions, enterprises and organizations.¹

In order to clarify our approach to the debatable subject of the legal character of this organization, let us first review its history.

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Arbitration Commissions. According to Article 15 of Decree No. 2 on the Courts, "court litigation between different state institutions is inadmissible."² During the period of War Communism, economic disputes between state agencies, enterprises, organizations and institutions were regulated through "administrative" channels. After the shift to NEP, state enterprises received greater freedom in their operations, which assumed a more contractual and commercial character, and the creation of a special institution to regulate such disputes became necessary. To this end, an Arbitration Commission was set up in 1922 under the auspices of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, with the power to resolve economic disputes between organs of enterprises and organizations subordinated to the Council or its branches. Confirming the principle already quoted, the statute of the Commission laid down that bodies subordinate to the Council were not entitled to submit their contractual disputes for decision to any organs, whether administrative or judicial, other than the Arbitration Commission.³

This was, of course, only a partial regulation of the question, since not all institutions and enterprises were subordinate to the Supreme Economic Council. On September 21, 1922, the All-Union Central Executive Committee and the

¹ *Entsiklopedichesky slovar v dvukh tomakh* (Encyclopedic Dictionary in Two Volumes), Vol. I, Moscow, 1963, p. 63.

² *Sobraniye zakonov i rasporyazhenii Raboche-Krestyanskogo Pravitelstva RSFSR*, 1918, Entry No. 347.

³ The statute of the Commission was not confirmed until 1926 (*Sobraniye zakonov i rasporyazhenii Raboche-Krestyanskogo Pravitelstva SSSR*, 1926, Entry No. 90).

Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR approved a Statute on the Procedure for Deciding Property Disputes between State Institutions and Organizations,⁴ which provided for a Supreme Arbitration Commission attached to the Labor and Defense Council and for local commissions attached to the regional economic councils. Further commissions were established at the *guberniya* (province) economic conferences (*sovesbchaniya*). The Supreme Arbitration Commission was composed of a chairman and two members, all of whom were appointed by the Labor and Defense Council. The members of local commissions were appointed by the *guberniya* economic conferences, but the chairmen were appointed by the Labor and Defense Council on the recommendation of the People's Commissar of Justice. Appeal against a decision of a local arbitration commission could be lodged with the Supreme Arbitration Commission or the Labor and Defense Council if the dispute involved a sum of more than one thousand gold rubles.

State Arbitration. All these central and local arbitration commissions were dissolved by a decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of March 4, 1931,⁵ and on May 3 of the same year the Central Executive Committee approved the Statute on State Arbitration,⁶ which marks the birth of state arbitration in the form that it has largely retained up to the present time. Its function, according to the Statute, was to resolve property disputes between institutions, enterprises and organizations of the socialized sector "in a manner such as to ensure contractual and planning discipline and self-sufficiency." However, before referring any dispute arising from contracts, transactions or other property matters to state arbitration, the parties had to take all measures to come to an agreement by themselves.

Excluded from examination by state arbitration were:

- a) disputes between organs of the same *vedomstvo* ("a system of central or local organs and institutions charged with a single branch of state administration, subordinate to the same guidance")⁷ and financed by state or local budgets;
- b) disputes between institutions and enterprises of the same system (as under a), economic union or cooperative system not permitted by the appropriate higher organ;
- c) disputes over operations of the State Bank if the latter was a party to the dispute;
- d) disputes arising from contracts concerning railroad transportation;
- e) disputes over taxes and other payments exacted according to indisputable procedure;
- f) disputes over the contractual use of communal services; and

⁴ *Sobraniye... RSFSR*, 1922, Entry No. 769.

⁵ *Sobraniye... SSSR*, 1931, Entry No. 135.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1931, Entry No. 203.

⁷ *Yuridichesky slovar* (A Legal Dictionary), Vol. I, Moscow, 1956, p. 87.

g) disputes falling under the jurisdiction of state arbitration organs attached to the Labor and Defense Council, to Economic Councils (Conferences) and to other bodies but involving sums less than 5,000, 3,000 and 1,000 rubles respectively.

The entire system was headed by the organ of state arbitration attached to the Labor and Defense Council, whose competence was limited to the examination of disputes between parties of which at least one was a central organ of all-Union importance and to disputes between central organs of different Union republics. The organs of state arbitration attached to the Economic Councils (Conferences) of the Union republics had to settle disputes involving a central organ of the republic concerned or a republican organ of "enterprises of all-Union importance" as well as disputes between krai and oblast organs of different kraia, oblasts and autonomous republics. Finally, there were the organs of state arbitration attached to the councils of people's commissars of autonomous republics and to the executive committees of kraia and oblasts, including autonomous oblasts.

Reorganization: The Decision of July 23, 1959: On July 23, 1959, the Council of Ministers of the USSR passed a resolution stating that the Statute on State Arbitration of 1931 "is obsolete and does not contribute to a proper solution of economic disputes under the existing conditions of industry and construction administration."⁸ The resolution further expressed the opinion that practical work of the organs of state arbitration did not correspond to the demands imposed by the national economy under changed conditions. When examining economic disputes, the organs of state arbitration did not produce the desired effect of consolidating "planning and contractual discipline," especially in cases concerning the fulfillment of plans and the observance of laws relating to the quality and quantity of output. They also did not work as they should do to suppress undue manifestations of local interests, nor did they contribute sufficiently to the elimination of defects established in the work of enterprises and organizations. Furthermore, it was stated that a great number of groundless disputes were submitted to state arbitration as a result of the failure of enterprises and organizations to examine claims properly and to satisfy on their own account demands that were indisputable. In Article 1 of the resolution, the Council of Ministers stated that it considered the main function of state arbitration to lie in exerting "an active influence upon enterprises, organizations and institutions in matters concerning the improvement of their work, the fulfillment of economic plans and the consolidation of economic self-sufficiency."

The competence of the organs of state arbitration was extended to cover all disputes between state, cooperative (with the exception of kolkhozes) and other public organizations which had hitherto come under the jurisdiction of the courts. A decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the USSR issued in 1959 promulgated this measure.⁹ The decree, which came into effect on January 1,

⁸ *Sobranie postanovlenii pravitel'stva SSSR*, 1959, Entry No. 105.

⁹ *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1959, Entry No. 163.

1960, also extended the competence of state arbitration organs attached to the Councils of Ministers of the USSR and the Union and autonomous republics and to the executive committees of krai and oblast soviets. In particular, the state arbitration organ of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was given the right to suspend the execution of decisions taken by similar organs at Union-republic level which violated national interests or the legitimate interests of other republics and to raise the question of reconsidering such decisions in due order.

On the other hand, the jurisdiction of republican and local organs of state arbitration was extended by assigning to the organ of state arbitration attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR only the most important disputes involving enterprises, etc., of different Union republics or of "all-Union subordination," and as a rule only precontractual cases involving the sum of ten million rubles and regular disputes involving not less than 100,000 rubles. A further restriction imposed on the work of the all-Union body was that even in the most important cases its jurisdiction was excluded when both parties to the dispute, even though of all-Union subordination, were located in the same republic.

With regard to the defects mentioned above, the resolution of the Council of Ministers charged the organs of state arbitration to draw the attention of leaders of enterprises, etc., to essential defects in their work established during the examination of disputes. (A similar provision had been incorporated in the Statute of 1931, but the Council of Ministers evidently deemed it necessary to emphasize the point once more.)

Another innovation was the granting of permission to refer individual complicated cases to the decision of private arbiters elected by the parties in order to "reinforce democratic principles in the resolution of economic disputes."

The New Statute on State Arbitration at All-Union Level of 1960. On August 17, 1960, the Council of Ministers of the USSR approved a statute relating to the work of the state arbitration organ attached to this Council.¹⁰ This body is charged with settling the most important disputes. Its functions, as given in the Statute, are: (1) during the decision of economic disputes, to protect the property rights and legitimate interests of enterprises, etc.; (2) to promote collaboration among enterprises, etc., in matters concerning the fulfillment of economic plans and to suppress all tendencies toward the prevalence of local interests and narrow departmentalism; (3) during the settlement of disputes, to exercise an active influence upon enterprises, etc., in order that the latter should abide by the law and by resolutions and orders of the government in questions of economic structure, and to apply material sanctions for the "non-fulfillment of plans and assignments concerning the supply of products, the delivery of defective and incomplete products and other violations of state discipline and contractual obligations"; and (4) to cooperate in the realization of plans and assignments concerning the supply of products and other obligations as well as in the elimination of defects discovered in the work of enterprises, etc., during the examination of economic disputes.

¹⁰ *Sobranije postanovlenii SSSR*, 1960, Entry No. 127.

The competence of the state arbitration organ attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR covers:

- a) precontractual disputes involving more than ten million rubles;
- b) precontractual disputes concerning the exploitation of spur tracks not in general use when the turnover of goods is greater than 100 railroad cars in 24 hours;
- c) disputes over the fulfillment of contracts and other matters involving a sum of over 100,000 rubles;
- d) disputes referred to state arbitration by the Council of Ministers of the USSR; and
- e) disputes accepted for examination at the request of the Union-republic councils of ministers.

The all-Union body is also entitled to initiate proceedings concerning the violation by enterprises, etc., of "planning and contractual discipline and the rules of self-sufficiency." The forfeits and fines exacted in these cases (as laid down by current legislation) are assigned to the Union budget or to the benefit of the enterprise, etc., in whose behalf the proceedings were initiated.

A dispute properly coming under the jurisdiction of the all-Union state arbitration organ may be submitted to private arbitration if the parties agree. Another function of this body is to approve special conditions governing the supply of particular kinds of products, technical equipment and consumer goods, as well as instructions concerning the procedure for accepting goods according to their quantity and quality.

Like a supreme court, this body is entitled to interpret the laws and regulations pertaining to the work of state arbitration; it can pronounce contracts violating legislation, governmental resolutions and orders, state plans and assignments to be totally or partially invalid, or bind the parties to amend the contracts accordingly. In order to ensure the necessary consistency in the settlement of disputes, it studies the work of state arbitration organs attached to sovnarkhozes and administrative systems, gives them instructions and publishes rules of procedure for the examination of disputes by state arbitration.

Like all other organs of state arbitration, this organ has to report to the body to which it is attached, *viz.*, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, on the most important violations of state discipline and legislation concerning the quality, etc., of products put on the market, as well as on cases of the undue promotion of local interests and other violations of "socialist legality" in the economic activity of enterprises, organizations and institutions.

Settlement of Disputes Within the Same Organizational System. We have already seen that disputes between organs of the same *vedomstvo* are not subject to state arbitration. In order to settle such disputes, arbitration organs were set up within each *vedomstvo* or administrative system, and were known as *vedomstvennye*, or "departmental," arbitration organs. They functioned alongside the organs of

state arbitration. They were only indirectly legalized by the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of December 8, 1931, which said that "the councils of people's commissars of the Union republics must charge the corresponding [organ of] state arbitration with the task of giving instruction to local and departmental [organs of] arbitration."¹¹

When the country's system of economic management was reorganized in 1957 and economic regions were created, each under its sovnarkhoz, organs of departmental arbitration were also created and subordinated to the sovnarkhozes or to Union-republic ministers. The sovnarkhoz statute of September 26, 1957, provided that the sovnarkhozes should approve and confirm the Statute on Departmental Arbitration and the procedure for examining disputes between enterprises, etc., subordinate to the same sovnarkhoz.¹²

The functions of departmental arbitration are similar to those of state arbitration. The sphere of competence is also in principle the same, except that it is confined to the *vedomstvo* concerned. In view of this, the question whether two systems of arbitration are necessary has been discussed in the Soviet press. Some writers suggested liquidating departmental arbitration and transferring its functions to the state arbitration system; others proposed authorizing those in charge of the *vedomstvo* to settle disputes arising within it.¹³

The Present Structure. In spite of these discussions, the structure of *arbitrazh* remained twofold. The present structure, therefore, is as follows. The highest level of state arbitration is that of the Council of Ministers of the USSR; then come the councils of ministers of the Union republics, and finally the local level, i.e., the executive committees of the krai and oblast soviets, the councils of ministers of the autonomous republics and the executive committees of the city soviets of Moscow and Leningrad. To each of these governmental bodies is attached a state arbitration organ.

It must be emphasized that this division is not a hierarchical one, i.e., each organ of state arbitration is subordinate only to the governmental body to which it is attached and not to the state arbitration organ at the next highest level. The same is true of the organs of departmental arbitration, which are individually attached to different economic and non-state administrative agencies and subordinate to them. The staffs of state arbitration organs consist of arbiters, formerly appointed individually by the Labor and Defense Council¹⁴ and by the Economic Councils (Conferences) and now appointed respectively by the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the councils of ministers of the Union republics and autonomous republics and krai and oblast executive committees, which also

¹¹ *Sobranie zakonov... SSSR*, 1931, Entry No. 470.

¹² *Sobranie postanovlenii SSSR*, 1957, Entry No. 121.

¹³ See R. F. Kallistratova, *Razresheniye sporov v gosudarstvennom arbitrazhe* (The Settlement of Disputes by State Arbitration), Moscow, 1961, p. 58.

¹⁴ The Labor and Defense Council was abolished in 1937 and its functions relating to state arbitration transferred to the Council of People's Commissars (since 1946, Council of Ministers) of the USSR.

appoint the staffs of their respective organs of departmental arbitration. In each case, the arbiters are headed by a chief arbiter appointed by the same agency.

The work of arbitration is under the general guidance of the chief arbiter and his deputies. Although the decisions of the state arbitration organs are final and there is no appeal against them, the chief arbiter has the right to suspend the execution of a decision within one month after it was taken and to submit the case for further consideration to another organ of state arbitration. Each dispute is dealt with by a bench comprising one representative from each party and an arbiter assigned by the chief arbiter. If the representatives of the parties cannot come to an agreement, the dispute is decided by the arbiter, who must be guided by the laws and rulings of both central and local authorities as well as by the general principles of Soviet economic policy.

Precontractual Disputes : Differences over Contractual Conditions. By the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of December 19, 1933,¹⁵ the competence of state arbitration was extended to a sphere which in other countries is free from judicial or semijudicial interference, namely, to the settlement of differences arising from the conditions of contracts to be concluded and the request for the signing of a contract presented by one party to the other.

It is obvious that arbitration in such cases can be necessary only in a country where the economy is socialized.¹⁶ In a capitalist state, no one can force an organization or private person to conclude a contract or dictate the conditions of a contract to be concluded. But when the entire economy belongs to one master, the state, and is directed by state plans, the acceptance of conditions for a contract providing for the production required by the plan can be enforced. The most important provisions concerning the state arbitration of precontractual disputes are contained in the above-mentioned resolution of December 19, 1933, and in those of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of April 21¹⁷ and May 22, 1959.¹⁸

As a rule, the draft of a contract within the framework of the plan is prepared by the seller or contractor, who directs two signed copies of it to the buyer or customer. The buyer or customer is bound to sign the contract within ten days after receipt of the draft and to return one copy to the seller or contractor. A peculiar point is that differences about the conditions of the contract do not suspend its signature. Objections to individual conditions of the contract may be formulated by the buyer or customer in a special document called "Record of the Differences," signed by both parties.

If the differences cannot be removed by the parties, they must be submitted for state arbitration within ten days by the seller or contractor. Differences about contractual conditions have to be scheduled for examination by the state arbi-

¹⁵ *Sobraniye zakonov* . . . SSSR, 1933, Entry No. 445.

¹⁶ Throughout this section, the kolkhozes are to be regarded as excepted from consideration.

¹⁷ *Sbornik normativnykh aktov* (A Compilation of Normative Documents), Moscow, 1959, p. 50.

¹⁸ *Sobraniye postanovlenii SSSR*, 1959, Entry No. 68.

tration organ within twenty-four hours after filing, and examined within four days. If one or both parties reside outside the city where the state arbitration organ charged with the case is located, the time necessary for the arrival of the parties' representatives and the presentation of explanations is added to the four days.

Such precontractual disputes are examined by the bench of state arbitration, consisting of one representative of each party and the arbiter. As stated, if the parties' representatives cannot reach an agreement, the dispute is decided by the arbiter, whose decision is declared in the same session and delivered to the parties, together with the motives for his decision, in writing within forty-eight hours after the communication of the decision.

Compulsion to Enter a Contract. It must be borne in mind that the conclusion of contractual relations between parties is prescribed by the plan, which determines the economic activities of all the participants in the country's economic life. Consequently, if the organs of state arbitration become aware that economic units do not enter a contract for the delivery of products provided for by the plan, they are obliged to start proceedings on their own initiative for the compulsion of one or both parties to conclude a contract, and, after the appropriate decision has been taken by state arbitration, to see that this decision is carried out. The usual reason for the initiation of such proceedings is the refusal of one of the parties to enter a contract. If proceedings are initiated by one of the parties, state arbitration has to consider whether a legal obligation to enter the contract exists for the reluctant party. As stated, such an obligation exists only if a corresponding assignment is provided by the plan. If the plan does not name the economic units obliged to sign a contract, the organ of state arbitration has to consider the expediency of creating direct contractual relations between the parties in order to improve the supply of goods. By way of precontractual supervision, the organs of state arbitration, at the request of the enterprises, etc., involved or on their own initiative, may declare invalid entire contracts or those parts of them that conflict with the law, with governmental decisions, state plans and assignments, and bind the parties to make the necessary amendments to contracts already concluded.

Arbitral Procedure. The procedure followed by state arbitration is laid down in the "Rules for Examination of Property Disputes by Organs of State Arbitration" of August 10, 1934,¹⁹ which are still in force. Proceedings may be initiated (a) at the demand of the organization interested in the dispute, (b) at the request of the agency to which the state arbitration organ is attached, and (c) on the initiative of the state arbitration organ. In addition, the following four conditions must be met: (1) the case must fall within the competence of the arbitration organ petitioned; (2) measures for reaching a voluntary agreement must have been taken before recourse is had to arbitration; (3) provisions of limitation

¹⁹ *Arbitrazh v sovetskomo khozyaistve* (Arbitration in the Soviet Economy), Moscow, 1948, pp. 199-210.

must be taken into consideration; and (4) there must be no previous decision in the case by an arbitration organ.

After having established that these conditions are met, the arbiter must study all the materials of the case in advance of the session. The defendant has to file a brief with a detailed substantiation of his objections immediately after he has received a copy of the claim. Article 34 of the Rules of 1934 reads: "If an agreement cannot be reached by the parties or if the agreement reached contravenes revolutionary legislation or planning and contractual discipline, the dispute is resolved by the state arbiter." Article 43 confers on the arbiter the right to adjudicate beyond the claim presented by the parties "with the purpose of increasing the responsibility of economic organs for the fulfillment of plans and contracts and the prevention of further disputes in the case."

As stated, the arbiter must pronounce his decision immediately after the examination of the case in the presence of the parties. If the case is very complicated, the decision may be postponed, but not for longer than three days. The arbiter's decision comes into force on the day it is pronounced, if no other date is laid down in the decision. A date for the execution of the decision may be established in the decision. If the arbiter deems it necessary to fine the chief of an economic organization or its accountant for the irregular taking of stocks and keeping of accounts, or to deprive an expert of the right to present conclusions in the litigation, the decision must be presented to the chief arbiter for confirmation. Such a decision does not come into force without such confirmation.

The arbiter's duties include bringing to the attention of higher economic organs defects in relations between economic organs, negligence, abuses, etc., brought to light during the examination of the dispute. This duty is based on the function of "strengthening revolutionary legality, contractual and planning discipline and the principle of self-sufficiency."²⁰ In the case of particularly serious violations of law or of Party and governmental directives, *arbitrazh* notifies the Committee for Party and State Control, and where necessary transfers the case to organs of the State Prosecutor's Office.

The arbiters further have to see that their decisions are carried out whenever the latter require economic organs to remove some defects in their mutual relations or signify negligence, abuses, etc., in these organs' work. If the decision is not complied with, the arbiter has to notify higher authority in order that the necessary measures may be taken. In the same way, he has to ensure that the organ of the State Prosecutor's Office to which a case has been referred has taken the necessary measures and to report any failure to do so to higher organs of the State Prosecutor's Office.

Reexamination of State Arbitration Decisions. In state arbitration, as in civil and criminal procedure, there is no right of appeal (in the Western sense), nor even of cassation; as we have seen, the decision of a state arbitration organ is final. However, such decisions, like the decisions and sentences of the general courts,

²⁰ The private interlocutory orders issued by the general courts have a similar significance.

may be reviewed by way of supervision. In contradistinction to court procedure, this review may be initiated not only by the authorities, but also by the parties themselves. The supervision of both state and departmental arbitration is in the hands of the agencies to which the arbitration organ is attached, i.e., the Council of Ministers of the USSR, etc. Within each organ of state arbitration, the chief arbiter supervises the work of his own organ. Thus, the review of a state arbitration decision may be initiated by the parties or, *ex officio*, by the agency to which the arbitration organ is attached or by the chief arbiter of this organ. A petition for review by a discontented party must be addressed to the chief arbiter of the organ which pronounced the decision: it is he who then reviews the decision. The party has one month after pronouncement of the decision for filing its petition for review, which does not suspend execution of the decision. An *ex officio* review may take place at any time. If the chief arbiter rejects a petition for review, the party is entitled to petition the agency to which the state arbitration organ is attached.

A further review *ex officio* may be initiated by a higher organ of state arbitration, which, however, in contradistinction to the review of court sentences and decisions already in force, is not entitled to reverse or change the decision. If the higher arbitration organ considers the decision of a lower state arbitration organ or of the latter's chief arbiter to be incorrect, it makes representations to the agency to which the lower organ is attached. Thus, the review of any decision taken by a chief arbiter is carried out by the agency to which his arbitration organ is attached. This might be, for example, the executive committee of an oblast soviet.

It must be agreed with R. F. Kallistratova that

... it is not expedient to charge the executive organs of state and administration with the examination of complaints against state arbitration decisions and the taking of countermeasures for the elimination of mistakes committed by state arbitration [organs], including the reversal of [these organs'] decisions.²¹

Kallistratova is of the opinion that the exercise of this function by a governmental body conflicts with the strict delineation of spheres of competence between state organs according to the nature of their work. It is natural that an oblast executive committee, for example, should not have personnel trained in arbitration, informed about the practice of state arbitration organs or familiar with the instructions issued by the organ of state arbitration attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. As a result, the decisions of such a body are drafted by the chief arbiter against whose original decision the complaint is being made.

A curious method of dealing with complaints against decisions of the chief arbiter was reported some years ago at a conference of the personnel of state arbitration organs of the Kazakh SSR.²² At the executive committee of the Aktyubinsk Oblast Soviet, complaints were prepared for decision by the exec-

²¹ Kallistratova, *op. cit.*, p. 197. See also P. V. Loginov, *Notariat i arbitrazh v SSSR* (Notaries and Arbitration in the USSR), Moscow, 1957, p. 9.

²² *Sovetskaya yustitsiya*, 1958, No. 9, p. 62.

utive committee's legal adviser, Dzharasov, who in turn invited the legal advisers of the organizations involved in the case to draft the decision to be taken by the executive committee. The parties' legal advisers were eager to do the job, but, of course, in the interest of their parties.

Thus, the legal provision that there is no appeal against the decisions of state arbitration is a fiction,²³ since the decision can be reviewed by several authorities and even on the initiative of the parties involved. The only difference from a regular appeal is that a petition for review does not suspend execution of the decision. Even here, however, there is a remedy, in that the chief arbiter has the right to suspend execution of a decision until it is reviewed.

*

Having reviewed the structure and the functioning of *arbitrazh*, we are now in a position to examine its legal character. On this question, the opinions expressed in Soviet legal literature have undergone a process of change, and three views have been put forward by three groups of writers.

Arbitrazh is a Special Court. Writing in 1936, Z. Shkundin declared that *arbitrazh* is an "economic court"²⁴ but a special type of court, since the property disputes examined by it arise from, and in the course of, the one and undivided socialist administration of property,²⁵ and because *arbitrazh* has features which differentiate it from regular courts.²⁶ These peculiar features are: the right to initiate proceedings on its own initiative; the obligation to initiate proceedings on instructions from a higher organ of arbitration; the duty of examining suits on orders from the sovnarkhoz or of the executive committee of the soviet to which the arbitration organ is attached; the obligation of the parties to discuss the possibility of reaching an agreement before resorting to arbitration; and the possibility of initiating proceedings not only by the organization interested in the dispute but also by a higher organization. Some twelve years later, Shkundin declared: "*Arbitrazh* is a special kind of court—an economic court examining only economic disputes between socialist organizations and enterprises."²⁷ Another article, written jointly by Shkundin and V. N. Mozheiko, asserts:

The principles of the arbitral examination of disputes correspond basically to the principles of our civil procedure, and the scope of court procedure and the arbitral examination of disputes is identical, as is also the policy pursued by the courts and the organs of arbitration.²⁸

²³ There is also no appeal, in the Western sense, against the decisions and sentences of general courts in the Soviet Union. However, the appeal in cassation has been developed in practice into a regular appeal, when the case is also reviewed on its merits.

²⁴ *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo*, 1936, No. 3, p. 49.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

²⁷ *Arbitrazh v sovetskom khozyaistve*, p. 21.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

The article denies the possibility of a contraposition of court and state arbitration because of the unity of the Soviet systems of economy and socialist law and also because of the similarity of scope of the courts and the arbitration organs.

Court and arbitration alike must protect public and socialist property by their decisions and educate a socialist attitude toward it; they must strengthen revolutionary legality in the sphere of contractual economic relations, and inculcate a socialist attitude toward duties in economic relations and toward the state, as well as principles of self-sufficiency and state discipline. Furthermore, a contraposition of court and arbitration is impossible because of the similarity of the methods which they employ . . . namely, the method of deciding disputes that arise by applying Soviet law to them.²⁹

Mozheiko also comes to the conclusion that "*arbitrazh* has many features and peculiarities inherent in the courts,"³⁰ and that "according to its scope and methods of work, *arbitrazh* has much in common with the court."³¹ Similarly, M. S. Lipetsker asserts that "as regards the content and the nature of their work, the organs of *arbitrazh* can be placed on the same footing as the judicial organs."³² A. A. Volin is of the opinion that state arbitration is by nature a kind of private court of arbitration (*treteiskiy sud*).³³

In the United States, the conception of *arbitrazh* as a kind of court is put forward by Harold Berman, who writes:

Both precontract and contract disputes of a commercial nature are, with certain exceptions, adjudicated by a special system of courts called the State Board of Arbitration (*Gosarbitrazh*) They are rather "economic courts," whose jurisdictions are independent of the will of the parties, whose procedures, though informal by American standards, are similar to those of the regular courts, and whose decisions are governed by the Civil Code and by relevant statutes.³⁴

Thus, the group of people who define the organs of arbitration as special courts base their assertion on the similarity of scope, competence, activity and role in the fulfillment of state economic, organizational, cultural and educational functions which exists between the courts and the organs of arbitration.

Practical conclusions have been drawn from these assertions by Soviet writers. It has been suggested to amend the Code of Civil Procedure in order to make it fully applicable to arbitration and even to transfer the functions of *arbitrazh* to the regular courts. Thus, Shkundin, having declared that a number of fundamental provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure can be applied to arbitral procedure and that only a few specific provisions pertain to the latter, comes to the conclusion that "the unification of court and arbitral procedure, their coordination in a

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

³⁰ *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1947, No. 6, p. 23.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

³² *Trudy Voenno-yuridicheskoi akademii*, 1948, No. 8, p. 66.

³³ *Kommunist*, 1959, No. 3, p. 59.

³⁴ Harold Berman, "Commercial Contracts in Soviet Law," *California Law Review*, Berkeley, Cal., No. 35, 1947, pp. 204-5.

single code of procedure, is practically expedient and will contribute to the improvement of decisions in disputes between enterprises of the socialist economy."³⁵ A. Rogovin, writing on "The Unification of the Norms of Court and Arbitral Procedures," demands that all provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure be applied to arbitration. This would eliminate the special provisions applied to arbitral procedure and introduce features of regular procedure such as appeals in cassation.³⁶

M. Rivkin flatly denies the necessity of *arbitrazh*. He argues:

Since the courts and the organs of arbitration alike watch over socialist legality [to ensure] that it shall not be violated in the process of deciding property disputes within the socialist economy and that socialist property shall be preserved, the existence of two parallel systems, the court and *arbitrazh*, cannot be justified.³⁷

Such a situation, he says, can only lead to a victimization of socialist legality. Rivkin strongly objects to certain fundamental features of the practice of arbitration. A court decision, he says, can be appealed against and the appeal examined by a higher court, whereas a complaint against the decision of a state arbitration organ is examined by the chief arbiter of the same organ. He cannot assume "an objective attitude on the part of the chief arbiter toward the review of decisions made by the organ of which he is the chief."³⁸

Rivkin is shocked to discover that when looking through *arbitrazh* decisions over a period of five years he could find no reference to law. In one case, it was said that "in his decision the arbiter proceeded from the importance of the parties' economic interests, not from the degree of legality and stability of the bank transaction of sale and purchase as considered from a narrow legal viewpoint." Thus, by placing himself above parties, the contract and the law and by taking the view that only matters of economic importance and state interests were relevant, the arbiter freed himself of all responsibility.³⁹

The American writer Kazimierz Grzybowski considers that not observance of the law and the contract but compliance with the plan primarily guides the arbiter in his decision. "Adjusting conflicting interests, . . . decisions of the economic arbitrator can be made exclusively in terms of economic policy and without reference to abstract rules of law."⁴⁰ Grzybowski points out that this view has been sharply rejected by Soviet writers. Mozheiko and Shkundin, for example, declared:

³⁵ *Sovetskaya yustitsiya*, 1937, No. 4, p. 28.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1937, No. 17, p. 12.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 1937, No. 5, p. 18.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Kazimierz Grzybowski, *Soviet Legal Institutions, Doctrines and Social Functions*, Ann Arbor, 1962, pp. 99-100.

Arbiters who imagine that an arbitral decision can be taken in spite of the law because a decision not corresponding to law is allegedly "economically" expedient must be blamed and punished. State arbitration has no right to deviate from the law even by one step.⁴¹

If *arbitrazh* insists on remaining by a contract or by individual provisions in it, it must bring it into alignment with the law. "The law of a socialist state," they say, "is the highest expediency. A contraposition of socialist legality and so-called 'economic expediency' is completely inadmissible."

Rivkin totally rejects assertions that the parallel existence of regular courts and *arbitrazh* is justified because the court defends socialist property from violations by individual persons while *arbitrazh* protects it from violations by enterprises and institutions, and that the court cannot investigate disputes within the socialized sector. The court, he says, examines disputes not only of a civil but also of a criminal character, of individual citizens among themselves and with enterprises of the socialist sector. The court must, and can, have sufficient knowledge of the work of economic organizations, of economic plans and contracts, to settle disputes between enterprises.⁴²

Another writer, L. Lensky, also strongly denounced the arbitral habit of being guided by "economic expediency" rather than by law, the reviewing of decisions by the arbiters who themselves made them and other features of arbitral procedure which, according to him, undermine the principles of legality advocated by Lenin and Stalin. He came to the conclusion:

It is not expedient to permit the existence of an organ outside the courts which ignores their decisions, works virtually behind closed doors, cannot fight real barratry, and creates a system tolerating the disregard of law. We vote for the liquidation of the organs of state arbitration and the transfer of cases examined by them to the jurisdiction of the courts.⁴³

Analysing the specific forms of procedure observed by *arbitrazh*, A. Farbstein comes to the conclusion that almost all of them have counterparts in the Code of Civil Procedure, so that the Code could be easily amended for the purpose of applying it to arbitration. Hence he sees no reason for the separate existence of *arbitrazh*: "There is no ground for the further existence of state arbitration as an organ outside the general system of courts of the USSR. The only possibility that can be entertained is special economic sessions of courts."⁴⁴

A. G. Goikhbarg, one of the creators of the RSFSR Civil Code of 1922, was of the opinion that the arbitration commissions functioning at that time were a kind of court and should be merged with the general courts. His view is reproduced by John N. Hazard as follows:

⁴¹ *Arbitrazh v sovetskom khozyaistve*, pp. 10–11.

⁴² *Sovetskaya yustitsiya*, 1937, No. 5, p. 18.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 1937, No. 11, p. 38.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 1937, No. 13, p. 13.

The special tribunal had been created because it was thought that such disputes should be heard by a body authorized to decide each case on the basis of expediency rather than law. . . . He [Goikhbarg] found also that there was added reason for union in that the arbitration commission was in its decisions applying the rules on contract law to disputes between agencies. It was being as legal as the courts.

The Fifth Congress of the Communist Party, in its resolution in response to Goikhbarg's jurisdictional proposals, accepted his view that the arbitration tribunals should no longer be independent but should be brought immediately within the general court system.⁴⁵

According to Hazard, "Goikhbarg's colleagues had frequently expressed their desire to reduce the number of special courts, and now it was his turn to revert to Kreski's old theme of a unity-court system."⁴⁶

Arbitrazh is an Organ of State Administration. The second group—the majority of Soviet writers at the present time—is of the opinion that *arbitrazh* is not a court but an administrative unit. P. P. Yakimov writes:

Soviet *arbitrazh* is a system of organs of state and public government of an administrative character, which, by examining and settling economic disputes and applying means of coercion, contributes to the strengthening of planning and contractual discipline, self-sufficiency and socialist legality in the work and relations of socialist enterprises, institutions and organizations for the fulfillment of the plan of the national economy.⁴⁷

This conclusion is derived from the following premises: (1) the organs of state and departmental arbitration have no judicial functions; and (2) the constitutional basis for the existence of *arbitrazh* is Article 68 of the Soviet Constitution, which establishes the right of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to set up in case of need special organs in matters of economic, cultural and defensive structure.

Both premises are incorrect—the first because the arbitration commissions were created as a judicial institution by the Statute on Court Structure of the RSFSR of October 30, 1922.⁴⁸ Article 2 of this statute, enumerating judicial institutions designed for the examination of special types of cases demanding special knowledge and skill, lists under 'd' "local and central arbitration commissions."

That *arbitrazh* was conceived as a special judicial institution by the legislators also follows from statements made by Krylenko, the leading jurist of that time. At the first all-Russian *arbitrazh* congress, held in 1932 (and so after the dissolution of the arbitration commissions and the publication of the 1931 Statute on State Arbitration), Krylenko declared that "different natures of arbitral and judicial cases, different methods for their examination and different principles of material and procedural law cannot exist with us." He insisted on the unity

⁴⁵ John N. Hazard, *Settling Disputes in Soviet Society*, New York, N.Y., 1960, pp. 431–32.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 431.

⁴⁷ *Uchenye zapiski Sverdlovskogo yuridicheskogo instituta*, Sverdlovsk, 1957, No. 5, pp. 247–48.

⁴⁸ *Sobranie . . . RSFSR*, 1923, Entry No. 292.

of Soviet law and on the identical nature of arbitral and judicial cases, asserting that "the principles governing the settlement of disputes in the court system must be elevated to [the level of] the principles governing the settlement of disputes by state arbitration." He maintained that in Soviet society there could be no difference between the nature of cases coming up for arbitration and that of those submitted to the courts, no difference in the methods of passing judgment on them and no difference in the principles of substantive or procedural law.⁴⁹

In the Regulations on Procedure in Arbitration Commissions of March 14, 1923, it was stated that "procedure in the arbitration commissions and the Supreme Arbitration Commission is similar to the rules of procedure in the regular courts, with the exception derived from the peculiarities of cases coming under the jurisdiction of arbitration commissions."⁵⁰ The "judicial bench" comprised a chairman and two members of the arbitration commission. One member of the bench had to be a jurist and another an economist.

The main function of *arbitrazh* is the settlement of economic disputes—a typical judicial activity.

The second premise is incorrect since the Statute on State Arbitration was promulgated in 1931, five years before the Constitution of 1936.

Prof. A. F. Kleinman bases his denial of the judicial character of *arbitrazh* on the assertions that (1) the sphere of competence of courts is not the same as that of organs of arbitration; the courts protect not only the interests of economic organizations but also the political, labor, housing and other personal and property rights of citizens; and (2) the methods of administering justice are different.⁵¹

Prof. Kleinman's arguments are not convincing. The competence of any special court, as for example the military or railroad courts, is limited in comparison with that of general courts. As for the methods employed, in almost any civil suit the bench attempts to reach an agreement between the parties before formally deciding the dispute, and the impartial decision of the court is in essence an act of arbitration. In its turn, the decision of the arbiter is similar to that of a court according to its form and its consequences: if not complied with by the losing party, it can be enforced. That the responsible representatives of the parties to the dispute are members of the bench is irrelevant, because the purpose of their participation is to reach a voluntary agreement; if the agreement is not reached, the arbiter makes his decision without their participation.

According to Kleinman, the Soviet Constitution charges only the courts with the dispensation of justice.⁵²

A. A. Dobrovolsky admits that the arbitration commissions, "according to the nature of their work, were put on the same footing as the judicial organs,

⁴⁹ *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo*, 1932, No. 7/8, p. 39.

⁵⁰ *Sobranie . . . RSFSR*, 1923, Entry No. 292.

⁵¹ *Arbitrazh v SSSR* (Arbitration in the USSR), Moscow, 1960, pp. 41–42.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 42.

and, in contradistinction to the regular courts, were considered as special courts."⁵³ He denies, however, that *arbitrazh* is a kind of court of arbitration, as asserted by Volin, and in support of his view quotes the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of July 23, 1959, entitling the parties to especially complicated disputes to submit such disputes to private arbitration:

If *arbitrazh* were a court of arbitration, there would be no necessity for a provision permitting the examination of a dispute, by way of exception, by a private court of arbitration especially organized by agreement of the parties and elected *ad hoc* for the case in hand.

It is evident that no support for Dobrovolsky's view can be found in this provision, the purpose of which, as given in the resolution, was to "reinforce democratic principles in the resolution of economic disputes." The democratization consists in the substitution of a private for the state court of arbitration and in the replacement of the arbiter appointed by the state with three arbiters elected by the parties and applying, not the special provisions of state arbitral procedure, but the norms of the Code of Civil Procedure. The resolution, therefore, hardly supports the claim that *arbitrazh* is not a kind of arbitration court.

Dobrovolsky goes on to point to peculiarities in arbitral procedure that are unknown to the Code of Civil Procedure, and these lead him to side with those writers who define *arbitrazh* as an "administrative organ of economic management and state government."⁵⁴ "The activities of state, sovnarkhoz and departmental *arbitrazh* are of an administrative, not judicial, nature," he concludes.⁵⁵

These peculiarities are also taken by other writers in the group as a basis for relegating *arbitrazh* to the administrative state organs.⁵⁶

Neither Courts nor Administrative Agencies. A third group of jurists defines *arbitrazh* neither as a judicial nor as an administrative or governmental institution, but as an organ *sui generis* in the Soviet state system.⁵⁷ Let us review the arguments of R. F. Kallistratova, an eminent representative of the third group.

Kallistratova rejects the classification of state arbitration as a judicial institution because of "the normative material in accordance with which it functions and because of its practical application, which testify to the numerous and essential differences between *arbitrazh* and judicial organs," and also because "according to the Constitution *arbitrazh* is not considered a judicial organ."⁵⁸ Evidently she here has in mind Article 102, which enumerates the courts dispensing justice in the USSR. However, only regular courts are listed in this article of the Constitution, because only regular courts enjoy the rights and privileges granted in Section IX of the Constitution.⁵⁹ The list contained in Article 102 is not, there-

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁵⁶ See writers listed in Kallistratova, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁵⁷ For writers in this group, see *Uchenye zapiski Sverdlovskogo yuridicheskogo instituta*, 1957, No. 5, p. 237, Footnote 2.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁵⁹ See R. Maurich, *Handbuch der Sowjetverfassung*, Munich, 1955, p. 276 (Comment No. 3 to Article 102).

fore, exhaustive. For instance, comrades' courts are also not mentioned therein, but no one would deny that the comrades' courts fulfill judicial functions. It may be added that Article 1 of the Fundamental Principles of Court Structure of the USSR, Union and Autonomous Republics of 1958 repeats the list given in Article 102 of the Constitution, and so is equally incomplete.

Kallistratova observes that "arbiters are not elected, but appointed by the administration, and there are no people's assessors on the bench in *arbitrazh* proceedings." To this it may be replied that judges were appointed and not elected in the USSR for many years, and there is a score of courts which even now function without the participation of people's assessors—for example, all the courts of appeal.

Kallistratova further remarks that "the organs of *arbitrazh* are structurally bound to the organs of state government." Here it may be pointed out that the railroad courts, which functioned from 1930 to 1935, belonged to the system of people's commissariats of justice of the Union republics and still were considered courts and not administrative organs.

Finally, Kallistratova maintains that "the responsible representatives of the parties involved in the dispute submitted for arbitration take part in the decision concerning the merits of the case." This, however, is not correct: the parties' representatives participate in the examination of the dispute only so far as an agreement can be reached. It is the arbiter alone who decides.

Much more convincing is what Kallistratova has to say in rejection of the theory that *arbitrazh* is an organ of government. Despite some administrative functions, she argues, *arbitrazh* is not a normal governmental organ: it has no right to issue orders in the sphere of economic planning, organization and administration, and has no administrative organs subordinate to it. She also rightly points out contradictions in the arguments of her opponents. Yakimov, for instance, asserts that the principles of court procedure are inapplicable to state arbitration, but convincingly demonstrates the use in arbitral procedure of the controversial principle and of the principle of evidence valuation on the basis of inner conviction.⁶⁰ Her conclusion is as follows:

In fact, state arbitration has at the same time features of both judicial and administrative institutions, and consequently assumes a place peculiar to itself in the system of the Soviet state apparatus, which differs considerably from [that of] both administrative and judicial organs.⁶¹

Taking into consideration everything that has been said about the legal position of state and departmental arbitration, the present writer is of the opinion that these organs may be defined as special courts—"special" because their functions are limited to settling disputes between socialized enterprises, organizations and institutions and because they employ special norms of procedure along with provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and "courts" because

⁶⁰ Kallistratova, *op. cit.*, pp. 16–17.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

they were intended as such by the legislators and because their main purpose is the fulfillment of judicial functions. The intention of the legislators and the judicial activities confer the status of courts upon the organs of state and departmental arbitration, despite all deviations from normal court procedure and despite their administrative functions.

Conclusion

We have discussed the question of the legal nature of *arbitrazh* at some length because this question has a direct bearing upon the work and the importance of *arbitrazh*.

Indeed, if the organs of arbitration are courts, their main task must be the preservation of legality. Any court, whether general or special, must be particularly concerned with the correct application of the law. Considerations of "expediency" cannot serve as a basis for a court's decisions, and those Soviet writers who denounce arbiters who are guided in their decisions by such considerations are certainly right. *Pacta sunt servanda*, and arbitration organs deciding the question of the violation or non-violation of a contract must be guided by the provisions of the law of contracts and not by other considerations.

When the Supreme Court of the USSR ruled in 1963 that "no violations of legality whatsoever can be justified by reliance on the notion that they are necessary in order to consolidate the fight against crime,"⁶² it evidently wanted to ban all violations of law in all branches of Soviet justice. And when it continued that "every criminal case, regardless of the nature and seriousness of the crime and of the official or social position of the accused, must be decided in strict accordance with the requirements of criminal and procedural law," it meant that the decision should not be influenced by the position of the person to be sentenced.

In analogy to this ruling, it may be concluded that the law must also in the decisions of *arbitrazh* take precedence over "economic expediency." Decisions guided by considerations other than law are violations of the law, regardless of the branch of judicial administration in which they occur, and *arbitrazh*, whether it be considered a court, an administrative unit or an institution *sui generis*, administers justice and so is bound above all to the observance of the law. As we have seen, however, the Statute on State Arbitration of 1931 lays down that when deciding disputes, organs of state arbitration "must be guided by the laws and rulings of both central and local authorities as well as by the general principles of Soviet economic policy" (Article 8) and that they must proceed from the necessity of "strict compliance with planning and contractual discipline" (Article 9); on the other hand, the rules for arbitral procedure of 1934 charge the organs of state arbitration with "the further strengthening of legality." Thus, the arbiter must not seldom find himself in a dilemma, being confronted with the obligation, on the one hand, to apply the law unflinchingly and, on the

⁶² Ruling No. 2 of March 18, 1963, *Byulleten Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR*, 1963, No. 3.

other, to observe the interests of plan fulfillment. Sometimes the fulfillment of the contract is no longer in the interests of the plan, and then the arbiter decides, not according to the law, but with regard to expediency. The interests of the plan prevail, and the law is violated. Such violations of the law hardly, speaking generally, contribute to the "strengthening of legality," but they are particularly reprehensible when committed by a court—an institution which is called upon to enforce the law and preserve legality.

Writing in 1961, Kallistratova maintained:

At the present time, no one still proposes to liquidate *arbitrazh* and to replace it by the court, because the arbitral form of deciding disputes has sustained the challenge of time and has been consolidated; in the main, those defects which provided the grounds for suggesting its liquidation have been overcome in arbitral practice.⁶³

Kallistratova does not, however, substantiate her claim. There is no evidence that the practice of applying expediency in the place of law has been abandoned.

There is also no evidence to show that the defects authoritatively indicated in the resolution of the Council of Ministers of 1959 have been removed. This much may be concluded from a discussion published by the journal *Sovetskaya yustitsiya* in 1963. The discussion was opened by I. Gorbunov, who wrote an article entitled "When Disputes are Conducted to the Detriment of the State," in which he pointed out many faults in the work of the arbitral system.⁶⁴ According to the editors of the journal, Gorbunov's article found a wide response among jurists and economists. Many readers reported defects in the work both of the arbitral system and of enterprises obliged to resort to it for the settlement of disputes, and a number of suggestions were made for improving this situation. These comments and suggestions were summarized in a later issue.⁶⁵

With regard to "strengthening legality," the transfer of the activities of *arbitrazh* to the general courts suggested by Lensky, Rivkin and others seems to be well founded. Mozhneiko and Shkundin rightly emphasized that strict observance of the law is the most expedient method of resolving disputes. Indeed, the plan should be adapted to the law, and not the law broken in favor of the plan. All this, of course, remains little more than *pia desiderata* so long as the Soviet Union continues to be a totalitarian state in which the interests of the state prevail over everything else, including the law. Admittedly, the new Party Program claims that "justice in the USSR is exercised in full conformity with the law. It is based on truly democratic lines."⁶⁶ But the main "democratic foundation" of law is its supremacy over the state; and this is not the case in the USSR.⁶⁷

⁶³ Kallistratova, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁶⁴ *Sovetskaya yustitsiya*, 1963, No. 2, pp. 6–8.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 1963, No. 12, pp. 9–11.

⁶⁶ *Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1961, p. 96.

⁶⁷ Harold Berman (*Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Law*, rev. ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1963, p. 87) quotes the answer he received from Deputy Procurator General of the USSR P. I. Kudryavtsev to the question, "Suppose the law conflicts with the interests of the state: which prevails?" The answer was: "The interests of the state."

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

The Economy

Suggestions for the Third Kolkhoz Congress

The First All-Union Congress of Kolkhozniks was held in February 1933. The second "Congress of the Record-Breakers of Kolkhoz Work" took place in February 1935, and many of the provisions of the Model Charter of an Agricultural Artel (known also as the Stalin Charter) which it produced are theoretically still in force today despite the sweeping changes which have taken place in the structure of socialist agriculture since the death of Stalin. It has long been evident that a third congress was overdue and a new charter required; in late 1961, for example, Khrushchev admitted that the existing statutes were obsolete but implied that the formulation of a new charter would have to await the promulgation of the new Soviet constitution.¹ This latter document appears to have been put away on the same shelf as its sponsor, and Khrushchev's administration ended without the convocation of a new kolkhoz congress.

At the March 1965 meeting of the Party Central Committee, Brezhnev outlined an extensive program of agricultural reform with stable and reduced state purchase and delivery targets, increased capital investment, appreciable financial concessions to the farms and the rural population and substantially increased purchase prices—without corresponding increases in retail prices—which have made Soviet agriculture the most heavily subsidized in the world. On the subject of the kolkhoz charter, the speaker declared:

It must be admitted that much in the Kolkhoz Statutes has become obsolete. Life insistently demands the improvement of the Statutes. The time has come to begin drafting new Kolkhoz Statutes that shall take into consideration everything positive that has been accumulated in the practice of kolkhoz development in recent years. Preparations for a Third All-Union Congress of Kolkhozniks should be initiated at the same time so that such a congress may be called as early as next year.²

This promise to convene a third kolkhoz congress touched off a refreshingly broad and frank discussion in the Soviet press throughout the remainder of the year 1965. Suggestions were made concerning virtually every aspect of kolkhoz operation and the duties and rights of kolkhozniks. A few were aired whose implementation would have further restricted the limited privileges of kolkhoz members, while some, if carried through to their logical conclusion, would have implied the *de facto* dissolution of the kolkhoz structure. Most of the proposals, however, outlined feasible and desirable improvements to the existing system.

In January of this year, the names were published of the members of the commission charged with examining these proposals and drafting a new charter.³

¹ *Pravda*, December 25, 1961.

² *Ibid.*, March 27, 1965.

³ *Ibid.*, January 26, 1966.

Those agricultural reformers who had been heartened by the Central Committee's bold and rational provisions of March 1965 must have been downcast when they scanned the list of those appointed to sit on the commission. Of 149 members, over one-third were high-ranking Party officials headed by Brezhnev, Suslov, Shelepin and S. P. Trapeznikov,⁴ about fifty were kolkhoz chairmen of whom few, if any, were known for their controversial or independent viewpoints, and only a dozen or so were agricultural scientists, economists, accountants or lawyers. Moreover, the commission contained none of the most pragmatic reformers like V. T. Venzher, who has braved official wrath for many years to point out the grosser errors of the kolkhoz system and to advocate viable alternatives. More ominously, recent discussion of the kolkhoz charter in the Soviet press has evidenced a retrogressive trend, with more emphasis being laid upon the duties of kolkhozniks and the limitations of their autonomy rather than on their rights and privileges.⁵

Despite these setbacks to the advocates of reform, it is to be expected that when it meets in December the commission will make considerable basic amendments to the kolkhoz charter. At this point, it may be of value briefly to list some of the more liberal proposals which have appeared in the Soviet press (although not all of them will be taken up at the Congress); references are supplied for those readers who may wish to probe more deeply into particular issues. In reviewing these proposals, certain (possibly self-evident) considerations should be borne in mind.

In the first place, it should not be forgotten that many of the irrationalities and inequities affecting kolkhozes and their members which have been criticized during the past few years have already been corrected by the Central Committee's provisions of March 1965 and later legislation.⁶ The stable and reduced targets for grain purchases together with the more modest targets for livestock products represent the most progressive innovation. The other principal reforms are the increased prices for state purchases of grain and of meat and milk products; the provision of a 50 percent bonus for above-plan sales of wheat and rye (later extended to the purchase of virtually all grains and pulses);⁷ the raising of agriculture's share of total investment to 26 percent during the Eighth Five-Year Plan (it was 19 percent during the preceding five years); a sharp increase in the scheduled supplies to agriculture of machinery, trucks and fertilizer; a vast program of land improvement, including the provision of irrigated land under wheat; financial assistance to the kolkhozes and a range of concessions to the rural population in general. All of the improvements outlined at the March

⁴ Trapeznikov's recent work *Agrarny vopros i leninskiye agrarnye programmy v trekh russkikh revolyutsiyakh* (The Agrarian Question and the Leninist Agrarian Programs in Three Russian Revolutions) would hardly distinguish him as an ardent advocate of kolkhoz reform.

⁵ See, for example, *Kommunist*, 1966, No. 9, pp. 30-32; *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 32, p. 12; and *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1966, No. 7, pp. 99-103.

⁶ See "Agricultural Reforms Since Khrushchev," in *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Joint Economic Committee, Washington, D.C., 1966.

⁷ *Kommunist*, 1966, No. 11, pp. 61-62.

meeting of the Central Committee have been incorporated in the Five-Year Plan except for a slight scaling down of the plans for new irrigation. The one outstanding prime prerequisite for a renewed upsurge in kolkhoz productivity was provided this year. After a TASS leak in the summary of the draft directives of the Five-Year Plan⁸ and after some guarded references by Brezhnev and Kosygin during the Twenty-Third Party Congress, a decree was unexpectedly promulgated in May which "advised" all kolkhozes to go over to a guaranteed monthly wage at sovkhos rates for their members with effect from July 1.⁹

A second consideration is that although it is patently clear to most Western observers—and to a growing number of Soviet officials and intellectuals—that socialized agriculture as practiced in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries is grossly inefficient and has acted as a brake upon the rate of overall economic development, it is nevertheless evident that the present Soviet leaders envisage no radical change in the basic structure of Soviet agriculture in the foreseeable future. All the reforms introduced since the departure of Khrushchev are aimed at improving, not altering, the existing structure. In the opinion of the present writer, a fundamental change will be made only if and when the current program of reform is shown to be inadequate. However, since the more modest agricultural goals for the Five-Year Plan are likely to be met—albeit at enormous cost—, no such change is likely during this decade. Consequently, it would be unrealistic to expect the commission to preside over the liquidation of the kolkhoz system, and observers should limit their discussion to viable proposals for the improvement of the existing system.

Thirdly, the kolkhoz system is operated over a vast expanse of territory, from the Ukraine to the Far East and from the Tadzhik to the Estonian republics. This in itself leads to incongruities; for example, a good case could be made for the retention of the kolkhoz system in the irrigated cotton fields of Uzbekistan which would have little validity in the forested regions of the north. Yet any basic charter for the kolkhozes must be universally applicable to all farms, regardless of location, ethnic groups, land and crops.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that many of the ills plaguing Soviet agriculture are common to all lands. In many countries, youth is leaving the village for the bright lights, regular hours and better living conditions of the city; inefficient farmers are protected by high tariff barriers or supported by subsidies; rarely is the criterion of normal economic rationality wholly applicable to the pricing of farm products, and so on. Comparisons should therefore be based upon the realities and not the theoretical models of other systems.

Kolkhoz Unions. One proposal which has received increasing support of late and which appears to have good chances of adoption is the restoration of the kolkhoz unions. The objects of this pyramid of raion, oblast and republic unions, headed by an All-Union Central Council of Kolkhozniks, would be to represent the interests of individual farms at all levels, to rationalize supply, production

⁸ TASS (in English), February 19, 1966.

⁹ *Pravda*, May 18, 1966.

and marketing practices and to assist farms with the provision and maintenance of equipment and with technical advice.

The original All-Union Kolkhoz Center was created by the November 1929 plenary session of the Party Central Committee but was soon dissolved in 1932. On two occasions during his administration, Khrushchev tried to further the cause of kolkhoz unions but was rebuffed. His first attempt, during the 1957–58 discussion of the MTS reorganization, met with short shrift. The second phase, opened in early 1958,¹⁰ received a setback at the Central Committee meeting of December 1958 and reached a climax at that of December 1959. Here Khrushchev's proxies—Polyansky, Podgorny, Belyayev and Kirilenko—put the case for the unions, but they were defeated by the majority, whose principal spokesmen were Mzhavanadze and Matskevich. Articles hostile to the formation of kolkhoz unions appeared in 1960¹¹ but advocates of a related cause, inter-kolkhoz construction organizations, reappeared in 1961 after Matskevich had been despatched to the wastes of Kazakhstan.

In March 1962, the Central Committee set up inter-raion kolkhoz-sovkhoz production administrations which effectively terminated the kolkhoz union campaign until after Khrushchev's removal. Since then, support for their reintroduction has been growing,¹² and although few words in their favor were recorded at the Twenty-Third Party Congress, subsequent articles give the impression that there was considerable unexpressed (or unrecorded) sentiment for their restitution at the congress.¹³

All advocates of kolkhoz unions seem to be agreed that these organs should not be restored in their original form. Many proponents favor the transfer from the state to the unions of many functions of management, supply and financial administration and the representation of the unions at all levels of the Party and state structure.

Safeguarding of Kolkhoz Rights. An article in the Central Committee journal *Partiinaya zhizn* expressed the pious hope that "the new kolkhoz charter will put an end to all sorts of misinterpretation of the duties of kolkhozes and their rights, both in regard to their members and in regard to organs for the administration of agricultural production."¹⁴ The writer then went on to make a commendable proviso: "In our opinion, this must be fostered also by proper bills which shall secure observance of the charter by all organizations and establishments which have business with kolkhozes and which shall stipulate their responsibility for violation."

¹⁰ See, for example, *Izvestia*, March 5 and 25, 1958; *Leninskoye znaniye* and *Pravda*, March 8, 1958; and *Literaturnaya gazeta*, March 25, 1958.

¹¹ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1960, No. 5, and *Nash sovremennik*, 1960, No. 5.

¹² See, for example, *Kommunist*, 1964, No. 16; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 16, 1965, *Selskaya zhizn*, September 18 and December 2, 1965.

¹³ See especially *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* and *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, April 8, 1966; *Pravda Ukrainy*, April 19, 1966; *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 16, p. 26; and *Selskaya zhizn*, May 5 and June 23, 1966.

¹⁴ *Partiinaya zhizn*, 1965, No. 10, pp. 20–25.

A concrete example of the violation of kolkhoz rights is the unjustified expropriation of kolkhoz land for industrial and communications purposes¹⁵ (legislation has long been in force which provides for expropriation of kolkhoz land for the benefit of the state and society).

Protection of Kolkhozes Against State Purchasing Agencies. A multitude of complaints concerning abuses by state purchasing agencies, largely at the expense of kolkhozes, have been registered in the Soviet press. Malpractices include the excessive downgrading of the quality of produce, refusals to accept produce delivered according to plan and faulty scales which understate the weight of deliveries and add handsomely to the agencies' above-plan profits.¹⁶

In theory, there exist legal guarantees which protect the producers against these malpractices, and this is a vital function of the control units of the State Purchasing Committee, but the trouble appears to lie in the implementation of these safeguards at the state purchase points. Obviously a more foolproof system of safeguarding the interests of kolkhozes and sovkhoses is required; this may be forthcoming through agencies of the proposed kolkhoz unions.

"Giganticism." Investigations carried out by certain Mid-Western universities in the US led to the conclusion that a farm of roughly 120–190 hectares (300–500 acres) makes possible a certain optimum investment in machinery and rational employment of the work-force, and that any increase in size beyond these limits does not lead to a conspicuous rise in profitability.¹⁷ In glaring contrast, the sown area of the average kolkhoz in 1964 was 2,881 hectares¹⁸ and Khrushchev's predilection for mammoth farms was often carried to extremes; in one instance, 137 small villages in a northern region, separated by marshes, forests, poor roads and other barriers, were merged into one collective farm.¹⁹ In many cases, the present kolkhoz "brigades" are formerly independent kolkhozes which, by virtue of their physical isolation, continue to enjoy a relatively large degree of autonomy.

At the Central Committee meeting of March 1965, Brezhnev observed that some of the enlarged farms had proved to be unmanageable, and shortly thereafter the results of a detailed four-year study of the optimum size of a kolkhoz were made known.²⁰ After a spate of articles condemning kolkhoz giganticism,²¹ there has been a lull in the discussion, but it is to be hoped that the issue will not be ignored by the Commission.

A device of Khrushchev's for dealing with backward kolkhozes was to merge them with leading farms. However, as an authoritative article correctly

¹⁵ *Selskaya zhizn*, September 22, 1965.

¹⁶ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, August 8, 1964 and October 3, 1964; *Izvestia*, August 8, 1965.

¹⁷ See Karl-Eugen Waedekin's contribution to *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, Zurich, December 1965, pp. 11–13.

¹⁸ *Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1964 godu: Statistichesky yezhegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1964: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1965, p. 399.

¹⁹ Examples are given in *Partiinaya zhizn*, May 10, 1965.

²⁰ *Ekonomika selskogo khozyaistva*, 1965, No. 5, pp. 28–43.

²¹ *Partiinaya zhizn*, May 10, 1965.

points out, "The main condition for success is not organizational changes on farms but work with people, training good cadres, raising the activity and independence of the workers and strengthening their incentives in the public sector."²²

Processing and Marketing of Farm Produce. Recent articles in the Soviet press confirm that inadequate and inefficient facilities for processing and marketing agricultural produce continue to impede the supply of foodstuffs in good condition to the consumer. Thus, we read that one-and-a-half million hogs were held back from slaughter because the meat processing combines were unable to cope with the animals offered by the farms,²³ and that over three million tons of vegetables grown in the communal sector could not be accepted by the state purchasing agencies and had to be fed to cattle;²⁴ classic examples are also cited of cross-shipments of produce.²⁵ The poor performance in processing and marketing stems largely from inadequate investment in the past, the low priority accorded to the food industry and trade and the endemic inefficiency of Russian bureaucracy.

Many viable solutions have been put forward by Soviet economists. Venzher, for example, has suggested that the annual state purchase plans be assigned to the state purchasing agencies, not the individual farms, and that the agencies bear contractual responsibility.²⁶ Alternatively, he proposed that farms be allowed to enter into direct agreements with industrial and trading organizations—a procedure which was approved in principle by the Central Committee in March 1965²⁷ but which appears not to have been put into practice.

Another simple and practical proposal was that if the state purchasing agencies do not accept produce, then it should be released to the kolkhoz market and not be left to rot or fed to cattle.²⁸

Subsidiary and Ancillary Industries. Mainly on the grounds that it detracts from the amount of work put in on the communal sector, Soviet authorities have long discouraged subsidiary work by the kolkhozniks, although this attitude appears to have been based on the false premise that the kolkhoz can provide work for its members throughout the year. Recent disclosures have refuted this; one estimate has put the average work-year of the kolkhozniks on the public sector at less than 200 days,²⁹ while another stated that 30–50 percent of all able-bodied kolkhozniks are not employed in the communal sector during the winter months.³⁰

In March 1965, Brezhnev conceded in principle that subsidiary and industrial crafts and trades were needed in kolkhozes. An authoritative article in *Kommunist* spelt out some of the principal measures which could help to alleviate seasonal unemployment on the farms; in addition to their traditional handicrafts, kol-

²² *Ibid.*, 1955, No. 10, pp. 20–25.

²³ *Pravda*, July 14, 1966.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, August 6, 1966.

²⁵ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1966, No. 1, pp. 37–46; *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 32, p. 36.

²⁶ *Komsomolskaya pravda*, March 22, 1966.

²⁷ *Ekonomika selikogo khozyaystva*, 1965, No. 6, p. 13.

²⁸ *Selskaya zhizn*, July 3, 1965, and *Pravda*, August 6, 1966.

²⁹ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, June 11, 1966.

³⁰ TASS, July 4, 1966.

khozniks could profitably engage in a whole range of food-processing activities and the manufacture of industrial components, packaging materials, etc.³¹

Although the principle appears to have been accepted, in practice much remains to be done. For example, industry must turn out simple machinery and equipment for farm workshops and kolkhozes must be assisted with long-term credits for setting up the subsidiary industries. It is to be hoped that the commission will provide for specific assistance in this respect.

Introduction of Land Rent. It would be fitting for the Soviet government to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Soviet rule by finally overcoming all ideological objections to the introduction of land rent. Already comparative economic evaluations of land have been initiated in the Tatar ASSR and in other regions,³² but this work should be regulated and coordinated on a national basis.

Restoration of the Machine and Tractor Stations (MTS). At the Central Committee meeting of March 1965, only Zarobyian called for the restoration of the MTS, which were dissolved in 1958. Since then, increasing support has been aired for some form of inter-kolkhoz machinery stations; there obviously exists a case for these where local farms are too small fully to exploit all the specialized machinery required for farm operations or economically too weak to purchase and maintain them. It is also clear that "Soyuzselkhoztekhnika" under the durable Yezhevsky is still failing satisfactorily to maintain machinery or to supply the necessary spares. Moreover, for its inadequate service it charges inordinate fees.³³

If the MTS are reintroduced, effective safeguards must be provided to prevent a repetition of the abuses prevalent under the old system. One possible solution has been tested out by the Tsebrikovskoye branch of "Soyuzselkhoztekhnika," which has formed PTS (production equipment stations).³⁴ To ensure that the quality of the work does not suffer from the harmful influence of the *val* cult (excessive emphasis on gross output), a PTS tractor brigade is allocated a certain piece of land for 8–9 years and is responsible for all machine operations carried out on this land, receiving additional pay and bonuses on the basis of the "final results of agricultural production" on that land.

Another article suggested that the present functions of "Soyuzselkhoztekhnika" be assumed by the kolkhoz unions.³⁵

The Election of Kolkhoz Chairmen. At present, the kolkhoz chairman is selected by the members of the kolkhoz board, usually upon the recommendation of the local Party organization, and only then is his name submitted to the general meeting for approval. One writer has been bold enough to protest against this "guided democracy." He suggests that the chairman "be drawn from among the best kolkhozniks and specialists" and that he be selected and elected at the general meeting of kolkhozniks.³⁶

³¹ *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 18, pp. 65–74.

³² *Izvestia*, June 30, 1965.

³³ *Ibid.*, January 26, 1965.

³⁴ *Molodoi kommunist*, 1966, No. 5, pp. 68 and 72.

³⁵ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 28, pp. 27–28.

³⁶ *Selskaya zhizn*, December 11, 1965.

Since the kolkhoz chairman has a great deal of power over individual members, e.g., in the allocation of private plots, the selection of tasks, the distribution of feed, assistance with farm transport, the provision of building materials, etc., one writer suggested that the kolkhoz chairman be elected by secret ballot.³⁷

The tendency of kolkhoz chairmen to act independently of and contrary to the wishes of kolkhozniks has also been criticized.³⁸

Trade Unions on Kolkhozes? In theory, kolkhozniks are the owners of kolkhoz property and elect the kolkhoz board from among their own members; thus, the general assembly of kolkhozniks or its executive board should provide adequate protection for the rights of individual kolkhozniks. That this theory has not always corresponded with reality was evidenced in 1964, when trade union committees were set up on kolkhozes.³⁹ Membership is apparently limited to wage-earners, such as "mechanizers" and mechanics. Although this innovation belies the supposedly cooperative form of the kolkhoz, it might be advisable to retain and expand the trade union activities on the farms as an additional, albeit limited, safeguard of the kolkhoznik's rights.

Mechanized Teams. A great deal of prominence in the Western press has been accorded to the few Soviet proposals for the introduction of the mechanized team (*zveno* or *otryad*). The most vociferous proponent of such teams has been the youth newspaper *Komsomolskaya pravda*, which began its campaign in earnest after Khrushchev's removal⁴⁰ and carried the most convincing plea just over a year ago.⁴¹ Since then, other newspapers and journals have taken up the theme, a cautiously favorable mention appearing in *Kommunist*.⁴²

The essence of these proposals is that teams of five or six kolkhoz families be allocated an area of up to 1,600 hectares, depending on the soil and the crops grown, and granted complete operational and economic autonomy over the farming of that land for a period of several years—in other words, land leasehold. However, since the universal application of this practice would virtually remove any *raison d'être* for the kolkhoz, it seems unlikely that the commission will seriously consider this proposal.

Rural Housing Construction. During the Seven-Year Plan, the target for kolkhoz housing construction was underfulfilled by 50 percent.⁴³ This shortfall was partly attributable to the large-scale conversion of kolkhozes into sovkhoses, but much of the blame may be laid on the low priority accorded to rural construction and the inefficiency of "Mezhkolkhozstroï."⁴⁴

³⁷ *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaistva*, 1966, No. 2, p. 103.

³⁸ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, November 3, 1964; Moscow Radio, May 24, 1966.

³⁹ *Sel'skaya zhizn*, November 20, 1965.

⁴⁰ See *Komsomolskaya pravda*, December 3, 1964, and May 25, 1965.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, August 7, 1965.

⁴² *Kommunist*, 1966, No. 2.

⁴³ The target was 7 million (*Pravda*, November 14, 1958), while only 3,500,000 were built (*SSSR v tsifrakh v 1965 godu: Kratkiy statisticheskiy sbornik* [The USSR in Figures in 1965: A Concise Statistical Compilation], Moscow, 1966, p. 157).

⁴⁴ See, for example, *Pravda*, December 14, 1964.

Rural Roads. It is difficult for a Western observer to imagine how bad roads are in the Russian countryside. In 1964, the entire country possessed 351,700 kilometers of hard-surfaced roadway, of which only 118,500 kilometers had tarmac or concrete surfaces.⁴⁵ The US figure, for a much smaller land surface, was 5,800,000 kilometers, most of which had tarmac or concrete surfaces.⁴⁶ Most of the hard-surfaced roads in the Soviet Union link cities and towns, and few join farms with population centers. It is no exaggeration to say that for two months every spring and fall the average Russian country road is impassable to normal two-wheel-drive vehicles, and even during the summer they make heavy going after a heavy shower.⁴⁷ Moreover, the problem is not merely how to drive from the farm to the next village or town but also how to get around inside the farm itself, as numerous *Krokodil* cartoons testify.

The bulk of the 63,000 kilometers of paved roadway scheduled to be constructed during the current Five-Year Plan appears to be earmarked for major intercity arteries,⁴⁸ despite the lip-service paid to the need for more rural road construction in the draft Five-Year Plan.⁴⁹ It would be unrealistic to expect a radical improvement in rural road conditions in the future; indeed, the materials for a highly developed road network just do not exist in the Soviet Union and so there is little hope for good roads during this century, unless new techniques are discovered. However, the financing of road construction in and around kolkhozes is borne entirely by the farms,⁵⁰ and it would seem reasonable to press for state assistance for whatever road construction is possible.

The Kolkhoz Market. Many of the restrictions placed upon the kolkhoz markets by Khrushchev have been lifted, although much remains to be done. Only a few of the markets are covered; the majority lack basic conveniences for the peasants and storage facilities are primitive: for example, out of 89 markets in Tadzhikistan, only 4 have refrigerators.⁵¹ The fixing of prices by administrative order in the kolkhoz markets was ordered to be discontinued,⁵² yet certain local authorities are evidently disregarding this decree.

As far as marketing the produce from private plots is concerned, the current practice differs little from that which has existed in Russia for hundreds of years. It is clearly uneconomical for able-bodied kolkhozniks to spend entire days, often at the peak of the harvest season, on traveling to and from the local market with a small quantity of produce. However, this primitive method is likely to persist until the kolkhozes can provide a reasonable return for work done on the

⁴⁵ *Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1964 godu...*, p. 483.

⁴⁶ *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1965*, Washington, D.C., p. 561.

⁴⁷ For a revealing and amusing description, see Vladimir Soloukhin's "Soaked Apples" in *Literaturnaya gazeta*, October 22, 1963; also *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, September 21, 1963.

⁴⁸ Radio Moscow, February 2, 1966.

⁴⁹ *Pravda*, February 20, 1966.

⁵⁰ See *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, December 2, 1964.

⁵¹ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1966, No. 33, p. 33.

⁵² *Izvestia*, May 14, 1965.

communal sector, and until the state trading organization can provide the consumer with adequate, fresh and good-quality foodstuffs.

The Size of Private Plots. According to the Party Program, "the personal auxiliary plot will gradually become economically obsolete." This prospect, however, is very distant and, to judge by the scant references to full Communism made by the new leadership, is even receding. At present, private plots occupy a mere 3 percent of all arable land; yet, with private livestock holdings, they yield one-third of all agricultural production and one-sixth of all marketed produce.

One of the first acts of the new leaders was to lift the "groundless" restrictions which had been applied under Khrushchev to the size of private plots and the amount of livestock in private ownership.⁵³ Yet cases are still cited of kolkhoz authorities who illegally reduce the size of plots,⁵⁴ and reformers have called for firm provisions safeguarding the kolkhoznik's right to his plot to be featured in the new charter.⁵⁵

Small Tractors for Peasants. The productivity of private plots could be raised appreciably if the peasants could use "mini-tractors" on them. While the Soviet government is unlikely to emulate the example of Yugoslavia, where peasants are permitted to import small tractors,⁵⁶ it should eventually be feasible for Soviet industry to produce a cheap model on the lines of the Czech 20-horsepower model, which sells for about 1,200 rubles.⁵⁷

Kolkhoznik's Right to Leave Kolkhoz. The Kolkhoz Statute adopted in 1935 speaks only of rules for expelling a kolkhoznik from a kolkhoz and makes no provision for members who may wish to leave of their own volition. It is not uncommon for kolkhoz boards to reject the requests of members who have applied to leave.

A law teacher at the Saratov Juridical Institute has suggested that provisions be made in the new statute for any kolkhoznik to leave the farm whenever he or she wishes after giving three months' notice.⁵⁸

Internal Passports for Kolkhozmks. Of all classes in the Soviet Union, only kolkhozniks and convicts are not entitled to internal passports. Many pleas have been published for an end to this discrimination. As one oblast Party committee secretary put it, "the time has come to think about reviewing the existing system of issuing passports as well. It is well known that young people in towns receive our be-hammered and be-sickled Soviet passport at the age of 16... young people in the country are deprived of this opportunity. This is a relic of the past."⁵⁹

Labor Laws. The length of the working day for youths of up to 16 years of age and for girls of up to 18 is stipulated in industry, but no such provisions are

⁵³ *Pravda*, November 6, 1964.

⁵⁴ *Izvestia*, July 9, 1965.

⁵⁵ *Sovetskaya yustitsiya*, 1966, No. 2.

⁵⁶ *Borba*, Belgrade-Zagreb, May 20, 1966.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, April 22, 1966.

⁵⁸ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, August 4, 1965 p. 30.

⁵⁹ *Pravda*, July 21, 1965.

made for kolkhozniks. One dairymaid complained, "The lack of juvenile labor protection regulations is one of the main reasons why young people quit the kolkhoz after completing secondary school."⁶⁰

One writer suggested that the new kolkhoz charter make provisions concerning annual paid leave and sick leave for kolkhozniks.⁶¹ Another proposed that kolkhozniks be given one day off each week and that the length of a working day be fixed at seven hours.⁶² Finally, a kolkhoz brigade leader wrote, "Female kolkhoz workers should have the same maternity leave as factory workers—56 calendar days for the birth and postnatal period."⁶³

Kolkhozniks' Pensions. The law on kolkhozniks' pensions which was announced in July 1964⁶⁴ was a progressive and welcome measure, but its provisions were too modest if the Soviet leadership is serious in its declared aim of narrowing the gap between urban and rural living standards. While it is true that retired kolkhozniks have an additional source of income in their private plots, the pension minimums as outlined in the law are too low; for example, the minimum for an ex-kolkhoznik with one dependant is 12 rubles a month.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the age at which kolkhozniks qualify for pensions is higher than that for workers and employees. As one correspondent put it, "It would be quite natural for our kolkhoz statutes to lay down clearly that kolkhozniks are entitled to a pension after reaching the age of 60 for men and 55 for women...in short, the same as in a factory."⁶⁶ The Congress directives for the Five-Year Plan did promise "to make kolkhozniks equivalent to workers and employees with respect to pensionable age,"⁶⁷ but no action has yet been taken to implement this.

Keith Bush

Science

Science as a Philosophy of Life in the USSR

During the past 5–7 years, a new professional and social group, made up of young scientists working in such rapidly-developing fields as physics, electronics and cybernetics, has been gaining prominence on the Soviet scene. Known collectively as "physicists" or "cybers" (short for "cyberneticians"), they have captivated the imagination of a substantial proportion of Soviet intellectual youth and become widely popularized in modern Soviet literature. Noted *Komsomolskaya pravda*:

⁶⁰ *Selskaya zhizn*, October 9, 1965.

⁶¹ *Selskoye khozyaistvo Kazakhstana*, November 1965.

⁶² *Selskaya zhizn*, September 25, 1965.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, August 28, 1965.

⁶⁴ *Pravda*, July 16, 1964.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Selskaya zhizn*, August 28, 1965.

⁶⁷ *Pravda*, April 10, 1966.

...the physicist has become famous. He was canonized long ago, and school-children and writers idolize him. Once he was rather awkward to deal with; he was, after all, exceptional and "untypical." Now the number of physicists is increasing in geometrical progression. Literature could not ignore them if it wanted to. Today, every third book which one opens is about physicists—or rather not about them so much as about [science as a whole]. The hero can be a biologist, chemist or cosmonaut as well as a physicist. But he is one of the "physicists," since this is what people in this country have begun to call scientists in general.¹

The "physicists" and their adherents are distinguished chiefly by an unshakeable belief that mathematics, cybernetics and other "advanced" exact sciences are destined to mold the world outlook of future society and that they, the "physicists," will accordingly become the leading force in this society.² Many of the younger "physicists" try to mold their thinking and even their emotions after a perfect electronic "brain," since in their view only such a device is capable of objectively studying the surrounding world, drawing correct conclusions and laying down the laws for society's future development.³

The fact that the social utopias predicted by the "philosophers" or "lyricists" remain dreams while the "scientific utopias" are becoming reality all the time is regarded by the "physicists" as clear testimony to the correctness of their chosen path and to the legitimacy of their claims to a leading role in society. They consider their intellectual superiority to be apparent in a comparison of the scientific works and achievements of the "physicists" and the "philosophers."

The predominance of the "physicists" on the Soviet intellectual front is also reflected statistically. For example, during the past six years the number of students of electrical machine- and instrument-building has almost quintupled, whereas the number of law students has merely doubled during this period.⁴ The general trend of scientific and technical development suggests that the "physicists" will continue to increase in number; one only has to think of the specialists in emerging branches of science who will doubtless swell their ranks as time goes by.

A curious weakness of the "physicists" is their love of science fiction. Apparently it is by no means uncommon to see a scientist entering the staid library of a Soviet research institute

...eagerly snatching up *Nauka i zhizn*, *Tekhnika—molodezhi* and *Znaniye—sil* and even (surreptitiously) *Yuny tekhnika* [all popular-science journals, the last-named for youth] and leafing back through them feverishly until he finds the next science fiction story. The lucky fellow is then dead to the world until he has got to the end. This passion is almost universal in scientific circles. Journals which in many people's opinion are meant for teenagers are in fact read with no less interest by adults, and a statistical examination would probably show that the largest percentage of science fiction readers is accounted for by scientific workers.⁵

¹ *Komsomolskaya pravda*, March 16, 1966.

² See, for example, *Izvestia*, October 16, 1963.

³ See, for example, *Nash sovremennik*, 1965, No. 11, p. 113.

⁴ *Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1964 godu: Statisticheskoye yezhbegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1964: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1965, p. 679.

⁵ V. Perelman, "Razvlekatelnaya literatura i nauchnyy sotrudnik" (Light Reading and the Scientific Worker), in *Fantastika*, No. 1, 1965, p. 257.

In fact, it is quite possible that science fiction (much of which is written by actual scientists, after all) is devoured so eagerly by Soviet scientists not only because it provides them with a form of escape but also because present-day social and philosophical problems are posed with greater frankness in such literature than elsewhere in the USSR. That science fiction is exerting a powerful influence on the minds of Soviet youth in general is clear from the considerable attention which has recently been focused on the ideological content of science fiction works at a number of official conferences.

Of course, the ideas and outlook of Soviet scientists are being influenced to a much greater degree by the very nature of their research work. Academician A. I. Berg expressed the view that the thinking of a person working with modern electronic computers is basically different from that of a person using older calculating means.⁶ If so, the thinking of cyberneticians, mathematicians or astrophysicists must be still more different from that of even a young philosopher or sociologist compelled to use centuries-old methods of work.

If the USSR is to make progress in the new branches of science and technology which are of such eminent practical importance in the military, economic and scientific competition between the two world systems, the young Soviet scientist must combine objective and accurate experimentation with a bold imaginativeness free of all dogma. Moreover, the functional method now being applied in many sciences, such as cybernetics, calls for an ability to make an unbiased evaluation of a large number of puzzling and contradictory phenomena which cannot be fitted into a ready-made pattern. This point was brought out by V.V. Parin, Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, in a Soviet youth journal. He wrote:

Young people entering the world of science must prepare themselves to see hypotheses which seemed almost proven, and even theories considered unshakeable, crumble before their very eyes. This is a trying experience. It brings with it agonizing cogitation and bitter disappointments, and demands of the researcher courageous resolution and an ability soberly to appraise facts which sometimes by their startling newness appear incompatible with anything.

Truth is born in a conflict of opinions. In order to arrive at the truth, one must be able to evaluate attentively the arguments of another person proceeding along his own questing path. One must be able not only to stand up for one's own convictions but also, for the sake of truth, to discard one's own opinions if they are incorrect, however painstakingly they were acquired, and to refrain from concealing one's own errors behind the authority of an *éminence grise* or the broad back of a scientific leader.⁷

An example of the conflict in the Soviet Union between modern scientific hypotheses and the ideological tenets of Marxism is the years-old dispute on whether the universe is finite or not,⁸ while recent discoveries in the field of

⁶ *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 1965, No. 11, p. 68.

⁷ *Molodaya gvardiya*, 1964, No. 8, pp. 10–11.

⁸ See, for example, *Nauka i zhizn*, 1963, No. 8, p. 38.

genetics go far beyond the "truths" propounded by Engels in his *Dialectics of Nature*. A good illustration of the close relationship between scientific and ideological problems in the USSR is the debate on the desirability of communicating with extra-terrestrial civilizations. At the First All-Union Conference on Questions of Civilizations of the Universe, held in 1964, the thesis was advanced that Earthmen have nothing to fear from such contacts, since after having reached a certain level of development all civilizations of necessity become Communist, and *ipso facto* devoid of "aggressive intentions."⁹ It thus seems that in the USSR astrophysicists may soon be confronted with the question of the possibility of building Communism on other planets.

Certainly, the philosophy of the "physicists" still lacks coherence. Nevertheless, having gained wide currency among the students (who are simplifying and radicalizing it), this attractively new philosophy is exerting a profound influence on the psychological development and behavior of Soviet intellectual youth. This is causing alarm in official and other leading circles.

The growing influence of science on the life of society is greatly enhancing the personal responsibility of the scientists themselves. Leading Soviet circles are thus disturbed at the gulf between the scientific knowledge of the young "physicists" and their ethical awareness. In 1964, roughly 2,000 persons participated in a two-months-long discussion which raged in the columns of *Komsomolskaya pravda* on the subject of knowledge and morals. The discussion wound up with a two-day conference of the newspaper's editorial board and the Great Learned Council of the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences on the subject of the influence of scientific progress on the human soul, the concepts of good and evil and the appearance of "talented persons without a drop of humanity."¹⁰

At the present time, however, the Soviet ideological authorities are probably even more disturbed at the "deideologization" of scientific workers and their cavalier attitude to the study of Marxist classics. The latter sin is particularly prevalent among students. At an all-Union students' conference held some months ago in Moscow, it was complained that there was a tendency to study dialectics "not according to Hegel but according to the *Concise Philosophical Dictionary*," to regard Marxist classics merely as something to be "got through," and to make the same scientific demands of social laws as of the laws of nature.¹¹ It was also mentioned that in a certain higher educational institution the jesting yet meaningful slogan "Physics is Salt, Everything Else is Nothing" was displayed above the rostrum from which Marxism was taught.

In the process of making a general reappraisal of ideological values, the young "physicists" have arrived at a more rationalistic view of the concepts of "fatherland" and "duty to one's fatherland." Some, on the basis of their detailed knowledge of the colossal destructive force of modern weapons, have fallen into a

⁹ See *Priroda*, 1966, No. 2, p. 113.

¹⁰ *Komsomolskaya pravda*, August 27, 1964.

¹¹ See *Komsomolskaya pravda*, April 20, 1966.

“scientific-technical defeatism” which is causing growing concern in Soviet military circles. General of the Army I. I. Yakubovsky, speaking on the importance of the individual soldier in the atomic era, wrote in *Komsomolskaya pravda*:

Whether we like it or not (and of course, we don’t!), here and there pacifism has found its way into the hearts of the youngsters. From here it is only one step farther to more disturbing sentiments. “The epoch of technology,” “push-button warfare”... No wonder there is alarm at the prospect of a modern war. “What is a tiny man, after all?”¹²

Since the “physicists” are confronted more often than anyone else with such problems as the origin of the universe, eternity and the meaning of life and fall back on terms borrowed from the natural sciences in their efforts to resolve them, it is in this group that a new religious-naturalistic philosophy is slowly emerging which may yet give both theologians and atheists a good run for their money. The latter are particularly worried about the new possibilities open to the theologians as regards explaining the divine principle in physical terms. In one anti-religious article, the cogitations of the theologians on the nature of God were reproduced as follows:

[God] is an invisible, imperceptible spirit, an “intellect” which controls all the processes taking place in the world. God is Information separate from signals and existing in its own right. The ways of this “intellect” are incomprehensible for man.¹³

The atheists, in fact, are already busy adapting their philosophy to the latest physical concepts of cybernetics and to the possibilities of the latter science.

Although in one form or another “scientific-technical thinking” has penetrated almost all spheres of Soviet intellectual life, it would be premature to say that it has gained a total victory. It must be remembered that this new school of thought grew up and spread in the USSR as a result not only of world-wide scientific and technical progress but also of the crisis springing from many years of intellectual repression. “Physics” owes its attraction for Soviet youth primarily to the circumstance that it offers an alternative to the sterile study of Marxist-Leninist classics. However, whether the natural sciences can ever satisfy the genuine spiritual thirst of Soviet youth—and world youth for that matter—is another question.

S. Voronitsyn

¹² *Ibid.*, March 13, 1966.

¹³ *Ibid.*, March 13, 1963.

REVIEWS

The Periodical Press

Communist ideology has long been comparable to a sea lashed by storms of an ever-increasing intensity. The Communist Party, in fact, cannot be said to have ever been genuinely monolithic. As soon as the Party seized power in Russia, opposition movements sprang up within it—some right-wing, some left-wing, some indeterminate in character. However, dissension became particularly acute when Communist systems were set up in a number of countries having different histories, cultures and character traits. It is only natural that each Party leadership does its best to prove its “purity,” its loyalty to Marxism. The leaders of the Soviet Communist Party are being compelled to theoretically substantiate their political line as well as their economic one, which of late has been enjoying priority over political dogma.

Soviet Party leaders invariably base their ideas almost exclusively on Lenin's theses. It can even be said that for some time now Marx and Engels, the founders of Marxist politicoeconomic teaching, have in the USSR been giving way to Lenin's revolutionary practice. Significant in this respect is the leading article which appeared in the twelfth issue of *Kommunist* for this year under the heading “On the Leninist Style in Party Work.” Here an attempt is made to use quotations from Lenin in order to justify the recent contradictory economic policy. It is especially emphasized that Lenin's directives on Party work are characterized by an extreme flexibility permitting of unexpected deviations from basic postulates. We read:

The Leninist style in Party work is a broad concept which includes many different features. But this style is not their arithmetical sum; it is applied not piecemeal but as a whole. At the same time, at various stages in its activity the Party has, in accordance with the demands of life, singled out various aspects and principles of this style and emphasized the necessity of mastering them first and foremost (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 12, page 3).

At the same time, the point is made that a Leninist style or, to be more precise, Party tactics and strategy, must have a solid basis, consisting in a scientific attitude, collectivity and a businesslike approach. The first of these is alleged to be inseparable from Marxism:

It was on Marxism, as a world-transforming doctrine and the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat, that the Party relied in its struggle for power. From its very first steps as a ruling party it strove to put all control of society, of socialist construction, on a scientific footing (page 4).

Lenin is depicted as a leader who always preached strict realism in politics and who warned that stages could not be leapfrogged, that it was necessary to “fully take into account the level of economic development attained by the country.”

The editorial then discusses problems of Party work at the present stage:

An especial place in the scientific control of the socioeconomic processes unfolding in the country's life, and of economic and cultural construction and the Communist education of the workers, is occupied by the Party organizations, their leading committees and cadres. Their role is extremely great (page 5).

Party organizations are then asked to rid themselves of everything hindering a creative exchange of opinions and clarification of the processes taking place in economics, ideology, culture and everyday life. The creativity of Party work is illustrated in the following terms:

Communists do, for example, justly oppose meetings at which a profound analysis of the situation, of unsolved problems, is replaced by a repetition of general truths and a recapitulation of achieved successes or existing shortcomings (*ibid*).

In fact, the above criticism applies to something which is endemic to all Party work, including the Party congresses and plenary meetings alleged to be of such great historical significance. The second characteristic of Party work, "collectivity," is, according to the *Kommunist* editorial, a product of the Party's democratism. Collectivity in the work of Party organs, it is declared, is developing all the time:

The role of meetings and conferences, elected organs, and committee and bureau members is growing, there is an increasing number of useful discussions, and critical remarks are being taken with a greater sense of responsibility. There are growing demands and efforts to the effect that collective work should contribute toward the more effective solution of a question and not be turned into collectivity for collectivity's sake (page 7).

Thus, a critical approach, as a prerequisite for democratism, is welcomed. Most important, according to the editorial, is that there should be contact between the leaders and the masses. At the same time, it is regretted that this is frequently not the case (page 9).

The third characteristic, a "businesslike approach," can obviously only be developed by the appropriate training. It is declared:

Cadres, their distribution and training, constitute the content and consistent method of the Party's work. Ever since the Party came to power, the guiding tendency in its cadre work has been the selection and education of workers, whether politicians or specialists, in such fields as economics, politics, science, culture, state administration... (page 10).

At the same time, it is frequently complained in the Soviet press that considerable numbers of responsible Party workers do not meet the requirements.

The same issue of *Kommunist* contains an article entitled "Toward Complete Economic Accountability" by P. Bunich, in which the implementation of the new economic reform is discussed. This reform, it will be remembered, calls for the gradual transfer of all Soviet enterprises to a Western-style mode of operation. Enterprises are to aim at making a profit, which in turn will enable them to

expand their production. Whether an enterprise makes a profit will, of course, depend on the demand for its products, and it is significant that in his article Bunich devotes much attention to the question of prices. He writes:

Prices are a powerful instrument for economically regulating proportional development. Fixed with due regard for payments into the works fund, rent payments, a correct evaluation of labor and a planned corelationship between supply and demand, prices will direct the interests of collectives into the necessary channel of proportionality (pages 27-28).

It is interesting to note that in this statement only one word, "collectives," testifies to its Communist origin, and even so it is inappropriate inasmuch as the interests referred to are those of enterprise managements or top-level economic administrators. The collective, the ordinary workers, will hardly count for much in this respect. More important, however, is the fact that the principle of complete economic accountability is diametrically opposed to Marxist theory.

Implementation of the economic reforms certainly seems to be regarded as a matter of some urgency. Says Bunich:

Inasmuch as the transfer of industry to the new operating conditions will be completed in 1968, this problem will already arise during the current Five-Year Plan. On the basis of the experience of pilot enterprises, it is advisable to first develop methods of predicting labor supply and demand, determine the approximate scope and area of release of labor resources, adjust capital investment plans so as to develop labor-intensive production capacities where necessary and effect retraining of work cadres (page 31).

The new criterion of the efficiency of an enterprise is regarded as the only real means of boosting the country's economy. It is being relied upon to make enterprises profitable, improve the quality of products and augment fixed and floating assets.

The economic reform puts a new complexion on the manpower problem. The emphasis on profitability demands an increase of automation on the one hand and careful selection of workers on the other. In other words, not every Soviet citizen offering his labor can count on receiving employment. This leads us to an article published in the sixteenth issue of *Partiinaya zhizn* for this year under the heading "The System of Training Work Cadres," which begins as follows:

New technology demands new knowledge. In order to control modern machines and complex technological processes to perfection, a worker must have theoretical and production training (*Partiinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 16, page 34).

This demand is sensible enough. It does, however, imply the *selection* of production workers, since by no means every candidate will be up to requirements. This means that some workers will become unemployed or else be degraded to the status of unskilled workers. It is complained that already

The low level of qualification of operatives is severely restricting the maneuverability of production; these workers have to be endlessly trained and retrained (page 36).

Going back to the *Kommunist* article "Toward Complete Economic Accountability," this ends significantly on the following note:

The present reform of the country's economic life is far-reaching and comprehensive. Its implementation demands great efforts, but these efforts will be rewarded by a growth of production efficiency (*Kommunist*, 1966, No. 12, page 37).

The point here is that there is talk only of increasing production efficiency, nothing being said about the workers' welfare or the solution of social problems.

The same issue of *Kommunist* contains an article entitled "The Unity and Continuity of the Generations" by S. Pavlov, First Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee. This deals with the "fathers and sons" problem, a problem which has been acute in the Soviet Union for some ten years now. True, in the second paragraph of his article Pavlov makes the stereotyped boast that

Our society is an example of a closely-knit and indestructible commonwealth of generations. The community of Communist ideals, the community of basic goals and aspirations—this is what unites the generations and cements the unity of the "fathers" and "children" (page 38).

Later, however, he comments that

The postwar generation of Soviet people is now pouring into literally all spheres of Communist construction. This generation has never, so to speak, smelt gunpowder. It knows of the October Revolution, the Civil War, the class struggles and the first Five-Year Plans, and even the [Great] Patriotic War only from the recollections of older people, from books and works of art (page 39).

The Komsomol leader urges that every effort be made to educate these young people, who have nothing in common with revolutionary traditions or the older generation of Party members. He warns that Soviet youth, with its highly skeptical attitude toward revolutionary romanticism, is susceptible to foreign ideologies. Complains Pavlov:

Imperialist propaganda strives to cast aspersions on the historical past of the Soviet people and the Communist Party. Everything negative connected with the cult of personality is particularly relished, and use is made of any work which speaks of the dark aspects, the difficulties, of life in Soviet society. The sole purpose of all this is to sow the seeds of skepticism in the minds of young people and poison them with distrust of the older generation as well as of the cause which the latter began and on whose continuation all generations of Soviet people are today working (page 40).

Pavlov's overly severe condemnation of the "skeptics" is the result of grave concern, and his denial of the existence of a "fathers and sons" problem is, in effect, confirmation of the contrary, namely that there is, in fact, a conflict in the Soviet Union between the old dogmatists and rebellious youth, between ideologically convinced "fathers" and unideological "sons."

Finally, mention may be made of the article "For a Leninist Approach Toward Analysing Philosophical Problems in the Natural Sciences" in the same

issue of *Kommunist*. Its authors, L. Bazhenov and M. Slutsky, set out to demonstrate that Lenin's ideas are in the center of modern man's intellectual life and are even influencing the development of scientific thinking. Lenin's methodological postulates, it is contended, are today being widely applied, the result being a harmonious marriage between scientific philosophy and basic Communist tenets. Thus, Lenin's eclecticism is employed to cover up the bizarre zig-zagging which the present Soviet leaders are being forced to perform between these "basic tenets" and plain economic common sense.

A. Gayev

Notes on Contributors

GALAY, NIKOLAI. Born 1902 at Staritsa, Tver Province. Studied and later taught on General Golovin's advanced courses on military science in Paris, 1927—39. Served with the White Army during the Civil War and, as a battalion commander, with the Vlasov Army in World War II. Senior associate of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, specializing in military affairs and Soviet foreign policy. Editor of the *Bulletin*.

KUCHEROV, SAMUEL. Born 1892 in Kiev. Graduate in law from the Universities of Kiev and Berlin. Practiced law in Kiev and, after emigrating in 1919, in Berlin until 1933. A.M., Ph.D., Columbia University (Department of Public Law and Government). Taught Russian history, literature and language at New York and George Washington Universities and Middlebury College; on the staff of the Library of Congress as an expert on Soviet affairs and law from 1949 to 1963. Member of various American and international legal and astronomical associations.

BUSH, KEITH. Born in 1929 in London. Trained at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University (M.A.). Analyst of current economic developments in the Soviet Union.

VORONITSYN, S. Born in 1925 in Yugoslavia. Graduated in 1960 from Frankfurt University in sociology. Has published work in various journals. Now on the staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich.

GAYEV, ARKADY. Journalist. Worked for *Pravda* and *Izvestia* and also for the Soviet regional press from 1921 until World War II, since when he has been living in Munich. A regular contributor of articles on Soviet literature and the Soviet press to the publications of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

September 1966

- 1 Announcement that Vienna city council delegation led by Mayor Bruno Marek has arrived in Moscow in response to invitation by Executive Committee of Moscow City Council.

International exhibition of "means for mechanizing engineering, technical and administrative operations" ("Interorgtekhnika-66") opens in Moscow.

British M.P. and secretary of Anglo-Soviet Parliamentary Group K. Zilliacus arrives in USSR in response to invitation by Soviet-British Section of USSR Parliamentary Group.

Announcement that former French Premier Pierre Mendès-France has arrived in Moscow in response to invitation by "USSR-France" Society and Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

- 2 Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev receives Honorary President Olivetti, Administrative Council President, and other representatives of Italian firm "Olivetti" for discussion on business cooperation between the firm and Soviet foreign trade organizations.

Party Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member M. A. Suslov receives Chairman of Central Committee of Australian Communist Party Dixon and Candidate Member of latter's Political Committee Robertson, who are in USSR on holiday.

Second All-Union Conference of Soviet Association for Friendship with Peoples of Africa opens in Moscow.

British destroyer "Devonshire" and tanker "Oleander" arrive in Kronstadt on friendly visit.

- 3 Defense Minister Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky issues order demobilizing servicemen who have completed their period of service and enlisting citizens born in 1947.

- 4 Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers adopt resolution "On the Electrification of the Agriculture of the USSR During 1966-70." Department for the Use of Electric Power in Agriculture to be set up under USSR Agriculture Ministry.

Delegation from "UAR-USSR" Society arrives in Moscow.

Announcement that five-hundredth issue of *Novy mir* has come out.

All-Union Oil and Gas Industry Workers' Day.

- 5 Japanese governmental economic delegation led by President of "Dowa Kogio" company arrives in Moscow for talks on expanding Soviet-Japanese business relations.

International seminar on problems involved in transition of nomads to settled way of life, organized at request of International Labor Organization, opens in Moscow.

- 6 Group of Soviet scientists leaves for Sopot (Poland) for Sixteenth Pugwash Conference.

TASS announces that area of Pacific closed to shipping and aircraft on August 25 owing to Soviet rocket tests is now clear.

Large group of Soviet research students specializing in mathematics, natural sciences and the humanities leaves for London. The students will work in British higher educational institutions under Soviet-British cultural and scientific cooperation agreement.

Minister of Finance, Budget and Mines of Congo (Brazzaville), Edouard Ebouka-Babackas, arrives in Moscow.

- 7 Party Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member A. P. Kirilenko awarded title "Hero of Socialist Labor," Order of Lenin and "Hammer and Sickle" gold medal for services to Party and state on occasion of his sixtieth birthday.

Broadened meeting of presidium of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions held to discuss resolution of Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers on promotion of physical culture and sport.

- 8 Second All-Union Rally of Young Patriots opens in Moscow.

International UN symposium on developing metal-working industry in developing countries opens in Moscow.

- Delegation from Foreign Affairs Commission of French National Assembly, led by latter's Vice-President, Jean Chamant, arrives in Moscow.
- 9 Soviet-Pakistani economic and technical cooperation agreement signed in Moscow.
- Announcement that agreement has been signed in Moscow under which USSR is to provide equipment for Czech chemical factories and oil refineries.
- Announcement that Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers have adopted resolution on improving administration of higher and special secondary education system as well as specialized training provided by latter.
- 10 First Secretary of Central Committee of East German Socialist Unity Party and Chairman of East German State Council, Walter Ulbricht, arrives in Moscow on friendly visit in response to invitation by Party Central Committee for discussion on mutual relations and international situation.
- Announcement that republican journalists' congresses are in progress.
- 11 Delegation from Franco-Soviet Parliamentary Group arrives in Moscow in response to invitation by Soviet-French Section of USSR Parliamentary Group.
- Announcement that agreement on cooperation and exchange of information has been signed in Damascus between Syrian Arabian Information Agency and "Novosti" Press Agency.
- Announcement that Deputy Minister of the Automobile Industry V. N. Polyakov has been appointed Director General of automobile plant now under construction in Tolyatti.
- Tankman's Day.
- 12 Polish Supreme Court delegation arrives in Moscow to study operation of Soviet judicial organs.
- Centenary of Moscow Conservatory.
- 13 Announcement that delegation from General Council of British Trades Union Congress led by head of latter's international committee, Fred Hayday, has arrived on first visit to USSR in response to invitation by All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.
- 14 Soviet Foreign Ministry declares Second Secretary of US Embassy in Moscow Donald Lesch *persona non grata* for "activities incompatible with the status of a diplomatic worker."
- Construction of 32-kilometer-long Ak-Bura irrigation canal (Kirghiz SSR) completed.
- Death of People's Artist of the USSR Nikolai Cherkasov.
- Announcement that USSR Supreme Court has met in plenary session to discuss intensification of measures against crime and hooliganism. Report delivered by Supreme Court Chairman A. F. Gorkin.
- 15 Soviet delegation led by Minister of Transport Construction Y. F. Kozhevnikov leaves for London to attend Fifth World Congress of International Road Federation.
- Announcement that rich gold deposit has been discovered in Kusmuran region (Semipalatinsk Oblast).
- 16 Chief of Staff of Indian Army arrives in Moscow on friendly visit in response to invitation by Chief of General Staff of Soviet Armed Forces.
- DOSAAF flier Marina Soloveva establishes new world speed record of 2,045 kilometers per hour in "Ye-76" aircraft over 500-kilometer course.
- Announcement that State Prosecutor of Congo (Brazzaville) has arrived in Moscow to familiarize himself with Soviet state prosecution system.
- "USSR-Chile" Society established in Moscow, Member of USSR Academy of Medical Sciences A. A. Vishnevsky being elected President.
- 17 Meeting of Standing Commission on Statistics of Comecon comes to an end in Riga.
- President of World Federation of Red Cross Societies arrives in Moscow in response to invitation by Executive Committee of Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of USSR.
- Announcement that inter-republican seminar on "international" education of workers (i.e., their education in spirit of friendship and cooperation among the nationalities of the USSR) has begun in Frunze.
- 18 Soviet, Ukrainian and Belorussian delegations, led respectively by Foreign Ministers A. A. Gromyko, D. Z. Belokolos and A. N. Guzinovich, leave for New York to attend Twenty-First Session of UN General Assembly.
- Forestry Worker's Day celebrated for first time.

Announcement that Union-republic Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order of the RSFSR has been dissolved, its functions having been taken over by Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order of the USSR.

Publication of Malinovsky's order on occasion of twenty-fifth anniversary of formation of Soviet Guards.

- 19 Party Central Committee Secretary General L. I. Brezhnev and Secretary Y. V. Andropov leave on friendly visit to Bulgaria.

- 20 Swedish parliamentary delegation led by Upper and Lower Chamber Speakers Erik Boheman and Fridolf Thapper arrives in USSR in response to invitation by Supreme Soviet.

Second All-Union Conference of Soviet Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Arab Countries opens in Moscow. Report delivered by Board Chairman Professor S. V. Kaftanov.

Somali President Aden Abdullah Osman arrives in USSR on official visit.

Announcement that delegation of Soviet economic and planning experts led by Deputy Chairman of State Committee for Labor and Wages B. M. Sukharevsky has arrived in Cairo.

- 21 Delegation from Nepalese National Panchayat (Assembly) arrives in Moscow in response to invitation by Supreme Soviet.

Announcement that military maneuvers have begun in Southern Bohemia with participation of Czech, Soviet, Hungarian and East German army units under code-name "Vltava." Those present include military delegations from Warsaw Pact countries led by respective Defense Ministers, and Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces Marshal A. A. Grechko.

Announcement that agreement has been reached on establishment of diplomatic relations between USSR and Maldive Islands.

Soviet-Somali talks take place in Moscow on future relations and international problems of mutual interest.

- 22 Brezhnev and Andropov arrive in Belgrade from Sofia in response to invitation by President Tito.

North Vietnamese economic delegation led by Vice-Premier and Politburo Member of Vietnamese Workers' Party Le Thanh Nghi arrives in Moscow for negotiations on expansion of trade and economic cooperation.

Announcement that delegation from French automobile firm "Renault" is in Moscow for negotiations on scientific and technical cooperation with USSR in field of automobile construction.

- 23 Death of Soviet nuclear physicist Vladimir Veksler.

Agreement signed in Moscow under which Czechoslovakia is to provide USSR with oil equipment during period 1966-74 in exchange for additional deliveries of oil.

Malaysian trade delegation led by Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry arrives in Moscow.

- 25 Brezhnev and Andropov arrive in Hungary from Yugoslavia on friendly visit in response to invitation by Central Committee of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

Delegation of Soviet scientists led by President of USSR Academy of Sciences M. V. Keldysh leaves for Bucharest to attend centenary celebrations of Rumanian Academy.

Publication of TASS announcement that during period September 26-October 25 Soviet rocket launchings will be carried out into area of Pacific having center at 37°14'N, 172°49'E and radius of 40 sea miles.

Machine-Builders' Day celebrated for first time.

- 26 Brezhnev and Andropov arrive back from Hungary.

Seventh plenary board meeting of USSR Journalists' Union held in Moscow to discuss holding of Second All-Union Congress of Soviet Journalists.

- 27 Announcement that Presidium of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions has adopted resolution "On Improving the Organization of Socialist Competition."

Tenth Plenary Meeting of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions opens in Moscow. Report delivered by Council Secretary V. I. Prokhorov.

- 28 Brezhnev, Party Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member M. A. Suslov and Party Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev receive Secretary General of US Communist Party Gus Hall for exchange of opinions on questions of mutual interest.

Second All-Union Congress of Soviet Journalists opens in Moscow. Report delivered by Acting Board Secretary D. P. Goryunov.

29 French Minister for Scientific Research and Atomic and Space Questions Alain Peyrefitte arrives in Moscow for talks on implementation of Franco-Soviet agreements on scientific, technical and economic cooperation and cooperation in space research and peaceful use of atomic energy.

Publication of joint communiqué on visit of Somali President to USSR. Invitation to Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman N. V. Podgorny to visit Somali Republic accepted.

30 Conference of chairmen of trade union central committees and republican, krai and oblast councils held in All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions on preparations for fiftieth anniversary of October Revolution.

Second All-Union Congress of Soviet Journalists comes to an end. M. V. Zimyanin elected Board Chairman, and B. S. Burkov and D. P. Goryunov Deputy Board Chairmen, of USSR Journalists' Union at first plenary board meeting of latter.

Changes and Appointments

6 Z. V. Mironova appointed Permanent Representative of USSR at UN Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva, replacing N. I. Molyakov, who is transferred to other work.

7 Mirzo Rakhmatov appointed Ambassador to Yemen, replacing N. P. Sulitsky, who is transferred to other work.

17 N. A. Shchelokov appointed Minister for the Preservation of Public Order.

24 Announcement that M. F. Bodrov has been appointed Ambassador to Kuwait, replacing M. F. Cherkasov, who has been transferred to other work.

25 Announcement that V. A. Nikolayuk has been appointed First Deputy Chairman of State Forestry Committee, and N. I. Radin Deputy Head of Central Board for Microbiological Industry under Council of Ministers.

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ARTICLES

The Relationship Between the Structure of Society and the Armed Forces as Illustrated by the USSR

(Continued)

NIKOLAI GALAY

We here publish the second half of Mr. Galay's paper delivered at the Sixth World Congress of Sociology. The first part appeared in the November issue of the *Bulletin*.

The Efficiency of the Soviet Military System in Peace and War

The efficiency of the Soviet military system has to be considered with regard to (1) the part it plays in domestic politics as a support for the regime, and (2) its morale and fighting qualities. The first of these relates to peacetime and the second to wartime conditions.

*

With regard to the part played in peacetime conditions, the best criterion is the question whether the Soviet army ever constituted a real danger to the Party's hegemony and whether it ever revealed a tendency to emancipate itself from the Party's influence. To this it may be said that the Soviet military system, created as it was as one of the main instruments of Communist policy, has on the whole served its purpose. In the series of crises with which the regime found itself confronted, both under Stalin and after, the army never attempted to question the Party's right to hegemony. Nevertheless, after World War II it did reveal a constant tendency to emancipate itself from the Party's dogmatic influence. During these crises, it transpired that that which constitutes the strength of the Soviet military system in domestic affairs—its artificially imposed Party character (*partiinost*)—becomes a weakness as soon as the Party itself is torn by internal dissension.

In the series of crises that began with the death of Stalin—the Beriia affair (1953), the removal of Malenkov (1955), the dethroning of Stalin (1955–56) and the expulsion of the Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich group from the collective leadership (1957)—the army was concerned insofar as a political role was played by its highest leaders. The main stages in this process were marked by the handing over to the military authorities of the task of holding Moscow

at the time of Stalin's death, the use of the army to neutralize MGB and MVD troops during the Beriya affair, the role played by military leaders in the physical liquidation of Beriya, the explosion of Stalin's "science of war" by military theorists before the political unmasking of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress, and the role of Marshal Zhukov in supporting Khrushchev against the Molotov group.¹

The fact that the army was thus involved in internal Party conflicts automatically enhanced its importance in domestic politics. This development was reflected in the entry of Marshal Zhukov, as head of the army, into the Central Committee Presidium in 1957 and the reduced prestige of the army's political apparatus—the eyes, ears and political brain of the Party in the armed forces.

After Khrushchev's consolidation of power, however, all these positions were immediately lost without any resistance from the army. The removal of Zhukov four months after he had helped Khrushchev to gain power and his exclusion from the Central Committee on the grounds that he had "underestimated the importance of the role of the Party in leading the armed forces"² marked the beginning of a campaign to put an end to the growing political power of the army's leaders and restore the influence of the Party in the armed forces. The fact that even at the most favorable juncture the army failed to make itself one of the decisive factors of domestic politics and that Zhukov was removed, without any major disturbance, by the army leaders themselves bears witness to the effectiveness of the system guaranteeing the Party's dominance over the army in peacetime.

The chief means of securing this dominance, however, proved in the course of these events to be one of the army's main political and social weaknesses—weaknesses which were not without danger for the Communist regime. Servicemen in the Central Committee, by virtue of their position, were inevitably involved in disputes dividing the Party, and the fact they were themselves divided by deliberately-encouraged rivalries meant that each of them, having fallen under the influence of some faction within the Party, was likely to attach his loyalties to that faction and so disunite the army's ranks at the highest level. When every important political leader has his own pet marshal, so to speak, the regime is in danger as soon as the Party becomes divided. Further, the disunity within the army could be carried down to the lower ranks, which, bound as they were by the law of absolute obedience to their immediate superiors, might also find themselves in different political camps. This occurred during the Beriya affair and again during the removal of the Molotov group, when the troops commanded by various marshals and generals were maneuvering against one another like pieces in a game of chess.³

¹ See the author's contribution on "The Army and Changes in the Post-Stalin Political Leadership of the USSR" (in Russian) to *Vestnik*, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1959, No. 1.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 42–45; *Pravda*, November 3, 1957.

³ *Vestnik*, 1959, No. 1, pp. 33–34 and 40–42.

The tendency within the army toward emancipation from the Party, on the other hand, has nothing to do with internal Party disputes; it is a chronic process of a social nature which comes from below, even though its open manifestation was accelerated by the army's growing political importance during the period of internal Party dissension. It may be taken that this tendency is always there, at least potentially, in view of the artificiality of the army's social structure. We have already spoken of the divided loyalties *vis-à-vis* Party and state that are called forth in the mind of the individual soldier by the Party's domination of the army. Communist indoctrination can, perhaps, "mold the consciousness" of a few hundred commanders at the highest level, thanks to the fact that conformity guarantees them their social and material privileges. It is a rather more difficult task to remove a feeling of divided loyalties in the minds of the four or five hundred thousand officers in the Soviet army, and experience has shown that it is impossible to fit the masses of the rank-and-file into the Procrustean bed of Party dogma. Thus, the dual structure of the USSR and its military system as state and at the same time Party organizations produces a dual, a divided, morale in the armed forces. This organic weakness always threatens to manifest itself when Party struggles become acute or when both country and regime are exposed to danger from without.

*

An analysis of the effects of the social structure of the Soviet military system in wartime conditions also reveals this moral dichotomy, which prompts the comparison of this system to a two-faced Janus.

During the almost fifty years of their existence, the Soviet armed forces have taken part in a number of limited conflicts and two large-scale wars, the Civil War and World War II. Of these, World War II provided the Soviet armed forces with their severest test; the degree of technical development at which it was waged was near to that of present-day conventional warfare; moreover, it demanded an extreme effort not only from the armed forces but from the country itself as a whole and from its society. It is therefore natural to take World War II as a criterion for judging the fighting qualities of the Soviet armed forces.

Such a judgment can only, of course, be based on objective statistics, such as the following: (1) the numbers of losses in dead and wounded on the battlefield—a positive factor revealing the victorious army's degree of resilience (the losses of the defeated side are not characteristic, since they grow out of proportion as defeat approaches); (2) the numbers of losses in prisoners-of-war—a negative factor because surrender as a rule signifies abandonment of the struggle (however justifiable such an act may on occasion be); and (3) the relation between the losses sustained and the results achieved. This last criterion, although of great importance for judging the quality of command and the military science employed, is irrelevant to our present purpose.

The difficulties of obtaining such statistics are great. No detailed information on Soviet losses has been published in the USSR and they may even not have been

finally established, especially with regard to the initial stage of the war. German data on Soviet losses cannot, of course, be exact, except those on the numbers of Soviet prisoners taken, which give a more or less accurate picture. All in all, it is possible to give very rough figures, which are adequate for our purposes. These figures are as follows: During the four years that the USSR was at war with Germany, the total number of persons called up for military service amounted to 28–30 million, or about 14 percent of the population.⁴ Losses sustained by the armed forces amounted to 16–17 million, including about five million killed and 11.5 million wounded, respectively 17–18 and 38–40 percent, or altogether over 50 percent of the total number enlisted.⁵ In addition, over five million, or 17–18 percent of the total strength, were taken prisoner.⁶

These figures in themselves are enough to show a certain anomaly: we find, on the one hand, a high degree of resilience, insofar as over 50 percent of the total number serving in an army of many millions constituted losses in dead and wounded, with which the Soviet army paid for its final victory; and, on the other, a high proportion of those who gave up the fight and were taken prisoner (approximately the same number as those killed). If we consider the state of affairs at various stages in the course of the war, the anomaly becomes even more striking. Here it is impossible to determine the numbers of dead and wounded: both Soviet and German reports of the time are obviously exaggerated, and cannot be taken into consideration. Of greater interest are the data on the numbers of Soviet prisoners-of-war. Although these data, taken from German sources,⁷ are to some extent also exaggerated, they are nevertheless sufficiently close to the truth for us to be able to use them. These stages are as follows:

1. In the course of frontier engagements up to July 11, 1941, the German army took 600,000 prisoners. On July 7, 1941, the German command reported that over 300,000 had been taken prisoner in the regions of Belostok and Minsk; of these, 72,000 had defected.

2. The break through the "Stalin line" in the directions of Leningrad, Smolensk and Kiev brought the number of prisoners taken by August 22, 1941,

⁴ Prof. A. A. Zaitsov, *Dinamika naseleniya SSSR na 1952 god* (The Growth of the Population of the USSR by 1952), Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1953, pp. 38–40; *Bilanz des zweiten Weltkrieges: Erkenntnisse und Verpflichtungen für die Zukunft*, Verlag Stalling, Oldenburg, [1953.] p. 98.

⁵ See Stalin's speech, Associated Press, March 13, 1946; *Novoye vremya*, 1946, No. 9; *Cahier d'économie soviétique*, Paris, 1946, No. 9. (The number of killed has been estimated by the author on the basis of official Soviet data on the number of wounded, which may be considered reliable. The ratio of those killed—including those who subsequently died from their wounds—to those wounded, which varies from war to war, was assumed in the present case to be 1:2.1, the ratio given by both German and American reports on their respective losses.)

⁶ See relevant reports (Frontberichte, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) in *Archiv der Gegenwart* (Sieglar and Co. KG, Bonn—Vienna—Zurich) for the period from 1941 to May 1, 1945. (In his article on "Defeatism, 1941–45" [*Novoye zhurnal*, No. 18, New York, 1948], N. Nikolayevsky gives the figure of seven million, based on documents relating to the Nuremberg Trials. In our view, this figure is exaggerated.)

⁷ *Archiv der Gegenwart*, July 5, 6 and 11, August 6 and 22, September 26 and 27, October 19, November 10 and December 1, 1941.

to 1,250,000. A further 600,000 were taken during the encirclement of Kiev in September of that year.

3. The advance launched at the beginning of October 1941, which brought German troops up to the environs of Leningrad and Moscow and into the city of Rostov, increased the number of prisoners to 3,800,000 by December 1.

4. After the German defeat near Moscow and the resulting stabilization of the front during the winter of 1941–42, the number of prisoners did not increase substantially, but a further 800,000 were taken during the operations of the summer of 1942 (near Kharkov and Sebastopol and during the advance toward the Don and the Caucasus).

5. During the whole of the rest of the war on the Eastern front, i.e., during the numerous campaigns of 1943–45, the number of Soviet prisoners taken was insignificant, amounting according to German data to 600,000–800,000.⁸

Thus, the first five months (out of a total of 47 months) of military operations accounted for about three-quarters of the total number of prisoners, i.e., 3,800,000 out of 5,200,000, which gives an average of 760,000 a month. During this initial period, the Germans had seized about 1,600,000 square kilometers of Soviet territory and reached the line Leningrad–Moscow–Rostov, and the Soviet Union had lost about 40 percent of its population and 63 percent of its coal-, 68 percent of its pig iron-, 58 percent of its steel-, 60 percent of its aluminum- and 38 percent of its grain-producing capacity, according to subsequent Soviet statistics.⁹

The series of large-scale advances by the Soviet army began in the latter part of 1942, and continued without interruption from the summer of 1943 until the end of the war. During this period of about two-and-a-half years something like 800,000 prisoners were taken, giving a monthly average of about 25,000. Since over five hundred infantry divisions alone were engaged during this period in large-scale operations, the average monthly loss in prisoners per division was at the most fifty. This is sufficient indication of the fighting spirit of the Soviet armed forces during the second half of the war.

*

These figures provide reliable evidence of the dual aspect of the Soviet armed forces, and confirm what is suggested by much subjective evidence. They may be supplemented by more detailed information regarding the fighting performance of individual strata of Soviet society. An opportunity of taking a closer look at the question of the influence of the structure of Soviet society on its military system is provided by the existence in all arms of a special category known as "guards" formations. The existence of this category is rooted in traditions going back to the time of Peter the Great. Guards regiments were distinguished for their exploits in the wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but retained

⁸ *Ibid.*, *passim*, 1943–45.

⁹ *Kommunist*, 1958, No. 2, p. 39.

their socially exclusive character right up to the 1917 revolution, so that numerically they were not significant, and by the early part of this century had become an almost negligible quantity. No more guards formations had been nominated since the war of 1812-13, and by 1917 there were only three guards divisions each among the 236 infantry and 18 cavalry divisions.

The institution of guards formations in the Soviet army should not be regarded as a mere restoration of an old Russian tradition: it was rather a new measure undertaken as part of the process of organizing the armed forces. The following table shows the proportion of guards formations to the total number of formations in all arms of the Soviet army as of August 1944:

	Total	Guards Formations	Remainder	Guards as Percentage of Total
Infantry Divisions	510	119	391	23
Infantry Brigades	109	35	74	32
Cavalry Divisions	33	17	16	50
Tank Brigades	173	59	114	34
Mechanized Brigades	41	23	18	56
Independent Tank Regiments ..	181	66	115	36
Air Divisions	129	29	100	23

SOURCES: German War-time Archives: *Truppen-Übersicht und Kräftegliederung. Rote Armee*, published by Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab des Heeres, Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (Ic), Position as of August 30, 1944, *SU Fliegertruppe*, Verbände in Fronteinsatz, Februar 1944, Angaben des Deutschen Luftwaffenführungsstabes (Ic), Fr. Luftwaffe Ost.

From these figures, it will be seen that toward the end of the war one-quarter of all infantry (rifle) and air force formations, over one-third of all tank formations and one-half of all cavalry and mechanized formations bore the designation "guards." This meant that the Soviet army was officially and practically divided into first- and second-category troops. This is borne out by operations in World War II. From the autumn of 1942 on, the role of shock troops was assigned to guards formations in all offensive and defensive operations. In every operation, corps or even entire armies of guards formations made their appearance at the vital sector, providing the spearpoint in an advance or cementing together the second-category formations in defense. This is confirmed by an excerpt from the order issued by Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin on February 23, 1943, to mark the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Red Army:

Generals, officers and men are to improve their command of tactics of mobile... warfare... [and] cooperation between different arms, to which end they should use the experience of guards units and formations and learn to attack the enemy as guards units do.¹⁰

Further evidence of the deliberate creation of a distinction between first- and second-category troops lies in the fact that the institution of guards formations continued until it had reached the proportions indicated in the table, after which the process ceased abruptly.¹¹

¹⁰ J. V. Stalin, *O Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soyuza* (On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union), Moscow, 1950, p. 158.

¹¹ See also N. Galay, "The Problem of Quantity and Quality in the Soviet Armed Forces," *Bulletin*, 1956, No. 10.

It is important here to consider the manner in which new formations in the Soviet army are made up or replenished. In contrast to the system employed by most armies, the Soviet system is non-territorial. Contingents of recruits from various parts of the country are mixed together in order to reduce the effect of national and local influences and so ensure that each division is more or less free from such particularizing factors. It would seem that this system, which was taken over from the Tsarist Army, makes it impossible to distinguish between divisions according to geographical or social criteria. In fact, however, this is not so, for in the USSR, as in Tsarist Russia, both national and social factors have always been reflected in the character of individual military formations, since the mixing together of contingents from different parts of the country takes place on a large scale and in each formation the local contingent is well represented. In the last war, the importance of the local contingent was greatly increased: as a result of transport difficulties, it became quantitatively and therefore qualitatively predominant. Consequently, by establishing the location of the recruiting centers of what later became guards formations, it is possible to get an idea of their national and social characteristics. (We shall here confine ourselves to the latter.) The following table shows the distribution, as of August 1944, of recruiting centers of guards formations among the various military districts and also among cities with a population of respectively over and under fifty thousand.

Numbers of Guards Formations and Their Recruiting Centers

LOCATED IN CITIES WITH OVER 50,000 INHABITANTS

Military District	Recruiting Centers	Infantry Divisions	Infantry Brigades	Cavalry Divisions	Tank and Mechanized Brigades
Moscow	10	23	17	—	16
North Caucasian	7	7	—	3	11
Urals	4	4	2	—	12
Volga	7	5	1	2	5
Orel	4	3	1	1	4
Central Asian	4	4	—	3	—
Far Eastern	3	3	—	—	—
Kharkov	2	1	1	—	—
Transcaucasian	4	3	3	—	2
Siberian	6	6	1	—	—
Western	2	2	—	—	—
Transbaikal	1	1	—	—	—
Kiev	2	2	—	1	—
Leningrad	—	—	—	—	—
Arkhangelsk	2	2	—	—	—
Odessa	2	2	—	—	—
Baltic	—	—	—	—	—
Total	60	68	26	10	50

LOCATED IN CITIES WITH UNDER 50,000 INHABITANTS

Military District	Recruiting Centers	Infantry Divisions	Infantry Brigades	Cavalry Divisions	Tank and Mechanized Brigades
Moscow	21	14	13	2	11
North Caucasian	10	6	2	3	1
Urals	3	3	1	—	1
Volga	5	3	2	—	1
Orel	5	4	—	—	1
Central Asian	4	2	2	1	—
Far Eastern	5	3	1	—	1
Kharkov	5	4	—	—	1
Transcaucasian	1	1	—	—	—
Siberian	—	—	—	—	—
Western	2	2	—	—	—
Transbaikal	3	2	—	1	—
Kiev	—	—	—	—	—
Leningrad	3	3	—	—	—
Arkhangelsk	—	—	—	—	—
Odessa	—	—	—	—	—
Baltic	2	2	—	—	—
Total	69	49	21	7	17

SOURCE. Compiled from *Truppen-Übersicht und Kriegsgliederung Rote Armee*, published by Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab des Heeres, Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (IIc), Position as of August 30, 1944.

From these figures, it may be seen that cities with a population of more than fifty thousand account for almost two-thirds of the total number of guards formations (in terms of infantry divisions, 120 of a total of 195),¹² and in particular for three-quarters of tank and mechanized brigades (50 of 67: the location of the recruiting centers of two guards tank brigades is unknown).¹³ Thus, the personnel of guards formations would appear to consist to an overwhelming degree of townsmen from the larger cities, i.e., for the most part of representatives of the working class.

However, it was not only the larger cities that provided contingents of urban workers for these guards formations. They were also evidently supplied by a number of smaller places of the nature of industrial settlements. For example, the town of Lyubertsy, in the Moscow Military District, which contains a large machine-building plant, provided during the war one division and two infantry brigades, all of which were assigned to the guards. The same applies to Shchelkov, where there are textile plants, Dmitrov and other small towns.¹⁴

The table just given confirms this conclusion on a larger scale. It shows that three military districts, those of Moscow, the Northern Caucasus and the Urals, provided 234 guards formations, or 55 percent of the total (in terms of infantry

¹² For purposes of comparison, one infantry division has been taken as being equivalent to two infantry brigades or two cavalry divisions, and two infantry divisions as being equivalent to three tank or mechanized brigades.

¹³ See Footnote 12.

¹⁴ *Truppen-Übersicht und Kriegsgliederung: Rote Armee*, published by Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab des Heeres, Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (IIc), Position as of August 30, 1944.

divisions, 111 out of 195).¹⁵ The Moscow Military District coincides almost exactly with the central industrial region; the Urals, with its large metallurgical centers of Sverdlovsk, Ufa, Nizhny Tagil, etc., has been, so to speak, the smithy not only of the USSR but of Tsarist Russia since the time of Peter the Great; while the North Caucasian Military District, although it includes agricultural regions in the south, also embraces the southwest portion of the Donbass, the important industrial centers of Stalingrad and Rostov and, finally, the regions, rich in military tradition, of the former Don and Kuban Cossacks.

On the other hand, those military districts with a predominantly peasant population—those of Orel, Odessa and Kiev, the Western (Belorussian) Military District and the western portion (i.e., excluding the Donbass) of the Kharkov Military District—provide a much smaller number of guards formations. All of them except that of Orel are in the south of the Soviet Union. Thus, the following generalization may be made about the effect of social factors on the fighting qualities of troops in World War II: workers are better fighters than peasants, and peasants from the north are better fighters than those from the south of the USSR. An exception is the North Caucasian Military District, which distinguishes itself in a positive sense from the rest of the southern regions of the USSR.

It is of interest to compare this generalization for the period of World War II with an assessment of the fighting qualities of various contingents of the Tsarist army in World War I. In his book *Russia's War Effort in the World War*, Prof. General N. N. Golovin observes:

As a rule, the southern zone of Russia fought somewhat better than the northern... Roughly speaking, the dividing line ran from the Podolsk *guberniya* [province] through those of Kiev, Chernigov, Vladimir, Nizhny Novgorod [Gorky], Vyatka and Perm. But among these northern and southern regions there were isolated areas constituting positive or negative exceptions.¹⁶

Prof. Golovin advances the hypothesis that the inferior fighting qualities of the northern, i.e., Great Russian, contingents were due to the influence of the communal system of agriculture which was then widespread in northern Russia and which tended to destroy the peasants' initiative, while the south, i.e., the Ukraine, scarcely knew this system and was characterized by the *khutor* or individual system of farming. It was by virtue of this very situation that the Ukraine was most severely hit by agricultural collectivization during the thirties, while Great Russia, although it found collectivization far from congenial, was less severely affected. Thus, the Soviet regime proved a heavier blow for the Ukrainian than for the Great Russian peasantry, and this was naturally reflected in the fighting spirit of those that were called upon to defend this regime in World War II.

An apparent contradiction is provided by the fact that a high proportion of guards formations came from the Northern Caucasus, which had also been sub-

¹⁵ See Footnote 12.

¹⁶ General N. N. Golovin, *Voennoye usiliye Rossii v mirovoi voine* (Russia's War Effort in the World War), Vol. I, Paris, 1939, pp. 167–68.

jected to collectivization, repression of the "kulaks" and even large-scale banishments. The explanation, however, is that in these areas the place of those that had been banished was taken by Great Russians resettled from the north, who were grateful to the Soviet authorities for transferring them to already established farms in the rich regions of the south.

A further significant change in the social basis, i.e., in the stratum supporting the regime, may be found in the fact that whereas, as Golovin testifies,¹⁷ troops coming from the industrial towns, i.e., from the revolutionary-minded working class, were poor fighters, this same class in World War II proved to be more reliable than the men drawn from the dispossessed kolkhoz peasantry.

Herein lies the explanation for the improved fighting qualities of the Moscow contingents and of troops drawn from the areas of the Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnieper, i.e., the Donbass, as compared with the peasants of the Western Ukraine, and of the inferior military qualities of the Great Russian contingents drawn from the Orel, Siberian and (especially) Arkhangelsk Military Districts, which were mostly composed of peasants. In general, this shift in the social basis explains the switch in the relative fighting efficiency of troops from the north and south, from Great Russia and the Ukraine, which took place between the two world wars.

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It should also be noted that the degree of fighting efficiency among formations drawn from the workers was also subject to some variation. If we consult the list of recruiting centers in World War II,¹⁸ we find that not all the large cities, i.e., those of over 50,000 inhabitants, which were important recruiting centers provided guards formations. More specifically, of 134, only 60 cities come into the latter category, and of 82 important recruiting centers which provided the equivalent of three or more divisions, only 51 supplied guards formations. Since the contingents supplied by all the larger cities were mainly composed of representatives of the working class, the only possible conclusion is that these working-class contingents were of varying quality.

The following table shows those recruiting centers which provided the equivalent of two-and-a-half or more guards divisions:

	Number of Divisions		Number of Divisions
Moscow	21	Kesteroovo	3½
Chelyabinsk	7½	Tula	3
Stalingrad	6½	Voronezh	3
Gorky	6	Alma-Ata	3
Saratov	4	Tambov	2½
Sverdlovsk	4	Rostov	2½

SOURCE Compiled from *Truppen-Übersicht und Kriegszuordnung: Rote Armee*, published by Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab des Heeres, Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (IIc), Position as of August 30, 1944.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 174—75.

¹⁸ See Footnote 14.

All these places, with the exception of Alma-Ata and K  st  rovo, are important centers of the machine-building and metal-working industries of the USSR. Workers in these industries represent the elite of the Soviet working class in respect of skill, remuneration and social status, so that it is not surprising that they should provide the best soldiers from among the working class.

On the other hand, the list of larger cities that did not provide any guards formations includes (with the exception of Krivoi Rog, which gave one guards division) all those situated in areas of the mining and iron and steel industries. Among them, Kemerovo, Stalinsk, Andzhero-Sudzhensk, Stalino and Dzerzhinsk provided formations that were not assigned to the guards, while Makeyevka, Gorlovka, Shakhty, Prokopevsk, Karaganda, Kerch, Magnitogorsk and Lipetsk provided no formations at all.¹⁹ Among the contingents of workers that did proceed from these centers, a considerable proportion were men condemned to forced labor. Apart from these, it may be said that miners and iron and steel workers, notwithstanding all propaganda, are, or at any rate were until the end of World War II, the least privileged section of the proletariat. In view of these considerations, the absence here of guards formations becomes understandable, and it may be supposed that in many cases recruits from these centers were sent elsewhere to be mixed with more reliable elements from other districts. Finally, no guards formations were forthcoming from important centers of the light and food industries such as Kirov, Kursk, Yelets, Penza, Syzran and the cities of the Ukraine, which were more closely associated with the kolkhoz peasantry.

Workers' contingents may therefore be classified according to their fighting qualities as determined by the prevailing civilian occupation as follows (in descending order): (1) metalworkers; (2) textile workers; (3) iron and steel workers; and (4) miners. Thus, it was social background which determined the fighting qualities of guards formations.

This discrimination between various classes and subclasses of Soviet society with regard to fighting qualities forces us to recognize three points. First, there is a certain justification for basing the Soviet military system on the class principle, that is to say, on the leading role of the working class, so far as the purposes of the Communist Party are concerned. The working class was the bulwark of the army and of the regime in both the Civil War and World War II. This fact, in view of the importance of technology in modern times, made an important contribution to victory.

Second, the social basis provided by the working class for the building of a Soviet society had to be narrowed down to certain limited subclasses, *viz.*, the privileged section of the working class and the upper stratum of the Party, *i.e.*, the stratum which Stalin officially described as the officer corps of the Party.

Third, the differentiation made above points to the instability of the very structure of Soviet society, created as it was by planned and artificial methods.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

This became reflected in the unstable morale of the armed forces: when during the war reservists were called up as a result of general mobilization, the strata of Party members and workers lost their influence in the armed forces, and so all the subtle plans for preserving the class structure of the army were frustrated. As the war proceeded, this necessitated a rapid switch from Party and class to national and patriotic *motifs*—witness the proclamation of a “patriotic war” to defend the “sacred motherland.” This instability, indeed dichotomy, within the Soviet army continues even today to be a chronic and unavoidable burden upon the Soviet military system.

The Influence of Social Factors on the Soviet Military System

Everything that we have said so far about the characteristics of the social structure of the Soviet military system, the methods employed to create it and the effectiveness of this system in peace and war leads us to the conclusion that the possibilities of molding a society by deliberate, artificial means are limited. The final result of all the carefully considered measures designed to produce a class-conscious army of fighters for Communism, of all the devices for Communization, proletarianization, etc., is a military system which, like the society it serves, is suffering, despite its imposing exterior, from a kind of social schizophrenia, a chronic conflict in the mind of the Soviet citizen and soldier between natural categories such as those of the state, the nation and universal ethics, and artificially imposed categories of Communist ideocratic dogma. Just as the schizophrenic is exposed by any external or internal shock to a dangerous mental crisis, so the Soviet social organism may be subjected to crises that are dangerous for the regime, as the case of World War II clearly shows.

That the Communist leaders are aware of the importance of this danger and of the inadequacy of methods confined to the artificial regulation of society and the armed forces is clear from the call, contained in the Party Program, for the “creation of a new Soviet man with a new morale and a new ethic.” They offer no explanation why a “new man” should have to be created after the fifty years’ existence of a social system based on the idea of regulating social and economic relations by means of planning. The reason, however, is clear: the Soviet citizen must be cured of his social schizophrenia.

A new means of accelerating this necessary process of regeneration, both on an individual scale and on that of small social groups, presented itself to the Soviet leaders in the form of the contemporary revolution in military technology. This may be seen from the description by Soviet theoreticians of one of the main aspects of the “Soviet military revolution” as a “revolution in the minds of Soviet servicemen, which finds expression in a new attitude to one’s work and one’s duties.”²⁰ The kind of attitude required may be seen in the demand for constant preparedness for action, for the constant maintenance of military equipment of all types, especially nuclear missiles, in a state of absolute readiness. This

²⁰ *Krasnaya zvezda*, January 7, 1964.

automatically develops in the men a feeling for order, technical accuracy and harmonious teamwork, i.e., a consciously-imposed self-discipline of a new type, through the need for security.

In this way, the disciplinary effect of modern equipment is being exploited in order to mold the new man. Indeed, it is being used to supplement those factors of a social order which the Soviet leaders in the initial period adopted not only as their principal means for creating the country's military system but also as their principal weapon. This may be interpreted as implying that the limitations of these social factors have finally been recognized, both as a means of artificially constructing society and as a weapon of offense. Here it may be confidently asserted that the hopes placed by the Soviet leaders on modern military technology as a means of remolding people's consciousness and removing the dichotomy of which we have spoken are extremely uncertain. The transformation of the Soviet officer into a military technocrat is bound to weaken the ideological hypostasis of the Soviet military system; the danger for the regime lies in the fact that an army whose officer corps has been politically emasculated cannot of its own initiative be a protector of the regime. Technocrats can obey orders, but cannot act independently in the absence of orders. Thus, during the latest crisis of the regime the Soviet army no longer had a part to play as Khrushchev was removed from his post as commander-in-chief.²¹

Finally, as may be concluded from the investigations carried out by Western sociologists and psychologists concerning the effect of the development of the modern industrial society on the minds of the younger generation, including young soldiers, in the West,²² the fact that the Soviet leaders are now placing all their hopes on technology is bound to bring the Communist doctrinaires not only some advantages but also a number of unpleasant surprises, the most important of which is the inevitable boost to the process of social differentiation, i.e., the appearance of antagonistic subclasses that are new even in Soviet society. This phenomenon (which will be reflected in the armed forces, into which fresh contingents of youth pour as every year goes by) will be largely due to the existence in Soviet society of various types of economic structure and consequently of various types of what Western sociologists term "behavior guidance" of the individual and of small social groups. Whereas in the West these economic forms—those of a "traditional," "industrial" and "consumer" society—and the corresponding types of behavior guidance—"traditional," "internal" and "external"—are separated from one another in time, one type completely replacing another, in Soviet society all these types may be said to exist side by side. Soviet agriculture and the whole of light industry are still in the stage of initial industrialization, while the country's tremendous war industry may in a sense be com-

²¹ See "The Role of the Soviet Army in Khrushchev's Overthrow," *Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union*, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, No. 346, December 1, 1965, and Petr Kruzhin, "The Technique of the Palace Revolution," *Bulletin*, 1964, No. 12.

²² See *Studies on the Soviet Union*, New Series, Vol. V, No. 2, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1965, p. 40, Footnote 15.

pared to the form of a "consumer" society, producing as it does for a large and demanding consumer, the army. Ideology plays the part of "external behavior guidance," while behavior guidances of the internal and traditional types continue to exist. All this is bound to push further the process of differentiation within each new generation, which in the USSR as elsewhere is particularly sensitive to external influences. This will result in a further estrangement between the older and younger generations, an aggravation of the problem of "fathers and sons," and this in its turn will increase the gap in the structure of Soviet society and the Soviet armed forces which prompted us above to speak of a two-faced Janus.

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

Religion

Recent Developments in the Moscow Patriarchate

"Schism or [mere] dissension?" That is, "Is it to be schism, or can we agree to differ?"—Such was the question put by A. Krasnov, a deacon of the Orthodox Church in the USSR and writer on Church affairs, to Aleksii, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, in an article entitled "By Love and Anger," which he wrote in Moscow on May 21, 1966, and which was published for the first time, without his knowledge, in a Paris émigré newspaper.¹

The pointedness of the question and the general style and content of the article express the indignation felt in certain circles of the Orthodox clergy in the USSR over recent events in ecclesiastical life. A recent article in the *Bulletin* was devoted to the documents written and despatched by two priests of the Moscow Eparchy to Patriarch Aleksii, the Orthodox episcopacy in the USSR and certain members of the Soviet government: the authors of these documents cited instances of violation by secular agencies of Soviet legislation concerning the Church, demanded full and systematic execution of the Soviet decree of 1918 separating Church and state, and accused the Patriarch of conniving at a further disorganization of religious life in the USSR.² In a resolution dated May 13, 1966, the Patriarch responded by removing both priests from their benefices, forbidding them to hold services and accusing them of conducting activities that were "harmful" and "damaging" to the Church. It appears, however, that the matter did not end here. Krasnov has raised the question of the coexistence of Church and atheist state in even sharper terms than the two victimized priests.

Krasnov's article is couched in rather fiery language. He makes no attempt to conceal his anger, and justifies anger which is founded on love. Krasnov appears to ask how it is possible to love the Church and feel no anger when the Church is attacked and no attempt is made to protect it. He refers to the angry protests of the prophets when they, in the name of love for the people, denounced the people's leaders and even the people itself (Ezek. 34:2-10; Isa. 65:2-16); he recalls the angry words of Christ when He censured contemporary canonists in the name of the truths of the Divine Revelation (Mark 3:5, Matt. 23:13-37); and cites Christ's rage when he drove the moneylenders out of the Temple (Matt. 21:12-13, John 2:15).

Krasnov is right. The creation of the sentimental image of Christ, the interpretation of His teaching as consisting in non-resistance to evil, the representation of the Apostles as complying with all demands of secular authority under all

¹ *Russkaya mysl*, Paris, July 7, 1966.

² See Rev. Dimitry Konstantinow, "Further Proof of the Incontrovertible," *Bulletin*, 1966, No. 7. The open letter from Nikolai Eshlimen and Gleb Yakunin was first published in Russian in *Russkaya zhizn*, San Francisco, Calif., April 16-30, 1966.

circumstances, all this has emasculated the spiritual power of Christianity and imprisoned it in the ghetto of the Church, killing what was the original characteristic feature of its supporters—the desire to be, like Christ, “witnesses unto the truth” (John 18:37) capable of defending the truth until the last.

In the first part of his article, entitled “Concerning Patriarch Aleksii,” Krasnov quotes the Patriarch’s resolution of May 13 and bitterly repents having written in 1957 an article devoted to the Patriarch’s eightieth birthday.³ This he regards as a disgraceful act on his own part. Thus he would seem to have only recently realized the significance of what was going on and to have seen how he was mistaken in the Patriarch. Now he not only refuses to acknowledge that Aleksii possesses a “patriarchal conscience,” but denies him those civic qualities of courage, dignity and honor that he, Krasnov, considers as typical of the Russian aristocracy from which Aleksii is descended. Krasnov draws attention to the hypocrisy displayed by the Patriarch in connection with the disgrace of Metropolitan Nikolai Yarushkevich; his failure to respond to the appeals of monks, priests and parishioners during the large-scale closure of churches; his failure to bely the false statements of his representatives who denied religious persecution in the USSR, and much more beside.

Krasnov is indignant that the Patriarch should refer to the canons of the Church: the Patriarch’s activities, he says, are “a constant violation of the Church’s canons.” Summing up his opinion of the Patriarch, he reminds him that he will have to face not only the Divine Judgment but the impartial judgment of human history. He points out that the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate shows a spiritual decline, and recommends the Patriarch to apply to himself the words that he speaks to newly-consecrated bishops, namely that they must “nurture in themselves the episcopal grace.” “Grace,” he continues, “does not act against the human will, it has to be attained by uninterrupted effort.” He therefore urges the Patriarch to strive for a renewal of the spirit in the following terms: “Make an effort of will yourself, and shake off the sleep of indifference which holds you prisoner.”

It may be recalled that Eshlimen and Yakunin, authors of the documents referred to above, also exhorted the Patriarch to make an effort of will to defend the Church, calling upon him to bear witness to the truth and to “cease rendering unto Caesar that which is God’s.”

In the second section of the article, headed “Dialogue with the Civil Authorities,” Krasnov rejects the slogan of “moral-political unity” beloved of state officials in the USSR. Krasnov asks two questions: first, can there be such unity if about thirty million believers in the country consider their rights to be violated, and, second, if this unity does not exist, what should be done to achieve it? In reply to the second question, he recommends

...executing consistently, completely and fully the law on the separation of Church and state...,[ensuring] that the religious-minded person in our society does not feel like a pariah, that all paths..., all doors are open to him.

³ *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, 1957, No. 11, p. 25.

Krasnov refers to certain satellite countries in which there has been no forcible closure of churches or other restrictions imposed on ecclesiastical life. Evidently ill informed on the real state of affairs, Krasnov here considerably exaggerates the tolerance of the secular authorities in these countries. The examples he gives are nevertheless of value, since they may encourage the Moscow Patriarchate to come out in defense of believers.

Eshlimen and Yakunin asked the Patriarch in their letter to summon a Council to regulate certain questions of urgent importance relating to the Church. Krasnov takes the view that these questions should be settled jointly by the religious community and the state authorities, and that the petition submitted by the two Moscow priests might serve as a basis for such discussions. Pointing out "contradictory tendencies" and a "lack of reasoning" in Soviet "religious" policies, Krasnov insists that mere statements and assurances on the authorities' part be replaced by a genuine implementation of Soviet legislation on the Church. Expressing approval of the decree issued by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on March 18, 1966, which "forbids" discrimination on the basis of attitude to religion, Krasnov would like to see evidence of its practical implementation. For a start, he suggests that he, Krasnov, be reinstated as a teacher at School No. 116 for Working Youth in Moscow, from which he was evidently dismissed for his religious views.

In the third section, headed "In Anger or Love? Schism or Dissension?", Krasnov dwells on the practice, prevalent in the Patriarchate, of discrediting those who dare to criticize the work of the "princes of the Church" and the harmful effect of their activities. Such critics the Patriarchate regards as "disturbers of the peace of the Church" and tries to silence by disciplinary measures. This situation is for Krasnov a "betrayal of Orthodoxy": "People who deny us the right to disclose obvious faults on the part of the Church authorities are advocating a worsened form of popery."—"Worsened" because the doctrine of papal infallibility has always been associated exclusively with solemn utterances of the Pope on questions of faith and morals *ex cathedra*: modern popes pay heed to far-reaching criticism of their activities, and in the Catholic Church of the twentieth century both integralist and modernist tendencies manage to live together.

Krasnov goes on to ask the Patriarch: Is it to be schism, or agreement to differ on the basis of brotherly unity and love?

It is not easy to grasp what Krasnov understands by the latter, i.e., by "disagreement" (*raznomyслиye*). In a totalitarian country, every organization recognized by the government works within strictly laid down limits. In the USSR, the Communist authorities have succeeded in setting up a body to represent the Church in a form most convenient to them, "with obedient officials in surplices and white cowls," as Krasnov puts it. Neither the Communist nor the "ecclesiastical" authorities are prepared to tolerate any dissension, either within the leadership of the Church or between the Church leaders and the rank-

and-file clergy and laity. Dissenters will meet a fate similar to that of Metropolitan Nikolai Yarushevich, as Krasnov points out in the second part of his article.

The other alternative is schism. Practically speaking, this has already begun. From what Eshlimen, Yakunin and Krasnov write, it is evident that they are not alone in their views but can count on considerable numbers of supporters. The former spoke of "those who refused to bend the knee to Baal," while the latter, referring in the first person plural to some indefinite number, warns that if the two priests are subjected to further patriarchal sanctions

...we will never acknowledge the unfrocking of these priests, just as we shall refuse to recognize patriarchal resolutions or decrees as carrying any weight...

If... the Patriarch is a bad and unworthy servant, the Holy Ghost will visit more worthy servants, bishops, for the world does not end in the Chisty Pereulok.⁴

Surely this is a clear hint of an imminent schism?

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A further question: If a schism occurs, will it be something essentially new? In their letter to the Patriarch, the two priests Eshlimen and Yakunin emphasized an historical truth to which the non-Soviet religious press had already frequently drawn attention: the present position of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate, which is deprived of its rights and is on the verge of schism, is the result of the false step made in 1927 by Metropolitan Sergii (Stragorodsky), who, as Deputy Acting Patriarch, unilaterally decided to accept the conditions of the Soviet government for the legalization of the Church leadership in the USSR. These conditions were, roughly speaking, as follows: (1) the removal of clergy unacceptable to the Communist authorities; (2) the banning of dioceses abroad of the Russian Orthodox Church which refuse to recognize the Moscow Patriarchate; and (3) collaboration between the Church and the Communist authorities in the latter's interests.⁵

The acceptance of such conditions obviously meant that the Church would lose her spiritual independence, which had been legally guaranteed by the 1918 decree on the separation of Church and state. Therefore, neither Patriarch Tikhon (Bellavin), who died in 1925, nor the deputies appointed by him—Metropolitans Kirill (Smirnov), Agafangel (Preobrazhensky) and Petr (Polyansky)—nor even the Acting Deputy—Archbishop Serafim (Samoilovich)—agreed to accept these conditions. They paid for their obstinacy by being subjected to "administrative" penalties ranging from house arrest to imprisonment and exile. Despite these measures, they remained inflexible.

⁴ *Russkaya mysl*, July 7, 1966, p. 5. (Chisty Pereulok, No. 5, is the address in Moscow of the offices of the Moscow Patriarchate.)

⁵ M. Polsky, *Kanonicheskoye polozheniye vysshei tserkovnoi vlasti v SSSR i za granitsei* (The Canonically Position of the Supreme Ecclesiastical Authority in the USSR and Abroad), Jordanville, N.Y., 1948, p. 19.

This is not to say that the Church's leaders of that time were involved in a political conflict with the Communist regime or that they were entirely opposed to a legalization of the Church. On many occasions, they expressed their political loyalty and tried to secure legalization of their position, and in doing so made their attitude clear and posed their own conditions. Thus, while asserting their loyalty to the regime, they left no doubt about the presence of "insuperable contradictions" between the Church and atheistic Communism, and insisted on a genuine and systematic implementation of the decree on the separation of Church and state. This they conceived as implying complete non-intervention of the Church in political affairs, whether in the form of public condemnation or in that of public approval, and of similar non-intervention by the state in the affairs and work of the Church.⁶

These conditions were similarly unacceptable to the Communist authorities, which employed the means at their disposal to secure Metropolitan Sergii's unqualified acceptance of their demands. This meant that the fundamental principles adhered to by Sergii's predecessors were now swept away, and the Church was deprived of its internal freedom. Persons were selected and approved by the atheist government to administer the Church and to act as an obedient tool in the government's hands. Then came the schism of 1927. The most courageous and determined members of the clergy, true to the traditions of Patriarch Tikhon and his successors, together with certain sections of the laity, refused to bow to Sergii and the "Temporary Synod" set up under him. A kind of illegal diaspora comprising Orthodox bishops, clergy and laity came into existence.⁷

The unnatural alliance of the legalized Church hierarchy and the atheistic government soon began to bear deadly fruit for the Church. In the circumstances, the ecclesiastical penalties imposed by Sergii on recalcitrant clerics virtually amounted to a denunciation of these persons to the organs of terror, which regarded the enemies of the "state" church as enemies of the secular authority. Treatment was meted out in accordance with the practice of the times. Another far-reaching consequence of the alliance was the demand imposed on Orthodox clergy outside the USSR who were then in communion with the Patriarchal Church in the USSR that they sign a declaration of loyalty to the Soviet govern-

⁶ See references to the Memorandum of the Solovki Bishops of June 7, 1926, and to the draft of Metropolitan Sergii's appeal to the Soviet authorities of May-June 1926 in *Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov v SSSR: Sbornik* (The Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR: A Symposium), Munich, 1960, pp. 37-38, and excerpts from the former, *ibid.*, pp. 93-100.

⁷ See Polisky, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-40, and the same author's *Novye mучéniki russkiye* (New Russian Martyrs), Vol. I, Jordanville, N.Y., 1949, pp. 141 and 160, Vol. II, 1957, pp. x-xi and xix-xxi; Prof. I. Andreyev, *Zametki o katakombnoi Tserkvi v SSSR* (Notes on the Catacomb Church in the USSR), Jordanville, N.Y., 1947, pp. 5-8, Archbishop Nikon (Rklitsky), *Zhizneopisanie blazhennitsy Antoniya mitropolita Kievskogo i Galitskogo* (The Life of the Most Blessed Antonii, Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia), Vol. VI, New York, 1960, pp. 233-34; G. Rar, *Plennaya Tserkov* (The Church in Captivity), Frankfurt on Main, 1954, pp. 26-30; G. Grabbe, *Pravda o Russkoi Tserkvi na rodine i za rubezhom* (The Truth About the Russian Church at Home and Abroad), Jordanville, N.Y., 1961, pp. 74-93; Nadezhda Teodorovich, "The Catacomb Church in the USSR," *Bulletin*, 1965, No. 4, etc.

ment. Yet another was Metropolitan Sergii's official denial of religious persecution in the USSR. During an interview given in 1930, he declared, evidently at the demand of the secular authorities, that churches were being closed, not under pressure from these authorities, but in response to the desire of the population. On this occasion, he also censured the Pope and the Archbishop of Canterbury for their condemnation of persecution of the Russian Church in the USSR.⁸

All this naturally aroused the indignation of religious-minded people in the Soviet Union: discontent with Metropolitan Sergii was in fact so great that some members of the clergy were careful to avoid mentioning his name during services. It also provoked wonderment among foreign correspondents: the American journalist Lyons, unable to comprehend what could have prompted the Metropolitan to make such statements, asked Yemelyan Yaroslavsky for an explanation.⁹ The "Sergian" movement was abandoned by large numbers of believers, who either joined the illegal "diaspora" already in existence or created new secret communities which preserved the Orthodox doctrine without acknowledging the official hierarchy. As they were discovered by the organs of state security, all these illegal communities were destroyed, being charged with having pursued "counterrevolutionary" aims and labeled "monarchist" or "kulak chaff," "enemies of the people," etc.¹⁰ Russian Orthodox communities abroad that were still under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, fearing the consequences of being controlled by a leadership that was not free, began also to break away and establish independent self-governing organizations.¹¹

A continuation of the schism was to be observed during and after World War II. On German-occupied territory, there sprang into existence either national autocephalous churches or eparchies shunning the Moscow Patriarchate. The former included the Autocephalous Churches of the Ukraine and Belorussia, while among the latter were the eparchies led by Metropolitan Sergii (Voskresensky), Exarch in the Baltic countries, and Archbishop Nikolai (Amossiisky) of Rostov-on-Don.¹² Even in non-occupied territory, there was a widespread tendency to move away from the Patriarchate, largely due to the unprecedented obsequiousness of the official Church leaders in helping to create "the moral conditions necessary for victory," i.e., lauding Stalin, lending the Church's

⁸ *Izvestia*, February 16, 1930. See also Prof. A. A. Bogolepov, *Tserkov pod vlastyu kommunizma* (The Church Under Communist Domination), Munich, 1958, p. 32; Prof. S. V. Troitsky, *O neprave karlovatskogo raskola* (On the Iniquity of the Karlovci Schism), published by the West European Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate, Paris, 1960, p. 76.

⁹ See *Bezbozhnik*, March 5, 1930 (cited in *Tserkovny vestnik Zapadnoyevropeiskoi yeparkhii*, Paris, 1930, No. 6/7, p. 31).

¹⁰ *Sotsialisticheskoye zemledeliye*, January 11, 1938; *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1964, No. 7, p. 68; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, July 21, 1964; *Yunist*, 1964, No. 5, pp. 6-45, etc.

¹¹ See Grabbe, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-212; also his contributions on "The Canonical Basis of the Russian Church Abroad" to *Tserkovnaya zhizn*, Munich, 1949, No. 10/12, p. 36, and on "Two Principles in Jurisdiction," *ibid.*, 1950, No. 5/6, p. 31; and *Tserkovnye Vedomosti*, Sremski Karlovci, 1922, No. 1.

¹² See the collection of documents *Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov i Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna* (The Russian Orthodox Church and the Great Patriotic War), published during World War II (no year given) by the Moscow Patriarchate.

authority to Soviet insinuations regarding the Katyn Wood murders and German "desecration" of Russian churches and monasteries, and publishing books designed to influence the "allies" by distorting the historical truth about the Church.¹³ After the war, the movement away from the Patriarchate was further intensified by a renewal of attacks against religion, especially in 1958. This was accompanied by the appointment to high office in the Patriarchate of new "officials in surplices" and without surplices. The religious feelings of many people, however much they may have approved of the social changes brought by the Revolution, were offended. The Church's leaders not only disdained to defend the Church, but denied that it was being persecuted. At home, its propaganda machine helped to create a façade of religious freedom, and abroad served the interests of Soviet foreign policy at various international forums.

The history of the Orthodox Church in the USSR has been presented in detail in many Western publications.¹⁴ These studies are based on information provided by the Soviet press, which during the thirties and again in the early sixties triumphantly recounted the victories of the antireligious activists, including the numbers of churches and monasteries closed, cases of the removal of children from their parents' care in order to give them an atheistic education, expulsions from educational institutions and dismissals from work, and the subjection of religious-minded persons to protracted treatment by "individual" atheistic propaganda, etc.¹⁵ Some idea of the scale and the ruthlessness of these measures may be obtained from letters written to the Soviet press by atheists criticizing the antireligious campaign and recommending that greater attention be paid to the faults of Soviet socialist society, including the spread of nihilism and amorality.¹⁶

¹³ E.g., *Pravda o religii v Rossii* (The Truth About Religion in Russia), published by the Moscow Patriarchate in 1942.

¹⁴ See Polsky, *Kanonicheskoye polozheniye... and Novye mučeniki rossiiskie*; Rar, *op. cit.*, Prof. V. P. Vinogradov, *O nekotorykh vazhnykh momentakh poslednego perioda zhizni i deyatel'nosti svyatskogo Patriarka Tikhona (1923—25)* (Certain Particularly Important Aspects of the Last Period in the Life and Work of the Most Holy Patriarch Tikhon, 1923—25), Munich, 1959; Mikhail Svyashchennik, *Polozheniye Tserkvi v Sovetskoi Rossii* (The Situation of the Church in Soviet Russia), Jerusalem, 1931; Nikon (Rklitsky), *op. cit.* (11 vols.); Prof. I. Andreyev, *Kratkyy obzor istorii Russkoi Tserkvi ot revolyutsii do nashikh dnei* (A Brief History of the Russian Church from the Revolution to the Present), Jordanville, N.Y., 1952; T. Manukhina, *Put moyei zhizni: Vospominaniya mitropolita Yevlogiya* (My Life's Course: Memoirs of Metropolitan Yevlogii), Paris, 1947; *Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov v SSSR* ..; A. Kischkowsky, *Die sowjetische Religionspolitik und die Russische Orthodoxe Kirche*, Munich, 1960; *Religion in the USSR*, Munich, 1960, Walter Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, London, 1962 (German trans.: *Die Religionen in der Sowjetunion*, Herder, Freiburg—Basle—Vienna, 1963); Chrisostomus Johannes, *Kirchengeschichte Russlands der neuesten Zeit*, Munich, 1965; Nikita Struve, *Die Christen in der UdSSR*, Mainz, 1965, etc.

¹⁵ See *Bezbozhnik u stanka*, 1930, No. 4; *Antireligioznik*, 1930, No. 3; *Literatūra i mastactva*, Minsk, June 10, 1960; *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, Kishinev, December 13, 1960; *Zarya Vostoka*, Tbilisi, February 10, 1961; *Pravda Ukrainy*, Kiev, January 8, 1961; *Voyovnychi ateist*, Kiev, 1961, No. 9, p. 60, and 1961, No. 12, p. 18; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, November 28, 1961; *Nauka i religiya*, 1961, No. 10, p. 91, 1962, No. 2, p. 17, 1962, No. 4, p. 22, 1963, No. 2, p. 75, 1963, No. 8, p. 77; *Novy mir*, 1962, No. 11, p. 142; G. Gorodnyak, *Pravda o Pskovo-Pecherskom monastyre* (The Truth About the Pskovo-Pechersky Monastery), Moscow, 1963; *Izvestia*, October 26, 1963; *Uchitel'skaya gazeta*, April 7, 1964, and *Komsomolskiy Tadzhikistana*, Dushanbe, May 20, 1964.

¹⁶ *Leningradskaya pravda*, March 11, 1964; *Izvestia*, March 24, 1964.

The movement away from the Moscow Patriarchate was noted by both ecclesiastical and antireligious publications in the Soviet Union. The latter also made no attempt to conceal that the reason lay in discontent with the Patriarchate's disposition to "follow Satan," and pointed out that large numbers of sectarians were recruited from members of the Orthodox Church.¹⁷ Basing itself on these materials, the foreign press informed the world about the position of the Church in the USSR, and censured the Patriarchate for having exceeded the bounds of the Christian conscience in collaborating with atheist Communism. These voices, however, were drowned by the skillful use of Communist propaganda tricks.

Such was the situation until believers in the USSR themselves began to appeal to the free world. Despairing of assistance from their own government and hierarchy, they addressed complaints to the United Nations, to the US President, to the Eastern Patriarchs and to the Russian episcopacy abroad. In response to these appeals, committees were formed from prominent representatives of the intellectual world. In 1964, a committee for the study of the position of the Church in Soviet Russia was set up under the chairmanship of the writer François Mauriac, with Prof. Jean Daniélou and P. Pascal, among others, as members. On March 11, 1964, French historian Clément addressed a large meeting in the Mutualité hall on the subject, and Archbishop Antonii (Bartashevi) of Geneva was the initiator of a number of press conferences on the subject. In the USA, the *New York Times* organized an interview with the Rev. Dimitry Konstantinow, on the basis of which the same paper published an article by M. B. Handler on March 7, 1966. Memoranda and protests were despatched to the Soviet government. The Soviet press contented itself with reprinting official declarations of religious toleration, and the Moscow hierarchy, following Metropolitan Sergii's example in 1930, denied religious persecutions in the USSR and accused the Church's defenders of "inflaming the cold war."¹⁸ The position seemed hopeless: on the one hand, there were protests from the West against the persecutions, and on the other the Church leaders in Moscow virtually supported the persecutions by denying their existence; on the one hand believers in the USSR wrote to seek the support of Western public opinion, on the other representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate attending Western and world ecclesiastical gatherings created the impression that all was well in the USSR.

The situation remained seemingly obscure until the end of last year, when champions of the Church's independence from political authority appeared among the ranks of the clergy itself. Despite the close supervision by the Soviet secular authorities of candidates for the priesthood and the censorship of the

¹⁷ *Patriarkh Sergii i yego dukhovnoye nasledstvo* (Patriarch Sergii and his Spiritual Legacy), Moscow, 1947, p. 408; Kolarz, *op. cit.* (German trans.), p. 367; *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, 1948, No. 2; *Sovetskaya kultura*, January 13, 1959; *Pravda Vostoka*, Tashkent, November 13, 1960; *Voyennyshy ateist*, 1961, No. 4, p. 34; *Slovar ateista* (An Atheist's Dictionary), Moscow, 1964, pp. 123-24; and *Kratky nauchno-ateistichesky slovar* (A Brief Scientific Atheistic Dictionary), Moscow, 1965, pp. 254-55.

¹⁸ TASS, Moscow, March 16, and December 19, 1964.

syllabuses and everything connected with theological schools in the USSR, young priests appeared on the scene who, as we know, were not afraid to censure both the persecutors of the Church and those who connived at such persecution among the higher ranks of the hierarchy, including the Patriarch himself. So far, only the voices of the two young priests Eshlimen and Yakunin and the deacon Krasnov have reached the free world; but the information contained in their writings makes it fairly clear that they are not alone.

It is apparent from the two priests' "open letter" to the Patriarch that their knowledge of the history of their church is not derived from official publications of the Patriarchate, which suppresses embarrassing facts. Instead, they would appear to have made a thorough study of original sources. They are aware, for example, that Patriarch Tikhon "called on the true children of the Russian Church to submit to the Soviet regime, not out of fear, but for conscience' sake." They continue, however: "The Most Holy Patriarch Tikhon at the same time systematically and inflexibly championed the essential independence of Church life . . . , insofar as there is no authority on Earth that could bind our Patriarchal conscience and our Patriarchal word."

They are aware that the "Sergian" path proved fatal to the Church:

The history of the Russian Church during the last forty years bears indisputable witness to the fact that, beginning with the prolonged tenure of office of Metropolitan Sergii (Stragorodsky) as Deputy to the Patriarch, the upper Church administration defied the Patriarch's wishes and, arbitrarily altering its course, embarked on a direct liquidation of the Church's freedom.

They censure the policies of the present Patriarchate:

...instead of abandoning the sterile and fatal tactics of the "Sergian" period, which made it possible for the Russian Church to be threatened with the complete destruction of all legal forms of its civil existence, and returning to the path of salvation inherited from Patriarch Tikhon; the present Church administration made the vicious practices of the "Sergian" period into a guiding principle in its activities.

They describe the present state of the Russian Church and the underlying reasons with chagrin:

...it has become clear, a bitter truth evident to everyone who loves Christ and His Church, that the Russian Church is seriously and dangerously ill, and this disease comes entirely from the fact that the ecclesiastical authorities have evaded the execution of their duty by retreating beyond the line "which must not be crossed."

The two authors recount the misfortunes that have befallen the Church during the last decade, and ask:

Why has the supreme ecclesiastical authority become an obedient tool in the hands of the atheist officials? Why do the Russian pastors and bishops...pass over this crying lawlessness in an incomprehensible silence?

In reply, they say:

...at the present time, there are a number of bishops and priests in the Russian Church who are deliberately serving [the rule of] lawlessness...the overwhelming

majority are silent... [they] consider that by their silence they are saving the Russian Church... What sense is there in this? And whom, apart from themselves, are they saving?¹⁹

Thus, the two priests are opposed to the policy of "Sergianism," which led to the schism of 1927, and this shows that the events now coming to the fore in the Russian Church are a continuation of this schism. The "open letter" and other documents written by the two young priests may be a sign of a "movement of the waters" among the clergy, who could not but be affected by the growing "awareness" of Soviet people in general and the spiritual emancipation of various strata of the Soviet intelligentsia both from the fetishization of the ideology and from the chauvinism provoked by the war. Discouraged more than other sections of the population by half a century's reign of terror, the clergy is only now beginning to grow bolder as it becomes aware of its importance and its rights. This growing boldness is brought by the younger generation, which experienced the war, served in the armed forces and then entered the service of the Church in the postwar years. The clergy's struggle for the emancipation of the Church will not, however, be easy, since it will have to be carried on on two fronts. On the one hand, there will be the struggle with the secular authorities, which have at their disposal every means of physical and economic pressure and opportunities for achieving the moral isolation of their enemies. On the other hand, the highest posts in the Church are occupied by persons appointed by the secular authorities—either intimidated old men who want nothing but their own peace and quiet, or young opportunists, who are as welcome and useful to the secular authorities now as the clergy of the *obnovlenchestvo*, or "Renewed Church," was in the twenties. It is self-evident that the state will do everything to retain an obedient leadership of the Church, which in turn will remove any who attempt to restore the Patriarchate to a healthy state.

This has already happened. As Krasnov tells us, the Patriarch, on instructions from the secular authorities, has taken radical measures against the priests Eshlimen and Yakunin, and in his resolution of May 13 threatens them with "yet severer measures." On June 6, he published a message to the bishops in his charge concerning the two priests' conduct. Observing that "repeated attempts to bring the priests to their senses [had] remained fruitless," he condemned the practice adopted by the priests of addressing themselves to the episcopacy as "violating the elementary rules of ecclesiastical discipline..., scandalous and harmful to the Church." What the two priests had to say was described by the Patriarch as a "slandorous accusation of the ecclesiastical authorities" and as showing an "intention to calumniate governmental bodies." Here, by himself accusing the two priests of antigovernmental activities, the Patriarch carries his desire to please the secular authorities farther than Metropolitan Sergii did in 1927–29: he even describes these activities as a "threat to the goodwill that reigns between the government and our Church."²⁰

¹⁹ See Footnote 2.

²⁰ *Le Monde*, Paris, August 18, 1966, *Russkaya mysl*, August 20, 1966; and *Tydzien polski (Dziennik polski i Dziennik żołnierza)*, London, August 29, 1966.

Thus, the Patriarch's message answers the question raised by Krasnov—"schism or agreement to differ?" And Krasnov, as though foreseeing this reply, remarks, as we have seen, that if the Patriarch proves an unworthy servant, the world "does not end in the Chisty Pereulok." Here we find an expression of the readiness of a section of the Orthodox Church to reject the Patriarch's authority.

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For a long time now, various forces have been at work in the Soviet Union, stimulating one another in their striving for freedom. Among the Baptists, for example, a schism may already be observed. A considerable number of pastors, preachers and laymen have broken away from the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists, the officially recognized body controlling Baptists in the USSR, which, like the Moscow Patriarchate, is servile to the secular authorities. The schismatics, who call themselves *initsiativniki*—from the Russian word for initiative—and who disagree with the Council's readiness to accept the limitation of their activities to the holding of services, have created their own organizational center, which has demanded recognition of the authorities. Consumed with a desire for spiritual achievement, the *initsiativniki* organize demonstrations in towns and villages throughout the country calling for the right to preach unhampered and for the religious upbringing of children.²¹

All this cannot but attract the attention of Soviet society, and it is essential for the authorities to put an end to this activization of believers. Under public pressure, in the form of numerous inquiring letters to the press, V. Kuroyedov, Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, for the first time published some "explanations" of the situation in the press, declaring that the Communist authorities were tolerant toward believers but warning against any violation of Soviet legislation concerning religious worship.²²

There are no grounds for expecting any pronounced developments in favor of religion in the USSR in the near future—far more a prolonged and bitter struggle, persistent and inspired on the part of those that are strong in spirit, and ruthless and (what is most important) underhand on the part of those armed with physical power. Resistance to all kinds of tyranny is growing in the USSR as it is throughout the world, for self-sacrifice and heroism in the name of religion have always been preferred by the people to servility. A good example is provided by the *obnovlenchestvo* clergy of the twenties, which Krasnov dwells on at some length in his article, observing:

The secular authorities simply took no notice of Patriarch Tikhon (he was termed the "former patriarch") and his successors, and categorically refused to accord them... legalization [i.e., official recognition]. This was the decision of the authorities, not of the people. The people fled from the *obnovlenchestvo* clergy, who were left alone in their magnificent empty churches and in their palaces, and in 1943 the Soviet government was obliged to abandon the *obnovlenchestvo* clergy and consent to a restoration of the Patriarchate.²³

²¹ *Nauka i religiya*, 1966, No. 7, p. 24.

²² *Izvestia*, August 30, 1966.

²³ *Russkaya mysl*, July 7, 1966, p. 5.

The restored Patriarchate, described by Krasnov as an “*ersatz*,” was born during the worst period of Stalinist rule. Politically speaking, it has much to its credit so far as services to the country during World War II are concerned, but it will inevitably be asked whether a church’s clergy should be respected solely on account of its political services. The reaction of the Moscow Patriarchate during this second period of antireligious attacks, with which we have been concerned in the present article, has been, paradoxically enough, purely negative in character, as we have seen: all it has done has been to deny, in one way or another, that the Church and its followers in the USSR are being persecuted. One may well ask whether such an ecclesiastical leadership can count on the confidence and support of believers and hold its own for long without radical changes, both in its personnel and in its obligations.

N. Teodorovich

The Communist Bloc

The Hungarian Revolution: Ten Years After

Ten years after the popular uprising in Hungary in October 1956, Stefan C. Stolte, on the basis of material published in the following year by a special UN committee, draws several conclusions of political and social significance from this lesson of the past. These conclusions are not only historical in nature, and are not confined to Hungary alone, they do, in fact, shed light on current aspects of the development of Communist society, such as the role of economic managers, Party *apparatchiki*, the technical intelligentsia and ideologists in this development.

Nothing has more severely shaken an already consolidated Communist regime than the Hungarian uprising in the autumn of 1956. Now, ten years later, a cool and objective analysis of this event is possible. In the present article, we shall attempt to establish which social forces were chiefly responsible for the uprising, and what their aims were: this undertaking is even today of practical value, since it will help us to establish in general which social forces within an already consolidated Communist state may be considered as potential supporters of a reformist or even subversive movement under favorable circumstances.

On December 25, 1956, *Népszabadság*, central organ of the Hungarian Communist Party, published one of the first theoretical analyses of the uprising under the meaningful title “Kronstadt and Budapest.” Here we read:

As in Budapest on October 23, 1956, so in Kronstadt on February 28, 1921, an armed revolt broke out. There it was sailors who took up arms, here students and working youth formed the bulk of the rebels . . . Thus, in both cases the rebel masses did not come from fundamentally counterrevolutionary strata.

The social foundation of the Hungarian Revolution is easily recognizable, and to a certain degree even statistically measurable, namely on the basis of a

breakdown by professional groupings of a list of 457 persons arrested in connection with the revolution between the beginning of November 1956 and the middle of August 1957 whose names were disclosed by the Hungarian press. This breakdown is not, of course, definitive, since it covers only a fraction of all those arrested. There is, for example, little doubt that the Communist press tended not to publish information on the participation of workers and peasants, and probably also of students and members of the army and police force, in the revolution; the revolt of the first two groups was, after all, especially embarrassing for a "workers' and peasants' state," and scarcely less so that of the army and students brought up under the regime. The press would have liked to have presented the revolution as the work of former landowners, clerics and Horthyite officers. However, to return to our list, this looks as follows:

**Persons Arrested in Connection with the Hungarian Revolution
During Period November 1956-Mid-August 1957**

Industrial Workers.....	199
Members of Army and Police	48
Peasants and Agricultural Workers	45
Writers, Artists and Teachers	44
Sundry Intellectuals	31
Employees	24
Students	22
Former Landowners and Officers, Priests, and Other "Reactionaries"....	22
Cooperative and Works Directors and Council Chairmen....	11
Engineers (including 1 Chief Engineer)	6
Small Entrepreneurs	5
Total	457

SOURCE. Compiled from information in *Hungary Under Soviet Rule: A Survey of Developments Since the Report of the UN Special Committee*, prepared by The American Friends of the Captive Nations and The Assembly of Captive European Nations, New York, 1957, Appendix B

The first point to note here is that the "reactionaries" account for less than 5 percent of this group, workers and peasants, on the other hand, for over half. Comparatively well represented are the writers, artists and teachers, i.e., members of professions exerting an especially powerful influence on public opinion. Cooperative and enterprise directors are an insignificant minority, and the technical intelligentsia even more so. These figures, in fact, are hardly confirmation of the opinion that the managers and chief engineers form a "class" capable of endangering the existence of a Communist regime. On the contrary, they indicate that the writers, artists and teachers on the one hand, and the workers and peasants on the other, constitute the social strata most likely to come into conflict with such a regime.

These conclusions are supported by the special UN report on Hungary,¹ which also mentions another important fact, namely that Communist deviationists played a decisive role in the outbreak of the revolution. Thus, the Petöfi Club, which, founded in the summer of 1956, did so much to undermine the regime,

¹ *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary*, United Nations, New York, 1957.

enjoyed the full support of the official Communist youth organization. Another major subversive element, the Writers' Union, was likewise a purely Communist organization consisting almost exclusively of Party members. All major resolutions which morally influenced the revolution originated from organizations founded and led by Communists, and all lay within the framework of a deviationist Communist ideology directed against the regime. This point deserves especial emphasis if only because of the frequent tendency to underestimate the significance of the contradictions and inconsistencies with which Communist ideology is increasingly plagued. There are many who doubt that the latter still possesses sufficient suggestive force to be able to serve as a religion (or *ersatz* religion) and who consider it to be merely a guideline for Party policy. Certainly, Communist ideology is a guideline for Party policy, but it is at the same time a socio-ethical justification of this policy (whether successful or not is another matter). It is also a moral code, which is anything but dead. Dead or *ersatz* religions do not have expansive force, but the Communist ideology has. Dead ideologies know no heresies; Communism, however, still has its heretics, whose aim is not to destroy Communism but rather to improve it.

Thus, the writers and young Communists who drafted the first major resolutions of the Hungarian uprising did not wish to liquidate Communism in their country but merely free it from the "aberrations" which in their view had appeared in its ideology and practice. They were interested not in saving the "new class" but in implementing a form of Communism which would have probably destroyed this class. The second of the sixteen points contained in a resolution adopted at a plenary meeting of the Building Industry Technological University in Budapest on October 22, 1956, reads:

We demand the election of new leaders in the Hungarian Workers' [i.e., Communist] Party on the low, medium and high levels by secret ballot from the ranks upwards. These leaders should convene the Party Congress within the shortest possible time and should elect a new central body of leaders.²

It is evident that the students who drew up this resolution "merely" wanted to democratize the Party. The Writers' Union and the Petöfi Club did not even go this far, calling only for (albeit drastic) personnel changes in the Party leadership. Point 6 of the Proclamation of the Writers' Union demanded in particular that

Imre Nagy, a pure and brave Communist who enjoys the confidence of the Hungarian people, and all those who have systematically fought for socialist democracy in recent years, must be given the posts they deserve. At the same time, a resolute stand must be made against all counterrevolutionary attempts and aspirations.³

Point 4 of the resolution of the Petöfi Club was almost identically worded.⁴

² *Ibid.*, Chapter IX, para. 404 A.

³ *Ibid.*, para. 404 B.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Annex E.

The question whether a really democratized Communist Party would have remained genuinely Communist need not concern us here. Much more important is the circumstance that the call for democracy came from within the Party itself. Support of or opposition to democratization is, however, not only a political guideline but a moral basis for political action.

Other points of the insurgents' resolutions declared national self-assertion *vis-à-vis* the Soviet occupiers to be the highest goal, while still others envisaged radical changes in the country's economic and social order. It was the former which were above all responsible for bringing, in a matter of hours, the entire nation behind a revolt which had originated in purely Party organizations. The first of the sixteen points adopted by the Building Industry Technological University, for example, reads:

We demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty.⁵

The first point of the Proclamation of the Writers' Union reads:

We want an independent national policy based on the principles of socialism. Our relations with all countries, and with the USSR and the People's Democracies in the first place, should be regulated on the basis of the principle of equality. We want a review of international treaties and economic agreements in the spirit of equality of rights.⁶

However, when analysing the special role played by the internal opposition within the Hungarian Communist Party it must be stressed that the rebels differed widely as regards domestic policy goals. The UN report on Hungary notes that "the reforms demanded by various groups differed in points of detail." The report does, at the same time, say that

Broadly speaking, however, those who took part in the Hungarian uprising did so with a clear idea of what they were opposing at the risk of their lives. All of them refused to tolerate the continued intervention of a foreign Power in Hungarian affairs.⁷

Indeed, nationalism was the only idea common to all the rebels. Their economic program, although likewise influenced by resolutions, was largely molded by practice. The resolution of the Building Industry Technological University made only comparatively modest demands on the industrial and agricultural sectors. Point 9 reads:

We demand the complete revision of norms in industry and an urgent and radical adjustment of wages to meet the demands of workers and intellectuals. We demand that minimum living wages for workers should be fixed.⁸

⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 404 A.

⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 404 B.

⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 374.

⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 404 A.

And Point 10:

We demand that the delivery system should be placed on a new basis and that produce should be used rationally. We demand equal treatment of peasants farming individually.⁹

Point 5 ends:

We demand that the workers should have the right to strike.¹⁰

Farther-reaching demands were made in the Proclamation of the Writers' Union, Point 4 of which insists that

Factories must be run by workers and specialists. The present humiliating system of wages, norms and social security conditions must be reformed. The trade unions must truly represent the interests of the Hungarian workers.¹¹

However, nothing is said here about how the workers and specialists were to run the factories, who was to appoint or elect these workers and specialists, whose property the factories were to become, etc. Also unclear is Point 5 of the Proclamation, which reads:

Our peasant policy must be put on a new basis. Peasants must be given the right to decide their own future freely. Political and economic conditions to make possible free membership in cooperatives must at last be created. The present system of deliveries to the state and of taxation must be gradually replaced by a system ensuring free socialist production and exchange of goods.¹²

The third sentence of the above could well be understood to mean that political and economic conditions had to be created which left the peasant with no option but "voluntarily" to become a member of a cooperative.

Neither the workers nor the peasants, however, confined themselves to the demands made by the internal Party opposition, but with remarkable alacrity struck out on their own paths, which led far beyond the program set forth in the "sixteen points" and in the Proclamation of the Writers' Union (we are not taking the resolution of the Petöfi Club into consideration here since it did not deal with the agricultural sector; on the industrial sector it called for fulfillment of the "justified political demands of the workers" as well as for "factory autonomy" and "workers' democracy").¹³

Action taken by the peasants during the Hungarian Revolution consisted not in drafting resolutions but in leaving the agricultural cooperatives in large numbers. Whereas in September 1956 there were 4,858 cooperatives in Hungary, with 343,000 members, at the end of December of that year there were only 2,089, with 119,000 members.¹⁴ In other words, the peasants decided unequiv-

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 404 B.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, Annex E.

¹⁴ *Népszabadság*, Budapest, February 2, 1958.

ocally against the kolkhoz system. On no account, however, did this signify a desire to return to the agricultural system prevailing during the Horthy era, with its vast semi-feudal estates. Quite simply, the peasants wanted to take possession of all the arable land, primarily by restoring individual farming. Any cooperatives remaining after this would have doubtless been made worthy of the name. Politically, however, the peasants, not living and working together in large masses, failed to make their influence properly felt, although they expressed solidarity with the freedom fighters in no uncertain terms.

Just as the peasants set about taking over all the arable land, so the industrial workers set about taking over all industry. On countless occasions during the uprising, Workers' Councils (not to be confused with the Revolutionary Councils, which were usually representative of all layers of the population), did in fact assume control of factories. Although the Workers' Councils were not formed until after the outbreak of actual fighting, they played a significant political role for about two months, i.e., until well after the uprising had been suppressed. The Hungarian Workers' Councils provide an excellent illustration of how important a role industrial workers can play under favorable circumstances in an opposition movement against a Communist regime.

The first of these Councils was established in the United Lamp Factory in Budapest on October 24, about two days before their constitution was approved by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party. The first Workers' Councils in the provinces made their appearance in Debrecen and Dunapentele around October 25. By October 26, Workers' Councils had been formed in a number of factories in both the capital and the provinces. They were also elected in other types of enterprise, such as mines, state farms and hospitals. The Workers' Councils of a given region formed coordinating committees. Around October 30, for example, the Central Workers' Council of Csepel was created by the nineteen Workers' Councils in this region. The Greater Budapest Workers' Council established after the second Soviet intervention played a major political role during November and part of December. In addition to all this, the UN report noted:

Few Communists were among those elected to the Workers' Councils. In the opinion of witnesses connected with various Councils, the industrial workers no longer put their trust in Communist leaders. Many of the heads of formerly Communist-controlled trade unions voluntarily relinquished their positions in favor of the new leaders of the Workers' Councils.¹⁵

The point that few Communists were elected to the Workers' Councils is of particular interest, since it signifies that in a measure the workers had dissociated themselves from the internal Party opposition. The report further commented that

In many cases Workers' Councils dismissed the directors and personnel officers who were all members of the Communist Party, but retained the business and technical managers, unless they were members of the Party.¹⁶

¹⁵ *Report of the Special Committee . . .*, Chapter XI, para. 544.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 545.

In general, the Workers' Councils acted as if they owned the factories, and in this capacity took care of such matters as the payment of wages, the provision of food for workers and their families, and the posting of factory guards. Where did the Councils get the idea of taking over the factories from? The explanation given in the UN report is as follows:

Hungarian workers were aware that in neighboring Yugoslavia, the economic and social status of workers was superior to their own, and that Yugoslav workers had some say in the running of factories through the agency of Workers' Councils. Hungarian workers, according to witnesses, were especially attracted by the Yugoslav system whereby the factory manager was elected by the Workers' Council and not imposed on them as was the case in Hungary. For some time before the revolution, questions relating to worker-management relations in general and the Yugoslav Workers' Councils in particular had been widely discussed in the trade unions and in the Petöfi Club.¹⁷

The Hungarian workers, however, went a good deal further than the Yugoslavs in that they turned the Workers' Councils into a weapon against the Communist leadership, their first move being to dismiss managerial personnel installed by the Communists. The latter circumstance also makes it clear why the managers and technical intelligentsia played such a passive role in the uprising. Indeed, if the Communist captains of industry learnt anything from the Hungarian Revolution it was that the overthrow of Party dictatorship from below means the end of their power as well. This cannot be otherwise. Although conflicts between Party bureaucrats and Communist managers certainly exist, in the final analysis both groups are in the same boat, and are dependent on one another. Although the managers are inclined to regard the Party secretaries as "parasites" on occasions, they cannot do without them, since they are the sole guarantee of the preservation of an economic system in which they, the managers, are little dictators. Of course, the manager would welcome a change in Communist property relations which could make him proprietor of his factory, but in such an eventuality he could scarcely reckon on the support of his workers, who would also strive to acquire ownership of the factory, just as the Workers' Councils did in Hungary.

One of the lessons to be learned from the Hungarian uprising, in fact, is that the sole genuine potential opponents of a Communist regime are: deviationist Communist intellectuals; industrial workers; and peasants. True, the remnants of the old ruling classes could also be included in this category, but their significance is rapidly waning. The Hungarian Revolution showed the industrial workers and deviationist Communist intellectuals to be the toughest opponents of the regime. The fighting carried on longest of all in industrial cities. Even after the uprising had been militarily crushed, the workers fought on using the strike weapon. "Hungarian factories had remained practically idle for nearly two months," reported the UN committee.¹⁸ Neither did the intellectuals allow

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 540.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Chapter II, para. 87.

themselves to be intimidated. As late as December 28, the Writers' Union condemned, by a vote of 150 to 8, the Soviet military intervention as a "historic mistake."¹⁹

While the industrial workers and the renegade intellectuals were natural allies during the revolt, they followed very different paths. Whereas the latter groped cautiously, and mostly within a Communist framework, toward true democratization, the Workers' Councils flatly demanded a multiparty system, with free and secret elections.²⁰

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Although it is extremely difficult to say even approximately what kind of social order would have emerged in Hungary had the uprising been successful, there is no doubt at all that it would not have been a Communist one. For this reason, the Soviet military intervention met with the approval of the entire Communist world. The Soviet Army, however, could only, by crushing the revolt, create the conditions necessary for the establishment of a Communist regime; it could not install such a regime itself. It is therefore only natural to ask what has become of the motive forces behind the revolution, and how Communism in Hungary could become reconsolidated.

After the bloody suppression of the uprising, the writers and workers were of course compelled to curb their opposition, but they have remained recalcitrant to this day, and are not without influence on domestic affairs. The writers protested against repression by a years-long silence which put the government in an extremely embarrassing position *vis-à-vis* world opinion and also had the effect of largely isolating the Party from the people. The workers continued to resist by means of sabotage; during the first nine months of 1957, industrial damage amounted to no less than 130,000,000 forints, as compared with only 20,000,000 forints during the corresponding period of the previous year.²¹

Going on to our second question: How did János Kádár manage to reconsolidate the Communist regime in Hungary?

After the suppression of the revolution, it was not at first clear what the Party's general line would be. On November 4, while fighting was still in progress, Kádár issued a government declaration couched in the most conciliatory terms. He promised, for example,

The ending of fratricidal fighting and the restoration of internal order and peace. The Government will not tolerate the persecution of workers, on any pretext, for having taken part in recent events.²²

In fact, however, such workers were not spared in the least. It was a worker, István Szabó, who on January 19, 1957, was one of the first to be executed.²³

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Chapter XIV, para. 696.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Chapter XI, para. 548.

²¹ *Népszabadság*, December 25, 1957.

²² *Report of the Special Committee . . .*, Chapter XIV, para. 642.

²³ *Népszabadság*, January 20, 1957.

Executions and mass arrests were in general characteristic of the initial period of the restoration of the Communist regime in Hungary, a period which culminated in the announcement on June 17, 1958 (the fifth anniversary of the East German uprising), of the execution of Imre Nagy and his Defense Minister, Pál Maléter. In addition, the Writers' Union and the Journalists' Association were temporarily dissolved and subsequently reorganized under the strict supervision of the Party. Numerous Workers' Councils were forced to disband after having been rendered impotent by the arrest of their leaders, and finally, in November 1957, they were categorically banned, being replaced by "Works Councils," a mere third of whose members were elected by the workers themselves, while the remainder were appointed by the Communist-controlled trade union.²⁴ Peasant resistance to the kolkhoz system was also smashed, and in the winter of 1960-61 Hungarian agriculture was completely collectivized.

Thus, the Hungarian Communist Party liquidated or "aligned" all organizations capable of further resistance. There was, at the same time, a certain amount of tension within the Party in that the Stalinists called for a return to extreme terror methods, while Kádár and the "revisionists" were anxious to come to some sort of agreement with the people—provided that the Party remained in absolute command. This conflict between the "dogmatists" and the "revisionists" ended in defeat for the former, arch-Stalinists Mátyás Rákosi and Ernő Gerő, along with 17 of their adherents, being expelled from the Party at a Central Committee meeting of August 14-16, 1962.²⁵

Although the Hungarian people is not exactly pleased with the Kádár regime, there is no doubt that the latter's action against the hated Stalinists brought a certain relaxation of tension on the domestic political scene. It made possible a compromise between the Party and the writers, who now enjoy a considerable amount of freedom as compared with their colleagues in other Communist countries. Kádár, in fact, although continuing to brook no organized opposition to his regime, has made many concessions. Hungarian citizens can travel relatively unhindered to the West, and can hold leading posts in the economy without being Party members. Party-Church relations have improved, and on September 15, 1964, Hungary concluded an agreement with the Vatican.

It was no coincidence that Kádár, and not the Stalinists, kept the upper hand after the uprising. The merciless tyranny of the Stalinists had become so badly compromised in the eyes of the entire nation that the Party could not seek salvation in an increase of terror. It was impossible, for example, to arrest the 150 out of 158 members of the Writers' Union who protested against Soviet military intervention. It was impossible to arrest virtually the entire population. The Party had first to dispose of the Stalinists and then reach a compromise with the people. The latter circumstance meant that the Hungarian people did not revolt in vain, and life in Hungary is undoubtedly freer and more bearable now than under the Rákosi regime. The Hungarian people cannot hope for more at

²⁴ See, for example, *Népszabadság*, November 17, 1957.

²⁵ See, for example, *Népszabadság*, August 19, 1962.

the present time, since it learnt during the revolution that the international balance of power does not permit of the liquidation of the Communist regime in Hungary.

In his governmental declaration of November 4, 1956, Kádár also promised to take into consideration the desire for national independence. He said:

After the restoration of order and calm, the Hungarian Government will begin negotiations with the Soviet Government and with the other participants to the Warsaw Treaty about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.²⁶

For ten years now "order and calm" have reigned in Hungary, but there have been no negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, whose presence is clearly desired by—and indeed indispensable to—the Communist regime of that country.

Stefan C. Stolte

²⁶ *Report of the Special Committee . . .*, Chapter XIV, para. 642.

REVIEWS

The Periodical Press

Among the multitude of themes raised in connection with the forthcoming fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet regime, a prominent place is occupied by the question of tradition. There have been a number of contributions to the Soviet press dealing, from a Party point of view, with the simple truth that traditions are there to be valued and preserved. *Partiinaya zhizn*, for example, has an article by G. Panov entitled "Preserve and Multiply Our Glorious Traditions." The author is secretary of the Party committee of a large Kiev enterprise with an interesting history. He refers to the enterprise, named "Arsenal," as follows:

Yes, our factory recently celebrated its two-hundredth anniversary. During the whole of this period, there has not been one important event in the life of the country, of the Communist Party, which has passed the enterprise by (*Partiinaya zhizn*, 1966, No. 19, page 24).

The factory, which is only half-a-century younger than the city of St. Petersburg and almost a coeval of the city of Odessa, naturally is a legitimate subject for a discussion about traditions, but in this case the traditions are necessarily rather limited in character. True, the author seems to have broader traditions in mind when he remarks that once upon a time Decembrist leaflets were distributed at the factory, later "Narodnaya Volya" circles met there, and, beginning in 1903, the Bolsheviks were also active. The author writes:

In order to keep the good traditions of one's collective on the alert [*na vooruzhenii*], it is necessary, first, to know them well and respect them, and, second, to propagate [them] every day and every hour, to help people to enrich themselves with everything that has been accumulated by their grandfathers and fathers, friends and comrades; and not to mark time but to move forward irresistibly, to multiply the traditions and extend their educative functions (page 25).

One of the workers at the factory is quoted as saying: "Tradition is a moving force, it is mobilization."

Even so, the whole of the article is devoted to traditions that are not even revolutionary, but only connected with the existing regime. Such a narrow approach is certainly not that of the intellectual elite, which thinks in other terms than those of purely Party dogma.

Of all the contributions on this subject, let us consider some of the more recent and significant. In a lengthy contribution published in two issues of *Molodaya gvaraiya*, entitled "Letters from the Russian Museum," the writer Vladimir Soloukhin dwells at length on the question of traditions and their merciless destruction over a prolonged period.

The celebrated Russian Museum in Leningrad here serves, of course, merely as a pretext for condemning a contemptuous attitude toward tradition in general.

Right at the beginning, Soloukhin asserts that during the period of Soviet reconstruction the city of Moscow lost its historic atmosphere. Soloukhin quotes Knut Hamsun as remarking at the beginning of the century:

I had never imagined that such a city could exist on Earth: all around glint red and gilded cupolas and spires (*Molodaya gvardiya*, 1966, No. 9, pages 240-41).

And now this city has disappeared: streets have been widened, monuments have been transferred to other sites, even certain buildings have been moved. Soloukhin gives a list almost two pages long (pages 242-43) of churches that have been destroyed for no known reason since nothing has been built on their sites. We read:

For forty years, the Church of Christ the Savior, a grandiose architectural structure, was under construction. With the aid of voluntary contributions, it was built as a monument to the celebrated fire of Moscow, as a monument to Moscow's refusal to submit to a powerful enemy, as a monument to the victory over Napoleon. The great Russian artist Vasily Surikov painted its walls and vaults. It was the tallest and the most majestic building in Moscow, and could be seen from all parts of the city. It was not an ancient building, but together with the Kremlin group of buildings it served to organize, architecturally, the center of our capital. It was pulled down, and a swimming pool built in its place (page 243).

Talking of this destruction of relics of the past, the author describes how the ancient Simonov Monastery was blown up. Close by were graves belonging to the family of the Aksakovs, including the well-known writer and Slavophile. It was decided to transfer the remains to the graveyard of the Novodevichy Monastery, but it turned out that the roots of a birch-tree standing above the grave had grown through the breast of the writer's body. The birch-tree was cut down, the graveyard destroyed together with the monastery, and so nothing was left. With equal feeling the writer refers to the destruction of the Sadovoi Ring, which had not only beautified the city but had become something of a symbol, for the whole of Moscow is based on ring roads around the Kremlin.

In Party circles, traditions are still treated as "survivals of the past," in the derogatory sense associated in such circles with this expression. The work of destruction has been carried out by various methods, including the actual suppression of monuments, and less drastic methods such as their removal to new sites or their renaming. Soloukhin speaks with indignation of the fact that the street leading to the Mikhailovsky Palace, where the Russian Museum is accommodated, was formerly known as Mikhailovsky Street but now is called after Brodsky, a third-rate artist who acquired a reputation by painting various prominent leaders, including Stalin, Voroshilov and Budenny. He expresses his surprise at the fact that the former Mariinsky Theater is today known as the Kirov Theater:

With a factory, it would not be so bad, but for a theater, especially an opera theater, the name of some eminent artist would be more suitable than that of a politician. The "Shalyapin Metallurgical Factory" would not sound particularly natural, but "Shalyapin Opera House" would be quite in place (page 248).

The author goes on to relate:

When, blinded by the magnificence of the park, the fountains and the palace, I was returning from Peterhof [now Petrodvorets], I heard the following snatch of conversation: "Yes, of course! it's wonderful, fascinating, unequaled, but how much money it must have cost! All of it was built by squeezing the juice out of the peasants and the people" (page 250).

Here Soloukhin leaves the realm of purely aesthetic considerations and finds himself in the midst of larger social, political and economic problems. He goes on:

There, my friends, you have one of the most remarkable of contradictions. Of course, the Emperor could not earn seven million rubles with his own hands to build the Mikhailovsky Palace. Of course, one can say without hesitation that all the famous palaces, the architectural creations and paintings of genius, the great and unique collections of art, all these Louvres, Dresden Galleries and Hermitages, all of it was founded by "squeezing the juice" out of people. No man in the world is capable by labor alone of earning enough to build either the Louvre or the Hermitage. Probably it was like this: all around there was squalor or even poverty, and in the middle of it all Versailles and Petrodvorets. But now the Louvre and Versailles are the national pride of the French, just as for us it is the Hermitage or the Tretyakov Gallery. Money distributed in an even thin layer cannot be transformed into eternal values; only when it is collected into a big pile can it be turned into palaces and picture galleries. This means that some one, a person or the state, has to collect it, and if it has to be collected, it has to be taken from some one (pages 250-51).

It is obvious that when making these observations, ostensibly relating to traditions, the writer approaches complex social problems. Other observations which he makes are also directed against a tendentious attitude to the past and to history:

Sometimes we have attacks of outright false modesty. As you know, on a certain significant day in 1961 none of the papers in this country carried a single line to remind us of the hundredth anniversary of the abolition of serfdom. This was an event of tremendous historical importance, but it seemed as though we were indifferent to the fact that the dreadful, uncivilized [phenomenon of] serfdom had finally been abolished with all due ceremony (page 255).

Traditions are all-embracing. Primarily, they concern the history of a people, its outlook, its likes and dislikes, its peculiar characteristics and its national awareness. Soloukhin does not, perhaps, set out to defend traditions in their most elementary meaning, but he evidently sets great store by the efforts of a nation to represent its past in the best and fullest light. He is very conscious of the incongruity of the use to which ancient buildings, particularly those with religious associations, are sometimes put. With regard to the Smolny Nunnery, for example, he says:

The monastery houses the oblast committee of the Komsomol. Young men and women members of the Komsomol sit around in former cells adorned with curious stucco moldings. In the corridors, the atmosphere is that of a church. Why must the Komsomol oblast committee choose a monastery? (Page 278.)

Needless to say, not only the traditions themselves have suffered but also their champions. Soloukhin gives a good example, that of a rich man named Likhachev, who devoted half of his life to collecting old Russian icons:

In 1913, Likhachev presented his collection of about one thousand five hundred icons to the Russian Museum. This constituted the foundation of the museum's [entire] collection. Probably as a sign of gratitude for this unprecedented gift, Likhachev himself was repressed in the middle thirties (*Molodaya gvardiya*, 1966, No. 10, pages 249-50).

In an attempt to be objective, the author dwells on the many-sidedness of Russia in the past. She had her officialdom, her rebels, her tillers of the soil, her students, her officers, her sailors, her pioneers in the taiga, dancing and singing, plowing and begging: "But," he adds, "there was also the Russia that prayed" (page 265). He lays particular stress upon the Old Believers and others, whom M. Nesterov portrayed in his canvases. A link with the present is hinted at by the reference to Andrei Voznesensky, "the most modern of poets," who is quoted as referring to Nesterov.

A digression is perhaps here justified in connection with the latest official "holiday" instituted in the Soviet Union. This is "Agricultural Workers' Day," celebrated for the first time on October 9 this year to the accompaniment of press fanfares about the concern shown by both Party and government for those who provide the country's food. The report of this new holiday prompts one to ask how it is that these workers have not been remembered until now. The Soviet official calendar is already full of dates devoted to various categories of workers. Recently, for example, they celebrated Trade Workers' Day, i.e., shopworkers' day. Agricultural workers, on the other hand, form the main category of the country's population, and today number tens of millions. Their praises have been sung by poets of all ages, regardless of the regime obtaining at the time. The reason for the belatedness of their recognition now may be found in the official designation of the new holiday—"agricultural workers' day." Not "peasants" nor even "kolkhozniks" but "agricultural *workers*' day." This, of course, is because the term "peasant" is inseparably bound up with the idea of property, with that of the right to own one's own plot of land and to dispose of one's own time as one thinks fit. To this, it should be added that the peasant's way of life is closely associated with traditions, which are essentially opposed to the foundations on which Communism has to be built.

Thus, there are two attitudes in the Soviet Union with regard to tradition. The official attitude is that only those traditions should be respected which go back no further than the Revolution; the other is that all traditions should be preserved, however old they may be. It would appear that in the struggle between the two views the victory may in the end be on the side of those who remember the country's thousand-year history and not merely the last fifty years.

A. Gayev

Immunitet gosudarstva

(State Immunity)

By M. M. BOGUSLAVSKY

Published by the Institute for International Relations, Moscow, 1962, 232 pp.

This book treats of the efforts made by the USSR to induce foreign states to recognize the right of immunity of the Soviet state in international relations as the sole owner of the nation's means of production, as well as its merchant ships, and as the possessor of a monopoly over all Soviet foreign trade. The book is of interest for two main reasons: firstly, it gives an interpretation of the concept of state immunity which reflects the official Soviet one, and secondly it contains a wealth of factual material on pertinent court practice in various countries.

Mr. Boguslavsky also endeavors to define the principles on which the USSR bases its relations with different groups of countries. Thus, he asserts that relations with the "socialist" countries are founded on a new type of international division of labor whose aim is, to "gradually overcome historically formed differences in level of economic development, and create the material basis for a more or less simultaneous transition of all peoples within the socialist system to Communism" (page 6). In its relations with the young Afro-Asian states and with Cuba, the "socialist" camp, according to the author, "renders all possible assistance and support to these countries in developing along the road of progress, setting up their own industries, developing and strengthening their economies, and training their own specialists" (page 7). These points are not, however, elaborated upon. Finally, Boguslavsky says that the USSR bases its relations with "capitalist" countries on the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. In his view, normal cooperation between such states is only possible if there is recognition of the immunity of a foreign state and its organs.

The book under review deals only with the legal immunity of a state and its property (diplomatic immunity being mentioned only briefly for the purpose of comparison), and then only in the sense of exemption from the jurisdiction of a foreign state, not in the wider sense, which also comprises immunity from the exaction of security for a claim as well as from the enforcement of a court decision.

The question of when a state enjoys immunity is a moot point in international law and practice. According to the "functional immunity" theory, a state enjoys immunity only when acting as a sovereign body (i.e., *jure imperii*), not when it is a participant in civil circulation, a party to an international trade agreement, an owner of merchant ships employed for commercial purposes, etc. Understandably, the USSR takes the opposite view, namely that a state enjoys immunity under all circumstances. Boguslavsky places an extensive construction on the immunity of a state and its property. Although in practice state immunity has the wider sense defined in the preceding paragraph, he goes as far as to say that "the inviolability of state property is not limited to exemption from legal enforcement actions," since such property could not be subjected to "administrative measures" or "forcibly detained on foreign territory" (page 23).

A particularly strong case is made for the immunity of Soviet maritime shipping, which, it is maintained, is subject to neither jurisdiction nor even detention by a foreign state; in this connection, the author quotes the following excerpt from a Soviet note of October 25, 1939, to the British government:

The government of the USSR cannot but declare that the merchant ships of the USSR are state ships, and for this reason alone cannot be subjected to any of the enforcement measures applicable to private merchant ships (page 202; see also *Izvestia*, October 26, 1939).

Another point stressed is that state immunity is enjoyed not only by the USSR as a whole but also by each individual Union republic. Here, of course, special reference is made to the Baltic States. Boguslavsky complains bitterly that the failure of the USA and Great Britain to recognize the Baltic states as Soviet republics, and the support given by these two countries to the diplomatic representatives of the former Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian governments, have resulted in the "theft" of Soviet state property (page 115).

Considerable space is devoted to the legal position of Soviet trade missions abroad. These, as organs of the Soviet state, may, according to Boguslavsky, bring action in the foreign country concerned, but are not themselves liable to either a counter-claim, or to the exaction of security for a claim, or to the enforcement of a decision by the foreign court; they are not liable to direct taxation or registration in a trade register, and their property (buildings, goods, funds, etc.) enjoys extraterritorial rights.

Only Soviet foreign trade associations, such as the all-Union import-export associations "Eksporthleb" and "Eksportiles," are acknowledged as not being covered by any form of state immunity, being legal persons and economically accountable. They may thus be sued in a foreign court and are liable to exaction of security for a claim as well to as enforcement. However, as Boguslavsky says, under Soviet law the state bears no responsibility for the operations and obligations of these associations, which in turn have responsibility for the debts of the state, and are only answerable for their own debts with that portion of their property liable to sequestration under Soviet law, a category which does not include supplies and technical equipment, for example. The author stresses that this question is a purely academic one inasmuch as all Soviet foreign trade associations invariably fulfill their obligations to the letter, no cases being known of creditors' having had to resort to compulsion in this respect. Whether this is true or not is another matter.

Suspension of the state immunity of other Soviet foreign trade organizations, such as trade missions and merchant ships, is only possible, we read, with the consent of the latter. Even so, according to Boguslavsky, the consent of the organization to stand trial in a foreign court does not mean consent to submit to either the exaction of security for a claim or to enforcement of the court's decision, such consent only being possible if stipulated in an agreement between the parties concerned.

The book concludes with a concise summary of the principles which, in the opinion of the author—and hence also of the Soviet government—are indispensable for normal international cooperation.

Finally, it may be said that, in view of the limited amount of literature on the subject, Mr. Boguslavsky's work has a certain interest for those engaged in the practice and theoretical study of international law. The fact that the book has appeared in a competent German translation can therefore only be welcomed.* At the same time, it is rather a pity that an appendix of treaties and agreements concluded between the USSR and foreign countries is absent in the translation; a little over three pages long, it could well have been included.

T. Davletshin

* M. M. Boguslavskij, *Staatliche Immunität*, translated by Wera Rathfelder and published by the Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, West Berlin, 1965, 272, pp.

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

October 1966

- 1 Publication of Soviet congratulatory message to Chinese People's Republic on occasion of latter's seventeenth anniversary.

End of radio contact with Soviet artificial Moon satellite "Luna-2" owing to exhaustion of satellite's power reserves.

Soviet delegation led by Chairman of Committee of Soviet Women N. V. Popova leaves for Stockholm to attend world conference on children's problems.

- 2 Announcement that Chairman of State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy A. M. Petrosyants and French Minister for Science, Atomic Questions and Space Alain Peyrefitte are ready to conclude agreement on joint use of 70,000,000,000-electron-volt accelerator under construction at Serpukhov (near Moscow) for research purposes.

Teacher's Day.

- 3 Signing of agreements under which USSR is to grant North Vietnam extra credits and gratuitous aid in order to strengthen her economy and defense capability, as well as agreement on Soviet-North Vietnamese trade in 1967.

Astrophysical conference devoted to terrestrial and extra-atmospheric exploration of Moon, Mars and Venus opens in Kharkov.

- 4 Twenty-fifth session of Executive Committee of Comecon opens in Moscow.

Soviet Party delegation led by Deputy Head of Central Committee's Department for Party Organizational Work B. N. Moralev leaves for Ulan-Bator to study Mongolian experience in this field.

Announcement that Professor D. I. Blokhintsev has been elected President of International Union of Pure and Applied Physics.

- 5 Supreme Soviet Presidium issues decree under which the naming of enterprises, railroad stations and other institutions of all-Union importance after prominent state and public (*obschestvennye*) figures is to be carried out by the Councils of Ministers of the Union, republics after the Ministries or government departments responsible for the given institutions have been informed.

Announcement that Franco-Soviet color television commission has ended its fourth session in Moscow, having examined practical measures for introducing jointly developed "Secam-III" system in both countries.

Third plenary session of Central Council of Union of Sports Societies and Organizations of the USSR, devoted to problems posed by resolution of Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers on promoting physical culture and sport, opens in Moscow. Report delivered by Central Council Chairman Y. D. Mashin.

International seminar on exploitation of satellite data for weather forecasting opens in World Meteorological Center in Moscow.

Announcement that Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers have adopted resolution under which 25 Lenin Prizes for science and technology and 5 for literature, art and architecture, each worth 10,000 rubles, are to be awarded once every two years on Lenin's birthday, and also, starting from 1967, double the number of corresponding State Prizes, each worth 5,000 rubles, yearly on the anniversary of the October Revolution. Those awarded State Prizes are to receive title of "USSR State Prize Laureate." Existing Lenin Prize Committees reconstituted as Committee for Lenin and State Prizes for Science and Technology and Committee for Lenin and State Prizes for Literature, Art and Architecture (both subordinate to Council of Ministers).

- 6 Party Secretary General L. I. Brezhnev, Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman N. V. Podgorny and Chairman of Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin send congratulatory message to East German leaders on occasion of seventeenth anniversary of German Democratic Republic.

- 7 Ministry of Higher and Special Secondary Education complains to Chinese Embassy in Moscow about Chinese government's decision, in connection with "cultural revolution," to expel Soviet students and trainees from China within 10-15 days, and announces that it, the Ministry, has decided, together

with USSR Academy of Sciences, to terminate the presence of Chinese students and trainees in USSR. These are to leave the country during the course of October.

Conference of physical culture workers, devoted to problems posed by resolution of Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers on promoting physical culture and sport, takes place in Central Committee's headquarters.

All-Union seminar of press, radio and television workers, convened by Party Central Committee, comes to an end. Speech on tasks facing these workers as result of Party Congress resolutions delivered by Deputy Head of Central Committee's Propaganda Department T. K. Kuprikov.

- 8 Soviet-Rumanian agreement on formation of joint governmental commission on economic cooperation signed in Kremlin, Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers M. A. Lesechko being the signatory for the USSR.

Announcement that Black Sea Fleet destroyer "Naporisty" is to pay courtesy visit on French port of Toulon October 15-20.

- 9 Delegation of Soviet journalists led by Board Chairman of USSR Journalists' Union M. V. Zimyanin leaves for Berlin to attend Sixth Congress of International Organization of Journalists.

Announcement that Soviet government has adopted resolution to set up hotel school in Kiev and public catering school in Riga in order to improve training of workers serving foreign tourists. Similar schools are to be established later in other cities.

All-Union Agricultural Workers' Day celebrated for first time.

- 10 Polish Party and governmental delegation led by First Secretary of Central Committee of Polish United Workers' Party Wladyslaw Gomulka and Chairman of Polish Council of Ministers Jozef Cyrankiewicz arrives in USSR on official visit.

Fourth session of Soviet-Hungarian inter-governmental commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation comes to an end in Moscow. Discussed were: reports on cooperation achieved in pharmaceutical and light industries as well as in design and production of diesel trains; the holding of exhibitions of industrial products.

Announcement that Podgorny's official visit to Austria has been postponed for a few

days owing to unforeseen circumstances (he has a cold).

- 11 All-Union seminar of ideological workers, convened by Party Central Committee, opened in Moscow by Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member P. N. Demichev. Participants in seminar, which is devoted to ideological work in the light of Party Congress decisions, include secretaries of Union-republic Party central committees and krai and oblast committees, and political workers of Soviet Army and Navy. Speech entitled "Actively Form the Marxist-Leninist Outlook and Communist Morality of Soviet People!" delivered by Head of Party Central Committee's Propaganda Department V. I. Stepakov.

- 12 Announcement of death of Soviet Ambassador to Netherlands I. I. Tugarinov.

- 13 International conference on heavy ion physics, organized by Joint Nuclear Research Institute, opens in Dubna.

Delegation from Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries leaves for Brussels to take part in Belgian-Soviet friendship festival.

- 14 Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-129."

- 15 Signing in Paris of agreement on scientific and technical cooperation between Renault and Peugeot concerns and State Committee for Science and Technology, as well as protocol on general conditions for the delivery of technological equipment for Soviet automobile plants.

- 16 Hungarian delegation including First Secretary of Central Committee of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Janos Kádár and Chairman of Council of Ministers Gyula Kállai arrives in Moscow on friendly visit.

Contract signed in Paris under which French firm of Camus is to supply equipment for house-building combine to be constructed in Tashkent.

Mauritanian delegation led by Foreign Affairs and Planning Minister arrives in Moscow.

Death of Party Central Committee Member V. G. Komyakhov.

Announcement that postponed state visit of Podgorny to Austria will take place November 14-21.

Publication of joint communiqué on visit to USSR of Polish Party and government delegation. Delegates toured Moscow and Sverdlovsk, visiting industrial enterprises and scientific and cultural institutions. Topics discussed included development of all-round cooperation, and international situation. Agreement reached on increase of mutual trade.

Announcement that governmental resolution has been adopted under which special fund, to be administered by State Committee for Prices, is to be created in 1967 from state budget resources for the purpose of compensating enterprises for losses due to unforeseen fluctuations in wholesale prices.

Food Industry Workers' Day celebrated for first time.

- 17 Arrival in Moscow, on friendly visit in response to invitation by Soviet Party Central Committee and government, of the following: from East Germany—First Secretary of Central Committee of Socialist Unity Party (SED) and Chairman of State Council, Walter Ulbricht, SED Politburo Member and Chairman of Council of Ministers Willi Stoph, SED Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member Erich Honecker, and SED Central Committee Member and Minister of National Defense Army General Heinz Hoffmann; from Czechoslovakia—Party Central Committee First Secretary President Antonín Novotný, Premier and Central Committee Presidium Member Josef Lenart, and Central Committee Member and National Defense Minister Army General Bohumír Lomský; from Rumania—Party Secretary General Nicolae Ceausescu, Executive Committee and Permanent Presidium Member of Party Central Committee and Chairman of Council of Ministers Ion Gheorghe Maurer, and Central Committee Member and Armed Forces Minister Colonel General Ion Ioniță; from Bulgaria—Party Central Committee First Secretary and Chairman of Council of Ministers Todor Zhivkov, and Central Committee Member and National Defense Minister Army General Dobri Dzhurov; from Mongolia—Party Central Committee First Secretary and Chairman of Council of Ministers Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal; and from Cuba—Party Central Committee Politburo Member President Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, and Party Central Committee Second Secretary and Politburo Member, Deputy Premier and Armed Forces Minister Raúl Castro Ruz. A further

arrival is Polish Party Central Committee Politburo Member and National Defense Minister Marshal Marian Spychalski. Dinner given by Soviet Party and government in honor of visiting Party and government leaders and defense ministers from "socialist" countries.

Signing of first trade agreement between USSR and Mauritania, under which both parties are to accord each other most favored nation treatment. USSR to deliver machinery, rolled iron and steel products, cement, etc., in exchange for such items as hides, skins and peanuts. Protocol also signed under which USSR is to deliver machinery to Mauritania during period 1967–69 on instalment payment basis.

Indonesian Chief Minister for Political Questions and Administration and Minister for Foreign Affairs Adam Malik arrives in Moscow.

Italian Proletarian Unity Socialist Party delegation led by Secretary General Dario Valori arrives in Moscow to study work of Soviet Party organizations.

Yugoslav trade delegation arrives in Moscow to sign protocol on Soviet-Yugoslav trade in 1967.

Press conference held in headquarters of Committee for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries of Council of Ministers in connection with international exhibition of food industry equipment ("Inprodmash-67") to open in Moscow in May 1967.

- 18 Member of Central Committee of Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and Mongolian Army Minister Colonel General Zh. Lkhavagsuren arrives in Moscow.

International exhibition of photographs ("Interpressfoto-66") opens in Moscow under slogan "For Peace and Friendship, For Humanism and Progress."

Publication of Party Central Committee's slogans (108 in all) for 49th anniversary of October Revolution.

- 19 Regular session of Commission of Historians of the USSR and GDR, devoted to history of Russo-German revolutionary ties and Soviet-East German relations, opens in Moscow.

Meeting of representatives of Moscow public held to celebrate tenth anniversary of signing of joint Soviet-Japanese declaration which paved way for establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Announcement that Kosygin is to pay official visit to Turkey December 19–24.

- 20 Launching of Soviet artificial Earth satellite "Kosmos-130" and communications satellite of "Molniya-1" type.

Announcement that delegation of leading British radiation safety experts has arrived in Moscow.

Announcement that All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Irrigation Mechanization and Technology has been formed in Kolomna from Moscow Experimental Sprinkling Station.

Announcement that delegation of Soviet scientists and technologists led by Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers and Chairman of State Committee for Science and Technology Y. A. Kirillin is in Great Britain visiting British research institutes and major industrial concerns. Scientific and technical cooperation agreement signed between ICI and State Committee for Science and Technology.

Announcement that USSR has for a considerable period been carrying out research into tsunamis in vicinity of Kurile Islands and south coast of Kamchatka Peninsula.

- 21 Announcement that delegation of Polish nuclear scientists led by governmental commissioner for nuclear energy questions has arrived in Moscow.

Announcement that Culture Minister Y. A. Furtseva has arrived in Tokyo in response to invitation by Japanese government.

- 22 Soviet Party delegation led by Central Committee Secretary I. V. Kapitonov leaves for Rome on friendly visit in response to invitation by Central Committee of Italian Communist Party.

Launching of Soviet lunar probe "Luna-12."

International UN seminar for acquainting specialists from Africa and Near East with Soviet experience in financing economic development ends in Moscow. Seminar leader was Corresponding Member of USSR Academy of Sciences and Director of Africa Institute V. G. Solodovnikov.

Announcement that during their stay in USSR October 17-22 Party and government leaders and defense ministers from "socialist" countries were shown latest types of ground and air force weapons and visited cosmodrome, where they were shown military and space equipment and witnessed launching of rockets and space vehicles.

- 23 Delegation of Soviet Party workers led by Deputy Head of Central Committee's Science and Educational Institutions Department Y. M. Chekharin leaves for Prague in response to invitation by Central Committee of Czech Communist Party to study experience of Czech Party leaders in field of higher and special secondary education.

Publication of Central Statistical Authority's report on fulfillment of state industrial plan for first nine months of 1966. Plan fulfilled by all ministries except those of Timber, Cellulose, Paper and Wood-Processing, Industries and Fisheries. Labor productivity showed increase of 5 percent over corresponding period in 1965.

Announcement that plan for construction of 420,000-kilowatt hydroelectric power station at Kanev (Cherkassy Oblast) has been approved.

- 24 King Hassan II of Morocco arrives in USSR on official visit.

Conference convened by "Intourist" opens in Moscow at which over 350 representatives of foreign travel agencies and transportation companies are to be informed on prospects for the development of foreign tourism in USSR as well as on new itineraries to be offered in connection with fiftieth anniversary of October Revolution.

- 25 Party Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Candidate Member P. N. Demichev and Central Committee Member and Propaganda Department Head V. I. Stepanov leave for East Berlin in response to invitation by Central Committee of East German Socialist Unity Party.

Soviet-Moroccan talks take place in Kremlin on strengthening and expansion of cooperation between the two countries, and on certain international problems.

Announcement that Soviet delegation led by Chairman of Committee for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries under Council of Ministers and also of USSR Commission for UNESCO Affairs, S. K. Romanovsky, has left for Paris to participate in Fourteenth Session of UNESCO's General Conference.

- 26 Delegation from East German *Volkskammer* (Parliament) led by *Volkskammer* President Deputy Chairman of State Council Johannes Dieckmann arrives in USSR on official visit in response to invitation by Supreme Soviet.

Twentieth anniversary of Party Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences.

- 27 Signing of Soviet-Moroccan agreements on scientific, technical, economic and cultural cooperation, cooperation in radio and television broadcasting, and the supply of machinery and equipment to Morocco by the USSR.

Soviet Foreign Ministry delivers note to Chinese government protesting that for several days Soviet Embassy in Peking has been subjected to "fresh provocative and insulting acts on the part of organized gatherings of rioting Chinese citizens."

- 28 Syrian trade delegation arrives in Moscow for negotiations on trade relations in 1967.

Party Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member A. N. Shelepin arrives in Frunze for fortieth anniversary of Kirghiz SSR and Communist Party.

Announcement that, in response to invitation extended by President de Gaulle during his visit to USSR, Kosygin is to pay official visit to France in early December 1966, and Brezhnev and Podgorny in 1967.

- 29 Signing in Moscow of Soviet-Yugoslav trade protocol for 1967 calling for trade to the value of around 480,000,000 dollars, or 15 percent above the 1966 level.

Soviet Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichiev leaves for Helsinki for negotiations on Soviet-Finnish trade in 1967.

- 30 Soviet Party delegation including Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member M. A. Suslov and Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev leaves for Finland in response to invitation by Central Committee of Finnish Communist Party.

- 31 Brezhnev arrives in Tbilisi to award Georgia its second Order of Lenin, for success in economic and cultural construction.

Changes and Appointments

- 6 Announcement that K. F. Kulakov has been appointed Deputy Chairman of State Forestry Committee.

- 16 Announcement that N. A. Bogdanov has been appointed First Deputy Minister and G. P. Kazansky Deputy Minister of the Radio Industry, and V. I. Nellin Deputy Minister of the Electrical Engineering Industry.

- 20 N. Y. Tarakanov appointed Ambassador to Australia, replacing V. A. Logonov, who is transferred to other work.

Notes on Contributors

GALAY, NIKOLAI. Born 1902 at Staritsa, Tver Province. Studied and later taught on General Golovin's advanced courses on military science in Paris, 1927—39. Served with the White Army during the Civil War and, as a battalion commander, with the Vlasov Army in World War II. Senior associate of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, specializing in military affairs and Soviet foreign policy. Editor of the *Bulletin*.

TEODOROVICH, NADEZHDA. Born in 1907. Attended teachers' and medical colleges and worked for psychiatric and "Mother and Child Welfare" institutions in the USSR. Took part in church affairs during the persecution of the Church in the USSR. After emigrating during World War II, took up the study of religious problems in countries of the Communist bloc. Member of the Research Section at the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

STOLTE, STEFAN C. Hungarian journalist. Imprisoned in Hungary from 1949 to 1956. Released during the Hungarian Revolution. Now a free-lance journalist in Munich, specializing in Soviet-satellite relations.

GAYEV, ARKADY. Journalist. Worked for *Pravda* and *Izvestia* and also for the Soviet regional press from 1921 until World War II, since when he has been living in Munich. A regular contributor of articles on Soviet literature and the Soviet press to the publications of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

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